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Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies 2019 Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies

Chief Editor Giuseppe Veltri Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies 2019

Volume Editor Yoav Meyrav The Yearbook is published on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies

ISBN 978-3-11-060332-3 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-061883-9 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-060737-6

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 Licence. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

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Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, Ms Cod. Levy 115, fol. 158r: Maimonides, More Nevukhim, Beginn von Teil III. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com In Memoriam Roi Benbassat

Contents

Editorial IX

Part I: Articles

Aryeh Botwinick The Simultaneous GenesisofMonotheism andScepticism in the Jewish Religion 3

MichelaTorbidoni Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and Jewish Emancipation:AComparison between Simone Luzzattoand Moses Mendelssohn 11

Behnam Zolghadr The TheoryofAḥwāland Argumentsagainst the Law of Non-Contradiction 31

Máté Veres The Causes of Epochē: ANoteonStromateis 8.22.1–4 53

Ze’ev Strauss Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 65

Giada Coppola ObadiahSforno and the Individual Human Soul 101

José María Sánchez de León Serrano Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 125

Avraham Rot Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 145

Timothy Franz What wasMaimon After? His Metaphysical Foundations of NaturalSciencein 1790 173

Michah Gottlieb Does Judaism Have Dogma? Moses Mendelssohn and aPivotal Nineteenth- Century Debate 219 VIII Contents

Anne Fiebig From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 243

GiuseppeVeltri Jesuit Strategic Scepticism toward Religious Self-Consciousness and Commonalities: Chinese Muslims, Jews, and Christians in the Eyes of Matteo Ricci(1552–1610) and His “Translator” NicolasTrigault (1557–1628) 265

Part II: Reports

Activities and Events 281 compiled by Maria Wazinski

SilkeSchaeper Report on the LibraryofJewish Scepticism 303 Editorial

The Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies2019 is the fourth volume of articles stemmingfrom research conducted by MCAS’sfellows and affiliates. It also includes asection with an overviewofthe activities and events conductedat the centre duringits fourth academic year and areport on its library.

The twelve articles contained in the present volume exhibit the extent to which MCAS scholarship advances the understanding of Judaism and scepticism, both in- dividuallyand together,among different thinkers and within different areas of study. Whether ashortnote or afull-fledged analysis,each paper has something fresh to offer and something new to say, opening new directions of research and inviting the scholarlycommunity to jointhe discussion. Aryeh Botwinick’sopeningessayoutlinesanew and thought-provoking approach to Western thought and religion’sperception of itself. Instead of anarrative of conflict,Botwinick’shistoriosophyraises the notion of God’sunknowability as the mediating thread thatrenders monotheism and scepticism fundamentallyinter- twined. Michela Torbidoni’sstudy adds an important chapter to the as-yetunderstudied history of the persona and function of Socrateswithin the Jewish tradition. Focusing on the cases of Moses Mendelssohn and Simone Luzzatto, who operated at different times and in different contexts, she tantalisingly argues that the figure of Socrates can be considered as avehicle for Jewishemancipation. The comparative discussion adds evidence to the thesis that modern Jewish Italian culturewas part of the intel- lectualbasis of the programme to reform the statusofEuropean Jews in the late eighteenthcentury. BehnamZolghadr tackles one of the cornerstonesofAristotelianlogic—namely, the principle of non-contradiction—by presentingcritiques of it as reported by the Muslim theologian Faḫral-Dīnal-Rāzī (d. 1210). Zolghadr argues thatthese critiques, which can be traced back to the Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn,function as part of its con- solidation of the theory of states(aḥwāl), which can consequentlyberegarded as a dialetheic theory.Assuch, Zolghadr devises the first steps in modelling it logically using tools of paraconsistent logic developed in the late twentieth century,more than athousand years after the theory’sinception. Máté Veres enrichesthe understanding of ancientscepticism by exploring Clem- ent of Alexandria’sdiscussion of epochē (suspension of judgment) in his Stromateis. He examines and refines arguments thatsupport the claim thatClement is presenting avariety of scepticism thatpredates the well-known version expounded by Sex- tus Empiricusand considers different explanations as to whyaChristian theologian of Clement’sstandingwould express interestinsceptical arguments, let alone recognise theirpotential legitimacy.

Ze’ev Strauss offers the first comprehensive scholarlywork in English on Meister Eckhart’semployment of IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae. He shows the vast extent to which Eckhart drawsonthis work, explicitlyand also implicitly,inorder to account for his own Christian philosophy, primarilygravitating towards IbnGabirol’smetaphysics of the One. Strauss shows that manyofthe provocative and unusual elements of Eck- hart’sChristian thoughtcorrespond to Eckhart’sfavourable view of Fons vitae. Giada Coppola elucidates Obadiah Sforno’s(?1475–1550) philosophicalinterpre- tation of the individual human soul in his Lightofthe Nations,with emphasis on his defence of its immortality.Coppola shows how exegetical interpretation and the text’sphilosophical background are intrinsically connected, identifies Sforno’ssour- ces common to the Hebrew and Latin traditions, and displays the interesting dynamics between Sforno’sphilosophical composition and his biblical commentaries. José MaríaSánchez de León Serrano offers anew reading of the Flemish thinker Arnold Geulincx (1624–69)based on an audacious interpretation of his epistemological views. By tracing the central tenetsofGeulincx’sthought back to his method of self-inspection, SánchezdeLeónSerrano illuminatesthe unity and systematic character of this multifaceted philosopher—who at first glanceseems to offer an incoherent blend of scepticism and metaphysics—and opens up new vistas in the studyof this stillwidelyoverlooked thinker. Avraham Rot’spaper offers an original and challenging interpretation of Spi- noza’sphilosophical project,arguing that if one shifts the focus of analysis from his theory of knowledge to his theory of affects, Spinoza emergesasaphilosopher whose scepticism is significantlymoreradical than its Cartesian counterpart.Rot claims that for Spinoza, the doubt that matters is not doubt as amethodological device employed to attain certainty,but rather the doubt that human beingsconstantly experience insofarasthey are finite, embodied, and uncertain of their future. TimothyFranz offers ahighlydetailed, in-depth analysis of Solomon Maimon’s seldom-studied Weltseele (1790), which he describes as aproto-dialectical metaphysics of the absolute. Beyond exploring the Weltseele on its own terms, Franz identifies it as akey stageinMaimon’sphilosophical development and argues that it functions as an attempt to overcome the self-conceivedfailure of Maimon’swell-known Essay on Transcendental Philosophy. In turn, the ideas in the Weltseele wereaban- doned,although not before they exposed the need to construct alogic of the absolute, which was ultimatelyexpressed in Maimon’s Logik (1794). Michah Gottlieb’scontribution does much to clarify the debate surroundingJu- daism and dogma as reflected in German-speaking Jewishauthors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, showing thatitisnot merelyatheoretical question, but also has much to do with concrete considerations concerning Jewish society.Hebe- gins with athorough analysis of Moses Mendelssohn’sview of Judaism, explaining in what sense it should be understood as anti-dogmatic and also how it reflects Men- delssohn’saspiration for aself-conception of Judaism thatisdistinct from Christian- ity.Gottlieb then turns to discuss leading nineteenth-century German-speakingJew- ish thinkers and shows how they transform the problem from an intrareligious one to Postscript XI

an interreligious one. Each response is informed by aconcept of Judaism that is intimatelyconnected to the problem of Jewishcommunal unity. Anne Fiebig’sarticle is the first to offer asystematic account of the concept of tolerance in the thought of Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903–94), one of the most important—and certainlymost controversial—Israeli philosophers, as it emergesfrom his religious scepticism. AnalysingLeibowitz’sepistemology,Fiebigpresents Leibowitz as amodel against religious dogmatism, which Leibowitz regardsascorruptive to agenuinelyfaithful position. Finally, through an analysis of an earlyseventeenth-century Jesuit report about religious minorities in China,Giuseppe Veltri introduces the novel notion of “strategic scepticism,” which is aform of abusingsceptical argumentationaimed at pre- serving and reinforcing political power.Atthe present time,strategic scepticism as an analytical category is becomingpressinglyrelevant.

We would like to take this opportunitytothankBill Rebiger,who edited the first three volumes of the Yearbook and who has done an excellent job of making it acorner- stone of the yearlyscholarlyactivities at MCAS. Special thanks are also duetoKath- arine Handel for her superb copy-and languageediting of all the papers in the present volume. We would also liketothank Maria Wazinski,the centre’sacademic coordinator, for compilingthis year’slist of activities and events; Silke Schaeper, the centre’slibrarian, for preparingthe reportonthe library;Sarah Wobick-Segev for her perceptive comments;and Mikheil Kakabadze for his valuable assistance in the editorial process.

Hamburg, October 2019 Giuseppe Veltri (Chief Editor) Yoav Meyrav (Volume Editor)

Postscript

As this volume was goingtopress,weweredeeplysaddened to learn of the untimely passing of our dear friend and colleagueDr. Roi Benbassat. Dr.Benbassat,ascholar of Jewish existentialism and agifted musician, belonged to the first generation of MCASfellows. He earned his bachelor’sdegree in philosophyand music composition from TelAvivUniversity, his master’sdegree in philosophyfrom the University Sorbonne-Pantheon Paris 1(with a mémoire entitled “The Religiosity of Spinoza”), and his PhD in Philosophyfrom TelAvivUniversity in 2011, with adissertation entitled “The Relation between the Philosophical and the Religious:ReconsideringKierkegaard’sConfrontation with Philosophy.” After aMinerva Postdoctoral Fellowship (Max Planck Institute) at the Institute of Comparative Ethics at Freie Universität Berlin, Benbassat arrivedatMCAS as apost- doctoral fellow in 2015–16 with aresearch project entitled “Yeshayahu Leibowitz— Strict Orthodox Practice and Unbound Scepticism.” One of the fruits of his research XII Postscript

at MCAS was his paper entitled “Jewish Faith and Scepticism—The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz,” which was published in the 2017 edition of the Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies. Until recently, he was aresearch associate at the Goethe Universität in Frankfurt am Main with aresearchproject entitled “Tolerance and Intolerance in the Dialogues between Conflicting JewishPositions in the 20th Century.” Benbassat hadawide arrayofresearchinterests that wasreflected in hispublica- tions, includingthe work of theIsraeli thinkerYeshayahu Leibowitz, therelationsbe- tweenreligious andmoral-philosophicalstandpoints,religious existentialism,Jewish– Christian interreligious conflictsand dialogues, religion andscepticism, andreligious positioninginthe conflictsand dialogues within JudaisminIsrael. He wasalsoatal- entedsingerand songwriter,releasing threealbums: Into Your Craft (2017), Footloose (2018),and Hard Nut (2019). Roi Benbassat was not onlyatalented scholar, but also akind, gentle, and hum- ble human being.Hewas also very funny. His radiant personality filled the Centre’s corridors from the dayofhis arrival. Those who became closer to him learned that underneath the ironic smile and quiet presencewas ahugeheart and agenerous soul. Roi was supposed to return to MCAS in 2021 with aresearch project entitled “Yeshayahu Leibowitz’sConcept of Faith—Between Intellectualism and Sentimental- ism.” We wereall eagerlyawaitinghis arrival. This volume is dedicated to his memory. Part I: Articles

AryehBotwinick The Simultaneous Genesis of Monotheism and Scepticisminthe JewishReligion

In this paper,Iwill arguethat the conceptual dichotomybetween religion and scepticism cannot adequately capturewhat biblical monotheism inaugurated in the world. In anumber of key respectsthat Iwill attempt to analyticallyplot,Iwill aim to show that Jewishscepticism and its cultural correlative of secularism are co-extensive with Jewish monotheism. Iwill try to plot the general outlines of an argument that will support the claim that both Western monotheism and Western scepticism have theirroots in negative theology. What Iwill attempt to show is that the logical impediments thatblock afullycoherent statement of the tenets of bothneg- ative theologyand scepticism point to acommon origin and acommon destiny for both doctrines. The traditional narrative of Western religion and its relationship to Western scepticism needs to be radicallyrevised. The traditionalstory is both structured around and invokedtolend support to the idea of irreconcilable conflict between religion and sceptical modes of thought.The conflicts between religion and scepticism are taken to applyboth to the substantivedoctrines and to the methodologies of argument of religious and sceptical discourse. With negative theology(the idea that we can onlysay what God is not,but not what He is) as our organisingperspective, we can arguethat the areas of continuity and overlapbetween religion and scepticism are much more prominent and decisive than the areas of tension and disconti- nuity.The practice of religion is in no waythreatened or undermined by this realisation. If anything,itisstrengthened and reinforced by it.Where the vista of distance between the human community and God is as steadilymaintainedasitisbynegative theology, the prospect of our succumbing to idolatry and worshippingour own handiwork is considerablydiminished. My argument is formulated as akind of thought experiment.Working with the Maimonidean assumptions in Sefer Ha-Madaʿ and TheGuide of the Perplexed (includingthe annexation of God as anecessary First Cause in the genealogyofmono- theism and the historical assumption that the patriarch Abraham was the discoverer of the monotheistic principle), what relationship emergesbetween monotheism and scepticism? The implicit conception of the relationship between religion and scepticism de- rivable from negative theologyisafunction of the central place thatPlatonic and Neoplatonicarguments occupy in its arsenal. Throughout this paper,Iamusing the term “scepticism” to refertothe philosophical doctrine that states that words are underdeterminedbythings; thatnoitem in the “furniture” of the world or the human psyche can be framed in onlyone way, but that openness and flexibility always prevail with regardtodesignatingthe identity of things.

OpenAccess. ©2020Aryeh Botwinick, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-003 4 AryehBotwinick

From aPlatonic perspective laterfleshed out by Aristotle, the One (whichwas later called the Western monotheistic God) emergesasaresponsetoanantecedent question: How can we bring the explanatory quest to ahalt?What drivesthis pursuit is simplythe sense that most of us aspire to reach “rock bottom” in the search for an explanation: thatis, that we have not overlooked anygeneral factor in dealing with the situation or phenomenon at hand. In order to achieveinternal reassurance that our explanation in anygiven circumstance has been along the right path, we seek confirmation thatwehaveexhausted all possibilities of going further.Ifthereis no move left to us but to invoke the infinite (and if this movecould be shown to be logicallylegitimate), we feel thatour explanation has been exhaustive.Where can the search for more abstract and comprehensive explanations than those we are currentlyinvoking end? In his dialogue Parmenides,Plato argues thatitcan onlyend with the invocation of aname: the One, the forerunnerofthe Western God.¹ In Parmenides,the One is just aname, and if anything could correspond to this name,that would undermine our ability to use it,because then there would be two entities rather than one: the name and the object thatitnames. Radical oneness presupposes the absence of both sense and reference, connotation as well as denotation. The idea of God is mystical at its inception, and it returns to this baseline again and again throughout the course of Western religious and intellectual history. In the crucial senses that Ihavejustdescribed, modernism (and even postmodernism) are with us from the beginningsofthe Western story (that is, the Western philosophical and theological narratives). As it turns out,anominalistic reading of God, just like anominalisticreading of knowledge (statements and claims), maybefound in ancient thought, and Plato is the author of both. In Cratylus and Theaetetus,heoffers us anominalistic readingofepistemology,and in Parmenides, he presents us with an acutelynominalistic version of the One. Acogent approach for delineatingthe tenetsofnegative theologylinks it to the formulation of the monotheisticprinciple itself. This principle—the assertionof God’sabsoluteoneness and otherness—represents adesire to bring the philosophical/commonsensical/scientific quest to ahalt.Aslongasthe subjectmatter to which the explanans (the statement doingthe explaining)makes referenceisinany waycon- tinuous withthe material to which the explanandum (the statementthatneeds to be explained) refers,the pursuit of reasons andcauses can proceedindefinitelyinthe search for aprimary explanation. The only waythat thephilosophical/commonsensical/scientific quest can be broughttoasatisfactory arrest andthat philosophicalrepose can be achieved is by postulating an explanans that invokesanentitytotallyunassimilable to human conceptual schemata. Theorigin of themonotheistic Godwho is depicted as

 Plato, Parmenides, 130B–132B in Plato, TheRepublic and Other Works, trans. BenjaminJowett(Gar- den City,NY: Doubleday/Anchor,1973), 388. See also the discussion in Aryeh Botwinick, Skepticism, Belief,and the Modern: Maimonides to Nietzsche (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), chapters 1 and 2. The Simultaneous Genesis of Monotheism and Scepticism in the JewishReligion 5

beingwhollyother than man can plausiblybereconstructedasarisingout of the need to achieverelease from philosophical anxiety by postulatingasFirst Causeanentity that embodies absolutedifference. Thereisanimportantprice that themonotheisticbelieverwho conceivesofhis belief in these terms has to pay. On theone hand, by postulating Godasbeing so distant,the believerhas latchedontoanentitythat canappropriatelybeconceptualised as God. On the otherhand, however, by beingsodistant anduntranslatable into human things,Heceases to be explicable and to have thecapacitytoserve as asourceofex- planationaltogether. Thequest foranultimateexplanatory factor is resolvednot by coming up with asolution forit, butineffect by de-legitimising thequest by dramatis- ing itsunattainability. Adeepened appreciation of thisproblematic offers aray of hope for salvagingGod, but only negatively as apossibility, not positivelyasanactuality. The negativetheolog- ical critique of the popular conceptofGod, which ascribes attributes to Himand there- forepropels theexplanatory questeverforward,cannot be formulated consistently. Although from anegativetheologicalperspective,noneofthe traditional theological termsliterallyapplies to God—He does notsee,hear,orevenexist in theway traditional religiousunderstanding projects—the adherent of negative theology still wants allofhis negativecriticismstoapply to Him: thesubject of allofhis negative,paring-down work is the traditional(mono)theistic God. In order forthe negative theological critical apparatus to have aviable target, it needstomaintain in some form,tosome extent,whatever it is that this criticalapparatus shootsdown. The negative theological conceptualisation of Godisthereforecontradictory.It states that it is onlybydenying Godinany humanly comprehensibleway that we have God. Ironically, it canbeargued that it is preciselynegativetheology’sembracing of contradiction thatgives itsadherents theironlyaccess to God. Karl Popper, in his essay “What Is Dialectic?”,argued that accordingtothe rules of inferenceenshrined in traditional Aristotelian logic, toleration of contradiction means that no possibilities can be ruled out,sothat ageneralised agnosticism (which theoreticallyleavesthe door open to all possibilities)becomes one of themajor corollaries of the acceptance of contradiction. As Popper succinctlystates histhesis: “If twocontradictorystatements areadmitted,any statement whatever must be admitted; forfromacouple of contradictory statements anystatement whatever can be validlyinferred.”² Sincenopossibility can be ruledout in theaftermath of contradiction, ontological space hasbeen created for God. Afurther paradox emergesthat it is only negative theological monism(that is to say, amonism that locatesscepticism andGod on the same ontological plane by iden- tifyinganalogous problems of consistency withregardtothe formulationofboth positions) thatisable to sustain aplace forGod. Onlyanapproach which emphasises that

 Karl Popper, Conjecturesand Refutations:The Growth of Scientific Knowledge,2nd ed. (London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1965), 317. 6 AryehBotwinick

attemptstocoherentlyformulatescepticism confront thesame self-defeating prospects as attempts to coherentlyformulatethe principles of monotheism—that effortsto sustain an intellectual universewithout Godfounderinmuchthe same wayasefforts to sustain an intellectualuniversewithGod—can manage,inthis crucialnegative sense, to keep theprospect of Godalive.Inorder to emerge as properly consistent,sceptical doctrine must encompass areflexive manoeuvrewhereby sceptical critical canons are turned against theverytenetsofscepticism,forcing themtorecoiland therebyinhibit- ingtheir adequateformulation.Analogously, the utterconceptual removalofthe monotheistic God, whichrenders Himentirelyunlike anythinghuman, requiressomekind of grammatical subject concerningwhomthe continual divestitureofpredicates can takeplace.Scepticismisadoctrine of radical critiquethat bothpresupposesand denies astable subject (inagrammatical sense), which aretenets of scepticism.Monotheism is also adoctrineofradical critique that simultaneouslypresupposes anddenies astable grammatical subject; namely,God. There is athird level of paradoxhere which relates to the fact that through the extremeness of its critique,negative theologypreempts aliteraltranslation even of itself. To know with certainty that we cannot literallygrasp or pin down God’sattributes because of Histranscendenceofknown things, so that we can translate those attributes onlymetaphorically, is alreadytohavebreached the unbridgeable distance separating us from God.Negative theologyundermines itself by the thoroughgoing nature of its critique,aswell as the official targets of its attack.Inthe end, it cannot foreclose the possibility that on asuperficial level, it is most adamantlyconcerned with refuting: namely, thatthe literal God exists, literallyunderstood. Negativethe- ologypropels us to go full circle from the jettisoning of literalism to the literal affir- mationofGod. The approach thatIam outlining here will open new sociological, historical, and theoretical vistas for re-conceptualising the relationship between monotheism and scepticism in Western thought.Fromsociological and historical perspectivesas well as logical ones, monotheistic religion (with negative theologyasits dominant exegetical decoder)needstobeviewed as asceptical responsetothe primitive animistic religion thatwas practised in the cultures in which monotheism emerged. Monotheism seeks to discredit the immanentistdeities affirmed by animistic religion. It counterposes to them asingle, transcendent,infinite deity who both created and governs the world. In His aloofness and loftiness, this deity can appropriatelybe viewed as flagging the limitations of human reason with regard to the search for ultimate explanations, rather thanasacognitively accessibleand substantively recog- nisable and identifiable God. The God of monotheistic religion has to be understood in terms of what He is blocking and ruling out and not in relation to what He is ostensiblyaffirming.He is blocking the divinisation of natural and historical forces rather than presenting Himself as their literal replacement.Interms of the strategic factors at stake here, He cannot do what they do in the mannerinwhich theydoitwithout becoming them and forfeitingHis status as the one transcendent God. The Simultaneous Genesis of Monotheism and Scepticism in the JewishReligion 7

In order to serveasatool for critiquing animistic religion, God has to be con- ceivedasbeing utterlytranscendent,asoccupying alevel of ultimacyofexplanation beyond which it is not possible to penetrate. Animistic religion sells the quest for ex- planationshort by arrestingthe search at asuperficial naturalistic level which it is clearlypossibletotranscend. Positing God as unique, singular,and transcendent means that by definitional fiat,itisnot possibletogobeyond Him in the search for explanation. There is another morenarrowly logical factor thatrenders the concept of God rationallyimpenetrable that is incisivelycaptured in averse in the Psalms. Psalms 119:138 reads: “Youcommanded the justice of your testimonies,and great faithfulness.” The first part of the verse appears highlyparadoxical, and the second seems deeplyambiguous. Instead of justice being implicitlyorintrinsicallyknown or knowable, the first part of the sentenceemphasises thatthe justiceofGod’s laws is afunction of His commands. We are to imagine the Psalmist addressing God and saying: “Youcommanded and stipulated that your laws are just; [there is nothing inherentlyjust in them/they are not inherentlyjust] by virtue of their content.” One wayofreadingthe second half of the sentence is that the opening words of the verse, “Youcommanded,” are applicable to the second half as they are to the first.The key wordinthe second half of the sentenceinHebrew is emunah, which can be translated as “faith,” as well as “faithfulness.” Read in this light,the Psalmist is remindingGod, as it were, that “we are believers because youcommanded us to believe.” We do not follow your commandments because we are believers. We believebecause we follow your commandment to have faith. From the perspective of this construal of the verse in the Psalms, we might saythat faith evokes the spectre of an infinite regress.Whydowehavefaith?Because we have faith in the idea of having faith. Whydowehavefaith in the idea of having faith?Because we have faith in the idea of having faith in the idea of having faith, and so on ad infinitum. The infinite regress can onlybebroken by acknowledging or stipulating that God commands us to have faith. The notion of “command” conjures up the same infinite regress as the idea of “faith.” Acommand can onlybeauthorised by aprior command that requires and/or legitimates compliancewith the first command. But this second command in turn has to be grounded in aprevious command, and so on indefinitely, so that the prospect of an infinite regress emergeswith regard to “command” just as it does in relation to “faith.” In the end, both “faith” and “commandment” loom as circular categories parasiticallyfeeding off each other’scircularity.The Psalmist thus envisages faith as acircle.There is no rational waytoenter into it; one has to be in it in order to be in it.Negative theologyreinforcesthe circular character of faith, and the attainment of ultimacywhich the introduction of the idea of the infinite God achievesforecloses the possibilityofexplanation. The implicit logic of the concept of the biblical God leads directlyinto negative theology. To ensure thatone achieves finality in one’sexplanatory quest,one has to switch dimensions from the finite to the infinite. This switching of dimensionsmeans 8 AryehBotwinick

that the concept of the biblical God can onlyserveasacritique of other theistic conceptions that arrest the search for explanation at the level of the finite. The infinite, transcendent biblical God,being deliberatelydesigned not to intersect with human things, cannot serveasanexplanatory factor Himself. All the descriptive epithets projected onto Him can onlybeconstrued as metaphors,capturingwhat God literally is not.The biblical God paradoxicallyonlyencodes the limits to reason that prevent the explanatory quest from being consummated. The explanatory line that links human beingstoGod thus has to be reconfigured as acircle.The blockagesthat we confront in trying to access and validateHim in- sinuate to us thatperhaps it is onlybyclassifying the limits of our rationalunder- standing of God as God thatwehaveGod. Onlybyre-conceptualising the limits at the outer perimeters of our lines of explanations as acircle (whether acircle of doubt such as scepticism or acircle of belief such as faith in the monotheistic God) are we able to sustain the lines within the circle that we choose.Inits inability to sustain itself as astraight line linking premise to conclusion, the circle of doubt (just like the circle of belief)bespeaks in anegative sense the possibilityofGod. It is the circular character of both faith and doubtthatconjures up adomain beyond either of them. The above-quoted Psalm 119 contains intimations about how the affirmationof God’sinfinity leadsinto acircular conceptualisation of monotheistic faith. Verse 160 reads: “Your very first utterance is truth, and every ordinanceofyour righteousness is valid for all time.” One wayoftranslating this sentenceistosay: “Your first statement which announced your infinity is true, and this is what establishes the righteousness of your laws.” Judaism, then, is envisioned by the Psalmist as aself-contained, self-justifyingdeductive system of faith and practice. Thefateofmonotheistic religion understood from anegative theological perspective is duplicated in virtuallyall of thefields of humaninquiry that have developed alongsidereligion, or in self-conscious opposition to it.All acts of theorisingcan be scepticallyquestioned, at leastinterms of interrogating howtheyprivilege theirprem- ises.Inorder to remain consistent, scepticism in turn also needstobesceptically as- sessed.Whatemerges as aresultiseither ageneralisedagnosticism—whereanuncer- tain “maybe” is assigned to allhuman knowledgeclaims, includingscepticism—or a full-scalerehabilitationofthe original targetsofscepticism, which, however, lacks theresources to preclude theresumptionofthe cycleofscepticalattacks,instantane- ousrehabilitationofthe targets of thoseattacks,and revivals of theattacks themselves.Either way, secure,fully reliable knowledge hasbeenblocked in allofthe intellectual areasthatare successors to religion, as fullyasnegative theology’sself- underminingblocksthe attainment of secure religious knowledge.Religionprefigures what befallsthe successormodes of knowledgeafter thehistoricaleclipse of religious worldviews andsensibility hasoccurred. Thesesuccessor modesofsensibility and practicedonot extricateusfromthe quandaries anddilemmasthatsurroundreligion itself,but rather, on apurelyformal, structural level, re-encode them. The Simultaneous Genesis of Monotheism and Scepticism in the Jewish Religion 9

Forexample, the empiricist approach to everydayknowledge is boggeddown in aproblematic that resembles the problematic of monotheism. The empiricist seeks to substantiateknowledge statements and claims in terms of their pattern of derivation from sense experience. What the great empiricists almost immediatelynotice is that sense experience does not come pre-packagedorpre-labelled and needs to be assembled into ausable and reliable basis for knowledge on the basis of an antecedent naming process that makesthe sense data valuable and relevant for the justificatory project on which the empiricist is embarked. The neutral and unbiased character of the sense data is thus called into question, with the result that our everydaystate- ments remain unanchored. The empiricist who, on one level, believes thathehas the antidote to scepticism—unadorned,irrefutable sense data—paradoxicallyends up reinforcing it by the unavoidable need to supplement sense data through endless- ly evolving human naming processes. The logical problematic that confronts scepticism itself meansthat the empiricist’swork remains systematicallyunresolved—and perhaps unresolvable. Monotheism interpreted from anegative theological perspective constitutes the first run of Western scepticism to have had apervasive culturalinfluence. The most influential forms of scepticism in Western thoughtand experienceappear to have been first monotheism and then,more explicitlyand self-consciously, the scepticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Conceiving the relationship between monotheism and scepticism as Ihavethe- orised it in this essayopens new approaches for interpreting the Western intellectual tradition and the relationship between modernity and postmodernity.The traditional Western intellectual story needstoberevised. Western intellectual history does not consist in adramatic supplantingofareligious sensibility and outlook by sceptical self-understandingsand modes of being in the world. Rather,Western thought seems to move from more inchoate and less self-conscious forms of scepticism to more fully explicit and articulated versions of it.Ifmodernity is to be theoretically and socio- logicallyidentifiedwith the emergence of scepticism into full prominence,Ibelieve that postmodernity can be most persuasivelyenvisionedasthe emergence of the limitations and dilemmassurroundingscepticism into an augmented self-consciousness. The unexitable square one of philosophy, to which the earlyforms of Western self-consciousness in Plato alerted us, can now be seen as our common habitation. The upshot of my reading is that “modernity” has been with us from the start of Western intellectual history.Anawarenessofscepticism and its limits and dilemmas has been present in Western thoughtsince at least the time of Plato, and it is integral to the reception of Greek ideas in boththe medieval and post-medieval periods. In an importantsense, aproper appreciation of the origins and developmentofnegative theologyclues us in to the fact that all of Western thought consists of one vast continual stationary moment characterised by preoccupation with scepticism and the dilemmas thatitengenders. One of the most cogent readingsofpostmodernism is that it highlights the incompleteand uncompletable character of what precedes it in Western thought and thereforeconstitutes modernity’smost elevated moment of re- 10 AryehBotwinick

flectiveness and self-consciousness. Beneath postmodernism’sgloryinginthe frag- mentary and the transitory lies an appreciation of the unity of Western thought that perhaps goes deeper than earlier modernist perceptions of it.

Bibliography

Botwinick, Aryeh. Skepticism, Belief,and the Modern: Maimonides to Nietzsche. Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1997. Plato. The Republicand Other Works. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Garden City,NY: Doubleday/Anchor,1973. Popper,Karl. Conjectures and Refutations:The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 2nd edition. London: Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1965. Michela Torbidoni Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and JewishEmancipation: AComparison between Simone Luzzattoand Moses Mendelssohn

1Introduction

Since antiquity,the legendary figure of Socrates has embodied the human desire for knowledge,and since the earliest theological controversies, he has symbolised the first authentic freethinker as wellasavictim of social and religious intolerance. The role of Socrates as arepresentative of secular knowledge within the framework of the struggle between philosophyand revelation was greatlythematised during the eighteenth century,which celebrated him as aparadigmofreason, amodel of secular virtue, “certainlynot an atheist one, but one which was independent of the dogmas of the priests, […]the archetype of the free thinker in matters of faith.”¹ Forthis reason, the character of Socrates was imbued with anew secular pie- tas,which must be considered asignificant expression of the Enlightenment’scon- cerns about the question of religion. AccordingtoLeo Strauss, the Socratic philosophical method reflects the original meaning of the term as away of life devoted to the realm of knowledge and asearch for the truth. Strauss makes adistinction between this concept of philosophyand that of philosophyasamassofdoctrines and asystem established by history.² In his view,Socrates’sphilosophyembodies the term’soriginal meaning because it consists on the one hand of an awareness of human ignorance towards fundamental issues and on the other of the eros which prompts inquiry and the search for the truth. And indeed, an awareness of the uncertainty of anysolution and of our ignoranceof the main aspects of philosophicalinquiry is the main feature of the philosopher’s search for truth and his wayoflife; namely, away of life that is incompatible with the biblical one. As part of the great discussion of the opposition between Jerusalem and Athens within Strauss’sthought,thereisanambivalencebetween the Bible and Greek philosophyconcerning how to deal with morality and which is the best wayof life: philosophers attempt to answer to these questions by relying on their reason and not merelyobeying the laws of aparticular tradition, thereby opposing biblical hu-

 Raymond Trousson, Socrates devantVoltaire, Diderot et Rousseau:laconscience en face du mythe (Paris:Lettres modernes,1967), 18.  See LeoStrauss, “The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy,” Independent Journal of Phi- losophy 3(1979): 114.

OpenAccess. ©2020MichelaTorbidoni, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-004 12 Michela Torbidoni

mility,which is grounded in fear and piety.³ Strauss expounded the two different approaches to life through the story of Abraham and the example of Socrates in the following way: the former obeys an unintelligible command without hesitation; the latter,Socrates,despite his belief that Apollo wascommandinghim, nevertheless did not react “in unhesitating obedience, but in examining an unintelligible saying of Apollo.”⁴ Socrates questions the truth of the Delphic oracle’sstatement that he is the wisest man and in doing so, his rational inquiry replaces the blind obedience to divine orders requestedbythe biblical tradition. In light of this example, the Soc- ratic form of inquiry must be interpreted as the authentic expression of human wisdom in opposition to the divine one. Despite the radical opposition between Jerusalem and Athens defended by Strauss’sview,his speculation about Socrateshas the merit not onlyofhaving high- lighted the secular tendency of Socratic philosophy—namely,Socrates’sattempt to free the mind from the fettersofdogmatism and his impact on the social order— but also, and even more surprising,ofhavinglinked Mendelssohn’senthusiasm for the figure of Socrates and Simone Luzzatto’s Socrates, Or On Human Knowledge (1651). In asmall passageinhis earlywriting on Mendelssohn’s Phaedon,Strauss quoted asentencewritten by Mendelssohn in aletter to his friend Thomas Abbt at atime whenhis Phaedon (1767) was almostcomplete:

Iamputtingmyreasons into Socrates’ mouth. […]Ineed apagan so as not to have to getin- volved with revelation.⁵

The abovesentencetaken from Mendelssohn’sletters is completed by ahandwritten marginal note in which Strauss adds areferencetoLuzzatto and his Socrates.⁶ The similarities that Strauss had perhaps seen between Luzzatto’sbook and Mendels- sohn’s Phaedon seem to be mostlyfound in Mendelssohn’sphilosophical decision to speak through Socrates’svoice. AccordingtoStrauss, this fact reflected not only Mendelssohn’sstruggle against the Scholastic tradition, but also his struggle against the very concept of tradition; namely, “prejudices,” especiallythose of the revealed religions. In Strauss’sopinion, Socrates and Plato attracted Mendelssohn’sinterest because they were philosophers who did not believeinrevelation; that is, they were “rational pagans.”⁷

 See Chiara Adorisio, Leo Strauss lettorediHermann Cohen: dalla filosofia moderna al ritorno agli antichi (Florence: Giuntina, 2007), 170–74.  LeoStrauss, JewishPhilosophyand the Crisis of Modernity:Essaysand Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought,ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany, NY:SUNY Press, 1997), 111.  Letter from Moses Mendelssohn to Thomas Abbt of July 22, 1766,inLeo Strauss, On Moses Mendels- sohn,ed. and trans. Martin D. Yaffe (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2012), 34.  Yaffe mentionsthis handwritten note and directs the readertoLeo Strauss’s Gesammelte Schriften, Band II:Philosophie und Gesetz—Frühe Schriften,ed. Heinrich Meier (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 1997). See Strauss, On Moses Mendelssohn,34n.40.  Strauss, On Moses Mendelssohn,33–34. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and Jewish Emancipation 13

Strauss’sinterpretation suggests that the choice of the pagan Socrates mayhave been methodological in order to fulfil Mendelssohn’swish to speak freefrom religious concerns and thus also to raise criticism of traditionalprejudices.This consideration, when viewed in connection with the marginalquotation, thus alsoinvites us to reflect on the role of the pagan Socrateswithin Luzzatto’sbook, and most of all to what extent this figure maybebound to the history of Jewish emancipation. The cases of Moses Mendelssohn and Simone Luzzatto, as representativesofthe German JewishEnlightenmentand Baroque Italyrespectively,provide meaningful evidence of the close connection between the use of Socrates and his critical approach and their struggle for the rights of Jews in society. The present comparison is apreliminary work aiming to provide some hints of a wider topic that will not be fullyrealised here. However,this brief overview of the Socratic impulses of Mendelssohn and Luzzatto maybeconsidered an interesting starting point in order to examine not onlytheir philosophical projects,but also the social and religious claims behind them. Starting from the better-known case of Mendelssohn’srational Socrates and proceeding to Luzzatto’ssceptical version of him, the great complexity of the Jews’ relationship to their surrounding culture will be explored. This will help to add some further considerations on the state of the Jews in earlymodern Italyand the German Aufklärung. As we will see, under Socrates’sflag,both Mendelssohn and Luzzatto pursue a common aim; namely, the foundation of auniversalistichuman community.Howev- er,what is interesting and more problematic in this respect is the different methodological approachestosuch afigure. While Mendelssohn uses Socrates as ameans of disseminating his original optimism and trust into the universalistic value of reason, careful to conform to the cultural tendencies of the Enlightenment,Luzzatto makes Socrates the mediator of his provocativesceptical pessimism towardshuman certainties. These two contrary methodological approaches inviteustoreflect on the freedom of speech alreadyachieved by this earlymodern Venetian rabbi, on the multi-level challengeissued by his philosophical writing in which Socrates was the main character,and aboveall on the real status of the Jews in Venice, wherea rabbi could state that his book had been written by a “Venetian Jew.”

2Mendelssohn’sSocrates of Reason

Within eighteenth-century Jewish thought, however,Socrates must be seen as an ambivalent figure of reason, and MosesMendelssohn’scommitment to achieving atrue and coherent synthesis between rationalist philosophyand Jewish religion properly shows this ambivalence. We should not overlook the fact that within the framework of intellectual history, the figure of Socrates also embodied crucial religious and political issues duringthe earlyGerman Haskalah (1680–1720): in an eraofintense criticism of Lutheran orthodoxy and its relationship to the Aristotelian philosophicaltradition in Germanuni- 14 Michela Torbidoni

versities,⁸ Socrates had usually been taken into account independentlyofthe Platon- ic tradition and praised as the philosopher of moral questions who had turned his attention from the contemplation of natural thingstohuman customs and behav- iours.⁹ However,accordingtothe German Lutheran theologian Johann Franz Budde (1667–1729), “the figure of Socrates assumes an important role: his struggle against the Sophists more or less foreshadowed the struggle of modernphilosophy against the empty metaphysical debates and arroganceofthe Scholastics (supercili- um scholasticum).”¹⁰ Asimilar attitude mayalsobefound in Mendelssohn’sdecision to put his reasoning into the mouth of Socrates,apagan, in his Phaedon (1767): this was meant to fulfil his wish to speak freefrom religious concerns and thus reflected his attempt to underline the universalistic foundation of philosophy, theology, and aboveall reason as the common ground of every religion. Phaedon was an essayabout what reason can know regarding the immortality of the soul when it is not guided by revelation; namely,bycountingonlyonits own capacities.Mendelssohn’sdecision to write such awork was prompted by his admiration for Platoand Socrates,which was rooted in his opposition to the dogmatism and pedantic authority of Scholastic philosophy. In putting forth strictlyphilosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul, the dialogues contend that such reasonings must take place independentlyofthe demands of religion. Mendelssohn’sportrayal of Socrates greatlyidealised his wisdom,his patience and impartial philanthropy,his devotion to the laws of his homeland until his death, his liberal attitude towards religious traditions, and his decisive opposition to prejudices and superstitions.¹¹ Although Socrates livedinatime thatdid not share the oppressive theological circumstances of Mendelssohn’scentury,nevertheless Mendelssohn described him by focusingless on his personality and more on his culturalcontext,which seemed to reflectMendelssohn’sown dilemma:

He had on the one hand to conquer the prejudices of his own education, to enlighten the ignorance of others,torefutesophistry and calumnyofhis adversaries,tobear poverty,tocontend against established power,and, what was still morehardthan either,todissipatethe dark terrors of superstition. On the other hand, the feeble understandingofhis fellow citizens required

 From 1660 in Germany, and morespecificallyfollowingthe foundation of the University of Halle, areligious circle that was highlycritical of Lutheran orthodoxy began disseminatingits ideas:its pro- moters, such as Christian Thomasius, Johann Franz Budde, and some members of the Pietist community,challengedLutheran traditions and encouraged anew studyofthe relationship between Chris- tianity and classical philosophy. On this topic, see Guido Bartolucci, “Jewish Scepticism in Christian Eyes: JacobF.Reimmann and the TransformationofJewishPhilosophy,” in Yearbookofthe Maimo- nides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2018,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin: De Gruyter,2018), 145–64.  Gregorio Piaia and Giovanni Santinello, eds., Models of the HistoryofPhilosophy.Volume II:From the Cartesian Age to Brucker (Dordrecht and New York: Springer,2011), 357.  Piaia and Santinello, 357.  See Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: ABiographical Study (Philadelphia: Jewish Publica- tion Society of America, 1973), 157–58. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and Jewish Emancipation 15

to be managedwith great tenderness,that he might drawnoreproaches upon himself, or lessen the influencewhich the poorest religion has on the morals of weakminds.¹²

The goal of Mendelssohn’sSocrates is to eradicate “the dark terrors of superstition” in favour of abroader horizon made by an enlightened concept of auniversal God which unifiesreason and religion and thus maybeshared by different cultures. The philosophicalproject of Phaedo’sSocrates is thus intimatelylinked to Mendels- sohn’spersonal intellectual experience and desire for aspace in which speculative thoughtcould be independent from anyreligious group:

Wisdom knows auniversal fatherland,auniversal religion, and if it tolerates divisions,itdoes not toleratethe unkindness,misanthropy of such divisions,which youhavemade the foundation of your political institutions.—This is how,Ithink, aman likeSocrates would think in our days and seen from this angle, the mantle of modernphilosophy, which Ihavegiven him, would not seem entirelyunfitting.¹³

In his use of apagan speaker,Mendelssohn was attemptingtoovercome the particularity of aspecific religious creed and to join Enlightenment’suniversalist project; however,the entire book must also be read as an answer to aChristian readership. AccordingtoMiriam Leonard, Mendelssohn engaged in this dialogue in order to ap- pease the long-standingChristian critique that accused the Jews of having neglected the immortalityofthe soul:

From the Christian perspective,the question of immortality was just one moreindication of the essential lack of Judaism. Paradoxically, immortality is aGreek not aJewish idea. Jewish philosophers likePhilo had to turn to Platotofill in the gaps of Jewish theology.Inthis version, Pla- tonism is not so much the antithesis as the supplementtoJudaism.Plato hardlyrepresented the dangerouslure of paganism. Jews needed Platotobecome betterJews.¹⁴

Socrates is anything but Mendelssohn’smouthpiece;heleads Mendelssohn’sopinion to the conclusion that this world has been conceivedsoastomake those of its inhabitants who are endowed with reason continue in theirprogress towards perfection and happiness.From this assumption, he deduced thatitwas impossible to conceive of adivine wisdom which would allow the interruption of this progress and cause them to lose the resultsoftheirefforts.¹⁵ Mendelssohn strengthensthis argu-

 Mendelssohn, Phaedon,inSchriften zurPhilosophie und Ästhetik,ed. Fritz Bambergerand Leo Strauss,vol 3.1ofGesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe,ed. Alexander Altmann et al. (Berlin: Aka- demie Verlag,1972),15–16.From now on, Iwill refertothis edition as JubA. The English translation is takenfromWilli Goetschel, Spinoza’sModernity:Mendelssohn, Lessing,and Heine (Madison: Univer- sity of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 119–20.  JubA,3.1:151–2; Goetschel, Spinoza’sModernity,121.  Miriam Leonard, “Greeks, Jews,and the Enlightenment: Moses Mendelssohn’sSocrates,” Cultural Critique 74 (2010): 194.  See Mendelssohn, JubA,3.1:115. 16 Michela Torbidoni

ment,which is in itself sufficient to demonstrate the immortality of the human soul, and underlined that human beingshaveaneed to believeinthe existenceofalife after death.¹⁶ Based on Plato’s Phaedo,Mendelssohn’sdialogue on the immortality of the soul put forth apersuasive plea for the recognition that human individualityisgrounded in every person’sinalienable right.His use of Socrates to expound his philosophy— namely, aGreek philosopher who represented acommon universalpoint of reference in Western philosophy—was the key to the immense success of his Phaedon. Mendelssohn’sessayismorethan simplyevidence of the conflict between the Enlightenment and religion: on the one hand,the figure of Socrates reflected Men- delssohn’sphilosophical search for the acknowledgment of the universalvalue of reason, and through him, he was able to present his philosophical project to agreater public. On the other,the Socratic impulsewhich permeated Mendelssohn’slife and work was sometimes misinterpreted by the Christian side and seen as an attempt to distance himself from Judaism and come closer to Christianity.For this reason, behindthe epithet “the German Socrates,”¹⁷ which wasbestowed on him by his contemporaries, there was not onlythe great acknowledgment thatMendelssohn receivedfrom the Christian intellectual world, but also persistent prejudice concerning his Judaism and the expectation of his conversion. An example of this concern is the caustic letter exchangebetween Mendelssohn and Johann Kaspar Lavater.Assoon as Mendelssohn had established himself in the republic of letters,hewas obliged to face Lavater’spublic challenge, which had a devastatingeffect on his life. In his translation of Charles Bonnet’s La palingénésie philosophique,¹⁸ the Swiss philosopher and theologian addressed adedicatory epistle to Mendelssohn. Since Lavater had interpreted Bonnet’sarguments as ademonstra- tion of the truth of Christianitymeant for non-Christians,heinvited Mendelssohn to either refute these arguments or else to do “what Socrates would have done if he had read [Bonnet’swork]and found it irrefutable”;¹⁹ namely,toconvert to the religion of truth and in so doing,todowhat,inhis opinion, reason would demand. Mendelssohn, deeplyoffendedbythis publicprovocation, was alsocompelled to react,because his failuretoanswer to Lavater’sattack could have been seen as an incapacity to dismiss Bonnet’sarguments and could alsohaveraised suspicion to-

 See Allan Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment (Albany, NY:SUNY Press, 1994), 57.  On this topic, see Christoph Schulte, Die Jüdische Aufklärung:Philosophie,Religion, Geschichte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002), 199–206.  Charles Bonnet’sbook, La palingénésie philosophique, ou, Idées sur l’état passé et sur l’état futur des êtres vivans,was published in Genevain1769byClaude Philibert and Barthelemi Chirol.  Mendelssohn, Zueignungsschreiben Johann Caspar LavatersanMoses Mendelssohn in Schriften zumJudentum I,ed. Simon Rawidowicz, vol7.1 of Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe,ed. Alexander Altmann et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,1930. The English translation is taken from Moses Mendelssohn, Writings on Judaism, Christianity,and the Bible,ed. Michah Gottlieb, trans.Curtis Bowman, Elias Sacks,and Allan Arkush (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press,2011), 3. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and Jewish Emancipation 17

wards his sincerecommitment to Judaism. At the same time,his denial of Bonnet’s arguments could have been interpreted as an implicit attack on Christianity. He was thus obliged to take apublic stand with regardtoJudaism, which was what he had aboveall wished to avoid. In this way, Lavater created asituation which undermined the openness and fairness of the free speech of the republic of letters.The solution that Mendelssohn devised masterfullyallowed him to avoid such an insidious trap. In an open letter to Lavater,hefocused on Judaism’stolerant attitude towards non- Jews by arguing thatitwas areligion basedonthe universal laws of rational morality,the Noahide Laws, which do not demand the conversion of others, contraryto Christianity.²⁰ Mendelssohn’sinvolvement in the emancipation of the Jews consisted, as is well- known, in his mediating role between twoapparent opposites, the Enlightenment and Judaism. His main goal was to createthe foundations for aJudeo-German literature by propagating an imageofJudaism that could suit the contemporary conception of reason. The uneasy compromise between reason and revelation that preoccu- pies Mendelssohn in his Phaedon is alsoatthe heart of his most famous work, Jerusalem, Or On Religious Power and Judaism (1783), in which he attempted to show that Judaism was not onlyreconcilable to the Enlightenment,but also that it provided the most convincing model of alife ruled by reason. AccordingtoDavid Sorkin, Mendelssohn’swished-for synthesis maybesituated within what he calls the “religious Enlightenment,” aterm thatpoints out the complexity of his relationship to the largerculture.²¹ On the one hand, therewas his support of an ideal compatibility between reason and divinerevelation basedonthe cul- tivation of intellectual perfection and the practice of universal ethics; an ideal prompted by “an egalitarian impulse, holding that all human beings(not just élite philosophers) could know metaphysical truth”²² and by the refusaltosearch for an ultimate truth. On the other,there was his relianceonwhat Bernard Septimus has defined as the “Andalusian tradition,”²³ meaning aflexible approach to Judaism within medieval Jewishphilosophywhich did not reject rationalism itself, but established boundaries to it by subordinating philosophytopiety and limiting the horizon of human knowledge.For this reason, accordingtoSorkin,Mendelssohn seems to use novel means to achieveconservative ends.

