MASTER'S THESIS M-680

KINAKA, William Tatsuo. ASIAN NEUTRALISM: BURMA, A CASE STUDY.

The American University, M. A ., 1964 Political Science, General

University Microfilms. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan ASIAN NEUTRALISM: BURMA, A CASE STUDY

by William T.' Klnaka

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

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î a n ô f t h ê AMERICAN UNIVERSITY D a t e : ____ LIBRARY AUG 2 61964 WASHINGTON. D .C . AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY AUG 2 61964 ASIAN NEUTRALISM:

BURMA, A CASE STUDY il

PREFACE

This paper attempts to define neutralism as prac­ ticed by Burma, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia. It tries to show the environment in which neutralism has devel­ oped and how this "new" concept has molded and Influenced the course of history in the past decade and a half. In order to bring this study Into a more specific and concrete form the Union of Burma Is used as a case study In helping to explain and Illustrate the various aspects of neutralism.

By case study the author simply means that he Is using the

Union of Burma to help portray the composition and operation of a country that has the kind of attributes to qualify as a "typical" representative of Asian neutralism. The author defines neutralism and then compares Burma with the defini­ tion. The value of using a country as a case study are threefold: (l) the reader Is able to relate the broad term neutralism to a specific practitioner of It; (2) a better understanding may be gotten of the factors that Influence the formulation of foreign policy of a country espousing neutralism; (3) aun example usually helps one to better remember an Ideology that It represents, especially since the philosophy is flexible and amorphous, a e period ooyered Ill by this study of Burmese neutralism Is limited to the AFPPL Government which lasted from January 1948 to October 1958. It does not Include the reign of the military caretaker government, idkleh succeeded the AFPPL, because Information concerning that period Is very limited and most difficult to obtain. The same holds true for the present ruling military regime. This study tries to show how neutralism Is being practiced by these countries and the advantages and disad­ vantages that can accrue from It. Neutralism has been chosen by many of the newly emerged countries as the only pragmatic and realistic policy to International relations that Is pos­ sible, In view of their goals and outlook of the world around them. "Bhls paper attempts to demonstrate how Aslan neutralism fits Into the cold war being waged by the Commu­ nist bloc, led by Russia, and the Western bloc, led by the United States. It also tries to weigh the Impact of neutra­ lism and see what Influence, If any. It has on the "balance of power” between the East and West. With the emergence of Aslan states into the world arena and the ever Increasing demands of Aslans to have their due share In shaping International affairs, the actions and Ideologies of the peoples of these countries are of great lsQ)ortance to us. American policy toward these new nations has been rather ambiguous, and this ambiguity points up the iv urgent need for a clear understanding and dispassionate ana­ lysis of the phenomenon of neutralism and Its effect on American Interests and goals. Most of the Aslan countries have picked neutralism as the guideline for their foreign policy and, therefore, a study of Its meaning and liiq>llea- tlons, as seen by the Aslans, Is of the utmost Importance. The value to be gained by studying the concept of neutralism Is the acquisition of a clearer understanding and apprecia­ tion of the way Aslan countries are operating In the Inter­ national sphere. This project Is not designed to give the reader a full and comprehensive mastery of Aslan neutralism. Such an undertaking would easily cover a good size book. But If the reader Is able to get a general knowledge of the complex­ ity of contesq*orary neutralism as practiced by the Aslans and the multiple factors that Influence It, then the primary goal of this paper has been achieved.

Washington, B.C. W.T.K. May 15, 1964 CONTENTS

Pre face...... 11

Section One

GENESIS OF ASIAN NEUTRALISM

Chapter One Aslan Neutralism and Its B i r t h ...... 1

General Definition ...... 1

The Aslan Definition ...... 7

Avoidance of Power B l o c s ...... 10

The Need for P e a c e ...... 12

Drive for Peace ...... 13

Dangers to Be Faced by the New N e u t r a l i s t s ...... 17

Chapter Two Manifestations of Aslan Neutralism .... 22

Bandung and Belgrade C o n f e r e n c e s ...... 22

Third Force C o n c e p t ...... 24

Desire to Maintain Peaceful Balance of Power .... 27

Antl-Alllance ...... 29

Section Two

CONTEMPORARY NEUTRALISM IN ACTION

Chapter Three Role of the Aslan N e u t r a l i s t s ...... 32

Mediators for East-West C o n f l i c t ...... 32

Champion of Movements to Liberate Other Colonies . . 34

Enlargers of the Area of P e a c e ...... 36 Section Three

BURMESE NEUTRALISM

Chapter Pour Government, Politics, and People ...... 39

The National Community ...... 39

Personalities ...... 43

Parties and Political Patterns ...... 46

Chapter Five Burma's Neutral Foreign Policy ...... 54

Judgments on World Issues ...... 56

Friendly Relations with all Countries ...... 58

Positive Endeavor to Promote Peace ...... 60

Nonallgnment ...... 64

Chapter Six Burma and the United Nations ...... 69

The Kuomlntang Issue ...... 71

The Korean Conflict ...... 8l

The Suez Crisis ...... 92

The Hungarian C r i s i s ...... 98

Chapter Seven Factors Responsible for Burmese Policy of Neutralism...... 107

Inexperience...... 107

Neutralism and Peace ...... 108

Drive for "Status" ...... 112

Local Insurrections...... 115

Special Interests and Groups ...... Il8

Foreign Aid "Without Strings" ...... 121

Need of Markets for Exports ...... 123 Neighborly Influence ...... 129

Section Four

REACTION TO AND EVALUATION OP ASIAN NEUTRALISM

Chapter Eight Reaction to Asian Neutralism...... 134

Ihe United States ...... 134

Chapter Nine Evaluation of Aslan Neutralism ..... l40

List of S o u r c e s ...... 143 Section One: GENESIS OF ASIAN NEUTRALISM

Chapter One

Aslan Neutralism And Its Birth

General Definition There are always difficulties present when anyone attempts to define a concept or Ideology idilch Is still growing and changing with the passage of time and usage. The description of a machine usually suffices to explain Its wortclng because Its functions are Implicit In Its form. However, the definition of an Idea, an Intangible entity, takes a little more tolerance and Imagination on the part of the reader In order for him to get the full meaning out of a term like neutralism. Neutralism Is nothing concrete. It has no definite form or function that one can recognize or appreciate Immediately. It Is an amorphous term that can mean many things to many people. It has many shades of rea­ lity to It. Because It encompasses a wide area of thought and action, this paper will only try to cover some of Its clearer and more comprehensible features. A complete under­ standing of Aslan neutralism at any one time Is practicably Isgpesslble. Neutralism In Its old sense refers to neutrals idio 2 wish to avoid Involvement In any future wars of other coun­ tries* They plan to achieve this goal by malntalnnlng strict Impartiality In peacetime* They try to persuade possible belligerents that they will play no favorites and In return they expect their neutrality to be respected by both sides In time of war. This strong desire to create no suspicion of partiality— and to have no occasion for being partial— leads the old-time neutrals to exercise the utmost restraint In their external dealings. They are afraid that any acti­ vity In International politics— even In the relatively harsLLess form of taking sides In the voting process at the United Nations— may create doubts about their lsq>Eu^lallty. So when a true neutral tries to maintain pensanent neutrality, rather than merely to avoid a particular war. It does so by minding Its own business and remaining aloof from the rough- and-tumble of world politics. Such a policy Is usually taken up by smaller and weaker states idiose chief ambition Is to be left alone. Therefore, their policy In Interna­ tional relations Is one of passivity and abstention. The degree of a nation's Involvement In International affairs Is one of the essential features which differentiates the practice of today's neutralism from that of traditional neutrality. The classic neutral made every attempt to remain Isolated from power polities. In comparlslon, the new neu­ trals have thrown themselves full force Into the fray. 3 Evidently all that Is required of the new neutral Is "to refrain from making solid political or military commitments to either side. Otherwise, he Is free to maneuver between the two opposing blocs, often playing one against the other 1 to his own advantage. " Although this Is a rather harsh and extreme statement to make of the new neutrals. It does have some truth In It. Today's neutralists are far from resigned to their fate. Even those states that do not have territorial griev­ ances or projects for wider groupings (Arab or African fede­ ration) are made restless by their own internal economic needs and political Instability. Present-day neutralism la a course of action chosen by many states that are anxious to get on In the world. These new states have shown their recognition of the dynamism In their brand of neutralism by searching for a more appropriate term— positive neutrality, nonallgnment, noncoflsiltment, positive policy for peace, and so on— that will more truly express both their ambitions and their feeling that there la something Ignobly passive about mere abstention. Neutralism, labelled by some Westerners as a vehement profession of expedient nonallgnment, appeals to some as a

"Neutrals Who are not Neutral, " Business Week, October 21, 1961, p. 67. 4 way of fulfilling their needs and ambition for significance. On the one hand It reflects a desire to avoid commitment, a sound attitude for any country with meager resources, and on the other a wish to be among those who count In world affairs. "It Is a way not of withdrawing, but of playing a role In globeüL politics, of getting Into the game, but stay- 2 lag out of the scrlmages. " The present character of Inter­ national politics seems to put a premium on this approach. A country that Is truly sincere In wanting to avoid any role In world affairs would virtually have to exclude Itself from the united Nations, a thing which none of the new neutrals want to do. On the contrary, acquiring United Nations membership Is one of their first goals In International affairs since being among those mho are counted, especially In the United Nations, almost necessarily puts one among those who count. Opposition to the term neutralism by those for whom It Is Intended derives from several considerations. Some feel that such an appellation carries too much of a negative and passive flavor. Others feel that It unfairly suggests a lack of responsibility concerning world affairs. The neutrals have been trying to put the point across that their

2 Lawrence Martin, Neutralism and Nonallgnment, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, p. 68. 5 position Is based on positive actions and equally positive beliefs. Sometimes these coincide with Western actions and Interests idille on other occasions with those of the Soviet Union. Ihelr main objective in International affairs Is to maintain a position that Is In harmony with their own In­ terests and values as they see them. These neutrals are quite confident that their position Is not only positive, but that It contains constructive proposals for reducing world tension. As the neutrals would put It, "We have participated In International affairs to the limit of our capabilities as long as they were consistent with our clearly stated views. Indeed, we have achieved some measure of leadership In pressing for a solution to certain current world problems. We have followed the practice of abstention only when any other course would jeopardize our basic beliefs, .. 3 not because we are afraid to stand up and be counted. One Is almost tesqpted to conclude that while the neutralist policy seeks to protect and advance so-called "national Interests" In the International arena. It, at the same time, seeks to retain, as much as Is possible, safeguards against heavy Involvement with the power blocs. It attesipts to do this by avoiding a pattern of consistent alignment on one

3 Robert Soalaplno, "'Neutxmllsm* In Asia, " The American Political Science Review, March 1954, pp. 49-50. 6 Bide and by using abstentions to establish a position idilch cannot be Identified definitely with either power bloc. Although the neutralist nations do not belong to a power bloc, they "have some sense of solidarity and some congrulty of Interests; but they reamiln Individuals who pay lip service to the tenets of nonallgnment, but rarely allow h them to inqpede opportunistic pursuit of their several goals. “ These tendencies tend to give a confused and diversified appearance to the "neutralist camp" as a iriiole. Some people have argued against the existence of such a camgp and others believe that neutralism. In any one Instance, Is not a policy at all, but merely an aimless and emotional reaction to day- to-day exigencies. Denis Healey believes that contemporary neutralism “is primarily an attitude of Individuals rather than a policy of state .... It Is a reaction to a phenomenon which did not, and could not, exist before recent Increases In the range 5 and weight of political power. " The cold war, an Inter­ national conflict conducted In peacetime between powers that are able to exert their strength simultaneously In all parts

4 Martin, o£. clt. pp. xll-xlll.

5 Denis Healey, Neutralism. London: The Ampersand Ltd., 1955, P. 21. 7 of the globe, has made the birth of contemporary neutrals possible, but at the same time has made it most trying for these new states. Every country is pressured to declare its allegiance in the struggle. The neutrals refuse to declare their allegiance to one side or the other and justify their refusal not only as expedient, but also as moral.

The Asian Definition

U Nu, then Prime Minister, had been one of the strong advocates of neutralism. It was not until the neutralist governments came under fire from the West for their "neutra­ lity" in the cold war that U Nu and his associates tried to formulate a more concise definition for their brand of

"neutralism." "The ground work for the idea of ’positive neutralism' had already been laid by Prime Minister Nehru of

India, whom the AFPPL leaders relied upon for their chief inspiration in formulating foreign policy, even though they 6 did not always follow India on specific actions and issues."

When Prime Minister U Nu was in the United,States in

1955, he made the observation in a speech at the National

Press Club that nations which choose not to participate in any military bloc are usually referred to in America as

6 W.C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism. Cambridge: Harvard University iPress, 1963, p. 96. 8 neutrals. He went on to say that if his impression is correct, the word "neutral" has acquired a distinct and rather unfa­ vorable semantic coloration. "Apparently, the word suggests the Image of the ostrich with his head in the sand, a nega­ tive attitude towards world politics, a blind withdrawal from reality. The implication seems to be that a nation that does not choose sides and join irrevocably with one or the other camp in the armed truce that exists in the world today lacks courage and conviction. And very often the in­ ference which seems to be drawn is 'if you are not with us, you must be either openly or secretly in tow with communism. * " In replying to a statement made by the late Secretary of State Dulles, udio considered countries which are neutral as verging on to immorality. Prime Minister Nehru gave a very penetrating answer. He contended that if you can divide the world up into good and evil and have a clear choice be­ tween good and bad, then obviously you must choose the good or else you inevitably belong to the evil part. However, Nehru doubts that any country, certainly not India, is totally good or totally bad because we all have our weaknesses and shortcomings. A person may approve of a certain way while another may not. And, apart from that, in time of war there

7 Ü Nu, An Asian Speaks. Washington; Bmbassy of the Union of Burma, 195?, p. i3. 9 is a natural tendency to consider one's enenor as the evil to be fought and defeated. Nehru continued his discourse on nonalignment with the observation that applying the above war approach to peaceful times is "not wise and does little good; in fact, it rather limits:: our thinking and prevents us from seeing many things vdiich we ought to see and understand. After all, there is great variety in the world. Even in my coun­ try— India— there is tremendous variety." "Now if that applies to India, much more does it apply to the wide world with its tremendous variety of historical background, thinking, philosophy of life, religion, habits, etc.; and to say that we should all pull together and think alike is, well, I do not think it is at all feasible and, if I may say so, it is not very democratic either. I think it is a totally undemocratic outlook to imagine that all 8 people should agree with you." Prime Minister Nehru holds the belief that countries Which are not aligned are functioning in the true democratic way. These unaligned states are not giving up their freedom of thinking, freedom of action, and freedom of explaining their position to others by tying themselves up to some

8 "Neutrality: Good or Bad? What Three Leaders Say, U.S. News and World Report, July 20, 1956, pp. 8 8 -8 9 . 10 policy with which, on occasions, they may not agree. That, in essence, is the core of contemporary neutralism as seen by Asians.

Avoidance of Power Blocs

One of the most conspicuous features of the foreign policy of the uncommitted nations is their refusal to join military blocs. One reason why they are against military alliances is that they feel no bloc would genuinely defend their interests when the chips are down. Also, being econo­ mically and militarily weak, they would have little influence in the councils of an alliance. On the contrary, "alliances

. . . often serve to preserve the privileges and to promote the national interests of developed states, who, besides controlling and guiding the foreign policy of alliance mem­ bers, have the possibility of controlling and influencing 9 the internal development of weaker nations."

Nonalignment has a great deal of potential in fur­ thering the establishment of national identity for these

9 M. Nlkezic. "Why Uncommitted Countries Hold That They Are Not Neutral, " The Annals of the Americstn Academy of Political stnd Social Science, July 1961, p. 78. 11 newly emerged countries. Before receiving Its Independence a colony had contact with the outside world only through the foreign office of Its métropole. Upon becoming Indepen­ dent, It wants to exercise Its own franchise, speak with Its own voice, and demonstrate Its own capabilities. Alignment with a bloc means a renewed loss of voice and Identity, idiereas, nonallgnment means an uninhibited voice, an Inde­ pendent role, and a sense of uniqueness. As Prime Minister Nehru asked at the Bandung Conference : "Has it come to this, that the leaders of thought who have given religions and all kinds of things to the world have to tag on to this kind of group or that, and be hangers-on of this party or the other, carrying out their wishes and occasionally giving an Idea? It Is an Intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and ^ r l c a shall have come out of bondage Into free­ dom only to degrade themselves In this way. . . . I will not tie myself to this degradation . . . and become a camp- 10 follower of others." The leaders of the new states condemn the cold war, the arms race, and nuclear tests; they tend to favor dis­

armament negotiations and summit conferences; they are usually Impatient and often feel that they are morally superior to the big powers. Apart from their merits, these responses

10 Quoted by Martin, Neutralism and Nonallgnment, p. 8. 12 are the results of a deeply felt need to demonstrate feel­ ings long suppressed and a capacity long denied. And the posture of nonalignment is expedient, perhaps even necessary, for the leaders who are anxious to speak their lines from the world stage since they are free from responsibilities.

The Need for Peace

Because of the nuclear stalemate,, the leaders of

these new states believe that their policy of neutralism is

a relatively safe one despite the political and military

exposure which it connotes. In addition, it enhances the

bargaining power of the state in question with both great

antagonists. This situation is attractive to any state that

is struggling with great need for technically trained man­

power and external credits for economic development.

This international policy of neutralism is inspired

to a large degree by domestic cancerns. The leaders of

these new countries sire strongly committed to economic

development as a means of achieving political stability which, among other things, would help keep them in power once they were in office. Because many of them realize that

their countries cannot afford the cost in national unity or

defense spending that a controversial alliance policy would 13 create, they have chosen the road of neutralism. The main reason, however, why the policy of nonallgnment Is economi­ cal Is that It brings In material assistance from both power blocs. The merely nonallgned leader seeks to demonstrate his Impartiality by accepting assistance from both sides; the militant neutralist seeks to prove his International Importsdce by accepting such aid. "When the neutralist leader has to accept the West's conditions of aid, he pays the price for extending the tripartite game Into the field of economics. To have a Soviet alternative helps In rela­ tions with the West. And the existence of a Western alter­ native has enabled some neutralists, such as India, to put economic relations with the Soviet bloc on a sound monetary 11 basis."

Drive for Peace

Practically every new state that has been b o m since the end of the Second World War has opted for neutrality. This Increase In the number of uncommitted nations has en­ hanced their Importance In International affairs. When America's nuclear monopoly came to an end, the position of the unallgned countries was greatly Improved; the major

11 Martin, og^. cit., p. 91, 14 powers were forced to pay greater attention to the neutra­ lists because when "the coercive component of state capabi­ lity diminishes in its effect to achieve state purposes, . . . the relative role or non-coercive influence cannot help but 12 increase in importance and scope." As the neutralists became aware of their new weight in international affairs, they began to incorporate a positive policy whereby they could more effectively influence the course of world events.

