DOCSLIB.ORG

Titel Der Dissertation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Titel Der Dissertation To Rebel or Not to Rebel? Explaining Violent and Non-Violent Separatist Conflict in Casamance (Senegal) and Barotseland (Zambia) A Comparative Framing Analysis Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen vorgelegt von Anne Lena Theobald aus Stuttgart Tübingen 2016 Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 25.11.2016 Dekan: Prof. Dr. rer. soc. Josef Schmid 1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Andreas Hasenclever 2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Thomas Diez Contents List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... i List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ ii 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Theoretical Foundations and Derivation of the Research Questions ......................... 3 1.1.1. Critical Review of Civil War Studies and Their Deficits ................................ 3 1.1.2. Bridging the Gap: Research Questions ....................................................... 6 1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Proceeding ............................................................. 7 1.2.1. A Very Short Introduction to Framing… ....................................................... 8 1.2.2. …and How It Will Be Applied ...................................................................... 9 1.3. Beyond the Cases: Contributions to the Literature .................................................. 10 1.4. Structure of the Dissertation ................................................................................... 12 2. Civil War Studies – Overview and Critical Discussion .............................................. 13 2.1. Definition of Key Concepts and Relevance of Civil War Studies ............................. 13 2.1.1. Definition of Conflict and Violent Conflict ................................................... 13 2.1.2. The Relevance of Civil War Studies .......................................................... 15 2.2. Review of Macro-Theories on Civil War .................................................................. 18 2.2.1. Grievances versus Greed: Economic Approaches to Civil Wars ................ 19 2.2.2. On State Weakness, Regimes, and Repression: Institutional Explanations of Civil War Onset ................................................................ 27 2.2.3. Identity as a Contested Cause of Armed Conflict ...................................... 32 2.3. Bridging the Gap: An Overview of Major Shortfalls of Conventional Theories and Potential Ways out ........................................................................................... 36 2.3.1. Critical Discussion of Prevailing Approaches to Studying Civil Wars ......... 36 2.3.2. Moving forward: Integrating a Micro-Perspective into the Analysis of Armed Conflict .......................................................................................... 39 3. Theoretical Framework: Framing as a Tool to Identify Micro-Mechanisms of Conflict Escalation ....................................................................................................... 44 3.1. Theoretical Considerations on the Integration of Framing into Civil War Studies ................................................................................................................... 45 3.1.1. Bridging the Gap: A Definitional Convergence of Social Movements and Armed Conflict.................................................................................... 45 3.1.2. The Emergence of Framing in Social Movement Studies and Its Potential for Civil War Studies ................................................................... 47 3.2. Clarification of Key Concepts: Frames and Framing ............................................... 50 3.2.1. Defining Collective Action Frames and Framing ........................................ 51 3.2.2. Conceptual Clarifications: The Distinction and Added Value of Framing in Relation to Similar Concepts ................................................... 56 3.3. Frame Resonance: The Missing Link between Words and Action ........................... 61 3.3.1. Ideas Matter – Interdisciplinary Insights on the Influence of Ideas on Action ........................................................................................................ 61 3.3.2. Frame Resonance: Criteria for Successful Mobilisation through Framing ..................................................................................................... 63 3.4. Potential Contributions of Framing to Theories of Violent Conflict ........................... 69 3.4.1. Framing as a Micro-Approach to Studying the Outbreak of Armed Conflict ...................................................................................................... 70 3.4.2. Shifting the Focus: How Framing Contributes to an Agent- and Agency-Centred Analytical Approach ........................................................ 72 3.4.3. Making the Invisible Visible: Studying the Impact of ‗Soft‘ Factors Regarding Conflict Onset .......................................................................... 73 3.4.4. Limits of Framing and Frame Resonance: Competing and Alternative Influences ................................................................................................. 74 4. Methodological Process: Data Collection and Analysis ........................................... 77 4.1. Methodological Process at the Cross-Case Level: Justifications and Procedure of a Comparative Case Study ................................................................................. 78 4.1.1. The Case Study Method in Theory ............................................................ 78 4.1.2. Criteria for Case Selection ........................................................................ 79 4.1.3. Theoretical Justification of a Case Study Design in the Field of Conflict Studies ......................................................................................... 81 4.2. Methodological Process at the Within-Case Level: Developing an Integrated Method of Framing Analysis as an Explanatory Approach ...................................... 85 4.2.1. Identifying Frames through Qualitative Content Analysis........................... 85 4.2.2. Framing Analysis II: How to Assess the Impact of Frames ........................ 88 4.2.3. Methodological Challenges to Analysing Framing in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond ................................................................................... 