 See Mendelssohn’sopen letter to Lavater,Mendelssohn, JubA,7.1:7–17.  David Sorkin,Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment (London: Halban, 2012), 25.  Sorkin, xx–xxi.  BernardSeptimus, “Nahmanides and the Andalusian Tradition,” in Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (Ramban):Explorations in His Religious and LiteraryVirtuosity,ed. IsadoreTwersky (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1983), 34. 18 Michela Torbidoni

3Luzzatto’sSceptical Socrates

Little more thanacentury earlier,aVenetian rabbi, fullycommitted to the defence of the Jews, had adopted the figure of Socrates as aspokesperson for his philosophical, religious, and political ideas: Simone Luzzatto. One of the chief rabbis of Venice, Luz- zatto is known for having published aplea to prevent the expulsion of his people from the city, Discourse on the State of the Jews,in1638. Among the manyarguments put forth in this work, Luzzatto also underlined the universalistic foundation of Ju- daism. He stated that the human community must be grounded in the observance of the precepts of natural moralityand in some cognition of the superior cause;²⁴ in this way, he showed that he shared the widespread belief of his time that humanity consisted in acknowledging the existenceofasuperior cause and in sharing the precepts of natural morality.²⁵ In this work, Judaism is presented as being deeply bound to this universal community thanks to its traditionalstruggle against misbe- liefs duetoits inner adherencetorational thinking:

No other precept is reiterated as frequentlyinthe Scriptureasthe prohibition against magic, the judicial magic of the times,necromancy, and all other vainobservancesand abominable idola- tries.For they are all the offshoots of superstition, which is nothingbut an abuse, or worse, a wasteproduct of true religion and the legitimateworship of God. Indeed, Moses was not so worried about chasingimpiety from the world as he was aboutrootingout superstition. Forareg- ular series of events, achain of connected causes,oreventhe anatomyofabase, ugly little animal is proof of the existenceofGod and aconfutation of atheism.²⁶

In his response to Tacitus’sdenigration of Judaism, Luzzatto wants not onlytodem- onstrate that Scripture itself is against idolatry,but also to underline the rational nature of the Jewishreligion:

Icannot fullyunderstand what he wishes to infer when he statesthat the ancient Jews wereop- pressed by superstition,while he himself affirmsfirst that they “conceive of one godonly, and that with the mind alone.”²⁷

However,the idea of Judaism having auniversal rational foundation is onlybriefly mentioned in the Discourse. After all, how could this book,which was an official defence of the Jews in light of dangers to their livesinVenice, be the right place to un-

 See Simone Luzzatto, Discourse on the State of the Jews of Venice,ed. and trans. Giuseppe Veltri and Anna Lissa (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), 134.  See Alessandro Guetta, Italian Jewryinthe Early Modern Era: EssaysinIntellectual History (Brigh- ton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2014), 97.  Luzzatto, Discourse,171–73.  Luzzatto, 172–73.The quotation fromTacitus is takenfromhis Histories,5.5.18–19,inTacitus, His- tories:Books 4–5. Annals: Books 1–3,trans. CliffordH.Moore and John Jackson (Cambridge,MA: Har- vardUniversity Press,1931), 183. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and JewishEmancipation 19

fold such aphilosophical argument?Luzzatto would onlyproperlyarticulate this idea more thanten years later in his second book, Socrates, Or On Human Knowledge, in which the famous Socrates and his critical attitude are allied to the pattern provided by sceptical philosophy. This combination of elements thus created the ideal premise for an inquiry able to delve into what Luzzatto defined as the “human community” described above. Mendelssohn’sSocrates is likeasaint,apositive character who entirelyrelies on the certainty of reason. His Phaedo amplydocumented Mendelssohn’sreliance on the abilities of reason, because it was an essaymeant to show what reason can know regardingthe immortality of the soul when it is not guided by revelation; namely, by countingonlyonits own capacities.Luzzatto’sSocrates is rather an anti-hero; he is insolent,restless in his inquisitive approach to life, and substantially sceptical. In the extended title of Socrates, Or On Human Knowledge,the premises of Mendelssohn’s Phaedon seem to be reversed,asitstates that it is “abook that shows how deficient human understanding can be when it is not led by revelation.” He belongstothe sceptical tradition going backtoMichel de Montaigne’sphilosophy, with which Luzzatto was very conversant.Montaigne’suse of Socrates’sattitude and irony²⁸ was meant to overcome the borders established by rituals, superstitions, and prejudices.His goal was to discover the universality of rationalthinking and at the same time to build the autonomyofthe conscience, because accordingtoMon- taigne, every human being bears in himself the entire human condition.²⁹ Like Mon- taigne, Luzzatto, through the figure of Socrates,defines the guidelines of his philosophical project: the possibilityofovercoming the mere singularity of his Jewish identity and achieving universality through his speculative thought. The pattern followed by Luzzatto’sSocrates wasstrongly inspired by Sextus Em- piricus’s Outlines of Scepticism:the ten tropoi lead his inquiry through the subjectivity of human perception, asourceofcontinual illusion, or the inconstancyofthe state of the whole up to the final acknowledgment of the inscrutability of anyobject by itself.³⁰ Like Sextus, Luzzatto’sSocrates is persuadedthatthe suspension of judgement (epochē)isthe correct attitude towards the world, because every statement is subjecttoirreconcilable conflicts (diaphōnia). Equipollence, which demands the suspension of judgement which they believerestores peace of mind or tranquil-

 See Alexander Nehamas, TheArt of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley, LosAngeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998), 101–27.  See Montaigne, TheComplete Essays,ed. and trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 2003), 3:2.  On the impact of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism on Luzzatto’s Socrates,see Michela Torbidoni, “Il metodo del dubbio nel Socrate di Simone Luzzatto,” in Filosofo erabbino nella Venezia del Seicento:Studi su SimoneLuzzatto,ed. Giuseppe Veltri(Rome: Aracne, 2015), 183–245, and Giu- seppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: Enquiryinto JewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 217–24. 20 Michela Torbidoni

lity (ataraxia), reigns in every inquiry that sceptics undertake.³¹ Socrates is here not onlymasterfullymanagingSextus’s Outlines,but he is also well acquainted with the Academic scepticism of Carneades, whereof Cicero’s Academics is the chief source. The “probable” (from the Greek pithanon)plays amajor role in Luzzatto’sbook, in which it is defined as the “North Star in his journey through life,” showing thus that it is consistent with the sceptic’sinstruction to follow the probable in the absence of truth. Socrates here embodies the restless human curiosity which questions past and present beliefs without stoppingtowonder what the futurewill bring.Hequestions anthropocentric cosmology by recalling disrupting thinkers such as Lucretius or Bruno and referringtothe impioustheory of the existenceofaninfinite number of worlds or the idea of the eternity of the world. Through Socrates, Luzzatto aims to break the illusion of mankind’ssuperiority,and on the contrary,heupholds its marginalised position in the universe: this stance is also strengthened by his comparison between human beingsand animalsand the fact thathereducesthe gapbetween them. Luzzatto’sgoal is to show the miserable state of every human being who arrogantlyboasts of his wisdomorisabsolutelyconvinced that he is following the right belief or custom. Following modern scepticism, Luzzatto comes to acknowledge the relativity of the customs and beliefs of every civilisation to every epoch: his arguments lead to an unavoidable “isostheny” between all views, past and present.Luzzatto’sSocrates champions the idea that no certaintyexists, but rather thateverything is true relative to its eraand to the culturetowhich one belongs. An example of this is found in the following passage:

However,inadditiontothis, is thereany opinion that,despitehavingstrongly persisted for a long time instead of endingits life and dyingout in accordancewith all other human things, turns out not to be temporary in relation to the infinite future and the undefined posterity to come? Rather,every day, we experiencethat manyopinions held in highesteem and consideration by antiquity nowadays turn into mere fabulous fantasies and ridiculous tales.³² The wor- shipped ox,deified by the Egyptians along with manyother brutes, alreadybegins to be consid- eredasfrenzied and mad by us Greeks.³³

Luzzatto’sSocrates fulfils adouble task: there is an evident parsdestruens meant to demolish traditionalcertainties in every field from astronomytoethics.This

 On the legacy of Pyrrhonism, see RichardH.Popkin, TheHistory of Scepticism fromSavonarola to Bayle,rev.ed. (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2003) and TheHigh Road to Pyrrhonism,ed. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force, repr.ed. (Indianapolis:Hackett,1993).  Livingbyexperienceand without opinions plays arelevantroleinSextus’sarguments against dogmatic assertions;see Outlines of Scepticism 2.246.  The reference to the Egyptians’ worship of animals also occurs in Discourse,168–71,where Luz- zattoquotes Juvenal, Satires 15.1–4. The same topic, together with the same quotation, is found in Montaigne’s Essays in 2:11,462–64. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and JewishEmancipation 21

part,which is the most consistent in the whole of the Socrates,pursues the daring undertaking of underminingthe traditionalbodyofknowledge based on Aristotelian philosophy, because it is evidentlynolonger able to contain the immense changes and discoveries thatarose duringthe seventeenth century.The reader of this first part of Luzzatto’sbook willfind the Socratic celebration of ignorance—meant as an awareness of not knowing anything that mayclaim the name of truth and the critical use of reason—to be atool for refusing everythingdictated by tradition or blindly accepted as religious belief. Thankstohis Socrates,the rabbiexpounded arefined criticism of the alleged truths or dogmata of his time established by an authorial tradition which demanded to be obeyed and not questioned. This part of the book,as has been seen, was made possible thanks to Luzzatto putting ancientand modern sceptical strategies into the mouth of Socrates,the most restlessmind in Western culture. However,the long parsdestruens prepares the basisfor the parsconstruens:the uncertainty disseminated throughout the book generates asense of loss which creates bonds between human beings rather than separating them. Doctrine, social wealth, beauty,custom, religious ceremonies—namely,the major sources of human division—are, in Luzzatto’streatise, all subjectedtodoubt,and the human being ends up being stripped of all his convictions that are opposed to God and Nature. Indeed, the universality that Luzzatto’sthinkingaims to achieveisnot atheistic, but is rather atheisticallyinspired religiosity which does not need anyparticular creed. Specifically, the final part of his Socrates shows that in his view,proper religious behaviour conforms to reason, is universal, and is against superstition and degenerate beliefs:

Foritissufficient for my defencethat youobservethe public and private reasonings that Ihave always deliveredconcerning the reverence duetothe first and worthiest cause, which moves and rules everything. Indeed, Ihavealways promulgated that the cognition that one has of it and the veneration that is due to it come not onlyfromsubtle and wide-rangingdeductions,but were also giventousalong with milk by Natureitself. Hence,itfollows that the human mind is so inclined and favourably disposed to religion and divine worship that if it weredeprivedof such apursuit,hewould not be very different from bruteanimals. Ihavenever despised or omitted[to perform] ceremonies or institutionsorderedbyour city for the observance of religion, but Ihavealwayspubliclyoffered sacrifices in accordance with the rites of my homeland, in appropriate places, at the right moment,and in alegitimateman- ner.And if Isometimes took aposition against the ignorant by reprehendingthem for their ridiculous superstition or degenerate religion, Iwas not then attempting, as the Giants did, to expel Jupiter fromthe sky,but rather tryingtoremove those despicable concepts which disfig- uredthe beauty and graceofthe true religion in their minds. Therefore, Ihaveoften solemnlysaid to those whoweretrulyprudent that they must pro- tect themselvesfromthe infection of superstition, an epidemic and serious disease of the people. They [must] be awarethat often the religion of the vile common people is abominable blas- 22 Michela Torbidoni

phemyfor wise men and that the true temple of God is in the wise man’smind, where He is ador- ed through offerings of loveand sacrifices of veneration.³⁴

Although Luzzatto’sopinion is presented very prudentlyinthis passage, it is nevertheless evident thathedeploys reason as the true temple of God. Onlythere, in his opinion, does true religion seem to find shelter from “the infection of superstition” and “abominable blasphemy.” Luzzatto’sconception of Nature is intended to increase this common ground shared by human beings: his sceptical Socrates promotes anaturalistic morality based on Nature as a “lover of equality” able to provide mankind with aprofitable tool thatshould be the onlyreliable guide through life; namely, the probable, described as comingdirectly “from the hands of Nature.” Luzzatto portrays asort of genealogyinwhich Nature must be considered the true sourceofmoral values:

Youmust not even doubt that in discreditingits own judgement and accusingitoffalsity,the court of conscience attended by the human mind would be debased and lackinginauthority, because it will be replaced by the majesty of Nature, which will lead the waymoredecorously towards the good and remove the evil.³⁵

Moral virtuesare indeed, according to Luzzatto’sSocrates, “daughters of the probable,” and thus “legitimate grandchildren of Nature itself.”³⁶ Nature is thus an imper- sonal entity freeofany traditional features,which thereforeoffers Luzzatto asolution to the dizzying resultsofhis free inquiry into dogmatic knowledge.Luzzatto’sfocus on Nature seems to continue to fulfilhis attempt to bring the discussion to auniversal level. According to him, humanitymust be conceived “not as something abstracted and excluded from universal Nature,but as something included in it that should complywith it and be ablyruled by it like the other mundane things.”³⁷ Luzzatto’sarguments concretelyerode dogmatic beliefs as asourceofsepara- tion and division in society and indirectlyput forth the premises of unity and equality among human beings; namely, the acknowledgment of what he had alreadyde- fined as the “human community” in his Discourse. In his view,this largercommunity shares the uncertainty of knowledge and beliefs as the onlypossiblecertainty and mayrelyonlyonanatural morality basedonthe probable and on the faith in God which dwells in the mind and not in religious ceremonies,securing itself from anyform of degeneration. In this way, Luzzatto constructed an indirect apologetic discourse which fosters tolerance and extends the borders of the concept of

 Luzzatto, Socrates,OrOnHuman Knowledge,ed. and trans.Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbido- ni (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), 478–79.  Luzzatto, 470–71.  Luzzatto, 476–77.  Luzzatto, 306–7. Socratic Impulse,Secular Tendency,and JewishEmancipation 23

community by creating anew space for more acceptanceofsocial and religious pluralism. Luzzatto could develop this parsconstruens onlythanks to the Greek Socrates. After readingLuzzatto’s Socrates,one maynote thatmostofthe author’sspeech is delivered by Socrates himself. It mayfurthermorebeseen that the text displays a rich variety of classicaldoctrines, includinggnoseology, ethics, psychology, medicine, mathematics, geometry,and astronomy, embellished by passages and verses taken from classicalpoems and plays.With the exception of afew direct quotations from medieval and Renaissance Italian literature—such as Dante’s Divine Comedy, Ariosto’s OrlandoFurioso,and Tasso’s TheLiberation of Jerusalem,which were typical for alearned Italian Jew³⁸—and two from the Bible (Ecclesiastes and Proverbs), Luz- zatto’sbook openlyprefers the Greeks and Latins as speakers;namely,Greek philos- ophersand mythological and legendary figures or politicians from this ancient world, as well as Greek and Latin literature for the quotations between the paragraphs.Questioning Luzzatto’schoice of the classicalworld for the setting of his philosophical scepticism therefore requires us to engagewith the long-lastingrelation- ship between Jewish thought and religion and classicalphilosophy, which began duringthe Middle Ages thanks to Jewishencounters with textsfrom the Greek philosophical traditions³⁹ and was revivedduringthe Renaissance,strongly impacting the passagetomodernity.During the Middle Ages, when the teachings of the two textual traditions seemed to contradict one another,avariety of methods for resolving contradictions and synthesising these traditions emerged, which spurred the development of medieval Jewish religious philosophyand gave rise to publiccontrover- sies. Ancient philosophy, which emergedasapolemical middle ground on which to engagecriticism duringthe Middle Ages, experienced arebirth during the Renais- sance, when manyclassical treatiseswereedited, translated, and commented on.⁴⁰ This revival was achallenging moment because it allowed atransition from aphilosophical setting shaped by Scholastic Aristotelian doctrine to modernity.Ancient wisdom(Platonism, Neoplatonism, Stoic ethics, Atomism, or Scepticism) continued to be examined for its “neutrality” in religious matters and theological controversies which were deeplyconnected to Aristotelianauthority and became extremelyimpor- tant during the sixteenthand seventeenth centuries. Classical philosophywas therefore seen as asafe zone for those intellectuals who were committed to freethinking or to the new experimentalscience, and for this reason, it was an excellent bridge of dialogue and comparison between Jews and Christians.

 See AsherSalah, “AMatter of Quotation: Danteand the Literary Identity of Jews in Italy,” in The Italian Judaica Jubilee Conference,ed. Shlomo Simonsohn and Joseph Shatzmiller (Leiden and Bos- ton: Brill, 2013), 167–96;Guetta, Italian Jewryinthe Early Modern Era.  See Adam Shear, “Science, Medicine,and Jewish Philosophy,” in TheCambridge HistoryofJuda- ism. Volume7:The Early Modern World, 1500–1815,ed. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2017), 522–49.  See Michael Heyd, “Introduction,” Science in Context 15,no. 1(March 2002): 1–8. 24 Michela Torbidoni

As in Mendelssohn’scase, Luzzatto’serudition in secular and Christian learning also allowed him to engageinasolid dialogue with the learned people outside the ghettoand even to gain the respect and attention of thoseChristians with whom he was acquainted. There is indeedsome evidence which clearlytestifies to the regard in which he was held among non-Jewish Venetians and foreigners: the wayheargued in defence of the Jews in his Discourse inspired and constituted the pattern of another plea on behalf of the Jews made between 1659 and 1660 by aVenetian senator of the Loredan family, twenty-one years after the publicationofLuzzatto’sbook.⁴¹ Re- cent studies have furthermore shown that scientists likethe astronomer Ismaël Boulliau,who was in the service of the French librarian and erudite humanist Jac- ques Dupuy,enjoyed the companyofthe wisest rabbis of the Venice ghetto, such as Leone Modena and Simone Luzzatto, for book collection and theological debates.⁴² Furthermore, there is evidence in Giulio Morosini’swork Via della fede mostrata a’ gli ebrei (1683) thatLuzzatto was asked to be the arbitrator in apublic debate between two brothers concerning the prophecy of Daniel.⁴³ The celebration of Luzzatto’serudition and wisdomamong the Gentiles is evidence of the intense dialogue and intellectual exchangeheundertook with the Chris- tian world. However,asinMendelssohn’scase, this openness was sometimes misinterpreted by Christians: the Franciscan LuigiBenetelli, in his invective work Idardi rabbinici (Rabbinical Arrows)published in 1705,mentioned Simone Luzzatto and Leone Modena as being known for addressing their works onlytoaChristian readership. Benetelli interpreted Luzzatto’sbehaviour and work as awish to convert or an inclination to Christianity. It is not surprising indeed that Benetelli should have clas- sified Luzzatto and Modena among the so-called evangelical rabbis (rabbini evangel- ici), meaning thosewho follow the Gospel but do not do so openly in order to not offend theircoreligionists.⁴⁴ The Franciscan strengthened his statement by mentioning some rumours thatCardinal Gregorio Barbarigoreportedtohim; namely, that Luzzatto wantedtoconvert to Christianityonhis deathbed, but that his coreligionists

 See Giuseppe Veltriand Gianfranco Miletto, “Difesa inedita del senatore veneziano Loredan in favore degli ebrei nel 1659–60 basata sul Discorso di Simone Luzzatto,” in Filosofo erabbino,249–74.  See Giuseppe Veltriand Evelien Chayes, Oltre le muradel ghetto:Accademie, scetticismo etolleranza nella Venezia barocca (Palermo:New Digital Press, 2016), 121–46.  See Giulio Morosini, Via delle fede mostrata a’ gli ebrei (Rome: Stamperia della Sacra Congrega- zione de Propaganda Fide, 1683), 13–14.Morosini reportsthat Luzzattostated: “As youknow,the text we arecurrentlydiscussingleavesall the most excellent rabbisinastateofperplexity,and they are so upset that they almost do not know whether they areinHeavenoronearth.” Furthermore, Moro- sini wrote that after afew similar words,Luzzattoputs afinger to his lips and said: “Be quiet,ifImay ask, because if we continue speculating on the prophecyofDaniel, we should all become Christians. Icannot denythat it shows very clearlythat the Messiah arrivedsome time ago. However,whether this was Jesus of Nazareth or not,Ido not want to state my opinion toohastily” (mytranslation).  See LuigiBenetelli, Idardi rabbinici (Venice:DomenicoLovisa, 1705), 19. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and JewishEmancipation 25

did not allow anyChristian, regardless of their social standing,tobepresent during the last moments before he died.⁴⁵ Contrary to Mendelssohn’scase, the scant amount of information concerning Luzzatto’sintellectual life in Venice does not provide anyevidence concerning his opinions or reactions in this regard.However,this short overviewmay be considered helpfultoinitiate an exploration of the meaning of this Jewish Socratic impulse— namely, the critical and anti-dogmatic approach to established knowledge—and how it was perceivedfrom aChristian perspective.

4Conclusion

The comparison between Mendelssohn and Luzzatto is useful here to understand the many implications involved in the use of Socrates by Jewishauthors. Forboth of them, speakingthrough Socrates becomes away to make their philosophical views reach awider readership and reflectstheir wish to be seen onlyasfar as their intellectual value is concerned. Mendelssohn and Luzzatto share the portrait of Socratesasafree thinker and free speaker beyond anyboundaries; they both celebrate his critical attitude towards degenerated formsofbeliefs,against superstition, in favour of aspirituality deeplyrooted in reason and natural morality. Forbothof them, the figure of Socrates implicitlybecomes ameans of fosteringtheir struggle for Jewishemancipation: according to Mendelssohn, Socratesisthe mediator of his strongbelief in the power of reason to build acommunity of human beings as esti- mators of speculative thinking which overcomes religious, social,orethnic boundaries. As far as Luzzatto’sSocratesisconcerned, he embodies the sceptic who inquires and demolishesevery certainty,causing the apparentlysolid castle of beliefs established as undoubtable certainties over the centuries to collapse. From the ashes of this, his sceptical Socratesleads the wayfor acommon ground basedonnatural moralityand afaith in God which, in order to maintain its integrity and avoid blasphemy, can onlybecelebratedinthe mind and not with external ceremonies. Through the figure of Socrates and Socratic dialogue, the two philosophers ach- ievenot onlythe goal of saving religion from degenerated forms of beliefs, but also that of fosteringcritical and free inquiry into dogmatic traditional knowledge and furthering one’sself-knowledge in dialogue with others. Socrates therefore becomes ameans of overcomingthe borders of religious division and preparingthe ground for alargercommunity;hewas thus amedium for removingJudaism’sparticularistic features and instead stressingits universalcontent.Most of all, the Greek philosopher embodies the culturalrole of philosophyand “secular” knowledge within the framework of Judaism; namely, the emergence of agroup of intellectuals who gave

 Benetelli, 19. 26 Michela Torbidoni

priority to such study, at least in their privatelives, over the traditional Halakhic focus of the rabbinic élite. It is alsocrucial to underlinethe revival of Socrates’scritical spirit among Jewish thinkers because it maybeconsidered as apossiblebeginning of Jewishphilosophy, which maybeidentified in the very moment whenthe traditionalbonds holding the community together begin to collapse, occurringwhen tradition starts to be per- ceivedasthe antithesis to progress and progressive thinking.Jewishphilosophy maythereforebeinterpreted as aresponse to this perception and also as the emergence of new questions usually articulated by modern philosophersconcerning individuality and community,the commensurability of reason and revelation, and the historisation of tradition.⁴⁶ In his great work on Jewish philosophy, Daniel Frank specified that “there are problems that arise at the end of the tradition, at atime when acertain distancing from the tradition has occurred”⁴⁷ and also that this was not an issue of interpreting or understanding tradition, but of questioning it.The use of Socrates maydocument the wayJewishphilosophyinterweavedwith emancipation: it refers to the intellectual experience of those Jewish thinkers who werechallenging the monolithic ground of tradition and inquiring into their own identity not onlyasacommunity, but as individual citizens in aChristian society.These Jews werethosewho developed personal relationships with Christians through the medium of philosophy: by doing so, they began to emancipate the individual from the sole identity that the Jew- ish community offered to him and started to gain adouble acknowledgment. Finally, it must be pointed out that while Mendelssohn made Socrates the interpreter of his ideas in search of away to find harmonybetween his religion and a more general education, Italian Jewish thinkers like Simone Luzzatto werealready able to link theirJewish religion to humanistic education and thus to express them- selvesvia the figure of Socratesand celebrate his genius.⁴⁸ The use of Socrates made by the Venetian rabbiLuzzatto substantiallysupports the thesis that earlymodern Italian Jewish culture must be exploredmorecarefullyasanimportant intellectual foundation of the programme to improvethe status of the Jews of Europe in the late eighteenth century.Ashas been underlined by Adam Sutcliffe, “in many different earlymodern European contexts, Jews found ways to establish themselvesona firmer footing in the communities in which they livedwithout making anyappeal to ideal of legal normalization or political equality,which would have been almost entirelyanachronistic until the 1780s.”⁴⁹ Through the maintenance of community

 Daniel H. Frank and OliverLeaman, eds., HistoryofJewishPhilosophy (London and New York: Routledge,1997), 4.  Frank and Leaman, 5.  See Jehuda Bergman, “Sokrates in der Jüdischen Literatur,” Monatsschrift fürGeschichte und Wis- senschaft des Judentums 80 (1936): 13.  Adam Sutcliffe, “Toleration, Integration, Regeneration, and Reform,” in TheCambridgeHistoryof Judaism,ed. Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1063. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and JewishEmancipation 27

concord, shared spaces,and inter-confessional interactions, the earlymodern period experiencedaconcrete Jewish–Christian coexistence in addition to the political and theological stances which onlyaffected these exchanges in acollateral way.⁵⁰ Fur- thermore, one should reconsider the paradoxicalimpact of ghettoisation on Jewish culture, because rather than “eroding its distinctiveness, it provided, behind the ghettowalls, asecure home for its autonomous development,influenced by the dominant culturewhile also to some extent sealed from it.[…]Far from making Jews and Christians invisibletoeach other,this in fact provided the basis for more robust and self-conscious encounters across this boundary of difference.”⁵¹

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 See Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,2007).  Sutcliffe, “Toleration, Integration, Regeneration, and Reform,” 1064.See also Jonathan Israel, Eu- ropean Jewryinthe Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750,3rd ed. (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civ- ilization, 1998), 67–98. 28 Michela Torbidoni

Luzzatto,Simone. Socrates, Or On Human Knowledge. Editedand translated by Giuseppe Veltri and Michela Torbidoni. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2019. Mendelssohn, Moses. Phaedon. In Schriften zur Philosophie und Ästhetik. Edited by Fritz Bamberger and Leo Strauss.Volume 3.1 of GesammelteSchriften. Jubiläumsausgabe,edited by Alexander Altmann et al. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1972. Mendelssohn, Moses. Writings on Judaism, Christianity,and the Bible. Edited by Michah Gottlieb. Translated by CurtisBowman, EliasSacks, and Allan Arkush. Waltham, MA: Brandeis UniversityPress, 2011. Mendelssohn, Moses. Zueignungsschreiben Johann Caspar Lavaters an Moses Mendelssohn in Schriften zum Judentum I. Edited by Simon Rawidowicz. Volume 7.1ofGesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe,edited by Alexander Altmann et al. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1974. Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Essays. Editedand translated by M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 2003. Morosini, Giulio. Viadelle fede mostrata a’ gli Ebrei. Rome:Stamperia della Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide, 1683. Nehamas, Alexander. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault. Berkeley,Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998. Piaia, Gregorio, and Giovanni Santinello, eds. Models of the History of Philosophy. Volume II: From the Cartesian Age to Brucker. Dordrecht and New York: Springer,2011. Popkin, RichardH.The High Road to Pyrrhonism. Edited by RichardA.Watson and James E. Force. Reprint ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. Popkin, RichardH.The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle. Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2003. Salah, Asher. “AMatter of Quotation: Danteand the LiteraryIdentity of Jews in Italy.” In The Italian Judaica Jubilee Conference,edited by Shlomo Simonsohn and Joseph Shatzmiller, 167–96. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013. Schulte, Christoph. Die Jüdische Aufklärung: Philosophie, Religion, Geschichte. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002. Septimus, Bernard. “Nahmanides and the Andalusian Tradition.” In Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (Ramban): Explorations in His Religious and LiteraryVirtuosity,edited by Isadore Twersky, 11–34. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1983. Shear, Adam. “Science,Medicine, and Jewish Philosophy.” In The Cambridge History of Judaism. Volume 7: The EarlyModern World,1500–1815,edited by Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, 522–49. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,2017. Sorkin, David. MosesMendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment. London: Halban, 2012. Strauss, Leo. GesammelteSchriften, Band II: Philosophie und Gesetz—Frühe Schriften. Editedby Heinrich Meier.Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 1997. Strauss, Leo. Jewish Philosophyand the Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern JewishThought. Edited by Kenneth Hart Green.Albany,NY: SUNY Press,1997. Strauss, Leo. On Moses Mendelssohn. Edited and translated by Martin D. Yaffe. Chicago: UniversityofChicago Press, 2012. Strauss, Leo. “The Mutual InfluenceofTheology and Philosophy.” Independent Journal of Philosophy 3(1979): 111–18. Sutcliffe, Adam. “Toleration, Integration, Regeneration, and Reform.” In The Cambridge History of Judaism. Volume 7: The EarlyModern World,edited by Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe, 1058–88. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,2017. Tacitus. Histories: Books 4–5. Annals: Books 1–3. TranslatedbyClifford H. Mooreand John Jackson. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1931. Socratic Impulse, Secular Tendency,and Jewish Emancipation 29

Torbidoni, Michela. “Il metodo del dubbio nel Socrate di Simone Luzzatto.” In Filosofo erabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto,edited by GiuseppeVeltri, 183–245. Rome:Aracne, 2015. Trousson, Raymond. Socrates devant Voltaire, DiderotetRousseau:laconscienceenface du mythe. Paris: Lettres modernes,1967. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom: Enquiryinto JewishPhilosophy and Scepticism. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2018. Veltri, Giuseppe,and Evelien Chayes. Oltrelemuradel ghetto: Accademie, scetticismo etolleranza nella Venezia barocca. Palermo: New Digital Press, 2016. Veltri, Giuseppe,and GianfrancoMiletto. “Difesa ineditadel senatore venezianoLoredan in favore degli ebreinel 1659–60 basatasul Discorso di Simone Luzzatto.” In Filosofo erabbino nella Venezia del Seicento. Studi su Simone Luzzatto,edited by GiuseppeVeltri, 249–74.Rome: Aracne, 2015.

Behnam Zolghadr The TheoryofAḥwāland Argumentsagainst the Law of Non-Contradiction

Introduction

Following the rise of dialetheism—the view thatsome contradictions are true—in the 1980s, there was agrowinginterest in exploring and searchingfor the possibleop- ponentsofthe lawofnon-contradiction throughout the history of philosophy, in both the East and the West.However,between these two—that is, philosophyinEu- rope and philosophyinIndia and East Asia—there was aphilosophicaltradition in the Islamicate world which, as far as Iknow,has been overlooked from this dialetheic point of view.Inthis paper,Iwill discuss some arguments against the lawofnon- contradiction (henceforth, LNC) setforth by some philosophers in the Islamicate world. The text in which these arguments can be found is Faḫral-Dīnal-Rāzī’smag- num opus Muḥaṣṣal afkāral-mutaqaddimīnwa-l-mutaʾaḫḫirīn (TheCompendium of the Thoughtofthe Ancients and the Moderns). It should be noted that Rāzī (d. 1210) himself is not an opponent of the LNC or the lawofexcluded middle (henceforth, LEM). However,inareview of the ideas of his predecessors,hediscusses the oppositiontothe LNC. The arguments against the LNC appear in the first part of the book in his discussion of assents (taṣdīqāt). Ac- cording to Rāzī,some assents are basedonsense-perception (henceforth, sensible assents), such as “the fire is hot,” and some are self-evident,such as “negation and affirmation do not combine and cannot be denied” (al-nafywa-l-iṯbātlāyaǧta- miʿānwa-lā yartafiʿān). As Rāzī explains, some philosophers denysensibleassents altogether and some accept some of them. Similarly,some philosophers denyall self-evident assents and some confirm that thereare self-evident assents. Hence, four possibilities emerge,and thus there willbefour groups of thinkers.The first is thosewho accept both sensibleand self-evidentassents. As Rāzī says,these constitute the majority.The second group contains thosewho accept self-evident assents, but denysensibleassents. Rāzī namesPlato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Galen as members of this group and then discusses their arguments for rejecting sensible assents. The third group is made up of thosewho denyself-evident assents, but accept sensible assents. Rāzī does not explicitlytell us who they are, but he puts forward their arguments against self-evident assents, such as the LNC and the LEM. In fact,these arguments are the main concern of this paper.Aswewill see, they are based on Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’stheory of aḥwāl.¹ Finally, the fourth group is

 Twocomments areinorderhere. First,the Muʿtazilitesare famous for advocatingrationality and askingfor the arguments for every claim. This thirdgroup of thinkers about whom Rāzī is speaking

OpenAccess. ©2020Behnam Zolghadr,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-005 32 Behnam Zolghadr

formedofthose who denyboth self-evident assents and sensibleassents. According to Rāzī,the Sophists belong to this group. Since the arguments against the LNC are logicallybased on Abū Hāšim’stheory of aḥwāl (i.e., states), before discussingthe arguments, Ishould brieflyexplain the theory of states and its main claim: that there is amiddle (wāsiṭah)between existenceand non-existence, or,inother words, that some thingsare neither existent nor non-existent.Thus, accordingtoAbūHāšim, there are truth-value gaps.² In fact,itwas not uncommon among the mutakallimūn (i.e., the Islamic theologians) to hold views which accepted some truth-value gaps or gluts.³ Thus, in the first section, Iwill explain the theory of states which is the basis of the aforementioned arguments against the LNC. In the second part,wewill discuss the arguments that Rāzī put forward. After this, in the third part,wewill see the relationship between other so-called self-evident assents and the LNC. These are the three following assents: “The whole is biggerthan its parts,”“two objects identical with athird object are identical to each other,” and “an object cannot be in two places at the same time.” On behalf of the opponents of the LNC, Rāzī also argues thatthese so-called self-evident assents are based on the LNC; that is, they are true because of the truth of the LNC. Finally, in the fourth part,wewill encounter aparaconsistent logic and

rejects all self-evident assents.Does this mean that they cannot be amongthe followers of Abū Hāšim; i.e., the Bahšamiyyah?The Bahšamiyyah weresome of the Muʿtazilites, and thus it does not seem that this can be the group of the thinkers to whom Rāzī is referring. However,this would be jumpingtoconclusions.Itispossible to violatethe lawofnon-contradiction and the lawofexcluded middle and still ask for reasons and arguments,or, in other words,toremain logical and coherent. Forone explanation, see section 4ofthis paper, in which some paraconsistent logics areintroduced. Foradetailed discussion, see Graham Priest, Doubt Truth to Be aLiar (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006), part 3. Second, in this paper,Iprovide no historical evidencethat this group of thinkers wereamongthe Bahšamiyyah.Ionlyfocus on the relationship between their arguments against the LNC and the theory of states. In fact,Rāzīis infamous for arguingagainst manypositions for the sake of argumentation.Thus,itmay be the case that those arguments against the LNC belongtoRāzīhim- self and that they arenothingmorethan dialecticalconstructions.However,Iwill not takeaside as to whether therewas such agroup of thinkers among the Bahšamiyyah or not; my concern hereis onlyphilosophical and not historical.  Truth-valuegaps arepropositions which are neither true nor false (or in other words,propositions which do not take anytruth value). Truth-value gluts arepropositions which areboth true and false. Consider the proposition “states areexistent.” According to the theory of states, this propositionis neither true nor false. Thus,itisatruth-value gap.  Forsome examples,see Ahmed Alwishah and David Sanson, “The EarlyArabic Liar:The Liar Para- doxinthe Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries CE,” Vivarium 47 (2009): 97–127, and Ahad Qaramaleki, “Khafri and the Liar Paradox” [Persian], Journal of Religious Thought of Shiraz University 11 (2004): 33–44.For the debates between the mutakallimūn and Aristotelian logicians,see Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Theology and Logic,” in TheOxfordHandbookofIslamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2016), 409–35,and Josef van Ess, “The Log- ical StructureofIslamic Theology,” in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture,ed. Gustave E. vonGrune- baum (Wiesbaden: OttoHarrassowitz, 1970), 21–50. The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 33

the wayitcan express the truth-value gaps and gluts in the theory of states without falling into triviality.

1The TheoryofStates

It is well-known that Abū Hāšim invented the theory of states to answer aproblem concerning divine attributes.⁴ However,the theory of states is not confined to this problem, as statesalso playanextensive role in Abū Hāšim’smetaphysics.First, let us discuss the problem of divine attributes and then we will see the other aspects of the theory of states. In the Qurʾan, different attributes are ascribed to God.The mutakallimūn were concerned about the nature of God in relation to these properties.The main question concerns the relationship between these attributes and the essence of God. There weretwo main rivalviews on this issue in earlyKalām: (1) Abū al-Huḏaylal-ʿAllāf (d. 841) held the view that God is identical with His attributes.For instance,Him being knowledgeable (ʿālim)implies that being knowledgeable is not adistinct reality from His. Being knowledgeableisGod Himself; thus, according to Abū al-Huḏayl, God’sattributes are not distinct realities from Himand “God’sbeing knowledgeable” refers to nothing but God Himself. (2)Ibn Kullāb(d. 859) advocated the view that God’sattributesare distinct entities from Him and so they are not identical with God. In his opinion, “being knowledgeable” refers to areality distinct from and alongside God. Each of these views had its problems. On the one hand, if God wereidentical with His attributes,Hecould not be transcendent.Moreover,His attributes,bytran- sitivity of identity relation, would be identical with each other and thus the differences between the attributes would disappear: for example, “being knowledgeable” would be the sameas“being powerful.” On the other hand,ifGod weredistinct from His attributes,then He could not be one, for affirming eternal realitiesalongside God means admitting the existenceofseveral Gods. Thus, neither case is acceptable. To answer this problem of divine attributes,AbūHāšim came up with his theory of states.⁵ Accordingtothis theory,attributes are aḥwāl (pl. of ḥāl)—that is, states—and

 See Muḥammad Šahrastānī, Nihāyah (Beirut: Dāral-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1956), 79;Allāmeh-Hellī, Kašfu l-Murād (Qom: Muʾassese Našr-eEslami, 1995), 15;Jan Thiele, “Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’s (d. 321/933) Theory of ‘States’ (aḥwāl)and ItsAdaptionbyAshʿariteTheologians,” in TheOxford Handbook of Islamic Theology,368;and RichardFrank, Beings and Their Attributes:The Teaching of the Basrian Schoolofthe Muʿtazila in the Classical Period (Albany, NY:SUNY Press, 1978), 16.  It is worthmentioningthat beforeAbūHāšim, different theologians had tried to answer this problem, though all of them were facedwith crucial objections.The most notable attempt was that of Abū Hāšim’sfather,AbūʿAlī al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 915), whowas the head of the Basrian Muʿtazilite school at the time. Formore, see Frank, Beings and Their Attributes,chapter1. 34 Behnam Zolghadr

aḥwāl are neither existent nor non-existent.But what are aḥwāl and how do they re- solve the aforementioned problem? Abū Hāšim borrowed the concept of ḥāl from grammarians. In Arabic grammar, one of the instances of ḥāl which Abū Hāšim took is the situation or state of the subject or object of the verb at the time of its occurrence.⁶ Forexample, in the sentence ǧāʾanī Zaydun māšīyan (“Zayd came to me walking”), māšīyan (“walking”)isaḥāl (“state”); the state in which the verb occurs.AbūHāšim paraphrases subject–predicate sentences in such away that the predicate becomes a ḥāl. Consider the sentence Zaydun ʿālimun (“Zayd is knowledgeable”). ForAbūHāšim, this sentence means that Zayd is and thatheisinthe state of being knowledgeable. He paraphrases the sentencebyadding the verb kāna⁷ (“to be” or “to become”). Thus, yakūnu Zaydun ʿālimun is aparaphrase of Zaydun ʿālimun. Although they both have the same meaning,each implies adifferent proposition on the metaphysical level. The original sen- tenceisausual subject–predicatesentence, but the paraphrase is not.The latterim- plies the being of the subjectand then the state in which the subject is. Abū Hāšim paraphrases all predicatesassuch. However,aswewill see, his use of the concept of ḥāl is not restricted to predicates. The Muʿtazilites wereatomists and for them, the metaphysical categories consisted of God,atoms,and accidents.⁸ Hence, there was no place for universals or attributes as such in their categoriesofbeings. Abū Hāšim added aḥwāl to these categories. One of the distinct rolesofaḥwālwastoexplain the relationship between different accidents which go by the sametitle. Thus, the theory of aḥwāl completes the Muʿtazilites’ metaphysical picture by explaining universals and attributes as a specific metaphysical category.Thus, aḥwāl are real. However,they are not objects (ḏawāt)and they are neither existent nor non-existent.There are five categories of aḥwāl:⁹ (1) The attribute of essence: this is the self-identity of things. Through this attribute, objects differ from each other.Athing being itself is the attribute of essence. For example, for an atom, being an atom is its attribute of essence which makes it what it is. (2)Essentialattributes:these are the attributes which are entailed as soon as objects become existent via the attribute of essence. Forinstance, the essentialattribute of an atom is to occupy space (taḥayyuz). When an atom is non-existent,itisstill an atom; however,itdoes not occupy space. But as soon as it becomes existent,

 Frank, 20.  The verb kāna is sometimesacompleteverb and sometimesincomplete. Here, the complete form of kāna,which means “to be” or “to become,” is used.  Alnoor Dhanani, ThePhysical TheoryofKalām:Atoms,Space, and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmol- ogy (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 17.  See Frank, Beings and Their Attributes,27; Thiele, “Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī’sTheory of States,” 370– 76;and Sabine Schmidtke, “The Muʿtazilite Movement III: The Scholastic Phase,” in TheOxfordHand- bookofIslamic Theology,163–64. The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 35

it occupies space. Thus, Abū Hāšim and his followers,aswell as some of the other Muʿtazilites,held the view thatsome objects do not exist.Their idea of existenceand objecthood will become more evident in our discussion of the next category of aḥwāl. (3) Attributes which are affected by an agent (al-ṣifātbi-l-fāʿil): specifically, this attribute is existence. An agent,which can be either God or human, generates an object and then the object is existent.Itisthe agent’saction which causes the existenceofthe object,and anon-existent object becomesexistent through the action of an agent.Thus, for an object,being existent is astate in which the essential attributes of the object are actualised. As alreadymentioned, some objects are non-existent.For instance, anon-existent atom is still an atom: it is knowable and we can discuss its attributes as an atom. However, as long as it is not in the state of existence, its essential attributes, such as oc- cupying space, are not actualised. What causes it to be in the state of existence is an act of creation performedbyanagent,and what causes anon-existent (maʿdūm)tobeanobject is its knowability.¹⁰ Anything thatisknowable, whether existent or non-existent,isanobject.However,existenceitself is not an object:it is astate (ḥāl). Since onlyobjects are knowable and states are not objects, states are not knowable; however,they are real. (4) Attributes which are grounded in accidents:asalreadymentioned, the Muʿtazi- lites’ metaphysical categories consisted of God, atoms,and accidents.Therefore, they could not explain the similarities and differences between objects by relying on these categories. One importantaspect of this shortcoming is acoherent account of universals. What is the similarity between araven and the night sky? The answer is easy;they are both black. But what is black?According to the Muʿ- tazilites,anaccident (ʿaraḍ)ofblackness inheres in araven and another accident of blackness inheres in the night sky.These two are distinct accidents; for one thing,they are in different places.Thus, the Muʿtazilites’ metaphysics cannot explain the similarity between two black objects. Abū Hāšim’sfourth category of states is thosestates which are grounded in accidents. An object in which an accident of blackness inheres is in the state of being black.Thus, states also playthe role of universals. Now we can saythatthe similarity between a ravenand the night sky is the state of being black. (5) Those states which do not gain actualitybythe object itself or by another object, the most important example of which is “being perceiving.” In contrast to his predecessors, Abū Hāšim takesperception not as an accident, but as astate.¹¹

 Dhanani, The Physical TheoryofKalām, 30.  Considering these five categories of aḥwāl,one might ask whether Abū Hāšim was under the in- fluenceofthe Stoics, specifically, the theory of hexeis. The historical rootsofthe theory of states are not my concern here, but Ican saybyreferring to Dhanani, The Physical TheoryofKalām, 5, that there is no historical evidenceofany direct link between the mutakallimūn and Greek philosophers. 36 Behnam Zolghadr

To sum up, statesare neither existent nor non-existent.They are alsonot objects, which means thatthey are not knowable. However,AbūHāšim explaineddifferent characteristics of states. Moreover,although states are not objects, they are real. These features of stateshelp Abū Hāšim to replytothe problem of the divine attributes.According to the theory of states,attributes of God are states.Statesare real, and thus they can explain the attributes ascribed to God. However,statesare not objects, and hence, in ascribing His attributes to Him, it does not follow that some objects are alongside Him. Thus, God’sunity willnot be violated. In this way, not only His unity,but also His transcendenceand the reality of His attributes are preserved. Let us see wherethe theory of states violates the LNC. That states are neither existent nor non-existent apparentlyentails truth-value gaps and thus violatesthe law of excluded middle.¹² Avicenna was well aware of the theory of states and calls the followers of the theory of states thosewho “are not among the assemblageofthe dis- cerning.”¹³ Some pages later,inhis Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt)ofal-Šifāʾ,while defending the LNC, he argues that anyviolation of the LEM entails aviolation of the LNC. The LEMfails when both affirmation and negation are removed. Avicenna tells us how this leads to the violation of the LNC:

[T1] If both [affirmation and negation] together arefalse with respect to one thing, then that thingwould, for example, be “not man” and also “not not man.” Hence,the thingwhich is “not man” and its negation (which is “not not man”)would have been combined (Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing,42–43).¹⁴

If this argument works, then the theory of states violatesthe LNC, and thus it is a dialetheic theory.There is amiddle between existence and non-existence, or,in other words, states are neither existent nor non-existent.Itfollows that states are not existent and not not existent.Therefore, accordingtoAvicenna’sargument,the middle between existenceand non-existenceentails acontradiction. On the other hand, although states are not knowable accordingtoAbūHāšim, he has told us about manyoftheir features and we now know several characteristics of states as well as their roles in his metaphysical theory.This is also acontradiction and is mentioned by some opponents of the theory of states. Whether these are good reasons to take the theory of states as adialetheic theory can be discussed further,but for our purposes, these would suffice. Let us now examine the arguments against the LNCwhich Rāzī ascribes to those who accept sensiblepropositions but denyself-evident propositions.

 It is worth mentioningthat this claim is based on the idea that existenceand non-existenceare the most general metaphysical categories.Inother words,everythingiseither existent or non-existent and consequently, predicatingexistence/non-existenceonstates is not acategorical mistake.  Avicenna, TheMetaphysicsofthe Healing,trans. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham YoungUni- versity Press, 2005), 27. ﺈﻓ ﻪﻧ ﺍﺫﺇ ﮐ ﺑﺬ ﻣﺎ ﻓﺎﻌ ﯽ ﺷ ﯽ ،ء ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺫ ﺍﻚ ﺸﻟ ﯽ ء ﻟ ﯿ ﺑﺲ ﻧﺈ ﺎﺴ ﻣﻥ ﻼﺜ ، ﻟﻭ ﯿ ﺃﺲ ﯾ ﺎﻀ ﻼﺑ ﺍﺇ ﺴﻧ ﻥﺎ . ﻓ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﺪﻗ ﺟﺍ ﻤﺘ ﺍﻊ ﺸﻟ ﯽ ء ﺬﻟﺍ ﯼ ﻮﻫ ﻟﺍ ﺇﻼ ﺴﻧ ﻥﺎ ﺳﻭ ﻟﺎ ﻪﺒ  ﺬﻟﺍ ﯼ ﻮﻫ ﻻﻻ ﻧﺇ ﻥﺎﺴ . The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 37

2Argumentsagainst the LNC

Rāzī givesfour arguments on behalf of those who denyself-evidentassents while defending sensiblepropositions.The most self-evident assentisdefined as “negation and affirmation do not combine and cannot be removed” (al-nafy wa-l-iṯbātlāyaǧ- tamiʿānwa-lā yartafiʾān).¹⁵ Before discussingthe arguments, anote on their method: they are ad hominem. Each of them shows thatholding the LNC is self-refuting;that is, that acceptingthe LNC leads to its refutation. Thus, these arguments do not have anypresuppositions: they begin with the opponent’sstance and then show that it refutes itself. Thus, in order to pose such arguments, one does not have to accept the LNC. Now let us brieflyconsider the relationship between these arguments and the theory of states.Aswewill see, the first argument concerns intentionality.Asserting the lawofnon-contradiction implies referring to contradiction. Whatever is intenda- ble is real, and thus, the LNCisself-refuting. The second argument concerns existence, suggesting the ontological explanation of existenceitself posed by the theory of states.Itcan be considered as an argument for the claim that existenceitself is neither existent nor non-existent.Asalreadymentioned, this claim is an important part of the theory of states.The third argument concerns the problem of universals, and is nothing more than an argument in favour of the theory of states concerning this problem. Again, universals are one of the five categories of states.The fourth argument concerns impossibility and the process of becoming. In these two latter arguments, the middle between existenceand non-existence,which is the coreofthe theory of states,isexplicitlyadvocated. Thus, it is not onlythe middle between existenceand non-existencewhich makes the connection between these arguments and the theory of states,but also the targets of these arguments are some of the most important aspectsofthis theory. Rāzī explains the first argument as follows:

[T2] This assent is based on conceptualising non-existence, and people have been perplexed by this. Because that which is conceptualised must be distinguished from other things,and whatever is distinguished from others must have an essential determination, and whatever is essen- tiallydetermined is an object in itself. Sincethe affirmation [of the lawofnon-contradiction] is

 In this passage, Rāzī sometimes defines the most self-evident assent as “affirmation and negation do not combine and cannot be removed,” sometimesas“an object either is or is not,” and sometimes as “negation and affirmation do not combine.” This mayhavebeen influenced by Avicenna’sargument that every violationofthe LEM is also aviolation of the LNC. As we will see, the arguments against the LNC do not always directlytargetit; sometimes,they reject it via their rejection of the LEM.This makessense if we accept Avicenna’sargument.Thus,for simplicity,Iwill not explain on every occasion that such amethod is beingused, but Iwill ask the readertobear it in mind while reading this section of the paper. 38 Behnam Zolghadr

based on this conceptualisation and this conceptualisation is impossible,therefore, this affirmation is also impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,30).¹⁶

Rāzī does not explicitlyexplain how the claim that “affirmation and negation do not combine and cannot be removed” is basedonconceptualising the non-existence. Non-existence, in this affirmation, occurs in two places:first in negation and then regardingtruth-value gaps or gluts.Negatingsomething of something is to claim the non-existenceofthe formerinthe latter.For instance, asserting that “snow is not black” is to affirm the non-existenceofthe accident of blackness in snow.More- over,the claim that affirmation and negation are neither combined nor removed also means that there are no truth-value gaps—that is, removal of both affirmation and negation—or gluts—that is, combinations of affirmation and negation. Thus, it affirms the non-existenceoftruth-value gaps and gluts. Iwillconsider both cases in order to make the discussion sufficientlyexclusive. Since, following the LNC and the LEM, truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts are non-existent,wemust first be able to conceptualise non-existence. It is the samefor negation: for example, negatingthe blackness of snow,which is the non-existenceof blackness in snow.However,having aconceptualisation of non-existenceisalready aproblem, though not for the followers of Abū Hāšim. In fact,besides some of the Muʿtazilites,nootherIslamic theologians or Muslim peripatetic philosophers held the view that some thingsdonot exist.For this much largergroup, every object is existent.Thus, for them, non-existent is not an object and since an object is that which is knowable, whatever does not exist is not an object and cannot be conceptualised. As for truth-value gaps or truth-value gluts, talking about them implies their objecthood, because in order to be able to refer to them, or in Rāzī’swords, to have a conceptualisation of them, they must be determined. Whatever is determined in itself is an object,and if every object is existent,truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts become existent and thus one cannot claim their non-existence. In other words, affirming the LNC and the LEM impliesthe conceptualisation of truth-value gaps and gluts. Thus, anyone one who accepts the LNC or the LEM cannot hold them to be true. One possibleanswer on behalf of the advocatesofthe view thatevery object is existent is to make adistinction between mental existenceand external existence. Rāzī mentions this possible reply. In fact,Muslim peripatetic philosophers, such as Avicenna, made this distinction. AccordingtoRāzī,one cannot replytothe objection by embracing such adistinction between mental and external existence, because for those who advocate the LNC and the LEM, truth-value gaps and gluts are impossible, not onlyinthe external world, but alsointhe mind; in their view,

ﻥﺃ ﺬﻫ ﺍﺍ ﺘﻟ ﺪﺼ ﯾ ﻣﻖ ﻗﻮ ﻑﻮ ﻠﻋ ﯽ ﺼﺗ ﺭﻮ ﺻﺃ ﻋﻞ ﻡﺪ ﺍﻭ ﻨﻟ ﺱﺎ ﺪﻗ ﺤﺗ ﯿ ﻭﺮ ﻓﺍ ﯿ ﻪ . ﻥﻷ ﻟﺍ ﺘﻤ ﻮﺼ ﻻﺭ ﺪﺑ ﻥﺃﻭ ﯾ ﻤﺘ ﯿ ﻋﺰ ﻏﻦ ﯿ ﻩﺮ ﺍﻭ ﻤﺘﻟ ﯿ ﻋﺰ ﻏﻦ ﯿ ﻩﺮ ﻌﺘﻣ ﯿ ﻦ  ﻓ ﯽ ﻔﻧ ﻪﺴ ، ﻭ ﮐ ﻣﻞ ﻌﺘ ﯿ ﻓﻦ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻔﻨ ﻪﺴ ﻬﻓ ﺛﻮ ﺑﺎ ﻓﺖ ﯽ ﻔﻧ ﻪﺴ ، ﻓ ﮑ ﻣﻞ ﺼﺘ ﺭﻮ ﺎﺛ ﻓﺖﺑ ﯽ ﻔﻧ ﻪﺴ ، ﻤﻓ ﻟﺎ ﯿ ﺑﺲ ﺎﺜ ﺖﺑ ﻐﻓ ﯿ ﻣﺮ ﺼﺘ ﺭﻮ ﺎﻓ ﻤﻟ ﺪﻌ ﻏﻡﻭ ﯿ ﺛﺮ ﺑﺎ ﻓﺖ ﻼ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﺘﻣ ﻮﺼ ﺍﺭ ﺇﻭ ﺍﺫ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺫ ﺍﻚ ﺘﻟ ﺪﺼ ﯾ ﻣﻖ ﻔﺘ ﻋﺮ ﻋﺎ ﻠ ﯽ ﺬﻫ ﺍﺍ ﺘﻟ ﻮﺼ ﻭﺭ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﺬﻫ ﺍﺍ ﺘﻟ ﻮﺼ ﻣﺭ ﺘﻤ ﺎﻌﻨ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺫ ﺍﻚ ﺘﻟ ﺪﺼ ﯾ ﻣﻖ ﺘﻤ ﺎﻌﻨ . The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 39

they are unperceivable. Moreover,when aperson negates the blackness of snow,it does not follow that she affirms the existenceofblackness in snow in her mind. Thus, the mental–external distinction of existenceisofnohelp here. It should be noted thatifthis argument works,itworks against those who hold every object to be existent.One might well be an advocate of the LNC and the LEM and yethold the view that some objects do not exist. Rāzī,then, explains the second argument:

[T3] Letusaccept that non-existencecan be conceptualised. However,the assertion that negation and affirmation do not combine implies adistinction between existenceand non-existence, and this distinction implies that the referent of non-existencehas adistinct essencefromthat of existence, but this is impossible,because every entity which the mind intends can also be removed by the mind; otherwise,itdoes not have an opposite. Therefore,non-existencedoes not have an oppositeand this implies the denial of existence, and it is false. Thus,the removal of that which is the referentofnon-existenceiscoherent.However,this removal is aspecific one and is countedasacase of absolute non-existence, and it means that the complement of non- existenceisapart of it,which is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,30).¹⁷

Since negation and affirmation do not combine,¹⁸ thereisadistinction between existenceand non-existence. In otherwords, thereisnothing which is bothexistent and non-existent,because affirmation implies the existenceofanentity,such as an accident or object,and negation implies the non-existenceofanentity,such as an accident or object,and these two—that is, affirmation and negation—do not combine. Consequently, the referents of existenceand non-existenceare distinct.Rāzī claims thatthis is not the case. Here is the reason why: on the assumption thatex- istencecan be removedbythe mind, the removal of non-existenceisthe opposite of non-existence;however,itisstillasub-caseofnon-existence,because all privations are cases of non-existence. Hence, acontradiction: the removal of non-existenceis non-existence and not-non-existenceatthe sametime. Therefore, the aforementioned distinctionbetween existence and non-existenceisimpossible. To sum up, the LNC is basedonadistinction between existenceand non-existence, which is impossible. Therefore, the LNC is not true. Rāzī then proceeds to the third argument.This is the longest and the most complicated of the four.Thus, Iwill first attempt to split the argument and then we will discuss the details.