The neutralists have constantly been directing their efforts toward world peace because they realize the sense­ lessness of a world war. The past two global wars demon­ strated that war solves none of the world's problems; many times the problems which they leave in their wake are "worse than those which they were intended to solve. The first world war got rid of the Kaiser, but it gave rise to Hitler; the second world war got rid of Hitler, but it brought on 13 the cold war." The neutrals carry the belief that in a new global war there will be no such thing as victor or van­ quished; there will only be a loser, and that loser will be mankind. Man tried to outlaw war in the past with the for­ mation of the League of Nations. Although that attempt to

12 C. Lerche, Jr. & A. Said, Concepts of International Politics, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 23l.

13 U Nu, Ac Asian Speaks, p. 29. 15 bring "permanent peace" to the world failed, the advent of the atomic age has made It more Imperative than ever before for man to try to find a solution to this perennial problem. If a world war should break out. It would be wishful thinking to suppose that nuclear weapons will not be used. % e result of such a war will not merely leave no victor to survey the scene of his "victory"; It would probably mean the end of civilization as we know It today. If this danger of total destruction Is to be averted, a clear shift of enqphasls, a change of heart among the world leaders. Is badly needed. Up to now the approach adopted to face the problems of International peace has been one based on considerations of relative military strength. As a result of this approach, nations have armed themselves against neighbors and Increased their military capacity to a point where the least dispute could Initiate a conflagration suf­ ficient to Involve the whole world. Ironical as It may be, their new strength brings no security, their armaments no defense. All the world— the big nations and the small ones— wants peace. But It has been the tragic fate of the contem­ porary world order that the great powers have failed to achieve It. Their negotiations have been tainted by mutual suspicion and their policies governed by a panic-stricken race for millltary superiority. We find that "this addiction 16 to the philosophy of fear, this competition In the techno­ logy of terror, has led to the Inevitable breakdown of every concrete suggestion put forward In the West for the limita­ it tlon of armaments or for the banning of nuclear weapons. " The nations on irtiose shoulders have been placed the respon­ sibility of preserving world peace are at a loss. Their diplomacy to devise a system for the reduction of arma­ ments by mutual consent or to set up an acceptable inter­ national authority for the Inspection and supervision of nuclear weapons has failed. Because of the above mentioned failures and the deep concern that they possess In wanting to help find some work­ able solutions, the nonallgned countries feel that they have a claim upon the attention of the mighty and upon the deli­ berations of the "peacemakers." They all have a common Interest In peace and a common desire to achieve It. These states believe that they have something which the strong and mighty lack. That something Is "the strength of our weak­ ness— the ability idilch our very defencelessness confers to offer ourselves as mediators In the dispute between the giants of Communism and anti-Communism vftilch. If fought out to an end, will deluge the world In blood and leave the earth In-

14 Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference, New York: Institute of Pacli'lc Relations, may l9$5, p. 7. 17 fected with atomic radiation for generations yet unborn or 15 never to be bom, " These states ask only that they be heard and their proposal to act as mediators be accepted before It Is too late. To them no task Is more urgent than that of preserving peace for war would not only mean a threat to their independence, but It may mean the end of civilization. Therefore, these neutralist states want to Inject the "voice of reason Into world affairs and mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength 16 of Asia and Africa on the side of peace."

Dangers to be Faced by the New Neutralists

Most of Asia had been set free In the years Immedi­ ately following the Second i#rld War and Joined the United Nations as equal members. In the sense of political and economic viability, however, they were not always equal. Their Instability has tended to whet the appetltles of some powerful predatory states. The two power blocs have been maneuvering to prevent each other from annexing any non- aligned state lAlch, If successful, would Increase the power

of one over the other. On the other hand, if the neutral nations are courted

15 16 Ibid. Ibid, p. 3. 18 by the Communists, It Is only because their nationalism Is useful as a preparation for eventual Communist takeover. The Communists do not believe there Is such a thing as neu­ tralism. Mao Tse-tung puts It thus: "Neutrality Is a camou- flage; the third road does not exist," Because the Com­ munists’believe In their inevitable takeover of the entire world, no neutral country can realistically hope to be left alone indefinitely. It may be allowed to exist In a "state of neutrality, " but that will be only for a duration of time until the Communists are ready to control or conquer It. The real danger for nations that walk the third road-- the path of neutralism— Is the notion that they can preserve peace by placating "the strong and predatory. " Without knowing It these neutrals may force the United Nations to take the same type of Ignominious actions that the League of Nations did; namely, capitulating to the prewar Japanese militarists, to Hitler and Mussolini. The League was too much In love with the easy doctrine of peace at all costs. It did not hesitate to bring pressure to bear on the victims of aggression to surrender peacefully so that war might be avoided. By Its actions It actually aided and abetted agres­ sion. The neutrals have responded quite sensitively to the

17 "United Nations; Where Neutralism Bods, Time, October 13» 1961, p. 30. 19 application of communiât power, which haa been brandished at will. On the other hand, the Vest, fearing that a head-on collision with Soviet power could lead to a nuclear holo­ caust, has restrained the use of Its power. And the neu­ trals, seeing idio exercises greater power, fall In line with the Communists more often than with the West. They "have little real power of their own and thus appear to appease the Communists, possibly In the misguided hope that the Soviets, In their drive to conquer the West, will let them 18 alone." One of the great Intangible risks of neutralism Is that continued adherence to It, which must Include atteaqpts to stay on friendly terms with the members of both power blocs. Induces a psychology of compromise. "Pear of offend­ ing a 'friendly* nation often leads a government to place undue value on settlement of any differences to the point where peaceful settlement of differences becomes an end In 19 itself." The public assertions of the neutralist leaders give one the general Impression that If only the major con­ testants In the cold war would sit down and negotiate any and all disputes between them. International tensions would be Immeasurably relieved.

18 "Neutrals Who Are Not Neutral, Business Week, October 21, 1961, p. 6 7 . 19 Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, p. 295. 20 There Is also the risk of a neutralist nation over­ doing Itself In trying to balance Its commitments to either side of the cold war In order to maintain Its "aura of neu­ trality. " Its leaders are usually unable or unwilling to de­ termine clearly Just what the limits of their neutralist policies and actions should be. By being so preoccupied with preserving Its posture of nonalignment, a nation may find itself, contrary to its belief. In a position idiere It Is only able to react to external actions and not pursue positive goals. In theory, one must adAit, the neutralist attitude Is a rather attractive and defensible one. Morally speaking. It Is very commendable to be able to judge every Issue on Its own worth as It Is presented. However, there are some problems Involved when the Issue is realistically appraised. If we accept the thesis that the Communists are plotting against the rest of the world, then neutralism In effect gives an edge to the Communists. The disorganized ranks of the neu­ tralist countries make them more vulnerable to attacks and subversions conducted by the Communists. "Since the Soviet Union long ago gave up the prospect of winning any non- communist Southeast Aslan state as the kind of genuine ally that the Philippines and Thailand are of America, neutralism— or the neutralization of possible associates of the Western democratic nations--has become a major objective of Soviet 21 foreign policy. The Indonesians, Burmese, and Cambodleuis are not pro-Communlst because they are neutralist, but their 20 neutralism does aid the Communists."

Even If they perceive some dangers In communism, the neutralists find It more difficult to resist communist pres­ sures thaui Western pressures. This stems from their feelings about the Western nations, their recent rulers, and from the fact that the leaders of Burma and of other neutral nations are not sure what they might suffer If they stand up to the

Communists. It Is an Ironic commentary on the present world situation that nations which have much to gain from close association with the free nations Incline toward closer rela­ tions with the communist world for fear of losing what they are sure to lose if they become satellites of Moscow or

Peking.

20 Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia Today - and Tomorrow. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951, p. 159. 22

Chapter Two

Manifestations of Aslan Neutralism

Bandung and Belgrade Conferences

The Afro-Aslan Conference held at Bandung In April 1933 and the Belgrade Conference of September I96 I are pro­ bably the two most Important lancUmarks In the series of meetings at which the new states have tried to define their relations with each other and with the world at large. There have been many unofficial attesqpts at cooperation among the peoples of colonial areas In the past, but meetings of sove­ reign Afro-Asian states are the product of postwar colonial emancipation. A group of fifteen Aslan nations met at New Delhi in January 1949 irtien hostilities broke out between Indonesian and Dutch forces. This meeting saw the fifteen countries agree on certain collective measures against the Netherlands and they also decided to try to co-ordinate their actions at the United Nations. Sir Senegal Rau, the Indian delegate, convened the first ad hoc Afro-Asian caucus at the United Nations the following autumn. This group remained active at various times, especially during the Korean War. The term "positive neutrality" was first used by Prime Minister Nehru while he was trying to bring about a settle- 23 1 ment of the Korean conflict. The then Prime Minister of Indonesia, All Sastromldjojo, was one of the first heads of government to propose steps to­ ward Afro-Aslan cooperation. He outlined. In a speech to his Parliament In August 1933, the purposes such cooperation 2 might serve: Because we are convinced that close cooperation between the AsIan-African countries will strengthen the efforts toward achieving permanent world peace, we therefore consider cooperation between those countries very im­ portant. Cooperation between the Aslan and African countries conforms with the United lotions regulation concerning regional arrangements. Moreover, in general these countries have the same views with regard to some aspects In the field of International relations; they have thus a common ground for the establishment of a special group. Hence we will continue and strengthen cooperation between these countries. The final decision to convene the Afro-Aslan Confer­ ence was taken at Bogor In Indonesia on December 28-29, 1954. The Bogor communique' clarified the purposes of the confer- 3 ence to be: a. to provide goodwill and cooperation between the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common Interests, and to establish and further friendliness and neighborly relations; b. to consider social, economic, and cultural problems and the relations of the countries represented; c. to consider problems of special Interest to Aslan

1 Martin, Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. xlli. 2 Ibid.. p. XIV. 3 A. Appadoral, The Bandung Conference. New Delhi : Indian 24 and African peoples - for example, problems affecting national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism; d. to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples In the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. Although this was not a conference attended only by neutrals,— Communist China, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philip­ pines, and others were In attendance— It gave the neutral leaders an opportunity to discuss various problems with their counterparts from the other countries. Neutralism per se was not an Issue before the conference. The Belgrade Conference, on the other hand, was at­ tended by neutrals %ho "claimed to speak for 730 million people in twenty-five lands, people iho cared little about the rights and wrongs of the cold war and less about such specific conflicts as Berlin. They wanted mainly geace and a chance to earn a decent living for themselves,"

Third Force Concept

Most of the new nations were b o m into the world after the two major power blocs were clearly distinguishable. Al­ though the concept of neutralism is rather vague and filled

Council of World Affairs, October 1955, p. 3. 4 C.Q. Pepper, "Men In the Middle Hold Their Course," Newsweek, September 11, 196I, p. 42. 25 with emotion, it, nevertheless, strongly reflects the lean­ ings of many non-Westem states and the practical range of possibilities open to them in the presence of the interbloc rivalries. Because the reaction of the bulk of the emerging nations to the massive confrontation of the two great group­ ings has been rather similar, it Is common today to speak of a "neutral bloc." "While on the one hand this Is an overstatement (as also Is the popular term 'Afro-Aslan'), since the neutral group displays neither the relatively high degree of integration nor the policy consensus that mark a genuine bloc actor, it is undeniable that on cold- war issues the otherwise Incongruous neutral states have frequently been able to form a common front in opposition to the attempt of the bloc leaders to universalize their 5 dispute. Since these new states are weak militarily, the idea of a "third force" is very attractive as a means of develop­ ing influence and possibly power in the international scene. The political advantages of nonalignment:.— the power of the floating vote--are rather ample under present circumstances, a stalemate in the cold war. There Is also the prospect of being an Important media of communication or buffer between the major power blocs. The fruition of these possibilities

5 Lerche & Said, Concepts of Internatlonal Politics, p. 136, 26 would greatly satisfy the ego and ambition of the new crop of nationalist leaders. The "third force" concept also has some Intimate con­ nections with regionalism. The battle against Western control has been closely related with the drive for Aslan regionalism. During the Second WOrld War such slogans as "Asia for the Aslans" and even "The Greater Co-prosperity Sphere" had potency because of this fact. Presently, the concept of regionalism has taken on a new and dynamic meaning. Many Aslans want to think of the "third force" as a group of nations working in concert on the international level striving to bring about a better world. Such a union, they believe, can serve as a formidable pressure group to secure justice and recognition for its members. Its basis for poli­ tical unity supposedly lies in common nationalist aspirations and opposition to domination by the major powers. Morally and politically speaking, the "third force" is "an instru­ ment for protection and advancement in the absence of other 6 force." Positive neutralism, by attempting to form a "third force, " Is damaging to the movement towards a free and demo­ cratic world community because it depends on dividing the

6 Frank Trager, "Burma * a Foreign Policy, 1948-1957: Neutralism, Third Force, and Rice," The Journal of Aslan Studies. November 1956, p. 97. 27 non-CoDBQunist camp In order to create a new balance of power. The neutralists do not seem to realize that the crucial weakness of all "third force" policies is that they refuse to accept the unlimited nature of Communist ambitions.

Desire to Maintain Peaceful Balance of Power

For the past few years the nonaligned states have been working toward creating a force that could maintain a peaceful balance of power between the two competing power blocs. They feel that this precarious balance is hanging like a sword over their heads and the heads of all humanity. This fear is rather universal for probably one of the most Important considerations affecting foreign policy decisions by large and simll states alike is the existence of the so- called "balance of terror. " This situation stems "from the present distribution of military capability In the world In Which two great states have built up such awesome arsenals' of new weapons that they far outclass all other states, and yetteach remains Incapable of mounting an adequate superio­ rity over the other. Bils allocation of military power inhibits everyone to the same extent if not exactly In the 7 same way. " Today the neutralist states may act as a weight in maintaining this balance, however precarious it may be.

7 Lerche & Said, og^. cit. p. 194. 28 between the two great power blocs which polarized the world since the end of the Second World War. The great powers seem to have reached the point where either could not develop a situation in which it might contemplate unleashing war on the other. In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union have a real vested interest in avoiding an all-out hot war. In the pre­ sent situation "there is little philanthropy or charity in this self-restraint, only the most elementary câlculatlons 8 of the prospects for survival on the cost/risk scale." Because of the tremendous destructive power that both the Soviet Union and the United States have available, they have, in a way, become immobile in exercising their full military strength. Neither may safely make Indiscriminate use of its great military power against lesser states. For one thing, a large proportion of the smaller powers are, in one way or another, under the protection of one or the other of the nuclear giants. Any overt pressure on one of these countries would bring its great nuclear leader into the dis­ pute. Neutralism, in the context of the cold war, is a carefully worked out status that exists only because the major bloc leaders are currently willing te tolerate it. Any attempt to exert military coercion on almost any neutral

8 Ibid. 29 by either cold-war camp would also bring in the opposite bloc and thereby polarize the military situation again.

Anti-Alliance

The neutralists' anti-alliance policy that can be found throughout Asia opposes all alliances. Including those among other powers. These neutralists feel that competition for allies is a big factor contributing to the growth of tension and possibly war. Alliances are despised and dis­ trusted because they are usually concluded in anticipation of a test of strength. Besides increasing the total des­ tructive power that statesmen can wield, they tend to tempt and encourage them to use It irtiile the alliance holds to­ gether. Besides partially substituting for national arma­ ments, alliances also encourage an armaments race as states seek to attract new allies. The smaller states In an alliance will depend on their alliance to provide a substitute or a substantial portion of their defense needs while powerful countries. I.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, will try to out do their rivals in order to Impress and attract new followers. There are many reasons that could explain the non- alignment of the weaker nations. If, for exanqple, there is only one main Issue Involved and the smaller state does not wish to be Identified with either power bloc. It may choose 30 to simply take the middle course. At times the danger of provoking one side, especially the Comnunlst side, by align­ ing with the other may well appear greater than the need for protection. When there are more than one issue plaguing the International system, a country may "make common cause with the West against the East on the issue of Communist expan­ sion, but not with the Industrial, resldually Imperialist North, against the formerly colonial, preindustrial South, on the other dominant Issue of today— econoralc-development and political independence for the less developed countries." The "have-nots" are rather suspicious of the "haves" and, therefore, are very cautious In their relations with them. After removing the yoke of imperialism from their shoulders the "have-nots" are not anxious to have themselves be con­ trolled by another kind of Imperialism— economic. The smaller states also possess the fear that as the number of conflicts increases, their alignment may create new antago­ nists for them. By joining an alliance they are faced with the unhappy predicament of adding the enemies of their allies to those of their own. The nonaligned states, idille following traditional antl-alllance patterns of thought and action, have emphasized a new factor In contenqporary International relations to jus­ tify their opposition to alliances. It involves nuclear weapons with their massively destructive power. In this

^Martin, Neutralism and Nonalignment, pp. 83-84, 31 field the neutralists possess an almost fatalistic attitude. According to their reasoning, no Individual or collective effort by small countries can significantly increase a small country's security if security means capacity for defense against a nuclear power. In this type of a circum­ stance the safest course for a small country is to do nothing to attract the contending giants, either as allies or as enemies. It should, instead, rely on faith; faith that the nuclear powers would be reluctant to either initiate a major conflict over a small country or to antagonize other small countries by using force against any of them. The most ef­ fective "alliance" available to a small country in a nuclear environment is to create a solidarity of nonaligned countries to oppose great-power encroachments. However, In the final analysis only an alliance with an atomic power would save the neutral from being coerced to surrender to the threat of atomic attack. 32

Section Two: Contemporary Neutralism in Action v__

Chapter Three

Role of the Aslan Neutralists

Mediators for East-West Conflict

"If a nuclear war occurred, there are . . . various different logical possibilities: first, the victory of one group; second, reversion to universal barbarism; third, the 1 end of the human race. " With these alternatives of a nuclear war facing mankind. It is very understandable why the neutralists would very much like to be able to lessen the chances of a Third World War breaking out between the two nuclear giants. The neutralists feel that they can make a lasting contribution to humanity by actively playing the role of mediator for the East-West conflict.

Burma's willingness to seek to reconcile the big powers was one of her positive contributions to the world community. Ü Nu tried unsuccessfully to bring about a Slno- Amerlcan rapproachment during his 1954 trip to Peking and

1 Bertrand Russell, "The Case for Neutralism, " The New York Times Magazine, July l4, I960, p. 10. 33 his 1955 visit to the United States. While on his tour of the United States, U Nu "sought to create an atmosphere that could lead to direct talks and friendly relations between 2 the Washington and Peking governments. " He proudly noted how he had told the Chinese Communist leaders during his visit to Peking the previous year that the Americans were a brave and generous people. He also told his American audience he thought the Chinese Communists believed that the United States was trying to create a ring of bases around them for aggressive purposes. U Nu also indicated his willingness to mediate on the Formosan question if both (kmnaunist China and the United States desired it. He was very optimistic about the chances of both countries reaching an understanding at that time for several reasons; neither wanted war, neither had anything to gain by it, both feared it, and, most of all, China needed a long time to develop her economy. Although the intentions of the neutralists to act as mediators for the great disputes that arise between the two power blocs are based on a sincere desire to prevent a nu­ clear confrontation between the Communist and non-Communist powers, their actions and pronouncements are many times more

Russell Flfield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia; 1945- 1 9 5 8 , New York: Harper & brothers, i95F, p. Ô25. 34 detrimental than helpful. Their presence in cold-war con­ flicts many times tend to falsify the issue which, in turn, results in evading the real problems Involved. "Abstract declarations substitute for concrete negotiations, and di­ plomacy Is reduced to the coining of slogans. Pressure for confrontations of heads of major states is exerted, but is not accompanied by any detailed programs. Peace Is demanded In the abstract, but much less attention Is given to defining 3 the conditions that make peace meaningful." One cannot help but think that the neutralists. In their desire to be mediators, are many times blinded by emotionalism accompanied by an excess of Idealism. The cold war Is a very complex and Intricate phenomenon that cannot be solved overnight. There are no ready-made solutions idilch some of these neu­ tralists think exist. If the nuclear giants are not truly motivated to solving their differences, there really is not very much that the neutralists can do to bring about a happy thaw In the cold war. The final decision rests with the nu­ clear powers, not the weak nonaligned countries.