101 5. The Casamance Crisis: A Case of a Violent Separatist Conflict ............................. 106 5.1. The Self-Determination Conflict in Casamance ..................................................... 106 5.1.1. Background Information: The Colonial Past ............................................ 107 5.1.2. The History of the Casamance Conflict ................................................... 109 5.1.3. Prospect: The Casamance Conflict after 2000 ........................................ 115 5.2. Conflict Actors ...................................................................................................... 116 5.2.1. The Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance .................. 117 5.2.2. The Senegalese State ............................................................................. 121 5.3. Conflict Analysis ................................................................................................... 123 5.3.1. Geographic Factors ................................................................................. 123 5.3.2. Identity-Related Factors .......................................................................... 125 5.3.3. Socio-Economic Factors ......................................................................... 127 5.3.4. Institutional Capacity and Degree of Democratisation ............................. 129 5.3.5. Repression .............................................................................................. 130 5.3.6. External Support ..................................................................................... 131 6. Rise and Fall of the MFDC: The Casamance Conflict through a Framing Lens ..... 133 6.1. The Communication Channels of the MFDC ......................................................... 134 6.2. The MFDC‘s Message: Identification of Collective Action Frames ........................ 136 6.2.1. Diagnostic Framing ................................................................................. 137 6.2.2. Prognostic Framing ................................................................................. 141 6.2.3. Motivational Framing ............................................................................... 144 6.3. Assessing Frame Resonance and Framing Effects in Casamance ....................... 148 6.3.1. A Successful Rebellion? Review of Effective Frame Resonance ............. 149 6.3.2. Losing Ground: Deficits in Frame Resonance ......................................... 160 6.3.3. Fighting for One‘s Rights: On the Emergence and Resonance of Violent Prognostic Framing ..................................................................... 168 6.3.4. With and without Diamacoune: Assessing the Credibility of Frame Articulators .............................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Post-Populism in Zambia: Michael Sata's Rise
    This is the accepted version of the article which is published by Sage in International Political Science Review, Volume: 38 issue: 4, page(s): 456-472 available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117720809 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24592/ Post-populism in Zambia: Michael Sata’s rise, demise and legacy Alastair Fraser SOAS University of London, UK Abstract Models explaining populism as a policy response to the interests of the urban poor struggle to understand the instability of populist mobilisations. A focus on political theatre is more helpful. This article extends the debate on populist performance, showing how populists typically do not produce rehearsed performances to passive audiences. In drawing ‘the people’ on stage they are forced to improvise. As a result, populist performances are rarely sustained. The article describes the Zambian Patriotic Front’s (PF) theatrical insurrection in 2006 and its evolution over the next decade. The PF’s populist aspect had faded by 2008 and gradually disappeared in parallel with its leader Michael Sata’s ill-health and eventual death in 2014. The party was nonetheless electorally successful. The article accounts for this evolution and describes a ‘post-populist’ legacy featuring hyper- partisanship, violence and authoritarianism. Intolerance was justified in the populist moment as a reflection of anger at inequality; it now floats free of any programme. Keywords Elections, populism, political theatre, Laclau, Zambia, Sata, Patriotic Front Introduction This article both contributes to the thin theoretic literature on ‘post-populism’ and develops an illustrative case. It discusses the explosive arrival of the Patriotic Front (PF) on the Zambian electoral scene in 2006 and the party’s subsequent evolution.
    [Show full text]
  • B-8-2017-0368 EN.Pdf
    European Parliament 2014-2019 Plenary sitting B8-0368/2017 16.5.2017 MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law pursuant to Rule 135 of the Rules of Procedure on Zambia, particularly the case of Hakainde Hichilema (2017/2681(RSP)) Cristian Dan Preda, Bogdan Brunon Wenta, Deirdre Clune, Mariya Gabriel, Pavel Svoboda, Tunne Kelam, Milan Zver, Krzysztof Hetman, Dubravka Šuica, Maurice Ponga, Sven Schulze, Stanislav Polčák, Lefteris Christoforou, Marijana Petir, Claude Rolin, Ivan Štefanec, Tomáš Zdechovský, Eva Maydell, Csaba Sógor, Adam Szejnfeld, Patricija Šulin, Sandra Kalniete, Ivana Maletić, Brian Hayes, Luděk Niedermayer, Elisabetta Gardini, Željana Zovko, Laima Liucija Andrikienė, Andrey Kovatchev, Jiří Pospíšil, Mairead McGuinness, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Roberta Metsola, Francisco José Millán Mon, Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso, Seán Kelly, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group RE\P8_B(2017)0368_EN.docx PE605.467v01-00 EN United in diversityEN B8-0368/2017 European Parliament resolution on Zambia, particularly the case of Hakainde Hichilema (2017/2681(RSP)) The European Parliament, – having regard to previous resolutions on Zambia, – having regard to the statement of 16 April 2017 by the EEAS spokesperson on political tensions in Zambia, – having regard to the EU Electoral Observation Mission Report on the 2016 elections in Zambia, – having regard to the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, – having regard to the Zambian Constitution, – having regard to the Cotonou Agreement, – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, – having regard to Rule 135 of its Rules of Procedure, A.