ﻮﻟ ﻠﺳ ﻨﻤ ﻣﺇﺎ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﺼﺗ ﺭﻮ ﻟﺍ ﺪﻌ ﻟﻡ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﺍﺎ ﻔﻨﻟ ﯽ ﺍﻭ ﺛﻹ ﺎﺒ ﻻﺕ ﯾ ﺘﺠ ﻌﻤ ﻥﺎ ﯾ ﺘﺴ ﻋﺪ ﯽ ﺘﻣﺍ ﯿ ﺯﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺪﻌ ﻋﻡ ﺍﻦ ﻮﻟ ﻮﺟ ﺩ ، ﺘﻣﺍﻭ ﯿ ﺯﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺪﻌ ﻋﻡ ﺍﻦ ﻮﻟ ﻮﺟ ﺩ ﯾ ﺘﺴ ﻋﺪ ﯽ ﻥﺃ  ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻤﻟ ﻤﺴ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﺪﻌ ﻫﻡ ﻮ ﯾ ﻣﺔ ﻤﺘ ﯿ ﺓﺰ ﻦﻋ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻟﺩ ﮑ ﺫﻦ ﻚﻟ ﺤﻣ ﻝﺎ ، ﻥﻷ ﮐ ﻫﻞ ﻮ ﯾ ﺔ ﯾ ﺸ ﯿ ﺍﺮ ﻌﻟ ﻞﻘ ﻟﺇ ﯿ ﺎﻬ ﺍﻭ ﻌﻟ ﻞﻘ ﯾ ﻤ ﮑ ﻪﻨ ﻓﺭ ﻬﻌ ﺎ ، ﺇﻭ ﻟﻻ ﻢ ﮑﯾ ﻟﻦ ﻣﻪ ﺎﻘ ﻞﺑ ، ﻭ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﯾ ﺰﻠ ﺃﻡ ﻻﻥ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻠﻟ ﺪﻌ ﻣﻡ ﺎﻘ ﻭﻞﺑ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﯾ ﺰﻠ ﻧﻡ ﻔ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻭﺩ ﻮﻫ ﺎﺑ ﻞﻃ ، ﺜﻓ ﺖﺒ ﻥﺃ ﺭﺍ ﺎﻔﺗ ﺍﻉ ﻮﻬﻟ ﯾ ﺍﺔ ﻤﻟ ﻤﺴ ﺓﺎ ﺎﺑ ﻌﻟ ﻡﺪ ﻌﻣ ﻝﻮﻘ ، ﻟ ﮑ ﺍﻦ ﺗﺭ ﺎﻔ ﺗﻉ ﻚﻠ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻬ ﯾ ﺍﺔ ﺗﺭ ﻉﺎﻔ ﺎﺧ ﻓﺹ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﺍﺩ ﻼﺧ ﺤﺗ ﺍﺖ ﻌﻟ ﻡﺪ ﻟﺍ ﻄﻤ ﻖﻠ ، ﻓ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﺴﻗ ﯿ ﺍﻢ ﻌﻟ ﻡﺪ ﺴﻗ ﺎﻤ ﻨﻣ ﻫﻪ ﺍﺬ ﻒﻠﺧ .  Initially, Rāzī defines the conjunction of the LNC and the LEMasthe most self-evident.However, on some occasions,instead of the conjunction of the LNC and the LEM, he is onlytalkingabout the LNC. One example is this passageofMuḥaṣṣal. Thus,the reader should be awareofthe wayRāzīuses the conjunction of the LNCand the LEM interchangeablywith the LNC. 40 Behnam Zolghadr

Rāzī begins by making adistinction between two cases in which affirmationand negation occur:¹⁹ first,affirmingand negatingthe reality (ṯubūt)ofthe object itself, such as “blackness is either existent or non-existent” (al-sawādu immā an yakūnu mawǧūdānwa-immā an lā yakūnu mawǧūdān), and second, affirming or negating the reality (ṯubūt)ofanobject in another object,such as “the bodyiseither black or not” (al-ǧismu wa-immā an yakūnu aswad wa-immā an lā yakūn).²⁰ Consider the first case:

(1) Blackness is either existent or non-existent. As Rāzī says,(1) can be assertedonlyafter conceiving the meaningof“blackness is existent” and “blackness is non-existent,” but this is not going to happen.

(1.1) Blackness is existent. In this statement,either blacknessisidentical with existent or blacknessisdis- tinct from existent.Rāzīdemonstrates that both are false. Let us takethe first.AsRāzīputs it:

[T4] Our statement that blackness is existent [would] be like the statement “blackness is blackness” and the statement “existent is existent,” but it is not like these, for the [two]latter [statements] aretrivial; however,the former is informative (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,31).²¹

Thus, since “blackness is existent” is informative, it is not asimple identitystate- ment. Then, Rāzī explains whythe second understandingof(1.1)—that is, that blackness and existent are distinct—is alsofalse. He givestwo reasons for this:

[T5] One of them: that is, if existenceisgrounded in blackness,then blackness is not,assuch, existent,because otherwise the question arises again, but the same object cannot be existent for asecond time. And if so, existencewould be grounded in that which is not existent.However, existenceisthe property of existent.Otherwise, we should accept the middle between existence and non-existence, but youdenythat (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,31).²²

If existenceisgrounded in blackness, then blackness is metaphysicallyprior.In other words, blackness is blackness without being existent and then existenceis grounded in it.Itisobvious that blackness could not be existent before being existent because, as Rāzī explains, this would mean that it would be existent for asecond time. Moreover,the question about the latter existencewould also arise for the

 Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,31.  The readershould be awarethat,asalreadymentioned, the theory of aḥwāl is based on the idea that some objects do not exist.Thus,the predication relation does not have existential import in itself. My thanks to an anonymous referee for mentioning this point. ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﺍﺎ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻣﺩ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﺭﺎﺟ ﯾ ﻣﺎ ﺮﺠ ﯼ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﺍﺎ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﺳﺩ ﺍﻮ ﻭﺩ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﺍﺎ ﻤﻟ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺟ ﻭﺩ ﻌﻣ ﻮﻠ ﺃﻡ ﻟﻪﻧ ﯿ ﺲ ﮐ ﻟﺬ ﻷﻚ ﻫﻥ ﺍﺬ ﺧﻷﺍ ﯿ ﻫﺮ ﺭﺬ ، ﺍﻭ ﻭﻷ ﻣﻝ ﻔ ﯿ ﺪ.  ﺣﺃ ﻫﺪ ﺎﻤ : ﻧﺃ ﺇﻪ ﺍﺫ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﺎﻗ ﻤﺋ ﺑﺎ ﻟﺎ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﺎﻓ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻓﺩ ﯽ ﻔﻧ ﻟﻪﺴ ﯿ ﺑﺲ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺟ ﻭﺩ ﻻﺇ ﻌﻟ ﺩﺎ ﺤﺑ ﻓﺚ ﯿ ﻪ ، ﻟﻭ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﺸﻟﺍ ﯽ ء ﻟﺍ ﺍﻮ ﺪﺣ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺮﻣ ﺗ ﯿ ﻭﻦ ﺍﺫﺇ ﮐ ﻥﺎ  ﮐ ﻚﻟﺬ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻗﺩ ﺋﺎ ﺎﻤ ﻤﺑ ﻟﺎ ﯿ ﺑﺲ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺟ ﺩ ، ﻟ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻔﺻ ﻣﺔ ﻮﺟﻮ ﺓﺩ ﺇﻭ ﻟﻻ ﺒﺜ ﺍﺖ ﻮﻟ ﺳﺍ ﺑﺔﻄ ﯿ ﺍﻦ ﻤﻟ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻭﺩ ﻟﺍ ﻌﻤ ﻭﺪ ﻭﻡ ﻧﺃ ﻢﺘ ﻧﺃ ﮑ ﺗﺮ ﻩﻮﻤ . The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 41

former. Thus, blackness in itself is non-existent.Since existenceisthe property of an existent,itcannot be the property of blackness, because blackness is non-existent. Therefore, Rāzī concludes,existenceand blackness, in the statement “blackness is existent,” cannot be distinct.²³ Here, Rāzī mentions the middle between existence and non-existenceasasolution to this issue. We sawinpart 1that this is the main idea of the theory of states. In fact,this is the first explicitreferencetothe theory of states in these arguments. Let us moveontothe second argument for the impossibilityofthe distinction between existenceand blackness:

[T6] If existenceisdistinct fromquiddity,the referentofour saying “blackness” is different from our saying “existent.” Then, if we saythat blackness is existent and by this we mean that blackness is that which is existent,this would be assertingthe oneness of the two[non-identicals], which is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,31).²⁴

We also cannot saythat thatwhich is existent is blackness, for this impliesthe identity of the two. This is unacceptable because we have alreadypresupposed that blackness and existent are non-identical. Moreover,wehavealreadyseenthatblackness and existent cannot be identical. One might replythatthe identity sentenceisasserting the identity relationship between “blackness” and “described by being existent” and not thatbetween “blackness” and “existent.” Rāzī explains to us that this readingfaces similar problems and does not work. As he put it:

[T7] And if yousay that this is not what we intendfromour sayingthat blackness is existent— that is, that the referent of “blackness” is the referent of “existent”—but what we intend is that blackness is described by beingexistent,you have just moved the issue to the referent of “described.” Then, if the referent of blackness is the referent of “describedbybeingexistent,” then this is also impossible,because our sayingthat blackness is described by beingexistent becomes the same as our sayingthat blackness is blackness,and that is impossible. And if [the referentofblackness]isdistinct from [the referentof“describedbybeingexistent”], then asserting that blackness is described by existenceisassertingthe oneness of the two(Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,31).²⁵

Thus, replacing “existent” with “being described by existence” does not solve the problem. Again, we will face the same problems as in the case of “existent.”

 However,ifweconsider that existenceisgrounded in blackness,this presupposition seems rea- sonable if we analyse the structureofthe sentence “blackness is existent” in asubject–predicate form. ﺍﺫﺇ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻣﺩ ﺎﻐ ﯾ ﺍﺮ ﻠﻟ ﻫﺎﻤ ﯿ ﺔ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻤﺴﻣ ﯽ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﺍﺎ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻏﺩ ﯿ ﻣﺮ ﻤﺴ ﯽ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﻣﺎ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻓﺩ ﺫﺈ ﻗﺍ ﻨﻠ ﺍﺎ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻣﺩ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻤﺑ ﻨﻌ ﯽ ﻥﺃ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺍ ﻫﺩ ﻣﻮ ﻮﺟﻮ ﺩ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻚﻟﺫ  ﺣ ﮑ ﺎﻤ ﻮﺑ ﺪﺣ ﺍﺓ ﺛﻻ ﻨ ﯿ ﻭﻦ ﻮﻫ ﺤﻣ ﻝﺎ . ﺈﻓ ﻗﻥ ﻟﺖﻠ ﯿ ﺍﺲ ﻤﻟ ﺍﺮ ﻣﺩ ﻗﻦ ﻟﻮ ﺎﻨ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺟ ﻭﺩ ﻮﻫ ﻥﺃ ﻤﺴﻣ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﻤﺴﻣ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ، ﻞﺑ ﻟﺍ ﺮﻤ ﺩﺍ ﻥﺃ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺻ ﺑﻑ ﻟﺎ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺟ ﺩ ﯾ ﻗﺔ ﺖﻠ ﺤﻓ ﯿ ﺬﺌﻨ  ﯾ ﻘﻨ ﺍﻞ ﻟ ﮑ ﻡﻼ ﻟﺇ ﯽ ﻤﺴﻣ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺻ ﻓ ﯿ ﺔ ، ﺈﻓ ﻪﻧ ﻣﺇ ﻥﺃﺎ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻤﺴﻣ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺻ ﻓ ﯿ ﺑﺔ ﻟﺎ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻣﺩ ﺎﺤ ﻓﻝ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﻮﻗ ﻨﻟ ﺍﺎ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻣﺩ ﺻﻮ ﻑﻮ ﺎﺑ ﻮﻟ ﻮﺟ ﺟﺩ ﺭﺎ ﯾ ﻣﺎ ﺮﺠ ﯼ ﻮﻗ ﺎﻨﻟ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﻮﺳ ﺩﺍ ﻫﻭ ﻣﻮ ﻝﺎﺤ ، ﺇﻭ ﺎﻣ ﻥﺃ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻐﻣ ﺎ ﯾ ﺍﺮ ﻓﻪﻟ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﺤﻟﺍ ﮑ ﻋﻢ ﻠ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﺄﺑ ﻪﻧ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺻ ﺑﻑ ﻟﺎ ﻮﺟﻮ ﺣﺩ ﮑ ﺑﻢ ﺣﻮ ﺓﺪ ﻻﺍ ﻨﺛ ﯿ ﻦ . 42 Behnam Zolghadr

So far,Rāzīhas shown that sentence(1.1) is false, or,tobemoreprecise, impossible (muḥāl). Obviously, it is impossible for one who endorses the LNC. Now,hepro- ceeds to the second part of (1) and demonstrates that this is also false:

(1.2) Blackness is non-existent. It is obvious that being blackness cannot be the same as the existenceofblackness. Otherwise, as Rāzī explains, (1.2)entails thatblackness is not blackness, which is acontradiction.²⁶ Thus, existence is not identical with blackness. Then, Rāzī argues that blackness and its existencecannot alsobedistinct,if(1.2) is to be true. The gistofhis argument is as follows. Negating the existenceofaquiddity implies the quidditytobedetermined and this in itself entails thatthe quiddity is real (ṯābit). To be real is to be existent.Thus, in order to negatethe existenceofanentity, it should be existent,which is acontradictory.Therefore, (1.2)cannot be asserted. This is the well-known problem of negative existentials.Itisobvious thatthis argument is onlyagainst thosewho hold every object to be existent,or, in other words, thosewho hold that all that is real (ṯābit)isexistent.Asalreadymentioned, this was the dominantview among the falāsifah and mutakallimūn. However,some Muʿtazilites held the view thatsome objects do not exist,or, in other words, that there are real entities (ṯābitāt)which are non-existent.Among these Muʿtazilites are those who advocatedthe theory of states; that is, Abū Hāšim and his followers. However,since one can wellbeanadvocate of the theory thatsome objects do not exist and alsobeanadvocate of the LNC, like some of the earlyMuʿtazilites, this argument loses its generality. Then, Rāzī proceeds to the second form of the sentenceexpressingthe LNC:

(2)Abodyiseither black or not. First,weshould grasp the meaningsofboth “the bodyisblack” and “the bodyis not black.” Rāzī argues that this is impossible. He begins with “the bodyisblack,” giving us two reasons for the “impossibility of this statement.” First,itcannot be an identity statement; otherwise,itisasserting the oneness of twodistinct entities, which is impossible. Second, since it is not an identity statement,ithas the form of a subject–predicatesentence in which the subject is described by the predicate.Now, as Rāzī explains, “that the bodyisdescribed by blackness is either anon-existential property or an existential one.”²⁷ Being described (mawṣūf)isitself aproperty.Itisnot anon-existential property, because it is the negation of not being described, which is itself anon-existential property.Onthe other hand, Rāzī alsoargues that being described is not an existential property:

 These arguments areagainst those whodefend the LNC. Thus,any premise which entails acontradiction is not acceptable. See Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,32.  Rāzī,33. The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 43

[T8] If [beingdescribed] is existential, then it is either the same as the existenceofthe bodyand blackness or distinct from them. The former is impossible, because it is not the case that whenever one conceivesthe existenceofthe bodyand the existenceofblackness,one also conceives that the bodyisdescribed by blackness.The latter is also impossible, because if beingdescribed by blackness weresuperadded to the body, then beingdescribed by that property [i.e., the property of beingdescribed] would also be superadded to the body. But this [leads to regress and thus] is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,33).²⁸

Here, Rāzī is asking about the ontological status of aproperty.Isthere areality which is correspondent to the property of an object?Hereplies that the answer is neither yesnor no. The property of being described is not existential. In other words, there is no reality (ṯābit)which is the property of being described. In order to be real, being described by blacknessfor abodyshould either be the sameasthe bodyand blackness itself or distinct from these two. It is not the sameasthe bodyand blackness, for one can conceive these two without conceiving the body being described by blackness. In other words, the existenceofabodyand the exis- tenceofblacknessdonot entail that the bodyisblack, or thatthe bodyisdescribed by blackness. Thus, there should be another reality which is described (mawṣūf)and is distinct from the bodyand blackness. But this is alsoimpossible, because then there would have to be another reality which is beingdescribed by being described, and this leads to regress. Therefore, neither of these possibilities is true. This argument exposes one of the problems which the theory of states answers: the problem of universals. As alreadymentioned in section 1, Abū Hāšim’stheory of states,among other things, explains the ontological status of properties. According to other mutakallimūn,the ontologicalcategories of the world consisted of God, atoms,and accidents.However,these cannot explain what it is to have aproperty. Relying on the grammarians’ analysis of language, Abū Hāšim appealedtostates (aḥwāl)toexplain the ontological status of properties.This argument demonstrates the shortcoming of the theories which Abū Hāšim criticised in order to give afull- fledgedontological explanation of the world. Let us moveontothe fourth argument against the LNC, which is also an explicit defenseofthe theory of states.Thisargument concerns impossibility(imtināʿ)and the processofbecoming(ḥudūṯ). First,consider impossibility. Rāzī says that there are three possibilities for that which is called impossibility:²⁹ either it is existent, or it is non-existent,oritisneither existent nor non-existent.Hedemonstrates that the first two possibilities are false:

ﻥﺃ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻣﺃ ﺍﺮ ﺒﺛ ﺗﻮ ﯿ ﻷﺎ ﻪﻧ ﻠﻋ ﯽ ﺬﻫ ﺍﺍ ﺘﻟ ﺪﻘ ﯾ ﺇﺮ ﺎﻣ ﻥﺃ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻔﻧ ﻭﺲ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺠﻟ ﻢﺴ ﺍﻭ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻭﺩ ﻣﺇ ﻥﺃﺎ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻐﻣ ﺎ ﯾ ﺍﺮ ﻬﻟ ﺎﻤ . ﺍﻭ ﻭﻷ ﻣﻝ ﺎﺤ ﻷﻝ ﻟﻪﻧ ﯿ ﺲ ﮐ ﻞ  ﻦﻣ ﻘﻋ ﻭﻞ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺠﻟ ﻭﻭﻢﺴ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻋﺩ ﻞﻘ ﮐ ﻥﻮ ﻟﺍ ﺴﺠ ﻣﻢ ﺻﻮ ﻓﻮ ﺑﺎ ﻟﺎ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ . ﺍﻭ ﺜﻟ ﻧﺎ ﯽ ﺃ ﯾ ﺎﻀ ﺤﻣ ﻝﺎ ﻥﻷ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺻ ﻓ ﯿ ﺍﺔ ﺠﻟ ﻢﺴ ﺎﺑ ﺴﻟ ﺍﻮ ﻟﺩ ﻮ ﮐ ﻧﺎ ﺻﺖ ﺔﻔ ﺍﺯ ﺓﺪﺋ ﻟ ﮑ ﻧﺎ ﻣﺖ ﺻﻮ ﻓﻮ ﯿ ﺍﺔ ﺠﻟ ﻢﺴ ﻠﺘﺑ ﮏ ﻟﺍ ﻔﺼ ﺯﺔ ﺋﺍ ﺓﺪ ﻠﻋ ﯿ ﺎﻬ ﻫﻭ ﻣﻮ ﻝﺎﺤ .  He does not tell us whyitcannot be both existent and non-existent.Evenifhethinks that the truth-value gaphere is the same as the truth-value glut,hedoes not explain it.However,thereis afourth possibility;i.e., both existent and non-existent. 44 Behnam Zolghadr

[T9] It is not existent,because otherwise that which is described by it would also be existent. Forexistent cannot be placed at non-existent and if that which is described[by impossible]were existent,then the impossible would not be existent; however,itwould either be necessary or possible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,34).³⁰

The instances of impossibilityare non-existent because otherwise, they would not be impossible. Since thosewhich are described by impossibility are not existent,impossibility is not existent because existent cannot be grounded (qāʾim)innon-existent. Impossibility cannot be non-existent either,

[T10] because it is the negation of not-impossibility which can be predicated to non-existent. Thus,sincenot-impossibility is non-existential, impossibility is not non-existential. Moreover, impossibility is adetermined quiddity in itself, which is distinct from other quiddities.Other- wise, it could not be intended by the mind. Thus,itcannot be absolute non-entity (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,34).³¹

There are twoarguments in this paragraph in favour of the view thatimpossibility is not non-existent.Itisdubious that the resultfollows in the first one. Forone thing,impossibilityisthe negation of possibilityand asimilar argument can be applied to demonstrate that impossibility is non-existential. Accordingtothe second argument,what is impossible is supposed not to be an entity simplybecause it is impossible. However,since it can be intended by the mind, it must be something,and thus, by understanding non-existenceinits broadest sense, it is not absolutelynon- existent.Rāzīalso considers apossible replyaccordingtowhich the impossiblehas reality in the mind and not in the external world. Rāzī rejects this replybyempha- sising the nature of the impossiblewhich is impossible in itself, whether in the mind or in the external world.³² Now consider the process of becomingexistent from non-existence. As Rāzī explains, becoming means comingout of non-existenceinto existence. Thus, the referent of becoming is distinct from both the referent of non-existence and the referent of existence,because otherwise, “the referent of non-existence or the referent of existence will be the referent of comingout of non-existence into existence,and that is impossible.” He considers threepossibilities for that which is the quiddity of the referent of comingout of non-existenceinto existence. It is either existent,non-existent, or neither existent nor non-existent.Then, he demonstrates that it cannot be existent:

ﺟﻻ ﺋﺎ ﺃﺰ ﻥ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻮﻣ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺇﻭ ﻟﻻ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻤ ﺑﻑﻮﺻ ﻣﻪ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻻﺍ ﺘﺳ ﺎﺤ ﻗﺔﻟ ﯿ ﻡﺎ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺟ ﺑﺩ ﻟﺎ ﻌﻤ ﻭﺪ ﻭﻡ ﻮﻟ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻤ ﺑﻑﻮﺻ ﻣﻪ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻢﻟﺍ ﮑﯾ ﺍﻦ ﻤﻟ ﺘﻤ ﻊﻨ  ﻤﻣ ﻨﺘ ﺎﻌ ، ﻞﺑ ﻣﺇ ﻭﺎ ﺟﺍ ﺎﺒ ﻭﺃ ﻤﻣ ﮑ ﺎﻨ . ﻧﻷ ﻧﻪ ﻘ ﯿ ﺍﺾ ﻼﻟ ﻣﺍ ﻨﺘ ﻉﺎ ﺬﻟﺍ ﯾﯼ ﻤ ﮑ ﺣﻦ ﻠﻤ ﻋﻪ ﻠ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻌﻤ ﻭﺪ ﻓﻡ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﻟﺍ ﺍﻼ ﺘﻣ ﺎﻨ ﻋﻉ ﻣﺪ ﯿ ﻼﻓﺎ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻻﺍ ﺘﻣ ﺎﻨ ﻋﻉ ﻣﺪ ﯿ ﺎ . ﻷﻭ ﺍﻥ ﻣﻻ ﻨﺘ ﻉﺎ ﻫﺎﻣ ﯿ ﻣﺔ ﻌﺘ ﯿ ﻓﺔﻨ ﯽ  ﻔﻧ ﻬﺴ ﻣﺎ ﻤﺘ ﯿ ﺓﺰ ﻦﻋ ﺎﺳ ﺮﺋ ﻟﺍ ﻫﺎﻤ ﯿ ﺕﺎ ﺫﺇ ﻮﻟ ﻢﻟ ﮑﯾ ﻦ ﮐ ﻟﺬ ﻻﻚ ﺘﺳ ﺎﺤ ﺇﻝ ﺎﺷ ﺓﺭ ﻟﺍ ﻘﻌ ﺇﻞ ﻟ ﯿ ﺎﻬ ، ﺇﻭ ﺍﺫ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﮐ ﻟﺬ ﺍﻚ ﺘﺳ ﺎﺤ ﺃﻝ ﻥ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻔﻧ ﯿ ﻣﺎ ﻀﺤ ﺎ .  Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,34. The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 45

[T11] If it was existent,itwould be true of the existent that it is coming out of non-existenceinto existence, and if this is so, it would be likesayingthat the existent is coming out towards existenceand thus the object is existent twice, and that is impossible (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,34).³³

It is also not non-existent,because otherwise, there would be no changefrom non- existencetoexistence. As Rāzī put it:

[T12] When it is non-existent,the original non-existenceendures,and as long as the original non-existenceendures,nochange from non-existenceoccurs (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,34).³⁴

Since it cannot be either existent or non-existent,Rāzīconcludes that when something is in the process of becoming, it is neither existent nor non-existent.Asalready mentioned, the same is true of the impossible. Therefore, the LNC is not true. So far,wehavediscussed the four arguments against the LNCwhich, according to Rāzī,wereposed by those thinkers who accept sensible assents, but altogether denyself-evident assents. We also sawthat these arguments are based on the theory of states,or, to be more precise, the middle between existence and non-existence, which is the coreidea of the theory of states,aswell as the idea that some objects do not exist. As alreadymentioned, they also arguethat other well-known self-evidentassents are based on the LNC, and since the LNChas been rejected, thoseassents are also unacceptable. These self-evidentassents are the subject of the next section.

3Other Self-Evident Assents

There are three other well-known self-evident assents: (i) The whole is biggerthan its parts; (ii) identity is transitive;(iii) an object cannot be in two different places at the sametime. The philosophersinquestion arguethat all threeofthese assents are based on the LNC. We will see their arguments one by one.

ﻥﺈﻓ ﮐ ﻧﺎ ﻣﺖ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻓﺓ ﺪﻘ ﺪﺻ ﻋﻕ ﻠ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﻤ ﻮﺟ ﺃﺩ ﻪﻧ ﯾ ﺮﺨ ﻣﺝ ﺍﻦ ﻌﻟ ﻡﺪ ﻟﺇ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺟﻮ ﻓﺩ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﻚﻟﺫ ﮐ ﻪﻧﺄ ﯾ ﺎﻘ ﺍﻝ ﻤﻟ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﯾ ﺮﺨ ﺇﺝ ﻟ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﺟﻮ ﻓﺩﻮ ﮑﯿ ﻥﻮ ﺸﻟﺍ ﯽ ء  ﻮﻣ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺮﻣ ﺗ ﯿ ﻭﻦ ﻮﻫ ﺤﻣ ﻝﺎ . ﺘﻣ ﮐﯽ ﻧﺎ ﻣﺖ ﺪﻌ ﺔﻣﻭ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺪﻌ ﺍﻡ ﺻﻷ ﻠ ﯽ ﻗﺎﺑ ﯿ ﻭﺎ ﺘﻣ ﮐﯽ ﻥﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺪﻌ ﺍﻡ ﺻﻷ ﻠ ﯽ ﻗﺎﺑ ﯿ ﻟﺎ ﻢ ﮑﯾ ﺍﻦ ﻨﻟ ﻓﻞﻘ ﯽ ﻟﺍ ﻐﺘ ﯿ ﻣﺮ ﺍﻦ ﻌﻟ ﻡﺪ ﺎﺣ ﻼﺻ .  46 Behnam Zolghadr

3.1 The whole is biggerthanits parts

As Rāzī put it:

[T13] The whole is biggerthan its parts because otherwise, the existenceofthe other part and its non-existencewould be the same. Thus,beingexistent and beingnon-existent is combined, at the same time, in the other part (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,29).³⁵

It is obvious that here, parthoodisproper parthood. Thus, consider an object,namely a,which has two proper parts,namely b and c.Byusing mereological formalisation, we have:

b < a , c < a

Since b and c are two distinct parts of a,they do not overlap. Thus:

c a c b ^: It follows that:

1 x x a x b 9 ^: On the other hand, if a was not biggerthan b,wewould have a b,which means that parthood is improper.Then, it follows:

2 x x a x b :9 ^: Therefore, (1) and (2)are contradictories. They express that thereboth is and is not an object—namely, c—which is the other part of a,while b is aproper part of a and is not smaller than a. The rejection of this assent leads to contradiction. Thus, this is true as long as the LNC is true. In other words, the statement that the whole is biggerthanits parts is based on the LNC.

3.2 Identity is transitive

Identity is transitive.Inother words, two objects which are identical with athird object are themselvesidentical with each other:

[T14] [Two] objects that areidentical with another object areidentical, because otherwise,[an object,namely] a which is identical with blackness is blackness. And sinceitisidentical with that which is not blackness,itisnot blackness.Hence, if a is identical with twodifferent things,

ﻟﺍ ﮑ ﺃﻞ ﻈﻋ ﻣﻢ ﺍﻦ ﺠﻟ ﺀﺰ ﻧﻷ ﻟﻪ ﻟﻮ ﻢ ﮑﯾ ﺫﻦ ﻟﻚﻟ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﺟﻭ ﺩﻮ ﻟﺍ ﺰﺠ ﺍﺀ ﺧﻵ ﻭﺮ ﺪﻋ ﻪﻣ ﻤﺑ ﺎﺜ ﺔﺑ ﺍﻭ ﺪﺣ ﺓ ، ﺤﻓ ﯿ ﺬﺌﻨ ﯾ ﺘﺠ ﻓﻊﻤ ﯽ ﻟﺫ ﺍﻚ ﺠﻟ ﺀﺰ ﻵﺍ ﺮﺧ ﮐ ﻧﻮ ﻣﻪ ﻮﺟﻮ ﺍﺩ  ﻌﻣ ﻭﺪ ﺎﻣ ﻌﻣ ﺎ . The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 47

it follows that a is in itself blackness and also that a is not in itself blackness.Thus,the affirmation and the negation arecombined (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,29).³⁶

Let us simplify the example. Suppose thereare threeobjects—a, b; and c,—and suppose, for the sake of simplicity,that there are onlytwo properties, P1 and P2. a has both properties and b onlyhas the property P2. c is identical with a,and thus it has both properties.Therefore, P1c and P2c are bothtrue. On the other hand, c is identical with b.Thus, c has the property P2; but it does not have the property P1.This means that P c and P c are true. Therefore, P c Pc,which is acontradiction. The table : 1 2 1 ^: 1 below shows the details:

P1 P2 a b À c Æ

If twodistinct objects, a and b,are identical with athird object, c,then the third object will have contradictory properties.³⁷ Thus, the rejection of the transitivity of identity entails contradictions. If the LNC is not true, then at least some contradictions are true, and therefore, it is not necessarilytrue that identity is transitive.

3.3 An object cannot be in two different places at the same time

[T15] Asingle object cannot be in two different places at the same time, because if this was possible, then therewould be no differencebetween an object beingintwo places or twoobjects beingso, and meanwhile, the existenceofthe other object would be the same as its non-existence, and it would be true to saythat it is both existent and non-existent (Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,29).³⁸

Suppose that a is an object which is located at l1 and suppose thatatthe sametime a is also located in another place, namely, l2.This scenario is similar to ascenario in

ﺷﻷﺍ ﯿ ﺀﺎ ﻟﺍ ﺴﻤ ﻭﺎ ﯾ ﻟﺔ ﺸ ﯽ ء ﺍﻭ ﺪﺣ ﺘﻣ ﻭﺎﺴ ﯾ ﻷﺔ ﻪﻧ ﻮﻟ ﻢﻟ ﮑﯾ ﻦ ﮐ ﻟﺬ ﻟﻚ ﮑ ﻥﺎ ﻷﺍ ﻒﻟ ﻟﺍ ﺤﻤ ﮑ ﻡﻮ ﻠﻋ ﯿ ﺑﻪ ﻪﻧﺄ ﯾ ﻭﺎﺴ ﯼ ﻟﺍ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﻮﺳ ﺩﺍ ﻻﺍ ﺤﻣ ﺔﻟﺎ ، ﻣﻭ ﺣﻦ ﯿ ﺇﺚ ﻪﻧ  ﺤﻣ ﮑ ﻡﻮ ﻠﻋ ﯿ ﺑﻪ ﻪﻧﺄ ﯾ ﻭﺎﺴ ﯼ ﻟﺎﻣ ﯿ ﺑﺲ ﻮﺴ ﺩﺍ ﯾ ﺐﺠ ﻻﻥﺃ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻮﺳ ﺩﺍ ﻓﺍ ﻮﻠ ﮐ ﻥﺎ ﻷﺍ ﻒﻟ ﺴﻣ ﻭﺎ ﯾ ﻟﺎ ﺮﻣﻸ ﯾ ﻟﻦ ﻡﺰ ﻥﺃ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻷﺍ ﻓﻒﻟ ﯽ ﻔﻧ ﻪﺴ ﻮﺳ ﺍﺩﺍ ﺃﻭ ﻻﻥ ﮑﯾ ﻥﻮ ﻓ ﯽ ﻔﻧ ﻪﺴ ﻮﺳ ﺩﺍ ﻓﺍ ﯿ ﺘﺠ ﻊﻤ ﻟﺍ ﻔﻨ ﯽ ﺍﻭ ﺛﻹ ﺕﺎﺒ .  Here, the Leibnizian definition of identity is used. According to this definition, two objects are identicalifthey sharethe same properties.For moreonthe non-transitivity of identity and its resulting contradictions, see Graham Priest, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of Its Parts,Includingthe Singular Object which Is Nothingness (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 2014), chapter2. ﻥﺇ ﻟﺍ ﺴﺠ ﺍﻢ ﻮﻟ ﺣﺍ ﻓﺪ ﯽ ﻵﺍ ﺍﻥ ﻮﻟ ﺣﺍ ﻻﺪ ﮑﯾ ﻓﻥﻮ ﯽ ﻣ ﮑ ﻧﺎ ﯿ ﻣﻦ ﺎﻌ ، ﻧﻷ ﻟﻪ ﺟﻮ ﺯﺎ ﻟﺫ ﻟﻚ ﺎﻤ ﻤﺗ ﯿ ﺍﺰ ﺠﻟ ﻢﺴ ﻟﺍ ﺍﻮ ﺪﺣ ﻟﺍ ﺎﺤ ﻞﺻ ﻓ ﯽ ﻣ ﮑ ﻧﺎ ﯿ ﻣﻦ ﺎﺒﺘ ﯾ ﻨ ﯿ ﻋﻦ ﻦ  ﻟﺍ ﺴﺠ ﻤ ﯿ ﺍﻦ ﺬﻠﻟ ﯾ ﺣﻦ ﻼﺼ ﮐ ﻚﻟﺬ ، ﺣﻭ ﯿ ﺌﻨ ﻻﺬ ﯾ ﻤﺘ ﯿ ﻭﺰ ﻮﺟ ﺍﺩ ﺠﻟ ﻢﺴ ﻵﺍ ﺮﺧ ﻦﻋ ﺪﻋ ﻓﻪﻣ ﯿ ﺪﺼ ﻋﻕ ﻠ ﯿ ﻪ ﮐ ﻧﻮ ﻣﻪ ﺟﻮ ﺩﻮ ﻣﺍ ﺪﻌ ﻣﻭ ﻣﺎ ﺎﻌ . 48 Behnam Zolghadr

which there are two objects, a and b,which both have exactlythe sameproperties with onlyone exception: that is a is located in l1 and b is located in l2.According to this argument,since these twoscenarios are not distinguishable, b can be considered as both existent and non-existent.Thus, the rejection of this assent entails acontradiction. Since the LNC is alreadyrejected,atleast some contradictions might be true. Therefore, if the LNCisnot true, this assentisnot true either. There is also another more straightforward argument that this assent is basedon the LNC. Letuswrite the property of being located in l1 as P.Thus, if a is located in l1 and is not located in l ,wehave P P ,which is acontradiction. 1 a ^: a

4Dialetheism andParaconsistency

In this part,wewill see how the violation of the LNC co-exists with the theory of states without demolishing the coherency of the theory of states and the ability to reason within this theory.³⁹ Letusaccept that the aforementioned arguments against the LNC work. Since this rejection of the LNC logicallyfollows from the theory of states,the theory of states is adialetheic theory.However,wealreadysaw that some contradictions are true in the theory of states;for example, thatstates are and are not objects. Now,weshould discuss how the theory can be logicallymodel- led. The logic of adialetheic theory should be aparaconsistent one. Aparaconsistent logic is alogic whose consequencerelation is not explosive;⁴⁰ that is, explosion, or ex contradiction quodlibet (ECQ), is not avalid argument in that logic. Otherwise, the theory will be trivial; thatis, everything,and consequentlyevery contradiction, would be true accordingtothis theory.⁴¹ There are manyparaconsistent logics on the market.Before choosing one, we should take another look at the theory of states and focus on the claims which are critical to the LNC and the LEM. These are two: (1) “states are neither existent nor non-existent” and (2) “states are and are not ob-

 Marwan Rashed givesanother interpretation of the theory of states by focusingonlyontruth- value gaps and applyingintuitionisticlogic. Formore, see MarwanRashed, “Abū Hāshim al- Ǧubbāʾī sur le langage de l’art,” HistoireE´piste´mologie Langage 36,no. 2(2014): 85–96,and Rashed, “Abū Hāshim al-Ǧubbāʾī et l’infini,” in Miroirdel’amitie´:Me´langes offerts a` Joë lBiard,ed. Cristophe Grellard(Paris:Vrin, 2017).  In classical logic, explosion—i.e., the argument A A⊢B—is valid. According to explosion, or ex ^: contradiction quodlibet,from an arbitrary contradiction, everythingfollows.However,inhis defence of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle does not propose this argument,although Avicenna later defended aprimary form of explosion in Metaphysics of the Healing, 42.Finally,inthe twelfth century,Willian of Soissons formalised the argument for explosion in away which is valid in classical logic. Formore, see Benham Zolghadr, “Avicenna on the LawofNon-Contradiction,” Historyand Phi- losophy of Logic 40,no. 2(2019): 105–15.  It is obvious that the theory of states is not trivial: “nothingexists in the world” is not true in this theory. The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 49

jects.” The former seems to state atruth-value gap, while the latter is apparentlya truth-value glut.Ifweaccept both truth-value gaps and gluts in the theory of states, we need afour-valued logic. Agood candidatemight be the logic of FDE.⁴² However, there are otherwaystochoose the proper logic for the theory of states while keeping the theory as simple as possible. Perhaps the best choice is the three-valued logic LP.⁴³ In LP,propositions can be onlytrue, onlyfalse, and both true and false. By applying LP,not onlydowehaveasimpler logic with more straightforward interpretations, but we can also have the truth of (1) without the need for afourth value; that is, neither true nor false. We will see the details afteranexplanation of LP.Since, for the purpose of this paper,the propositional logic of LP suffices,Iwill restrict the discussion to it and skip the first-order LP. Alogic is defined by the structure < V; D; f : c C >:Vis the set of truth val- fgc 2 ues, D,which is asubset of V,isthe set of designated values, C is the set of connec- tives, and f c is the correspondingtruth function.For LP,wehave: V 0; 0:5; 1 fg D0:5; 1 f g C ; ; :fg^_ Thus, the truth values are true, both true and false, and false, which are convention- allyrepresented by 0, 0.5, and 1respectively.The designated values are true and both true and false. Theconnectivesare negation, conjunction, and disjunction. The material conditional can be defined as follows:

A B A B : _ An interpretation for the languageisamap, ,from the set of propositional param- eters, P,into V.Thisisextendable to all the formulas of the languagebyapplying truth functions recursively.This extension is done through the following conditions:

A 1A : À A B min A ;B ^ fg ABmax A ; B _fg The notionsoflogical truth and semantic consequence are defined as follows: Σ Aiff there is no interpretation, ,such that for all B Σ;B D,but 2 2 A =D: 2 Aisalogical truth iff for every interpretation A D. 2

 Formoreabout FDE, see Graham Priest, Non-Classical Logic, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is,2nd ed. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2008), chapter8.  Formoreabout LP,see Priest,chapter7. 50 Behnam Zolghadr

It can easilybecheckedthat LP is not explosive;that is, ECQ is not avalid argument in LP.

P P Q ^: Foracounter-model, suppose:

P 0:5 Q 0 Thus, contradictions can be true in LP withoutmaking the system trivial. Twocomments are in order here. LP has the simplest semantics among all the paraconsistent logics.Infact,LPisaminimal revision to classicallogic and classical logic is aproper extension of LP.Thesemake LP agood choice for the desired paraconsistent logic. Now let us return to the theory of states.Asalreadyseen, states both are and are not objects. Hence, for every state, we have the following sentence: P P.LPhan- ^: dles such contradictions without falling into triviality.Moreover,one important aspect of the theory of states is the middle between existence and non-existence.We sawthat this is usually seemingly uttered as atruth-value gap. There are threevalues in LP,none of which is neither true nor false. Therefore, we should explain how to understand “astate is neither existent nor non-existent” without appealing to the truth value of “neither true nor false.” Thiscan easilybedone via the following in- ferencefrom double negation:

P P P P : ^:: : ^ One can easilycheckthat this argument is valid in LP.Insection 1, we sawthe same argument from Avicenna, demonstratingthat anygappy sentence results in acontradiction. Thus, to saythat statesare neither existent nor non-existent is another form of saying that statesare both existent and non-existent.Therefore, we can preserve the truths of the theory of states in LP,especiallyabout the claims critical to the LNC and the LEM. This is also true of the impossible and becoming,which we met in the discussion of arguments against the LNC. As alreadymentioned, at the beginning of this section, we chose LP over FDE. Now we know the reasons for this choice.Inaddition to the merits of LP due to its simplicity and its relation to classicallogic, seeming truth-value gaps in the theory of states can be paraphrased as truth-value gluts by applying LP. Before finishing this section, Ishould saymoreabout the use of contemporary logical apparatuswhich we sawinthis paper.Itisobviousthatthe theory of states and the context in which it was statedare very far away from modern logic. Thus, Idonot claim that Abū Hāšim and his followers would accept this methodology or thatthey would confirm the brief formalisation of the theory of stateswhich we have seen here. The aim of applying LP to some aspects of the theory of states is nothing more to show that it is possible to have amodel of the theory—or to be The TheoryofAḥwāland Arguments against the Law of Non-Contradiction 51

more precise, adialetheic readingofthe theory—without losing its coherency.Itis also obvious thatamodel of atheory is merelyanabstraction which onlygrasps some aspects of the theory in question. Here, we have onlyprovided asketch of the idea, which Ithink suffices for the purposes of this paper.

5Conclusion

After discussing the arguments against the LNC, Rāzī says:

These objections are onlyadrop of the sea of objections which have been raised against our saying that an object either is or is not.And if this is the state of the strongest self-evident [assent], what do youthink about the weaker ones?⁴⁴

Rāzī seems to be exaggerating about the number of objections to the LNC, but his discussion of the LNCshows thatthere wereongoing debates about it which were drivenbythe proponents of the theory of states.Unfortunately, none of Abū Hāšim’s works has survivedand most of the works of his followers are no longer extant. Hence, it is not possible to trace back the arguments discussed abovetotheir advo- cates.Asalreadymentioned, Rāzī himself is not an opponent of the LNC. He is well known to have enjoyed rejecting different views onlyfor the sake of argument.How- ever,itseems unlikelythatthe arguments that we discussed in this paper are his. For one thing,heexplicitlytalks about others who hold this view,atvarious pointsinthe text,though with all that said, we do not know who posed those arguments first.Let us leave it to historians and scholars to decide. Moreover,wesaw that the theory of states,understood as atheory which violatesthe LNC, can, by applying modern logical apparatus, be coherentlyuttered within the contemporary metaphysical scene.

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 Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,35. 52 Behnam Zolghadr

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The majority of the excerpts traditionallytaken to derive from aplannedbook 8of Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis concern the theory of demonstration (apodeixis) and related matters of logic. The suspension of judgement (epochē), arecognisably sceptical response to disagreement and alack of demonstrative certainty,receives two brief treatments in this context.Apart from an attempted refutation of scepticism which pointstothe allegedlyself-refuting character of universal epochē (5.15.2–16.3), the text also includes an account of the causes that lead one to suspend judgement (7.22.1–4). The sourceofthis treatment of scepticism is unknown.² In his recent edition, translation, and commentary,Matyáš Havrda givesajudicious overviewofthe schol- arlyproposals and argues that a liber logicus,perhaps Galen’slost work On Demon- stration (De Demonstratione or Peri Apodeixeōs), could have been the direct or indirect sourceofparts or the whole of the alleged book 8.³ At the sametime,Havrda is not convincedthat this material ever made it into aClementine book. In his view,itis

 This paper was presented at aworkshop entitled “‘Liber Logicus’ by Clement of Alexandria: Proof, Inquiry,Scepticism, Causation in an EarlyChristian Text” held at the Czech AcademyofSciences, Prague, April 20–22, 2017.Ithank the DFG-2311 for their financial support and Matyáš Havrda and my anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft.  Scholars either cautiouslyrefertoanotherwise unknown liber scepticus,treat the anti-sceptical strategyofthe first excerpt as reflectingaStoic position, or suggest that Clement’ssource had some- thingtodowith Aenesidemus,the most notable sceptical figurehead of his native Alexandria. See Hans vonArnim, De octavo Clementis Stromateorum libro (Rostock: Adler,1894), 11–15;Christiane vonWedel, Symbola ad Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum l. VIII interpretandum (Berlin: s.n., 1905), 5–8; Eric F. Osborn, ThePhilosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1957), 149–51;Karel Janáček, “Ainesidemos und Sextos Empeirikos,” in Studien zu Sextus Em- piricus,Diogenes Laertius und zurPyrrhonischen Skepsis,ed. Filip Karfíkand JanJanda (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter,2008), 251–64 (originallypublished in Eirene 17 [1980]: 5–16); Karel Janáček, “ZurInterpretation des Photiosabschnittes über Ainesidemos,” in Studien zu Sextus Empiricus,Dio- genes Laertius und zur Pyrrhonischen Skepsis,216–24 (originallypublished in Eirene 14 [1976]: 93– 100). Forthe suggestion that the so-called book 8transmits Antiochean material, perhaps with Peri- patetic mediation, see Reginald E.Witt, Albinus and the HistoryofMiddle Platonism (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press, 1937), 31–41.  Matyáš Havrda, TheSo-Called Eighth Stromateus by Clement of Alexandria:Early Christian Recep- tion of Greek Scientific Methodology (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), 34–50 (with reservations as to whether the Galenic source would have coveredthe excerpts on suspension); see also Matyáš Havrda, “Galenus Christianus? The Doctrine of Demonstration in Stromata VIII and the Question of Its Source,” Vigiliae Christianae 65,no. 4(2011): 368–72.

OpenAccess. ©2020Máté Veres, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-006 54 MátéVeres

unlikelythat these excerpts wereintended, “at least in the form preserved for us,” as another book of the Stromateis.⁴ It goes without saying thattheories concerning the text’sprovenance depend to a large extent on the appreciation of its philosophical content.The excerptsonscep- ticism are interesting both with regard to the broader question of the text’sorigin and in their own right.Inthis paper,Iaim to contributetothe analysis of the sceptical ideas contained in the alleged book 8. Ioffer considerations in favour of the scholarlyconsensus that the version of scepticism discussed therein is different from, and earlier than, the variant of Pyrrhonism formulated by Sextus Empiricus.⁵ In doing so, Irevisit and partiallycorrect some of the receivedarguments in support of this claim,⁶ so as to place the position on amore solid footing. First,Iwill give abrief overview of boththe argument from self-refutation employed in the first Clementine excerpt and the Sextan rejection of arelated argument. Iwill arguethatthe comparison does not support definite claims about the origin of the Clementine material (section 1). Then Iwill discuss the second excerpt,which offers aseries of remarks on the causal origin of epochē (section 2).Iwill then contrast it to Sextus’saccount of the origin of suspensive disposition in terms of originative principles (archai)rather than causes (aitiai), arguingthat Sextus’sformulation allows for amorenuanced sceptical position (section 3). In conclusion, Iwill briefly consider possible views on the relevanceofthis material,orthe lack thereof, for Clement’sChristian project (section 4).