Champion of Movements to Liberate Other Colonies

One of the major preoccupations of the newly emerged

3 Henry Kissinger, "The New Cult of Neutralism, " The Reporter, November 24, I960, p. 27. 35 countries has been their participation, either through ora­ torical exercise or concrete action, to foster the libera­ tion of other colonial areas from Western rule. The leader of a new state is usually an impassioned antl-coloniallst. One major important reason for such a stand is that anti- colonialism is like cement that holds together otherwise incompatible domestic factions. The chhesive function of the "common enemy" must be perpetuated even irtien the foreign "enemy" is no longer a real threat. This invocation of the putative threat Is very useful in maintaining unity at home. This, pexhaps, is the main reason idiy opposition to colo­ nialism frequently grows more Intense after Independence is achieved. The delegates from the Afro-Asian states that met in Bandung in 1955 had the subject of colonialism very much on their minds. When the question of colonialism was brought up for discussion. Sir John Kotelawala, Head of the Ceylonese Delegation, condemned Weste^ colonialism as well as Commu­ nist colonialism. He said: There is another form of colonialism which many of us represented here may not be aware of. Imagine, for example, the conditions of these states under Communist domination, such as Ihingary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechkoslavakla, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. These states are In worse conditions than the Western

4 M.A.K. Hassouna, League of toab States Report, submitted to the League Council, Cairo, IW55, P« 99• 36

colonies In Africa. And, if we, generally, are opposed to colonialism, why should we not declare our opposi­ tion to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western impe­ rialism? The Conference should, therefore, declare before the whole world that it is unanimously opposed to colonialism ±n all its forms, and that it is deter­ mined to take urgent and effective measures to wipe it out altogether.

Anti-colonialism usually begins in the new states as an ideology of the political elite. It generally serves the economic, political, and social ends of both leaders and masses within the non-Western states. Anti-colonialism

is a rallying point that gives direction to people whose

society, traditional as it was, is being disrupted by urban­

ization and the large scale intrusion of Western culture.

It usually lacks many positive values because it is prima­

rily founded on an anti-West platform. The new states are

usually so busy consolidating their positions that they have

very little time to draw up plans for the future. The mili­

tant character of this new ideology may well tone itself

down as these countries develop a functional posture vis-k-

vis the West and as political and economic progress replaces

revolution, charisma, and self-assertion.

Enlargers of the Area of Peace

Enlarging the area of peace was one of the major

topics under discussion at the Bandung Conference. Its

proponents felt that increasing the area of peace would be 37 a realistic solution for the central problem before the con­ ference. Although reference had been made to the value of collective defense through military pacts, the delegates were a little skeptical about Its over-all usefulness. They felt that such arrangements for collective defense would be used to serve the particular Interests of the big powers more than the little ones. The Idea of dependence on mili­ tary alliances and military strength had to be revised In the revolutionary times In which they were living. The atomic age has forced man to change his whole concept of war, peace, and International politics. In this age of modem technology It Is most unfortu­ nate that the thinking of men's minds often lag behind events. Thus It happens that they often think In terms of the past when What Is happening Is already different from the past. To the neutralists the fact that one country Is more power­ ful than another In the use of the atom bomb only means that one Is more powerful In Its ability to ruin the other. The unallgned leaders also feel that It Is entirely unrealistic to think that their countries, undeveloped as they are, could ever hope to build up their military strength to match that of any of the nuclear powers. Building up their military strength per se Is not the correct approach to the problem of peace anyway. And since suspicion begets suspicion and trust begets trust, enlarging 38 the area of peace could be a workable formula. The dele­ gates at Bandung felt that "It was the only way to develop the quality of self-reliance In a people, which alone would result In strengthening the morale, the e^ Ian, the vitality of the people and idilch refused to give In irtiatever hap- 5 pened. To the delegates self-reliance was the real source of strength of a country. Also, the enlargement of the unallgned area would enable the countries concerned to pro­ mote peace by at least helping to keep the two blocs In a position of balance and possibly weighting the scales In favor of peace. If these countries could properly develop their social, political, economic, and moral strength, would not their decision not to Join either bloc help In weighting the scales In favor of peace?

5 Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference, p. 26. 39

Section Three: BURMESE NEUTRALISM

Chapter Four

Government, Politics, and People

The National Community

The new governn which took over the reins of power upon Independence started off with less than full support from the people. Because of unpleasant experiences with previous governments In Rangoon, the Burmese tended to look upon this new one with some reservations. They thought that It was Just another group out to exploit the people.

So, besides the fact that the government had to deal with an armed rebellion and the underlying evils that crept Into the society, it had to wrestle with the negative psycholo­ gical attitudes that were present to a large extent In the

national community.

The possible solutions to these problems called for nothing less than a comprehensive program of natlon-bulldlng that Involved religion, ethics, politics, and economic and social betterment. In the broad moral field the government took some measures to combat the problem of graft and cor­

ruption In public Jobs. Vivid memories of the collapse of 40 the Kuomlntang regime In neighboring China and the role that corruption and graft played In Its downfall Influenced the actions and thoughts of many of the AFPFL leaders. Remedial measures were Instituted at all levels of government with no considerations being given to the position or Influence of the malefactor. "Those dealt with have ranged all the way from the lowest officials to Cabinet Ministers. These measures demonstrated to the public that they had an honest Government, Which was not afraid to do a job of drastic house-cleaning udienever It was necessary. This brought res­ pect and esteem from the people, and thus raised the prestige 1 of the Government." A great remedial factor was the re-emphasls placed on religion In maintaining the basic unity of the country. The government sponsored a religious revival which was not a fanatical campaign on behalf of Buddhism. Although elghty- 2 five per cent of the population Is Buddhist, Burma has no state religion. This religious revival was not limited only to the Buddhist religion. The leaders of the other religious sects In the country were brought Into the campaign and fi­ nancial assistance was provided to them by the government. The effect of this campaign, according to Ü Nu, was "nothing

1 U Nu, Ajn Aslan Speaks, p. l6.

2 Robert; Bone, Contemporary Scut]Southeast Asia, New York: Random House,s. Inc., 1962, pp. 115-19. 4l shoz*t of startling. " U Nu realized and recognized the Intimate relation­ ship that Buddhism had with the national community. He demonstrated his great Interest In furthering Buddhism many times and even used the machinery of the State to aid him In this cause. U Nu constantly called for Increased reli­ gious activity In order to unite a country t o m by civil strife. At one time he professed that, "if we go to the root causes of the present disorders In this country, we will find that not less than eighty per cent of them are .. 3 due to apathy to religion. An interesting and profound example of U Nu*s attitude toward the national community, which In turn reflected the Influence It had over U Nu and policy making, could be gotten from a project he undertook In the early days of Independence. Burma had been heavily damaged by the Second World War. Rangoon had been crippled by the devastating bombings of the Axis and Allied powers. Cities and towns throughout the country were still In shambles and everything that was needed merely for survival was lacking. The officials In chaz*ge of the rehabilitation program hardly knew Wiere to start due to the Immensity of the destruction. Any start could only be so little as cwpared with the great need. In this kind of

3 Fred von der Mehden, "Buddhism and Politics In Burma, " The Antioch Review, Summer, 1 9 6 1 , p. 170. 42 an environment U Nu acted in a very characteristic manner, as probably no other head of state would have acted. He 4 built a pagoda and called it the Peace Pagoda. Foreign observers were naturally stunned at such a "ridiculous" undertaking. The money that was required to construct the Peace Pagoda could have built many thousands of homes and provided thousands of people with clothing. But Ü Nu realized that even all this would have been only a small fraction of Burma's great need. For a problem of this magnitude that would take so many years to be success­ fully tackled, U Nu felt that a nation's morale first had to be fortifiedj thereafter, nothing would be impossible. Burma's foreign policy was tempered to a large extent by her recent experiences with the great powers. Observations had shown the Burmese that an alliance with a big power gene­ rally meant domination by that power and a loss of indepen­ dence for the weaker power. One could question the validity of this belief but it was an accepted political fact that any government of Burma which aligned itself with a big power bloc would at once lose the confidence and support of a great number of people. To put it another way, the chances of subversion would be greatly increased by such an action.

4 U Nu, The People Win Through, New York; Taplinger Pub. Co., Inc., 1957f PP. 4?-4W. 43 And if one accepted the fact that the real danger to Burma was found in subversion rather than overt aggression, then it followed that membership in a big-power bloc tended to add to lAiat was already said to be the greater of the two dangers. However, in determining the scope and character of its foreign policy, the leaders of Burma always had to be conscious of its weakness. In the realm of international politics clashes of interests between a big power and other nations, large or small, seemed unavoidable. A large nation usually had a variety of instruments of national power, in­ cluding an armed force, which it could employ to carry out its policies. On the other hand, a small state like Burma was denied many of the instruments of power. It was, there­ fore, incumbent on the Burmese leaders to so define the scope and character of Burma's foreign policy as to avoid any dis­ putes with other states irihich mi^ht jeopardize their coun­ try's independence.

Personalities

The central post independence figure in Burma until the military coup d' e*tat of 1962 was ü Nu. He was the leader of a country where personalism played a major role in political affairs. His power and influence in government were very impressive. U Nu was looked upon as the "champion 44 of democracy in Burma, the liaison between the sophisticated modernism of Burma's younger generation and the traditional cultural values of old Burma, and Burma's good-will salesman . 5 abroad par excellence. He was also a strong advocate of public welfare. He became an enthusiastic lay defender and promoter of religious revivals, which to him provided a kind of stabilizing re-affirmation of Burma's national cul­ ture. U Nu was strongly against being an opportunist in the international field. He felt that the only political pro­ gram which Burma should pursue was one which the people genuinely believed to be the most suitable for their coun­ try. He believed that their salvation rested in their own hands and no matter i«rtiat help foreign capitalists or foreign Communists could give them, it would be of no avail if they were divided and lacked the ability to steer their own ship of state. Domestically, U Nu felt that "the lyidawtha effort ... was the attempt of a government sharing the peoples confi­ dence, to carry out the peoples' will.... IT Nu also praised democracy domestically as a means of ending the forcible scramble for power, traditional to Burma, whenever a ruler

5 John Ceuly, A History of Modero Burma. New York: Cornell University Press, 19$8, pp.“5i25-b26. 45 died or a government changed. Democracy guaranteed for the people freedom to criticize the authorities, to form rival 6 parties, and to worship freely. " These beliefs held by U Nu shed some light on the type of person he was and the kinds of policy he helped to formulate. During most of his years in office U Nu shared some power with two Socialist Party leaders, U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Myein. These men were dedicated socialists idiose mass poli­ tical following constituted by far the most influential ele­ ment of the AFFFL. U Ba Swe favored an unmerciful national­ ization of all important sectors of Burma's economic life. He had a meager formal education ahd was closely associated with the All-Burma Peasants' Organization. TRiis organization became the rural activating arm of the AFPFL. It had vast political influence and responsibility for administering land nationalization programs. As Minister of Labor and Head of the Trade Union Congress, U Ba Swe was highly res­ pected by his followers "who proudly displayed their red hammer and sickle flag and cheered their leader's Burma- 7 brand Marxism, " With his added portfolio of Minister of Defense, U Ba Swe was in charge of the anti-insurgent opera­ tions of the army as well as the irregular local defense forces.

6 7 Ibid.. p. 626. Ibid., 627. 46 U Kyaw Nyeln, an Intelligent and well-informed person, was the other outstanding Socialist leader. He was sometdiat less doctrinaire than U Ba Swe. He attached little faith, contrary to U Nu, to the assumption that Buddhism alone could interpose an effective barrier to the Communist impact on Burma. He was Secretary of the AFFFL and as Minister of Industries, he was in charge of Burma's ambitious program of industrialization. "His authority was, therefore, consider­ able, but he had sometimes been rash, and he lacked the mass 8 personal following enjoyed by some of his colleagues, " Although there were others among the roll of persona­ lities nAio held some extraordinary influence in the AFPFL policy making machine, the three mentioned above were about the most important. Of course, there was not anyone vAio could match the influence and prestige that U Nu had over the masses; this, in turn, was a tremendous asset for him in the political arena of policy formulation.

Parties and Political Patterns

The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League was the domi­ nating political party of Burma from the time of its inde­ pendence until the military caretaker government took over

3 Ibid., p. 628. 47 9 In 1958. Because the AFPFL was the organization responsi­ ble for running the government and, in a way, the govern­ ment itself, considerable space will be utilized to give a full coverage of its orgin, structure, and policies. A careful study of the AFPFL is indispensable if one wish to get a closer look at how foreign policies were influenced and formulated in Burma, The AFPFL was founded by Aung San in May 1945 as a national organization made up of a loose coalition of numer­ ous groups united only in their common opposition to foreign 10 rule. To understand and appreciate the character and per­ sonality of the AFPFL one must go further back and look briefly at the evolution of political parties in Burma, Pumivall dated the birth of modern nationalism in Burma from the founding of a Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 1906. This group professed to be religious rather than political in character. But, since Buddhism was the religion of the great majority of the people, the YMBA was as much nationalist as religious and it could not help but carry political implications. Its earlier activities were centered around the field of education. It attacked the edu­ cational system which allowed Eurasians to enjoy superior

^Butwell, Southeast Asia Today - and Tomorrow, p. 31. ^^Ibld. 48 advantages. It also demanded educational reforms that would open up a wider field of opportunity and employment for Burmese. Only a few Buddhist monks were among its earliest 11 leaders. The early efforts of the YMBA to organize a popular "semi-political " movement contributed some remarkably last­ ing traditions to subsequent Burmese politics. First, they "encouraged a strong interest in discussion of ideological matters. The search for a new world view was recognized as essential for Burmese political growth. Even more signifi­ cant, ideological discussions were seen as comforting, secure, and, above all, innocuous. As long as discussions remained at this level, there was little danger of serious 12 conflict." Second, these early experiences convinced many Burmese that the practical problems of political deve­ lopment and modernizing were highly dangerous and likely to threaten the social and political security of many people. Third, the early political experience suggested that persis­ tent efforts at programmatic actions could lead to splits and divisions Wiich invariably opened the door to an increase

11 Josef Sllverstein, "Burma, " in George McTurnan Kahin, (ed. ) Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, New York: Cornell University Vress, 1959> p. 81. 12 Lucian W. Pye, Polities, Personality, and Ifatlon Building : Burma's Search j*or Identity, New Haven; Ÿale University Press, 1962, p. Il4. 49 In the Influence of the traditional elements of society. The activities of nationalist groups drifted along until the Japanese occupation of Burma during World War Two. Most of these groups had initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators. The section with communist leanings took the side of the allies in sympathy with Russia and opposed the Japanese from their first arrival. Than Tun was one of the chief leaders Mio organized the resistance movement against the Invading Japanese. As the opposition to the Japanese grew stronger, it rapidly increased in number and came to be known as the National Revolutionary Party. This party helped Aung San With the creation of a coalition formed in August 1944, known originally as the Anti-Fascist Organiza­ tion and from May 1945 as the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom 13 League. A closer look at the character and constitution of the AFPFL should reveal some interesting insights concerning this powerful and all-embracing party. Its most striking and important feature was that it was a nation-wide organi­ zation with a machinery extending over the whole country. Aside from the AFPFL, there were three other political organ­ izations that also covered the entire nation. These were the All-Burma Trade Union Congress, All-Burma Peasants'

13 J.S. Fumivall, % e Governance of M o d e m Burma, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, I960, p. 57. 50 Organization, and the All-Burma Youth League. These three organizations were affiliated with the APPPL and the local leaders were generally members of the APPFL. Many of these 14 same people were also the local leaders of the AFPFL. One may safely conclude that the AFPFL had almost sole com­ mand over the vdiole political organization of the country. Another Important feature of the AFPFL was that it did not profess any particular political ideology other than nationalism. Prior to the rise in power of the Communists under Than Tun, political diversity was generally disre­ garded. However, a socialist party that preferred Western democratic socialism to communism was founded within the wings of the AFPFL. Others, who mistrusted socialism or had more to lose under a socialist regime, began to draw apart in separate groups within the AFPFL. These groups had so few in their membership that they carried little weight 15 in the over-all policy forming process. The chief strength for a party like the AFPFL stemmed from the fact that it inherited and was able to consolidate the political organization of the nationalist resistance movement. Some would-be leaders were reluctant to join the AFPFL or any other organization in any capacity except the

14 U Nu, ^ Asian Speaks, p. 48.

15 Fumivall, o£. cit., p. 59* 51 highest While others feared the effect of socialist legis­ lation on their pocket books. These dissatisfied men broke away from the main nationalist body to form splinter groups. In the end the strength of the APPPL's continuing hold over the country was due primarily to the absence of an organized opposition and to the general acceptance by the people of the program it offered to them. Practically all the groups that remained with the APPPL after independence was attained professed some form of socialist ideology— from Democratic Socialism to Marxism. The Burma Trades Union Congress favored Marxism and left the League in sympathy with the communist insurrection. The unions %diich remained loyal to the League were organized into the Trades Union Congress, Burma by U Ba Swe. A fur­ ther split arose in the APPPL in connection with a contro­ versy over America's Korean policy. The Burma Workers and Peasants' Party was b o m out of this dispute. By the end of 1957 the total membership of the APPPL was given as 16 1,287,290. Political power was concentrated in the Central Coun- 17 oil of the APPPL. All important questions of policy were

16 Ibid. p. 114.

17 Apart from U Nu, the leaders of the League were the surviving members of the Revolutionary Party. Within this 52 settled in it before the government decided on the line it would take. Although in constitutional theory "the Govern­ ment shall be collectively responsible to the Chamber of 18 Deputies," it could exercise the strict control of party discipline over the members of the Chamber. In practice, however, the Government was responsible to the AFPFL. Although the AFPFL was the all-powerful governing party of Burma for a decade since independence was achieved, it was faced with many problems within its own ranks as the years went by. Deterioration and corruption within the AFPFL continued until a great schism resulted in the early part of 1958. At the Third All-Burma Congress of the AFPFL held in January 1958, U Nu, in the process of a detailed analysis of Marxism, lashed out at the theory of Dialectical Materialism with reference to Buddhist beliefs. He ended his speech by saying, "the AFPFL rejects Marxism as a guiding 19 philosophy or as the ideology of the AFPFL. " The Ba Swe-

group certain members carried additional weight by virtue of the control over different mass organizations. Thakin Tin was President of the A.B.P.O. and U Ba Swe was President of the T.U.C.B. U Kyaw Nÿein possessed great influence outside the League through his connection with the cooperative movement, 18 The Constitution of the Union of Buima, Rangoon: Government Printing Office, 1947, SectTon 11$, p. 28.

