POLITICAL PLATONISM in the ENGLISH RENAISSANCE Donald
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Carolina Digital Repository POLITICAL PLATONISM IN THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE Donald Douglas Wells A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of English. Chapel Hill 2007 Approved by: Reid Barbour Mary Floyd-Wilson C.D.C. Reeve Jessica L. Wolfe Larry Goldberg ABSTRACT DONALD WELLS: Political Platonism in the English Renaissance (Under the direction of Reid Barbour) I argue that the influence of Platonic thought in Renaissance England cannot be properly understood without attending to what I call “Political Platonism”—a particularly civic approach to Plato and his works. Political Platonism, which derives in part from the efforts of early humanists such as Leonardo Bruni, differs sharply from the approach favored by more well-known Platonists such as Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. Where Pico and Ficino are drawn primarily to Plato’s metaphysical and cosmological speculations, Political Platonists tend to favor his moral, political, and rhetorical ideas. After identifying Political Platonism and distinguishing it from the Cosmological Platonism favored by Ficino and Pico in the first chapter, I trace its appearance in English writers with significant Platonic influence throughout the Renaissance in subsequent chapters. Chapter Two examines early Tudor writers such as Thomas More and Thomas Elyot, with whom the pressing needs of the new political regime combine with their own humanist ideals to produce a uniquely civic approach to Plato. Chapter Three explores how Francis Bacon uses, changes, and challenges Plato in the course of developing his own program for the advancement of science. Finally, in Chapter Four I show how John Milton continues to read Plato as a civic philosopher even as he wrestles anew with the difficulties confronting the adaptation of classical philosophy to Christian culture. ii DEDICATION With love, to my mother, without whose support this dissertation would not have been completed. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. ENGLAND AND RENAISSANCE PLATONISM ..........................……..1 Existing Scholarship on Plato and Renaissance England ..................……..4 The Platonic Revival(s) in Italy .........................................................……..8 Political Platonism and Theological Platonism .................................……18 Political Platonism, England, and the Transmission of Texts ...........……31 II. POLITICAL PLATONISM AND THE EARLY TUDORS .............……37 The Platonic Humanism of Sir Thomas Elyot ...................................……39 Thomas Starkey and the Limitations of Plato....................................……64 Thomas More and the Political Plato.................................................……74 Political Platonism in the Elizabethan Era.........................................……95 III. FRANCIS BACON’S READING OF PLATO .................................…..103 Incidental and Minor References.......................................................…..104 Plato, Politics and Morals ..................................................................…..107 The Limitations of Platonism.............................................................…..110 Bacon and the Philosopher-King .......................................................…..120 What Knowledge is For .....................................................................…..123 Bacon and Rhetoric............................................................................…..127 Affections and Appetites....................................................................…..133 iv Plato and The New Atlantis................................................................…..137 After Bacon........................................................................................…..150 IV. RETHINKING MILTON AND PLATO...........................................…..152 Plato and Rhetoric..............................................................................…..155 Plato and Civic Thought ....................................................................…..160 Political Principles and Examples......................................................…..169 Plato and Moral Virtue.......................................................................…..177 Paradise Lost and Milton’s Reading of Plato....................................…..182 Reflections .........................................................................................…..186 General Conclusion............................................................................…..187 WORKS CITED ........................................................................................................…..190 v CHAPTER 1 ENGLAND AND RENAISSANCE PLATONISM In the last book of Paradise Regained, Milton’s Jesus offers a remarkable and dismissive account of ancient philosophy. Of particular note are his words at the outset on Socrates and Plato1: The first and wisest of them all profess’d To know this only, that he nothing knew; The next to fabling fell and smooth conceits. (ll. 293-5) At first glance the judgment seems clear enough. Socrates at least admitted his ignorance, but Plato was a liar, a poet, a maker of fables. On closer examination, however, these lines become more and more confusing. How could a Milton who elsewhere makes use of technical matters from dialogues such as Cratylus and Philebus seriously dismiss the whole of Plato as “fabling” and “smooth conceits?” Though there is certainly precedent for calling Socrates the wisest of philosophers, in what sense is he “first?” Why would he make Jesus go on to complain that the philosophers accuse God under names like Fortune and Fate when Milton himself elsewhere praises Plato and others precisely for not doing so? What at first seems an almost casual and simple dismissal upon reflection becomes a locus for serious questions. Jesus’ words on the philosophers are all the more startling in their immediate context. He is replying to a fourth temptation—one Milton has added to the three found in the biblical account of the wilderness encounter between Jesus and Satan. Further, this 1 All references to Plato are to the English translations available online at The Perseus Digital Library. new temptation sounds much like one which classical studies posed to Renaissance Christians: Be famous then By wisdom; as thy empire must extend So let extend thy mind o’er all the world In knowledge, all things in it comprehend, All knowledge is not couch’t in Moses’ law, The Pentateuch, or what the Prophets wrote, The Gentiles also know, and write, and teach To admiration, led by Nature’s light. (ll. 221-8) When Satan adds that Gentile knowledge is most useful for one who would deal with Gentiles, “ruling them by persuasion as thou mean’st” (l. 230), one is reminded of the love and hope Renaissance authors held for classical learning and rhetoric. Many humanists, for instance, hoped to find what Satan offers here—guides to knowledge, writing, and teaching; wisdom to supplement and expand that offered by the Bible, the Church, and the Fathers—in classical authorities. When Jesus replies, “He who receives / Light from above, from the fountain of light, / No other doctrine needs, though granted true” (ll. 288-90), it sounds like a repudiation of the Renaissance rehabilitation of classical learning. If divine revelation alone is necessary, what authority and value can pagan Greece and Rome hold? Milton’s words can sound harsh to ears accustomed to hearing only praises sung of the classics or of Plato. But the manner in which classical authority is subordinated and circumscribed in this passage is most useful for outlining the manner in which many English Renaissance authors read, understood, and used the classics in general—and Plato in particular. I begin with the distinction and subordination of wisdom, implied at the beginning of Satan’s speech, into natural and revealed. What the classics, and Satan, offer is bracketed by the rare use of rhyme: we may extend our minds over and 2 comprehend “the world,” that is, nature. Wisdom, expressed by the traditional metaphor of light, seems to come in two forms: we may be led by the light of Nature, and Satan offers the fruits of this, or we may receive “light from above,” or from the divine. The authority of the classics lies entirely with the light of Nature, which has decidedly the second place in honor. We must be careful, though, with this distinction. It is not absolute. Rather, the one, the light of Nature, in some way depends upon or derives from the divine light—for it is not only “from above,” it is “the fountain of light.” Matters which seem worldly or mundane are not entirely to be separated from matters eternal and divine. For instance, Jesus insists that the Prophets better teach “the solid rules of civil government” (l. 358) than any of the orators of old. No thoughtful writer in Renaissance England could fail to notice, say, how problems of politics could influence religion and vice versa. And one who believed in the incarnation of the deity, or who looked for a true resurrection of the flesh, might well find an absolute division between temporal, ever-changing matter and timeless, eternal spirit difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, a distinction can still be drawn between things known by one’s reason alone and those known only by revelation—and