The first excerpt,which appears under the inserted heading Pros tous Pyrrōn[e]ious (using the Byzantine spelling), criticises the sceptical position on two counts.The first objection is thatone could hold the statement “nothing is certain” (bebaion einai mēden)tobetrue onlyonpain of self-refutation (15.2–7; cf. 16.1). This is then followed by the claim that one cannot even begin to inquire without aprevious apprehension of some statesofaffairs, which in turn implies thatsomething certain can be apprehended (15.7–9).⁷

 Havrda, So-Called Eighth Stromateus, 10,cf. 14,25, 50.Nevertheless,heentertains the possibility that while composingbook 7, Clement made use of something like the so-called book 8(70,cf. 74). Forhis summarystatement,see 76–77.  See Janáček, “Ainesidemos und Sextos Empeirikos,” 252–54;Havrda, The So-Called Eighth Stroma- teus, 244 n. 299.  Janáček’smain argument for anon-Sextan variety of scepticism is puzzlingatbest; see my discussion of T4 below.  ForSextus’sclaim that the sceptic can act and investigatewithout dogmatic apprehension, see his distinctionsbetween twosenses of dogma (PH 1.13) and twosenses of katalēpsis (PH 2.1–11). The Causes of Epochē: ANote on Stromateis 8.22.1–4 55

More precisely, the charge of self-refutation is introduced in book 8asone horn of adilemma.Inresponsetothe question of whether anything is true, one might either give an affirmative answer,which amountstoarejection of the claim that “nothing is certain,” or holdthatnothing is true, which turns out to be aself-refutingpo- sition. Similarobjections wereroutinelyraised about avariety of sceptical positions.⁸ Aversion of the objection is addressed by Sextus Empiricus, who states that utterances such as “everything is false” (panta esti pseudē)or“nothing is true” (ouden estin alēthes)apply to themselvesand cancel themselvesout (symperigraphei, PH 1.14). Sextusgives avariety of responses in the Outlines (PH 1.14,206;2.188, all three passages featuring the term symperigraphein;cf. also PH 2.84), as well as in the second book of Against the Logicians (M 8.55,480–81). Accordingtothe receivedview,Sextus’smain strategy is to embrace the self-refuting nature of self-referring sceptical utterances.⁹ Accordingtoarecentlyproposed alternative view,however,the term symperigraphein invokes aspecificallyPyrrhoni- an strategywhich was designed to avoid self-refutation. On this proposal, self-referring utterances are self-refuting onlyifand when they are advanced with adogmatic mindset; i.e., whenthe premises and the conclusion are endorsed as true by the one who utters or entertains them.Bycontrast, when uttered or entertained with asus- pensive disposition alreadyinplace, they “bracket themselves” (this being the proposed translation of symperigraphein), as aresult of which no contradiction arises.¹⁰ On either reading, Sextus is readywith an answer to the sortofobjection from self-refutation that we find endorsed in the first of the two excerpts from book 8. On the novel reading,however,itbecomes possibletoclaim that the sceptical response that Sextus preserved is reported under Clement’sname as well. One of two occurrences of the key term in Clementcomes “seemingly with the same meaning as in Sextus and in asceptical context.”¹¹ One could suggest on this basis that the two texts show little differenceinterms of philosophical sophistication. Further- more, even if we discount this possibilityand admit that the sourceinformingthe Clementine passages is philosophicallyless advanced thanSextus, it might still not suffice to establish achronological difference. After all, individuals workingat the sametime and place might achieve different levels of philosophical acuity.¹²

 Forsimilar objections,see Cicero, Acad. 2.29,109;Aristocles apud Eusebius, Praep.evang. 14.18.5– 24;Photius, Bibl. 212.169b.18–31;Sextus Empiricus, M 7. 399,440;8.55; cf. alreadyAristotle, Metaph. 4.8.1012b13–22.  See especiallyMark L. McPherran, “Skeptical Homeopathyand Self-Refutation,” Phronesis 32 (1987): 290–328.  Luca Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation: TheLogic and History of the Self-Refutation Argument from DemocritustoAugustine (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2010), 251–307, especially 266, 269, 277.  Castagnoli, 351n.137,pointingto8.22.2(T4 below). The other Clementine passage, Strom. 6.15.119.4,isirrelevantfor,and impossible to squarewith, Castagnoli’sinterpretation.  It is worth mentioningthat if these passageshad indeed been derivedfromGalen, then one could even come to imagine—though not in anyway to establish—that Sextus was respondingtothe sort of 56 MátéVeres

Nor does it follow that the second excerpt,acausal account of the origins of epochē which does not even mention the argument from self-refutation, represents aless de- velopedform of scepticism. With these reservations in mind, Iwillnow turn to the causal account developed in the second excerpt.

Even though the first excerpt rejects universal epochē,itdoes allow for the legitimacy of suspending one’sjudgement on particular occasions:

[T1] Not onlythe “suspenders,” but every “dogmatist” tooisused to suspendingjudgement in some matters, either fromweakness of thought,[or from] the obscurity of things, [or from] the equipollenceofarguments (16.3).¹³

The second excerpt arguablypicks up on the conciliatory tone of this remark and goes on to explain the reasons for widespread disagreement in the domainsofinqui- ry and ordinary life. It is, of course, questionable whether these two discussions derive from the same sourceorevenexpress the samegeneric outlook concerning scepticism.Atany rate, even if it is possible to detect atransitionfrom adistinctlyanti- sceptical perspective to another which is mildlysympathetic to sceptical considerations,¹⁴ the crucial link seems to be provided by the observation that localised epochē is acommon resort of bothsceptics and doctrinaire philosophers. On the account at hand, there seem to be three reasons whyone might suspend one’sjudgement. The first has to do with asubjective condition; namely,the weakness or infirmity of one’sown cognitive capacities.Bycontrast,the second reason has to do with the objects of inquiry:they are unclear or obscure, and hence they do not deliverimmediate knowledge of themselves. Finally, the arguments one might consider for and against accepting agiven proposition are said to be equipollent. Going onlybythis brief sentence, it is unclear how these threesources of suspension are supposed to relate to each other. The second excerpt is almost entirely devoted to the discussion of the causes(aitiai)ofthe suspension of judgement.Tobegin with, it states:

anti-sceptical considerations that Galen had put forward. Unfortunately, the limits of historical fancy areset by the available evidence, and nothingseems to support such aconnection.  Οὐ μόνον οἱἐφεκτικοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶςδογματικὸς ἔντισιν ἐπέχειν εἴωθεν ἤτοι παρὰ γνώμης ἀσθένειαν ἢ παρὰ πραγμάτων ἀσάφειαν ἢ παρὰ τὴντῶνλόγων ἰσοσθένειαν.Translations taken from Havrda, So-Called Eighth Stromateus.  “This excerpt or paraphrase [i.e., the second] was probablymade by the same author whoaccepts the limited validity of epochē in 16,3,not in order to embrace scepticism, but rather to represent the sceptic’sposition with his [i.e., the sceptic’s] own words” (Havrda, 241). The Causes of Epochē: ANoteonStromateis 8.22.1–4 57

[T2] The most general causes of suspensionofjudgement aretwo.One is the fickleness and in- stability of the human mind; it naturallygenerates disagreement,either that of one with another,orthat of one with oneself. Second is the disagreement in things, which also, with good reason, comes down to inducing suspension of judgement (22.1 =93.19–23).¹⁵

This passagediffers from T1 in anumber of respects.First,itleavesout the equipollence of arguments mentioned above. Second, it explicitlycasts the other two sources of epochē in causal terms.Inaddition, it seems that equipollence is here replaced by disagreement (diaphōnia), which figures twice in T2.Onthe one hand, it is aconsequence of the fallibility of the human mind, which, by its nature (note the term gennētikon,which will reappear in T3 below),bringsabout avariety of differing opinions on both the interpersonal and the intrapersonal level. On the other hand, disagreement applies to the nature of thingsthemselves(hēen tois ousi diaphōnia), perhaps in the sense that they give rise to anomalousappearances.¹⁶ The final,lengthiest discussion of the causes of epochē givesyet another variation on the sametheme.Accordingtothe passagebelow,which includes avivid description of the dogmatic predicament,disagreement is the proximate cause of suspension of judgement (hē de diaphōnia proseches aition tēsepochēs), and it is ultimatelydue to the condition of the human mind, with no explicitmention of the nature of thingsthemselves:

[T3] Out of these most principal [causes] of suspension, the infirmity of the mind is the one that generates disagreement,and disagreement is the proximatecause of the suspensionofjudgement.Asaconsequence, life is full of courts, councils,assemblies, and, generallyspeaking, choice regarding so-called good and evil things. These aretokens [showing] that the mind is puzzled and that it wavers vis-à-vis the equipollence of opposingthings.And libraries arefull of books of people disagreeingwith one another in their beliefs,each having convinced himself that he knows the truth in things (22.3–4=93.27–94.4).¹⁷

 Τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐποχῆςαἴτια δύο ἐστὶντὰἀνωτάτω, ἓνμὲντὸπολύτροπον καὶἄστατον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, ὅπερ γεννητικὸνεἶναι πέφυκεν τῆςδιαφωνίας ἤτοι τῆς ἀλλήλων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἢ τῆς ἑαυτῶνπρὸςἑαυτούς, δεύτερον δὲἡἐντοῖςοὖσι διαφωνία, ἣ καὶ εἰκότως ἐμποιητικὴ κα- θέστηκε τῆς ἐποχῆς.  But cf. vonWedel’salternative classification: “Et eodem modo bipartitae sunt causae ἐποχῆς in Clementis §16(I) γνώμης ἀσθένεια (II) 1. πραγμάτων ἀσάφεια 2. λόγων ἰσοσθένεια” (von Wedel, Sym- bolaabClementis Alexandrini,8). My understanding is closer to the contrast in Osborn, ThePhilos- ophyofClement of Alexandria,151 (on the one hand, people change their minds and disagree with each other;onthe other hand, the world as such presents us with conflictingappearances).  Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶντῶνἀρχικωτάτων <αἰτίων> τῆς ἐποχῆςτὸμὲνἀβέβαιον τῆςδιανοίας γεννητι- κόν ἐστι διαφωνίας, ἡ δὲ διαφωνίαπροσεχὲςαἴτιον τῆς ἐποχῆς, ὅθεν πλήρης μὲν ὁ βίος δικαστηρίων τε καὶ βουλευτηρίων καὶἐκκλησιῶνκαὶκαθόλου τῆςπερὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ αἱρέσεως <καὶ φυγῆς>, ἅπερ ἠπορημένης ἐστὶ διανοίας καὶ πρὸςτὴντῶνἀντικειμένων πραγμάτων ἰσοσθένειαν μετο- κλαζούσης τεκμήρια. πλήρεις δ’ αἱ θῆκαι τῶνβιβλίων [καὶ αἱ συντάξεις καὶ αἱ πραγματεῖαι] τῶνδια- φωνούντων ἐντοῖςδόγμασι καὶ πεπεικότων ἑαυτοὺςτὴνἐντοῖςοὖσιν ἀλήθειαν γινώσκειν.Havrda added <αἰτίων>tothis passage;Stählin added <καὶ φυγῆς>; Heyse and Weydel modified εἰς ἀσθένειαν to ἰσοσθένειαν;and Havrda removed [καὶ αἱ συντάξεις καὶ αἱ πραγματεῖαι]. 58 MátéVeres

Whether or not one is sympathetic to the assumption that all three passages (T1–T3) belong to one and the sameaccount concerning the causes of suspension, one might find the last version to be the closest to Sextus Empiricus’sPyrrhonian stance. After all, in T3,the major consideration in favour of epochē appears to be equipollence.On the one hand,there is widespread disagreement in matters of theory and practice; on the other,contrary arguments turn out to be equallypersuasive,and this is in fact the main feature thatdefines Sextan scepticism (PH 1.8). Insofar as this passagedown- plays or drops the idea thatdisagreement is duetothe nature of the thingsinvesti- gated, it might after all managetoescape alurkingdogmatic commitment concerning the objective limitations of our capacity for knowledge.¹⁸ Nevertheless,the emphasis on our subjective limitations might still hold the dan- geroflatent dogmatism. In this respect,itisnot so much the characterisation of the human mind as feeble or changeable (polytropos and astatos in T2; abebaios in T3) which seems problematic, but rather the claim that it is acongenital condition.¹⁹ If equipollence is merelyaconsequenceofthe infirmity of the human mind, the question once again becomes whether this infirmity is due to our limited cognitive capacities or rather to the nature of thingsthemselves. In order to read T3 as obeying the spirit or perhaps even the letter of Sextan Pyrrhonism, this aspect of the account should be downplayed. The following two considerations indicate aharmonious rapport between Sextan Pyrrhonism and the sceptical stance reported by Clement.Firstly, Sextus’sclassifica- tion of the TenModes for epochē shows affinitywith the causes specified by Clement: as Sextus puts it,some of the modes have to do with the one who judges, some with the thing being judged, and some with acombination of both(PH 1.38).²⁰ The same

 On the other hand, this might be nothingmorethan achange of terminology.Perhapsthe disagreement en tois ousi amounts to what Sextus calls “anomalies” or conflictingappearances. See, e.g., Sextus’sreferencestoanōmalia in his narrativesofsceptical conversion (PH 1.12,29, 214; M 1.6), as wellasthroughout his description of the TenModes of Aenesidemus (PH 1.112, 114, 132, 163, 198, 218, 220; cf. 3.233–35, M 9.191,and M 1.154,236,240).See also DL 9.76: “Whenever thingsare at odds with each other and arguments have equal strength, ignoranceofthe truth follows suit” (τῶνμὲνγὰρ πραγμάτων διαφωνούντων τῶνδὲλόγων ἰσοσθενούντων ἀγνωσίατῆςἀληθείας ἐπακολουθεῖ, trans. Scharffenbergerand Vogt).  Interestingly,arelated remarkfromSextus appears in the contextofdefendingPyrrhonism against self-refutation by invokingthe idea that the human mind will not put lastingtrust in the argument against the possibilityofdemonstration: “However,ifthe skeptics have to answerfor themselves, they will answerinasafe way. Forthey will saythat the argument against demonstration is merelypersuasive,and that for the moment it persuadesthem and induces assent, but that they do not know whether it will also be like this in the futuregiven the fickle character of human thought” (ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοὺςσκεπτικοὺς ἂνδέῃ ὑπὲραὑτῶνἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀσφαλῶς ἀποκρι- νοῦνται. φήσουσι γὰρτὸνκατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον πιθανὸνεἶναι μόνον καὶ πρὸςτὸπαρὸνπείθειν αὐτοὺςκαὶἐπάγεσθαι συγκατάθεσιν, ἀγνοεῖνδέ,εἰκαὶ αὖθις ἔσται τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης διανοίας; M 8.473, trans. Bett).  “Superordinate to these [i.e., to the TenModes] arethreemodes:that derivingfromthe subject judging; that derivingfromthe object judged; that combined from both” (τούτων δὲἐπαναβεβηκότες The Causes of Epochē: ANote on Stromateis 8.22.1–4 59

classificatory concern explains his presentation not onlyofthe TenModes, but also that of the Five Modes, the TwoModes, and the Eight Modes (PH 1.31–186). Secondly, an additional argument offered in-between T2 and T3 sounds especiallyclose to a statement of Sextus’sofficial position:

[T4] We can neither believeall presentations,because of their conflict; nor disbelievethem all, because the one sayingthat all [presentations] are untrustworthy, is bracketedalong with the “all,” beingone of them; nor can we believesome and disbelieveothers,because of their equality;thus we arebrought to suspension of judgement (22.2 =93.23–27).²¹

Surprisingly,Janáček invokes this passageasthe main argument in favour of apre- Sextan variety of scepticism informingthe so-called book 8’streatment of scepticism.²² Admittedly, the argument itself has apre-Sextan pedigree, but there is no reason to believethatitmight not form part of aposition sufficientlysimilar to that of Sextus. He himself found it congenial to his presentation of the Pyrrhonist position, as evidenced primarilybyhis discussion of the criterion of truth, which, at M 7. 389, starts out with exactlythe samesort of argumentation.Asthingsstand, therefore, we find little in book 8’spresentation of scepticism which cannot,atthe end of the day, be made to square with Sextus’sflexible Pyrrhonism.

Ihaveargued thus far that there is amore or less straightforward, if somewhat over- zealous, wayofreadingClement’saccount as pointing away from asceptical view based on dogmatic commitments concerning the nature of reality and towards one that livesuptothe Sextan gold standard. My purpose in pushing for such areading was not to arguethat the Clementine excerpts do in fact understand scepticism in the vein of SextusEmpiricus; rather,myintention was to preparethe ground for the next step, which is to draw attention to amore significant differencebetween these presentations. Quite importantly,while Clement or his sourcegives acausal account of the suspension of judgement,Sextus embeds his own account in abiographical narrative concerning the conversion to scepticism—not least because acausal account, by his standards,would qualify as dogmatic. In his idealised biographyofanindividual who sets out to discover the truth but ends up suspending judgement instead (PH 1.12,26, 29), Sextus speaksnot of causes

εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁἀπὸτοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁἀπὸτοῦ κρινομένου, ὁἐξἀμφοῖν,trans.Annas and Barnes). See Havrda, So-Called Eighth Stromateus, 241–42.  μήτε γὰρπάσαις ταῖςφαντασίαις πιστεύειν δυνηθέντες διὰ τὴνμάχην μήτε πάσαις ἀπιστεῖνδιὰτὸ καὶ τὴνλέγουσαν πάσας ἀπίστους ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἁπασῶνοὖσαν συμπεριγράφεσθαι πάσαις μήτε τισὶ μὲν πιστεύειν, τισὶ δὲἀπιστεῖνδιὰτὴνἰσότητα, κατήχθημεν εἰς ἐποχήν.  Janáček, “Ainesidemos und Sextos Empeirikos,” 253: “Das Hauptargument aber für eine ältere skeptische Quelle als Sextos im Klemensabschnitt ist die dreifache Begründung des Skeptizismus.” 60 MátéVeres

(aitiai), but rather of originatingprinciples (archai)which motivatethe adoption of a suspensive disposition. Sextus’sstorydescribes the interplayoftwo such principles. The first,originative principle (archē aitiōdēs)isthe hope of tranquillity: individuals sensitivetophilosophicalconcerns and troubled by theirinability to decide between conflictingappearances setout to discover what is true and what is false, in the hope of achieving intellectual tranquillity. The second sustaining or constitutive principle (archē systaseōs)appeals to their eventual recognition that to every account an equallypersuasive account is opposed, which leadsthem to suspend their judgement and, in turn, to afortuitous state of tranquillity. Since the first principle appliestoall philosophers (labeled by Sextus hoi megalophyeis)while the second onlyapplies to those who have become Pyrrhonians, Sextus’snarrative links togetherthese two groups in away that enables him to claim that sceptics are, as their chosen denomination suggests, proper inquirers.²³ Sextusnot onlydistances himself from the all-too-formal accounts of what bringsabout epochē;healso manages to establish acontinuity between what he takes to be the original motivation for inquiry and the aim of the full-fledgedPyr- rhonist.Bycontrast,book 8does not engage in conjectures concerning the background of aphilosophical sceptic—it does not mention tranquillity or,for that matter, anyother possiblemotivation for adopting asceptical position.²⁴ Nor does it present sceptics as genuine inquirers;rather,the opening passageofbook 8suggeststhat the sceptical predilection for an aporeticoutcome is nothing but an obstacle to genuine inquiry.Insofar as neither of these characteristic features of Sextan Pyrrhonism make an appearance in it,book 8can hardlybetaken to expound aform of scepticism sufficientlysimilar to that of Sextus. At this point,one might pose the question why, givensuch an unflatteringview of scepticism, Clement would show anyinterest in it.Ifbook 8’sdiscussion of scepticism is in fact compatible with Clement’sChristian agenda, then the guiding idea must perhaps be that genuine inquiry takes its departure from divine authority, and the alternativetoacceptingthat authority is to engageinthe fruitless, sophistical bickeringofscepticism. Whether or not this was in fact Clement’sposition, as we shall see in the concluding section, is ultimatelyunclear.

Scholars have understandablyfound it puzzling that aChristian theologian of Clem- ent’sstanding would express interest in sceptical arguments, let alone recognise

 Foradetailed defenceofthis reading, see Máté Veres, “Keep Calm and Carry On: Sextus Empiri- cus on the Origins of Pyrrhonism,” HistoryofPhilosophy and Logical Analysis 23,no. 1(2020), special issue on Ancient Modes of Philosophical Inquiry,ed. Jens Kristian Larsen and Philipp Steinkrüger.  It has been suggestedtomethat this might indicateanAenesideman source,but it is difficultto squarethis suggestion with DL 9.108;cf. also Aristocles apud Eusebius, Praep.evang. 14.18.2–4. The Causes of Epochē: ANoteonStromateis 8.22.1–4 61

their potential legitimacy.²⁵ On the basis of the discussion in the previous sections, two possibilities seem to emerge:either to find aplace for these excerptsinClement’s Christian thoughtortodiscard them as inauthentic,meta-Stromatic material that bears no relation to it. As to the former option, one might saythat it is not unheard of thataChristian thinker would employscepticism in support of their religious stance. In such aview, the sceptical predicament shows thathuman reason naturallygenerates disagreement,which, if unaided by divine revelation, it cannot ever hope to overcome.²⁶ It is conceivable that sceptical argumentation could playaninadvertent role in the formulation of such aquasi-fideistic position: by calling into question our ability to acquire demonstrative knowledge,scepticism can be seen as giving support to revealed starting points for inquiry.²⁷ Ageneral context of this sortmay bring us closertoappreciating Clement’sinterest in the book 8material. Such areading, then, is at the very least possible; the question is whether thereisatextual basis to support it.One might point to the opening paragraphs of book 8, whereClement contrasts more recent Greek philosophers, who reduced themselvestoelenctic and eristicargumentation,with both the more ancient Greek philosophers and the true philosophyofthose who are led to

 See Janáček, “Ainesidemos und Sextos Empeirikos,” 252: “It [i.e., the second excerpt] is clearlyan excerpt from asceptical author,just as the polemic in III 89–90 [i.e., the first excerpt] betrays an antisceptical author.One could hardly claim that Clement the Christian, an admirer of Plato, Pythagoras, the Stoics, was asceptic.” (“Es ist natürlich ein Exzerptaus einem skeptischen Autor,gerade wie das Pamphlet III 89–90 einen antiskeptischen Autor verrät.Den Christen Klemens,einen Bewunderer von Platon, Pythagoras, den Stoikern, könnte man mit Mühe einen Skeptikernennen.”)  On the Christian use of sceptical arguments,see Gábor Kendeffy, Az egyházatyák és aszkepticizmus (Budapest: Áron, 1999), especially48–60.OnClement, see George Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy:AStudy of Its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001), 188–94,and George Karamanolis, ThePhilosophy of Early Christianity (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 120–27.For aclassic statement of such areading,see Eugène De Faye, “The Influence of Greek Scepticism on Greek and Christian Thoughtinthe First and Second Centuries,” Hibbert Journal 22 (1924):717–20,who argues that the structureand styleofthe entire Stromateis is ultimatelydue to Clement beingshakenbythe force of sceptical arguments.OnClement’sproject in general, see also PierreNautin, “La fin des Stromates et les Hypotyposes de Clément d’Alexandrie,” Vigiliae Christianae 30,no. 4(1976): 268–302, Silke-Petra Bergjan, “Logic and TheologyinClementofAlexandria. The Purpose of the 8th Book of the Stromata,” Zeitschrift fürAntikes Christentum 12, no. 3(2008): 394– 411, and Matyáš Havrda, “Clement’sExegetical Interests in Stromateis VIII,” in Clement’sBiblical Ex- egesis,ed. Veronika V. Černušková, Judith L. Kovacs, and Jana Plátová(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), 162–78.  Forarecentargument that fideism as adistinct philosophical stanceappeared in the Alexandrian contextasacombination of Jewish monotheism and Aenesideman scepticism in the works of Philo of Alexandria, see Carlos Lévy, “De l’epochè sceptique àl’epochè transcendantale: Philon d’Alexandrie fondateur du fidéisme,” in Scepticisme et religion: Constantes et évolutions,delaphilosophie hellénis- tique àlaphilosophie médiévale,ed. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulicand Carlos Lévy (Turnhout: Bre- pols,2016), 57–73. 62 MátéVeres

investigation by Scripture(8.1.1).²⁸ This might also fit well with Clement’sproject of carving out aniche for aChristian stance which does not reject philosophical inquiry,but ties its possibility and eventual successtothe prior acceptance of Christian revelation. After all, book 8opens with the interpretationofabiblical passage, Mat- thew 7.7: “Seek and youwill find, knock and it will open, ask and it will be givenfor you.”²⁹ The other option,that scepticism is of little relevance to Clement’sstatedpur- poses in the Stromateis,nevertheless remains equallyplausible. The closest Clement comes to engagingwith sceptical strategies is probablyhis discussion of the argument from disagreement in book 7(7. 89–90).³⁰ In that context,heappears adamant that his method of scriptural interpretation leadstoasort of demonstrative knowledge which is not vulnerable to the challengeofdiaphōnia. This, of course, could still be squared with the quasi-fideistic suggestion that,ifitwerenot for Scripture, one would never be able to reason one’sway out of disagreement; the emphasis, however,isvery much on the messageofsuccess, not on the appeal of scepticism.³¹ In sum, the questions concerning the origin of these excerpts and their connection to the main text of the Stromateis are at the very least contentious, and suggestions concerning the Clementineappropriation of scepticism for Christian purposes will inevitablystand on shaky grounds.³² Hencethe modest aim of this paper was to provide an analysis of the causal account of suspension offered in the alleged book 8 and to compareitwith the mature Pyrrhonist position of Sextus Empiricus. Amore ambitiousdiscussion could venture to situate the Clementine material in its suppos- edlyAlexandrian context and to analyse its possible ties not onlytoClement’sepistemology and theory of faith, but alsotothe pre-Sextan form of scepticism reported by Philo of Alexandria and championed by Aenesidemus.³³ This, however,remains a task for another day.

 Cf. Stromateis 7.4and Nautin, “La fin des Stromates,” 291. Bergjan, “Logicand Theology in Clem- ent of Alexandria,” 406–9, suggests that the proponents of universal suspensionofjudgement that Clement has in mind arenot so much sceptical philosophers, but rather the followers of Tertullian, whoreject the religious relevanceofrational argumentation.  Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· ζητεῖτε, καὶ εὑρήσετε· κρούετε, καὶἀνοιγήσεται ὑμῖν.  Forhis rather limitedawareness of sceptics,see also references to Pyrrho in Stromateis 1.14,64.4 and 7.16,101.4.  See Matyáš Havrda, “Demonstrative Method in Stromateis VII: Context,Principles,and Purpose.” In The SeventhBook of the Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Olo- mouc,21–23,2010),edited by Matyáš Havrda, V. Hušek, and J. Plátová (Vigiliae Christianae Supple- ments 117) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 261–75.Havrdaargues that “the material in the eighth book […]seems to reflect Clement’stheological goals to alimited extent only” (263;cf. 270–71).  See Havrda, So-Called Eighth Stromateus, 54–55;cf. 27–28 for the claim that onlythe first chapter of book 8isofanundoubtedlyChristian character.  Havrda, 241, points out that other than Clement,onlyPhilo, Ebr.170–71 speaks of the causes of disagreement and suspension. The Causes of Epochē: ANoteonStromateis 8.22.1–4 63

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Introduction

The High Scholastic German Dominican Meister Eckhart (1260–1328) is renowned for his innovative philosophythatdared to break the mould of the accepted Scholastic worldview of his days.² Someofthe heterodoxelements of his thought alsoseem to have originated from his favourable view of Jewishphilosophical sources. The celebrated Jewishphilosopher Maimonides (1135/38–1204) immediatelycomestomind since his Judaeo-ArabicAristotelianism exerted aformative impact on Eckhart.³ How- ever,Maimonides is not the onlyJewishphilosopher to have shaped Eckhart’sbody of thought.Afurther philosophicalsourcerequiring scholarlyattention is Fons vitae by the eleventh-century JewishAndalusian Solomon IbnGabirol(1020/21–58), gener- allydenoted in Scholasticism as Avicebron or as Avencebrol. Eckhart,who was not aware of Avicebron’sJewish faith, approvingly invokes his philosophicalauthority on several occasions. His treatment of Fons vitae’smetaphysical assertions represents aconstructive wayofapproaching Gabirolean thought which deviates from his Dominican predecessors, the ardent Aristotelians Albertus Magnus (c. 1200– 80) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). These two thirteenth-century Scholastics are rather notorious for their critical attitude towards Avicebronian hylomorphism.⁴

 The title of my article alludes to Yossef Schwartz’s “To Thee Is Silence Praise”:Meister Eckhart’s Reading in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv:AmOvedPublishers, 2002), in which he methodicallyreveals Meister Eckhart’sdependencyupon Maimonides, showingthat he regarded “Rabbi Moyses” as aphilosophical authority of the highest order.  See Kurt Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,trans. Anne Schindeland Aaron Va- nides (New Haven: Yale University Press,2015), 234–73.  Forafurther article by Schwartz on this subject matter,see Yossef Schwartz, “Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides:From Judaeo-Arabic Rationalism to Christian Mysticism,” in ACompanion to Meister Eckhart,ed. Jeremiah M. Hackett (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 389–414.  Cf. Alessandro Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources:Avicenna, Avicebron, and Aver- roes,” in ACompanion to Meister Eckhart,ed. Jeremiah M. Hackett (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 274; Fernand Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” in LectionumVarietates. Hommage àPaul Vignaux (1904– 1987),ed. Jean Jolivet, Zenon Kaluza, and Alain de Libera (Paris:Vrin, 1991), 150;BernardMcGinn, “IbnGabirol:The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” in Neoplatonism and JewishThought,ed. Lenn E. Goodman (Albany, NY:SUNY Press, 1992),96–97.AsAlessandro Palazzo correctlynotes, despiteEck- hart’spositive approach to IbnGabirol, his treatment of his systemofthoughtisstill not on the same level of complexity and of similar elaboration as those of his fellow Dominicans:Palazzo, “Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources,” 274.

OpenAccess. ©2020Ze’ev Strauss, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-007 66 Ze’ev Strauss

In this study, Iset out to provide abrief overviewofEckhart’sexplicitand implicit references to Avicebron’s Fons vitae. The main argument Iwill put forward is that Avicebron’smetaphysics influenced Eckhart’sChristian philosophyatsignifi- cant points. Iwill aim to uncover this extensive usageand appropriationbybringing six central themesofGabirolean thought to the fore: (1) divine creation; (2)the ultimate epistemological goal of the human soul; (3) emanation and its fourfold ordo essendi;(4) negative theology; (5) God’sabsolutetranscendenceand pure unity; and (6) universal hylomorphism. Our approach will not confine itself solelytoEck- hart’sexplicit references to Fons vitae,but will alsohaverecourse to implicit ones, especiallywhen theyappear to echo ideas present in the former.Iwish to argue that Eckhart does not affirm particularthought patterns from Fons vitae while dismissing others. Rather,heappears to wholeheartedlyendorse doctrines that are central to Avicebronian philosophy. Furthermore, Iwill attempt to establish that Eckhart was intimatelyfamiliar with Fons vitae,aptlyevaluating it as advancingametaphy- sics of the One. Iwill show that through IbnGabirol’sphilosophy, Eckhart not onlyexplicates the philosophicalmeaning of keyverses from the Pentateuch, such as Gen 1:1, but also that of verses from the New Testament, aprime example being the prologue to the GospelofJohn. In fact,contrary to his use of Maimonides,which is almosten- tirelylimited to his exegesis of Jewish Scripture,⁵ Eckhart mainlyinvokes Avicebron in his reading of the New Testament. Nearlyhalf of his mentions of Fons vitae are found in his Commentaryonthe Gospel of John.⁶ It is also noteworthythatseven out of Eckhart’soverall twelve allusions to IbnGabirol refer specificallytotopics found in the fifth chapter of Fons vitae. This particularchapter seems to bear the strongest resemblancetoChristian theology, denoting, for example, God’sWill (vol- untas)interms of the all-pervading divine Word (verbum)insection 36.⁷ By emphasising these pointsthroughout this survey,Iwill prompt the conclusion thatEckhart assumedAvicebron to be aChristian thinker,through whom he can philosophically

 See BernardMcGinn, TheMystical Thought of Meister Eckhart: TheMan from Whom God Hid Noth- ing (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 271n.47.  See Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 275.  The writings of IbnGabirol will be citedinbrackets accordingtoBaeumker’scritical edition: Aven- cebrolis (Ibn Gabirol)Fons Vitae, ex Arabico in Latinum Translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino,ed. Clemens Baeumker,inBeiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen,vol. 1.2, ed. ClemensBaeumker and Georgvon Hertling,2nd ed. (Münster: Aschendorff, 1995),323.17(5:36) (henceforth FV). Forthe possible influence of the Longer Theology of Aristotle on IbnGabirol’stheory of the divine Will, see Jacques Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1980), 65–66;Sarah Pessin, “Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Avicebron],” in TheStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ibn-gabirol/ (under section 4.2: “Will, Wis- dom,Word, Intellect and the Cosmos”); Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’sTheologyofDesire: Matter and Method in JewishMedieval Neoplatonism (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2013), 177. Meister EckhartReading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 67

uncover coretenets of Christian faith.⁸ However,the ultimateclaim Iwillbring forth is thatitwas not Avicebron’ssupposed religious affiliation thatwas the decisive factor in attracting Eckhart to his philosophy, but rather its speculative and universal approach, metaphysicallyaccounting for theological notions concerning God, creation, and man. Although several scholarlyworks have been produced that concentrate on Avice- bron’sgeneral reception history within HighScholasticism,⁹ there has been scarcely anyattention devoted to Meister Eckhart’sextensive usage of Fons vitae. Twoschol- arlyworks in which Eckhart’sreception of IbnGabirol takes centrestagemerit special attention, the first being the article entitled “Maître Eckhart et Avicébron” by the Swiss historian of philosophyFernand Brunner published in 1991.¹⁰ In fact,this is the onlyarticle of its kind, inasmuchasitdeals exclusively with this subject matter. Brunneroffers aconcise and profound overview of Eckhart’semployment of Fons vitae in his Latin works (henceforth LW)aswell as in his German ones (henceforth DW). The second is the article by Alessandro Palazzo entitled “Eckhart’sIslamic and JewishSources: Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes” published in 2013.This article is the first major contribution to this topic in recent scholarship. Palazzo predicates his exploration of Eckhart’sJewishsources almostexclusively on IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae,which entails an 11-page section that systematicallytackles the themeat hand.¹¹ His studyoffers us amore detailed account of Eckhart’sapproach to Fons vitae throughout his writingsthan Brunner’s. Through astatistical evaluation of Eck- hart’squotations of Avicebron, Palazzo outlines, in asuccinct and carefullythought- out manner,the explicitmentions of Fons vitae in the corpus of Eckhart’sworks.

 It was not unprecedentedinthe scholastic tradition to consider Avicebron to be aChristian thinker. See James A. Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron. ANoteonThir- teenth-Century Augustinianism,” in Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays,ed. Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. Shahan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 244.  To mention afew:McGinn, “IbnGabirol:The Sageamong the Schoolmen,” 77–109;Jacob Gutt- mann, Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und zur jüdi- schen Literatur (Breslau: M. &H.Marcus,1902),1–46,60–85,154–67;Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn Gabirol (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht’sVerlag, 1889), 39–65;Weisheipl, “Alber- tus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism,” 239–60;Michael Wittmann, Die Stellung des hl. Thomas von Aquin zu Avencebrol(Ibn Gebirol)imEntwicklungsgang der arabischen Philosophie,inBeiträgezur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,vol. 3.3, ed. Clemens Baeumker and Georgvon Hertling (Münster:Aschendorff, 1900); John A. Laumakis, “Avicebron (Solomon ibn Gabirol)and Aquinas on Primary and Secondary Causality” (PhD diss., MarquetteUniversity,2001); Mária Mičaninová, “WasAquinas Right When He Claimed That Avicebron Departed fromAristotle?” Archive of the His- toryofPhilosophy and Social Thought 62 (2017): 281–305.  Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 133–39.Another noteworthyarticle, which Iunfortunate- ly came across toolate, is Alessandra Beccarisi’s “Zwischen Averroes, Avicenna und Avicebron. Meis- terEckhart und die Noetik im Islam und Judentum,” in Christine Büchner,Markus Enders and Die- tmar Mieth, eds., Meister Eckhart – interreligiös (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,2016), 223–40.  Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 271–81. 68 Ze’ev Strauss

In Eckhart’swritings, one encounters explicit references to Fons vitae,but also several passages which implicitlyexhibit similarities to Gabirolean notions. In his Latin works,Eckhart directlycites Avicebron on thirteen different occasions:¹² ‒ once in his Expositio libri Genesis (henceforth In Gen.I): (1) n. 27 [LW1,205.8–15]: FV 5:25 [301.20–302.1, 10–14]; ‒ twice in his Liberparabolarum Genesis¹³ (henceforth In Gen.II): (2)n.113 [LW1, 580.2–4]: FV 1:3[5.13–16], (3) n. 209[LW 1, 684.5–685.4]: FV 5:24 [301.16–302.15]; ‒ four times in his Expositio libri Exodi (henceforth In Ex.): (4) n. 58 [LW2,64.12– 13]: FV 5:23 [300.16], (5) n. 90 [LW2,93.11–13]: FV 5:23 [300.16–17], (6) n. 271[LW 2, 218.13–219.2]:FV5:43[338.22–27], (7) n. 281[LW 2, 225.5–12]: FV 1:4[6.16–22, 24]; ‒ once in Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici C. 24:23–31 (henceforth In Eccli.): (8) n. 9[LW 2, 238.9–12]: FV 5:22 [298.18–21]; ‒ on five separate occasions in Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Johannem (henceforth In Ioh.): (9) n. 263[LW 3, 218.4–11]: FV 3:14 [108.19–20,108.23– 109.3], (10) n. 389 [LW3,332.10–11]: FV 5:23 [300.16], (11) n. 463[LW 3, 396.10–397. 3]: FV 3:14 [108.19–20,108.22–109.1], (12)n.467 [LW3,399.9–10]: FV 3:14 [108.25–26], (13) n. 554:[LW 3, 483.13–484.3]: FV 2:9[40.6–27], 2:10 [41.11–16], 3:4 [82.9–83.10].

Moreover—as Brunner revealed—two further parts of Eckhart’sGerman sermons, ren- dering aphilosophicalconversation between ateacher (meister)and his pupil (jüng- er), echo specific sections from Fons vitae:DW2,612.3–10 [sermon 58]: FV 3:56 [204.10–13] and DW 3302.3–14 [sermon 75]: FV 3:56–57 [204.13–205.18].¹⁴ As in his treatment of Maimonides,Eckhart alsoentirelyrefrains from openly mentioning IbnGabirolinhis Middle HighGerman works.¹⁵ The critical edition of Eckhart’swrit- ingssuggests the presenceofnumerous passages bearing resemblancetoformula- tions and ideas found in IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae. As Palazzo notes,some of these parallels come across as being rather coincidental, whereas others—such as LW 1,

 Both Palazzo and Schwartz enumerate twelve explicit references by means of direct citations of IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae in Eckhart’sLatin writings:Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 272; Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 80;Schwartz, “Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides,” 392. Eckhart’swritings will be citedinbrackets accordingtothe critical edition: Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen und die lateinischenWerke,commissioned by the DFG, comprising Die deutschen Werke,ed. Josef Quint and GeorgSteer,5vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936–2016) (henceforth DW) and Die lateinischen Werke,ed. Konrad Weiss, Loris Sturlese, Albert Zimmermann, Joseph Koch, Her- ibert Fischer,Bruno Decker,Ernst Benz, Karl Christ,BernhardGeyer,and Erich Seeberg, 5vols.(Stutt- gart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936–)(henceforth LW). McGinn alludes to the fact that Eckhart mentions IbnGabirol by name seventeen times.  Cf. Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 80.  Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 133–39,149.  McGinn, TheMystical Thought of Meister Eckhart,267–68 n. 21. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 69

196.4–5and LW 2, 64.6–7—are quite persuasive.¹⁶ In total, the editors of the critical edition of the DW and the LW suggest that thereare nine sections in which Eckhart makes recourse to sections from Fons vitae in order to implicitlysupport his arguments: ‒ once in his Middle High German sermon 102 Ubi est, qui natus est rex Iudaeo- rum?:(1) [DW4,420.3 n. 31]: FV 1:3[5.22–23]; ‒ four times in his In Gen.I:(2) n. 12 [LW1,196.4–5n.3]: FV 3:22 [131.3], (3) n. 32 [LW1,210.3–4n.1]: FV 3:3[81.17], FV 5:42 [335.9], (4) n. 36 [LW1,213.9–10 n. 3]: FV 5:11 [277.5–9], (5) n. 88 [LW1,246.6–7n.3]: FV 4:11 [236.11–237.9]; ‒ twice in his In Gen.II:(6) n. 11 [LW1,483.1–3n.2]: FV 5:23 [300.16], (7) n. 197[LW 1, 669.12–13 n. 2]:FV1:3 [5.13–16.22]; ‒ twice in his In Ex.:(8) n. 18 [LW2,24.2–4n.2]: FV 5:24 [301.16–302.15], (9) n. 58 [LW2,64.6–7n.2]: FV 4:13 [239.12–17].

1Emanation of the One or the Two? Avicebron’s Fourfold Ordo Essendi

On examining Eckhart’s Opus tripartitum,one immediatelyencounters IbnGabirol’s impact on it,seeing that the Dominican alreadyreverts to his thought for his metaphysical reading of Gen 1:1:

Finally, it must be observed that it says “God” created “heavenand earth in the principle,” two things,not more, such as three or four and so forth. It does not saythat he created one thing. The reason is because by the fact that anythingisorhas been created it falls away from unity and simplicity.Unity and simplicity areproper to God and arehis property,asIhavewritten at length on the text “God is one” (Dt.6:4;Gal. 3:20). Again, everythingthat falls away from the One, the First of all things,immediatelyfalls into two and untothe other numbers by means of duality.And so Avicebron says that “the question ‘whether athingis’is asked in relation to the One because it is pureexistence,”“Under him the questions ‘whether athingis’and ‘what athingis’in the manner of duality belongtothe intelligence, which is the first thing below God. In athreefold waythe questions ‘whether athingis,’‘what it is,’ and ‘what sort it is’ belongtothe soul. In afourfold way, the questions ‘whether,’‘what,’‘what sort,’ and ‘why’ athingisbelongtonatureorthe realm of generation that is below the soul. The fourth question refers to the first three.” The first equal number,namelytwo, is the rootofall division, plurality and number,justasthe unequal or the One is the root and reason of lack of division (In Gen.I n. 26–28 [LW1,205.1–206.4]).¹⁷

 Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 272n.48.  Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart:The Essential Sermons,Commentaries,Treatises,and Defense, trans. Edmund Colledge and BernardMcGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 91. The printedtrans- lation uses the name “IbnGabirol,” which Ichaged to “Avicebron” sinceEckhart did not know his true identity.For Eckhart as an interpreter of the book of Genesis,see Flasch, Meister Eckhart:Phi- losopher of Christianity,115–30. 70 Ze’ev Strauss

In the quoted passage, Eckhart tackles the exegetical difficulty of providingareason as to whyGod in His singularity initiallycalls into being two creations as opposed to one or anyothernumber.Heexplains this problem away by employing the Avicebro- nian notion of the binarium famosissimum.¹⁸ The precept at hand,positing thatfrom the first unifiedprinciple, two further principles emerge—those of form and matter— is critical for the understanding of IbnGabirol’smetaphysical undertaking.Itentails Gabirolean hylomorphism, inferring acompositeofaspiritual Materialprinzip (materia spiritualis/universalis)with auniversal form (forma universalis)underlying all levels of the created realm.¹⁹ As Jacques Schlanger contends, this notion addresses the chief systematic objective of Gabirolean philosophy, reconciling the oneness of the Creator and the multiplicity of His created beings.²⁰ Prior to quoting from Fons vitae,Eckhart seems to reiterate this Gabirolean notion, asserting that everything emanating from the One, it being the origin of the universe, must directlyfall into the rank of the Two. If one keeps in mind Albertus Magnus’sexplicit Aristotelianrebuttal of this particularAvicebronian proposition, then Eckhart’sacceptance thereof becomes even clearer.Inthe first book of his commentary on Liber de causis,apseu- do-Aristotelian paraphrase of Proclus’s Elementatio theologica,²¹ Albertsingles out this one tenet as the most problematic element underlying Avicebron’sphilosophy.²² Following his endorsement of this metaphysical view,Eckhart then quotes apas- sagefrom the fifth chapter of Fons vitae (section 24), asection of which he seems particularlyfond, citing it on threedifferent occasions. In this passage, which resembles a Präpositionsmetaphysik,²³ IbnGabirollaysout his Neoplatonic outlook in an

 See Paul V. Spade, “Binarium Famosissimum,” in TheStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. EdwardN.Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/bina rium/; Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’sTheology of Desire,186–88;McGinn, “IbnGabirol: The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 86–87,96–97.  Fordetailed explanations of Gabirolean hylomorphism, see Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’sTheology of De- sire,66–90,106–12, 165–88;Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,177–218; Nicola Pollo- ni, “Toledan Ontologies:Gundissalinus, IbnDaud, and the Problems of GabirolianHylomorphism,” in Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical and Theological Exchanges Between the Arabic, Hebrewand Latin Intellectual Traditions,ed. Alexander Fidora and Nicola Polloni (Barcelona: FIDEM, 2017), 19–49.For an analysis of Albertus Magnus’scritique of this specific metaphysical tenet of Avicebronian philosophy, see McGinn, “Ibn Gabirol: The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 97.  Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,135.  Cf. Yossef Schwartz, “Die Rezeption philosophischer Schriften ausdem Judentum,” in Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters IV:13. Jahrhundert,ed. Peter Schulth- ess and Christoph Flüeler (Basel: SchwabeVerlag 2017), 1:206–16.  Albertus Magnus, Buch über die Ursachen und den Hervorgang von allem aus der ersten Ursache: Liber de causis et processu universitatis aprima causa,ed. and trans. HenrykAnzulewicz, Maria Bur- ger, Silvia Donati, Ruth Meyer,and Hannes Möhle (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,2006), 46.See Kurt Flasch, Meister Eckhart. Die Geburt der “Deutschen Mystik” aus dem Geist der arabischenPhilosophie, 2nd ed. (Munich: Beck, 2008), 82–83.  See, for example, Philo’s Cher. 125–27.For afurther examinationofPräpositionsmetaphysik in relation to Philo and Jewish and Christian sourcesinantiquity,see Gregory E. Sterling, “Prepositional Meister EckhartReading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 71

interrogative fashion, supplying the answers through the order of the first four natural numbers. These in turn epitomise the four respective metaphysical principles and ranks of being(God, intellect,soul, and nature).²⁴ It is still not quite clear how IbnGabirol’sexplanation of the fourfold structure of being aligns with his specific readingofGen 1:1here. However,the previous paragraphs provide an indication. Actually, In Gen.I n. 24–25 is the point of departure for Eckhart’sdrawing on Avicebron. There, he symbolicallyequates the creation of heavenand earth with thatofform and matter,arguing that the latter pairalso came into being simultaneously. Eckhart then goes on to ascribeactivity to form and, accordingly, passivity to matter,the first inhabitingthe higher realm, the latter the lower one.²⁵ This maybethe point that Eckhart aims to highlight: IbnGabirol assigns the universalintellect,representing the category of the Two, this specific ontological rank, inasmuchasits innate structure comprises of genus and differentia, both fundamental categoriesdenoting form and matter,²⁶ which in turn make up its being.²⁷ Moreover,one need look no further thanthe concluding remark of section 23 in chapter 5ofFons vitae in order to observe that IbnGabirol’sframework is almost identical to Eckhart’s. In it,the magister sets out to answer the basic question as to whymatter and form come into being,the answer supplying the ground- work for the subsequent discussion in the following section (24).²⁸ The passageat hand depicting God’sproductive essence as the One from which the twofold reality comprised of matter and form emergesisquite revealing,inasmuchasitseems to

MetaphysicsinJewish Wisdom Speculationand EarlyChristological Hymns,” Studia Philonica Annual 9(1997): 219–38. As Altmann and Stern note,asimilar presentation is alreadypresent in Isaac Isra- eli’s Book of Definitions,inIsaac Israeli. ANeoplatonic Philosopher of the Early TenthCentury,trans. Alexander Altmann and Salomon M. Stern (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2009), 23.See also Pseudo-Aristotle, TheTheology of Aristotle,5:30–52, trans. Geoffrey Lewis,in, Plotini Opera. Tomus II: Enneades IV–V,ed. Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer and Paul Henry (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1977), 437–39 (henceforth ThA). Cf. Schlanger, The Philosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,87–89,98.  FV 5:24 [301.20–302.1, 302.10–14]. Forthe English translation, see Solomon ibn Gabirol (Avice- bron), TheFontofLife (Fons Vitae),trans. John A. Laumakis (Milwaukee: MarquetteUniversity Press, 2014), 270(henceforth FL). In chapter1ofFons vitae (section 16 [20.15–17]), IbnGabirol also discusses matter and form in relation to both the heavenlyrealm and the earthlyone, though he rather contends that their mergencetakesplaceinboth ontological realms.For further similar depictions in Fons vitae,see FV 4:11 and 4:13.For Ibn Gabirol’sNeoplatonic theory of creation, see Yossef Schwartz, “Salomon IbnGabirol: Zwischen Schöpfungsmythologie und Geheimnisder Einheit,” in Platonismus im Orient und Okzident: Neuplatonische Denkstrukturen im Judentum, Christentum und Islam,ed. Raif G. Khoury,Jens Halfwassen, and Frederek Musall (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Win- ter, 2005), 144–59;Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,229–42.  LW 1, 204.1–16.See BurkhardMojsisch, Meister Eckhart: Analogy,Univocityand Unity,trans. Orrin F. Summerell (Amsterdam:B.R.Grüner,2001), 70–71,105.  Forthe definitions of universal matter and form, see FV 1:10 [13.23–14.5], 1:13 [16.9–13].  See, for example, FV 3:41 [172.10–20]; 4:6[223.17–224.1] 5:12 [279.6–19]. Forthe unifyingand dynamic featureofthe divine Will in relation to universal matter and form, see FV 2:13 [46.2–12].  FV 5:23 [300.14–26]. 72 Ze’ev Strauss

constituteagreat deal of Eckhart’smetaphysical understanding and approach to Gen 1:1inIn Gen.I n. 24–28.Ibn Gabirol’spassagereads as follows:

S. Whydid matter and form exist? T. Because of the first essenceand its property.Moreover,two was placed under the One, and they arethe expressions of it,and if what was created wereone, there would be no difference here, because differenceisfound onlyunder the One. Moreover,because non-beingdoes not have form, it is necessary that beinghas form. Moreover,sincebeingneeded to be finiteinitself, it is necessary that it should be made finitebyform, because aform is what encompasses a thing. Moreover,sincethe first actingunity does not have hyle,itisnecessary that the unity that follows this one should consist of hyle. Hence,itreceivesunity and is made two,that is, subjected hyle and sustained unity.Moreover,sincethe first unity is aself-sufficient agent,it is necessary that the unity that follows it needs what sustains it.Hence,there must by hyle herethat sustains it,and consequently, twocome to be (FV 5:23 [300.14–26]).²⁹

The wayinwhich Eckhart characterises matter and form, the two building blocks of reality,inthis context also bears aresemblancetoIbn Gabirol’sconceptualisation thereof: (1) LikeIbn Gabirol,³⁰ Eckhart posits the passivity of matter³¹ and the activity of form. (2)Eckhart infers the ontologicalpriorityofform over matter in amanner similar to descriptions found in Fons vitae.³² While IbnGabirol usuallyportrays form as occupyingthe higher noetic realm, in his empirical diversification, he often relegates matter to the lowest ontological level.³³ (3) Eckhart’semphasis laid on the creatio simultanea of matter and form is afeature that conforms well to Avi- cebronian thought. On numerous occasions,Ibn Gabirol underpins the fact that God is abovetime and eternity and thereforethatHis creative activity is not constrained to the realm of time. (4) Eckhart’sspecific terminologyused to account for worldly divisibilityinlight of the indivisibility of God’sunity by means of numerologicalar- gumentationisreminiscent of Gabirolean thought. Following his quotation of Avice- bron, Eckhart links the “root of division of all things” (radix omnis divisionis)tothe