19 Hugh Tinker, Rie Union of Buma, (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, P. 91. 53 Kyaw %reln faction of the AFPFL took It as a direct chal­ lenge to its Marxist Socialist philosophy. Relations be­ tween this group and U Nu's rapidly deteriorated until fif­ teen out of thirty Cabinet Ministers had resigned by June 20 4, 1958. One of the important reasons for the schism in the AFPFL was the clash of personalities among the top leaders. The men who guided the destinies of the AFPFL government through the initial years of independence represented a wide diversity of personal capabilities, ambitions, and standards of political conduct. As the threat of the insurrection grew less and less and the reasons for overlooking personal dif­ ferences for the sake of cohesiveness faded away, these leaders reacted in their own various ways. Eventually, "many became more and more impatient for concrete accomplishments, more and more impatient with inefficiency. These men, idio had to associate together almost daily, began to get on each others 21 nerves. " This was a big factor that influenced the inevi­ table split and downfall of the AFPFL in 1958.

20 The Rangoon-Hopkins Center for Southeast Asian Studies, A Chronology of Burma ' s international Relations ; 1945-1958, Burma: Rançon University Press, J^anuary 1959, p. 21 W.C. Johnstone, Observation on Conteiaroorary Burma, California: The Rand Corporation, ïÉty 9, i960, p. iTT 54

Chapter Five

Burma's Neutral Foreign Policy

The new neutralism, like that practiced by Burma, has stemmed from circumstances and motivations substantially different from the ones underlying traditional neutrality and its quest for respect of neutral rights by belligerent powers. The new neutralists, like the old neutrals, have also been concerned with preventing the involvement of their countries in the wars of others. But when it comes to protecting them­ selves against such involvement, they have relied upon means different from those employed by neutrals of the traditional type. A chief characteristic that has distinguished the neu­ tralists from the neutrals has been the primary concern of the former, not with a future war but, with objectives to be pursued under present cold war conditions. Vtc. Wolfers thinks that the old-time neutrals are "status quo" powers vdio have no urgent demands to make on others. By contrast, "the new states have their eyes fixed on peacetime opportu­ nities and dangers that call for action in the name of both nationalist and unlversalist objectives, two sets of objectives 1 not always compatible with each other. "

1 Wolfers, "Allies, Neutrals and Neutralists in the Con- 55 In the beginning Burma's foreign policy was predo­ minantly a response to domestic conditions and not to exter­ nal problems. Instead of trying to manipulate the external environment to suit her interests, Burma's initial policy sought to affect its internal environment in ways that would help to build a stable and viable nation. Nonalignment gave Burma a more cohesive community than it would othex*wise have had during its struggle to unite the country. This kind of a policy allowed Burma to diversify its source of external assistance, Wiich resulted in diluting the potency of foreign influence in its domestic life. By 1952 the leaders of Burma had gained enough confi­ dence to feel that they understood the rules of the game of international politics. They tended to scorn polemics about the free world versus communism or to see in this struggle any great moral crusade by either side. Burma's foreign policy by then took the neutralist form that was to hharac- terize it for the rest of the decade. Many people had the impression that Burma envisioned the establishment of a third power bloc with her concept of neutrality. This was not true because her leaders were al­ ways denying that they favored such a development. However, the Burmese leaders believed that Burma, Indonesia, India,

text of U.S. Defense Policy." Neutralism, Washington, D.C. : The Johns Hopkins University, 1961, p. 51. 56 and others were right in trying to enlarge the "area of peace" with their neutral foreign policy.

Judgments on World Issues

As was stated earlier, Burma's neutralism did not imply aloofness or withdrawal from international affairs.

Nor did it connote a refusal to take a positive stand on world issues. Because Burma’s foreign policy was indepen­ dent of ties with either power bloc, her leaders arrogated to themselves the right to judge each international issue on its merits and take their stand on what they believed to be "right" at any given time. Many times the exercising of independent judgment on what was "right" seemed to align

Burma with one bloc or the other. This usually resulted in

immediate action by the leaders explaining their stand as

simply being the outcome of their exercising their indepen­ dent judgment of what was "right" and nothing else.

By emphasizing his government's need to follow a non-

aligned policy U Nu was trying to broaden the interpreta­

tion of the principle of neutralism. The Burmese, favoring

independent Judgment on the merits of issues as they arose

in world politics, strongly criticized bloc voting in the

United Nations. Burma's Ambassador Barrington once stated: "We do not hesitate to come out openly on an issue when the

facts clearly call for such an attitude. Our actions in the 57 United Nations are determined not by a blind neutralism, 2 but by a close scrutiny of the merits of each Issue." U Nu made a frank exposition on September 5, 1950, In defense of the above stated outlook. He said, "If we consider that a right course of action Is being taken by a country, we will support that country, be It America, Britain, or Soviet Russia. • . . Although a small country, we will support 3 what Is right In the world." "The sole criterion for all 4 our decisions Is our sense of idiat Is right and proper." The Burmese never had the desire to join either the Anglo-American or Slno-Sovlet bloc because they felt that if they did, they had to support that bloc In any and every­ thing, right or wrong. They would have no choice. That was the kind of situation Into which they did not want to fall. Their conviction, a valid one, was that In this world there was no one or no country that was always "right" or always "wrong." Therefore, the Burmese did not want to allow them­ selves to be drawn Into a position In which they had to blindly support any country, "right" or "wrong."

2 Plfleld, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958, pp. 176-177. 3 U Nu, Prom Peace to Stability, Rangoon: Government of the Union of Burma, 195T7 p. 1Ô1. 4 Ibid., p. 196. 58

Friendly Relations with all Countries

Burma's policy of seeking friendly relations with all countries was based on many considerations, some of vAilch will be covered In this section. There were several reasons idilch overlapped each other and created crosscur­ rents that were not fully appreciated or understood by the members of the power blocs. This nonallgnment and campaign on the part of Burma to be friendly with all countries naturally did not make either bloc view her as favorably as It would Its own close colleagues. However, both blocs came to realize that Burma was not going to be a "yes" country to any power. Burma's neutral stand placed her In an excellent position to be on friendly terms with all countries. It might peihaps be difficult for some partisan countries to understand that her friendly dealings with all countries were Important for her stability. A glance at a world map and a close study of the countries that surround Burma con­ vinced the Burmese how much their friendly relations with all countries based on their neutral policy contributed to­ wards the stability of their Independence. The vivid memories of World War Two and the destruc­ tion that It brought to Burma was not a small factor In Influencing the Burmese to work for peace for the whole 59 world. Burma supported several measures that had hopes of reducing the friction and dissension that existed between the big powers. Only If these powers were In harmony could the peace of the world be secured. That was idiy the Burmese sought friendly relations with Russia and her satellites and the countries of the free world. In his efforts to bring about friendly i*elatlons between Burma and the countries of the world, U Nu, with his wlde-rovlng international gestures, was open to criti­ cism and misrepresentation. He was accused of spreading himself too thin In too many directions. His government was seen as supporting Peking, Moscow, Washington, and London against the Interests of the opponents of each. Burmese neutralism, out of Burma's anxiety to preserve her indepen­ dence, seemed to sway to the Left and then to the Right. This kind of action was labelled as sheer opportunism. What­ ever others thought, the drive to have friendly relations with all countries was consistently applied during U Nu's ruling era. And It can be said that. In the light of the special problems Burma had to face as a small, newly Indepen­ dent country In a vulnerable location, It stood up as a rea­ sonable and sound policy. Burma's development of friendly relations with a sizeable number of nations having conflicting Interests In world politics was profitable and did not hinder the Burmese 60 government in the pursuit of Its policy goals or In obtain­ ing the kinds of external assistance It desired. This con­ clusion sort Pf tended to reinforce the old thesis that a small nation existing In a small world of predatory states did well to play off one against the other and to spread Its "Interest eggs" In as many baskets as possible. This element of reality was not absent from the minds of the pollcymsdcers, but It was not a primary or paramount factor In determining the scope and character of Burma's foreign relations. "Friendly relations with all countries" and "economic aid from any country as long as It did not Infringe on Burma's Independence" were principles of very wide appli­ cation, ones which could encompass a considerable variety of actions In International relations. To the Burmese leaders these principles of their foreign policy worked well because they produced good results with no really adverse conse­ quences.

Positive Bideavor to Promote Peace

Although the unaligned countries have achieved a cer­ tain degree of cooperation, they are not and will not be a bloc of powers. Such an undertaking to build up a real mili­ tary force would ruin their economies and would eventually force them to join one or the other bloc, thereby Intensi­ fying the cold war. Instead, these countries have found a 61 path that serves both their national Interest and world peace as well. Tills policy Is their abstention from any alliance and their efforts to do everything they can to settle crises nAienever they appear. Since Independence, many of the APPPL leaders frankly expressed their conviction that neutrals as well as belli­ gerents would suffer In another world war. TSiese leaders fully realized the fact that the development of nuclear weapons had gxeatly magnified the potential of human and material destruction. The Burmese delegate to the United Nations pointedly said In the General Assembly on October 1, 1954, "In other words, the alternative to coexistence seems 5 to be no existence." This anxiety plus a very real fear by the Burmese leaders that the Indo-ghlna war might expand to seriously threaten their security during the mid-fifties led U Nu to attempt the role of mediator between the two principal Southeast Aslan antagonists— the United States and Communist China. There was little doubt In most people's minds that U Nu conceived of his new role In world affairs as a means of adding to the prestige of Burma and his own. Although U Nu's role as a mediator between the two great powers could not be counted a success. It was at least psychologically Important because the Burmese leaders and

5 Plfleld, op. cit., p. 169. 62 many of their supporters believed It was Important. In many ways It marked for them the point at which Burma, even though weak and small, came of age In International affairs. Their experiences In world capitals, their talks with world leaders, add their participation In the Bandung Conference and other International meetings convinced them that the foreign policy concepts they, as leaders, had formulated were workable. They were convinced that these principles gave an air of dignity and stature to their nation idilch could not have been achieved by any other course. And re­ gardless of whether U Ifti's efforts In International affairs bore any significant and lasting fruit, he and his APPPL colleagues exhibited from 1955 on a greater degree of self- confidence In guiding the foreign relations of their coun- 6 try. U Nu, In sharing his thoughts and Ideas on the sub­ ject of peaceful coexistence, stated that "... man must learn to live with himself. Regardless of his beliefs, traditions. Ideologies, and the political systems to which he subscribes, he must l e a m to live with his neighbors. This calls for a new outlook, a new approach, and even a new philosophy. More than ever, man needs to exercise cour-

W.C, Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy; A Study In Neut^llsm, Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 95-96. 63 age, patience, tolerance, and Imagination* Pear, which for so long has been the counsellor of man. Is today man's mortal enemy. Suspicion and mistrust are likewise greater 7 enemies of the human race than ever before." In this new environment he believed that nations of the world had to be guided In their relations with each other by five basic principles: respect for sovereignty and territorial Inte­ grity, non-aggression, non-interference In the Internal affairs of another state, equality, and mutual benefit. In U Nu's belief, the sum of these principles added up to the 8 Burmese concept of coexistence. During his state visit to China In 1954 U Nu endorsed the five principles of peaceful coexistence with Premier Chou Eh-lal. These principles had been previously enun­ ciated by Nehru and Chou In India. U Nu and Chou also Issued a joint statement asserting that "the people of each nation should have the right to choose their own State sys­ tem and way of life without Interference from other nations." The two leaders expressed the hope that In order to safe­ guard peace In Asia and the world, the five principles of peaceful coexistence would be widely accepted by all coun-

7 8 U Nu, An Aslan Speaks, pp. 50-51. Ibid., p. 51.

9 Communique on Talks Between Chinese and Burmese Premiers and Other Documenta, Government Printing, January 1, 1955, p. 4. 64 tries of the world. The two men maintained that even coun­

tries now antagonistic to each other could establish normal,

peaceful, and friendly relations if they would strive for that end with sincerity and goodwill. The two leaders also expressed their profound interest in the consolidation and enlargement of the "area of peace." They felt that if this were to happen, international tension would gradually be relaxed, thereby lessening the likelihood of a new war and strengthening the cause of world peace. Finally, although the Peoples ' Republic of China believed in communism and the Union of Burma did not, U Nu, at a banquet given in his honor by Premier Chou En-lai, went so far as to say, "... countries with differing political ideologies can live to- 10 gether in peace and friendship."

Nonalignment

Burma is a small, weak nation and the AFPFL leaders recognized this fact from the day they took over the reins of government. They had few illusions about their country's potential military strength. In facing their problem of

defense, the Burmese were confronted with two alternatives. The first alternative was to increase their fighting force— land, sea, and air. However, it was not an easy task for

10 Ibid. p. 6. 65 an underdeveloped country like Burma to expand her armed forces. The first obstacle was money. Military experts had calculated that It would take millions of dollars to augment the fighting strength of Burma to the required standard of efficiency. As U Nu remarked, "Even If we spend all our revenues for that sole purpose for a period of twenty years successively, we may have a fairly strong de­ fense force. Even with such a force built up for twenty years, we cannot expect to feel secure. Of course we will be militarily stronger but still our defenses will not be 11 strong enough to stem determined aggression." The rea­ son for this belief was rather simple. Burma's neighbors had populations that were many times larger than hers. To handle open aggression from any one of them was merely wish­ ful thinking. Therefore, It was evident to the Burmese that no matter how much they expanded and strengthened their armed forces, they could not be In a position to defend their Independence effectively. The second alternative that the Burmese had was to join an organization vdilch could come to their aid In the event of aggression. Because of their policy of non-partl- sanshlp, the Burmese were precluded from joining either the Anglo-American or the Slno-Sovlet bloc. However, they were

11 Ü Nu, Prom Peace to Stability, pp. 98-99. 66 quite eager to Join the United Nations. They felt that since the West and the East were well represented In It, Burma could not be labelled as pro-Communist or pro-West. In explaining their reason for Joining the United Nations U Nu said, "We have Joined this organization without pre­ judice to our declared policy of non-partIsanshlp and with the full conviction that this organization will be able to offer protection to the attacked country In the event of 12 aggression." Burma's policy of non-partisanship received some severe criticisms from various American leaders. These men felt that Burma should openly commit herself to the fight against communism by Joining the Western bloc. However, Burma had other Ideas about her foreign policy. When U Nu was visiting the United States In 1955, he spoke before the Senate and reminded the Senators that the foreign policy vdilch Burma was following— to avoid aligning with a power bloc— was exactly the policy pursued by the United States In Its first hundred years and that both nations had been cri­ ticized and misunderstood on the same score. On December 11, 1949, U Nu declared, "... our cir­ cumstances demand that we follow an Independent course and not ally ourselves with any power bloc. Any other course

12 Ibid., p. 99. 67 can only lead the Union to ruin. . , . The only political programme nftiich we should pursue is the one which we genuinely believe to be the most suitable for our Union, , , , Be friendly with all foreign countries. Our tiny nation can- 13 not have the effrontery to quarrel with any power. ” By being committed to neutralism, Burma was able to attain a stature in world politics urtiich was probably greater than if she were allied to either the East or the West. It can be said that neutralism served Burma well and that it enabled her to be more effective as a leader among the uncommitted nations of Africa and Asia. In striving for world peace the Burmese government pursued a policy of determined friendliness with both sides of the cold war conflict. It hoped in this way to build a bridge of cooperation and understanding between East and West, between the Communist and non-Communist countries. To some extent this was the basis for the wary approval that both sides gave to Burma on different occasions. In keeping with their desire for peace and the creation of an atmosphere of harmony among all countries, the Burmese consistently held the belief that their associating with any military pact would be detrimental to the Wiole concept of international brotherly cooperation, U Hu felt that the

13 Ibid., p. 51. 68 test of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), America's biggest bid for Southeast Aslan support, was not udiether such an alliance could win a war, but Wiether it could keep the peace. SEATO, in U Nu's words, "increases the chances of a third World War because it hightens the tensions in Asia, intensifies China's fear of American encirclement, and diminishes the chances of peaceful co- 14 operation." With this fear of provoking a country or a group of countries into a hostile frame of mind due to its joining any alliances, Burma decided, since independence, to follow a path of nonalignment and positive neutralism in its foreign relations.

14 Ibid. p. 21. 69

Chapter Six

Burma and the United Nations

Seeking membership Into the United Nations has been one of the first, if not the first, goals of all the newly emerged countries upon receiving their independence. Gaining admission into the United Nations has been psychologically accepted as the thing to do for any new country. To the leaders of these countries it marks the culmination of their long drive for independence and national sovereignty. Being a member of the United Nations also gives these new countries "status’* in international affairs. In the General Assembly they are all recognized as equals— one country, one vote— , even to the superpowers. The United Nations is also looked upon as an excellent forum for public debate— a place where even the weakest may be heard on any international issue. There are many other reasons why thes ) new countries covet admission into the United Nations. As for Burma, her joining the United Nations, accord­ ing to U Nu, was not "prompted by considerations of financial aid, medical aid, educational missions to plan our educa­ tional programme, and such other benefits likely to be accrued by joining it. . . . What was foremost in our thoughts was 70 the expectation of United Nations assistance utien our coun- 1 try is subjected to aggression by a stronger power. " Burma's actions during the decade following her independence seemed to bear out this faith that her leaders had placed in the United Nations. She also felt a reciprocal obliga­ tion to contribute udiatever she could to the United Nations vrtien that organization had to tackle any aggressor in any place at any time. When U Nu visited the United States in 1955, Burma's general outlook toward the United Nations had changed, but her basic faith in that organization had not. In summing up his government's feelings about the role of the United Nations, U Nu stated that despite its failures to come up to their expectation, their faith in the United Nations re­ mained undiminished, Tie Burmese felt that the United Nations still "... remains the main hope for mankind in this atomic age. If it were considered essential ten years ago, it is even more essential today. A divided world stands in greater need of a common forum to discuss differ­ ences than a world united, . . . Our task . . . is to strengthen it, and to make it the effective organization 2 vrtiich had been plar iel by its founders. " M Nu felt that

1 U Nu, Rrom Peace to Stability, p. 99. 2 U Nu, ^ Asian Speaks, p. 19. 71 the United Nations* CSiarter was in effect one great mutual security pact. He did not think the system had broken down, but merely that it had not been made to work^ Tie remedy, in U Nu*8 words, "is not to push the U.N. aside but to 3 strengthen it and put more life into it."