    [Show full text]
  • Zambia Edalina Rodrigues Sanches Zambia Became Increasingly
    Zambia Edalina Rodrigues Sanches Zambia became increasingly authoritarian under Patriotic Front (PF) President Edgar Lungu, who had been elected in a tightly contested presidential election in 2016. The runner-up, the United Party for National Development (UPND), engaged in a series of actions to challenge the validity of the results. The UPND saw 48 of its legislators suspended for boycotting Lungu’s state of the nation address and its leader, Hakainde Hichilema, was arrested on charges of treason after his motorcade allegedly blocked Lungu’s convoy. Independent media and civil society organisations were under pressure. A state of emergency was declared after several arson attacks. Lungu announced his intention to run in the 2021 elections and warned judges that blocking this would plunge the country into chaos. The economy performed better, underpinned by global economic recovery and higher demand for copper, the country’s key export. Stronger performance in the agricultural and mining sectors and higher electricity generation also contributed to the recovery. The Zambian kwacha stabilised against the dollar and inflation stood within the target. The cost of living increased. The country’s high risk of debt distress led the IMF to put off a $ 1.3 bn loan deal. China continued to play a pivotal role in Zambia’s economic development trajectory. New bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with Southern African countries. Domestic Politics The controversial results of the August 2016 presidential elections heightened political tensions for most of the year. Hakainde Hichilema, the UPND presidential candidate since 2006, saw the PF incumbent Lungu win the election by a narrow margin and subsequently contested the results, alleging that the vote was rigged.
    [Show full text]
  • Election Observation Delegation for the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia
    Texte ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATION FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ZAMBIA 2 October 2011 Report by Mr. David MARTIN Head of the Delegation Annexes: A. List of participants B. Programme of the delegation C. Observations by the EP Delegation D. Preliminary Statement E. Press release by EU EOM’s Chief Observer, Ms. Maria Muñiz De Urquiza Introduction Following an invitation sent by the President of Zambia on 17 December 2010, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised, on 7 September 2011, the sending of an Election Observation Delegation to observe the presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia, scheduled for 20 September 2011. The country also held local government elections that day which were not observed by the EU EOM. The European Parliament Election Observation Delegation was composed of two Members: Mr David MARTIN (S&D, UK) and Ms Radvilè MORKÜNAITĖ-MIKULĖNIENĖ (EPP, Lithuania)1. Mr David MARTIN was appointed Chair of the Delegation at its constitutive meeting. These elections were the fourth since the introduction of the multipartite system in 2001. The Movement for Multipartite Democracy (MMD) was in power since then. The previous general elections had been organised in 2006. Nevertheless presidential elections had to be held in 2008 after the death of late President Mwanawasa. The presidential election was the most watched and commented as a close contest was expected between the two runners from 2008 election: incumbent President Rupiah Banda and main opposition leader Michael Sata. In 2008 Mr Banda won with a small margin (40% against 38%). The three elections are single round "first-past-the-post".