 FL 239(emphasis in original).  See, for example, FV 2:9[40.6–27].  See Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 149.  See, for example,FV2:9 [40.6–27], 4:11 [236.5–237.17]. Forananalysisofthis Gabirolean theme, see Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,161;McGinn, “IbnGabirol: The Sageamong the Schoolmen,” 87–89.  The critical edition of Eckhart’sLWalludes to the overlap of features (1) and (2) in In Gen.I n. 32 [LW1,210.3–4n.1](“Inferiora autempassiva sunt,informia et nuda”). Twopassages from Fons vitae arequoted in this respect: FV 3:3[81.17] (“Omne quod est,quantosuperius est,tantoformae similius est”)and 5:42 [335.9–11] (“Forma unenit asuperiore, et materia eam recipit ab inferiore, quia materia est subiecta, per hoc quod habeesse sub forma, et forma est sustentata super eam”). The additional notion herethat is similar to Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae is that the ideas perfect matter: “perficereessen- tiam illius in quo est” (FV 1:13 [16.10–11]; emphasis in original; cf. also FV 1:13 [16,17], 2:10 [60.28– 61.3], 3:36 [161.20–162.1], 4:10 [233.17–19]). Foradetailed presentation of the ontological differencebetween matter and form in Gabirolean philosophy, see Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Ga- birol,141–46. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 73

concept of the first even naturalnumber,the Two,³⁴ and the notionofstrict indivisibility to the first uneven natural number,the One.³⁵ In Fons vitae,one encounters various such lines of argumentation using similar jargon.³⁶ Eckhart’swording in this respect,speakingofthe Two—that is, matter and form—in terms of radixomnis divisionis alsostands out.Inakey section (11) of chapter 4ofFons vitae,Ibn Gabirol specificallydescribes matter as epitomising the nature of the Twoand as being,by virtue thereof, the root of all divisibility.Accordingly, he renders matter together with form—with both of them together conformingtothe nature of the uneven number three—the ultimate radixomnium.³⁷ Interestingly,the critical edition of Eckhart’s works does not allude to the possiblecorrelation here, but to asimilar correlation in In Gen.I n. 88 [LW1,246.6–7]. In this section, Eckhart attempts to explain why in Gen 1:8b, the second dayofcreation does not end with God’sotherwise usual con- cludingproclamation that it was good. In order to account for this exegetical difficulty,Eckhart once again reverts to the metaphysical idea thatthe Twoisthe root of all division(“binaries radix est et origoomnis divisionis”), claiming that in this instance, division embodies evil.³⁸ Eckhart concludes his ontological view on the subject with the assertion that the Twoand division are always afalling from being.³⁹ At this thematic conjuncture and against this backdrop, another remark in the critical edition of Eckhart’sLWconcerning his reading of Gen 1:2(“tenebrae errant super faciem abyssi”)attracts our attention. In In Gen.I n. 36,Eckhart explicates the ontological potentiality (potentia)ofmatterinterms of being lacking in form (“privatio formae”).⁴⁰ As Konrad Weiss suggests,⁴¹ this depiction closelyresembles asection from chapter 5ofFons vitae:

Consider the privation of matter to be likethe darkness of air,and consider form in it to be like light.And consider dark air as havingbeinginitself and as havingthe beingoflight in potency when it lacks light.Similarly, consider that matter has beinginitself and has beinginpotency when it lacks form, and that beingisproduced from the joiningofmatter and form.⁴²

 Cf. In Gen.I n. 88 [LW1,246.6–7].  In Gen.I n. 28 [LW1,205.16–206.4].  See, for example, FV 4:14 [242.8–24].  FL 203: “Moreover,inits first division, matter is divided into two parts according to the nature of two,namely, into the matter of the simple substances and into the matter of compositesubstances. The property of two, therefore,also belongs to it in this way.–Therefore, it is now clear to youthat form is likened to one and matter to two.And sincethis is so and matter and form arethe root of all things, it is, therefore,clear that threeisthe root of all things[et materia et forma sunt radix omnium: ergomanifestum est quod tria suntradix omnium]” (FV 4:11 [237.9–17]). See McGinn, “IbnGabir- ol: The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 79.  The editors provide the followingpassagefrom Fons vitae: FV 5:11 [236.18–237.9].  In Gen.I n. 90 [LW1,248.15–16].  In Gen.I n. 36 [LW1,213.9–10].  LW 1, 213n.3.  FL 226: FV 5:11 [277.5–10]. Weiss specificallyrefers to Fons vitae 5:11 [277.5–9]. Weiss also mentions Eckhart’s In Ioh. n. 440 [LW3,378.5–6] and 492[LW 3, 424.7–11], which appears to echo IbnGabirol’s 74 Ze’ev Strauss

The similarity becomes even more prominent if one accounts for Eckhart’ssymbolic exegesis of the darkness hovering over the abyss.The darkness,asheexplains, is to be understood in terms of deprivation of light,while the abyss manifests the shape- less prima materia.⁴³ If we develop the logical consequence of this Eckhartian depiction further,then light,accordingly, represents form. If our purportedreadingholds true here, then this reveals that the LW aligns Augustine’sview of matter (in book 12 of his Confessions)with the premises of Gabirolean hylomorphism.⁴⁴ In Eckhart’sreadingofGen 1:1inIn Gen.II n. 11,the Gabirolean binarium famosissimum appears to recur.Inthis section, he aims to account for diversity within the created realm by stating that it is in keepingwith the nature of the Two, typified by God’ssimultaneous creation of heavenand earth.⁴⁵ HisNeoplatonicline of thoughtisquite straightforward: while no form of multiplicity can be present within the category of the One, anything that stems from it—hence occupyinganontological realm outside of it—conforms to the category of the Two. In this way, Eckhart clarifies Augustine’sdichotomous view of God’screation of the heavens and the earth in section 7ofbook 12 of his Confessions.⁴⁶ Abrief analysis of section 23 of chapter 5of Fons vitae suffices to discern the parallels it bearswith Eckhart’srendition of the thoughtpattern of binarium famosissimum: “And if what wascreated wereone, there would be no difference here, because differenceisfound onlyunder the One.”⁴⁷ The editors of the LW are correct in drawing support for their purposed linkage of In Gen.II n. 11 to this specific passagefrom Fons vitae by alludingtoIn Ioh. n. 389.⁴⁸ There, within an exegesis of John 4:38,⁴⁹ Eckhart explicitlyrefers to IbnGabirol’sassertion that each differentiation occurs under the One (“omnis differentia sub uno est”)inFons vitae 5:23.⁵⁰ Admittedly, the context in which Eckhart employs this Ga- birolean idea is entirelydifferent.However,more importantly, it uncovers Eckhart’s

attitude towards matter as purepotentiality and as adeficiencyofform. Eckhart’sdepiction of matter’slack of form in terms of athrone (In Ioh. n. 36 [LW1,213.11–12]) in the same paragraph,ameta- phor which can be found in Fons vitae 5:42 [335,22–24], is also striking. See Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,53.  In Gen.I n. 35 [LW1,212.4–5].  Forthe correlation of Augustine (and Boethius) with IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae within HighScho- lasticism, see McGinn, “IbnGabirol:The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 93,95.  In Gen.II n. 11 [LW1,482.8–10].  Augustine, St. Augustine’sConfessions in TwoVolumes,trans. William Watts (London: William Hei- nemann; Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1912), 2:269–71: “Foryou arealmighty and good in makingall things good, the great heavenand the small earth: two entities [duo quaedam], one near to you, the other near to nothing. Youalone would be greater than the one, while nothingwould be lesser than the other.”  FL 239: FV 5:23 [300.14–20].  LW 1, 483n.2.  “Egomisi vosmetere quod vosnon laborastis:alii laboraverunt,etvos in laboreseorum introis- tis.”  In Ioh. n. 389 [LW3,332.11]. Meister EckhartReading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 75

view thereof as atrue metaphysical precept.With the aid of this Avicebronian axiom, he can reinforce, ex negativo,the unification of the faithful manwith God by means of his loveofHim.⁵¹ As Konrad Weiss aptlyobserves, Eckhart appears to resort to an Avicebronian precept at the outset of In Gen.I (n. 12), in afurther metaphysical rationalisation of Gen 1:1, attemptingonce more to explain how multiplicity emergesfrom the One.⁵² Concedingthatfrom the One, nothing other than athing that is one in essence can emerge,Eckhart accounts for the multiplicity of God’screation by putting forward the claim that the universe, notwithstanding God’sostensible plurality of forms, is one in nature.⁵³ He proceeds to applythis contention to God, arguing in analogous terms that God is also purelyone in light of His attributes of being,life, thought, and activity.⁵⁴ Eckhart’sdependence upon Fons vitae at this juncture does not become evident until he makes the metaphysical assertionthat the simpler and moreperfect an existing thing is, the more diverse it is in relation to its powers:

Debet necessario ut omnis causa sit imprimens Ubi notandum primo quod, quantores est perfec- figuras suas et formas in suo causato. et nullum tior in esse et simplicior,tanto copiosior est se- impressum est tale quale id aquo imprimitur in cundum rationes et potentias (In Gen.I n.  fortitudine et perfectione. et substantia simplex [LW , .–]; my emphasis). causa est compositae. ergo debet necessario ut substantia simplex sit plurium figurarum et forma- rum quam substantia composita (FV : [.–.]; my emphasis).

Through this argument,Ibn Gabirolendeavours to show that the substantia simplex, such as the universalintellect thatencompasses all forms,⁵⁵ constitutes astructure of totality which entails all of created reality within it.⁵⁶ However,not onlydoes Eck- hart’sclaim itself bear aresemblancetothe Gabirolean one, but so toodoes the example he adduces for it.Eckhart moves on to contrastthe rational soul with the forms of matter,maintaining that the substance of the soul is more unifiedthan anymaterial form, while its powers are more diverse.⁵⁷ An examination of the next section (23) of Fons vitae’s chapter 3reveals the fact thatIbn Gabirol alleges almost the exactsameexample for his contention.Inconnection with the soul, he also dem-

 Brunner underpins this fact here: “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 146. Cf. Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,108.  LW 1, 196 n. 3. Cf. LW 1, 194.7–8. Palazzo also evaluates this passage’slink to Fons vitae as being one of “the most convincingones amongthose suggestedbythe editors of Eckhart’s Operaomnia” (Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 272n.48).  In Gen.I n. 12 [195.10–196.3].  In Gen.I n. 12 [195.12–196.2].  See Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,194–95.  See, for example,FV2:3 [30.6–20], 3:9 [98.24], 3:22 [131.14–17], 3:23 [132.22–133.6], 3:24 [137. 26–27], 3:32 [153.1–4, 154.15–155.6].  In Gen.I 12 [196.5–8]. 76 Ze’ev Strauss

onstratesthat the spiritual elemental substance (substantia simplex spiritualis)is “better suited for gatheringmanyforms in itself than is acorporeal compositesub- stance.”⁵⁸ If our tracing of Eckhart’scontention to Fons vitae holds true here, then this means that he had aptly grasped Gabirolean thoughtasultimately being ametaphysics of the One. That is to say, Eckhart would thereby be indicating thatinthe final analysis,Avicebron does not subscribe to the precept of the binarium famosissimum,but rather to the notion of the primary unity from which afurther unity emerges, albeit one that is created and ontologicallysubordinatedtothe first.⁵⁹

2The Soul’sIntellectualAscent to the Noetic Realm

Eckhart is by no means exclusively interested in IbnGabirol’sabstract metaphysical premises:heisalso interested in their anthropological framework; in the final goal of the human soul, which is its reunification with its pure counterpart,the higher world.⁶⁰ The following point of interest finds its apt expression in In Gen.II n. 113. In his Philonic readingofGen 2:18 (“Non est bonum hominem esse solum, faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi”)—with man epitomisingthe faculty of reason (intellectus) while his female counterpartepitomises that of sensual perception (sensitivum)⁶¹— Eckhart adduces an idea from the third section of chapter 1ofFons vitae for his exegesis. He specificallyquotes IbnGabirol’scontention “that the perfection of the soul is its knowledge,whereas its imperfection is its ignorance […]. And[…]from its beginning in this world, the soul is changed from ignorancetoknowledge and thus goes forth from potencytoact.”⁶² In fact,this citation seems to constituteanimpor- tant reference point for Eckhart’sclaim that sense perception is indispensable for the initial phases of the intellectual actualisation of the human soul.⁶³ IbnGabirol depicts this intellectual process in Aristotelianterms,asatransition from potentiality to actuality,which in turn means the transition from ignorance to knowledge.How- ever,heplaces this Aristotelian portrayal as part of abroader Neoplatonic theme of the soul’sintellectual ascent to the divine realm.Asthe Andalusian philosopher proclaims from the outset,the subject at hand, providing the answer as to whyGod created man, actuallymarks the focal thread running through the entire metaphysical

 FL 141: FV 3:22 [131.23–24]. See FV 3:23 [132.5–17].  See, for example, FV 2:20 [60.18–62.9], 4:13–14 [238.23–245.4], 5:23 [300.23–26].  See, for example,FV1:2 [4.24–25]. See Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,2–4.  Forthe influence of Philo’sallegorical readingofAdam and Eveonthe Church Fathers,see David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: ASurvey (Assen: VanGorcum; Minneapolis:Fortress Press, 1993), 309,352.  It is noteworthy that in the original text, the passage in question appears in the interrogative form: FL 63 (FV 1:3[5.3–16]).  In Gen.II 113 [LW1,580.5–6]: “Hoc autem fit ministerio sensuum, sensitivi scilicet.” Meister EckhartReading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 77

examination of Fons vitae.⁶⁴ Thus, the critical edition of the LW is correct in noting⁶⁵ that asimilar depiction is found in Eckhart’sallegoricalreadingofthe expression “duae gentes” (Vg. Gen 25:23) in In Gen.II n. 197, by which God alludes to Rebecca’s impendingdelivery of Jacob and Esau.⁶⁶ Drawing upon the invocation of Avicebron in In Gen.II n. 113,the critical edition of the DW notes that Eckhart mayhaveintended to echo this Gabirolean idea once again in his German sermon 102,⁶⁷ claiming “Got hât den menschen gemachet, daz er wizze.”⁶⁸ This appears to be IbnGabirol’sunequivocal answer to the question of whyGod created maninFons vitae 1:3: “It follows that the end and aim of the creation of man is for his conscious knowing to develop from potentiality to actuality.”⁶⁹ Yetitcould also be the case thatEckhart is simplygiving voice to atheological premise prevalent among Dominican circles of his day. However,the clear-cut manner in which Eckhart bringsforth this argument would suggest otherwise,since it seems to be distinctivelyGabirolean. Palazzo rightfullypoints to the thematic correlation between Eckhart’scitation of IbnGabirol in In Gen.II n. 113 and his implicit citations from Fons vitae in sermons 58 (FV 3:56 [204.10–13]) and 75 (FV3:56–57 [204.13–205.18]). All three references to Fons vitae pivotaround IbnGabirol’stheme of the soul’sintellectual ascent to the upper world. Sermon 75 is particularlyinteresting in view of Eckhart’sinvocation of IbnGabirol in his interpretationofJohn 4:38. The theological foundation of this referencewas the attainment of a unio mystica through divine love. In the German sermon at hand, this is whereEckhart’semployment of Fons vitae takes its departure: in order to attainthe perfect loveand subsequentlyunify with God’sbeing, one must first be endowed with the ûfklimmenden geist,through which the individual can spirituallyascend to the Godlyrealm.⁷⁰ Even though IbnGabirol does not directly deal with the theme of the soul’s amorDei in these specific instances,Eckhart was most likelyaware of its significance within the overall framework of the Avicebronian metaphysics of longing. Section 32 of chapter 5ofFons vitae revolves, for example,

 FV 1:1[2.8–10], 1:2[3.30–4.9], 1:3[5.22–25], 2:6[36.6–14]. On Eckhart’sconnection of Avicenna with IbnGabirol at this juncture,see the insightful remarks by Palazzo: “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 276–77.Cf. also Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 141; Schlanger, The Philosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,243–46.  LW 1, 669n.2.  Afterhis interpretation of the duae gentes in Rebecca’swomb as the tworespective tendencies innatetothe human soul, the sensual (Esau) and the rational (Jacob) (In Gen.II 196 [LW1,668.8– 669.11]), Eckhart proceedstopresent them both in terms of knowledge and ignorance(“duae gente in nobis sunt […]scientian et ignorantia”).  DW 4, 420n.31.  DW 4, 420.127.  FL 6[5.22–23].  Cf. Palazzo’sapt description of this passage: “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 277–78.Cf. Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 135–39. 78 Ze’ev Strauss

around the notionofall thingsascendingtowards the goodness of the transcendent One, adrive stemmingfrom theirfundamental desire for unity.⁷¹ However,whereas Eckhart exploits these Avicebronian portrayals to buttress man’sviable epistemological prospect of aspiritual union with God’sbeing,Gabiro- lean philosophycertainlydoes not wish to go this far.Despite the ultimate striving to be at one with God’sprimarybeing that is intrinsic to the human soul, IbnGabirol restricts the pinnacle of its attainable intellectual endeavours to its unification with the noetic realm.⁷² Another noteworthyfeature of this Eckhartian reference to IbnGabirol in the DW is the fact thathealso deems it importanttodisclose the means by which Fons vitae conveys these theoretical notions: through an intellectual instruction between a magister and his discipulus. This mayshow that Eckhart considered the dialogical form of Fons vitae to have aspecial pedagogicalthrust,which proved effective within the framework of the religious instruction in his sermons. Eckhart’sGerman sermon 58 also underpins this hypothesis, for there he quotespassages from Fons vitae in their original literaryform as part of alesson between a meister and his jünger.

3AGabirolean Reading of the Gospel of John’s Metaphysicsofthe Verbum

Eckhart’sinsertion of Avicebron’sphilosophyinto adistinctly Christian theological discourse findsits culminationinhis readingofthe prologueofthe Gospel of John (1:1–2).⁷³ At this thematic juncture, we find aperplexing passageinIn Ioh. n. 47:

From acareful investigationofwhatAugustine said, we can understand what the second book of the Posterior Analytics says: “The questions we ask areequal in number to the things we truly know.” We can ask about things whether they are, what sort they are, what they areand why they are. The four passageswehavehere answerthese in order. “In the beginningwas the Word” givesyou the fact that the thingexists,for he says that it “was.” What sort of thing the Word is, is pointedout in what follows, “and the Word was with God.” This will be made

 FV 5:32 [317.4– 12]. Forfurther analysis of this Gabirolean theme, see Schwartz, “Salomon IbnGa- birol,” 157–59;Warren Zev Harvey, “Filosofía ypoesía en IbnGabirol,” Anuario Filosófico 33,no. 2 (2000): 491–504 (I would liketothank Harvey for givingmethe English translation of this article). Forasystematictreatment of the subject of desireinGabirolean metaphysics, see Pessin, Ibn Gabir- ol’sTheology of Desire,especially15–52, 66–90;Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol, 213–19.  Brunner points to ThA,specifically ThA 1, §§ 21–42 [Enn. 4.8.1], as the possible source at the root of these Gabirolean depictions: “Maître Eckhart et Avicébron,” 138–39.Cf. Schlanger, ThePhilosophyof Solomon Ibn Gabirol,64.  On Eckhart’sintention in his philosophical readingofthe Gospel of John as awhole, see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,166–89. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 79

clear below.What the Word is follows in the text, “the Word was God.” The reason whyisshown when it says, “this Word was in the beginningwith God” (LW3,39.1–8).⁷⁴

On examining the passageinquestion, one might justifiably ask how this even relates to IbnGabirol. On the face of it,Eckhart is merelyciting the openingsentence of book 2ofAristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Yetacloser lookatitexposes—as the critical edition of the LW notes⁷⁵—that in fact,itpartiallyhas its origin in Fons vitae 5:24. The Dominican master begins by simplyciting the opening assertion of An. post. 2.89b23, which reads: “Quaestionessunt aequales numero his, quaecumque vere scimus.”⁷⁶ However,Eckhart proceeds to predicate his detailed presentation of the questions themselvesonFons vitae 5:24 [301.18]:

Est autem quaestio de rebus: an Dico quod esse ab extremosupre- Quaerimusautem quatuor: sint, quales sint, quid sint, et mo usqueadextremuminfimum quia,propter quid,siest, quare (In Ioh. n.  [LW , .]). distinctum estquatuor ordinibus, quid est(An.Post. .b). scilicet an est, quid est, qualeest, quareest (FV : [.–]).

This unexpected use of section 24 of chapter 5ofFons vitae,asection with which Eckhart was very familiar,appears to be anything but coincidental. This passage prompts the following three inferences: (1) The fact that Eckhart drawsupon Ibn Gabirol without explicitlymentioninghim does not diminish IbnGabirol’ssignifi- cance within his bodyofthought. On the contrary, it would rather suggest that the impact of Gabirolean philosophyonEckhart was so profound that he—possibly even unknowingly—uses it to completeAristotelianideas. Bearing such non-explicit invocations in mind, one maybetempted to put forward the claim that Eckhart not onlyread Fons vitae firsthand—as Palazzo convincingly contends⁷⁷—but that he even knew several sections of it by heart.(2) One must also account for the particular context in which Eckhart makes use of Fons vitae: an interpretation of the two opening verses of the prologueofthe Gospel of John, whose sense he aims to uncover by allusion to the sixth chapter of book 8ofAugustine’s On the Trinity (section 10). He then, in turn, goes on to elucidateAugustine’sportrayalofthe soul’sintuitiveinner

 Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons,Commentaries,Treatises,and Defense,138.  See the remark by the editors of the LW: “Quattuor hae quaestionesnon sunt eaedem quas Aris- toteles I. c. enumerate (quaerimus autem quattuor:quia, propterquid, si est,quid est),sed quas Aven- cebrol point, Fons vitae V. c. 24” [emphasis in original]. Cf. Niklaus Largier’sremark, seeminglybased on the verdictofthe critical edition: “532,8 an < … >quare] In den vier Fragen folgt Eckhart,obwohl er sie Aristoteles zuschreibt,nicht diesem, sondern Avencebrol, Fons vitae Vc.24” [emphasis in original] (Meister Eckhart: WerkeII,ed. Niklaus Largier,trans. Josef Quint [Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1993], 866).  Aristotle, PosteriorAnalytics.Topica,trans.HughTredennick and E.S.Forster (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1960), 174–75.  Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 273. 80 Ze’ev Strauss

knowledge of its ownbeing⁷⁸ by making recourse to Aristotle’s An. post. 2.89b23. Eck- hart employs IbnGabirol at apoint intersectingwith the most crucial sources of his Christian philosophy: the prologueoftheGospel of John and the two most cited thinkers in his oeuvre, Augustine and Aristotle. Against this background, Avicebron’s centralitytoEckhart’sthoughtbecomes all the more evident.(3) More importantly, the Dominican appears to apply the four Aristotelian inquiries, in their Gabirolean incarnation, to John 1:1–2inasimilar fashion to Fons vitae 5:24.That is to say, Eckhart adopts this methodfor the purpose of outlining his speculative worldview.Taking his cue from Avicebronian metaphysics,Eckhart implements the Aristotelian questions in his Neoplatonic readingofVg. John 1:1–2: “In principio erat Verbum” provides an answer to the initial question of whether the Word even exists. The subsequent statement “et Verbum erat apud Deum” yields the Word’sessence. The third assertion “et Deus erat Verbum” discloses the inner makeup of the divine Word. The con- cludingformulation “hoc erat in principio apud Deum” reveals the reason for its existence.⁷⁹ Of course, one maydismiss this proposed comparison with IbnGabirol’sphilosophy, arguing that Eckhart’sexegesis here does not exhibit anydistinct Neoplatonic features.Given, however,the broader scope of his understanding of the prologueof the Gospel of John, one mayraise the following threeobjections: (1) Eckhart describes the Word’scominginto being in emanatistic terms, as perpetuallyoverflow- ing from God the Father.⁸⁰ From this perspective,one mayliken this employment of Fons vitae 5:23 to the one in In Gen.I n. 26–28,inasmuchasbothdeal with basic questions emerging from Scripture pertainingtothe creation of the universe.⁸¹ (2)Like IbnGabirol in Fons vitae’s chapter 5, Eckhart,insections 1to51ofIn Ioh., quite often equates the divine Word with the universal intellect.⁸² (3) Although the Dominican applies the four questions exclusively to the Word, he still appears to want to depict adifferent ontologicalstageofits unfolding with each respective an-

 See Augustine, On the Trinity:Books 8–15,ed. Gareth B. Matthews,trans. Stephen McKenna (Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press,2002),16. See Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity, 181.  Cf. Jens Halfwassen, “Ein Meister der Philosophie. Neue Literatur zu Meister Eckhart,” Philosophi- sche Rundschau 58 (2011): 172–73.  In Ioh. nn. 8[LW 3, 8.10–13], 25 [LW3,20.5–6], 27 [LW3,21.28], 35 [LW3,29.6–30.9]56[LW 3, 46.13–47.1], 82 [LW3,70.6–8]. See also In Ioh. nn. 185[LW 3, 154.9–14], 342[LW 3, 291.6–9], 489 [LW3,489.10–12], 546 [LW3,492.9–12]. See Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 145; Flasch, Meis- ter Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,185.  ForEckhart’sstrong correlation of the account of the creation with the prologueofthe Gospel of John, see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,41.  In Ioh. n. 34 [LW3,27.12–28.3]. Forthe Neoplatonic thoughtpattern of the universal intellect in Eckhart’sphilosophy, see Jens Halfwassen, “Gibt es eine Philosophie der Subjektivität im Mittelalter? ZurTheorie des Intellekts bei Meister Eckhart und Dietrich vonFreiberg,” Theologie und Philosophie 72 (1997): 338–60;Halfwassen, “Gott als Intellekt: Eckhart als Denker der Subjektivität,” Meister-Eck- hart-Jahrbuch 5(2011): 13–25. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 81

swer.Taking this view,one mayfurther develop this claim by aligningEckhart’sreading of John 1:1–2with IbnGabirol’sapplication of the four questions to reality’sfour- fold order of beinginFons vitae 5:24:⁸³ ‒ Existence (ei esti/an est): John 1:1a, signifyingthe Word in its original coexistence with God. ‒ [Existence,] quiddity (ti esti/quid est): John 1:1b, signifying the Word’smanifesta- tion as intellect. ‒ [Existence, quiddity,] quality (to hoti [hopoion ti esti]/quale est): John 1:1c, signifying the Word’sembodiment as the soul.⁸⁴ ‒ [Existence, quiddity,quality,] quality (to dioti [ti dia esti]/quare est): John 1:2, signifying the Word’sepitomeofthe physical world.⁸⁵

Even in light of this comparison, the differencebetween Eckhart’sontological scheme and that of IbnGabirol is still substantial and in some aspects simplyirrec- oncilable. In stark contrasttoIbn Gabirol, the sequence of emanation does not actuallyseem to entail a fundamental ontological differencefor Eckhart,but has at its coreGod’sabsolute being.⁸⁶ As Schwartz aptly observes, the Eckhartian “God is simultaneouslythe most transcendent and most immanent entity.”⁸⁷ In In Ioh. nn. 34–35,Eckhart highlights his view of John 1:1–2asphilosophicallymirroring the tenet of HolyTrinity.⁸⁸ Perhaps the fact that IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae appears to coincide with notions present in the prologueofthe GospelofJohn on several central points might have stimulated Eckhart to draw support from it.⁸⁹

 See Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 140, 142.  See Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,246,259.  ForEckhart’sequation of God and the world, see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christi- anity,175,189,243–44.For adetailed discussion of the development of these four Aristotelian inquiries within Islamic and Jewish philosophy, see Altmann and Stern, Isaac Israeli,13–23.  ForEckhart’s “metaphysicsofthe verbum,” see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christian- ity,36–37,70, 89–90,117,169,177–81, 185–87,244,246.  Schwartz, “Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides,” 399.  LW 3, 20–21,28–30.Cf. In Ioh. nn. 38 [LW3,32–33], 45 [LW3,37.13–38.2], 54 [LW3,45.2–7]. See Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,178,201–2, 239.  In section 16 of chapter3of Fons vitae,for example, we read: “This is whythe primaryCreator is said to be present in all existing things,and without him nothing can exist” [et ideo dictum est quod factorprimus est in omnibus quae sunt et nihil sine eo esse potest](FV 3:16 [114.4–6]; my emphasis). This is quitereminiscent of the Vulgate’sLatin translation of John 1:3, which reads: “Omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil.” See also FV 5:39 [327.15–17]. 82 Ze’ev Strauss

4Avicebron’sChain of Being and Jacob’s OntologicalLadder

Concludingtheir reference to Fons vitae 5:24,the editors of the LW call further attention to In Gen.II n. 209,⁹⁰ since Eckhart explicitlyinvokes this specific Avicebroni- an paragraph there. This exegetical reference is particularlyinteresting considering the fact—based on Abraham ibn Ezra’sfragmentary account—that IbnGabirol actually advanced aphilosophical reading of Jacob’svision of the heavenlyladder.⁹¹ In this section, Eckhart offers aphilosophical analysis of Jacob’sladder in Vg.Gen 28:12– 13.⁹² At the outset of his interpretationofthis biblical depiction and prior to his mention of Fons vitae,hedraws on chapter 10 of the second part of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed,using it as the main referencepoint for his entireexegetical discussion.⁹³ Within ageneral metaphysical analysis of the number four,Maimonides then clarifies Jacob’sdream of the heavenlyladder.The category of four is relevant for Maimonides’sunderstandingofJacob’svision, inasmuchasheassumesthat four angels made use of the ladder,two ascendingand two descending.AccordingtoMai- monides, the four angels on the ladder allegoricallycorrespond to the four elements of the sublunar universe: fire and air match the two ascendingangels, while water and earth match the two descending ones.⁹⁴ The manner in which Eckhart goes on to explicate Maimonides’sexplanation of Jacob’sladder is quite surprising.He does not simplysubscribe to Maimonides’sspecific alignment of the four angels to the four empirical elements, but perceivesitasanontological claim markedly wider in scope, reproducingthe fourfold structure of the cosmos.⁹⁵

 LW 3, 39 n. 2.  See Schlanger, ThePhilosophyofSolomon Ibn Gabirol,20. Forfurther analysis of the Gabirolean exegesis of Genesis,see Julius Guttmann, “Zu Gabirols allegorischer Deutungder Erzählung vom Paradies,” Monatsschriftfür Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 80 (1936): 180–84;Sara Klein-Braslavy, “The Philosophical Exegesis,” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: TheHistoryofIts Inter- pretation,ed. Magne Sæbø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,2000), vol. 1, part 2: 304–6.  “Vidit quoque in somnis scalam stantem super terram et cacumen eius tangens caelumetangelos dei ascendentesetdescendentes per eam et dominum innixum scalae” (LW1,667.2–5).  LW 1, 677–79.For acomprehensive and insightfulinterpretation of Eckhart’susage of Maimoni- des’sexegesis of Jacob’sladder,see Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 256–65.  See SaraKlein-Braslavy, “Bible Commentary,” in The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides,ed. KennethSeeskin (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005), 260–61;Schwartz, “To Thee Is Si- lence Praise,” 257; Gad Freudenthal, “Maimonidesonthe Scope of Metaphysics alias Ma’aseh Merka- vah:The Evolution of His Views,” in Maimónides ysuépoca,ed. Carlos del Valle, Santiago Garcia- Jalón, and Juan PedroMonferrer (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales,2007), 224–30.Eckhart is alluding,ofcourse, to this reading: LW 1, 678.14–15 (“quartoelementamundi quattuor”), 681.13–683.11. Forthe other two instances in which Maimonides interprets Jacob’sladder in TheGuide of the Perplexed,see TheGuide of the Perplexed,trans. ShlomoPines,2vols. (Chicago:Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1963), 1:12–13 [part 1, introduction], 1:41 [1:15] (henceforth Guide).  In Gen.II 209[LW 1, 684.1–2]. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 83

This becomes apparent in Eckhart’srecourse to Proclus’s Elementatio theologica, by which he reframes the Maimonidean reading of Gen 28:12–13 in distinctlyNeopla- tonic terms.⁹⁶ Drawing on proposition 20 of Elementatio theologica—which states that “beyond all bodies is the soul’sessence,beyond all souls, the intellective principle; and beyond all intellective substances,the One”⁹⁷—Eckhart makes Maimonides’sAr- istoteleanexplicationofJacob’sladder conform to Proclus’soutlinedstructure of reality in its fourfold hierarchical structure of emanation:(1) the One, (2)the universal intellect,(3) the soul, and (4) the corporeal realm.⁹⁸ The merging of IbnGabirol with Proclus’s Elementatio theologica has aprovocative edge,ifone keeps in mind Albertus Magnus’scritical treatment of Avicebronian philosophyspecificallywithin the context of his commentary on this work in its Latin rendition as Liber de causis.⁹⁹ At this point,seeking to reinforce his own Neoplatonic and dynamic take on the heavenlyladder,Eckhart proceedstocitefrom what appears to be his favourite part of Fons vitae;namely, section 24 of chapter 5. This is the specific section through which he supports his readingofJohn 1:1–2aswell as thatofGen 1:1. Citing almost three entire paragraphs,constitutingtwo successive answers from the magister (!), in which IbnGabirol provides asuccinctaccount of his ontological Weltanschauung (301.16–302.7, 9 – 15), Eckhart bringshis Neoplatonic view of Gen 28:12–13 to its conceptual peak.¹⁰⁰ While one cannot simplyignore the central role of Maimonides here, it does appear that Eckhart adduces him particularlyfor his basic exegetical intuition, through which he is able to discern the ladder’sbasic symbolic meaning as signifyingthe fourfold order of reality.However,toaddress the question of what ultimatelyconsti- tutes each of the respective ontologicalranks, he takes an Avicebronian perspective. The three different layers of philosophical views on the structure of the universe— which, on the face of it,Eckhart seems to conflate¹⁰¹—might entail acertain hierarchical order:having Jewish Aristotelianism (Maimonides) as his starting point,then turning to its logical continuation in the form of pagan Neoplatonism (Proclus), and culminatinginwhat Eckhart thoughttobeChristian Neoplatonism (Avicebron).

 Cf. Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 259.  Proclus, TheElements of Theology,trans. Eric R. Dodds,2nd ed. (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1971), 23.  ForEckhart’sdynamic understanding of the ladder as asymbol of the fourfoldstructureofthe universe, see Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 258, 260.  Nevertheless,asMcGinn observes, Eckhart’sspecific unifyingapproach seems to have become moreprevalent in his time, with thinkers such as Berthold Moosburg(?–after 1361): McGinn, TheMys- tical Thought of Meister Eckhart,173.Cf. Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 139.Onthe possible impact that Proclus’s Elementatio theologica could have exertedonFons vitae,see Schlanger, ThePhi- losophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,68–71;McGinn, “IbnGabirol:The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 79– 80;Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 142–43,145.  Foranaccurateaccount of this reference to IbnGabirol,see also Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 278–79.  Schwartz lays out this insightful perspective:Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 259. 84 Ze’ev Strauss

5Seeing God’sHidden Face through Avicebron’s Negative Theology

As McGinn hints, another,evenmore explicit conflation of Maimonides with IbnGa- birol in Eckhart’sthoughtfinds its expression in his negative theological readingof Exod 33:23b(“faciem meam videre non poteris”).¹⁰² This time, however,Eckhart’sex- egesistakes its departure not from TheGuide of the Perplexed,but rather from Fons vitae:

In Book 1, Chapter4,ofthe Fountain of Life Avicebron asks, “Is thereany waytounderstand the first essence?” His response is that “this is not impossible,but it is not possible in anyway whatever.Itisimpossible to know the first of essences apart from the createdthings that comefrom it; it can be known from its works. […]Headds that [full] knowledge of the essenceofthe First, that is, God’sessence, is impossible, because it is aboveall things,because it is infinite,because it is not likethe intellect,and because the First Essenceand the intellect do not agreeand have a mutual bond.” In Book 1, Chapter 58, Rabbi Moses says, “The sagesagreethat the sciences do not apprehend the Creator; onlyGod himself can grasp his essence.” Nevertheless, Moses knew everythingthat we can know abouthim to the limit of our apprehension. What he knew no one beforeorafter him knew,asRabbi Moses says in the same chapter(In Ex. n. 281[LW 2, 225.5– 226.7]).¹⁰³

In spite of the fact that Eckhart appears to be following Maimonides’smetaphysical illumination of Exod 33:23,hecommences his interpretation by presentingthe chief epistemologicaland ontological premises at the coreofIbn Gabirol’sapophatic the- ologyinits original interrogative form: thatdirectlyapprehending God’sabsolute transcendent being as the first essence (essentiae primae)is, strictlyspeaking, impossible. The sole possible wayofknowing Him—thatis, merelyknowing that He exists— is by meansofmediation; namely, through His created works.¹⁰⁴ Eckhart proceedsto bring forth the four reasons that IbnGabirol subsequentlyprovides which completely rule out human soul’spotential to conceive of God’sprimary essence: (1) God “is aboveall things”;¹⁰⁵ (2)Heisinfinite;¹⁰⁶ (3) God’spurelyunified being is dissimilar in every sense from the universal intellect and its dual structure compounded of matter and form,¹⁰⁷ which is rather analogous to the human intellect;¹⁰⁸ and finally,

 McGinn, TheMystical ThoughtofMeister Eckhart,173.For Eckhart’sprogrammatic exegesis of the book of Exodus, see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,142–54.  Itook this citation fromthe English translation by McGinn: Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preach- er,ed. and trans.BernardMcGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 129 (henceforth LWE).  FV 1:4[6.16–22].  FL 64 [FV 1:5(6.24)].  FV 1:5[6.24].  See, for example, FV 1:7[10.20].For further analysis,see Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’sTheology of Desire, 82–84.  FV 1:5[7.1– 7]. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 85

(4) the primaryessence does not have anyontological point of commonality with the universal intellect.¹⁰⁹ It is important to note that at the coreofall these arguments lies IbnGabirol’shylomorphic hypothesis,from which afundamental division emergesbetween the pure One and the twofold being consistingofuniversal matter and form. Intendingtoreaffirm his Avicebronian reading, Eckhart cites excerptsfrom chapters 54¹¹⁰ and 59¹¹¹ from the first part of TheGuide of the Perplexed,which are broadly congruent with IbnGabirol’snegative theology.¹¹² The basic ideas Eckhart employs here are already, for the most part,present in IbnGabirol’sthought:¹¹³ the human intellect’sabsoluteincapability of apprehending God’sessence, thereby restricting man’sknowledge of God to His attributes of action and the mere fact of His existence.¹¹⁴ Maimonides’srelevance for Eckhart’sexegesis of Exod 33:23 actuallyap- pears to lie not so much in atangible philosophical contribution, but rather in an exegetical one: drawingsupport for his negative theological understanding of Jewish Scripture. Interestingly,atthe same time, Eckhart exploits two elements from Maimo- nides’sexplanations—Moses’sexceptional knowledge of God and God’sapprehen- sion of Himself—to buttress his ownaffirmative theology, which, by supernatural means, permits the human intellect to access God’sbeing.¹¹⁵ Thus, while Eckhart puts forward the tenets of Gabirolean apophatic theologyinstrict terms,hepinpoints the “weak spots” in the Maimonidean ones. IbnGabirol’sspeculative philosophyalso proves significant for Eckhart’sinitial readingofthe analogous depiction of Vg.Exod33:13b (“ostende mihi faciem tuam”) in its peculiarLatin rendition,¹¹⁶ in which Moses asks God to reveal His face. Follow-

 FV 1:5[7. 2– 3]. Palazzo provides the most comprehensive interpretation of this passage: “Eck- hart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 280–81.Cf. also Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 178–79, and Udo Kern, “Gottes Sein ist mein Leben.” PhilosophischeBrocken bei Meister Eckhart (Berlin: De Gruyter,2003), 231–32.  Guide 1:123(givenaschapter53inthe Latin edition).  Guide 1:139 (givenaschapter 58 in the Latin edition).  Foradetailed and profound analysis of Eckhart’suse of Maimonidean apophatic theology here, see Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 177–79;Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity, 247.  Foramorethoroughexamination of IbnGabirol’sapophatic theology,see Schlanger, ThePhi- losophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,98, 220–22;Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’sTheology of Desire,118–39.For Ibn Gabirol’snegative theology,see, for example,FV2:20[61.3–8], 3:3[78.24–79.1]: 3:5[88.18–25], 3:6 [91.7–29], 3:7[92.9–10], 3:8[93.19–28], esp. 3:11 [103.21–104.17], 3:15 [109.22–27], 3:56 [204.13–205.7].  This is the limited knowledge of God that Maimonidesascribes to Moses in the context of the passage cited from chapter 54 of book 1ofthe Guide: “The answer to the tworequests that He, mayHebeexalted, gave him consisted in His promisinghim to let him know all His attributes, making it known to him that they areHis actions,and teaching him that His essencecannot be grasped as it reallyis”(Guide 1:123).  LW 2, 225.13–226.7. Cf. Kern, “Gottes Sein ist mein Leben,” 232–33;Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 179.  The original Hebrew reads: hodiʿeni naʾ et derakhekha. 86 Ze’ev Strauss

ing citations from Augustine’s On the Trinity and Confessions, he goes on to quotethe concluding section of Fons vitae:¹¹⁷ “S: What will help attain this noble hope [sc. the avoidance of death and union with the origin of life]? T: To be separated first from sensiblethings, to be poured out in intelligible thingsbythe mind, and to be com- pletelysuspended from the giverofgoodness.”¹¹⁸ In the cited passage, IbnGabirol—with an allusion to Ps 36:10—delineates his conception of man’saspiration to apprehend God in Neoplatonic terms: as the as- cendanceofthe human soul to the transcendent Good and the sourceoflife for the purpose of unification, thus triumphing over death and attaining salvation. This invocation of Fons vitae implies that Eckhart—similar to his understanding of Maimonides—ultimatelyconstrues IbnGabirol’smetaphysics as resortingtocata- phatic theology. As Palazzo conciselypoints out,this specific employmentshares athematic feature common to several of the other Eckhartian references to Avice- bron: “The teachingonintellectual perfection is one of the main focuses of Eckhart’s readingofthe Fons vitae.”¹¹⁹ In his employment of Fons vitae,Eckhart,asPalazzo claims, “is inclined to emphasize […]the existential dimension in the process of achieving intellectual perfection.”¹²⁰ The aligning of Avicebronian and Maimonidean negative theologyis, however, even more far-reaching. In fact,alreadyinEckhart’s In Ex. n. 58, as part of alengthy philosophical elucidation of one of the opening lines of the Songofthe Sea (Vg. Exod 15:3b: “Omnipotens nomen eius”; YHWH iš milḥamah YHWH šemo in the original He- brew), he resorts to IbnGabirol and Maimonides.¹²¹ The discussion at hand revolves around his understanding of the Vulgate formulation “Omnipotens nomen eius” (“Almighty is his name”), which he explicates by recourse to thoughtpatterns that are pivotal to negative theology. The main thread of his exegesis lies in the assumption that the omnipotence of God’sname insinuates that Hisessence is inexpressible in terms of discursive thought.¹²² This, in turn, implies God’sabsolutetranscendence and pure unity,which, strictlyspeaking,does not entail multiplicity in anyform:

The distinction which the term “all” implies is indeed guilt,fault,and defect in existenceand unity.Everythingthat exists is either aboveall and abovenumber,orisnumbered amongall things.But aboveall and outside number thereisonlythe One. No differenceatall is or can be in the One, but “All differenceisbelow the One,” as it says in the Fountain of Life,Book

 Eckhart actuallystates that the source of this quotation is book 3ofFons vitae. Cf. Palazzo, “Eck- hart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 273n.51.  FL 261(FV 5:43 [338.22–27]).  Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 280.  Palazzo, 280. Cf. Schwartz, “Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides,” 409–12; Brunner, “Maître Eckhart et Avicébron,” 150–51.  Brunner,143.  See, for example, In Ex. n. 35 [LW2,41.6–15,42.1–5] and 57 [LW2,63.7–13]. Foradetailed and profound analysis of the influence of MaimonidesonEckhart in relation to speakingornamingGod, see Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 201–37. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 87

5. “That is trulyone in which thereisnonumber,” as Boethiussays. And Rabbi Moses, as mentioned above, says that God is one “in all ways and according to every respect,” so that any “multiplicity either in intellect or in reality,” is not found in him. Anyone whobeholds [the number] twoorwho beholds distinction does not behold God, for God is one, outside and beyond number,and is not countedwith anything(In Ex. n. 58 [LW2,64.10–65.6]).¹²³

In this citation, Eckhart addresses the question of whether ascribingpositive attributes to God is merelyamedium through which the human intellect is able to con- strue God’sentity in terms that are more concrete.¹²⁴ Eckhart’sresponse is decisive: God’sessence is inconceivable by means of His primary determinations—such as wisdom, power,and goodness¹²⁵—for His pure unifiedbeing transcends all these conceptual differentiations.Itisatthis thematic juncturethatEckhart invokes Ibn Gabirol, Maimonides, and Boethius in order to strengthenhis negative theological viewpoint. As in In Ioh. n. 389,¹²⁶ here too, Eckhart refers to the Gabirolean premise from section 23 of Fons vitae’s chapter 5[300.16–17], which situates the category of “difference[…]belowthe One” (“differentia non est nisi sub uno”).¹²⁷ He then proceeds to quote chapter 51 of the first book of TheGuide of the Perplexed,inwhich Maimonides claims thatinGod’sstrict oneness,no“multiplicity either in the thing as it is outside of the mind or as it is in the mind” can be present.¹²⁸ Eckhart’scor- relation of IbnGabirol and Maimonides,both in general and in this specific passage, caught the attention of Bernard McGinn. In his monograph on Meister Eckhart entitled TheMystical Thought:The Man from Whom God Hid Nothing,hestatesthat “Eck- hart cited Gabirol in his Latin works mostlyfor the Jewish philosopher’semphasis on God as AbsoluteUnity,” while stressing that “it is interesting to see him combining Maimonides and Gabirol with the Christian witness of Boethius to proof-text his teachingonGod’soneness.”¹²⁹ Afurther examination of Eckhart’sown line of reasoning—laid out prior to his invocation of these three authoritative sources—prompts the conjecturethat it echoes distinct Gabirolean views. Even the editors of the LW have partiallyrecognised this fact,inasmuchasthey suggest that Eckhart’sassertion regardingthe numerical order

 LWE63(emphasisinoriginal). Cf. In Ex. n. 90 (“In uno autemnon est maius autminus.Omnis enim ‘differentia sub uno’ est,utsupra, dictum est”). Forfurther analysisofthis Eckhartian theme, see Mojsisch, Meister Eckhart: Analogy,Univocity and Unity,98–99;Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philoso- pher of Christianity,138–39.  In Ex. n. 58 [LW2,63.14–64.1].  Foradetailed accountofEckhart’sprimary determinations (Erstbestimmungen), see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,77–85.  Cf. LW 2, 64 n. 3.  Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 142–43.  Guide 1:113.  McGinn, TheMystical Thought of Meister Eckhart,172–73.Cf. Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,200–202, 244–46,268–69,276. 88 Ze’ev Strauss

of being falling under the ultimateOne stems from Fons vitae 4:13 (239.12–17). By comparing both passages, theirsimilarities come effectively to the fore:

Creatures, by the fact that they are from the One And it seems to me that the substances that are but below the One, necessarily fall into number, ordered below the intelligenceare ordered be- plurality,distinction,guilt,and fault, acondition cause of the order of numbers, since they fall by which they are numbered among all the things under one. […]Ingeneral, when youconsider all that are. That which commits an offense in the the thingsthat exist,you will find them ordered One and against the One incurs the guilt of dis- and constituted accordingtothe nature of num- tinction and falls into the all [et per creaturas, ber, and you will find all things falling under the ubi necessario hoc ipso quod ab uno quidem, form of the intelligence, which is unity,for the rea- sed sub uno sunt,incidunt in numerum multitu- son that everynumber falls under one. Because of dinem et distinctionem et reatumseu maculam, this, the form of the intelligenceand its essence quo interomnia numerantur.Quod enim in uno gathereverythingand comprehend everything et unum offendit cadens ab uno,incidit reatum [et omnimo cum consideraueris omnia ea quae distinctionis et cadit interomnia] (In Ex. n.  sunt,invenies ea ordinata et constituta secundum [LW , .–]; my emphasis).¹³⁰ naturam numeri,etinvenies omnia cadentia infra formam intelligentiae, quae est unitas,ideo quia omnis numerus cadit sub uno;etpropterhoc forma intelligentiae et eius essentia est collectiva omnis rei et comprehendens omne] (FV : [.–]; my emphasis).¹³¹

In fact,Eckhart’sidentification of the category of the true One as being abovethe concept of number is not what renders this parallel so special.¹³² Rather,itisthe logical development of this view,which claims that createdreality rests on afixed numerical structure. Similarly, Eckhart’ssubsequent exegetical analysis of the concept of omnia from Vg.Jas 2:10¹³³ appears to be illuminated in terms of this Avicebronian division, differentiatingbetween apurelyunified totality that transcends number altogether and atotality confined to numerical order: “Everything that exists is either aboveall and abovenumber,orisnumbered among all things. But aboveall and outside number there is onlythe One.”¹³⁴

 LWE63.  FL 204.  Cf. In Eccli. n. 149[LW 2, 487. 2– 5].  “Quicumqueautemtotam legem servaverit offendat auteminuno factus est omnium reus” (my emphasis).  LW 2, 64.10–11 [LWE 63]. Another thematic juncture in Eckhart’s CommentaryonExodus,in which he philosophicallyexpounds on one of the divine names,isIn Ex. n. 18. In this section, Eckhart seeminglyapplies the four Aristotelian forms of inquiries frombook 2ofAn. post. to God’srevealed name in Vg.Exod3:14a (“Egosum qui sum”). However,asthe editors of the LW point out (LW2,24 n. 2),Eckhart—whosees adirect conceptual link between this biblical verse and John 1:1–3(In Ex. n. 15 [LW2,20.11–12], 16 [LW2,22.7–9])—appliesthese questions to God as the absolute beingina similar fashion to Fons vitae 5:24.LikeIbn Gabirol,hetoo essentiallyasserts that it onlymakes sense to applythe question “whether” to God: “But in God where ‘that-it-is’ is the ‘what-it-is’ itself, afittinganswer to someone askingwho or what is God is ‘God is,’ for God’sexistenceishis ‘what-it- Meister EckhartReading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 89

6The Absolute TranscendenceofGod’sUniversal Form

Eckhart’sinvocation of Avicebron in section 9ofhis commentary on the Wisdomof Sirach is also revealing.Inhis speculative readingofSir 24:23, he exhibits his particular appreciation of IbnGabirol’sinsight into concepts relatingtothe transcendent realm. Here, Eckhart bringsupAvicebron within acontext that is pivotal to his un- derstandingofwhat constitutes Godlywisdom:

To the realm of the purity of substancebelongs the meaningofthe [personal] pronoun “I.” This is the initial thingwhich is soughtafter in the beloved; that is, purity without anyadmixture. This [purity] trulypertains to Divine wisdom. Forthis reason, the author of Fons vitae contends the followingabout God, the transcendent and Holy, in book 5: “[Heisthe] substanceconstitut- ing the existenceofall forms;the perfect wisdom and purest illumination” (In Eccli. n. 9[LW 2, 238.7–12]; my translation).