Tie Kuomintang Issue

Prom the beginning of her independence Burma had to contend with the problem of Chinese Nationalists troops crossing over into her territory and using it as a base for raids into China. Tie Burmese concern about the danger implied by the presence of foreign troops on her soil vas- cillated during the first few years of their independence with the tide of the revolution in China add the degree of their preoccupation with their own domestic rebellions. At first, because of their small size and lack of organic ton, the Kuomintang forces were not considered as an inter. nal problem. As time went by and as the forces became bigger and better organized, the issue of the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma began to carry serious inter­ national implications for many countries. Tie Union of Burma, Communist and Nationalist China, Thailand, the United

3 Ibid., p. 43. 72 States, and the United Nations were the principal bodies

involved in this case. The whole conflict had its begin­ ning in 1950 when some 1,700 Kuomintang troops crossed the

Chinese border into Burma and settled themselves in a sec­

tion of the Shan State. The soldiers refused to leave Burma

or submit to disarmament and internment. In the latter part

of 1950 Burmese forces drove the Chinese troops out of the

area they occupied, but the troops merely withdrew westward,

establishing their headquarters at Mong Hsat. By recruiting

men from the Burma-Yunnan frontier region the Kuomintang

forces increased their number by early 1953 to possibly

12,000. Originally, they were operating east of the Salween

River, but by 1952 they extended their efforts to areas west

of the river suid collaborated with rebel Karen units. The 4 leader of the Nationalist Chinese troops was General Li Mi.

On the domestic front the implications of the Kuomin­

tang issue were serious and widespread. The highly pressed

ABPFL government was forced to divert part of its limited

armed forces to handle the Nationalist Chinese threat. This

new demand for troops substantially weakened the govern­

ment's operations against other rebels. The Peoples' Volun­

tary Organization and the Communists, both of whom were in

armed rebellion, offered to join forces with the government

4 Pifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, p. 202. 73 against the Kuomintang forces, but the Burmese officials refused to enter Into such an agreement. The Kuomintang Issue offered an excellent opportunity to the opposition In Parliament to attack the APPPL government. By 1950 sentiment was growing among some Burmese officials to present the Issue before the United Nations. In 1951 the government was ready to take such a step but the American officials stationed In Rangoon were able to dis­ suade It from this course of action by promising to inter­ cede with Chlang Kai-shek*s government to effect a with­ drawal of Its troops from Burma. Unfortunately, the American officials Involved miscalculated the mood of liashlngton and Talpeh. While the diplomatic efforts continued futllely, the Kuomintang Issue began to have a strong emotional Intact on the Burmese. Por several years (1953-1955) this Issue was consistently the major news Item In Burma and "the chief topic of political conversation with students, government officials, shopkeepers, and even the usually uninformed village people. The widespread suspicion that the Americans, If not actually supporting the Kuomintang forces, were at least tacitly approving the Talpeh maintenance of them, was chiefly responsible for the rapid deterioration of the Amerl- 5 can public Image In Burma. Janet Brown feels that the

^Janet Brown, Burma*s Policy In the United Nations, The American University: Doctoral KTssertatlon, 19o4, p. 211. 74 suspicion the United States created in connection with the

Kuomintang problem was the sole cause of the premature ter­ mination of its aid program in Burma.

The AFPPL leaders were not as much concerned about local opposition as they were over the attitude of the

Peoples' Republic of China. If the Peking regime were look­ ing for a Justification to invade Burma, the issue of the

Nationalist forces in Burma presented it with an excellent excuse since the main objective of the Kuomintang troops was to assist in the overthrow of the Chinese Communist regime. The Burmese did everything possible to placate her northern neighbor. They kept the Peking government closely informed on all developments in the situation. For­ tunately, the Chinese Communists maintained what Burma con­ sidered a proper and correct attitude, blaming the United S States and Thailand for the crisis.

In a careful analysis of the Kuomintang question U Nu observed, in a speech to Parliament on March 2, 1953, that

since early 1950, Burma had faced three possible courses of action to follow. The first was to refer the matter to the

United Nations. This possibility raised a few questions: Would the Formosa regime deny responsibility for the forces in Burma by declaring them deserters; would the Nationalist

6 Fifield, o£. cit., p. 203 75 Chinese government claim that the soldiers in Burma were troops of Communist China wearing Nationalist uniforms; and would the Peoples* Republic of China be antagonized by United Nations action? The second course was to negotiate with Nationalist China through the offices of diird powers having diplomatic relations with both countries in an effort to secure the withdrawal of the Kuomintang troops. Tie third course of action was for the armed forces of the Union to fight the Chinese Intruders. In the end Burma chose to take the matter up to the United Nations because the Kuomin­ tang troops were not abandoning their aggressive activities. This action was taken in spite of the possible consequences of denial by Formosa and other added complications. Taking the Kuomintang problem to the United Nations has been the only major test that Burma has made of the United Nations* ability to enforce the concept of collective security and the willingness of it to protect the interest of a small country. Tie failure of the United Nations to act with the speed and fairness that Burma expected it to perform condi­ tioned her to the limitations of this world organization. Following on the heels of the Korean problem, the Kuomintang issue increased Burmese sophistication in connection with their view of the United Nations. In explaining Burma's position before the United Nations U Myint Tie in traced the history of the Kuomintang 76 forces In his country and attenqited to prove that the troops were being supported from Foimosa. The draft reso­ lution presented to the United Nations by Burma stated that armed troops of the Kuomintang government of Formosa had committed acts of Infringement against the territorial inte­ grity of Burma. It wanted the Security Council to condemn the Nationalist Chinese Government for her aggressive acts and to take all necessary steps to bring about an end to 7 this aggression. The official Burmese version of the Kuomintang issue was delivered before the United Nations General Assembly by U Myint Thein. The following excerpt from his speech is 8 concise and informative: In 1950 we had only approximately 1,500 Kuomintang troops to contend with, and their activities were restricted to only a part of the Kengtung State. In 1951, the number had increased substantially, the Kuomintang strength by April of that year being at least four thousand. By the end of the year, the number was considerably greater, and the area covered by the operations of the Kuomintang troops had ex­ tended to the Wa and Kokang States, north of the Keng­ tung State. . • . What is even more sinister is the fact that the Kuomintang in Burma have taken to inter- ferring in our internal affairs. I have already re­ ferred to their liaison with the Karen insurgents and to the reasons underlying it. But nAierever they have

7 Ibid., p. 204. o U Myint Thein, "Complaint by the Union of Burma Regarding Aggression Against Her by the Government of the Republic of China," Buima, Washington: Information Bul­ letin of the Bnbassy of iBurma, April 23, 1953, PP. 4-5. 77 gone, the Kuomintang troops have engaged In subversive propaganda against the Government. When they occupied the Nongshu area, they deposed the ruling Chief and replaced him with a chief of their own choosing. They preached that they were out to help the people who were being oppressed by the Government of the Union of Burma and that their purpose was to restore the Shan Chiefs (idio had recently agreed to give up their exe­ cutive powers and functions in favor of a more democra­ tic form of Government) to their former positions of authority and power. They had issued leaflets in Burmese and Shan inciting the citizens of the Union of Burma to disobey the orders of the Government and even to rebel against the Government. This general pattern has been followed throughout all the areas in which they have operated. Their object is obviously to set up the minority groups inhabiting the eastern portions of the Union of Burma against the lawfully established govern­ ment . The Burmese were very reluctant to place the fore­ going problem before the United Nations General Assembly for several important reasons. They tried to solve the problem outside the United Nations, but failed. The Chinese Nation­ alist situation had developed, both in terms of domestic opposition and of Burmese foreign policy, to the point where American aid, whatever its economic merits, had become a political liability. Pear of hostile Chinese Communist re­ action was the major factor which had refrained the Union of Burma from taking the problem to the United Nations ear­ lier. However, the Burmese later came to the conclusion that "discontinuance of American aid in protest against American support of the Chinese Nationalists would serve as a convincing demonstration to the Chinese Communists of Burmese sincerity in taking the problem up before the United 78 Nations. It would at the same time circumvent any possible Peoples' Republic of China claim that the Burmese move was part of a conspiracy against them. The Burmese would be go- .. 9 ing before the United Nations with undeniably clean hands. A draft resolution was presented to the General Assem- 10 bly with the above memorandum. It called upon the Security Council (l) to condemn the Chinese Nationalist Government for its acts of aggression; (2) to enforce necessary measures to bring about a cessation of such acts; and (3) to ask all countries to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union of Burma. Because the Burmese expected the Chinese to veto this resolution in the Security Council, they took this matter to the General Assembly first. There they would have a larger audience and, hopefully, the backing of the Assembly. After some discussion the matter was referred to the First Committee which considered it at eight meetings from April 17-22, 1953. Sympathy for the Burmese and admiration for their conduct was expressed by most of the countries in the de­ bates that followed the draft resolution. A strong condem­ nation of Kuomintang aggression was favored by a majority of

9 Oliver Clubb, Jr., Tie Effect of Chinese Nationalist Military Activities in Burma on Burmese foreign Policy] California: Tie Rand“ 0t5»poratîôh, January èô, 1959, P. 22. 10'u.N. Doc. A/C. 1/1/42, March 26, 1953. 79 the delegates. Specific acceptance of the Burmese evidence and support of the Burmese draft resolution came from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, 11 Yemen, Yugoslavia, and the Communist bloc countries. Al­ though all other countries condemned the aggression against Burma, they differed on the wording of the Burmese draft resolution and how best to approach the situation. Some felt that formal condemnation of the Kuomintang Government "would not be useful" irtiile others felt that it "could be of no practical help." Several other draft resolutions were submitted in an effort to obtain near unanimous support and to avoid condem­ nation of the Republic of China, Finally the Mexican draft resolution with its amendments was passed by the Assembly in 12 plenary session on April 23 by a vote of 59-0-1. Although the Burmese delegate expressed his appreciation for the ef­ forts of the other delegations, he said he was very disap­ pointed that the majority did not see eye to eye with Burma. Tie experience that Burma had with the United Nations on the Kuomintang issue left her with some unhappy and dis­ appointed feelings. Although she enjoyed a moral victory, with unanimous majorities in her favor, Burma felt that she

^^U.N. O.A. VII O.R. First Committee, April 21, 1953, P. 680, 12 U.N. O.A. VII O.R. Plenary, April 23, 1953, P. 718. 80 did not receive the kind of response she thought she de­ served. Where the United Nations had acted immediately on behalf of Korea, it would do no more in this case than to urge its members to withhold aid from the "outlaw forces" in Burma. U Nu expressed his disappointment in the United Nations on this particular matter at the Bandung Conference. He said, "We found the U.N., which acted with such speed and energy in Korea, unwilling even to bring in a verdict of 'aggression* against the Kuomintang Regime. It seemed to us that the U.N. had more than one yardstick for mea­ suring aggression. In our view aggression is aggression 13 regardless of the source from which it comes. " In spite of their disappointment the Burmese, in terms of international public relations, came out of the struggle very well. There was warm and widespread sympathy for Bur­ ma's plight and genuine admiration for the restraint and gentleman conduct of her delegates. Although the Burmese received firmed support from the communist bloc, it was not without embarrassment for them. Tie Soviet bloc tried desperately to turn the problem into a cold war issue. The Nationalist Chinese also tried to present this problem as a cold war issue because they were probably under the impression that it would be the best

13 Burma Weekly Bulletin, Vol. 4. No. 6, May 12, 1955, p. 37. 81 way for them to muster any kind of a support. A significant aspect of the Kuomintang problem was the effect it had on Burmese-American relations. When the Burmese presented their complaint to the United Nations, the relations between the two countries were at their lowest level. The Burmese were convinced that the United States was not doing all it could to apply pressure on the National­ ist Chinese in order to bring about a speedier and more favorable solution. Due to the bitterness existing then, the United States did not receive the credit it deserved from the Burmese for the role it played in effecting the evacuation. Whether Burma received as much as she expected from the United Nations deliberations or not, she, nevertheless, received some valuable information from this experience. Her leaders acquired a more realistic view of the power and limitations of the United Nations. They are now better pre­ pared to assess the potential of the United Nations as a peace keeping organization through their observations of its performance of a task in Burma's own back yard.

The Korean Conflict

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces during the summer of 1950 gave the United Nations its first real challenge as an international organization. Its opera- 82 tlon In Korea raised many practical and theoretical ques­ tions about its role in an international dispute. This was the first time that a large number of nations had collec­ tively intervened, within the charter of an international organization, to rescue a beleaguered country. Some of the problems that came up as a result of the United Nations decision were: (a) the piwblem of policy control and the degree of intervention; (b) the problem of from vrtiere lead­ ership for this collective effort was to come; (c) the pro­ blem of each country being able to rationalize its own foreign policy with the objectives of the United Nations in this particular situation. Like many countries, Burma's initial response to the American appeal for the defense of South Korea was rather enthusiastic and idealistic. The reasons for her great in­ terest in the Korean question were several. Both Korea and Burma were small, developing Asian nations vrtiich only recently had the yoke of colonialism and Japanese bondage lifted from their shoulders. Although they were thousands of miles apart, Burma felt a sort of vague relationship with Korea since both countries were of Asian background. "There were . . . over­ tones of a racial and colonial nature in addition to the charge of aggression and to the big power - small power con­ flict and involvement in the cold war. When the United Nations took action in Korea, it seemed to the Burmese that their 83 hopes for Internationally guaranteed security were being realized, that the United Nations could meet aggression firmly, and with force if necessary. The fact that it was a small nation being 'threatened* and saved only increased 14 theif hopes and enthusiasm. " Burma was involved in the Korean conflict primarily as a result of her membership in the United Nations. This strife in Asia presented a real test to Burmese foreign policy. Although it was clear that the North Koreans were the aggressors and that the United Nations Security Council was trying to invoke collective measures against them, the Burmese were wondering how they, following a policy of neu­ tralism and seeking to be friends with all, could carry out their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. Almost two weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War the Burmese government issued a statement that Burma, as a member of the United Nations and as a believer in the settlement of disputes by peaceful methods, "feels bound to support the Security Council in the stand it has so far taken in regard to South Korea, which aims at stemming the aggression and restoring peaceful conditions. The government also

14 Janet Brown, og.. cit., p. 116.

15 U Nu, Prom Peace to Stability, p. 97. 84 asserted Its desire to make It clear that Burma's support of the Security Council's decision in regard to Korea did not in any way affect its foreign policy goal of maintaining friendly relations with all countries.

Although the Burmese were initially supporting United

Nations operations in Korea very vigorously, they did not consider themselves to be embracing American policy in the

Par East. Instead,,they felt that their support of United

Nations action in Korea was simply the result of their desire to help bring about peace in that beleaguered country. Theo­ retically speaking, support for the United Nations action in Korea should have been relatively easy. But as the months went by, the Korean issue became blurred with all kinds of cold-war implications. The Burmese soon realized that this concept of positive neutralism was, in reality, very diffi­ cult to effect where the cold war and the great powers were involved.

During the first years of her independence and parti­ cipation in the.United Nations, Burma did not really have a definite set of policies to guide her foreign relations.

These developments, for the most pairt, were coincidental since the APPPL government was in a formative and shaky

state at home and could give only a limited amount of atten­ tion to foreign affairs. During her initial period of expo- 85 sure to the Korean problem, Burma made three clear-cut decisions: (l) she was strongly In favor of the United Nations working for a unified and democratic Korea; (2) she supported the Idea of inviting both North and South Korean representatives to attend the General Assembly proceedings; (3 ) she went on record as being against a "solutlon-by-par- tition. " Ambassador U Pe Khin, while explaining his coun­ try's abhorance to partition as a solution, said that the only answer «diich could bring about unity was the withdrawal of all occupational forces. He went on by expressing his hope that the Soviet Union and the United States could over­ come their differences as soon as possible in order to make 16 a solution in Korea possible. The Assembly considered two substantive draft reso­ lutions after the question of Korean representation was settled (in South Korea's favor). One was submitted by the United States, China, and Australia urtiich would approve the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCK) Report, declare the Government of the Republic of Korea to be lawful and in effective control of the areas under UNTCK observa­ tion, recommend the withdrawal of occupational forces as soon as possible, and create a new Commission on Korea to 17 continue the work of the Temporary Commission.

^^U.N.O.A. Ill O.R. First Committee, Dec. 6, 1948, p. 936,

^^U.N. Doc. A/C 1/426, Dec. 6, 1948. 86 Tie Soviet Union submitted the second draft resolu­ tion which took just the opposite point of view. It favored the termination of UNTCK on the grounds that it had set up a reactionary unrepresentative regime that was the puppet of the United States. It also called for the withdrawal of all occupational forces and the establishment of an inde- 18 pendent democratic Korea. Burma voted with the majority by favoring the three-power draft instead of the Soviet draft. On June 25 the Security Council was informed of the North Korean attack and took swift action by approving a United States draft resolution calling for a cease-fire and 19 withdrawal of the North Korean forces. Prompt action was possible largely because of the Soviet representative's absence. A second United States proposal calling on all members to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the 20 North Korean attack was also adopted. In all forty-four member governments subsequently announced their support of the two American resolutions. Burma was among those favoring

18 U.N. Doc. A/C 1/427/Corr. 1, Dec. 8, 1948.

19 U.N. Doc. 8/1497, Jhne 25, 1950. 20 U.N. Doc. S/1508/Rev. 1, June 27, 1950. 87 the resolutions. At this stage of the Korean conflict the Burmese had no real reservations about the rightness of the actions being taken by the United Nations in Korea. As Prime Minis­ ter U Nu explained to Parliament in September, in discussing 21 the security provided by the United Nations to its members: . . . I was not free from doubts at first. . . . Will the United Nations be a repetition of the League of Nations? Will the member nations only think of their own safety and leave the smaller nations to their fate in the event of aggression by a powerful nation with idiom they wish to remain on good terms? Korea has dispelled these doubts. There may or may not be other motives. But it is a fact that as soon as aggression started in South Korea, the United Nations went to its assistance. This has set up a noble precedent. Henceforth, if aggression occurs elseidiere, there too the United Nations must step in. They simply cannot get out of this responsibility. This is the great hope, the only hope for small member nations like us . . . if Burma was threatened with aggression too, the United Nations would come to our help. It is only fitting that Burma wholeheartedly supports the United Nations in the step they have taken in South Korea. Although Burma saw eye to eye with India on many of the issues involved in the Korean problem, the two countries reacted differently to an item that technically had nothing to do with the Iforean problem although it was a direct con­ sequence of that question. The United States was concerned about future Korean-type crisis and the ability of the Soviet Union to obstruct any positive United Nations plan of action.

