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Bashur Getting There is Airfield Half the Battle: Operation UGLY BABY by Robert W. Jones, Jr. News that P���������� for organized as an Advanced Operating Base Turkey would what would become Operation IRAQI (AOB) successfully infiltrated from their FREEDOM began months before the prepositioning location into the northern not allow U.S. start of hostilities on 19 March 2003. sector and made initial coordination with News that Turkey would not allow U.S. the Kurdish resistance organizations.2 forces to pass forces to pass through its territory was a Turkey’s 1 March refusal to allow over- through its surprise, but to the soldiers of the 10th flight to coalition aircra� prevented the rest Special Forces Group (SFG), it was a near of 10th SFG from infiltrating across the territory was disaster. Months of contingency plan- Turkey–Iraq border as planned. With driv- The UGLY BABY Route. The red areas are Iraqi antiaircraft missiles and guns. ning had been conducted, and equipment ing across the border no longer an option, a surprise, had been painstakingly prepositioned 10th SFG conducted air planning with at an Intermediate Support Base (ISB) in the 352nd Special Operations Wing. Time but to the Turkey. The soldiers of 10th SFG would was quickly running out on the carefully TURKEY soldiers of the truly show their me�le by adjusting plans developed unconventional warfare plan. and executing operations in an extremely In the meantime, on 3 March the 10th SFG IRAN 10th Special austere and flexible environment. forward deployed to Constanta, Romania, SYRIA X As with many operations, the first task in an effort to stay relatively close to the Bashur Forces Group of the 10th SFG staff was to get soldiers Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). The on the ground in order to show commit- Turkish decision to block coalition access UGLY BABY Route (SFG), it ment. Based on their experiences in 1991 increased the infiltration distance fourfold, “Green Line” X was a near during the Gulf War, the Kurds were from 250 miles to over 1,000 miles. For sev- Radar and AAA As Sulaymaniyah hesitant at first to commit to a U.S. effort eral days the State Department a�empted Iraqi troops disaster. to oust Saddam. A primary responsibil- to gain overflight permission from the Border ity of Special Forces (SF) was to show the Turkish government, but to no avail. As Kurdish leadership and the rank and file the 10th SFG staff adjusted the overall that the U.S. was serious and commi�ed to plan, logistics soldiers worked with the combat. The only way to show U.S. resolve ODAs and aircrews to load MC-130s for was to get SF soldiers on the ground and infiltrations ultimately cancelled because conducting combat operations with the of the overflight refusal. A bold decisive SYRIA Kurdish Peshmerga units. This meant get- move had to be made or the U.S. would IRAQ ting as many Operational Detachments A run the risk of losing Kurdish support on (ODAs), the basic combat unit of the Special the northern front, freeing some of the Forces, into northern Iraq as quickly as sixteen Iraqi divisions arrayed against IRAN possible.1 To that end, an SF company (-) the Kurds for movement south to Bagh- IRAQ 10 Veritas dad, and possible combat against U.S. forces.3 task organized for split team operations.5 In the event The first leg of the bold two-day air-land infiltra- of a catastrophic aircra� loss, the mission could contin- tion was conducted by six MC-130H aircra� from ue. ODA 062 almost experienced that grim eventuality. the 7th Special Operations Squadron, Joint Special For most of the soldiers, the beginning of the flight Operations Air Detachment–North, flying from Con- into Iraq was uneventful. The commander of ODA 062, stanta, Romania to another staging base in theater. Captain (CPT) David McDougal (pseudonym), com- The second leg began at 1730 hours (Zulu time) on mented that during the first hour they experienced some 22 March 2002, when three MC-130s carrying 2/10th turbulence, but it was minor enough that it felt like SFG soldiers took off for Bashur Airfield, and another flying on a training mission from Fort Carson to Fort three MC-130s carrying 3/10th SFG soldiers, headed Polk. The first indication that the flight was anything for As Sulaymaniyah. (Located north of Irbil, Bashur but routine came when the MC-130 suddenly dropped Airfield would become the site of the 173rd Airborne altitude. People and equipment floated in the simulated Brigade jump three days later.) The circuitous infiltra- weightlessness, the load visibly li�ing