As Joseph Koch notes in the critical edition of the LW,inthe original passageinFons vitae 5:22 [298.17–21], IbnGabirol is in fact not depicting God, but rather the universal form.¹³⁵ In spite of this blatant misrepresentation of IbnGabirol’sphilosophical intent,itassistsusinunearthing Eckhart’sprogrammatic picture of Avicebron: prob- ablyregardinghim as neither aJewish nor aMuslim thinker,but as aChristian Pla- tonist writing in Arabic. The identification of Avicebron’sNeoplatonic conceptualisation of wisdom as the totality of forms with his own notion of intellect entailing the world of ideas¹³⁶ could have enticedEckhart to misconstrue IbnGabirol as a Christian Platonist positing aconsubstantial worldview,which puts the intellect as the divine Word and wisdomonthe sameontological level as God.¹³⁷ Following Brunner,¹³⁸ Palazzo is right to suggest that “the very combination of the notions of

is.’ He says, ‘Iamwho am’” (LW2,24.5–7[LWE47]). Drawing on these Aristoteliantypes of questions, IbnGabirol prompts the conclusionthat God’smere existenceisthe onlyfact that human knowledge can infer regarding Him (FV 5:24 [301.18–302.1]). ForSchwartz’sextensive treatment of Eckhart’s drawing on the Maimonidean explication of the divine name in Exod 3:14,see Schwartz, “To Thee Is Silence Praise,” 229–37;Schwartz, “Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides,” 401–8. Cf. also Brun- ner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 144. On Eckhart’sequation of God with the category of being, see Mojsisch, Meister Eckhart: Analogy,Univocity and Unity,51–65;RobertoVinco, “Meister Eckhart’sNon- standardNatural Theology,” Neue Zeitschrift fürSystematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 58, no. 4(2016): 485–89;Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,138, 143–51.  LW 2, 238n.6.Cf. Brunner, “Maître Eckhart et Avicébron,” 144, and Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 275.  See, for example, In Eccli. n. 10 [LW2,240.3–7].  Cf. Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 144–45.  Brunner,144. 90 Ze’ev Strauss

purity and wisdom in the passages of the Fons vitae would have led Eckhart to single out and apply them, in contrast with their original meaning, to God.”¹³⁹ While this assertion is in itself true, one must also account for the wider framework in which Eckhart puts this Gabirolean notion to use. The specific paragraph takes its thematic and exegetical departure from John 1:1, to which Eckhart alludes for the sake of underpinning the human aspiration to grasp God the Father as the ultimateorigin.¹⁴⁰ Here, Eckhart explicates the opening verse of the prologueof the GospelofJohn through the complementary relationship between thought and its discursive expression by means of uttered words.¹⁴¹ Eckhart alsoreads this Avice- bronian passageinanalogous terms: as acreative divine wisdom, which is purely one and from which the noetic world emanates.Heseemingly conflates the universal form with the universalintellect as the totality of forms¹⁴² and then movesonto equate the universal intellect with God. Examining subsequent sections from chapter 5ofFons vitae,one actuallyencounters similar depictions of the universal intellect.InFons vitae 5:30,for example, IbnGabirol portrays the universal intellect as the divine verbum,which he identifies with the noetic light which establishes forms.¹⁴³ At the outset of the concluding section of Fons vitae,Ibn Gabirol likens God’sdivine creation to the utterance of aword.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, his distinct tendencytoportraythe universal intellect in analogous terms to his description of God in chapter 5may also have facilitated Eckhart’smisinterpretation of Fons vitae 5:22 [298.17–21]. In chapters 38 and 39 of Fons vitae,Ibn Gabirol asserts that the divine Will is indescriba- ble,¹⁴⁵ abovethe categories of movement and time,¹⁴⁶ omnipresent,and that “nothing existsapart from it inasmuchasthe existenceand constitution of all things depends on it.”¹⁴⁷

 Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 275.  Eckhart proceedstocite John 14:8: “Domine, ostendenobis Patrem, et sufficit nobis.”  LW 2, 237.11: “Verbum enim ad notitiam et intellectum pertinent.” Cf. In Eccli. n. 12 [LW2,241.8– 242.8].  See, for example, FV 3:32 [153.1–4]. Forthe Gabirolean conflation of the divine Will with the universal form, see Schlanger, ThePhilosophyofSolomon Ibn Gabirol,195–97.  313.15–17.Cf. FV 4:20 [254.19–24], 3:53 [196.24–197.15].  Forfurther analysis of this Gabirolean depiction, see Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,32, 48, 53,230–32;McGinn, “IbnGabirol: The Sageamong the Schoolmen,” 90–92.  FV 5:38 [326.3].  FV 5:39 [328.11–13]; also FV 3:57 [205.23–206.5]. See Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,166.  FV 5:39 [327.14–17]. ForIbn Gabirol’sportrayals of the divine Will in transcendent terms,see Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,172, 223–28. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 91

7Platonising Avicebronian Hylomorphism

One of the unifying features of Eckhart’semployment of Fons vitae in his Commen- taryonthe GospelofJohn is IbnGabirol’suniversal hylomorphism. In his reading of three different verses—Vg.John 1:48, 8:34,and 14:8—this Avicebronian doctrine, which claims that all levels of the cosmos consist of the universalprinciples of matter and form, is brought to the fore. Aiming to establish that the divine omniscience and providenceallegedlypur- ported in Vg.John 1:48¹⁴⁸ match up with accepted philosophical tenets,¹⁴⁹ Eckhart turns to draw support from this Avicebronian worldview.The primary notion that Eckhart has in mind here appears to be aPlatonic one; namely,the demiurge’sgoodness as the impetus for his creation of the cosmos (Ti. 29e1).¹⁵⁰ Through Plato’scos- mologic concept of the demiurge,Eckhart is able to substantiateone of his initial assertions regarding Vg.John 1:48:byvirtue of his artistic skill, the artificer sees the piece of art prior to his production of it.¹⁵¹ After twocitations from Avicenna,¹⁵² he movesontoquote two interrelated passages from chapter 3ofFons vitae,towards which he—as Palazzo notes—particularlygravitated:¹⁵³

Hence,itisnecessary that form give itself and its own form to what is preparedtoreceive it.This is amoreevident sign that form proceeded from the first maker and is obedient to him, because it is compelled in its own naturetogiveitself and to confer its own form, when it finds matter receptive of it.Moreover,because therewas afirst makingand, similarly, afirst action, it was necessary that this makingand this action penetrated through everythinguntil therewas a lack of somethingable to receive them (FV 3:14 [108.19–20,108.23–109.3]).¹⁵⁴

It might not immediatelystand to reason whyEckhart continues his citation of Avi- cenna’s Metaphysics with these specific passages from chapter 3ofFons vitae. Eck- hart seems to place both the Avicennianand the Avicebronian descriptions within

 “Priusquam te Philippus vocaret cum esses sub ficu vidi te.”  In Ioh. n. 251[LW 3, 209.11–12].  In Ioh. n. 262[LW 3, 217.6 – 7].  In Ioh. n. 255[LW 3, 212.3–4]. Forfurther analysis, see Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,182–83.  ForEckhart’slinkageofAvicenna and Avicebron in the contextofthe passage at hand, see Pal- azzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 276. Cf. Yossef Schwartz, “Thirteenth CenturyHebrew Psychological Discussion: The Role of Latin Sources in the Formation of HebrewAristotelianism,” in TheLetter Beforethe Spirit: TheImportance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle, ed. AafkeM.I. van Oppenraayand Resianne Fontaine (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 175–78,190 (“As claimed above, aclose readingofGundissalinus’ Tractatus de anima reveals aunique Latin mixtureofAvi- cenna with Gabirol,creating aform of ‘Gabirolian Avicennism.’ The ‘Jewish,’ Gabirolian part of this synthesisdoes not disturb the earlytranslatorofTractatus de anima but is absolutelyneglected by Gershom and Hillel, who systematicallyignore the Gabirolian themes and terminology”).  Schwartz, “Thirteenth Century Hebrew Psychological Discussion,” 276n.60.  FL 128. 92 Ze’ev Strauss

the cosmologic account of Plato’s Timaeus.¹⁵⁵ Both philosophersadvance asimilar Neoplatonicoutlook towards God and His creation: in His overflowing goodness and pure actuality as the first cause, God bringsthe world into existenceand makes it complywith His divine will.¹⁵⁶ While Eckhart,like Avicenna, stresses the goodness of creation resulting from God’sown overflowinggoodness, he analogously shows through Avicebron how the universal form, by directlyimitating God’s pure active power,enforces itself upon its receptive counterpart,the materia spiritualis.¹⁵⁷ The closing remark of this paragraph also provides afurther indication as to what Eckhart has in mind when quoting Avicebron here: “Doctores etiam dicunt quod angeli superiores illuminant inferiores naturaliter de omnibus quae nover- unt.”¹⁵⁸ The overlappingcharacteristic between Avicebronianand Christian teaching is that God endows His pure intelligible substances (universal form/high angels) with knowledge,which they then conveyand applyonwardstolower ontological realms (matter/lower angels).¹⁵⁹ Eckhart’sexegetical observations regarding Vg.John 8:34b (“omnis qui facit pec- catum, servus est peccati”)inIn Ioh. n. 463alsocentre on Avicebronian hylomorphism.Infact,itserves as an important philosophical reference point for his entire readingofthis verse. Through IbnGabirol’s Fons vitae 3:14,Eckhart substantiates

 It is not surprisingthat Eckhart links Avicebron to cosmologic notions from Platonic philosophy, sincePlato is theonlyphilosopherreferred to in Fons vitae (FV 4:8, 5:17). Foradiscussion of Gabir- olean hylomorphism seen from the perspective of Platonic metaphysics, see Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’sThe- ology of Desire,165–67;McGinn, “IbnGabirol:The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 89–90.  Cf. Palazzo’sconcise interpretation of this link made by Eckhart in “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 276: “While addressingthe prophetical flow fromGod in the Commentaryonthe Gospel of John,Eckhart connects Avicenna’s Metaphysics Book 8Chapter6(which, as said, describes the Nec- essary Existent’sability to overflow and producereality) with the Fons vitae textwhich argues that it befits form to communicateitself to matter,whenever the latter is apt to receive the former,and that in its process of self-communication form obeysthe First Maker,Who is the originator of the universal flow of form” (emphasis in original). Cf. Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 147.  Foradetailed analysis of this topic in IbnGabirol’stheory of creation, see Schlanger, ThePhi- losophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,161–64,166;McGinn, “IbnGabirol: The Sageamong the Schoolmen,” 84–85.  In Ioh. n. 263[LW 3, 218.11–12]. Cf. the parallel passage in In Gen.II 146[LW 1, 616.1–3]. Here, Eck- hart describes the higher realm’scontact with the lower realm in terms of love. Interestingly, IbnGa- birolexplains the relationship between God’screative activity,mediated by form in shaping passive matter,inquitesimilar terms in FV 3:13 [106.13–17]: “As to the natureofthis activity,itisone entity endowinganother with its own form, when each of them lends itself to this. As to how,itisbycom- bining, either without or with an intermediary;either with alteration and decrease of the active form or on the contrary with no decrease of the active quality;either by the timeless impress of the active potencyonthe receptive entity,orbythoughtand imagination, as by somethingloved on the one wholoves” (FL 100). The idea of this allusion to the Christian teachers in In Ioh. n. 263also aligns wellwith Eckhart’sinitial citation of Avicenna relating to the angels’ noetic communication with the inferior human souls (In Ioh. n. 262[217.7– 15]). Forfurther analysisofEckhart’suse of Avicenna, see Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 257–71 (esp. 264).  Cf. Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 145–46. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 93

two of his four clarifications of John 8:34b. He explicates this apparent moral notion that aperson who commits asin becomes its servant in Aristotelian terms,¹⁶⁰ as the precept that each agent bringsabout that which ontologicallymatches itself (“cum omne agens agat sibi simile”).¹⁶¹ It is within this framework that Eckhart lays out the Avicebronian viewpoint,citing the exact same passages as in his readingof Vg.John 1:48. To this end, Eckhart insinuatesthatthe principle of actionisthe universalform, imprinting its qualities on its receptivecounterpart of universal matter.It is temptingtoequate the sinful act with the mergence of form with matter,but that would be to miss Eckhart’sphilosophicalpoint.His claim seems to be more basic. Taking its cue from God’stranscendent activity,form endows its ownnature on passive matter.The ontological symmetry is not so much related to the substrate of matter,but rather to form’sarticulation of its own essence.¹⁶² Earlier,Eckhart expresses this idea in conjuncture with Exod 3:14,arguing that God’s modusoperandi, by virtue of Him beingbeing itself, consists of calling thingsinto being.¹⁶³ Proceeding to quote—as in his In Ioh. n. 263—IbnGabirol’ssubsequent depiction of God’screative productivity mediated by the universal form (108.25–109.3), Eckhart mayalso have been indicating that he has the same scheme in mind here: God’snoetic being establishing the universe through the universalform,which reproduces His creative activity within alower ontologicalrealm.¹⁶⁴ On examining the next paragraph (464), one finds further reinforcement for this assessment,inasmuch as Eck- hart speaksofthe Gabirolean concept of the universal form as God’smediator within the natural realm between activity (form) and passivity (matter)(“mediatio inter agens et patiens”).¹⁶⁵ Again, referring to one of the abovecitations from Fons vitae 3:14,¹⁶⁶ Eckhart attempts to show thatthe motif of servitude in Vg.John 8:34b implies afurther metaphysical idea; that is, that the activityofeach object serves its corresponding form by predisposing matterfor its exhaustiveabsorption therein.¹⁶⁷ Similar to his interpretation of Vg.John 1:48, instead of stressingthe ontological symmetry between uni- versalmatter and form lyingatthe coreofAvicebronian hylomorphism, Eckhart rather chooses to accentuate the clear ontological priority of creative form over pas-

 See LW 3, 396 n. 1.  In Ioh. n. 463[LW 3, 396.5].  Palazzo, “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 276.  In Ioh. n. 463[LW 3, 396.5–7].  Foranelucidation of the participation of form in divine creation, see Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,239–42.See, for example, 3:13 [106.17–107.9].  In Ioh. n. 464 [LW3,397.1–3].  108.25–26: “Forma […]compellitur in natura sua ad dandum se et ad conferendumformam suam.”  In Ioh. n. 467[LW 3, 399.6–10]. Cf. Palazzo’ssuccinct description of Eckhart’sspecific usage of Fons vitae here, in “Eckhart’sIslamic and Jewish Sources,” 276n.60: “Furthermore, Avicebron[’s] text is quoted to make it clear that operation predisposes matter not onlyfor form, but also for whatever is connected or propertoform.” 94 Ze’ev Strauss

sive matter that it posits. Eckhart’sstrongmetaphysical readingofVg. John 8:34b overshadowsthe literal ethical meaning of the verse to such an extent that their link to one another becomes blurred.¹⁶⁸ The subsequent reference to Avicebron’suniversal hylomorphism in Eckhart’s Commentaryonthe Gospel of John takes place in his reading of Vg.John 14:8(“Dom- ine, ostende nobis Patrem, et sufficit nobis”). AlreadyinIn Eccli. n. 9, we sawhow Eckhart adduces what he perceivedtobeAvicebron’stranscendent concept of God within an exegetical framework, in which the God the Father of Vg.John 14:8,understood as the principium sine principio,occupies asignificant role.¹⁶⁹ In In Ioh. n. 554, Eckhart analyses Vg.John 14:8 along similar lines, inasmuchasheattempts therein to throw light on different aspects of the transcendent oneness of God the Father.The one chief differenceisthat Eckhart does not directlyrefer to Avicebron’sview of God, but rather to the superiority of form beingaunifying principle over the passive and diversified matter.Eckhart inserts this Avicebronianviewpoint into his eighth reason, through which he accounts for the notion of God as the One. The general claim Eck- hart advances is that “form and nature avoids and […]detests matter.”¹⁷⁰ To this effect,heestablishes aworldview of God being the absolute One as opposedtomatter being pure multitude. Eckhart supports this philosophicalperspective by referring to no less than three excerptsfrom Fons vitae: “Therefore, he says, ‘Show us’ the One, ‘and it is enough for us.’ The One is opposed to matter,inthat it is manyand evil, or nothing,assaid above. Hencethe author of the Fountain of Life in 2.9and 10 and 3.4 deniesthat anybodies composed of matter have activity,but [says] they are onlypas- sive due to matter.”¹⁷¹ Acursory examination of the three passages to which Eckhart made recourse hints at the fact that at their corelies the sharp ontological contrast between God’spure actualism, conferred on the universal form, and the passivesub- strate of matter.Itwould thus appear thatEckhart,when drawing on these examples from Fons vitae,does not merelyhaveAvicebron’sprecept concerning the passivity of matter in mind, but also the conceptual framework in which IbnGabirol advanced it. Against this backdrop, one can betterobservehow Eckhart’soverall programmatic presentation here, which attempts to provethat God is the transcendent unity,corresponds to Gabirolean philosophy.¹⁷²

 On Eckhart’s “philosophic allegorism” in his LW,see Schwartz, “Meister Eckhart and Moses Mai- monides,” 398.  LW 3, 237.11–238.2.  In Ioh. n. 551[LW 3, 481.5–6] (FLW183).  In Ioh. n. 554 [LW3,483.12–484.2](FLW184). Cf. Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Chris- tianity,181–182.  The section from Fons vitae 2:9that Eckhart probablyhas in mind is 40.6–27:the view that Ibn Gabirol outlineshereisofGod’screative productivity,mediatedthrough the active rational substances, imposedonthe passive and receptive substrate of matter.Zimmermannand Sturlese offer 40.6– 10:LW3,484 n. 1. The image from Fons vitae 2:9that Eckhart drawsupon is 40.6–27.AsZimmermann and Sturlese suggest,the specific section fromthe subsequent chapter in Fons vitae 2:10 fromwhich Eckhart drawssupport is 41.11–16.Inthis passage,Ibn Gabirol opposes passive matter that has been Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 95

By adducingthis textual evidence from Fons vitae,Eckhart appears to want to actuallyweaken the sweeping thrust of the claims raised by Avicebronian hylomorphism.Instead of emphasising the exceptional ontologicalstatus of universal matter in Fons vitae—which IbnGabirol conceptualises as abasic noetic principle intrinsic to all of created reality and as even having priority over form¹⁷³—Eckhart chooses to firmlyrelegate it to asecondary position. From this perspective,Eckhart can proceed to establish abaffling connection between Avicebron and Thomas Aquinas,asthe latter also deniesthe possibilityofmatter being active (“Videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum”): “On this see Thomas in the [Summa of Theology], Ia, q. 115,a.1.”¹⁷⁴ As is known, Aquinas, in light of his incorporealconception of angels, systematically grapples specificallywith the radical assertions of Avicebronian hylomorphism in four subsequent chapters (5–8) of his De substantiis separatis seu de angelorum natura.¹⁷⁵

Summary

This studymaps Meister Eckhart’svarious explicitand implicit references to Avice- bron’s Fons vitae. What emergesfrom these invocations is an unusual imageofIbn Gabirol. Eckhart givesthe eleventh-century Andalusian Jewish philosopher asignificant position within his Christian bodyofthought,unmatched by most of his non- Christian sources of inspiration from the Middle Ages. Unlike other central non-Chris- tian authorities cited by Eckhart,such as Rabbi Moyses (Maimonides)and the heide- nischer meister (Avicenna), the ambiguity attached to the religious affiliation of the Avicebronian worldview appears to have actuallycontributed to its adoption. Eck- hart,not entirelysure as to Avicebron’sreligious affiliation, could not onlyapproach his innovative philosophyinamore objective way, but could alsoexploit it more flex- iblyfor his own specific Christocentric interests. Eckhart does not single out aspecific themefrom Fons vitae,but rather seems to endorse the outlook thatGabirolean thought provides.His fascination with Fons vitae centres on awide array of topics covering the main ideas of Gabirolean philosophy. Aside from IbnGabirol’shylomorphism, Eckhart also drawsonhis notions

set in motion to God as the ultimatesource of movement from which all of reality overflows.The editors of the critical edition specificallyrefer to 83.1–6. See LW 3, 484 n. 1and cf. FV 1:14.The third section from Fons vitae 3:4towhich Eckhart mayhavewished to allude is 82.9–83.20. In these paragraphs,Ibn Gabirol depicts God as beingthe transcendent artificer of the universe, whose purecre- ative activity requiresanintermediary substanceinshapingpassive matter.For further analysis,see Schlanger, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,132.  Formatter’spriority over form, see McGinn, “Ibn Gabirol: The Sageamongthe Schoolmen,” 86– 87;Schlanger, The Philosophy of Solomon Ibn Gabirol,181–82.  In Ioh. n. 554 [LW3,484.2–3] (LWE 184).  Foramoredetailed analysis of this correlation, see Brunner, “MaîtreEckhart et Avicébron,” 148. 96 Ze’ev Strauss

of divine creation, the intellectual ascent of the human intellect to the noeticrealm, God’stranscendent unity,negative theology, and the fourfold ordo essendi. Oursur- veyhas made it clear that in fact,itwas not chiefly Fons vitae’s well-known doctrine of universal hylomorphism that resonatedwith Eckhart’sphilosophy, but rather its outlined Einheitsmetaphysik,which conceptualises God as well as His creation through the determination of Oneness. The Gabirolean formulationthat the Twofol- lows from the One also does not lurehim into thinkingotherwise, for Eckhart knows that the category of the Two, denoting universal matter and form, is merelyaconstruct to make Avicebronian hylomorphism more comprehensible. Strictlyspeaking, form and matter can onlyexist in their interdependent unity within the universal intellect. At the same time,Eckhart seems to approach Fons vitae in aprogrammatic manner.Thisstudyhas pointed to two of the inclinations underlying Eckhart’sunderstanding of Avicebron: (1) Eckhart is reluctant to takeIbn Gabirol’sradical hylomorphism at face value. Rather,heattempts to weaken the pivotalroleofthe Avicebronian Materialprinzip by decisivelyrelegatingitto thesecondary status of asubstrate for the creative productivity of form. (2)Although Eckhart was familiar with IbnGabirol’snegative theology, he appears to want to conflateGod with the universal form—as evidenced by his readingofFons vitae 5:22 and his general presentation of Gabirolean hylomorphism—equatingthe universal form with God by virtue of its transcendence, unity,and creative power. In Eckhart’sreadingofFons vitae, the fifth chapter gains centre stage. The reason for this emphasis, as Ihaveargued, lies in the fact that it harmonises well with Chris- tian theological patterns of thought in general and with Eckhart’smetaphysics of the verbum in particular.While it is certainlypossiblethatEckhart supposedAvicebron to be aChristian, Imaintain thatitwas not this feature thatattracted him to his uni- versalphilosophy, but rather the speculative thrust of his innovative metaphysics of the One. By incorporating such aunique philosophicalvoice as IbnGabirol into his thought, Eckhart could better account for the speculative elements intrinsic to the Christian faith and thus present them in auniversal light.Given the scrutinising critique of Fons vitae levelled by the most celebratedDominicans, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart’sbroad adoption of Avicebronian thought in his Christian philosophystands out as being arather subversive move. Inserting such acontrover- sial philosophicalsourceinto his Christian philosophymust alsofactor in what Kurt Flasch assesses as Eckhart’s “divergence from the traditional path of common scho- lasticismand his explicit polemicalposition against it.”¹⁷⁶ Yetitwould seem that preciselythis subversiveness is that which renders Eckhart’sChristian philosophysoap- pealing and worth exploring.

 Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity,157. Meister Eckhart Reading Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae 97

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Giada Coppola Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul¹

The philosophical activity of Obadiah Sforno, who is primarilyknown for his exegetical interpretations of the HolyScriptures,has receivedlittle scholarlyattention. Nonetheless,the few scholars interested in Lightofthe Nations—Sforno’s(uniquely) philosophical work—wereparticularlycritical of the author’sposition in this exposition, showing asceptical attitude towards the uniqueness of the work. Obadiah Sforno’sphilosophical treatise reproduces the classical schema of the medieval quaestio disputata (“disputed question”), in which therewas no place for a “new” or “innovative” analysis characterisingsome of the most original interpreters of the Renaissance period. He published the Hebrew version of Lightofthe Nations,entitled Or ʿAmmim,inBologna in 1537. In 1548,also in Bologna, he published the Latin version, with the title Lumen Gentium. The fact that Sforno himself translated his ownworkfrom Hebrew into Latin makes him particularlyexceptional.² The Hebrew and Latinversions do not appear to offer significant differencesin their overall view.The order of the questions and the general approachestoeach argument are identical (with very few exceptions), but nonetheless, we find several changes concerning the style and the breadth of topics,aswillbeclear from reading the passages presented in this paper. Although the structure of Lightofthe Nations reproduces the medieval format of the disputed question, it seems thatSforno exercises asceptical approach towards introducing the quaestio and establishing the solution. In Lumen Gentium, every question is precededbydubitatur utrum (“it is questionable”), and in the last part —namely,the solution—of bothversions, we read:

שנ בי םא ןכ הל ית סר קפ חה יק הר נה כז תר Ad dubium ergo respondetur To dispel anydoubt

Doubt does not onlyplayadialecticalfunctioninthis pamphlet.Sforno is following the Maimonidean tradition,³ and he introduces “doubtand perplexity,”⁴ which are

 Iwould like to thank Professor WarrenZev Harvey for his advice, his valuablecomments,and his suggestions on how to improvethis article.  Iwill employ the appellation Light of the Nations to refertoboth versions of the pamphlet in general terms;when appropriate,Iwill makeadistinction between the Hebrewand Latin editions.  Cf. Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,Physics, and Doubt,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in JewishLaw,Thought, and HistoryPresented to Dr.NormanLamm,ed. Yaakov Elman and JeffreyS.Gurock (New York: Michael Scharf Publication Trust of the Yeshiva University Press; Hobo- ken, NJ:Ktav, 1997), 149–62.

OpenAccess. ©2020Giada Coppola, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-008 102 Giada Coppola

inherent in the quest for knowledge.Nevertheless,Sforno introduces the term safeq to present the solutions to the questions, in which sense the doubt is asynonym of “objection” (with referencetothe previous arguments), following Gersonides, who was the first to use it in this manner. In the Renaissance, Isaac Abravanel employed safeq to translate obiectio in his Roš Amanah,confirmingits double function, as did David Messer Leon in his Tehillah le-Dawid. Forthis reason, the relationship to Jew- ish scepticism cannot be ruled out,asisalsohighlighted by GiuseppeVeltri in his book Alienated Wisdom.⁵ Twoarticles by Robert Bonfil on Sforno’s Lightofthe Nations appeared in 1976 and 1995 respectively.⁶ Both focused on the interpretation of the idea of the soul (the crucial points of which Iwill analyse in detail later). Bonfil highlights the lack of originality in the author’sapproach to philosophy; he considers Sfornonot onlya“terrible” philosopher—in comparison with his contemporaries, taking into account the brilliant work of Leone Ebreo—but also awoeful interpreter of the classical philosophical tradition.⁷ As Warren Zev Harvey has emphasised, acomparison between Leone Ebreo and Sforno turnsout to be inappropriate,asthe first was a great philosopher,while Sforno was an eruditescholar. Nevertheless, Bonfil recognises a “modern approach” represented by the relevance of the topic of the soul in Sforno’swork, as the question of the immortality of the soul was one of the most common issuesdiscussed in philosophical treatises duringthe Renaissance period.⁸

 Harvey,161.  Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: EnquiryintoJewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Bos- ton: De Gruyter, 2018), 143–44: “The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arefoundational for several aspects connectedboth with the Jewish consciousness of and attitudes towards scepticism. At the end of the Humanist period and the Renaissance, we can observethe first changesinthe perception and formulation of philosophical questions.After some seminal beginnings,mirrored by ‘Ovadya Sforno, therecould be no hesitation in recognising that the use of dubitatur/dubium and quaestiones dubitatae is morethan arhetorical tool. They became adialecticalstrategythat playedanimportant roleinthe Late Renaissance (Accademia dei Dubbiosi)and earlymodern period (Accademia degli In- cogniti,Simone Luzzatto). The ‘doubts’ (dubitationes)are not primarilyaliterary instrument to introduce the dogmatic opinion of teachers,masters, or opponents, but adialecticalstrategytointroduce very delicatequestions that could have dangerousresults for the majority.The topics handled involve the usual themes of sceptic origins and tradition: authority,morality,theodicy, collective society and individuality,immortality of the soul as asocial and moral problem (doctrine of remunerations), etc.”  Robert Bonfil, “The Doctrine of the Soul and Holiness in the Teachings of Obadia Sforno” [Hebrew], Eshel Beer Sheva 1(1976): 200–257; Bonfil “Il Rinascimento:laproduzione esegetica di ‘O. Servadio Sforno,” in La letturaebraica delle Scritture,ed. Sergio J. Sierra (Bologna: EDB, 1995), 261–67.  Bonfil, 270: “Non dovrebbe far meraviglia che non lo si sia presosul serio eche, come filosofo, a lungoandareegli sia statocondannatoaldimenticatoio.”  Bonfil, 271: “Eppure,anche nella forma nella quale si presentava, il Lumen Gentium offriva un cu- rioso esempio di elementidecisamente innovatore innestati sulla struttura essenzialmente medie- vale.Se, infatti, al di là dell’elencodelle quaestionesdisputate, riflettiamo sulla quantitàdienergia discorsiva econseguentementesulla quantità di spazio dedicata ad ognuna di quelle questioni,cisi accorge subito che l’interesseera decisamente spostatosuquantoera di attualitá nel Rinascimento, e in particolaresulla questione dell‘anima umana etc.” Obadiah Sforno and the IndividualHuman Soul 103

Apparently, Sforno’sintention, as the author himself announces in the prologue of both treatises, was to refute some of the Aristotelian positions which wereentirely at odds with the principles of the Jewish faith. Hence, the subtitle of Lumen Gentium is worthyofnote: in it,Sforno expresslyasserts that the book was written “against some opinionsofAristotle,” and thatit“demonstrates the doctrines of the creation of the universe from nothing,the providenceGod has for human beings,and the immortality of human soul, which they [i.e., Aristotelian philosophers] shamefullyre- ject,deriding religion.”⁹ Charles Manekinfollows the pattern established by Professor Bonfil, albeit with aless critical approach: “Yetitisalso an attack on those principles of Aristotelianism that conflict with religious dogma,placing Sforno in the intellectuallyawkward position of appealing to Aristotle in order to undermine his own philosophy!”¹⁰ In fact,itmay be better to state “appealing to the authority of Aristotle and Averroes in order to undermine their own philosophy.” However,inmyopinion, Sforno’spar- ticular approach represents acomponent of modernity,consistingofquoting asen- tencenot onlyfor the argument,but also for the counterargument,which is the con- futationofthe topic presented in the first part of the quaestio. It is necessary to note that most of the quotations from Aristotle and Averroes in Lightofthe Nations are favourable and not critical, despite what was announced by the author himself. Sfor- no does not care about the principle of contradiction, accordingtowhich it is not possiblethat p and -p maybepresented by the sameauthority;inthis sense, he is not anchored in the classical medieval system. Sforno was defined by the late Mauro Zonta as the lastrepresentativeofwhat maybecalled “Hebrew Scholasticism,”¹¹ but also as an “anti-philosopher,” as he characterised him in his contribution to the first international symposium on Oba- diah Sforno.¹² Taking into account the latest discoveries of the DFG-funded Sforno

 Obadiah Sforno, Lumen Gentium (Bologna, 1548); frontispiece: “Opusculum nuper editum contra nonnullas Peripateticorum opiniones demonstratiue docens presertim circacreationem et vniuersi nouitatem et diuinam de mortalibus curam et humanarumanimarum immortalitatem, quas ipsi tur- piter respuunt religionis penitus irridentes quareillud meritoLumen Gentium appello.”  Charles Manekin,inTheJewishPhilosophyReader,ed. Daniel H. Frank, OliverLeaman, and Charles H. Manekin (New York: Routledge,2000), 284.  Mauro Zonta, “The Autumn of Medieval Jewish Philosophy: Latin Scholasticism in 15th-Century Hebrew Philosophical Literature,” in Herbst des Mittelalters? Fragen zurBewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts,ed. JanAertsen and Martin Pickavé(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2004), 475: “In Italy, thereisevidenceofthe persistenceofaninterest in Latin Scholasticism by some Jewish phi- losophersactive in the 16th century,e.g.Obadiah Sforno”;Zonta, HebrewScholasticism in the Fif- teenth Century. AHistoryand Source Book (Dordrecht: Springer,2006), 30.  This symposium,entitled “Lost and Found in Translation—Ovadiah Sforno and His World,” took placeinHamburgon18and 19 January 2017.Inhis paper entitled “Or ‘Ammim/Lumen Gentium and the quaestio disputata,” Zonta stated: “Ovadiah Sforno is thereforenot seen todayasasimple ‘philosopher’ but rather as an ‘anti-Aristotelian’ thinker, and so, consideringthe keyroleplayedbyAris- totle in the thinkingofthat time, almost as asort of ‘anti-philosopher.’” Zonta was probably follow- 104 Giada Coppola

Project at HamburgUniversity,aswell as the studies of Giuseppe Veltri¹³ and Warren Zev Harvey,¹⁴ it is now possible to newlyplace Sforno in the history of Jewish thought: he maybedefined not onlyasthe last interpreter of Scholasticism, but also as the last Averroist.AsVeltri phrased it,Sforno is “an Averroist malgré lui.” Har- vey, during his fellowship at MCAS, proposed an enlighteningexplanation: that Light of the Nations is the resultofSforno having taught classes in Latin on Averroist philosophy. Sforno was presumably hired to teach this class by the professors at Bolo- gna University,orperhaps by Christian theologians.Inthis sense, Averroes represents not onlyan“authority” in Sforno’streatise, but alsothe subjectmatter of his teaching. As Harvey suggests, Sforno could have been movedtoteach the Christian scholars in Bologna about Averroes for the same reason he chose to teach Reuchlin Hebrew in Rome. This general overview pavesthe wayfor new perspectives: Elijah del Medigo (1458–93)—who was most active in Padua and Venice—would no longer be held as the last “Averroist”¹⁵ of the Jewishtradition, since Averroes would have continued to have been studied in Jewish communities into the sixteenth century.AsMontada noted, this tendencypersisted in the Latin world—with its ups and downs—until the Renaissance period. Asimilar phenomenon maybeobserved in Jewishthought: “JewishAverroism” is aconcept thatusually refers to Jewish philosopherswho philosophised within the context of Averroes’sinterpretation of Aristotelian philosophy. Forthis reason, Sfornoshould be considered as aJewishAverroist; chronologically speaking, as the last one. The fact thatSforno does not conform to all of Averroes’s philosophyisnot an indication of an anti-Averroistic attitude. Even though Bonfil and Manekin note the influenceofAverroes throughout Sfor- no’swork, they do not stress the importance of this aspect,not remotelyconsidering the general overviewofthe Italian setting.¹⁶ On the contrary,for them,the impor-

ing the interpretation of Cecil Roth in his TheJews in the Renaissance (Philadelphia: Jewish Publica- tion Society,1959), 80–81.  Veltri, Alienated Wisdom,162–67.  The second international symposiumonObadiah Sforno and his world, entitled “The Philosoph- ical Canon of Obadiah Sforno and His Contemporaries,” took placeinHamburgon5and 6November 2018.  Josep PuigMontada, “Eliahu del Medigo,the Last Averroist,” in Exchangeand Transmission across Cultural Boundaries: Philosophy,Mysticism and Science in the Mediterranean World,ed. Haggai Ben-Shammai, Shaul Shaked, and Sarah Stroumsa (Jerusalem: Israel AcademyofSciences and Hu- manities,2013), 155–86.  Bonfil, “Il Rinascimento,” 266: “Il metododel ragionamentoello Sforno resta dunque ancorato alla pesantedotta struttura accademica che ci si accorge poi subitoesserecostruita tutta di “mattoni” di auctoritates phylosophorum,prima traiquali naturalmenteAristotele eAvveroè. Insomma, dichiar- ando in cima all’opera latina, che l’intento eradisputarecon nonnullas Peripateticorum opiniones,lo Sforno non intendevaaffattorespingere il discorso peripatetico, bensì precisamenteinserirsi organ- icamenteinesso, prendereparteinuna discussione considerata attualmenteincorso, semprevali- da”;269: “Questo sistema aristotelico-averroistico […]costituiva la struttura di riferimentodel pen- sieromedievale di tutti, ebrei ecristianiEsso era ancora al centro della discussione filosifica nelle Obadiah Sforno and the IndividualHuman Soul 105

tance accorded to Averroes corroborates the idea that Sforno was anchored to an out- dated medieval tradition. In the Italian universities and in academic environments, Averroes was still being studied and commented on by scholars and members of the intellectual community.Since the lack of new elements in Sforno’streatise, such as (Neo‐)Platonism and Kabbalah, has been considered anegative factor up until now,inview of recent studies, is it possibletosuppose that Sforno’sintention was to become a “full” member of an élite and to be accepted by the Italian university milieu? It is likelythat Lightofthe Nations was written for aparticular audience (Chris- tian and academic) and this could also explain Sforno’s modus operandi,according to which onlyAristotle and Averroes are quoted, since they are still considered the major “authorities” for systematic philosophical thought.Sforno’sinterpretation and exposition of Aristotelian philosophyishighlycomplex and sophisticated; it is not onlybasedonmedieval Scholastic sources, such as Aquinas, Grosseteste, and Jandun, but also on contemporary ones, among them Paul of Venice, Gaetano da Thiene, and Augustine Nifo;namely, the representative figures of the “strong” Averroeian tradition. This is the tradition accordingtowhich Giglioni identifies the Averroistic tendencyinEuropean culture.¹⁷ Sforno belongstothis trend, all the more so giventhat he decided to write his work in bothlanguages for two different audiences. This point also characterises Sforno’sgeneral attitude towards philosophy, which is embedded in his deliberate choice to referonlytoAverroes throughout the entire Lightofthe Nations,with the exception of Maimonides, who is mentioned twice in Or ʿAmmim.¹⁸ Moreover,another particularaspect—which has been neglected by scholars—is the use of Latinsources in the Hebrew version as well: Sforno does not employ the Hebrew translations of Averroes, but onlythe Latin editions,¹⁹ and this is very surprising since all the texts wereavailable in Hebrew translation.

universitá d’Italia durante il Quattrocento egranparte del Cinquecento. Sennonché in questoperiodo operavanosul sistema medesimo le tendenze caratteristiche dell’umanesimo edel rinascimento, ren- dendo possibile l’introduzioone in esso di componenti eclettiche,soprattutto platoniche, che finirono per trasformarlo più omeno radicalmente. Orbene,contrariamente aquantosipuó tuttoraleggere qua elàneo manuali di storia degli ebrei nel Rinascimento, il Lumen Gentium restófondamental- mentefedele al sistema aristotelico-averrostico.”  Cf. Guido Giglioni, “Introduction,” in Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe,ed. Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni (Dordrecht: Springer,2013), 2. “‘Aver- roistic’ refers to the generic culturallabel denotingapronounced rationalistic attitude, of avaguely Aristotelian ilk, towards questions of philosophical psychology (in particular,the natureofthe human mind and its survivalafter the death of the body), natural determinism and, aboveall, the relationships between philosophical freedom and dogmatic truths,often of areligious kind.”  Obadiah Sforno, Or ‘Ammim (Bologna, 1537), 8, 10. to( גנ גד רא וקי ) ” Aclear example is givenbythe employmentofthe expression “contraGaricone indicatethe Megarians in book Theta of Metaphysics,amisunderstandingwhich is onlyfound in the Michael Scotusedition, which was published in Venicein1473. 106 Giada Coppola

Sforno’serudition is nevertheless evidentthroughout,displayedinhis use of Jewish, Arabic and Scholastic sources, which he cleverlydisguises, as thereisno mention of them in his treatise. His philosophicalknowledge is quite clear when we compare the pamphlet with the exegetical and biblical commentary.Anevident example is represented by his interpretation of Numbers 7:89,²⁰ in which he inter- -vocalised middabber)asGod speaking to Himself, which is clearlyaref) דמ רב prets erencetothe theory of the intellect in Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed 1:68. However,Sforno does not mention this biblical verse in his Lightofthe Nations, even if he presents asimilar argument in the sixth question, “On the Creation,” according to Maimonidean principles. As Rabbi Kravetz supposes, the commentaries are chronologicallylater than Or ʿAmmim. Sforno considers the relation between reason and revelation as an essential point in order to understand the ultimategoal of human beings, which is naturally the higher knowledge of God. His attitude towards philosophyfollows the classical Jewishtradition, according to which it is possible to find astandpoint to reconcile the claims of reason and revelation. Sforno criticises the Aristotelianprinciples that are contrary to the Torah. Nonetheless,heaccepts twenty-seven “philosophical propositions” as being in accordance with the Torah’steachings.²¹ However,ashis starting point for Lightofthe Nations,Sforno assumes that the root of every philosophicaland scientific thought is founded in the Torah: Moses, duringthe revelation on Sinai, receivedthe Torahthatisnot onlythe Law, but also the original wisdom. LightoftheNations sticks to this principle: in order to re- solve the philosophical issues, the “final” solution Sforno presents is always characterised by the exegetical interpretation of abiblical passage.

Sforno’sArgumentsregarding De Anima

The problem of the human soul and its perfection occupies the third part of Lightof the Nations,²² and, as mentioned above, it represents the most importantsection of

 “And when Moses was gone into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with Him, then he heardthe voice of one speakinguntoHim from off the mercyseat that was upon the ark of testimony, from between the twocherubims:and he spakeunto Him” (King James Version).  Cf. Or ʿAmmim,12–14,and Lumen Gentium,9–11.  Summarising the topics of Light of the Nations,wecan divide the workinto three different sections.Inthe first part of the book—chapters 1–7—Sforno analyses the physical cosmos, denying anypossibilityofthe pre-eternity of the sublunary and superlunary worlds with particular attention to some topics such as the movement of coming-to-be and passingaway, the elements,prime matter, the heavens, and motion. In the second part—chapters 8–10—he analysesthe metaphysical and ontological aspects,the nature of God, unicity,corporeality,knowledge,and God’swill. In chapters 11– 14,the author approaches some questions on the soul, the natureofthe soul, the morality of man, and providence. Chapter 15 could be consideredasort of “outsider” on accountofits principal argu- Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 107

Sforno’senquiry.Sforno demonstratesthe immortality of the human soul and its in- corruptibility by refutingfour arguments, which are founded upon Averroes’sLong Commentaries on Aristotle and the Incoherence of the Incoherence.²³ Bonfil specificallycriticises Sforno’sapproach to the question of the soul, which he considered to be an obsolete approach commonlyfound in the classical medieval Judeo-Christian tradition that was closed to the new influences typical of this era.²⁴ Sforno “saves” some principles of the Averroeian/Aristotelian system (the twenty- seven propositions presented at the beginning of Lightofthe Nations)which are in accordancewith Jewish religious dogmas.Hence, Bonfil asserts that Sforno may be compared with “some thinkers [who are] supposedtobeparadigmatic followers of Averroes withoutbelievinginthe Averroeian doctrines,” as Pomponazzi phrased it.²⁵ At the beginning of chapter 12,the reader is faced with the first problem, which constitutes the heart of the question:

םא נה שפ אה ונ יש הת כש יל את רש הב יה הה דא מם רבד Utrum intellectiva hominis anima םצעב יה בא תל ני ספ תד םא יא ן qua substantialiter dicitur rationalis sit quidimmortale velnon. Whether the intellectual human Whether theintellectualhuman soul,bywhich soul, by which man it is essentially manisessentially rational,isincorruptibleor called rational, is immortal or not. not.

ment,which includes and embraces all those three aspects—physics, metaphysics, and providence— with particular focus on the relationships between deity,essence, and humankind.  The primarilysources arethe Long Commentaries on On the Soul 3.5, Book Lambda of Metaphy- sics,and On the Heavens,aswellasthe Incoherence of the Incoherence. As aforementioned, Sforno probablyuses the Scot’sversion for the commentaries and for the original Averroes’ works, he uses the Nifo’sedition.  Bonfil, “Il Rinascimento,” 269–70: “Lo sforzo precipuo del nostroviene quindi rivoltoacorreg- gere il sistema aristotelico-averroisticodal di dentro,asalvarlo dai propri errori equindi anche dalle critiche che si sarebberopotutemuovere ad esso. Non diversamente da consimili tentativi di pensatori cristiani, come per esempio PietroPomponazzi, lo Sforno intese salvare il principio averroistico dell’intelletto separato eeterno comune atuttoilgenereumano senza perórinunciarealla esigenza religiosa di credere nell’esestinza di un’anima individuale forma dell’uomo, sostanza sepa- rata eeterna, non pura potenzialità. Come Averroé, lo Sforno sostenevache l’intellettomateriale non è neque corpus neque virtus in corpore. Secondo lui, però, l’anima umana è sostanza individuale,eter- na, emanante da una non meglio definita essenza superiore.”  Bonfil, 270: “Con questa posizione di apertura, lo Sforno si allineava decisamente conquei pensatori che adetta di Pomponazzi si credevano di essereaverroisti senza peraltroesserlo davvero.” Cf. Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence: Le Monnier,1965), 18–19: “Ideoteneoquod orrupt Averrois devitat maiores difficultates quam alia; nec me pudet amoreorruptio me ipsum retractare. Unde qui dicunt me aliis orruptio ut contradicam,mentiuntur.Oportet enim in philosophiahaereti- cum esse, qui veritatem invenirecupit.” 108 Giada Coppola

In Or ʿAmmim,the statement of the problem focuses on the concept of the corruptibility of the soul (nifsad). In Lumen Gentium,wefind the word “immortality” (immortale). The two ideas are naturallyequivalent,because the notionofincorruptibility logicallyembraces the idea of immortality.Sforno usesthe Hebrew term niṣḥi to translate the Latin immortale,evenifitliterallysignifies “eternal.” Nevertheless, the author himself explains that nifsad and niṣḥi and immortale and incorruptibile are synonyms. This kind of distinctionisalso presented by Thomas Aquinas,who, when alludingtoAugustine in the Summa Theologiae,shows that some substances are incorruptible (incorruptibilis)and immortal (immortalis).²⁶ In this example, it is interesting to note that the Hebrew ʿeṣem nivdal—literally, “separate substance”—is translated as abstractum from matter,which normallyindicates the pure form .( בנ לד ןמ חה רמו )

כש על םצ בנ לד וה נא חצ י Quodlibet abstractum est immortale ² ⁸ sive incorruptibile.²⁷ Every abstract substance is immortal Every separate substance is incorruptible. or incorruptible.

Sforno, in defenceofthe immortality of the soul, points out four essential arguments accordingtowhich he explains the nature of the (human) soul, from the general definition of the faculty to the particularcharacterisation of the intellectual human soul: ‒ The (in)corruptibility of the soul (in Or ʿAmmim)²⁹/(im)mortality of the soul (in Lumen Gentium)³⁰

 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.97.1: “Respondeodicendumquod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter.Uno modo, ex partemateriae, eo scilicet quod velnon habet materiam, sicut Angelus; velhabetmateriam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile.Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex partefor- mae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter acorrup- tione prohibetur.Ethoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum, tam potenti naturaDeus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plen- itudo sanitatis,idest incorruptionis vigor.Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex partecausae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilisetimmortalis.Quia, ut Au- gustinus dicit in libro de quaest.Vet.EtNov.Test., Deus hominem fecit,qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset autadvitam autadmortem. Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poteratcorpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliterfactum est.Quia enim anima rationalis excedit pro- portionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est.Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservareposset supra naturam corporalis materiae.”  Lumen Gentium,57v.  Or ʿAmmim,89. כש צל רו נת ספ הד אי מא םנ פנ דס ות הנה נה שפ אה ונ יש הת כש יל הת אי וצ תר פנ דס םא ןכ יה נא ספ תד . : Or ʿAmmin, 84 Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 109

‒ The natureofthe intellectual human soul; i.e., whether each individual has their own soul or wherethereexists onlyone common soul for the entire human species.³¹ ‒ The potentiality of the intellectual human soul;³² namely, whether the intellect is apower of the soul. ‒ The perfectionofthe intellectual soul as the actualisation of the material intellect/the fallacy of the intellectual human soul.

The problem of the soul is presented together with another question intrinsicallyre- lated to the last part of the argument Sforno presents in this chapter; namely,the perfectionofthe (human) soul. In this case as well, the Hebrew and Latin editions present some differences. The influenceofThomas Aquinas³³ is manifest in Lumen Gentium:Sforno’sinterpretation is easy to understand, as he translates the expres- -with actum secundum,atermthat Aquinas uses in his commenta שה מל תו שה ינ sion ries.

Sforno’sSolution: The Human Soul Is Emanated from aSpiritualNature

Sforno proposes asolution, in line with the classicalJewish tradition: the intellectual human soul is immortal (incorruptible and eternal) and individual. It is interesting to focus on his analysis, which is naturallyfoundedupon the Aristotelian and Aver- roeian system, but alsocharacterised by some original elements, especiallyinthe Latin version:

נה שפ אה ונ יש הת כש יל את רש הב אנ רמ הש םדא Intellectiva hominis animaqua scilicet וה בא צע חם מי בד הר או צע נם חצ וי פי לו לע וי homo dicitur substantialiter rationalis יר וב כי סמ רפ יא יש מה ןי אה ונ יש מו וק ור טמ עב -est quid immortale, ad individuorum nu

 Lumen Gentium, 55v: “Nulla mortalium forma est immortalis,intellectus hominisanima est huiusmodi, ergo non est immortalis.”  Cf. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed,trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago:Chicago University Press, 1963–78), 1:74 (seventh method).  Cf. Giovanni Picodella Mirandola, Conclusiones siveTheses DCCCC: Romae anno 1486 publice Dis- putandae, sed non admissae,ed. Bohdan Kieszkowski (Geneva: Droz, 1973), Conclusiones paradoxe numeroLXXI.secundum opinionem propriam noua in philosophia dogmatainducentes: “Cuilibet seriei animarum unus correspondet purus intellectus.”  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Anima II, lectio 4, 12, 14,16; III, lectio 1, 2, 5–9, 11. Thomas Aquinas, Ar- istotle’sDeAnima in the Version of William of Moerbekeand the CommentaryofSt. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Kenelm Foster and SylvesterHumphries,repr.ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).  Lumen Gentium,58v.  Or ʿAmmim, 92. 110 Giada Coppola

וכ יח מי וש ףת כל הל ימ הן נא שו שי פו מע בנ לד םי -merum dinumerabile, et hoc quia pro לע וי ינ בם מא ור ענ הש דא בם לצ נמ וו מא ור -ducitur aquadam spirituali naturaasu בר תו ני זו " בל למ כא הי רש נת למ כך ול רמ נש ןת -peris, sive abstractis intelligentiis ema הל כם חו זל תא הה פש הע לו הז וא יל תה וע רר ,nante, quibus ipsapotentialiter inest רא סי וט ' פכ מי שה יב רא בא רן דש שב ומ סב רפ qui scilicet naturaest humano generi המ אש רח מאמ זר ' רפ לק '' בא מא ור הש חוכ communis prout videtur Aven R. de שה לכ יי הת הו המ בנ לד םי כו בן אי בר פס הר זנ רכ -mente Philosophi inferred Metaphysico אמ ירמ '' פב יקר '' בח םש פא טל ןו אב רמ ו -rum VII,  quodscilicet virtus intellecti הש פנ הש נא שו תי אנ לצ מת הן לא יה הם נש םיי -va tanquam quid abstractus habet ab ab הו הנ חי זס הה בט הע וש עפ וה אא הל וצ תור stractioquodammodo produci. Et idem אה ונ יש וי הת יא יש וי כת חי הס וח רמ רה שא ןו לא -Platonis auctoritate infert Metaphysico יא ניש שו יא מה חו וש הת מנ אצ םי פב לעו rum XII,  ubi dicit: “Animam intellec- ³ ⁵ tivam fieri aDeis secundis” huiusmodi ergo nature proportio ad actualeshomi- num individuorum formas, talis est qualis est proportio materie prime ad ac- tuales hominum individuorum subiecta.³⁴ The intellectual human soul, by which The intellectual human soul, by which it man is essentiallycalled rational, is im- is said that man is essentiallyarational mortal, and its plurality corresponds to living being, is an immortal substance the number of individuals because [the and multiplicity is applicable to it,asis intellectual human soul] is produced by the number of the individuals of the aspiritual natureemanating from the human species. And [the intellectual higher—namely, the separate intellects, soul] has its origin in the potential na- in which it [the intellectual human ture shared by the whole human species, soul] is found in potency, meaning that which emanates from the higher sepa- the nature [of the intellectual human rate [intellects], as it says [Genesis

 Cf. Long CommentaryonMetaphysics [1494and 1497]; Averroes, Ibn Rushd’sMetaphysics:A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’sCommentaryonAristotle’sMetaphysics, Book Lām,ed. Charles Genequand (Leiden: Brill 1984), 106: “This shows that these proportions aresomehow inspired by acause nobler,worthier and higher in rank than themselves, i.e. the world soul which Platothought had been produced by the secondary gods and Aristotle by the sun and the ecliptic”; 108: “He also explained it here, sayingthat this soul is that postulated by Platoasbeingproduced by the secondary gods and by Aristotle by the sun and the ecliptic. This question is extremelydifficult and obscureand we shall explain it to the best of our abilities and according to the premises and principles which have been established, in our sciencebythe doctrine of the man whose doctrine, in the wordsofAlexander,isthe least subject to doubts,the most adequatetobeing, the most adapt- ed and suitedtoitand the most free of contradictions.”  Cf. Themistius, On Aristotle On the Soul,trans. Robert B. Todd (London: Bloomsbury,2014), 20,19 paraphrasingAristotle’s On the Soul 407a2–11;p.36; Plato, Timaeus 41a. Cf. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics,106 n. 87. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 111

soul] is common to the whole human :]: “We made man in our image.” species, Averroes seems to explain in And our Masters, of good memory, said the name of the Philosopher in Metaphy- [Genesis Rabba :]: “He consulted the sics .,saying that since the intellectu- ministeringangels,” that is to saythat al power of the soul is aseparate sub- He provided them with the power for stance, therefore it is produced by a this emanation. And this, perhaps,Aris- separate intellect.This is similar to totle recognised, accordingtowhat Aver- what Plato says in Metaphysics .,³⁶ roes explains quoting him in Metaphy- in which he states: “The intellectual sics .,that the intellectual power soul comes from the secondary gods.”³⁷ came to be from the separate [intellects]. And therefore, the relationship of this And he also explains in the aforemen- nature to the form of the individual tioned book ,par. ,quoting Plato, human being existinginact is like the that the lofty human soul is emanated relationship of the prime matter to the from the secondary gods and [that] the substrate of the individual human relation of this emanating nature to the being existinginact. human individual souls waslikethe relation of primematter to the individuals of the substrates of the sensible which exist in act.