21 U Nu, Prom Peace to Stability, p. 100. 88 It wanted to devise a plan whereby, should a similar crisis occur, the United Nations would not be prevented from acting by a Soviet veto in the Security Council, The United States proposal, officially titled "United Action for Peace," would give a larger political role to the General Assembly. As revised and passed, it became knowm as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. It provides a means whereby the General Assembly could act in defense of peace if the Security Council were prevented, by exercise of the veto, from taking 22 action. Although the members (except for the Soviet bloc) may have acted from different motives, they, nevertheless, acted constructively together. Burma voted for the resolu- 23 tion whereas India abstained. U Tin, Burma's representa­ tive, said his government looked upon the resolution "... not so much from a legal point of view but rather as an instrument to make the United Nations effective in its pri­ mary function of preventing threats to the peace in any part 24 of the world. " Tie Burmese "viewed the resolution as a matter of the United States joining the smaller nations in achieving for the Assembly a role they had long considered

22 Hans Morgenthau, "The New United Nations and the Revi­ sion of the Charter," The Review of Politics, January 1954.

23 . U.N. O.A. V, O.R. First Committee, Oct. 19, 1950, p. l6l, 24 Ibid., October 18, 1950, p. l4?. 89 an appropriate one. Tie Burmese had no apparent hesitation in being counted among the supporters for this United States sponsored move. Tie positions taken by Burma and India on the "Uniting for Peace" resolution illustrated two different approaches to the United Nations, Although both nations belong to the middle-of-the-road group in the cold war and favor first of all the conciliation and mediation of differences, they dif­ fered in their idea of action to be taken in certain kinds of cases. The Burmese felt that in cases of clear armed aggression the United Nations should pass judgment and take action. They were quite consistent in maintaining this ap­ proach. India, on the other hand, in theory at least, usually abhorred the condemnatory line and worked for conci­ liation. When the United States draft resolution condemning Red China as an aggressor in Korea came up for a vote, it was approved by a vote of 44-7-8. Burma and India joined the Soviet bloc in opposing the measure while Indonesia ab- 26 stained. Tie Burmese and Indians obviously felt that the majority was closing all the doors to the possibility of

25 Janet Brown, op. cit., p. 148.

26 U.N. O.A. V, O.R. First Committee, Jan. 30, 1951, pp. 600-601. 90 negotiation by condemning Red China. They probably felt that condemnation would not ease the situation or bring them any closer to a settlement of the dispute. This was the first time that Burma voted against the majority posi­ tion on the Korean question. Her new alignment on this issue did not go unnoticed in the West. Some news média even had the audacity to label Burma and India as satellites of the Soviet Union. The perennial question of the representation of Com­ munist China in the United Nations had great importance since Peking made the settlement of the Korean issue somewhat de­ pendent on her acquiring the seat held by Nationalist China. Burma firmly supported an Indian draft resolution which noted that the Peking (Government, being the only government of China which "actually exercises control over the territory of that member and commands the obedience of its people ..." and has a ". . • reasonable expectancy of pennanance," should 27 represent China in the Assembly. At the Sixth Session, U Hyint Thein made a forceful appeal for Peking's represen­ tation in the United Nations. His main arguments were based on the desirability and necessity of universal membership. He strongly appealed to the Assembly not to leave out nearly

27 U.N. Doc. A/1365, September 19, 1950. 91 one quarter of mankind. This was the position that Burma held on the representation issue throughout the Korean War.

The entrance of Chinese forces into the Korean pic­

ture caused Burma to re-examine and revise her policy on

Korea. The political and military implications of this new factor entering into the Korean conflict were quite frighten­

ing to the Burmese. They became seriously distressed over

the possibility that the war could not and would not be con­

fined to Korea. The new caution in their policy was partly

caused by an increasing awareness on the part of the Burmese

of their vulnerability to their large northern neighbor.

The dangers of the Korean conflict were brought closer to

the Burmese with the entrance of Communist China into the

dispute. A change in policy was definitely called for and

eventually consummated.

In reflecting back on Burma's participation in the

United Nation on the Korean problem U Nu carefully analyzed

the reasoning behind his country's actions. The first con­

sideration, he pointed out, was to protect Burma from aggres­

sion since she could not build up sufficient armament to

stand by herself. She definitely needed the support of an

international organization if she were attacked. The second

factor influencing the government's decision was the policy

of non-partisanship. Burma acted on the "merits" of the

case and did what she thought was right without a prior com- 92 mltment to the Anglo-American or Slno-Soviet bloc. "Pair deal," stated U Nu, was the third principle on which Burma's policy was built. Since North Korea was clearly seen as the aggressor, the Burmese felt it their duty to oppose the ag- 28 gressor.

Burma played a small role in all of the Korean de­ bates and negotiations. Of the neutralist group India played the dominant role. Her leadership was clear through­ out. Although there were some differences, Burma's policy in most cases followed India's very closely. In the begin­ ning Burma was very enthusiastic over the actions being taken by the United Nations in Korea while India was more cautious, more suspicious of American motives, and seemingly held more reservations about the final outcome. The Korean conflict gave Burma her first real opportunity to put her policy of neutralism into practice.

The Suez Crisis

The so-called "Suez crisis" was the product of two

Middle Eastern issues: (l) the long-standing bitter Arab-

28 U Nu, Prom Peace to Stability, p. 104. 93 Israeli conflict; (2) Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Burma and the other members of the United Nations not on the Security Council became formally Involved with the problem In November 1957 after Israel invaded the Sinai area and Prance and Great Britain attacked the Suez area. These actions led to the convening of the First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The Suez question that was placed before the United Nations meant different things to different people. To some countries it was simply a colonial question of Western imperialism in a slightly different form. The Arab nations saw the Suez action as another flagrant manifestation of Israel's intentions to conquer the Middle East; this time more openly backed than usual by Great Britain and Prance. The countries that were economically dependent on the canal saw the Egyptian move as a blow against their very survival. France's move may be seen as the final release of temper and frustrations against Egypt for aiding the Algerian rebels. Burma was one of a group of nations vrtiich was able to see the Suez problem with some degree of perspective and objec­ tivity. To her the Suez crisis was a delicate combination of political, economic, and nationalistic factors. Burma's role on this issue was a limited one. Because she was the only intimate friend of Israel among the Afro-Asian countries, any effort that she might want to exert on any 94 Middle-Eastern problem was looked upon with suspicion by the Arab countries. Amid bias and partial speeches of recrimination be­ fore the General Assembly, U Win, Burma's spokesman, de­ livered a sober speech that reflected much credit to Burma. He felt that Great Britain, Prance, and Israel did not dis­ charge their obligations properly under the United Nations Charter. He said that such dubious international morality cannot be condoned by anyone or any nation. He went on to 29 express the Burmese attitude on this controversial issue. We feel that armistice and inspection commissions vAiich are not allowed to function freely, or even to function, do not make for peace. Where associated nations are continuing raids and reprisals across boundaries, that does not nmke for peace. . • • Freely uttered threats by one nation to annihilate another, in a crusade, do not make for peace either. Nor does a truculent response which leads to so-called "preven­ tive war" or self-appointed police action make for peace. Nationalization of vital property is obviously within the competence of any sovereign nation. But with equal obviousness, when the use of such property vitally affects the economic health of many nations, prompt and effective negotiations on its use, for all users, seems to be indicated. After a cease-fire agreement among the hostile powers was reached Burma firmly supported the withdrawal of foreign troops and the implementation of a United Nations Emergency Fbrce. U Pe Khin, Burma's new delegate, announced his coun­ try's willingness to make a token contribution to the United

29 U.N. Doc. A/3256, November 1, 1956. 95 Nations force. Here again, the tone of the Burmese inter­ vention was more positive and less hostile to Great Britain, France, and Israel than that of the Indian and Indonesian delegates. The fact that Burma was the only one of the three to sponsor the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) draft indicated her sincere interest in seeing such a body established. She was willing to send a small number of troops because she could afford to release some soldiers then; whereas, she could not do so in 1950, There was not present, in addition, the factor of this being an armed East-West conflict. During the Fifth Committee debate in 1958 the Burmese delegate outlined his country's policy toward UNEF. He felt that all members should share the responsibility for sup­ porting the UNEF. He expressed Burma's stand as favoring Argentina's suggestion that countries which had already contributed should not have to pay the deficit of defaulting members and that such deficit should be paid by the perma­ nent members of the Security Council. Burma was also in favor of altering apportionment and endorsed the principle that states should "contribute to the financing of emergency action by the United Nations in proportion to the material benefit which it derived from such action.

30 U.N. G.A. XIII, O.R. Fifth Committee, Dec. 3, 1958, pp. 2 6 5 -2 6 6 . 96 Burma's stand for the following two years were about the same as the one stated above. Although she paid her assigned portion, she "continued to side with those idso felt that the method of apportioning was unfair to smaller developing nations" and voted for the same system only be- 31 cause "it was the only practical and acceptable one." The Suez crisis was as complicated and demanding as any for Burma. It was compounded by the outbreak of the Hungarian problem which helped to mark the latter part of 1956 as one of the darkest moments in the short history of the United Nations. The Suez conflict involved the problem of aggression vrtiich had overtones of Western colonialism and possibly other issues of the cold war. It also chal­ lenged Burma's relations with the Afro-Asian group and her special friend, Israel. Due to forces pulling her in many directions at the same time, Burma chose to exercise a role that was moderate and simple. By relatively keeping in the background and saying as little publicly as possible, she was able to come through the ordeal quite consistent with her policy principles. However, Burma had to pay a price for her strong ad­ herence to her foreign policy principles. The price was her "failure to play any positive role in settling the problem—

31 Janet Brown, og^. cit., p. 374. 97 for this was more exactly 'neutralism' than 'positive neu­ tralism'— except perhaps in the calming and constructive 32 tone of the Burmese interventions in debate. As stated above, Burma's position on the Suez issue was quite consistent with her declared policies. She up­ held the right of any nation to nationalize vital national property and professed that no large power or powers could impose their will on others simply because of their strength. She also maintained that Israel had no right to invade the territory of another nation, even if she intended to right some alleged wrongs. Throughout the entire debate on the Suez issue Burma was able to hold a fairly balanced view of the entire conflict. The Burmese continued to hold on to the belief that the United Nations must play the major role in stopping the fighting and trying to bring about a peaceful and agreeable solution. Although their offer to provide a limited number of troops for the peace keeping mission was not accepted, they were firmly behind the creation of the UNEP. They al­ ways tried to be conciliatory in their public utterances and never reverted to emotionally charged words like "imperialism" or "Zionism 1' By their praise of the United States and their condemnation of Israel's aggression the Burmese demonstrated

32 Ibid.. p. 376. 98 the courage and openralndedness that they possessed in taking stands and giving credit where it was due.

The Hungarian Crisis

What began as a peaceful protest demonstration ended up being a world problem within a couple of days. On the night of October 22, 1956, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 Hungarian students, intellectuals, and workers gathered in front of the Parliament Building to voice their demands. They wanted a liberalization of national policy and the for­ mation of a new government under former Premier Dnre Nagy, The following day a crowd of demonstrators were fired upon by members of the AVH, the greatly feared and hated State Security police, while atten^ting to have its demands broad­ cast to all of Hungary. This shooting incident transformed a peaceful demonstration into a violent and bloody national uprising. Soviet tanks and troops were on the streets of . 33 Budapest by the early morning of October 24, On October 27 the United States, United Kingdom, and Prance requested a meeting of the Security Council to dis- .. 34 cuss " % e Situation in Hungary. Ihe representatives of

^^U.N. Doc. A/3592, "Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary" pp. 5-12. 34 U.N. Doc. S/3690, October 27, 1956. 99 these three countries stated that foreign military forces were mercilessly repressing the Hungarian people in vio­ lation of the Treaty of Peace of 1947. Subsequent Council debates were filled with the details of the fighting. In addition these representatives brought up the fact that Imre Nagy, then President of the Council of Ministers of Hungary and Acting Foreign Minister, had stated in a radio broadcast on October 28 that the upheavals were part of a large national democratic movement. In communications to the Secretary General President Nagy objected to the intro­ duction of additional Soviet troops, repudiated the Warsaw Treaty, had the Hungarian appeal placed on the Assembly agenda, asked for great power recognition of Hungarian neu­ trality, and wanted the Security Council to pressure the 35 Soviet Union to negotiate. Security Council consideration of the Hungarian pro­ blem was opposed by the Soviet representative on the grounds that the events in Hungary were a purely domestic matter. Debates were conducted inspite of the Soviet objection. During a subsequent debate the Soviet delegate reported that Russian troops would be withdrawn when the Budapest Government thought it was feasible. He also stated that the whole Hungarian issue had been fermented by the Western

35 U.N. Doc. A/3592, 0£. cit., pp. 5-12. 100 powers as a means of distracting attention from the Anglo- French aggression In the Suez area. This argument was re­ peated many times throughout the duration of the Hungarian problem. A draft resolution was submitted by the United States on November 3 which called upon the Soviet Union to stop its intervention in Hungary and affirmed the right of the Hungarian people to have a government that is responsive to their needs and dedicated to their independence. While the Council was considering this draft, reports of a second, more massive Soviet armed intervention and renewed violence in Budapest were received, 'Hiis triggered an urgently sum­ moned Council meeting vrtiich considered in the early morning hours of November 4 a revised American draft which called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces in Hungary. The vote (9-1-1) failed because of a Soviet veto. The Coun­ cil then called for an Bnergency Special Session of the General Assembly by a vote of 10-1. Burma played a relatively prominent part in the Gene­ ral Assembly proceedings of the Emergency Special Session, Burma was prominent simply for its unique stand as opposed to that of the other neutralist countries. Some have tried to explain away the abstention of the other neutralist coun­ tries by citing their preoccupation with the Suez crisis or their desire to undertake conciliation instead of condemns- 101 tlon. However, the fact remains that Burma was the only one from the neutralist group that took a definite position— a position for national freedom and human rights and against aggression by a big power. Burma could have acted like the other neutral coun­ tries and simply abstain from taking a position that would have provoked the Communists, but she chose to do otherwise. The strong determination on the part of the Hungarians to fight for their freedom probably touched the inner depths of the Burmese hearts. The leaders of Burma probably pic­ tured the Hungarian struggle with a thought about their own position in the face of a possible intervention by Communist China. The United States submitted to the Emergency Session a draft resolution vrtiich was quite similar to the one re­ jected in the Security Council. The preamble of the reso­ lution would recall Hungarian treaty rights, Nagy's appeals, Soviet declarations on non-intervention, and the great loss of life. The paragraphs of operation would affirm the right of the Hungarians to their chosen form of government; call on the Soviet Union to cease her armed attack and withdraw her troops without delay; ask the Secretary General to in­ vestigate the problem caused by foreign intervention and to suggest methods to bring it to an end; request that Hungary and the Soviet Union allow United Nations observers to enter. 102 travel, and report on the situation. It would also ask the Secretary General to look into the relief needs of Hungary. These were some of the main provisions of the American draft 36 resolution. Speaking for the Burmese delegation, U Pe Khin made several observations: (a) that Burma was greatly distressed about Soviet armed intervention in Hungary; (b) that the Intervention was contrary to the Bandung principles of non­ interference and peaceful co-existence; (c) that, therefore, he hoped the foreign troops would be withdrawn. He continued unwaveringly : . . . if the Charter itself is not to be flouted vriien- ever some big power or group of powers is concerned about its imperialist interests, then it follows that there is no justification for the armed intervention of the Soviet Union against Hungary. . . . delega­ tion will therefore support any effort by the United Nations consistent with the Charter— which effort, to ray Government's mind, does not amount to interference by any outside power, urtiich ever that might be— to enable the Hungarian people to settle down and pursue a path of their own choosing. U Pe Khin concluded, “Finally, I can do no better than to agree with the representative: of Yugoslavia, when he observed at this morning's meeting, 'The less Interference, from what­ ever source . . . the better . . . for the Hungarian people .. 37 and the peace of the world.'

36 U.N. Doc. A/3286, November 4, 1956.

^^U.N. G.A, E.S.S., O.R. Plenary, Nov. 9, 1956, p. 35. 103 India's representative Menon was relatively evasive In his statement in comparison to the Burmese position. He announced that his delegation was in accord with the pur­ poses of the American draft resolution and added, "If I am right, the purposes of this draft are humanitarian, that is the relief of suffering." He made it known, however, that the purpose of the draft had been weakened and dis­ torted by the inclusion of political phraseologies and that amendments were necessary if it were to receive wider sup- 38 port, 39 U Pe Khin'8 speech, by comparison, was most succinct: . . . my government does not see any justification whatever in the course which the Soviet Union has taken in Hungary and has expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would take steps to effect speedy withdrawal of its troops from there. . . . The Government of Burma would support any effort of the United Nations which is not incompatible with the Charter or which the people of Hungary will not con­ sider tantamount to interference in their Internal affairs.

It was at the fourth meeting that U Pe Khin expressed in general terras Burma's policy regarding the United Nations 40 and international relations:

38 Ibid., pp. 71-72.

39 U.N. G.A, E.S.S. II, O.R. Plenary, Nov. 9, 1956, pp. 68-6 9 .

40 U.N, G.A. XI, O.R. Plenary, Nov. 20, 1956, p. 155. 104 We cherish with a fierce love of country our free­ dom and independence. The very nature of our struggle to be and to remain free has created in us a special sensitivity to any violation of those precious values; thus we have given our support wholeheartedly to the United Nations as the best bulwark of peace and free­ dom. In our international discourse and relations with other nations we seek to avoid any evidence of anger, excitment, or related tones of hostility. This we do, secure in the belief that right thinking and right speaking may thus better prevail in the councils of nations. We always seek the maximum facts before passing judgment; we always give to the next fellow the same benefit of doubt before acting as we would wish to have accorded to us; we always prefer the soft- spoken word to that of harshness and condemnation. These guiding lines of our conduct are sanctioned by our expectation that such a policy is more conducive to negotiations, to safeguarding peace, to ensuring free­ dom and independence for others as well as for our­ selves. At a later meeting U Pe Khin expressed the feelings 41 of his fellow countrymen concerning the Hungarian Issue. Burma . . . wants for Hungary and all Hungarians what it wants for itself. It wants Hungary to be free of domination, alien domination. . . . It wants Hun­ gary to remain a member of the United Nations, but­ tressed by its own consent, idiatever that consent may be. No nation, large power or small power, has the right to coerce other nations. Tliis principle is embedded in the Charter of the United Nations. Yet we have seen in the case of Hungary that the Soviet Union insists on coercion. Its apologists say that the Soviet Union coerced Hungary to preserve communism for Hungary. But it has no right to do this, though obviously it has, up to the present, the power to do so. My government would in fact be deeply distressed if Fascism anywhere in the world were to triumph once again. But my government does not believe that the Soviet Union has the right to anticipate Fascism or any other 'ism' for the Hungarians.

