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And the Network of Monarchy Aryanta Nugraha Crisis Of Democracy In Thailand CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND AND THE NETWORK OF MONARCHY Aryanta Nugraha International Relations Department UPN “Veteran” Yogyakarta Jl. Babarsari 2, Tambakbayan Yogyakarta Email: [email protected] Abstract Artikel ini bermaksud untuk menjawab dua pertanyaan; mengapa terjadi krisis demokrasi di Thailand dan siapa sebenarnya pemenang dari krisis demokrasi tersebut. Dengan mempertimbangkan semakin pentingnya kehadiran kelompok yang sering disebur sebagai Network of Monarchy, artikel ini berargumen bahwa krisis demokrasi di Thailand sangat terkait dengan persaingan politik antara kubu pro-Thaksin dengan kubu anti-Thaksin yang disponsori oleh kalangan Network of Monarchy. Kompetisi politik tersebut tidak hanya terjadi pada tingkat elit, tetapi berubah menjadi keresahan politik dan kerusuhan sosial yang melibatkan pertentangan antar kelompok masyarakat yang dicirikan oleh penggunaan warna kaos yang berbeda (clash of colored shirts). Meski akhirnya Thaksin berhasil diturunkan, artikel ini berpendapat bahwa kemenangan sementara kubu Network of Monarchy ini tidak akan berpengaruh banyak bagi stabilitas dan kepastian demokrasi di Thailand, apabila kerangka pengaturan demokrasi pasca Thaksin gagal melibatkan partisipasi masyarakat di tingkat akar rumput. Terlebih lagi, pemerintah demokratik juga harus mampu mengatasi persoalan ketimpangan ekonomi, terutama di wilayah utara. Keywords: Thailand, democracy, network of monarchy Introduction color of Buddhism and also related to Monday, the day of the King’s birth, while the blue color In post 19 September 2006 military coup represents the queen. The white colour associated that ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra with Thai’s Flag of nation-based Unity. Red until now, Thailand entered into a political colour has no clear connection with Thai culture turmoil featured by the widespread of civil unrest and Monarchy symbols (Dressel, 2010; 445). in various ‘colored shirts’ that represent divided This political crisis marked a setback camps, between anti- and pro Thaksin. The multi of Thailand democracy that started at 1992 coloured mass movement consists of several and the prospect of political reform is loom. color shirts group. The Red Shirts movement, The ongoing political crisis showed by the a pro Thaksin Group organised in United Front occupation of Government House and the closed of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) that down of Bangkok’s airport in the late of 2008 supported by rural mass especially in the north. by the Yellow Shirts supporters, the disruption The Yellow Shirts, an anti-Thaksin of the People’s of ASEAN Summit in Pattaya in April 2009 by Alliance for Democracy (PAD) group led by the Red Shirts supporter and the clashes between Shondi Limthongkul that also supported by the security forces and the Red Shirts between March palace and urban middle class. The Blue Shirts, and May 2010 that involved at least 90 deaths a group that counter against the red usually in (McCargo, 2010; 8). This essay will explain the violence organised by Newin Chidchob, a former recent democratic crisis in Thailand and shows pro-Thaksin political leader that well-known in that the royal associated political groups or mobilising thugs. There was also the White Shirts network monarchy (McCargo, 2005) is the winner around the journalist and the moderate groups of recent political confict and pro-Thaksin who seek a non-violence campaign (Prasirtuk, movement is the loser. However, this stage is just 2009; 203-210). Interestingly, the choice of a beginning of a protracted confict to build a sort colours represents a unique symbol. Yellow is the of democratic regime in Thailand. Volume 16, Nomor 1, Januari 2012 1 Crisis Of Democracy In Thailand Aryanta Nugraha Democratisation and the Network of Monarchy network monarchy never achieved domination in Historically, the path of political change political sphere and has to work together with other (democratisation) in Thailand is widely formal political institutions, mainly the elected understood as a linear-progressive change from parliamentary. This is proven by the failure of the absolute monarchy period (ended in 1932), democrat government of Chuan Leekpai which military rule (from 1932-1973) and democratic was supported by network monarchy from 1992 reform (from 1992 until now). The ultimate to 1995 and led fgures that unsympathetic to the challenges of democratisation, in this view, monarchy such as Banhran Silpa-archa (1995- are corrupt politicians and money politics, not 1996) and Chavalith Yongchaiyudh (1996-1997) the monarchy or the military. In this kind of in the top of government. understanding, the coup in 19 September to expel After the 1992 political crisis, the liberal