    [Show full text]
  • Africa Update
    ML Strategies Update David Leiter, [email protected] Georgette Spanjich, [email protected] Katherine Fox, [email protected] ML Strategies, LLC Sarah Mamula, [email protected] 701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 USA 202 296 3622 202 434 7400 fax FOLLOW US ON TWITTER: @MLStrategies www.mlstrategies.com JANUARY 23, 2015 Africa Update Leading the News West Africa Ebola Outbreak On January 14th, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) issued its 16th fact sheet on the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The most recent fact sheet highlights that new Ebola cases continue to decrease in Liberia, and the number of confirmed cases has declined by 43 percent between December 22nd and January 5th in Sierra Leone, according to the United Nations (U.N.) World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, the fact sheet highlights how USAID partners have worked to open one Ebola treatment unit (ETU) and four community care centers (CCCs) in Sierra Leone. The latest fact sheet can be downloaded here. On January 15th, U.N. Special Envoy on Ebola Dr. David Nabarro said while the number of new Ebola cases in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea is declining, there are at least 50 micro-outbreaks in the three hardest hit countries. While Dr. Nabarro said it is good news that Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea are now reporting the lowest weekly totals of new Ebola cases since this summer, he cautioned that the emergence of micro-outbreaks evidences there are still chains of transmission that need to be understood. He argued the key will be to continue efforts to get local communities to change their traditional healing rituals and funeral and burial practices.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CONTINUUM of STATE SOVEREIGNTY: a Commentary on African Elections K.C
    University of Baltimore Journal of International Law Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 4 2017 THE CONTINUUM OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY: A Commentary on African Elections K.C. O’Rourke The Bridging Institute Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation O’Rourke, K.C. (2017) "THE CONTINUUM OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY: A Commentary on African Elections," University of Baltimore Journal of International Law: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil/vol5/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CONTINUUM OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY A Commentary on African Elections By: K.C. O’Rourke1 Abstract Twenty-six African States hold elections between 2016 and 2017.2 More basic than campaign rhetoric and ethnocentric political jockeying, the state in Africa is ripe for a deeper engagement with notions of state sovereignty that are more relevant for this century as the African state seeks to exercise its core functions, protect its inter- ests within its own geographic boundaries, and care for all of the people it seeks to govern. The intentional structuring of such a dia- logue must be guided to secure the cornerstones of individual liberty and participatory democracy – two basic protective functions that uniquely belong to the nation-state.
    [Show full text]
  • EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report
    EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 01-05 December 2014 EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report | Republic of Zambia LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ADS Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme AVAP Anti-Voter Apathy Project AU African Union CMCs Conflict Management Committees CSOs Civil Society Organisations ECZ Electoral Commission Zambia EISA Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa FDA Forum for Democratic Alternatives FDD Forum For Democracy and Development FODEP Foundation for Democratic Process FRP Fourth Revolution Party GPZ Green Party of Zambia MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy NAREP National Restoration Party NGOS Non-Governmental Organisations OYV Operation Young Vote PAM Pre-election Assessment Mission PEMMO Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region PF Patriotic Front SACCORD Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes SADC Southern African Development Community SUV Suburban Utility Vehicle ToT Training of Trainers UPND United Party For National Development UNIP United National Independence Party UDA United Democratic Alliance ZNWL Zambia National Women’s Lobby EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report | Republic of Zambia CONTENTS 1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 4 2. Political Background And Context Of The 2015 Presidential By-Election .............. 4 3. Electoral Framework .........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Zambia 2019 Human Rights Report
    ZAMBIA 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Zambia is a constitutional republic governed by a democratically elected president and a unicameral national assembly. In 2016 the country held elections under an amended constitution for president, national assembly seats, and local government, as well as a referendum on an enhanced bill of rights. The incumbent, Patriotic Front (PF) President Edgar Chagwa Lungu, won re-election by a narrow margin. A legal technicality saw the losing main opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) candidate, Hakainde Hichilema, unsuccessfully challenge the election results. International and local observers deemed the election as having been credible but cited a number of irregularities. The pre-election and postelection periods were marred by limits on press freedom and political party intolerance resulting in sporadic violence across the country. Although the results ultimately were deemed a credible reflection of votes cast, media coverage, police actions, and legal restrictions heavily favored the ruling party and prevented the election from being genuinely fair. The national police have primary responsibility for internal security and report to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The military is responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities in cases of national emergency. The president appoints the commanders of each military service and they report directly to him. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over the security forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Zambia's 2006 Elections
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 28 September 2006 Author: Dr Peter Kagwanja and Patrick Mutahi Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Zambia’s 2006 Elections: Still Trapped in the Transition Gridlock Zambia will hold its third tripartite multiparty elections on 28 September 2006, when the country’s 3.9 million registered voters will go to the polls to elect a national president, parliamentarians, and local government councillors. Five political parties or party coalitions are vying for the top job, including the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) of President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, who is seeking a second five-year term. In all, 29 political parties have fielded candidates for the 158-seat legislative assembly and local government seats. The government’s decision not to introduce a new republican constitution and electoral reforms prior to these elections, however, has cast serious doubts on the integrity of the electoral process and the probable legitimacy of the outcomes. Although the implementation of constitutional reforms was delayed ostensibly on grounds of expense, this also favours the incumbent’s strategy of winning power through a simple majority based on the ‘first-past-the-post’ system and a ‘winner-takes-all’ principle. This strategy compounds the crisis of Zambia’s multi- party democracy, trapped since 1991 in the transitional space between actual democracy and autocracy. An opposition fractured along multiple fault-lines and facing an existential crisis about tactics, vision and strategy has failed to sway the electoral debate in favour of entrenching genuine democracy. By plunging into Zambia’s opposition politics, ex-presidents failed to unite or to galvanise public debate in favour of fundamental democratic reforms or to act as a stabilising force in a fragile polity.