41 Ibid.. December 12, 1956, pp. 655-656. 105 In summing up Burma's action and attitude toward the Hungarian problem in the United Nations, one can safely say that the Burmese took a definite stand from the begin­ ning. Although they abstained along with the Indians, Indo­ nesians, and others on the first few resolutions, they did so for different reasons. Tiey were unequivocal in regis­ tering their disapproval of the use, of armed force by the Soviet Union in crushing the Hungarian national uprising. There was a clear distinction between Burma's forthright stand and the weak and generalized position that India and Indonesia took. The Hungarian case, more than any other controversial international issue, gave Burma the opportu­ nity to demonstrate to the world that she woùld not hesi­ tate about "taking sides" on a cold war issue vrtien the Charter of the United Nations was clearly violated. Burma's character and courage were tested to their very foundation since her neutralism required its advocates to judge each issue on its merit and to take a stand accordingly. Burma met this test with little hesitation. Burma differed from India and Indonesia in her con­ cept of the United Nations. The three countries saw the United Nations as a "harmonizing center" and tended to em­ phasized her role as a conciliator and mediator of disputes. However, for the Burmese the conciliatory role, though the primary one, was not the only role of the United Nations, 106 The Burmese clearly felt that It was also an Important function of the United Nations to condemn specific inter­ national action, i.e., armed aggression, especially If the transgressor was recalcitrant in its response to preliminary appeals from the United Nation. So in the Hungarian case Burma, unlike India and Indonesia, truly acted like a genuine non-partisan country by passing judgment on the merits of the conflict without regards to the recipient of the con­ demnation. 107

Chapter Seven

Factors Responsible for Burmese Policy of Neutralism

Inexperience

There were many similar factors that influenced the formulation of foreign policy in the newly independent coun­ tries of Asia. These states were all faced with the problems of gaining recognition, preserving their independence, ac­ quiring markets for their produce, and running the affairs of state without any outside help. Burma was no exception to this rule. If the AFPFL leaders had any doubts when they took over the reins of government, these most likely arose vdien they thought about Burma's foreign relations. It was a natural phenomenon since this was the one major function of an independent government idiich they were least prepared to carry on or had any experience in. The highly competitive world of cold-war politics was something the Burmese politi­ cians had to approach cautiously. They were neither stu­ dents nor practitioners of international diplomacy. As prac­ tical leaders, however, "when facing an uncharted course, they were predisposed to play it safe until they could learn 1 by experience in foreign relations." Inexperience, there-

^Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, p. 41. 108 fore, was a factor which played a role in developing Burma's policy of neutralism and nonalignmeht. It tempered the thinking and actions of the AFPFL leaders considerably.

Neutralism and Peace

In ideal and aspiration at least, being dedicated to parliamentary democracy and having an aversion to totali­ tarianism characterized the approach of Burma and her leaders to national and international problems. By means of demo­ cratic socialism Burma was endeavoring to create a society of free and equal peoples. The Burmese saw the world as plagued by age-old tensions— political, social, and econo­ mic— and they firmly believed that the safety and survival of free political institutions depended upon resolving these tensions before they became too cancerous and, most likely, incurable. The Burmese believed that man must rise to the challenge of his age— an age which calls for a new outlook, a new approach, even a new philosophy. The old antiquated ways were no longer adequate for the new circumstances and crucial issues of the day. The issues involved "include not only communism versus democracy but also strong versus weak, prosperous versus poor, ruler versus ruled, master race ver­

sus subhuman. These issues can be resolved only when man­ kind is willing to sit down together and create for itself 109 a world vrtilch will guarantee freedom. Justice, well-being, 2 and equality to all." The experience of the past decade, since independence, helped In molding a new type of society idilch, for the sake of convlnlence, was generally called democratic socialism. The major aim of a democratic socialist movement In Burma was the creation of a society of free and equal peoples with equal opportunities for all. In a country like Burma this type of movement was the only sensible kind of action which had the possibility of removing the age-old social, political, and economic tensions. In order for a democratic socialist type of movement to succeed, a long period of Internal harmony amd Inter­ national peace was needed. Therefore, the Burmese attitude toward political systems prevailing In other countries was governed mainly by the consideration of peace. They were convinced that It was not the path of wisdom to form mili­ tary blocs, to enter Into a hectic armaments race, and for opposing powers to rant hysterically at each other. These things certainly did not make for peace; they only increased tensions. If the world's great religions like Islam and Christianity, after a prolonged and bloody war for centuries, could flourish side by side In peace and amity, the Burmese

U Thant, "a Burmese View of World Tension, " The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 3%ily 1958, p. 110 asked, vfliy cannot Conmiunlst and non-Ck)mmunlst systems be permitted to co-exlst peacefully? It was most unfortunate for Burma that her emergence as an Independent sovereign state coincided with the onset of the cold-war struggle be­ tween the two opposing military blocs urtilch plunged the entire world Into a state of fear and tension such as It never knew before In times of peace. In such an environment neutralism was chosen, vrtille Burma was trying to Improve her Internal situation, because It provided the leaders with a greater latitude of choice In the development of local political and economic Institu­ tions and doctrines. The leaders had to preside over the affairs of people vdio generally lacked familiarity with or fidelity to the principle of large-scale free enterprise as we understand It in the West. At the same time they lacked the enthusiasm for the rigidities and constrictions of communism. In such a situation "their natural preference Is for a regime that will be more flexible than communism and more centrally directed, as far as economic life Is con- .. 3 cemed, than capitalism. Such mixed situations of some free enterprise and much state direction and control over the economy are certain to be characteristic of the newly Independent states.

3 Grayson Kirk, "Forces Shaping World Society," Vital Speeches, August 1, 196I, p. 621. Ill The Burmese leaders chose neutralism In political alignment In part because they do not feel that either the communist or the capitalist economic model will serve their needs for the years ahead. They also tended to equate fullest political Independence of action with Independence In economic policy. If the United States falls to recog­ nize and understand this tendency and to deal with It sym­ pathetically, our long-range Interests are likely to be Impaired because we may reap a harvest of hostility. The development of neutralism has stemmed basically from the feeling of both egocentrism and ethnocentrlsm which has been characteristic of most new nations. The former colonies which have become Independent since World War Two tend to be the "status-seekers" In the world com­ munity since few of them have either the resources or the capabilities of becoming "power-seekers. " In the years following Burma's Independence there Is little doubt that the AFPFL leaders were concemed with establishing a "status" position for Burma In the world community. These leaders desired greater recognition for their nation but were handi­ capped by uncertainty as to vAiether they could even maintain the unity and Independence of their country. Ifemy well-meaning people suggested to the Burmese during their initial period of trial and tribulation that the best defense against the dangers of Internal subversion 112 was to ally themselves with a great power. However, the Burmese leaders felt that military power per se was not the answer to the danger of their domestic conflicts. U Nu felt that the major answer to Internal subversion could be found in honest government and In the dedication to the Interests and welfare of the people. TSie Burmese leaders believed that the advent of the atomic era reduced even further the chances of overt aggression.

Drive for "Status"

The APPPL leaders knew that In order for Burma to gain Internal stability she needed to obtain as much Inter­ national respect for her sovereign Independence as she could. They sought, therefore, to bolster her prestige In the eyes of the world. Burma tried to make herself heard and to play an active role among the nations of the world. At times Burma and the other neutralists attempted to demonstrate their ability to Influence the policy of the two superpowers as they did when they called on President Elsenhower and Premier Khrushchev to meet and settle their differences. The need for the Burmese to think that Burma and. In turn, the APPPL leadership were Important In International politics was very crucial to the government In Its battle with the various local rebels. The policies of nonalignment and neutralism were a means for counteracting the opposing 113 elements In their bid to overthrow the AFPFL government. By enhancing the International status and, consequently, the domestic authority of the national leaders, nonalignment promoted. If nothing else, temporary stability. It also helped to Insulate factional and regional struggles against the strains of outside Interference. This fear of domestic division was one of the main reasons Burma chose a policy of neutralism In International affairs. Neutralism, as an active foreign policy, provided some kind of a focus for domestic cohesion and silenced, to a great extent, opposi­ tion to the government. The attention paid to Burma after 1954 by other na­ tions, especially the most Important members of the two power blocs, made the Burmese feel that their country had achieved a real status In the world commumlty. The Burmese government had been. Increasingly after 1954, host to heads of states, prime ministers, and foreign ministers from the Communist bloc, the free world, and uncommitted nations.

4 On January 6, 1955, President Tito of Yugoslavia paid an Important eleven-day state visit to Burma, one result of vdilch was to make the Burmese leaders develop a special af­ finity for Tito and his country. In February Secretary of State Dulles paid a quick one-day visit to Rangoon. U Nu went to Delhi In March. April was the most Important month for the Burmese government and to the people of Rangoon It must have seemed that many world figures were beating a path to Burma's door. On April 12, the Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister of the Ho Chlh-mlnh regime In North Vietnam arrived for a brief state visit. On April l4. Prime Minister Nehru 114 Similarly, "Burman officials from U Nu down . . . who have gone abroad since 1954 have been accorded VIP treatment. When abroad on official missions, vrtiether In the Communist of India, President Nasser of Egypt, and Naim Khan of Afghanistan stopped In Rangoon and these dignitaries were joined by Chou En-lal of Communist China. After brief talks and state dinners, the idiole group left with U Nu for the Bandung Conference on the loth. On the 27th all were back again In Rangoon, before going their separate ways to their own countries. A month later. In part to demonstrate Burma's "inde­ pendent " policy In redressing vdiat seemed to some as a ''leaning" toward the Communist bloc, U Nu set off on an extended trip, first to Israel, and next to Yugoslavia, the two countries with vdilch Burma had developed a special affinity. Prom his visit with President Tito, Ü Nu went to London for a week and then for his first experience In the United States from June 23 to July 19 vAien he left for Tokyo and his return home. Again in October, U Nu redressed his middle-of-the- road course by a state visit to the Soviet Union, Poland, and then Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Perhaps to return his visit and most certainly to show their nation's Interest In Aslan affairs, Bulganin and Khrushchev took their well-publicized swing out to Asia at the end of 1955, ar­ riving In Burma on December 1 for a week's stay. In January Madame Sun-Yat-sen was a state guest In Burma as If to keep attention focused on the other half of the Moscow-Peking partnership. More Important to the Burmese, however, was the visit of a Yugoslav economic mission In February. During the remainder bf 1956 the Israeli Prime Minister paid an official visit to Burma, Soviet First Vice Premier Mlkoyan appeared In March, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Federenko came In December, and In February, Soviet Marshall Zhukov paid a five-day visit to Burma. Although Chou En-lal came to Rangoon for the third time In December 1956, Soviet visitors outnumbered those from Communist China or any other country In the fourteen months between November 1955 to February 1957.* * Johns tone, Burma's Foreign Policy; A Study In Neutralism. pp. 90-91. 115 bloc or In the free nations, Burman officials were well taken care of, their reasonable wants met, and they are wined and dined lavishly. This is heady stuff for the repre­ sentatives of a small nation which has been Isolated from contacts with other nations within the memory of most of the 5 Burman officials who receive such treatment. Under these circumstances. It was difficult for any political leader not to feel that Burma had attained an enhanced position in the world.

Local Insurrections

Local uprisings Injected caution Into the character and personality of Burmese foreign policy formulation, The uprisings and the threat of them tempered Burmese foreign policy considerably. Independent Burma was faced almost at once with rebellions on a scale that made the old antl- Brltlsh strikes seem like friendly arguments. A month after Independence the Burmese Communist leaders "attended a Southeast Aslan Communist conference in Calcutta vdiere In- 6 surrectlon was plotted. " Two months later the Communists launched an armed Insurrection against U Nu's government.

5 Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, p. 280. 6 U Nu, to Aslan Speaks, p. 15. 116 This was a direct contradiction of a pledge made by the

Burmese Communist leaders to U Nu six months before Inde­ pendence was granted that they would give their full co­

operation to the ruling government.

U Nu was a man who believed that "the government

should be open to all of Burma's political parties and that

the threat of civil war had to be met by conciliation of .. 7 the extremists. It was In this kind of a spirit that

U Nu offered on May 25, 1948, his "Program of Leftist Unity,"

In a sincere attempt to pacify the Communists. U Nu de­

clared this statement of fifteen points as the government's

"maximum and minimum" objectives In Its effort to bring the

Communists back Into the government. The first point was

constructed to appeal to the far Left. It stated that Burma

should secure "political and economic relations with the

Soviet Union and the democratic countries of Eastern Europe

In the same manner as we are now having with Britain and 8 the United States." Point fifteen went further by calling

for the formation of a study group to propagate Marxist

doctrines. The British government was facing the prospect of

writing Burma off to the Communists when U Nu first announced

7 John S. Thomson, "Burmese Neutralism," Political Science Quarterly, June 1957, p. 271.

^Ibld. 117 his "Program of Leftist Unity. " Many Western observers

thought that U Nu was altogether too conciliatory. They were afraid that If the Communists had accepted his offer,

they would have been In a very good position to gain control

of the government. As It turned out, they forced the govern­ ment to fight them,

% e Central Government was also faced with other rebel­

lions throught the country. Aside from these armed Insur­

rections, the government had to face the demands of the

Constituent States for state autonomy. With the spirit of

revolt and rebellion against authority spreading even Into

the ranks of the armed forces and police, the Karen National

Defense Organization decided that the time was right for It

to use force to obtain concessions which it had not been 9 able to get through previous negotiations.

The peoples In the hills had on several occasions

Influenced the government's outlook In the field of Inter­

national relations. On the eve of Independence one probable

reason why U Nu did not suggest where Burma should look for

allies was because the country was strongly divided on the

Issue, The Socialists favored going to Russia, but this

decision would have alarmed the conservative elements In

the country, The Karens, and to a lesser extent the Shans

^Kahln, Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, p. 88, 118 and Kachlns, would have preferred to conclude an alliance with Great Britain. Naturally, this would have been repug­ nant to the Socialists and be labelled as a "sell-out to the Imperialist," The result of this division In public opinion greatly helped to Influence Burma to opt for a policy of nonalignment and neutralism.

Special Interests and Groups

A special group that had some Influence In foreign policy formulation was the Youth Movement. However, with the Communists Infiltrating Into the field of education the

Government tried to defect their Influence Indirectly by forming Its own group among the students under a party name.

Unfortunately, the Government was less successful with stu­ dents than with labor. In a recent university election the

communist group, demanding longer holidays and less rigid

examinations, won an easy victory. This victory "does not

imply that all the students who want longer holidays and

easier tests are Communists, and almost all of them would

certainly re-act much more violently against communist dis­

cipline. But, here again, the students who follow the com­

munist lead get their cause (and their names) advertised In

the newspapers, and this exposes the weakness of the Govern- 10 ment, wtille making It still weaker."

Potentially speaking, the group most able to put pres-

lOlbld.. p. 6 1 . 119 sure on the Government was the Buddhist clergy. So firm was Its hold over the people that even the strongest govern­ ment could not afford to alienate the Buddhist monastic order with Impunity, Under the Constitution the clergy was debarred from political activities, even from the exercise of Its franchise. Although some members of the order were prominent as nationalist leaders under British rule, the

clergy was traditionally against participating In political activities. Buddhism was not a state religion, but the Con­

stitution "recognizes the special position of Buddhism as

the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens 11 of the Union, " The Government was always trying to im­ prove and strengthen Its. relationship with the clergy through

various legislative enactments.

■nie Ecclesiastical Courts Act provides for the esta­ blishment of ecclesiastical courts for the decision of dis­ putes In religious matters and for the expulsion of Im­ moral or heretical monks. Hie Pall University Act establishes a Pall College which Is being used as an institute for the promotion of Buddhistic studies. And the Sasana (Religious) Council Act created an organization with power to act on behalf of the Government In all religious matters,

These measures and other gestures of respect for the Buddhist

religion and clergy attracted the sympathy and moral support

of the religious order. Even with these welcomed measures

11 The Constitution of the Union of Burma, Sec 21, p. 4,

12 Pumlvall, The Governance of Modem Burma, p. 62, 120 to its credit, the Government still proceeded cautiously in regard to measures that might possibly offend the clergy.

Purnlvall felt that there was a closer, though unofficial, alliance between some government leaders and a strong group among the younger members of the clergy. So long as Burma was led by U Nu and others respected as men of piety, the monks were unlikely to subscribe to an opposition party with religion as its main plank. However, If control over the

APPPL were passed on to men v*io regarded religion as secon­ dary to other creeds, Hugh Tinker then felt that "a Buddhist party might well arise and form a very powerful rival to the 13 APPPL."

The Buddhist clergy has been able to exert some In­ fluence on the formulation of Burma's policy of neutralism through Its religious ties with other neutralist countries—

Ceylon, Cambodia, and India— that have some connections with the Buddhist heritage. The Buddhist characteristics of tolerance and a drive for peace have shaped the thinking and outlook of many Burmese leaders. These qualities and others have made It easier for the Burmese to accept neu­ tralism and Its corollaries of no military alliance, peace­ ful co-exlstence, and so forth. Buddhism has also made com­ munism with Its atheistic outlook toward religion rather

13 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 70. 121 repulsive to the Burmese.

Foreign Aid "Without Strings"

Burma was In desperate financial need during the years following Independence. Internal warfare had cut down her

Income from the export of rice and teak and the financial cost of dealing with the Insurgents was heavy. By 1950 only foreign economic aid could save the Burmese economy and give the leaders an opportunity to Initiate their Indus- rlal development and economic reform programs. To help them along In their ambitious program U Nu turned to the

United States and Britain for assistance. On March 24,

1950, Britain, through the Colombo countries of Asia, loaned

Burma six million pounds while the United States agreed In 14 September to provide continuing Point Pour aid.

Burma's drive for economic development aimed at greater self-sufficiency depended, at least for a transitional period, on expanding Its reliance on external aid--more technical assistance, more loans, more students studying abroad. At­ tention was many times directed, for psychological and poli­ tical reasons, toward diversifying the sources of foreign aid. This was done, not only to neutralize the various political factions within the country, but also to minimize

^^Thomson, "Burmese Neutralism," Political Science Quarterly, p. 273. 122

Burma's dependence on any one country or bloc of countries.

This kind of outlook was very common among the nonaligned countries that wanted to Improve themselves rapidly, but were, at the same time, dependent on external assistance to help carry out their programs.

The desire and need for International assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the world were stressed In the

United Nations by Burma's delegates. For example, U % l n t 15 The In told the General Assembly In September 1953:

We know that the underdeveloped areas of the world cannot be developed In five years, but we do suggest that It Is important to utilize these years to build up among the peoples of the underdeveloped areas the prospect of a better life. If not for themselves, at least for their children; for life without hope of any kind can only result In the release of destructive forces which, once released, might easily make the present turbulent phase In the history of the world appear, by comparison, a spell of paradise.

External assistance was critically needed, especially during the Immediate years following Independence, in order to at least partially fulfill the promises of the nationalist leaders to get the country moving. The expectations of the people were developed beyond the limit '^rtiere they could be satisfactorily satisfied by local resources alone. Outside help was greatly needed to aid In rebuilding and rehabili­ tating the moral. Intellectual, physical, and economic

strength of Burma.

15 Quoted by Flfleld, Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, p. 185, 123 The results that the Burmese were able to get from their request for economic assistance "without strings" conditioned the APPPL leaders to believe that their policy of nonalignment plus this precept of accepting aid from any source so long as "no strings are attached" was the "best" and most workable foreign policy they could formulate. In a very practical sense. It enabled Burma to have the "best of everything. " It permitted her to be on the friendliest terms with the big powers In both the Slno-Soviet and Anglo-

American blocs, and to avoid antagonizing any country. It was only natural for the Burmese leaders to attribute this

"success" of their foreign policy to their own efforts and not to external circumstances or to the policies of other nations.

Need of Markets for Exports

Burma is a country that had been heavily dependent on the sale of rice for most of her foreign currency earnings,

Due to this heavy reliance on one product— rice--as the back­ bone of her export trade, Burma's foreign policy, to a large extent, was vulnerable to the accessibility to markets and the rise and fall In prices. Fluctuât Inns In world prices, then, played a major role In Influencing Burma's actions In

International relations.