Thaksin Shinawatra from his offce and the today faction of network monarchy around Anand Thailand’s political turmoil tacitly represent the Panyarachun and Prawes Wasi sought to reinvent ‘democratic reform’ against corrupt politicians a new system of monarchical governance based and money politics. However, as shown by on liberal construction and no more rely on Connors, the recent political crisis mirroring military and bureaucratic network. According a struggle between political elites relating to to Anand and Prawes, a new institutionalised of political order and the rules of the game (Connors, network monarchy is part of a long project to 2008; 478-496). In this battle of the rules of the reduce direct involvement of the King in politics game it is interesting to reconsider the active role as well as a preparation to avoid violence confict of the monarch in shaping democracy and to gain at the time of royal succession. As a result of political prominence in Thailand. the new constitution was promulgated in 1997. The role of the king in Thailand’s The new constitution also accompanied by new democratisation has become a subject of academic institutions such as the Electoral Commission research since the King Bhumibol Adulyadej and National Human Rights Commission. as an important source of political legitimacy directly involved in mitigating several political Competition between Thaksin and Network of crises mainly in 1973 and 1992 mass uprising Monarchy (Winichakul, 2008; 11-37). More than just Ironically the 1997 constitution and the occasionally direct involvement such as through impact economic crisis paved the way to the rise public speeches, the central role of monarchy of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Rhai (Thai in political development in Thailand has been Loves Thai) Party in January 2001. Thaksin established and reproduced through a sub- victory was based on his personal magnate of a system and a mode of para-political institution pragmatic and successful CEO of multibillionaire governance the so-called network monarchy. telecommunication company, his populist appeal The main characteristics of network to rural mass, particularly in the north, north-east monarchy are: (1).The monarchy is the render of and central region and off course money politics. the last political resort in the time of crisis; (2). Historically the relationship between the The monarchy is the ultimate source of national palace, the government and the business group legitimacy; (3). The King actively involved in was not harmonious. But when the economic setting political agenda, especially through his crisis sprang, King Bhumibol promoted the idea annual birthday speeches; (4). The monarchy of “suffcient economy”. This appeal drew many intervention especially has been done through supports from Thai middle class and translated privy councillors lead by ex prominent military into the active involvement of domestic business fgure and Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond elite in controlling the state. Thaksin was benefted (McCargo, 2005; 501-502). McCargo (2005) from this kind of political atmosphere (Hewison, argues that since 1973 up to now, the network 2008; 200-201). In order to strengthen his political monarchy actively involved in political process base in rural area, Thaksin became more populist by the king and his proxies, particularly ex- by pouring money to rural areas such as giving prime minister Prem Tinsulanond. However, the soft loans for every community, debt moratorium 2 Volume 16, Nomor 1, Januari 2012 Aryanta Nugraha Crisis Of Democracy In Thailand for farmers, universal health care program Thaksin’s business instinct favoured quick and a people bank. Taksin, actually, was not a profts. No wonder that Thaksin business was not populist by nature, since his frst priority when only competitor to CPB but also challenged the he initially established the TRT was to rescue honour status of CPB (Hewison, 2006; 206). Thai businessman from the economic crisis and Thirdly, Thaksin was considered as palace modernisation in political and economic life. It is competitor in political arena, mainly in reducing shown from his slogan “Think new, act new for the symbolic connection between the King and every Thai” (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008; 62- the poor. The palace is positioning itself as a 83). Moreover, Thaksin also controlled the media champion to the poor through many projects to the and arrogantly attack the critics. His growing poor and recently to the idea suffcient economy. arrogance demonstrated in the war on drug When Thaksin came with different approach to campaign in southern region that approximately the poor by establishing a welfare system, it was caused more than 2000 extra judicial killing truly a potential challenge
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