    [Show full text]
  • Urgent Action
    Further Information on UA: 90/17 Index: AFR 63/6504/2017 Zambia Date: 19 June 2017 URGENT ACTION OPPOSITION LEADER HELD IN INHUMANE CONDITIONS There is fear for safety of Hakainde Hichilema after he was transferred from Lusaka Central Correctional Facility in Lusaka Province to Mukobeko Maximum Correctional Facility in Central Province. He is being held under degrading and inhumane conditions at the Maximum Security Prison. The conditions to which he is subjected may amount to torture and other ill- treatment. Hakainde Hichilema is facing the charge of treason together with five others for allegedly obstructing a Presidential Motorcade. The police moved Hakainde Hichilema and five others accused with him from Lusaka Correctional Facility in Lusaka Province to Mukobeko Maximum Correctional Facility in the Central Province of Zambia on 9 June. Hakainde Hichilema, who is the leader of the United Party for National Development (UPND), was badly beaten by police in the course of the transfer. He was bundled into a van and then flown in a helicopter that had not been operational for two years. The police did not provide any reasons why they had transferred him even though his trial will take place in Lusaka. His lawyer and family were not informed of the transfer that took place despite a magistrate having ruled that he be kept in Lusaka. The police only revealed his location on Saturday 10 June, a day after the transfer. Upon arrival at Mukobeko Maximum Correctional Facility, Hakainde Hichilema was separated from his five co-accused. He is being held in a tiny underground cell with no access to sanitary and ablution facilities including running water and a toilet and is forced to use a bucket.
    [Show full text]
  • Urgent Action
    1st update on UA: 90/17 Index: AFR 63/6504/2017 Zambia Date: 19 June 2017 URGENT ACTION OPPOSITION LEADER HELD IN INHUMANE CONDITIONS There is fear for safety of Hakainde Hichilema after he was transferred from Lusaka Central Correctional Facility in Lusaka Province to Mukobeko Maximum Correctional Facility in Central Province. He is being held under degrading and inhumane conditions at the Maximum Security Prison. The conditions to which he is subjected may amount to torture and other ill-treatment. Hakainde Hichilema is facing the charge of treason together with five others for allegedly obstructing a Presidential Motorcade. The police moved Hakainde Hichilema and five others accused with him from Lusaka Correctional Facility in Lusaka Province to Mukobeko Maximum Correctional Facility in the Central Province of Zambia on 9 June. Hakainde Hichilema, who is the leader of the United Party for National Development (UPND), was badly beaten by police in the course of the transfer. He was bundled into a van and then flown in a helicopter that had not been operational for two years. The police did not provide any reasons why they had transferred him even though his trial will take place in Lusaka. His lawyer and family were not informed of the transfer that took place despite a magistrate having ruled that he be kept in Lusaka. The police only revealed his location on Saturday 10 June, a day after the transfer. Upon arrival at Mukobeko Maximum Correctional Facility, Hakainde Hichilema was separated from his five co- accused. He is being held in a tiny underground cell with no access to sanitary and ablution facilities including running water and a toilet and is forced to use a bucket.
    [Show full text]
  • Trial Monitoring of People V. Miti Et Al. (Zambia 2018)
    Trial Monitoring of People v. Miti et al. (ZAMBIA 2018) July 2019 Ju Beth Van Schaack Member of the TrialWatch Advisory Board Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights Stanford Law School ABOUT THE AUTHORS The Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic works to advance human rights around the world and to train the next generation of strategic advocates for social justice. The clinic works in partnership with civil society organizations and communities to carry out human rights investigations, legal and policy analysis, litigation, report- writing and advocacy. Beth Van Schaack is the Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights at the Stanford Law School and a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security & Cooperation at Stanford University. Professor Van Schaack, a member of the TrialWatch Advisory Board, was previously Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues in the Office of Global Criminal Justice of the U.S. Department of State and Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law. ABOUT THE CLOONEY FOUNDATION FOR JUSTICE’S TRIALWATCH INITIATVE TrialWatch is an initiative of the Clooney Foundation for Justice focused on monitoring and responding to trials around the world that pose a high risk of human rights violations. TrialWatch is global in scope and focused on trials targeting journalists, LGBTQ persons, women and girls, religious minorities, and human rights defenders. It works to expose injustice and rally support to secure justice for defendants whose rights have been violated. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y Between September and December 2018, TrialWatch monitored the trial of six activists in Zambia, who were arrested and charged under the Public Order Act in connection with an anti-corruption protest they organized in 2017.
    [Show full text]