In the first few years of Independence Burma did not 124 have much trouble in finding a sufficient number of markets

to absorb all the rice she could produce. The outbreak of

the Korean conflict Increased the demand for rice and, con­

sequently, raised the price of rice to a very favorable

level. However, the Korean armistice, concluded In 1953,

caused a rapid fall In world-wide government purchses for

stockpiling. These purchases had push the price of most

primary commodities. Including rice, to a postwar high.

Immediately after the Korean armistice world rice prices

began to decline, but the Burmese government initially re­

fused to lower their sale price. As a result, India and

Japan, two of her Important customers, cut their purchases

to an extent that Burma's export of rice fell by over thirty 16 per cent during the latter half of 1 9 3 3 .

The drop In rice exports created a two-fold problem

for Burma. It resulted In a reduction of foreign currency

earnings and an unwanted rice surplus. As the Burmese

government became more and more apprehensive over Its rice

suiTplus, It carried on negotiations with the United States

and with the World Bank. In October 1954, Prime Minister

U Nu acknowledged that negotiations for a resumption of

American aid had been going on, but stated that "Burma Is

willing to accept United States economic aid, but we do not

16 Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, p. 79. 125 want It free. We prefer to pay for It as this forms a more „ 17 solid basis of friendship than acceptance of gifts.

Unfortunately, no agreement was reached because the Burmese offer to pay for American assistance In rice was unaccepta­ ble to a government that was Involved In disposing Its own cereal surpluses.

New pressures were brought to bear on the world rice market, causing prices to decline still further, when It became known that the rice yields for 1954 throughout South­ east Asia, plus India and Japan, were going to be very good.

By March 1954, Burma was confronted with a more serious rice export problem than the previous year. All Indicators pointed to a very bleak possibility of disposing the entire

1 9 5 4 crop In normal markets.

In light of this gloomy prospect local sentiment In favor of expanding trade with Communist China grew. The

New Times of Burma felt that It would be advantageous for

Burma to develop trade relations with her great neighbor and friend. It strongly felt that Burma and Communist China stood to profit together by developing their mutual trade and commerce. Burma's raw materials, strategic as well as non-strategic, would have a strong appeal to her Chinese neighbor. It suggested that Communist China could be a

17 Ibid., p. 81. 126 "bargain counter" If anyone had enough foresight and bold­ ness to grasp the chance. The APPFL leaders, however, gave no evidence that they had carefully analyzed the kinds of economic relations vrtilch their government might undertake with other nations. They had no long range program designed to prevent Burma from becoming economically dependent on one or the other of the two power blocs. U Nu and his advisers found It hard to obtain a concrete and expert assessment of just how and where a small nation could or should draw the line between economic independence and economic dependence. Therefore, they had to react to the economic conditions of the moment and deal with each annual surplus rice disposal crisis as It occurred. TSie consequences of the rice export problem— declining rice prices and foreign exchange reserves, smaller sales to previous customers, and the failure of negotiations for assistance from the World Bank and from the United States at that point— were met by drastic actions at the cabinet 18 level. A new Ministry of Trade Development was organized. It was headed by U Raschld, one of the ablest administra­ tors In the Cabinet,

18 Louis J. Wallnsky, Economic Development In Burma; 1951- 1961, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 19627 p. 157. 127 To meet the crisis Burma had to redirect her patterns of trade and, consequently, her foreign policy was altered considerably. The various economic setbacks which created a desperate Burma allowed the Slno-Sovlet bloc to easily move Into the picture. A series of agreements with China,

Russia, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslavakla, and Rumania were negotiated. These agreements enabled Burma to dispose her surplus rice stock on barter arrangements. In exchange for her rice Burma had to take reciprocal quantities of 19 Slno-Sovlet bloc goods and technicians. This sudden shift

In trade activities with communlst-bloc countries made some leaders of the free world conclude that Burma was being drawn Into their opposition's camp. This was not the case, however.

By far the most significant economic development In the opening months of the fiscal year 1957-1958 was the sharp decline In the Indicated size of the paddy harvest. Because of adverse cllmati c conditions. It appeared that the new paddy crop would be almost a million tons smaller than that 20 of the previous year. The Implication of such a decline

for rice exports, foreign exchange earnings, budgeting reve­

nues, and the execution of the fiscal programs was most

19 Prank Trager, "Burma's Foreign Policy, Journal of Aslan Studies, November 1956, p. 91. 20 Wallnsky, op. cit., p. 238. 128 serious. As further reports on the progress of the crop confirmed the earlier findings. It became clear that coun­ tervailing actions were needed.

The small crop also raised the question as to how much paddy the State Agriculture Marketing Board should pro­ cure for export. It also had to decide on how to allocate the reduced export tonnages. Another Important question was that of price. The only commitment Burma had made for

1 9 5 7 - 1 9 5 8 was to grant India a price of thirty-two pounds 21 per ton. The first question, therefore, was whether India

should be given the entire 500, 0 0 0 tons called for by the

contract or asked to take a lesser pro rata share of the to­

tal export rice available along with other contractual buy­

ers for whom prices had not been set. A further question

to be decided was whether other buyers should be supplied

on the basis of the contract price established for India or

required to pay a higher price vdilch would be more In line

with market conditions. These and other economic questions

figured prominently Into the deliberations on a significant

portion of Burma's foreign policy formulation. Because

Burma was so overly dependent on the exportation of rice for

her foreign exchange earnings, her foreign policy was. In a

way, vulnerable to and Influenced by the fluctuations of the

21 Ibid. 129 world price for rice.

Neighborly Influence

Because Burma was surrounded by countries which were stronger than her, she was. In the words of Ü Nu, "hemmed 22 In like a tender gourd among the cactus." It was Impos­ sible for Burma to regard foreign affairs as something re­ mote or academic because blunders In foreign policy were bound to have direct repercussions at home, Burma's precarious situation— geographic location plus small size and weakness,— her leaders argued, dictated no other rational course than that of "close, cordial, and friendly" relations with her neighbors, especially Communist China. It was difficult for anyone to disprove the logic of this viewpoint. So long as the leaders of Burma saw no other alternative vrtilch offered better results and better safe­ guards for their country's security, they continued to pur­ sue a neutralist policy firmly based on their entente cor­ diale with Communist China. Whether such a policy, which made the Burmese Government more dependent upon decisions taken In Peking and less free to take the "right" action, could still be called positive neutralism was open to question.

22 U Nu, Prom Peace to Stability, p. 102. 130 The following quote of Cabinet Minister U Kyaw ftyein 23 vividly demonstrated Burma's attitude toward Communist China, Small nations always mistrust bigger one, especially those close by. For years past, every Burman has mis­ trusted China, whether under Mao or Chlang. . . . We do not consider China a menace, but we accept a pos­ sibility of China one day Invading us. We are not alone In this concern. Our neighbors will also be perturbed as our fate may likely be theirs. We are entering Into closer relations with India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and are trying to find a formula for peace­ ful co-exlstence In this part of our world. We don't want Communist Russia or Communist China, but being a small nation, we must find ways and means of avoiding embroilment in power blocs. In other words, Burma had a sincere desire to remain neutral In the cold war in order to preserve her Independence. In discussing Burma's policy of neutralism an ex­ perienced Burmese politician replied; "In back of all of our public statements about 'non-alignment, ' 'friendship with all countries, ' 'positive neutralism, * and the like, is a constant awareness of our big and powerful neighbor to the north. We do not fear Communism as an Ideology so much as we fear the day when China's masses must find living space in our under- 24 populated country. " Thus we can see how the foreign policy of a weak, unstable nation was Influenced to a great degree by a large, well-organized, and powerful neighbor.

23 Quoted by Trager, 0£. clt. p. 93.

24 Quoted by Johnstone, op. clt. p. 158. 131 Besides Communist China per se, the local Chinese minority had some political Influence In Burma, The Chinese community In Burma, though small in comparison to those of

Indonesia or Thailand, provided a potential source for re­ cruitment of agents and the conduct of a variety of subver­ sive activities. Another reason for concern was the con­ nections that were established at an early date between the underground Communists of Burma and their counterparts across the border. Lastly, the Slno-Burmese border area presented an excellent opportunity to the Chinese Communists for stirring up trouble whenever they wished. The frontier terrain and its length made It most difficult for the Burmese government to police border crossings and to prevent Infil­ tration by communist agents. As practical politicians, the

APPPL leaders were always cognizant of the dangers that the local Chinese community could pose for Burma.

The APPPL leaders relied on India, credited with lay­ ing the groundwork for the idea of positive neutralism, as their main guide in formulating Burma's foreign policy, even though they did not always follow her on specific problems.

"NoWiere else In Southeast Asia is India's Impact greater than In Burma. Obviously the foreign policy of the New

Delhi government Is closely watched and carefully weighed 25 in Rangoon. " Neither Burma nor India was contented to

25Plfleld, 0£. clt., p. 216. 132 merely follow a neutral or negative policy. They both wanted an Independent foreign policy which would give them maximum freedom of action In future and unforeseen circumstances.

In more ways than one, India helped Burma establish the foun­ dations of her Ideological outlook toward foreign affairs.

When Burma cancelled the American Aid Program In 1953 and suffered no penalties from the United States, this event 26 had great significance for her. It was the forerunner of a later belief Implicit In her neutralism that she, as well as other neutral nations, could deal with the United States and Its allies as they saw fit without fear of serious re­ prisal. On the other hand, any action which might antago­ nize the Soviet Union, or particularly Communist China, had to be weighed carefully In terms of Its possible adverse consequences. For Burma the United States was far away and

Uncle Sam was pictured as a friendly person, but Mao Tse-tung and his Chinese hordes were near at hand and no Burmese could guess at what moment the olive branch of peaceful co-exlstence would be overrun by a mass of China's millions moving south.

One result of the policy of neutralism was the crea­ tion of a psychology of compromise on the part of the govern­ ment officials who tended to feel that every action of the

26 John P. Cady, A History of Modem Burma, New York: Cornell University Press, 195o, p. 621. 133 government that seemed to swing toward one power bloc must be balanced by another action toward the other bloc. This attitude made the Burmese leaders susceptible to almost constant pressure from the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments. % e Burmese politicians and government offi­ cials felt that Britain and the United States were far away and that, idien their representatives protested some policy or action as being too pro-communist, their governments would not really do anything drastic about It. On the other hand, there was uncertainty and even fear of what the Soviet Union or Red China might do If the Burmese government did not heed their advice. Thus, "attitudes engendered by a policy of 'neutralism' lead towards appeasement of the Com­ munists. Tils was true of the whole period of the former 27 APPPL government. "

27 W.C. Johnstone, Observation on Contemporary Burma, California: The Rand Corporation, )6y 9, i960, p. 7. 134

Section Pour: REACTION TO AND EVALUATION OP ASIAN NEUTRALISM

Chapter Eight

Reaction to Aslan Neutralism

The United States

When Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 12, I9 6 I, 1 and was asked udiat his views on neutralism were, he replied:

I do not believe that we ourselves should be unduly concerned about vhat might be called genuine neutra­ lism because If a new nation Is Internally vigorous, viable, strong, progressive. Its orientation In foreign policy Is not so Important as Its health and strength. Its orientation as a neutral. . . . I do not believe we ought to ask commitments of a sort that would make It difficult for them to lead their own peoples In development, or difficult for them to draw together In regional associations of their own, as the opportunity might arise, or difficult for them to take their proper place In such organization as the United Nations.

Secretary Rusk went on to say that the United States can

work together with other countries on common practical pro­

blems In many fields "without having political pledges which

may In many cases be beyond the competence of the governments

1 "Secretary Rusk before Senate Foreign Relations Com­ mittee, " Bt)relgn Policy Bulletin, March 15, 1961, p. 193. 133 2 concerned to make good on."

The view Secretary Rusk expressed before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee is completely different from the opinion the late Secretary of State John Poster Dulles had of the nonaligned states. When Secretary Dulles first brought the serious attention of the American government to our relations with the new states, he saw a bipolar world in which those not actively helping the West were regarded as hostile. The best form of assistance, in his view, was alliance. In a much publicized remark made on June 9, 1956,

Secretary Dulles excoriated neutralism as the delusion that

"a nation can buy safety for itself by being indifferent to 3 the fate of others. " He went on to say that this "has

increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it Is an immoral and short- 4 sighted conception."

The idea that neutrality was untenable and somehow

"wrong" probably stemmed from the fact that American neutra­

lity policy broke down in the past two world wars. Since the

Western nations regarded their cause as morally "right," it

2 Ibid.

3 Martin, Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. xvii.

4 Ibid. 136 was only natural for them to consider neutrality as morally

"wrong. " Once the cold war became an accepted phenomenon.

Western statesmen and publicists who believed In the "right­ ness" of the struggle against Communism regarded a policy of nonalignment as being similar to neutrality and Inveighed against It. So vAien Burma and other nations following a nonalignment policy were labelled as "neutralist, " it was done with the Implication In Western countries, especially

In the United States, that such a posture was "immoral.”

During the Dulles era "many Americans viewed 'neu­ tralism* as a new type of social disease. Its probable causes: Intimacy In some form with Communism; Its symptoms: 5 mental confusion and moral dereliction; Its cure: unknown.

That somber diagnosis Is filled with Implications of doom for the "victims. " But our warnings and protests to the neutralists have been of little avail. Many of these coun­ tries have deliberately rejected them. Among the centers of Infection, Asia Is the region udiere this "disease" has been consistently strong and most diverse In form. And however strongly wè may be against it, we must recognize the fact that Aslan neutralism can be neither Ignored nor talked out of existence. For our own sake, therefore, we should

5 Robert Scalaplno, "Neutralism In Asia," The American Political Science Review, March 1954, p. 49. 137 try to get a clearer understanding of this highly complex force— its causes and effects and possibly Its implications for future American policy. Understanding does not neces­ sarily mean acceptance; however. It does permit a more ac­ curate calculation of possible alternatives.

In recent years the United States has ceased to con­ demn the neutralists for their refusal to participate In collective defense efforts. However, favors, especially economic aid, extended to neutral nations may adversely affect United States relations with Its allies. This may happen either by Increasing the appeal of neutralism to their people or by causing resentment of the favorable treatment accorded countries that bear no share of the burden of col­

lective defense. The United States must, therefore, be

careful not to add to the lures of neutralism.

Our various defense alliances were shakened and

weakened during the Elsenhower days because we created an

air of confusion and doubt among our friends. Our attitude

toward neutralism, as enunciated by President Elsenhower,

was contrary to the hard black-and-khlte policy of Secretary

Dulles. At a news conference the President was quoted as

saying :

. . . today there are certain nations that say they are neutral. Tils doesn't mean vriiat It Is so often Inter­ preted to mean, neutral as between right or wrong or decency or Indecency. If a nation Is truly neutral. If It Is attacked by anybody— and we are not going to attack them— public opinion of the world Is outraged. 138 If* it has announced its military association with an­ other great power, things could happen to It, diffi­ culties along Its borders, and people would say: ''Good for It. They asked for It." ^ In our confusion over vftiat neutralism Is and how we should treat It, Americans have continually tried to find ways of answering these questions. American critics of neu­ tralism have contended that a good test of neutralism Is to see whether a given country "is with us or against us "--that Is, whether It takes the side of the anti-Communist coali­ tion led by the United States against the Soviet Union and Communist China or not. Tils was a tenable test during the earlier period of the cold war. But since the Geneva con­ ference, . . . It has been gradually undermined by the Increas­ ing readiness of the United States and of our Western allies to expand contacts with the USSR and with the countries of Eastern Europe. If Britain can trade With Russia, Is It neutralist for India or Egypt to do so? If Sir Anthony Eden and Premier Guy Mollet can go to Moscow without being labelled neutralists, urtiy pin the label on Nehru and Nasser? And If It Is thought wrong for India or Egypt to recognize Peiping when Wash­ ington does not, then Is It not also wrong for Britain, (Prance) and our Aslan ally Pakistan to have diplomatic relations with Communist China? ' In formulating any kind of attitude or policy toward

6 "Welcome Ifet for In-Between Nations, " Newsweek, June 1 8 , 1 9 5 6 , p. 57.

7 V,M.Dean, "What Is United States Policy on Neutralism?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, August 15, 1956, pp. 183-184. 139 the neutralists, American policy planners must remember that there are all types of neutralists. They must be cognizant of the fact that the United States Is dealing, not with neu­ tralism, but with neutralisms, and that no adjective or action Is equally applicable to all. 140

Chapter Nine

Evaluation of Aslan Neutralism

< Neutralism, as referred to In this paper. Is a post- World War Two product. It has been embraced as the founda­ tion for the foreign policies of many of the newly Indepen­ dent countries. They have opted for neutralism because they feel that It Is the best possible way to prevent the loss of their highly cherished Independence to economic, political, or military Imperialism of either of the two combatants In the prevailing cold war. Neutralism Is a posture which will also enable these underdeveloped countries to get the best and the most from the Industrial countries without Jeopard­ izing their recently won freedom. If they play their cards right, these neutral countries can milk two cows at one time and get all the benefits of the milk without having to worry about the upkeep of the cows. Tie countries that label their orientation In world politics as being neutral have come to realize the great service that they can offer to mankind. They realize the great danger of the cold war and the grave consequences that face humanity should It break out Into a hot war. By virtue of their non-partIsanshlp they can operate between l4l the two power blocs and try to bring about some kind of workable peace. By trying to expand the "area of peace" and act as a strong moral force for peace, these countries have undertaken a tremendous and challenging task. Mili­ tarily speaking, they are battling for world peace without any weapon of consequence at their command. They cannot hope to create a military balance of power or to enforce peace because their armed might Is Infinitesimal when compared to those of the super nuclear powers. And since the prospect of their developing anything militarily significant In the future Is practically Impossible, their only hope of bring­ ing about world peace Is through persuasion, negotiations, and the use of moral force. Because of the present nuclear stalemate, the neutral countries of the world have Increased In Importance and sta­ ture In relation to the power blocs. They have become In­ creasingly Important In the United Nations as the countries with the votes to determine the outcome of many conflicts between the East and the West. In addition, they are seeking to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council In order to gain adequate representation on these

Important organs of the United Nations. They have tried to work together as a "third force" In order that their stands and actions on the world scale of politics will have a greater Impact. Although these countries have been able to act with 142 some degree of coherence, due to their common desire to wipe out colonialism from the face of the earth, their sense of "unity" will fade away as this common objective has been accomplished and their domestic problems, their individual needs, and their national aspirations emerge as being more important motives in their foreign policies. Although the nonaligned countries have many times used a double standard— one for the West and one for the Communists— in judging various international issues, they will eventually become the "conscience" of the cold war. They will carry more and more weight in molding and directing world opinion as the super giants fail to solve their dif­ ferences and create a more harmonious atmosphere in which men may live and develop their dreams into realities. And since the basic desire of any rational man is to have peace, and as the "big guys" fail to achieve it for the world, the "little guys" will eventually be given their turn to try. 143 ■

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