Themostobvious difference is related to thebiblicaland Talmudic references,which do notappearinthe Latinversion.While in Or ‘Ammin,the higher andseparateintel- lectsmay be identified with theangels, accordingtoSforno’sinterpretation of Genesis Rabba, in LumenGentium,the separateintellects areemanatedfrom “indeterminate” naturescalledthe “higher spiritualnatures.” Moreover,inthe Jewish philosophicaltradition,the connection betweenthe separate intellects—whichare also intelligences— andthe angels hadalreadybeennoted by Maimonides³⁸ andGersonides.³⁹ Adetailed explanation of the nature of the spiritual “substance” is giveninthe second counterargument,i.e., against the idea of the multiplicityofthe soul. In that case, Sforno clearlystates thatthe spiritual natures maybeidentified with Plato’s secondary gods, mentioned by Averroes in his commentary on Metaphysics Lamb- da.⁴⁰ This tradition is adirect referencetoThemistius’sinterpretationofthe Aristo-

 Cf. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed 2:4–6.  Cf. Gersonides, TheWarsofthe Lord,trans. Seymour Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,1999), 5:2: “Themistius,OnAristotle On the Soul which according to Plato is generated from the movers of the heavenlybodies,whereas according to Aristotle it is generated from the sun and the inclined sphere[i.e., the ecliptic]. Hence,the soul performs its operations accomplishingthe [intended] goal, although not knowingthe goal.” P. 87,  Cf.YoavMeyrav, “SpontaneousGenerationand ItsMetaphysics in Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aris- totle’s Metaphysics 12,” in AristotleRe-Interpreted. NewFindingsonSeven HundredYears of theAncient Commentators,ed. RichardSorabji (Londonand NewYork: BloomsburyAcademic, 2016), 195–210. 112 Giada Coppola

telian text.Sfornodid not read Greek, and the Latin edition of Themistius’scommentaries was printed after his death. We cannot rule out the possibility that he read the Hebrew translation of Themistius, but the most plausible sourceisNifo, who uses Themistius and the other Greek commentators in his commentaries.⁴¹

מא םנ םע יה תו הז טה עב מנ אצ וק םד יש פש עע ל -Et tamen de ipsaspirituali naturaquam יא יש מה ןי אל תת יח בי וא הת סה ית הר שא הר התי -vis antequam humano individuo copule חתמ ביי את הם הי חה מו הר אר וש נן צמ קא םדו tur habeat quodammodo esse scilicet תש וח על יל צו הרו . זו כה אי נמ הם וח רמ רה שא ןו -potentiale, non tamen sequitur illa con הב וי מת יצ וא ות כה חו יי לב ית וש עפ מנמ אצ tradictionis implicatio, que sequitur ad וז תל הו הנ םא היה מנ אצ וק םד תש וח על יל ו sermonem dicentium ut detur materia וצ הר יה מה חת יי מב הז הש הי ול צמ אי תו פב ו לע . -prima existens aqualibet forma denuda עו זם בה יה תו צמ אי בותו חכ לב דב וה מא דצ ta, quia in quantum materia tantum est צע ומ לב ית מנ אצ פב לעו . יו דצ וק לע וי נש חי קל י quid potentiale tantum, et pro quanto סה תו אר רש אל תי ןכ מכ שו יב רא בא רן דש actu existeret esse quid actu ens quod סב רפ שה ימ מם מא גר ' רפ כק '' אט לב הז .implicat contradictionem sicut Aven R טה עב שה לכ הי וש עפ ןמ שה לכ םי אר יו יש היה ,docet in commentolibro De Caelo III ול צמ אי תו וכ יח בי שמ יפ קע דו שם שי עפ פב לעו . - et quia ipsa intellectiva sive spiritua לו יא פש בע ופ לע וז תל בי מה אצ ונ אש ימ דחו lis naturaasuperis sive Deis secundis לא וי מו כו לן בק ול . יו יה אה מז יצ וא ות וצ הר emanans, ut supra, non influitur ab eis פב עו לל וא ות ונ אש . יכ מכ שו קי הר גל םש actu nisi dato subiecto sibi proportionato מה יא שר אל גי חי וא ור וז תל בי שג סם יפ יר מי ןכו ,et eiusdem capaci cuius sit actu forma קל לב את רו כו ומ ןכ אל שי עפ הז טה עב שה לכ י sicut accidit de lucido aquo non emanat וז תל עי אל שי המ ימ שן היהי ומ ןכ קל לב בו וא ןפ actualis lux nisi datodiaphano eidem יש יה זה הה בט הע כש יל וצ הר פב עו לל שיא -luci proportionate. Quare huiusmodi spi נה רכז . בו ןכ תי בר זה הה בט הע זנ רכ רפסמכ ritualis naturahabet suum potentiale אה שי םי שא יר פש עע יל םה esse in his secundis Deis antequam in- ⁴ ³ fluant.Suumvero actuale esse acquirit postquam ab eis in subiecto sibi disposi- to influxa fuerit cum fiat actualis illius forma et per consequens plurificatur ad individuorum numerum ad quos ema- nare contingit.⁴² Andalthoughthisspiritual nature,before However,although this nature exists be- beinginconjunction with thehuman fore it emanatesonthe individuals of the individuals, is somethinginpotency,it species, this does not have to mean that [thisidea]doesnot involve acontradic- the contradictory exists which would tion.And by this discussion,itfollows be necessary if the first matter existed

 Cf. Agostino Nifo, Commentationes in librum Averrois de Substantia Orbis (Venice,1508), f. 2.  Lumen Gentium,60r.  Or ʿAmmim,95. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 113

that thereisprime matter devoid of form, prior to the initiation of aform on it.And becausethismatterisinpotencyonly, this is so because the first matter,since it andifexistinginact is beinginact, exists in potencyonly, does not emanate andthisimplies acontradiction,asAver- from another existent.Ifthis existent ex- roes explains in thecommentary On the isted priortothe initiationofform on it, Heavens ..And this is becausethe in- it would have to be the case therefore tellectual or spiritualnature is emanated that it had areality in act.And since from higher andsecondary gods,asmen- its essence is in potencyonly, it—with re- tioned above. Anditwillonlybeemanat- gardtoits substance—does not exist in ed in actwiththe subjectspecifiedfor it act.And two parts of this contradiction anddisposedfor it,and itsformisin would be proven for it,which is not pos- actbecause it will happen that alumi- sible, as Averroes explains in On the nous body will emanatelight in actonly Heavens ..But this intellectual na- if thereisatransparent body whichis ture which emanates from the intellects proportioned to itslight. Likewise thein- is suited for apotential existenceinthe tellectual nature,ifitisinpotency, will emanator before it emanates in act. emanatebefore throughthe secondary And it will onlyemanate in act (together) gods;ifitisinact it will receivethings with the forth-bringingofasubstrate whichhavebeenemanatedbythe subject specifiedfor it and disposed for its re- specified foritand it will produceaform ception, and then the reality and the in actand consequentially itsplurality is form will be in act for that substrate. Be- thesameasthe number of individualson cause, just as it is the case that luminous whichitwillemanate. bodywill not emit his light except through atransparent bodywhich is disposed for the reception of his light,likewise this intellectual nature willonly emanate on an individual of the species which is disposed for its reception in such away that this intellectual nature will be aform in act for the aforementioned individual. Andtherefore, the aforementioned nature will become a plurality which matches the number of the individuals on which it will emanate.

However,the author clarifies in this passagethat the expression spiritualisnatura The term belongstoclassicalphilosophical .( שה לכ הי עבט ) means intellectivanatura terminology; in the Italian Renaissance Jewish context,asimilar phrase is presented 114 Giada Coppola

by Leone Ebreo in Dialoghi d’amore,⁴⁴ in which we also encounter the metaphor of the light and the transparent body.⁴⁵ In Lumen Gentium,the correspondence between intellectual natures/secondary gods and angels is givenafew lines later. Likewise, in the Platonic tradition, God orders the angels to createmortal beings:

“Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem “God makes man in our image, etc.” Per- suam etc.” et fortasse hoc voluit Plato di- haps this is what Platowants to attest

 Leone Ebreo, Dialoghi d’amorediMaestroLeone Medico Hebreo (Roma: per Antonio Blado d’As- sola, 1535), 169r: “Et tu non m’hai mostrato che l’intellettohumano qualche vota mene in tanta per- fettione, che si puo sollevareacopularsi con l’intellettodivino, overo angelicoseparato da materia, e finirlo in attovedendolo direttamente, enon per discorso potenztiale, ne mezzo corporeo.” On the light cf. also 196v: “Ma questoècomevedereillucido corpo del Sole in acqua, oinaltro diafano; perchè la debile vista non può vedere de diretto in se stesso: che cosi il nostrointelletto humano nelle corporee vede l’incorporee.” Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa contraGentiles 3.43 and Scriptum super Sententiis,lib. 2, d. 13,q.1,a.3.  This kind of metaphor was alreadyfamiliar in the Scholastic milieu: cf. Robert Grosseteste, De Luce and Hexameron;Thomas Aquinas, Summa contraGentiles 3.65.  Lumen Gentium,62v,and cf. 62r–62v: “Et hec sapienter docet Sacrum Genesis documentum1cum dicit: ‘Deum creasse hominemadeiusdem imaginem quasi ad eius similitudinem’ ubi per divinam imaginem intelligit intellectum quo intelligibilia imaginamur,quem dicit esse divine nature et per consequens est quid immortale, et cum hoc docet quod per eiusdem intellective naturecognitionem quam per suam propriam actionem percipimus,nonnullam de Deo nedumdereliquis abstractis possumus habere cognitionem, cum scilicet huiusmodi naturam Dei imaginem appellet,inferens quod sit quodammododivine nature,adquod sequitur ut per eiusdem intellective naturecognitionem ad aliqualem de Deo cognitionem pervenire possumus.QuareAvenR.in commento libro De Anima I, 2 ait: ‘et debes scireque iuvamentum scientie de anima ad alias scientias invenitur tribus modis etc.’ subdit ibidem dicens: ‘divinus autem sive metaphysicum suscipit ab ea substantiam subiectisui, hinc enim declaratur quoniam forme abstractesunt intelligentes, et alia multa de cognitione dispositio- num consequentium intelligentiam in eo quod est intelligentia et intellectus etc.’ Et idem videtur in- ferre ibidem III, 5ubi dicit: ‘et nisi esset hoc genus entium quod scimus per scientiam anime non possemus intelligere multitudinem in rebusabstractis quemadmodum nisi sciremus naturam intellectus non possemus intelligere quod virtutes moventesdebeant esse intellectus etc.’ cumque prefa- tus Genesis textus ibidem scilicet circahumanam productionem tamen non autem circareliquas dicat: ‘et dixit Deus faciamus’ quibus videbatur quodammodo angelos alloqui, docet quidem huiusmodi intellectivamnaturam ab eisdem angelis Dei iussu emanareutsupra, et hoc quia tunc Deus dedit eis potentiam influendi huiusmodi naturam quam Dei imaginem appellat ab eodem Deo tunc creatam, quaresequitur dicens ‘et creavit Deus hominemadimaginem suam etc’ et fortasse hoc voluit Platodicens quod Deus iussit angelis ut crearent mortalia prout Aven R. refertincommen- to Metaphysicorum XII, 44.Cumque idem Genesis documentum ibidem dicat ‘quasi ad similitudinem nostram’ videtur inferrearbitrariam voluntatem, qua fit quodammodoDeo similis et angelis per quantoest agens cum cognitione,cuius oppositum accidit naturali agenti, similitudo enim per formam formam vero per actiones consideramus.Meritotamen ponitur ly quasi inferens quod non est omnimodasimilitudo, ab angelis enim differt in suis actionibus quoad arbitrium, aDeo vero quo ad arbitrii nobilitatem. Quibus demonstrative docet eiusdem Dei imaginis immortalitatem, et hoc quia cum sit quid divine nature et per consequens presit corporeis etiam celestibus licetsint Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 115

cens quod Deus iussit angelis ut crearent when he says that God ordered the an- mortalia prout Aven R. refert in commen- gels to createthe mortal beings, as Aver- to Metaphysicorum XII, .⁴⁶ roes reports in the commentary on Meta- physics ..

In the Hebrew edition, Sforno quotes verbatim the passagefrom the LongCommetary on Metaphysics⁴⁷ in which Averroes mentionsPlato’sopinion accordingtowhich the creator created the angels himself. As Harvey also notes,this agood example of Sfor- no’sskill as abiblical commentator.Hegives new meaning to Genesis 1:26 by reading it in light of the Platonic text.Healso givesanew monotheistic interpretation to the Platonic text:

או כם גן מם דצ וצ תר או רש הב הת יי הנ וא ןת And if so, also with regard to the form פה וע ול ית תו נר בכ מד לכ אש הר מנ אצ םי which it contains,those activities will טה עב יי עם הם וי קת תצ נם חצ יי כם ומ שה םימ be nobler than all the rest of the natural כו צל אב כם מא ור ןה הל ' לא יה הך מש םי שו ימ existents,although some of them are שה ימ הם רא וץ לכ שא בר רה בק בא תו ךי קשח permanent,like the heavens and all ה ' מא םנ אב רמ נו שע אה םד נכ למ בך מפ ילי אי their hosts, as it says [Deuteronomy לש כו בד יר בר תו ני זו " נל אר שה וה הר גש רז זא ,:–]: “They belong to ha-Šem אה יל בת ךר תש יה בה יר תא הז כה חו שה לכ י your God: the heavens, and the highest שו עפ בו דא מם תא שמ תר וי נה דב יל אם מו דחא heavens, the earth, and everything המ ום תנ אן בז בנ לד וכ לח שה יפ וע מכ ו which is in it.Onlytoyour fathersdid הש בת רא מל לע וה הז וא יל צר אה לפ וט בן מאמ ור ha-Shem have affection.” Indeed, it שא הר יב אא ןב שר בד יב וא סר רפ המ אש רח says: “Let us make man,” as though He מאמ יר '' פב מקר '' בד מא ור הש לא רב אא ת was consulting His “familia,” as [in the מה אל יכ בם די וו וצ שה בי אר או הת פנ דס םי ,.case of]the “words of our fathers” [i.e נו אש הר או מב ונ הח the Rabbanan] of good memory.It ⁴⁸ seems that it teaches [us] that God— mayHebepraised—decrees then that there will be the creation of this intellectual potencyand its emanationonman quid immortaleafortiori quidem sequitur ut ipsa Dei imago his prestantior,habeat esse quid immortale.”  Cf. LongCommentary on Metaphysics,1653: “This has been explained by Nicolaos the Peripatetic in his book on the Metaphysics. This is whywesee that the man who has attained this science has achieved the most perfect state of existence, and that it is the best of his actions because it is the action in which the best beingshares. What is said on the authority of Plato’smyth, namelythat the creator created the angels himself and then entrusted them with the creation of mortal animals and remained himself idle and inactive is amyth which it is wrongtotake as truth. It maybethat such an imputation on the creator is the cause of the obligation of the Sabbath in the religion of the Jews.”  Or ʿAmmim, 101. 116 Giada Coppola

from His separate servants or from one of them,and He gave [it] then in aseparate potencytoemanate it,ashas become clear above. And this is perhaps what Platowanted [to say] in his statement which Averroes mentioned in the commentary on Metaphysics , par. : “God created the angels by His hand and commanded that they create the corruptible things. And He stayed at rest.”

The samepassageofthe commentary on Metaphysics 12.44isalso presented in the eighth chapter of Lightofthe Nations, “On the Divine Unity”:⁴⁹

או לו זי רה הצ פא טל ןו מב מא ור שא הר יב אא ןב Et fortasse id voluit Plato in sermone ab שר בד יב וא סר רפ המ אש רח אמ ירמ '' פב קר -Aven R. allegatoincommento Metaphy מ '' בד מא ור מא םנ הז אש רמ פא טל ןו מב מא יר ו sicorum XII,  ubi dicit : “Hoc autem סה ות ימ שם בה רו בא אר תא מה אל יכ בם די וי ,quod Platodixit in suis verbis obscuris או רח יצ הו הל שם בי אר הו וה יו ום פנ דס םי נו אש ר -quod Creatorcreavitangelos manu, de וה בא נמ חו אה ןי אר יו הל יב ונ פכ וש וט כע " ל . inde precepit eis crearealia mortalia et או לו הי יב אא את לפ וט לן שח בו הז בס תר תצק remansit ipse in quiete sine labore, non חא ור ינ שם מא ור רש וא שי עה םצ רה שא ןו הי הי est intelligendus ad litterametc.” Et שפ טו תב לכ תי פה יש וט ות מש הן חא הד שפ טו hoc fortasse putavit Plato ductum illa אל תי וה כה אי אם דח מא םנ יכ אז הת בס אר modernorum ratione ab Aven R. ibidem םע יה תו בה תל מי פו תית לא שא יה דא תע relata, qua scilicet dicitur quod: “Prima וא צי ני וא וז תל מו אה רח נו םי substantia habet esse una et simplex in ⁵ ¹ fine, quoque ab uno et simplici non pro- venit nisiunum.”⁵⁰ And this is probablywhat Plato wanted And perhaps this is what Platowanted [to explain] in the speech which Averroes [to explain] in his statement which Aver- quoted in the commentary on Metaphy- roes mentions in the commentary on sics .,inwhich he says: “This is Metaphysics ,: “This is what Plato what Plato said in his obscure words: said in his obscure statements:the crea- the creator created the angels by his tor created the angels with His hands hands, and afterwards he ordered them and afterwards He gave them the order to create the mortal beingsand he re- that they should createthe generable

 Or ʿAmmim,59–64; Lumen Gentium,45r[49]–47v [53].  Lumen Gentium,46r[51].  Or ʿAmmim,62. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 117

mainedatrest without working. It is not and corruptible [things], and he re- appropriate to understand this literally.” mainedatrest.Itisnot appropriate to And this is probablywhat Plato thought, understand this literally.” Andperhaps accordingtowhat Averroes explains con- this brought Plato to consider the opin- sidering the position of some later phi- ion of some later[philosophers] who losophers saying thatthe first substance said that it is appropriate that the first will be one and absolutelysimple, be- substance is absolutelysimple, the sim- cause from one comes forth the one plicity,and thatfrom asimple being and the simple. nothing willbegenerated except [another] one. Yetthis opinion is not demonstrative,but onlythe opinionofAvicen- na, and,besides him, of otherlater [philosophers].

Sforno not onlyaffirms that angels maybeconsidered as the secondary gods (as in the Platonic tradition), but also that this vision is consistent with the account in Gen- esis. Hence, there is no contradiction between the Jewish tradition and the philosophical position, because the intellectual natures are emanated directlyfrom the Creator. Sforno uses the Platonic idea to interpret abiblical verse, since he quotesPlato (or better,the interpretation givenbyAverroes via Themistius) to clarify Genesis1:26. In Or ʿAmmim,Sforno quotes not onlyGenesis 1:26,but also Psalm 148:2–6, distinguishing the activities of men from the Divine actions and additionallythe difference between men and angels:

בו מא ור דכ ומ נת הו דו עי יש יה פה עו בל ידי הע And when it says “like our likeness,” it הו רכ וה זב יה מד לה לא תי רב וך מל אל יכ וו אל ןכ makes known that there will be an קי הר של רא נה צמ וא הת ופ לע תו טב עב דבלב . יכ -agent [acting]byknowledge and con מא םנ הה מד תו הי הי צב רו וה צה רו תה וו עד -sciousness. Andtherefore, it will be sim פב וע ול הת מנ כש תו ממ הנ מא םנ מא כר מד תו ונ ilar to God—mayHebepraised—and His כםע '' הף מד וי לן וה ור שת הה מד תו וה בא תל י angels. And it is not right thatthis will םלש . זו כה הי דא הם או בנ לד פב וע ול ית בו דצ onlyhappen naturallytothe rest of the המ המ לא תי ' םע יה ותו וד המ לאל תי רב בך נע ןי acting existents, because the likening בה יח הר . זו כה בי יח תר אה יל בת ךר יה לא וע םל will be by form. Andthe form is known טל בו יכ מא םנ טה בו הי הי צמ הד כת תיל . הו הנ .by the activities which follow from it יא תן לכ תי וי רת כנ דב המ קפ רת וצ ונ תי רב אך לב But it says “like our likeness,” together אה םד םע יה תו בו יח יר לי עפ ימ ים יה תה לכ ותי with the [letter] “Kaf” of the resemblance לב ית וט וב הז נב וט ות המ צר ןו אה הל הי נ " ל . like”], to teach [us] that the likening is“] אכ רמ הו רד יכ אל תי נכ בו י ית רש לא אלה not [a] perfect [identity]. Andthis is so

 Or ʿAmmim,100. 118 Giada Coppola

רד כיכ לם יא כת ונ . בו דצ המ וה נא לדב -because man, by his activities, is sepa מהמ אל יכ בם עפ ולו ית ו םע יה ותו וד המ םהל rate in acertain wayfrom God—mayHe עב ינ הן וי ות ופ לע יב יד הע הו הרכ . יכ מא םנ be praised—although he is similar to עפ לו תו מה אל יכ עם הם וי םת יב יד הע הו רכ הה ם God—mayHebepraised—in the caseof לב ית חב רי מה םתא . זו כה בי יה תו שם לכ פב לעו free choice.And this is so because the על לו בם תל הי נת דג תו וכ מח את הו הת הי free choice of God—mayHebepraised עפ לו םת שי הר על לו ום אל קי הר הב הם אטח ,is always for the good, because indeed— קה רו בה עפ ולו הת דא לם יס תב מה את הו the good will be in accordancewith the הו רת לש תו שה לכ למ תה וק םמ במ תל הי וי ות goal. And see: thereisnonoblergoal כש בל ופ עללע לו כם ומ הש יע הד שמ רו בר מא ור than the bringingout of His will—may לה ול וה לכ למ כא וי וכ ' He be praised. But man, although he ⁵ ² also choses freely, sometimes has “a goal that is not good”.And this is so because of his inclinations [to deviate] from the above-mentioned divine will, as it says [Ezekiel :]: “Is my way not just, House of Israel?Isitnot your ways that are unjust?” And in acertain way, he is separate from the angels because of his activities, although he is similar to them because he is an agent in knowledge and consciousness, because indeed, the activities of the angels, although they have knowledge and consciousness, are not freelychosen by them. And this is so because they are an eternallyinact without the opposition of an appetitive faculty.Their activities will forever be right and the sin which occurs in the activities of man as caused by the appetitive [faculty] and the intellect neglectingtostand against [the state of]not forever being an intellect in act will not happen to them, as the poet testifies [Psalms :, ]: “Praise Him all His angels, etc.”

On the one hand, the angels are the separate intellects⁵³ and the pure separate forms; on the other hand, men, who are similar to God and angels, sharing the intellectual

 Forthe exegetical interpretation in Genesis,see Norbert M. Samuelson, Judaism and the Doctrine Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 119

soul with them, are superior to the latter,because human beingspossess freewill, which givesthem asuperiornature.⁵⁴ In the Kitvei,Sforno shares the same ideas: God gave mananopening to acquire knowledge regardingentities that are separate from matter (i.e., angels) through the knowledge of our souls; for instance,the angels are substances separate from matter by definition:

צב מל ונ . הש או צע שם לכ וי צנ יח בו הז תפ הח לא תי ' -In our image. [Who shall be] asub תפ בח ות תר לו נק תו די עי בה צע ימ הם בנ לד םי יב יד תע stance that is everlasting [endowed פנ נש ו with] reason; and thus God, the ⁵⁵ BlessedOne, gave man an opening in His Torahtoacquire knowledge regardingthoseseparate from matter through the knowledge of our souls.

לה ול וה לכ מ־ אל יכ ו , לכ אש הר צע ימ הם בנ לד םי חמ רמו . -Praise Him, all His angels,all sub לכ צ־ אב וי , כה כו םיב . stances which are separate from עו כל םלו .matter מש וש חרי , פש וע תל ים תו מר ופ סר ותמ חא יר םה – לכ ־ All His hosts,the stars. Andboth וכ בכ אי רו Sun and moon,whose actions are מש הי מש םי , גה גל יל שם םה מש םי גב בו גה בם רע אך ל well-known, and afterthem of Creation (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1994), particularly142: “The classical Jewish phi- losophersidentify them with the separate intellects of the astronomyoftheir time. In the case of the sagesand Rashi, these substances, whoare second in power and perfection onlytoGod, turn out to be reified virtues.”  On the imago Dei,cf. the studies of WarrenZev Harvey,particularlyhis lectureatthe second international symposium.  Genesis 1:26.  Cf. Kitvei Rabbi Obadiah Sforno,ed. Ze’ev Gottlieb (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-RavKook, 1987), Gen- esis 1:6–7: הי רי יק בע ות הך םימ – הי טי עב תב ךו מה םי יה וס יד םי מכ גו גל בל ות םכ בס בי , במ יד בל וצ הר צק םת קמ םתצ , אב ןפו אש זי חה קל לע וי מן הן ימ לם דצ אה יו יר וש לב בט אע ידי י . הו הנ זב עה ול הב רכ אח אל זי גה וב בל וא רי יה וס יד י , קו לב אה ריו יא הז יע וס בי כה חר הל וי מת וק לם לח שק הנ ךפ אל די , הו פת טש לא קמ םו בר כה ומ מת קמ מו הו אר וש ן . “ Letthe nature of the elemental waters become as though the form of asphereisgirdlingit, separating one part from the other,insuch manner that aportion of the upper waters adjacent to the air mass change onceagaintothe natureofvapor,this air will now perforce somehow be made into aplacefor the portion of waterwhich changedtovapor.Itwill expand considerably into alargerareathan it was originally.” יו שע לא יה אם הת קר עי – בו יה תו כש שא סר ור צק הת ימ הם סי דו יי מם חת את תו הו לח מק םה נש פה לך בט אע די יי , מכ שו יה בה מא ור ” קי וו מה םי תחתמ שה םימ “ ( ספ טקו ‘ ,) יה רה וא שי רי אד הז לח הק יא יד אי אל תו מהו וק שם רס או םתו מה םי םשמ , עו הש אש ותו ” רה עיק “ מה דב לי הי הי וב חכ וע רצ מו נו אע הת לח הק יא יד שי אל דרי , הו או ” מה םי שא מר לע 120 Giada Coppola

רה יק הע קנ אר מש םי , הו ימ אם רש עמ הל מש םי , .all your stars of light אה יו הר ימ ימ אי רש םה מה םי שא מר לע רל עיק , Youheavens of the heavens,the יו מע די לם דע על םלו spheres which are the highest heav- ⁵⁶ הי לל או ־ת םש יה , יש יה אה הז םש םלש . יו לה ול מכ כו ן ens over the firmament are called יכ וה צא הו נו רב וא , אל דמ רב וק םד יו מע די לם דע על םלו heavens, and youwaters above יש יה נו חצ יי בם תל ני ספ יד לם וע םל the heavens,the air [portion] of ⁵⁷ the waters which are the water abovethe firmament, He also established them forever and ever. Let them praise the name of the Lord, which is the perfect Name. ForHecommanded and they were created, He did not speak before. He also established them forever and ever,which are eternal and incorruptible forever.

רל עיק “ , אב פו שן רי הד לח הק וא רי הי עמ הסו , נו אש הר יא יד בי קמ מו הו אר וש ן . לו הז הב יג שע הם יא הד חל , תי בע וה וי דיל גה םש הו לש וג בה דר , בו תה בע תו ים דבכ וו רי וד , אכ רמ ו ” קל לו תת הו ומ מן םי שב םימ “ ( רי ימ יוה ‘ : י ‟ ג .) צר נו בו מא ור ” שה םימ “ , רה יק הע עמ הב תא חה קל אה יו יר , אכ רמ ו ” יו רק אא הל םי רל יק שע םימ “ ( ספ חקו ‘ .) בו גה עי םש אה די קה טי ירו נה הל יב לו די ער ום קרב , אכ רמ ו ” יו לע נה אש םי קמ הצ אה ץר רב יק לם טמ ער הש “ ( רי ימ וה םש .) בו יה תו צק הת סי דו מה מי יי כה דב מל לע מה אה יו הר לק שא אר לצ ונ גנ טד םעב , וי הר לע עפ לו פת עו רל וצ ינ מי וכ ןו לא כת יל בת יל קפס , אכ רמ ו ” מו השע ידי ו גמ די רה עיק “ ( הת יל ים ‟ ט : ב ‘ .) יו יה ןכ – שנ רא יק םי ןכ גנ טד עב ו . “ Now,sincethe rest of the foundation waters—which remained below those waters that vaporize —gathered together,asitsays, let the waters beneath the heavenbegathered, it should follow that the upper waters which became vapor would have filled the vacuum left by the departureofthe waters. However,Hemade the firmament which separated (the higher and lower waters), in such manner that it was giventhe power of restraint,preventingthe vapor portion—that is, the water which was abovethe firmament—from descending;inamanner that the fashionedatmospheredid fill the void while the vapor remained in its initial position. Now,whenthe moist vaporized water becomes dense, it bringsforth rain, snow and hail as it becomes laden heavily(with water)and descends (to the earth), as it is said, ‘at the sound of His placinganabundanceofwater in the heavens’ (Jeremiah 10:13). What is meant by the term ‘heavens’:isthe firmament which holds back the vapor portion, as it is said ‘And God called the firmament “heavens” (Genesis 1:8). And when the smoke- laden mist comesthere,itresults in thunder and lightning, as it is said: ‘He lifts up clouds fromthe ends of the earth, thunder fromthe rain He makes’ (Jeremiah 10:13). Sincethe elemental waters, which are denser,are abovethe light air,this condition is contrary to nature, indicating that is an act performed by God’sWill, directedwithout adoubt towardapurpose and end as it is said, ‘the work of His hands shall the firmament declare’ (Psalms 19:2).”  Psalm 148:1–2. Obadiah Sforno and the Individual Human Soul 121

In the biblical verses, we find alternateexplanations of the samephilosophicalcon- cepts found in Lightofthe Nations. As in his philosophical work, Sforno considers the angels to be separate substances;theyshare theirspecific nature with the celes- tial bodies, similarlyseparate from matter.Inhis interpretation of the Psalm, Sforno focuses on the creation of the cosmos,i.e., the stars and the firmament,referring once again to Genesis 1:2and 1:7, but also to On the Heavens 2:42.Itisalso interesting to note that Sforno usesasimilar idea in Or ʿAmmim.⁵⁸

עו זל הה יב מא פו בת מא הר הו רא הץ התי ות בו וה -AndHeprovidesthe proofofthis[Gene לכ מו כר בי כה חר יה הת צה רו הה אר וש הנ חב רמו sis :]: “Andthe earthwas Tohu and רה שא ןו וצ הר ימ חו תד ול קנ אר מה רו בכ המ תם וה Bohu,” that is to say: becausethe first בו וה מו נמ נו הת הו הב תש ונ ות פב ינ מם חת פל םי form wasnecessarily in theprime matter בו לח יק מם חת פל םי ממ ונ שח שך וה אא יו נר רדע specialisedfor it,and thecomposition of אה רו לע נפ תי וח שם םה בה ' סי דו תו כה דב םי them wascalled “Tohu andBohu.” And שא אר לצ מה כר וז סוה ףי או רמ רו חו לא םיה from it, throughchangeindifferent רמ פח עת פל ינ מה םי הל יב ון הל רו תו וה יי הת שא -ways andindifferent partsofthem, dark יה וס יד שי יה בה נה תע צע נם דב מל ינ וע רמ ףח ,[.ness,which is airdeprivedoflight [ibid תא חה שו עך פל ינ מה םי יכ מא םנ עה מצ םי wasgenerated “abovethe abyss,” which נה דב יל ים רק וא ור אח הל םי אב רמ בו יס רופ is made up of thetwo heavyelements עמ הש רב שא תי וע הש למ כא וי ור תוח . וה יד אע ם i.e., earthand water],which arenextto] ןכ רש ףח הו ינ הע וא רי לע מה םי בו ןכ יה קה תצ ו thecentre. Andhecontinues: “Thespirit חל צמ קד בר ות לא מה םי קו תצ חו ום בי לש שבו of Godwas hovering on thesurface of וצ הר שא יי מת דצ וק בר ות לא גה גל ול נת עו ות ,thewater,” to convey elementary fire מכ שו יב רא רא סי וט ' סב בי הת שא יה וס יד י that it was[generated] by thepropulsion סב רפ שה ימ ום עה לו מם מא בר ' רפ מק '' ב . -of aseparate substance, moving andhov eringoverthe darkness on thesurface of thewater,because theseparatesubstan- cesare called “thespiritofGod,” as told in thestory of theworkofcreation [Psalms :]: “He makesHis angels spirits.” Andittestifies, if so,thatHehov- ered over theair andmoveitonthe water. Andtherefore,partofitbecame moistbyits proximitytothe water, and part of it (became) warm anddry,taking on afieryformbyits proximitytothe sphere andits movement,asAristotle explains thecause of elementary fire in On theHeavens ..

 Or ʿAmmim,32. 122 Giada Coppola

Sforno tries to harmonise philosophyand the Torahinadouble sense: from one side, in his Kitvei,hegives some philosophical doctrines belongingtothe Aristotelian tradition in order to explain the biblical verses.Onthe other,heconcludes each chapter of his philosophical enquirywith abiblical verse to show that onlywith the light of the Torah⁵⁹ is it possibletounderstand the ultimateend of the cosmos and of human beings:

ןה בר םי מא יר פש נר אצמ םי סב רפ קי שד ומ םיר But manybeautiful words are found in דמ תו הו הנ וג נת רו וא [ ת ] צב קד תל ןק לו רדס [the HolyScripture which teach [us נמ שפ עו בד רש הל וט םת דה ךר ךא וט לב רב י -great thingsabout righteousness in eth בבל ⁶⁰ על ור סך קפ תו אמ רז זי קי תו צמ קי תו ics and politics to improveand orderly מו יד וב נת שפ תב לח הת יע ןו לו כה יר אע כת םל arrangeboth soul and bodytoturn אב רמ תו הט רו תו םע אר וי בת ורור עת כל נל םלע them towards the [right] way. But it is לא לה יח עי לו לם מא ית צו אי מו פש יט פס לר ה ' good for those of clean hearts to present דל רו doubts, flamingarrowswhich disturb [us] and cause sorrow to the soul, at the beginning of the inquiryand to over- whelmthemall with pure words and with clear arguments about all that is mysterious. These [words] are for the life of the [future] world. They bring forth justiceintruth. This shall be told about ha-Shem to the [coming] generation.

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 Or ʿAmmim,9.  As Harvey suggests,this is an implicit referencetoPsalm 73:1 (“Surely God is good to Israel, even to such as arepureinheart”)and Isaiah 50:11. Obadiah Sforno and the IndividualHuman Soul 123

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1Introduction

The Flemish thinker Arnold Geulincx (1624–69)isknown among historians of philos- ophyasone of the founders of modern occasionalism, the view that God alone, not creatures, exerts causal efficacy.¹ Being counted among the modern occasionalists, Geulincx has alsobeen associatedwith awide variety of philosophical tendencies. Whereas for some, he is merelyaminor disciple of Descartes, for others, he is the missing link between Descartes and Spinoza.² Acertain line of interpretation (nota- blyrepresented by Cassirer)sees Geulincx as aprecursor of Kant.³ Accordingtode Vleeschauwer,Geulincx is the first thinker who explicitlyequatedknowing and doing,thus paving the wayfor the constructivism of Giambattista Vico and Benedet-

 Comparethis brief characterisation of occasionalism with that of Clatterbaughinhis TheCausation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637–1739 (New York: Routledge,1999), 97.The other founders of modern occasionalism wereLouis de La Forge(1632–66) and Géraud de Cordemoy (1626–84), although Geulincxdeveloped his own occasionalistic conception independentlyofthem. See Jean-Christophe Bardout, “Occasionalism: La Forge, Cordemoy,Geulincx,” in ACompanion to Early Modern Philoso- phy,ed. Steven Nadler (Boston: Blackwell Publishers,2002),140–51.Modern occasionalism would reachits apex with Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715); regarding the affinities and divergences between Geulincx’sand Malebranche’soccasionalism,see Steven Nadler, “Knowledge,Volitional Agen- cy and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx,” BritishJournal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 263–74.Ihave explicitlysaid “modern” occasionalism, for avariation of this view (or group of related views,asoccasionalism is not ahomogeneous trend or school) alreadyexisted in medieval Muslim philosophy. See Ludwig Stein, “Antikeund mittelalterliche Vorläufer des Occasionalismus,” Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie 2, no. 2(1888): 193–245; also Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus:Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken (Göt- tingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,2000). Forathorough reconstruction of the emergenceofoccasion- alism after Descartes, see Rainer Specht, Commercium mentis et corporis.Über Kausalvorstellungen im Cartesianismus (Stuttgart-BadCanstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Günther Holzboog], 1966).  This is BernardRousset’smain thesis in his posthumous work Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza (Paris:Vrin, 1999). In the earlyeighteenth century,Geulincxwas accused of Spinozism by Christian Thomasiusand Ruarda Andala. His philosophyhas been suspected of Spinozism ever since. See H. J. de Vleeschauwer, “Three Centuries of GeulincxResearch: ABibliographical Survey,” Mededelings van die Universiteit vanSuid-Afrika 1(1957): 1–72, and especiallyHan vanRuler, “Geulincxand Spinoza: Books, Backgrounds and Biographies,” Studia Spinozana 15 (2006): 89–106.  However,Cassirer also stresses the large gapbetween Kant and Geulincx. See Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit,3rd ed. (Berlin: VerlagBruno Cassirer,1922),1:552.

OpenAccess. ©2020 José María Sánchez de León Serrano, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-009 126 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

to Croce.⁴ Despite these multiple affiliations and fatherhoods—or perhaps because of them—Geulincx’sphilosophyhas rarelybeen studied for its own sake and remains widelyunknown.⁵ With the exception of de Lattre’sseminal work,⁶ we are still await- ing athorough studyofGeulincx’smultifaceted thought. Without pretending to fill this lacuna, the present studywill focus on Geulincx’s remarkable approach to human cognition and its extent,which constitutes the basis of his entire philosophy, includingthe occasionalism for which he is known. Geu- lincx’sposition in this regard is at first glance extremelyambivalent,ifnot incoherent.Onthe one hand, he seems to denythe possibilitythat the human mind may attain genuine knowledge and to embrace ahopeless scepticism. On the other,he presents his own philosophyasatrue metaphysics,which he defines as knowledge of thingsasthey are in themselves, independent of our consideration. Moreover,in his metaphysics,heendorses aquasi-pantheistic conception—quite reminiscent of Spinoza’s—that prima facie is the antipode to scepticism. Iwill try to make sense of these disparate claims and arguethat they actuallyform acoherent whole. In particular,Iwill show how Geulincx’ssceptical distrust of our cognitive powers leads him to embrace aform of mental holism, accordingtowhich the human mind is just aparcel or sub-region within an infiniteintellect.Furthermore, Iwill examine how our containment within God’smind enables us to grasp necessary truths but prevents us from understandingthe created world, whose existenceisacontingent fact that is unaccountable by reason. The example of Geulincx will thus reveal that afecund scepticism can, by discardingcertain objects as unknowable, open up areas of exploration that were hitherto considered impenetrable. Iwill structure my exposition as follows. In the next section, Iwillexamine Geulincx’sgeneral position on human cognitionand its apparent inconsistencies. In the third section, Iwill reconstruct Geulincx’sreasoning process in the first part of his True Metaphy- sics (Metaphysica vera), which seamlessly moves from an initial scepticism to ascer-

 See H.JdeVleeschauwer, “Lesantécédants du transcendentalisme. GuelincxetKant,” Kant-Stud- ien,45, 1–4(1953): 246–47.  Geulincx’sonlysignificant follower was RichardBurthogge(1637/38–1705), whostudied at the Uni- versity of Leiden in 1661and almost certainlyattended Geulincx’slectures. Geulincx’sinfluence is clearlyrecognisable in his Essay upon Reason and the NatureofSpirits (London: Dunton, 1694), which he dedicated to John Locke. Regarding Burthogge’sthoughtinconnection with Geulincx’s, see Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem,1:543–53;Michael R. Ayers, “RichardBurthoggeand the Origins of Modern Conceptualism,” in Analytic Philosophy and HistoryofPhilosophy,ed. TomSorell and G.A.J.Roger (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 179–200. Furthermore, scholars have unsuccessfullyattempt- ed to establish alink between Geulincxand Leibniz, mainlydue to Leibniz’ssimile of the two clocks, which also appears in Geulincx, despitethe fact that Eduard Zeller conclusively demonstrated in 1884 that thereisnosuch influence. See Eduard Zeller, “Über die erste Ausgabevon Geulincx’ Ethik und Leibniz’ Verhältnis zu Geulincx’ Occasionalismus,” Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preußischen Akade- mie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 29,no. 2(1884): 673–95.  Alain de Lattre, L’occasionalisme d’Arnold Geulincx (Paris:Éditions de Minuit,1967). Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 127

taining our containment in God’smind.⁷ In the fourth section, Iwill examine Geu- lincx’sdemonstration of the existence of acorporeal world by means of the notion of time. In the fifth and final section, Iwill focus on some aspects of Geulincx’scritique of Scholastic philosophywhich indirectlyilluminatehis own philosophical approach.

2Scepticism and the Priority of the Knower over the Known

Geulincx’sepistemological position is summarised in an explanatory note from his short treatise Metaphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind (Metaphysica ad mentem peripateticam).⁸ Neither the nature of this treatise (whichIwill brieflydiscuss in the last section) nor the context in which Geulincx inserts this explanatory note is important for us now.The text in question reads as follows:

We should not consider things insofar as they aresensible (i.e., insofar as they enter into the senses under acertain aspect), nor insofar as they are intelligible (i.e., insofar as we think of them in acertain way). Yetwecannot consider them as they areinthemselves[ut suntinse], from which we see our great imperfection. Therefore, it onlyremains for us to do (which we can and must do) that in the judgment of the mind, whenever we apprehend something under acertain mode of our thought (which we always do, and we cannot do otherwise while we arehuman beings), we always keep in mind that the thingisnot in itself as it is apprehended by us.Evenifwealways attributethe appearancesofthe senses and the intellect to the things themselves, thereisnevertheless something divine in us that always tells us that it is not thus,and onlyinitdoes our wisdom [sapientia]consist,insofar as we arehuman beings.⁹

This passagedistinguishes threewaysofconsideringthings: as sensible, as intelligible, and as they are in themselves. The first two ways show how thingsare in relation to us,both to our senses and to our intellect.Due to their relative character,these two ways of consideringthingsdonot count as real knowledge.Onlythe third waycan

 All references to Geulincx’sworks arefromthe standardedition: Arnoldi Geulincx Antverpiensis OperaPhilosophica,ed. JanPieter Nicolaas Land, 3vols (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1891–93); henceforth OP.The English translations of Geulincxinthis paper aremine.  OP 2:300–301;adpag.200.  OP 2:300–301;adpag.200: “Nos non debemus res considerare prout sunt sensibiles(id est,sub certa specie incurrunt in sensum); neque ut sunt intelligibiles (id est,sub certo modo anobis cogi- tantur). Sed ut sunt in se, non possumus eas considerare; unde videmus magnam nostram imperfec- tionem. Hocunum igitur restat nobis faciendum (quod et possumus et debemus facere), ut judicio mentis,quotiescunque rem aliquot sub modo aliquot cogitationis nostrae apprehendimus (quod equidem semper facimus,nec possumus aliterdum hominessumus), semper hoc teneamus,rem non esse ita in se, ut apprehenditur anobis.Etiamsi nos semper phasmata sensus et intellectus ipsis rebus tribuamus; tamen est aliquid divinum in nobis, quod semper dicit nobis, non esse sic; et in hoc unicoconsistit nostra, quatenus hominessumus,sapientia.” 128 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

rank as knowledge proper,insofar as it apprehends thingsasthey are in themselves; i.e., independent of our consideration. Yetthis description alreadyshows that knowledge is out of our reach, for we cannot,asitwere, go beyond ourselvesand consider thingsfrom astandpoint thatdiffersfrom ours.We seem, therefore, to be trapped in a deadlock and to be unable to overcomeour distorted view of things. In view of this predicament,Geulincx argues, there is onlyone thing that we can (and must) do; namely, to always bear in mind that thingsare not the waythatweperceive and conceptualise them. This awareness (or scruple) is the onlyknowledge available to us and is something divine in us (aliquiddivinum in nobis), for in away,itraises us aboveour cognitive imperfection, yetwithout thereby remedying our condition. Judging by this passage, Geulincx’sposition can be described as a resigned scepticism. Yethis statements in other passages, as well as his attempt to develop ametaphysical system, seem to contradict the epistemological stance described above. In another explanatory note, he affirms that atrue metaphysics considers thingsasthey are in themselves, independent of us.¹⁰ Moreover,hetitles the exposition of his own philosophy True Metaphysics,thus suggesting that he is in possession of the knowledge that—accordingtothe passagequotedabove—human beingsare constitutively unable to attain.Does this mean that Geulincx’sviews concerning human knowledge are simplyinconsistent?Inwhat follows, Iwill show that this is not the case and that Geulincx’smetaphysical endeavour is actuallyasagacioussolution to the predicament described above. Between the mere consideration of thingsasthey appear to us and the (unattainable) apprehension of thingsasthey are in themselves, there is, for Geulincx, athird possibility.This third wayrefrains from considering things and focuses on the consideration of ourselves, i.e., of our minds regardless of their particularcontents. Giventhe general uncertainty of our knowledge,our only certainty is the mere fact that we think and perceive,irrespective of the objects that are thought and perceived. Geulincx calls this fact the “prerogative of the knower over the known.”¹¹ Certainly, knowledge requires bothaknower and aknown thing.Yet whereas the latter can somehow be absent—for instance,when we err— the former must necessarilyexist.Therefore, the onlypossible wayofexpanding our knowledge,once we realise that thingsare not the wayweapprehend them, is by taking our own thought as the point of departure for our philosophical inquiry. ForGeulincx, sceptical doubt is thus the negative flipside of the knower’spriority over the known things. Knowledge does not have its sourceinthe known objects, but in the knower’s self-certainty. Thus, our entire knowledge of the world must exclusively derive from acareful inspectionofourselves, without(unjustifiably) assign-

 OP 2:287.  OP 2:267. Arnold Geulincx:Scepticism and Mental Holism 129

ing anyreality to our perceptions beyond our consciousness.¹² This will be Geulincx’s strategyinhis True Metaphysics,asIwill show in the next section. Before examining Geulincx’sself-explorative approach more closely, we must clear up apossible misunderstanding.Byproposinganexploration of our own thought, Geulincx might seem to be engaginginthe second kind of consideration of the three listed above; i.e., the consideration of intelligible things. YetGeulincx does not simplydismiss sensibleknowledge in favour of intellectual knowledge,understandingthe latter as aknowledge by means of concepts. Forhim, both of them are equallyunreliable, insofar as they are concernedwith particularcontents—be they sensibleorintellectual—thus giving precedence to the known over the knower. Therefore, the self-inspection thatGeulincx proposes does not have the meaningof an inquiry into our basic set of categories or our conceptual apparatus. Forthe same reason, for him, the phrase “self-inspection” does not designate an investigation of the human soul as aspecific object among others or as aspecific realm of reality differentiated from others, for such an investigation would presuppose aprior classification of beings, apreexistent map of reality,asitwere, which we uncritically take for granted before exploring our ownthought. This kind of implicit assumption is preciselywhat Geulincx’s “prerogative of the knower over the known” calls into question.¹³ Hence, the onlyvalid starting point of knowledge is the consideration of our thought simpliciter,without further qualifications. One might rightlyobserve that if we put aside our entire set of basic concepts, the philosophicalinvestigation is left with nothing.Ifour onlycertainty is the mere fact that we think, regardless of what we think and how we think, we can justifiablyclaim that our initial certainty is almostnil. Yetthis objection, far from undermining Geulincx’sendeavour,actually strengthens it.Atthe beginning of the philosophical inquiry,Geulincx demands: “Be- fore enteringmetaphysics, youmust consider yourself empty of all knowledge.”¹⁴ The knowledge that Geulincx is seeking cannot depend on aprior knowledge,for that would contradict the prerogative of the knower over the known. Therefore, and in

 In Geulincx’s Ethics,self-inspectionis—together with self-contempt—one of the constituents of humility,which he views as the most importantofthe four cardinal virtues (that is: diligence, obedience, justice,and humility). Self-inspectionthus constitutes the foundation of both true cognition and ethics.See OP 3:30–37.Regarding the ethical significanceofself-inspection in Geulincx, see An- drea Sangiacomo, “Defect of Knowledge and PracticeofVirtue in Geulincx’sOccasionalism,” Studia Leibnitiana 46,no. 1(2014): 46–63.  One might wonder to which extent Geulincxcan actuallycarry out this questioning of givencat- egories,for he presupposes the real distinctionbetween the corporeal and the mental, in which respect he still moves within aCartesian framework. See the conclusion to this paper.For athorough comparison between Descartes and Geulincxregarding their criticism of receivedcategories and notions,see Mark Aalderink’s Philosophy, Scientific Knowledge,and Concept Formation in Geulincx and Descartes (Utrecht: Zeno, 2010).  OP 2:140: “[…]necessum est,utante ingressum in Metaphysicam consideres the ipsum ut vacuum ab omni scientia […]” 130 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

order to attain indisputable certainty,the philosophical inquiry must start from a zero-pointofknowledge.