and straining tion route covered 590 miles at altitudes under 500 the ratchet straps that were supposed to keep it in place. feet and required the use of night vision goggles As the plane’s descent slowed, weight returned with (NVGs) for nocturnal navigation. The Air Force a vengeance, and the soldiers and payload slammed later called this the longest low-level infiltration since down onto the deck. The inside of the aircra� was filled World War II. The soldiers knew it as Ugly Baby.4 with the unmistakable sound of chaff firing as the In planning the high-risk movement, the command- aircra� rolled and jumped to avoid antiaircra� artil- ers and staff were forced to make many tough decisions. lery (AAA). Blinded by the darkness, CPT McDougal Load plans for all ODAs were altered due to weight lim- focused on the sound of shrapnel hi�ing the aircra� itations on the aircra�. Personnel were also adjusted, and anxiously “waited for the side of the plane to open in case of the tragic loss of a plane, and all ODAs were up.” Then, almost as suddenly as it had dropped, the The UGLY BABY Route. The red areas are Iraqi antiaircraft missiles and guns. TURKEY IRAN SYRIA X Bashur UGLY BABY Route “Green Line” X Radar and AAA As Sulaymaniyah Iraqi troops Border SYRIA IRAQ IRAN IRAQ Winter 2005 11 plane leveled out and flew straight to Bashur Airfield.6 the journey, no one inside the aircra� actually knew the The MC-130 crew performed a good landing, and the full extent of the damage. The MC-130 landed without 2/10 SFG soldiers executed a combat offload, grateful problem, and as it taxied, the ramp lowered and the to have land under their feet. As arranged, the infiltra- crew chief stepped out onto the ramp to conduct his tion team was met by members of their ba�alion and visual checks. He quickly returned and yelled, “Run!” Kurdish Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdistan Democratic Responding quickly to the chief’s alarm, the soldiers Party (KDP).7 CPT McDougal and his half of ODA 062 conducted an emergency exit and assembled one quickly set to work training a KDP Peshmerga quick hundred meters to the rear le� of the aircra�. Only reaction force company, but found they had to do so then did they see the extent of the damage—the le� number one engine was blackened from fire, and fuel was gushing out of both wings. The next morning the soldiers found out that the pilot’s windshield had been blown out from shrapnel, forcing the pilot to fly using instruments alone.8 They all felt very lucky to be alive. A�er landing, the SF soldiers were led by Air Force personnel to an American recep- tion area, and stayed at Incirlik for a day. They then loaded into a C-17 on the a�er- noon of 24 March, and, a�er a quick stop- over at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, proceeded back to their starting point—the base at Constanta, Romania. Finally, on 27 March 2003, ODA 062 “B” landed at As Sulaymaniyah Airfield and met up with 3/10th SFG (FOB 103). The forty-nine 2/10th SFG soldiers moved north by ground con- voy in order to rejoin with their parent unit.9 The 2/10th SFG soldiers in the lead air- Passengers on one aircraft shaken but unhurt. cra� had an excellent view of the Iraqi air defenses that gave their brothers such trou- without the rest of their team. Assistant Detachment ble. To pass time on the flight, a few soldiers decided Commander Warrant Officer 1 (WO1) Timothy Zlatich to look out the windows wearing their NVGs. Since and his half of the ODA had landed in Turkey. the night was cold, they were able to easily observe The “B” split of ODA 062, on aircra� number the crews of a cluster of four AAA guns huddled three (call sign “Harley 34”), had a much different around burn barrels for warmth. As the aircra� passed flight experience than McDougal’s split. WO1 Zlatich overhead, the Iraqis looked up in apparent surprise remembered hearing the flashing and popping of at an MC-130 passing 150 feet over their heads. They AAA fire hi�ing the sides of the aircra�, and then scrambled to man their guns, but were too slow to watching as the padded insulation covering the fire at the first aircra�. The trailing aircra� were not inside of the aircra� suddenly began to shred as as fortunate.12 SFC Chris Yates (pseudonym), of ODA shrapnel cut through the skin and bounced around 085, was sleeping in one of those later aircra�, only to the interior. Once out of the heavy fire, the pilot con- be woken by men moving around the cargo hold. He tinued evasive maneuvers and the passengers quickly recalled, “The next thing that I know a buddy of mine checked for casualties.