Report on the Inquiry Conducted on the Ragnar Rylander Affair Geneva
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Report on the Inquiry Conducted on the Ragnar Rylander Affair Geneva, September 6, 2004 1 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………..3 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….6 1.1. Current Status of the Issue…………………………………………………….6 1.2. Specific Nature of the Inquiry………………………………………………….7 2. The Inquiry and Documentation………………………………………………………9 3. Findings………………………………………………………………………………….11 3.1. Links between Prof Rylander and Industry…………………………………12 3.1.1. Ragnar Rylander worked secretly for the tobacco industry as of the 1960s, rendering a wide variety of services……………………………..12 3.1.2. Ragnar Rylander concealed his links with the tobacco industry in order to give his scientific activity an appearance of independence……13 3.2 A Scientist Under Influence……………………………………………………14 3.2.1. The “Rylander Symposia”………………………………………………14 3.2.2 The report of the Environmental Protection Agency on passive smoking and Ragnar Rylander’s role in the tobacco industry’s reaction……………………………………………………………………………18 3.2.3. Ragnar Rylander’s Chinese connections and the TI’s Asian policy…………………………………………………………………………….20 3.3. Study on the dietary habits of no-smoking women living with smokers or non-smokers………………………………………………………21 4. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………21 5. Prof Rylander’s Defense……………………………………………………………..26 6. Recommendations……………………………………………………………………..27 2 Summary A Fact-Finding Commission was set up by the delegate for integrity issues of our Faculty pursuant to guidelines drawn up by the Swiss Academy for Medical Sciences. This Commission conducted an inquiry regarding an alleged lack of scientific integrity by Professor Ragnar Rylander, an associate professor at the Faculty of Medicine, within the framework of a defamation suit he had filed against M Pascal Diethelm and Dr Jean-Charles Rielle. It should be recalled that the Cour de Justice (Court of Appeal) had ruled in its December 15,2003 decision that Mr Diethelm and Mr Rielle had proved their claims against Professor Rylander and that the respondent’s motion was dismissed. On the basis of the inquiry, this Commission has reached the following conclusions concerning the research and consulting work carried out by Professor Rylander on the effects of passive smoking. Professor Rylander cannot be considered to be an independent researcher vis-à-vis the tobacco industry as he maintained longstanding and largely secret ties as a consultant in the industry. Many documents show that Professor Rylander rarely took initiatives in this area without actively consulting his counterparts in the tobacco industry in particular those at Philip Morris. Not only did this involve scientists in the employ of Philip Morris but also counsel at a law office defending the industry’s interests. The epidemiological studies on passive smoking by Professor Rylander were carried out in response to initiatives taken by the tobacco industry, which hoped that the studies would generate scepticism over the effects of passive smoking, in line with a strategy adopted by the industry. Moreover Ragnar Rylander worked as an agent subsidized by the industry and not as an independent researcher in the following domains: As a specialist, i.e. for the American Environment Protection Agency; As an organizer of scientific meetings on the theme of passive smoking; As a representative of Philip Morris for laboratories conducting partially secret research on passive smoking; As an influential agent at a university (the University of Hong Kong) invited to confer an important promotion on a researcher who herself was working for the tobacco industry, so as to give the tobacco industry a springboard in Asia. It should be noted: That at no time did the Commission fault Professor Rylander for his opinions such as they were nor for the fact that he had accepted financing for his research from the tobacco industry. That the Commission made no judgement concerning any activities of Professor Rylander’s that were unrelated to the issue of tobacco. 3 On the other hand, the Commission believes that concealing the true scope of the dependence on the tobacco industry and aligning his activities as a researcher and specialist in the areas of tobacco smoke with the strategic objectives of the industry constitutes an infringement of the scientific integrity that the general public and his peers were entitled to expect from a university researcher. The Commission believes it is incumbent upon it to propose compensation for harm caused by breaches to scientific integrity by Professor Rylander, and above all to prevent repetition of such infringement. Toward this end, the Commission proposes the five following measures: 1-The Scientific community and the public-at-large should be informed that Ragnar Rylander’s work on the effects of environmental smoke on health have been cast under serious suspicion since the researcher did not disclose any conflict of interest likely to influence the scope of his work and that given the role he played as a secret employee of the tobacco industry, he cannot be held to be an independent scientist. The Fact-Finding Commission proposes to send written notification of this to the following journals: -European Journal of Public Health -Archives of Environmental Health -International Journal of Epidemiology 2-The impact of Professor Rylander’s lack of scientific integrity can only be fully understood within the context of the strategy designed and undertaken by the tobacco industry to create doubt as to the toxicity of smoke, in particular for non- smokers. Although this is an individual case we should not overlook the fact that the most unpardonable guilt results from the institutional and commercial power of the tobacco industry whose objectives and interests clash with those of both public health and medical science. The copious documentation stemming from the tobacco industry, made public through rulings against the industry in American courts shows that these companies tried to manipulate public opinion for decades and that the targeted involvement of many scientists has been a useful instrument in this endeavour to disseminate misinformation . The tobacco industry cannot be considered a credible partner of independent scientific research. The Commission proposes that henceforth, members of the University be prohibited from requesting, directly or indirectly, research grants or consultancy contracts from the tobacco industry. This measure is designed to protect the scientific integrity of researchers. 3-Given the current context, this prohibition probably will have mainly a symbolic impact. The Commission wishes to ensure that its recommendations measure up to the challenges before us in the future and thus proposes that the Faculty and the University engage in thoughtful reflection on links between university research and the private sector. Private financing of biomedical research is an inevitable fact of life for therapeutic innovation, particularly regarding the pharmaceutical sector. 4 This is nothing new; moreover, such partnerships are necessary for new therapies to be developed. Nevertheless the very nature of the bonds between industry and academic research are undergoing deep-rooted changes. We have moved from two distinct worlds that followed their own rules to one where an increasingly close interlinkage prevails, due, in particular, to the need to give monetary value to scientific knowledge. The question that the entire university community must now urgently address is: how these partnerships can be organized in a mutually beneficial manner, consistent with the university’s primary mission, that is, a disinterested quest for scientific knowledge. The Commission urges university authorities to take proactive measures to anticipate and control developments in this domain. 4- A lack of vigilance at the time facilitated the serious infringements to scientific integrity for which Ragnar Rylander is held accountable. The Commission wishes all members of the University to be reminded of the rules that will henceforth be applied concerning transparency and disclosure of conflicts of interests that must govern their relations with the University, university departments, financing entities for research, and scientific journals. Furthermore, challenges to scientific integrity are constantly changing and the University must be able to keep up with these changes and adapt. When the need for new rules arises, they must be designed with and accompanied by penalties in case of breaches. Moreover, University, faculty, and departmental management must be kept abreast of accessory activities (consultantships, involvement with commercial enterprises) by members of the faculty and staff and that standards for curriculum vitae must reflect this demand. This also holds true for associate professorships, a post which has proved its worth in bringing in outside talent to university but which should not lead to any administrative laxity. 5- The Commission wishes information and specific training to be organized for young researchers, to empower them to practice their profession clear-sightedly so they can act as knowing collaborators with industry with discernment. The Commission proposes that the Rectorate and Deans organize a consultation on how this should be carried out. This would be a continuation of the work currently in the pipeline by the Rectorate to disseminate guidelines on scientific integrity to all faculties. These guidelines should be taught in a specific educational context involving practicing