3Geulincx’sAutology: Self-Inspection and Mental Holism

Geulincx’smain philosophicalwork, the treatise True Metaphysics,¹⁵ begins with an Autology (or self-knowledge), continues with a Somatology (or knowledge of the corporeal world), and concludes with a Theology (or knowledge of God).¹⁶ In this chapter,Iwant to focus on the first sections of his Autology and show how Geulincx’s initial scepticism seamlesslyexpands into the affirmation of an all-encompassing mind, of which the human mind is alimited parcel or sub-region. As already noted, the priority of the knower over the known dictates that atrue metaphysics cannot be derivedfrom aprevious knowledge.Thus, in asimilar waytoDescartes in his Meditations (and obviouslyfollowing his example), Geulincx establishes that we must doubteverything before enteringthe path of true knowledge.Yet he insists that this procedurehas nothing to do with the usual attitude of the sceptics, who do not aspire to knowledge and are content with remaininginpermanent doubt.Incontrasttothe sceptics, Geulincx intends to attain genuine knowledge while at the sametime remainingwithin the limits of the sceptical scruple described above. Therefore, the general doubtthatheproposes at the beginning of his True Metaphysics is onlythe threshold to afundamental, radical knowledge.¹⁷ Geulincx looselyadopts Descartes’smeditative approach in the first reflections of his Autology,onlytoderivequite different conclusions from Descartes, as we will soon see. Thus, he starts by observing that even if Iconsider myself empty of knowledge and uncertain of everything,itisindubitable that Iexist as athinking being.Therefore, cogito,ergosum. Even the stubbornest sceptic would have nothing to counter this certainty,which Geulincx calls the “prima scientia” (i.e., first discernment or first knowledge)ofhis Autology.¹⁸ Allfurther knowledge thatwemight attain must entirelyderive from this first certainty,without surreptitiouslyintroducing foreign elements. It is noteworthythatGeulincx avoids—as much as he can—using the word “res” with respect to the ego,for the fact that Ithink does not entail that Iama self-sufficient thing or asubstance. To draw such ahasty conclusionwould be are- lapse into the “reifying” thinkingthat Geulincx is trying to overcome and to privilege known thingsoverthe knower.Aswewillsee, it is preciselythis strict adherenceto

 OP 2:139–98;annotationsinthe same volume, 266–310.  The treatise also contains an introduction in which Geulincxelucidates, among other things,the relationship between metaphysics and the rest of the sciences.  See Rousset, Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza,50.  OP 2:147. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 131

his methodofself-inspection and the refusaltoreify thoughts that will enable Geu- lincx to overcome the limited scope of the ego. In anycase, having ascertained that Iexist as athinking being,Iobserve an infinitevariety of thoughts or modi cogitandi in myself. Iamaware that Isee,touch, hear, etc. Besides these kinds of sensations, Ialso observefeelings in myself such as love, fear,and hatred, as well as mental operations such as affirming,associating,denying,inferring,and the like. All these thingsare modes of my thoughtofwhich Iamaware and certain. We can thus establish asecond discernment,immediatelyderivedfrom the first,towit: Ihaveanin- finite variety of modes of thought.¹⁹ Geulincx observesthat the ascertainment of this truth does not commit us to affirming the existenceofthingscorresponding to these diverse modi cogitandi. If Iperceive alight,for instance, that does not mean that there is indeed alight beyond my perception, or,inthe event that there is, that the thing in question is the wayIperceive it.The sameapplies to all the things Ihear,smell, touch, etc. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Ihavesuch perceptions, which are nothing but modes of my thought. Having established that Ithink and thatIcontain an infinite variety of modi cogitandi,Geulincx goes astep further by observing that despite the plurality of thoughts Ifind in myself, Iamsomething (quaedam)thatissimple, undivided, and devoid of parts.²⁰ Imay have abodythat is divisibleinto parts—which is still uncertain—but as athinkingbeing,Ihave no parts. Certainly, Ithink and perceive amultitudeofdiverse things, yetthe one that thinks and perceivesthis diversity is one and the same,and hence simple. When Isee, touch, and even when Iphiloso- phise, Iam, in all these different actions, the same “I.” Iwill return to the simplicity of the ego in the next section, when Iexamine Geulincx’sdemonstration of the ex- istenceofacorporeal world. The ascertainment of my simplicity leads to the next, decisive discernment; namely, thatthere are manythoughts in me that do not depend on me (multae suntinme, quae amenon dependentcogitationes).²¹ Iobserve aplurality of thoughts and sensations in myself that do not arise whenever Iwant. The simple act of observing the world around me fills me with impressions that take place in me independentlyofmywill. ForGeulincx, the given or found character of these thoughts is incompatible with the possibility of my mind being the author of them. “Givenness”²² and efficacy exclude each other,for efficacy bringsinto exis- tencesomething that was not therebefore, i.e., that wasnot given. Now,Geulincx argues, if Iamnot the cause of these thoughts,something other than me must cause them,for it is impossiblethat they come from nothing or merelyhappen spon-

 OP 2:148: “Varios habeocogitandi modos in infinitum.”  OP 2:149: “Egosum res una atquesimplex.”  OP 2:149.  Iemploy the notion of the “given” here in asimilar waytohow Salomon Maimon would charac- terise it acentury later in his Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie (Berlin: C.F. Voss,1790), 203: “Eine Vorstellung, deren Enstehungsartinuns, uns unbekannt ist” (“arepresentation whose means of origination in us is unknown to us”). 132 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

taneously.Itmight seem at first that they come from my body, but Istill do not know whether abodycan produce such sensations in me and, if so, how. We thus arrive at the central insight of Geulincx’sself-explorative approach, the one thatwill enable him to go beyond the limited scope of the ego. We have just seen that the infinite variety of thoughts in me that Ihavenot produced must come from something otherthan me. Now,the othernessthat causes all these thoughts in me must be aware that it causes them and of how it causes them; knowledge must nec- essarilyaccompanythe production of all these modi cogitandi. Geulincx observes that this requirement—i.e., no causation without knowledge—is actuallyaself-evident principle, which we onlyfail to grasp due to deeplyentrenched prejudices. Forinstance, we are used to thinking that when we approach afire and feel warmth, the fire produces that warmth. In like manner, we assume that the sun produceslight and that awaterfall produces aparticular noise. Put differently: we unjustifiablyas- sume that thingsthat are devoid of thought can be efficacious and bringabout certain effects. Yetthis prejudice dissolvesassoon as we payheed to the following self- evident truth: “That which youdonot know how to do, youdonot do” (“quod nescis quomodofiat,idnon facis”;henceforth, the quods nescis principle).²³ To make this principle clearer,recall that consciousness is the onlymeasuring stick or valid criterion in Geulincx’sinquiry and that we are not allowed to illegitimately introduce extra-mental elements. Since we do not know of anyefficacy except the one we im- mediatelyexperience in ourselves—i.e., one accompanied by knowledge—the notion of efficacyonlyhas meaning within the mental sphere.²⁴ From this,itfollows that the

 OP 2:150.Concerning the historical rootsofthe principle quod nescis,which go back to Galen’s De Foetus Formatione,see Emanuela Scribano, “‘Quod nescis quomodo fiat,idnon facis.’ Occasionalism against Descartes?,” Rinascimento 51 (2011), 63–86;see also AndreaSangiacomo, “Geulincxand the Quod Nescis Principle,” in TheOxford HandbookofDescartes and Cartesianism,ed. Steven Nadler, TadM.Schmaltz, and Delphine Antoine-Mahut (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2019), 450–64.In his illuminatingstudy, Sangiacomo shows that the quod nescis principle is alien to Cartesian philosophyand rather has its rootsinlateScholastic thought. According to Sangiacomo,this principle can equallybeused to support the autonomyand efficacyofnatural agents vis-à-vis God (namely, by at- tributingknowledge to them) and to restrict causal efficacytoGod alone (bydeprivingnatural beings of knowledge). Geulincxisclearlyinterested in the seconduse, and he thus attempts to integratethe principle intoDescartes’sdualistic framework, which reducesthe natural world to mereextension (deprivedofthought). This operation enables him to philosophicallyunderpin the Calvinistic view according to which God alone governs all events. Thus,Sangiacomo argues,Geulincx’sendorsement of the quod nescis principle serves aspecific agenda dictatedbyhis Calvinistic creed. Concerning Geulincx’sattempt to elaborate an ethical system (based on Cartesian premises) consistent with Cal- vinism, see van Ruler, “Geulincxand Spinoza: Books,Backgrounds and Biographies.”  Regarding Geulincx’s “subjective” or “mental” approach to the idea of causation—which distin- guishes him from the rest of the occasionalists—see Ursula Renz &Han van Ruler, “Okkasionalimus,” in Enzyklopädie Philosophie,ed. Hans JörgSandkühler (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,2010), 2:1843–46. Hume’srejection of volitional efficacyfeatures strikingparallels with Geulincx’suse of the quod nescis principle. Regarding the possible connection between the twothinkers, see Jason Jordan, “Voli- Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 133

othernessthat producesall these modi cogitandi in me cannot be something that is brutishand devoid of thought.The fire cannot produce the feeling of warmth in me, just as the sun is per se unable to illuminate. The cause of all these effects must be abeing endowedwith consciousness and will, which knows exactlyhow to produce them. We must thus conclude (fifth discernment): “There is someone who knows and wills who is different from me” (“est sciensaliquis et volens diversus ame”).²⁵ Aside from my own existenceasathinking being,Imust admit the existenceofanother thinking being that induces those perceptions in me for which Iamnot responsible. This fifth discernment is full of consequences and contains Geulincx’sentire phi- losophyinembryonic form. Let us brieflyconsider some of its far-reaching implications. We have seen that the “givenness” of certain thoughts excludes the possibility of me beingtheir cause. If Iweretheir cause, Iwould know how to produce them, and thereforeIwould not merely find them in myself, independent of my will. Thus, the givencharacter of certain thoughts in me indicatesthe limitation of my intellect,which would be perfect if it werethe cause of all its thoughts.Aperfect mind does not find anything—i.e., it is not passive or receptive—and thereforeitisthe only author of its thoughts and perceptions. Iamthereforelimited and imperfect,insofar as Iampassive and receptive.Yet Iamnot passive with regardtosomething that is not,inturn, amind. Something devoid of thought—such as abody—cannot act upon me, for,asrepeatedly observed, there is no causationwithout knowledge.Behind the impressions Ihavenot produced, there is not an unknown thing,but the unknown action of another mind. Therefore, if Iamlimited and passive, it is so necessarily with regardtoanunlimited mind. Anotherway of saying this is that Iamalimited intellect within an unlimited,all-embracing intellect,and my being part of it accounts for both my thinking power and my cognitive imperfection.²⁶ Guelincx can thus affirm: “We are from God and belong to God; we are not God Himself, because of our limitations and imperfections, with respect to which we do not belong to God,

tional Efficacyand the Paralytic’sArm: Hume and the Discursus of Occasionalism,” Intellectual His- toryReview 25,no. 4(2015): 401–12.  OP 2:150.  We find asomewhat similar explanation of our cognitive imperfection in Spinoza. See his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect,inOpera,editedbyCarl Gebhardt(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), 2:28;TheCollected WorksofSpinoza, edited and translated by Edwin Curley (Princeton:PrincetonUni- versity Press,1985–2016), 1:33: “But if it is—as it seems at first—of the natureofathinkingbeingto form true, or adequate, thoughts, it is certain that inadequateideas arise in us onlyfromthe fact that we arepart of athinkingbeing, of which some thoughts whollyconstitute our mind, while others do so onlyinpart” (“Quod si de natura entis cogitantis sit,uti prima fronte videtur,cogitationes veras sive adaequatas formare, certum est,ideas inadaequatas ex eo tantum in nobis oriri, quod pars sumus alicuius entis cogitantis,cuius quaedam cogitationes ex toto,quaedam ex partetantum nostrum mentem constituunt”). 134 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

for they do not belong to our being, but to non-being.”²⁷ Observethat just as our limitations and imperfections do not belong to God, nor do they belong to us, for limitation is simply alack of being,and hence our being is not different from God’s. Geu- lincx illustrates this point immediatelyafterwards with the following simile (which drew him accusations of Spinozism): just as avast prairie is divided into parcels, our minds can be considered parcels or sub-regions of God’sunlimited mind.²⁸ If youremovethe parcels—i.e., the limitations—there remains onlyacontinuous and unlimited space. Similarly, if youremoveour cognitive limitations, thereisonlyan infinite mind.²⁹ We can thus see how Geulincx’sself-explorativeapproach, together with the quod nescis principle, enables him to reestablish the continuity between the infinite and the finite and to embrace aform of mental holism. It is noteworthythat Geulincx arrivesatthis bold conclusion without ever abandoningthe element of thought; i.e., by focusing on our consciousness alone and without presupposing anything previouslyknown.³⁰ Iobserved in the previous section that for Geulincx, scepticism is the negative flipside of the knower’spriority over the known. Now we can affirm that mental holism is the positive flipsideofGeulincx’sscepticism. YetalthoughGeulincxadvocates mental holism—i.e.,thatall mindsare butone mind—he does notthereby advocate idealism;i.e., that thewhole of realityisofa mental nature.AsIwill show in thenext section, he contends that Godcausesanin- finite variety of thoughts in me throughthe mediationofthe body.Hence,there is after allsomething external to themind, whichisnot just anothermind, butsomething cor-

 OP 2:269: “Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemusadDeum; non sumus tamen ipse Deus, propterlim- itationes et imperfectiones nostras, respectu quarum ad Deum non pertinemus, quia non pertinent ad nostrum esse, sed ad non-esse.”  OP 2:269; also 293. Rousset argues (Geulincx entre DescartesetSpinoza,86) that our mind’scon- tainment within God’smind is not to be takenliterally, but rather in the sense that our minds are imperfectinstantiations of God’sperfect mind. Rousset’smain reason for rejecting mental holism in Geulincxisthe fact that Geulincxstill conceivesthe relationship between God and His creatures in terms of “creation,” anotion that in Rousset’sopinion is clearlyincompatible with holism or monism. Against Rousset,itmust be notedthat Geulincxexplicitlyequates “creation” with God’s “self- limitation.” See the followingpassagefromhis Annotata latiorainPrincipiaPhilosophiaeRenati Des- cartes (OP3:381): “Quod Deus creare possit,abaeternitatesua habet; cum enim inde primus sit, atque ideo etiam illimitatus,potest etiam ille aliis quibusdam, quod in se eminentissime et illimitate habet, limitatecommunicare, dando illis portionem istius naturae, quam ille sibi totam et illimitatam vindicaverat. Limites enim ponendo certis suis perfectionibus, eas quodammodo alienat et extrase ponit,easdem tamen sibi retinens quatenus illimitatae sunt.” Regarding Geulincx’saccount of creation as self-limitation, see Brian Cooney, “Arnold Geulincx: ACartesian Idealist,” Journal of the His- toryofPhilosophy 16,no. 2(1978): 167–80.  OP 2:239: “Removeenim atelimitationem illam, qua intellectus tuus ita circumscriptusest,utin futurum prospiciat nihil, de praeteritis pauca recolat,depraesentibus non multa sciat,multa de rerumnatura ambigat, multa ignoret; his omnibus limitationibus […]ablates, quid nisi Deum ipsum, infinitam mentem aqua praecisus fueras,apprehendis?”  He himself stresses this (OP2:239;italics mine): “Et certecum bene hanc remperpendimus, nos ipsos examinando,cum id quod ad praecisionem, abstractionem, limitationemque pertinet,anobis removerimus, clarissime Deum ipsum in nobis agnoscimus et nos in illo.” Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 135

poreal anddevoidofconsciousness.Yet this does notchangeany of theimplications just drawn concerningthe fifthdiscernment.Since causationrequiresknowledge, Icannotproperlysay that fire causes warmth in me,but ratherthatGod uses fire as an instrument to producewarmthinme. Here,wecan recognise Geulincx’soccasionalism;i.e., theviewthatonlyGod hascausalefficacy. By establishing that there is no efficacy withoutconsciousness, Geulincx is committedtoaffirming theexistence of an omniscient beingthatconcentratesall efficacy in itself.Certainly,the mere prin- cipleofquod nescis does notdeprive me of allefficacy: although Iampassive regard- ingcertain thoughts,Iam theactualsourceofothers, such as my intentions,volitions, consents,denials,and thelike. Yet, in anycase, Icannotbring aboutanythingbeyond my ownmentalsphere withoutthe assistance of another(knowing) being. Forin- stance,Icannot move my ownlegs solely in virtue of myself,for Icannotexert an action on athing that Ihavenot produced,suchasmybody, even if Ifeelittobe“mine.” My body is something giventome,and thereforesomethingthatisforeigntomy knowledgeand as such asignofmymentallimitations.Inevery action of mine in whichsomethingforeigntomymindisinvolved, Icannotbethe only cause, and theconcurrenceofanother knowingbeing thereforeisindispensable.Considernow theentire createdworld as an infinite aggregateoffinitebeings—be they mindsorbod- ies—interactingwithone another. Theirinteraction is inconceivable withoutGod effect- ingit, forbodiesare devoid of efficacy andparticularminds do notcause anything beyond thesphereoftheir consciousness. Hence, we must conclude that an unlimited omniscient beingconnectsall particular things with oneanother andconstitutes their unifying principle. Thewords of theapostle thus receivetheir proper philosophical meaning(Acts 17:28): “Forinhim we live,and move,and have ourbeing” (“in ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus”).³¹

4Multiplicity,Time, and Corporeality

After demonstrating that an infinite mind causesthose thoughts in me for which Iamnot responsible, Geulincx goes on to demonstrate that it produces these thoughts by means of abody, not immediately. To show this is the purpose of the sixth and seventh discernments of the Autology,inwhich Geulincx’sreasoningbe- comes somewhat obscure. His argument,inbroad strokes, runs as follows. Recall that the human mind is something simple and undivided: Iamone and the same throughout my various mental states.God is also amind, and hence is equallysim- ple and undivided. Now,since variety cannotemanate from something simple (at least directly), the variety of thoughts Ifind in myself cannot emanate either from me or from God. Such variety is onlyexplainable by means of something intrinsically multiple or susceptible to multiplicity.Such is the case with matter (or extension),

 OP 2:239; also 293. 136 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

which—in contrast to the mental—admits division and multiplicity. Yetthe mere notion of extension does not entail division, but merelysusceptibility to being divided. Considered in itself, extension is something homogeneous and uniform.Inorder for multiplicity to emerge from mere extension, there must also be motion, which, together with matter, generates the diversity of figures we encounter in the corporeal world.³² Since mere corporeality is unable to generate motion, God must be the one who—by acontingent decree of His will—introduces motion, and hencevariety, into the corporeal world.³³ The diversity of my thoughts is thus duetothe diversity introduced by God in inert extension. It might seem here thatGeulincx betrayshis own self-explorativeapproach by surreptitiouslyintroducing an unjustified assumption; namely, the existence of acorporealworld besides the mental.If, up to this point,Geulincx has remained within the limits of amere self-inspection, the sudden talk of corporeality in the sixth and seventh discernments seems to violate this restriction.Atfirst glance, it is alsounclear whyGeulincx needstointroduce corporeality (and motion) in order to account for the diversity of our thoughts.Wehaveseen that the “givenness” of our thoughts indicates the existenceofanother mind, which —in contrasttoours—is unlimited and able to generate impressions in us without our will. If our containment in God’smind alreadyaccounts for our limitation and passivity,and hence for the existenceof“given” thoughts in us, whydoes Geulincx addi- tionally need to invoke something extra-mental? Whycan he not attribute the variety of our thoughts directlytoGod’sefficacy?Clarifying this question is the goal of the following considerations. Despite appearances, the introduction of the corporeal in this context is far from gratuitous (although its actual justification appears much laterinthe text,inthe So- matology).³⁴ The keytothe present difficulty lies in the notion of time. Time and succession presuppose motion, for if everything wereatrest,itwould make no sense to talk about time.Motion, in turn, presupposes corporeality,for onlybodies are susceptible to motion. Now,Iam conscious of time and there is acertain succession of mental states in me. Hence, since time presupposes motion, there must be bodies in motion, and thereforeaphysical world! Note thatGeulincx is not saying thatphys- ical motion (from which time derives) causes avariety of mental statesinme, but rather that God uses physical motion as ameans to produce this variety of mental states.Asalreadynoted, entities devoid of thought such as bodies are unable to pro- duceanything by themselves, either among themselvesorinmeasathinking being. God is therefore ultimatelyresponsible for the succession of mental states in me. Yet since time is inconceivable without physical motion, the temporality of my mental states necessarilyrequires the mediationofthe corporeal. The gist of Geulincx’sargu-

 ForGeulincx, division and motion arethe same thing. See OP 2:279, ad pag.176.  The idea that physical motion can onlybecaused by amind would reappear,outside of occasion- alist circles, in George Berkeley’sessay De motu,written and published in 1721.See TheWorks of George Berkeley,ed. Alexander Campbell (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1901), 1:487–527.  OP 2:176–77. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 137

ment is the following:ifthe mind werethe onlyexisting reality,therewould be neither plurality nor mutability,onlyarigid and undifferentiated simplicity.³⁵ Difference and mutability are foreign to pure thought,which—as the third discernment has alreadyshown—is one and simple. Therefore, besides pure thought, we must assume the existenceofabeing capable of being modified, differentiated and divided, in order to account not onlyfor the temporality of mental states,but also for the exis- tenceofdifferenceand multiplicity as such. We onlyfind such susceptibility in the corporeal. Certainly, God’screation of acorporealworld and the suffusion of motion in it are incomprehensible events for us. Theemergence of multiplicity and mutability from the divine mind, although an undeniable fact,isamystery beyond our cognitive grasp.³⁶ Iwill return to this point in the next section. The demonstration that God acts on us by means of the corporeal allows Geu- lincx to explain other things, such as the union of my mind with aparticularbody —i.e., “my” body—as wellasthe dissolubility of such aunion (which opens the door to aproof of the mind’simmortality). Moreover,the introduction of the corporeal into the philosophical inquiry sets the basis for aphysical doctrine of aCartesian nature, which Geulincx presents in his Somatology and develops in his True Physics (Physica vera).³⁷ However,dealing with these issues would go beyond the boundaries of this paper.Inany case, Geulincx’sdemonstration of the existence of acorporeal world by means of the notion of time appears to be if not forceful, then at least plausible. As agood Cartesian, Geulincx takes extension and thought as the most fundamental notions and the supreme generaofthings.³⁸ Just as the mental is aprimary reality,unexplainable by something other than the mind itself, the physical has es- sentialfeatures thatcannot be deduced from the mental alone.³⁹ In this respect,

 Here, Geulincxtouches upon adifficulty that would become cruciallyimportant in German Ideal- ism; namely, the origin of differenceand non-identity.Whereas thinkers likeFichte would take non- identity as external to thought, Hegelwould attempt to conceive non-identity as intrinsic to thought (i.e., identity) itself.  We should not forget, however,that Geulincxattempts to provide arational account of the idea of “creation.” See note 28 above.  OP 2:368–457.  See Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy,§48, in ŒuvresdeDescartes,ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris:Vrin, 1974–1989) 8:23; Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. and trans. John Cotting- ham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch(vols.1and 2),and AnthonyKenny(vol. 3) (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,1984–1991), 1:208: “But Irecognize onlytwo ultimateclasses of things:first,intellectual or thinkingthings, i.e. those which pertain to the mind or thinkingsub- stance; and secondly, material things,i.e.those which pertain to extended substance or body” (“Non autemplura quam duo summa genera rerum agnosco:unum est rerum intellectualium, sive cogita- tivarum, hoc est,admentem sive ad substantiam cogitantem pertinentium; aliud rerum materialium, sive quae pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est,adcorpus”). On this point (as in manyothers), Spinoza also appears to be very close to his contemporary and compatriot Geulincx, as they both endorse aholism with respect to both the mental and the corporeal.  It should be clarified that the irreducibility of the corporeal to the mental onlyholds for us (quoad nos), finiteminds,insofar as the infinite’smind creation of extension is beyond our comprehension. 138 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

for Geulincx, thought and extension are—as de Vleeschauwer fittingly puts it— “transcategorial realities” independent of our knowledge.⁴⁰ Note that thatwhich ini- tiallylooked like an unattainable goal—i.e., knowledge of thingsasthey are in themselves—now appears to be the necessary outcome of aself-inspection that is distrust- ful of our cognitivepowers.The initial scepticism has thus developed into alimited, yetindisputable knowledge.Fromthe objectivevantage point thus attained, it is now possibletolook at the common misconceptions of philosophers and unmask the mechanism behind them. As Spinoza repeatedlystresses, “veritas index sui et falsi”:the true accounts for itself and for its opposite, the false.Inaccordance with this principle, Geulincx attaches to his True Metaphysics an annex entitled Met- aphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind,⁴¹ wherehecriticallyexamines the basic notions of Scholasticism, which for him is the philosophicalexpression of common sense. In order thus to completeour brief exposition of Geulincx’sepistemological views, it is pertinent to take abrief look at this work.

5Anti-Dogmatism andthe Critique of Scholasticism

In his Metaphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind,Geulincx declares Peripatetic philosophyfalse from the very outset.⁴² In accordance with the classification presented in the second section, this kind of philosophyisaconsideration of things relative to us,hencedevoid of objective validity.For Geulincx, the falsity of Peripatetic phi- losophycomes from its naive pretension of directlyexploring thingswithout previ- ouslyexploring the knower itself.Peripatetic philosophybarelyproblematises our cognitive access to reality,and thus it takes mere appearances—both sensitive and intellectual—for the thingsthemselves. Insofarasitassigns to the thingsthemselves that which is onlyrelative to us, this kind of philosophyisdogmatic. Geulincx’smain purpose in this text is thus to surmount dogmatism from within by showing the de-

Quoad se,however,the corporeal entirelyderivesfromthe mental, for the corporeal is passive,and the passive is necessarilyposterior (not in temporal terms, but ontologicallyand conceptually) to the active.See OP 2:160–61.  H.J. de Vleeschauwer, “Lesantécédants du transcendentalisme.” Thus,Geulincxclaims (OP 2:240): “Videmus itaque duas res singulares, menteminquam atque corpus,creditas hactenus ut uni- versales: illam Deum […], hoc vero creaturam.” As alreadyindicated in the previous note,weshould avoid construing the distinction between thoughtand extension as arigid dualism, for Geulincx equallymaintains that extension is “eminently” contained in God (see OP 2:300). In this regard, Coo- ney convincinglyargues (see “Arnold Geulincx: ACartesian Idealist”)that extension is only “external” to finiteminds,not to God, whocomprehends everything.  OP 2:199–265.  ConcerningGeulincx’scriticism of Aristotelianism in conjunction with that of Baconand Des- cartes, see Aalderink, Philosophy,Scientific Knowledge,and Concept FormationinGeulincx and Des- cartes,17–64. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 139

ficienciesofits conceptual apparatus. Iwant to focus on Geulincx’scritical examination of two conceptual pairs thatare characteristic of Scholasticism: universality and singularity on the one hand and essence and accidentonthe other.The upshot of Geulincx’scritical assessment will roughly be the following:thatwhich is the most impenetrable and obscure for Scholastic philosophyisactuallythe most knowable for the human mind. Conversely, that which Scholasticismtakes as the most knowable is actuallythe most obscure.Thus, for Geulincx, God’sintellect before creating the world is the most accessible for the human mind, whereas the createdworld is the most impenetrable. In the section dedicated to universality and singularity,⁴³ Geulincx focuses his attention on the main intellectual operation of Scholastic philosophy: abstraction.⁴⁴ It is through abstraction that Peripatetic thoughtgenerates its basic concepts, such as being,substance,the one, etc. Abstraction consists in separating by means of the intellect aparticular content from the integral whole to which it belongsand considering it in an isolated manner.When the separated content is afeature common to various individuals,the product of abstraction is auniversal concept.Inthe case of the most general concepts, such as being or substance, the common feature is not a particularcontent (for such concepts are devoid of content), but an objectified mental operation.⁴⁵ There are cases in which abstraction does not separate something common to many, but instead simply one thing from another,such as when we abstract apoint from aline or aline from asurface. In anycase, abstraction is nothing but amental operation thatdoes not changeanything in the natureofthings. Yet Geulincx alsoobserves—quoting Aristotle—that “thosewho abstract do not lie” (“ab- strahentium non est mendacium”).⁴⁶ That is, we must concede that universals exist in the thingsthemselves, for abstraction selects “something” existing in reality (otherwise it would not be something). However,weshould not thereby assume that the thing thus abstracted exists in exactly this way;i.e., differentiated from the rest.Thus, the actual risk of abstraction consists in attributing aseparate and independent ex- istencetosomething that can onlyexist as part of something else. To illustratethispoint,take, forinstance, thenotionofbody. Particular bodies are finite andhaveaspecific shape. If we select thesefeaturesand universalise them,we mighterroneously conclude that thebodyorthe corporeal as such (simpliciter)ises- sentiallyfiniteand hasashape. Yetcorporealityinitselfisnot theresultofartificially separating (orabstracting) certainfeaturescommontoparticularbodies; rather, par-

 OP 2:235–40.  Regarding Geulincx’stheory of abstraction in the contextofseventeenth-century debates on abstraction, see againAalderink, Philosophy,Scientific Knowledge,and Concept FormationinGeulincx and Descartes,323–49.  Gabriel Nuchelmans traces Geulincx’sreflections on this issue back to the scholastic distinction between actus exercitus and actus significatus. See Gabriel Nuchelmanns, Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant (Amsterdam:North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983), 100–104.  OP 2:236. 140 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

ticularbodiesare abstractionsofthe only existing body—i.e.,extension—whichas such is unlimitedand without shape. As we cansee,the validity of abstraction de- pendsonhow we applythe distinctionbetween theabsoluteand therelative. Since abstractionartificiallyseparates things that originally belong together,the abstracted contentisnecessarily relative to theintegral wholefromwhich it hasbeenseparated. Abstractioncan thus neverprovide access to an absolute andself-containedreality. Putdifferently:wedonot know what corporeality as such is by isolating features from particular bodies,but by removing allparticularities anddelimitations that we have superimposed onto thecorporeal.The corporealnaturemanifestsitselfwhen we eliminateits finite appearances. Thesameapplies to themind: particular minds arelimited andimperfect, butifweremoveall particularity, we will grasp themind as such,which is unlimitedand perfect(recall theanalogy with theprairie andits parcels in thesecond section).Inthisrespect, Geulincx observes that properly speaking, we should nottalkabout bodies andminds,but aboutcorporeal things andmental things.⁴⁷ In sum: abstractionseparates thefinitefromthe infinite,whereas in fact thefinite—i.e.,the delimited, theabstract—exists only within theinfinite andmust be conceivedthrough it. Note that theremoval of allparticularity that Geulincx com- mendsasthe rightway of graspingreality—as opposedtoabstraction—coincideswith thescepticalscruple discussedinthe second section. Only thedistrusttowards our ownsubjectiveforms and modi dicendi (“ways of speaking”)enables us to examine thought as such—i.e.,inanabsolutemanner—thus transcendingall relativity. Let us now pass to the notionsofessence and accident.⁴⁸ Essential is apredicate that necessarilybelongstoathing,sothat it is impossibletodenyitofit. Thus, the essence of the bodyistobeextended,and the essence of the mind is thought.There are also certain “secondary” properties that we can deducethrough reasoningfrom a thing’sessence, such as infinity from extension, its infinite divisibility,etc. There are, furthermore,predicatesofathing that do not necessarilybelong to it,sothat we can conceive the thing without them. Motion, for instance, presupposes extension, but does not immediatelyderive from it,asthe fact that we can conceive of extension without motion makes clear.The connection between these two notions is contingent—we could also say “accidental”—for we cannot movefrom the one to the other through an interrupted reasoning.For Geulincx,there cannot be anysci- ence of the contingent due to this gapinthe reasoningorscala rationis. The existence of contingent thingsdepends solelyonGod’swill, which Geulincx—following Des- cartes—clearlydistinguishesfrom God’sintellect.Tothe classofcontingent things belong the world, the sun, the earth and its parts, human beings,etc. Allthese things fall outside of the realm of the rational, for no demonstration can explain why they exist.Yet the impossibilityof“deducing” the contingent is not incompatible with tracing the root of contingent things. As alreadyshown, Geulincx can demonstrate

 OP 2:286–87.  OP 2:261–65. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 141

the existence of acorporeal world by virtue of the notion of time, which presupposes motion, which in turn presupposes extension. Although the upwards reasoningfrom time to extension is valid, the downwards reasoning from extension to time is not. From the existenceofcontingent things, we can inferthe existenceofacreator, but the existenceofcontingent thingsassuch is rationallyunaccountable, for it exclusively depends on God’sdecree. If we now connect these considerations with Geulincx’sreflections on abstraction, we can see that in away,the contingent and the finite (or abstract) coincide. As alreadyobserved in the previous section, motion generates the variety and multiplicity of thingsinthe corporeal world. Moreover,particular things—be they minds or bodies—are abstractions from unlimited realities without which they cannot be properlyconceived, yetfrom which they cannot be deduced. Thewhole realm of the finite and contingent is thus rationallyunaccountable for us. Thisrealm constitutes the point of departure of Peripatetic philosophy, from which it attempts to as- cend to the apprehension of the absoluteand unconditioned. Yetwehaveseen that the particularcannot provide access to the absolute. Forthis reason, Geulincx affirms thatScholastic philosophyhas an obscure notion of infinite realities.Bycon- trast,for Geulincx,infinite realities—such as thoughtand extension—are the only ones that are transparent to the human mind, as long as it refrains from grasping the particularand focuses on the inspection of its own self. Whereas Scholastic phi- losophyremains imprisonedinaworld fashioned by our subjective view of things, the intellectual itinerary proposed by Geulincx elevates the mind to the “transcategorial,” yetatthe cost of alienating it from the existing world.

6Conclusion

Geulincx’srich thought comprises further aspectsthatrequireaseparate examination, such as afull-blown ethical system,⁴⁹ arelatively innovative logic,⁵⁰ and an out-

 See Ethics (Ethica)inOP3:1–271. The first part of Geulincx’s Ethics appeared in 1665under the title De Virtute et Primis Ejus Proprietatibus. Tenyears later (six years after Geulincx’sdeath), the complete Ethics was published.There is an English translation (which includes Samuel Beckett’snotes): Ethics, with Samuel Beckett’sNotes,trans. Martin Wilson, ed. Han van Ruler,AnthonyUhlmann,and Martin Wilson (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006). Geulincx’sethics features strikingparallels with Stoicism that have been explored by Ruben Buys, “Between Actorand Spectator: Arnout Geulincxand the Sto- ics,” BritishJournal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 18, no. 5(2010): 741–61.Regarding Spinoza’sand Geu- lincx’srespective approaches to human passions,see Mark Aalderink, “Spinoza and Geulincxonthe Human Condition,Passions,and Love,” Studia Spinozana 15 (2006): 67–87.  His main works in this area are Logica fundamentis suis restituta (OP1:165–454) and Methodus inveniendi argumenta (OP2:1–111), the first of which appeared the same year as La logique ou l’art de pensar by Arnauld and Nicole (1662).For instructive accounts of Geulincx’slogic, see Nuchelmans, Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant,99–120; also Karl Dürr, “Arnold Geulincxund die klassische Logik des 17.Jahrhunderts,” Studium Generale 18 (1965–68): 520–41. 142 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

dated yetquite elaborate physics.⁵¹ In this paper,Ihave confined myself to what Itake to be the coreofhis philosophy; namely,the self-explorative approach developed in his Autology. This approach is afine example of how scepticism, farfrom hin- dering philosophical inquiry,can in fact significantlyexpand its scope. Hegel fa- mouslystated thatscepticism is “the free side of every philosophy,” insofar as it raises the mind abovethe limitation and one-sidedness of common sense.⁵² In Geu- lincx’scase, scepticism presumably liberatesthe mind from its subjective forms and its modi dicendi,thus revealing that the mind is one and infiniteand thatour finite mind is just aparcel of it.Furthermore, the temporality of our mental statesindicates the existenceofbodilymotion—without which there would be no temporality—and hence the existenceofaphysical realm beyond the mind itself.Geulincx’sself-inspection thus results in the attainment of two “transcategorial” realities, the mental and the physical. One could justifiably ask here whether these realities are indeedas “transcategorial”—i.e., independent of our knowledge—as Geulincx pretends. Just as Geulincx sharplycriticises the conceptual apparatus of Scholasticism for beingmere- ly “subjective,” he could equallyhavequestioned the objectivity of the (Cartesian) distinction between the mental and the corporeal and subjected it to acritical examination. Yethere we encounter—as Cassirerrightlyput it—“the inner limit” of Geu- lincx’santi-dogmatism.⁵³ Despite his effortstodisembarrass himself from uncritical assumptions, Geulincx stillthinks in Cartesian terms, even if he departs from Des- cartes in crucial respects.Thus, he cannot be critical of Cartesian philosophyto the sameextent thatheisofScholasticism, preciselybecause Descartes provides him with the conceptual resources to rebut Scholasticism. Thisdoes not mean, however,thatGeulincx accepts the Cartesian understandingofthe mental and the physical without further ado. As has been shown, he attemptstopurify these notions of all traces of “reifying” thinking, apurification that results,among other things, in the de-substantialisation of the human mind and its localisation within the divine intellect.Spinoza arrivedatthe same conclusion, based on the sameCartesian premises. Aseparate studyisrequired to show the differences and similarities of their respective approaches.

 See his Physica Vera (OP2:368–446) and his Physica Falsa s. ad mentem Peripateticorum (OP 2:313–67). Foragood summary of Geulincx’sphysics, see Rousset, Geulincx entre Descartes et Spino- za, 101–28.  GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie,inJenaer Schriften 1801–1807,ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 229.  Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem,1:540–41. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 143

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Spinoza is known to have made it the business of his philosophytopresent us with the most immediate alternative to Descarteswith regard to virtuallyevery fundamental philosophical subject: while Descartesisadualist,Spinoza is at once amonist (with respect to substance) and apluralist (with respect to attributes); while for Descartes, philosophybegins with the I, for Spinoza, it begins with God or the self-caused; while Descartessharplydistinguishes between the human intellect and the will, consideringthe former finite and the latter infinite, Spinoza insists that they,like all the other faculties,are one and the same thing;like others, notably Malebranche, Spinoza rejects Descartes’smind–bodyinteractionism,ridicules the notion that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul, and argues instead for aparal- lelist conception of the psychosomatic relation; while for Descartes,wonder (admiration)is“the first of all the passions,” for Spinoza, wonder (admiratio)isnot even a passion, but merely “an imagination of athing in which the mind remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with others”;² and the list can be further extended. On the face of it,the subject of scepticism appears to be yetanother case in point: while Cartesianism proceeds from doubt,Spinozism proceeds from certainty. Indeed, the receivedscholarlyview is that in direct opposition to Descartes’smethod of doubt,which is commonlyconsidered aradical formofscepticism that marks the

 Iamvery grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their generous comments and suggestions on adraft of this essay. Ialso thank Máté Veres, Rachel Aumiller,Behnam Zolghadr,NancyAbigail Nuñez Hernández, TimothyFranz, José María Sánchez de León Serrano, Yoav Meyrav, Jonathan Garb, Michah Gottlieb, Haim Kreisel, Julie Klein, and other friends and colleagues at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies for helpful discussions about the themes discussed here.  Forthe quoted texts,see René Descartes, ThePassions of the Soul,§53,and Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics,part 3, definitions of the affects,definition 4. Citations fromDescartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy, Principles of Philosophy,and ThePassions of the Soul aretaken from ThePhilosophical Writings of Descartes,trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 2vols.(Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984–85), hereafter abbreviated as CSM. Citations from Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,abbreviated as TdIE), Political Treatise (Tractatus Politicus,abbreviated as TP), Ethics (Ethica,abbreviated as E), and Theological-Political Treatise (Tractatus theologico-politicus,abbreviated as TTP) aretaken from TheCollected WorksofSpinoza,trans. Edwin Curley,2vols.(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985–2016). The abbreviations of subsections of Spinoza’s Ethics areasfollows:1–5(part number); d(definition,ifpositioneddirectlyafter digit); a(axiom); p(proposition); s(scholium); d(demonstration, if not positioned directlyafter digit); exp (explanation); pref (preface); app(appendix); l(lemma). Original languagereferences aretoSpinoza Opera,ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4vols.(Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925).

OpenAccess. ©2020Avraham Rot, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-010 146 Avraham Rot

beginning of modernphilosophy, Spinoza’sphilosophyisthoroughlyantisceptical.³ The purpose of this paper is to question this view and to demonstrate thatthe opposite is in fact the case; namely, while Spinoza indeedpresents us with the immediate alternative to Descartes with regardtothis subject as well, this alternative is not antiscepticism, but amore radical, truthful, and realistic form of scepticism. (I am using these qualifications interchangeably.)More particularly, Cartesian scepticism is limited in that it is dichotomous,transitory,dualistic, and narrowly cognitive; Spinozist scepticism is radical, since it is continuous, ongoing,and all-encompassing,that is, at once—or,touse Heideggerian terminology, equiprimordially(glei- chursprünglich)—cognitive,embodied, imaginative,mnemonic, motivated, and affective.Itistrue thatunderthe species of eternity,there appears to be no room for doubt in Spinoza’ssystem. God or nature is indeednot subject to doubt.But this does not mean that thereisnodoubt in God or nature. On the contrary,accordingtoSpinoza, doubt is ubiquitous,for God or nature is necessarilyaffected in agreat many ways, these affections in turn are also necessarilyaffected in agreat manyways, and these latter,secondary affections are necessary features of finite existence that designate the realm of both doubtand affectivity. Ishall proceed as follows. In the next section, Iwill consider the reasons that Spinoza has been regarded as an antisceptical thinker by examining some of his most famous explicit remarks on the subject.Iwill demonstrate that while it is true that Spinoza appears to be speakingagainst scepticism, he does not reject the reality or even the desirability of doubt as such, but rather merelytakes issue specificallywith the sense in which Descartessaysthat he doubts. Spinoza’scontention is that Cartesian doubtiseither insincereormisconceived, and inasmuchas Descartes’svery conception of doubt is untruthfulorfallacious, he employs this term with equal inadequacy both when he considers the validity of clear and distinct ideas and when he considers the reality of the external world. Spinoza’spositive statements about the nature of doubt are scarceand oftenperplexing. The subsequent sections are devoted to the elucidation of the meaning of doubt in Spinoza’s philosophy. In sections 2and 3, Iwill demonstrate thatrather than apurelyintellec- tual act involving the operation of the faculty of reason alone, as it is for Descartes, Spinozist doubt involves the operation of all the faculties in concert and in an equiprimordial manner.Insection 4, Iwill show that Spinoza’sdiscussion of doubtinthe second part of the Ethics,which appears to amount to afew bizarre remarks on the

 Foraccounts pursuingthis line of interpretation, see Willis Doney, “Spinoza on Philosophical Skepticism,” TheMonist 55,no. 4(1971): 617–35,and Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza (London: Rout- ledge,2008), esp. 127–34,263–64,281. Iwould liketothank one of the tworeviewers of this paper,who pointedout that one should takeinto consideration the distinction between epistemological and religious scepticism. It is of course onlywith respect to the former kind of scepticism that Spinoza has been consideredanantisceptical thinker, whereas with respect to the latter kind, which can be understood in terms of secularisation or critical hermeneutics, it is widelyagreed that Spinozaisnot just asceptic, but amajor forerunner of modern scepticism. Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 147

topic, is completed onlyinthe third part of this book. Heredoubtsuddenlymakes sense as Spinoza explicates its affective dimension in addition to its cognitive,perceptual, mnemonic, imaginative,and motivational dimensions. While this is easily overlooked, Spinoza’smost specific and readilyintuitive description of doubtis giveninthe definitions of the affects of hope, fear,confidence, and despair,which Iwill examine in sections 5and 6. By wayofconclusion (section 7), Iwill return to Descartes and consider the various senses in which it can be said that Spinozist scepticism is more radical than Cartesian scepticism.

Spinoza presents his critique of Cartesian scepticism in what is most probablyhis earliest surviving work, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. His point of departure in this context is the argument that it is ridiculous to assume that in order to know something,one should know that one knows it.The problem with this kind of reasoning,heexplains,isthatitleads to an infinite regress. “In order for me to know,itisnot necessary to know thatIknow,much less necessary to know that Iknow that Iknow […]. Fortoknow that Iknow,Imust first know.[…] Forcertaintyand an objectiveessence are the same thing.” Based on this argument, Spinoza formulates his famous conception of truth as index sui et falsi in the subsequent passages:

Sincetruth, therefore,requiresnosign, but it suffices, in order to removedoubt,tohavethe objective essences of things,or, what is the same, ideas,itfollows that the true Method is not to seek asignoftruth after the acquisition of ideas, but the true Method [veraMethodus]isthe way that truth itself, or the objective essences of things,orthe ideas (all those signify the same) should be soughtinthe proper order.[…]The Method must speak about Reasoning, or about the intellection […]. It is understandingwhat atrue idea is by distinguishingitfromthe rest of the perception; by investigating its nature, so that from that we maycome to know our power of understanding and so restrain the mind that it understands, accordingtothat standard [ut ad illam normam], everythingthat is to be understood; and finallybyteaching and construct- ing certain rules as aids,sothat the mind does not weary itself in useless things.⁴

It is clear from these passages whySpinoza has commonlybeen regarded as an antisceptical thinker.The true method proceeds from certainty, from the condition of having atrue idea thatcan serveasastandard with which to assess all other ideas. As Spinoza writes later in the treatise, “doubtalways arisesfrom the fact that thingsare investigated without order.”⁵ Accordingly,what is crucial is that the foundational certainty be established as firmlyaspossible. However,this goal is onlyattainable in virtue of the power of an idea whose certainty has alreadybeen

 TdIE §§ 36–37.  TdIE §80. 148 AvrahamRot

established. In the Ethics,Spinoza designates this idea as causa sui,that whose “essence involves existence”;here, he designates it as God.⁶ This indeedappears to be an unequivocal formulation of astrong antisceptical position. Although what Spinoza explicitlyrejects here is onlythe notion that philosophical inquiry should begin with doubt,itisobvious thathedoes not consider doubt the proper end of it,nor does he appear to consider it anecessary intermediary stage. He thus appears to suggest that if we proceed from the proper foundation and in the right order,nodoubt should arise at anystage. Even morefundamentally, if “certaintyand an objectiveessence are the samething,” the very possibilityto doubt appears to be negated. Giventhat objective essence belongstothe realm of representation, what Spinoza is in effect saying here appears equivalent to Berkeley’s dictum that esse est percipi. Under the constraints of such an epistemology,itisas difficult to make sense of doubtasitisoffalsehood. In the subsequent passages of the treatise, however,itbecomes evident thatSpi- noza does not reject the methodical use or reality of doubtassuch, but specifically the Cartesian conception of doubt.Without mentioning Descartesbyname,though while clearlythinking of him as his immediate interlocutor,Spinoza speaks here not onlyof“true Method,” but also of “true doubt” (vera dubitatio), distinguishing both of them in the same breath from the method and doubtthat one finds in Des- cartes:

Iamspeakingoftrue doubt in the mind [veradubitatione in mente], and not of what we com- monlysee happen, when someone says in words that he doubts,although his mind does not doubt.For it is not the business of the Method to emend that.That belongs rather to the investigation of stubbornness, and its emendation.⁷

That the one who stubbornly “says in words that he doubts, although his mind does not doubt” is no other than Descartesbecomes abundantlyevident afew lines later, whereSpinoza rejects what Descartes famouslypresents as the reason for the most radical doubt; thatis, the notion of adeceiving God:

Onlysolong as we have no clear and distinct idea of God, can we call true ideas in doubt by supposingthat perhapssome deceivingGod exists,who misleads us even in the things most certain. […]But if we have the kind of knowledge of God that we have of the triangle, then all doubt is removed. And just as we can arrive at such aknowledge of the triangle,eventhough we may not know certainlywhether some supreme deceiver misleads us,sowecan arrive at such a knowledge of God, even though we maynot know whether thereissome supreme deceiver.⁸

 E1d1.  TdIE §77.  TdIE §79. Spinoza’sAffectiveScepticism 149

In the Ethics,this argument is summarised as follows: “He who has atrue idea at the same time knows that he has atrue idea, and cannot doubt the truth of thatthing.”⁹ Spinoza further explains in the scholium to this proposition:

Fornoone whohas atrue idea is unawarethat atrue idea involves the highest certainty.For to have atrue idea means nothingother than knowingathingperfectly, or in the best way. And of course no one can doubt this unless he thinks that an idea is somethingmute, like apictureona tablet,and not amode of thinking, i.e., the very [act of]understanding.

We can read these passages as follows. It is impossibletocall clear and distinct ideas into doubt; hence, Descartes cannot be sincerewhen he tells us that he does so. It is in this sense that one can make the judgment thatwhen Descartes says that he questions the truthfulness of clear and distinct ideas, he “says in words thathedoubts, although his mind does not doubt.” However,this interpretationappears to intro- ducearedundancy.Why should Spinoza infer from the fact thatitisaltogetherim- possibletodoubt clear and distinct ideas, no matter in what way, that it is impossible to doubtsuch ideas sincerely? Theanswer is that by attacking the very meaning of Cartesian doubt, Spinoza’scritique equallytargets bothDescartes’suse of the concept of doubt with regard to clear and distinct ideas and his use of this concept with regard to unclear and indistinct ideas, including those that furnish the so-called external world. Regardless of whether or not they are clear and distinct,insaying that he doubts them, Descartes treats ideas not as they trulyare—that is, as “mode[s] of thinking” and the “very [act of]understanding”—but as “something mute, like apicture on atablet.” As we shallsee,itisnot the case that Spinoza thinks that it is also impossible to doubt unclear and indistinct ideas; that is, that doubt is altogether meaningless or pointless regardless of whether it is exercised with respect to unclear and indistinct ideas or clear and distinct ideas. The true method is not one that eliminates doubt but one that involves the recognition of what “true doubtinthe mind” is. What is impossible is not to doubt such unclear and indistinct ideas as the idea of the Iorany otheridea of afinite being or of an affection of afinite being;what is impossibleistobecertain of such ideas. Since one can onlypretend or imagine oneself to be certain about such ideas, calling them into doubtasifthey were not necessarilyamatter of doubt equallyinvolves the workings of pretenceorthe imagination.

We have thus far focused on what doubt is not,accordingtoSpinoza. It is now time to consider his positive account of doubt.What does Spinoza mean when he speaks of “true doubt in the mind”?The first thing thatSpinoza notes in this regardinthe

 E2p43. 150 AvrahamRot

Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is that doubt is astate that necessarilyin- volves aconflictofideas and ipso facto more than one idea. “There is no doubt in the soul […]through the thing itself concerning which one doubts. […]But doubt will arise through another idea which is not so clear and distinct.”¹⁰ Thus, the reason that doubtcannot be artificiallyproduced or generated, employed at willwith respect to bothdoubtful and indubitable ideas as if they werepictures on atablet, is thatdoubt can onlytakeplace insofarasithas alreadytaken place; that is, when one alreadyhas another idea “which is not so clear and distinct.” In short, in order to be in doubt, one should always alreadybeindoubt. As we have seen, the same holds for certainty: in order to know that one has atrue idea, one should always alreadyhaveatrue idea. It is accordinglyimpossibletodoubt clear and distinct ideas, just as it is impossibletobecertain of unclear and indistinct ideas. And it is likewise as meaningless to seek afterasign of truth for what one alreadyknows as it is redundant to doubtwhat one alreadydoubts. But what is radical about doubting thatwhich is alreadydubitable and remain- ing certain of that which is certain?¹¹ My argument is that what makes Spinoza’s scepticism radical is preciselyits realism; that is, its concrete limitedness instead of fanciful universal applicability.That the most profound philosophical discoveries mayappear to amount to trivialities is to be expected. After all, whydoweneed a Parmenides to tell us that “there is Being,but nothing is not”?¹² This oscillation between the trivial and the profound, the everydayand the ontological, is key to understanding Spinoza’sphilosophy. Our investigation can thereforebenefit from acon- sideration of aphilosophyinwhich this oscillation takes centrestage; namely, that of Martin Heidegger. The affinities between Spinoza’sand Heidegger’sphiloso- phies are remarkable, yetfor various reasons—aprominent one of which is Heideg- ger’sconspicuous lack of engagement with Spinoza’sworks—underexplored.¹³ This

 TdIE §78.  Or,asone of the anonymous reviewers puts it: “This beingthe case, the presumable ‘radical skepticism’ that the author attributes to Spinoza amounts to the followingtriviality:Spinozadoes not doubt that which is indubitable and is skeptical concerningthat which is doubtful.”  Parmenides, Parmenides,trans.Leonardo Tarán (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1965), 54.  Kasper Lysemose notes: “Heideggerwrites about Spinozaonlytwice. The first time is in his 1926/ 27 Marburglectures on HistoryofPhilosophy fromThomas Aquinas to Kant. These lectures appear to have been purelyamatter of duty.Weencounter herelong quotes not penetratedphilosophicallybut accompanied with an unusual amount of biographical information. The second time is in the 1936 lectures on Schelling’sTreatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. Spinozaispresentedhereas part in [sic]the emergenceofthe modern concept of systemand Heidegger’sevaluation of his contribution is as short as it is unfavorable.” See Lysemose, “The ForceofExistence:Looking for Spinoza in Heidegger,” Sophia (2019). Heideggernevertheless made at least one moreremark about Spinoza; namely, in his 1929/30Freiburglecturecourse Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt—Endlichkeit— Einsamkeit,ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm vonHerrmann, vols.29and 30 of Gesamtausgabe,ed.VittorioKlos- termann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2010), 437, translatedbyWilliam McNeill and Nicholas Walker as TheFundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University Spinoza’sAffectiveScepticism 151

is not the place to give asystematic treatment of this issue. Nonetheless, certain points of correspondence are noteworthyasthey can orientusinour search for the meaning of doubt in Spinoza’ssystem. What Spinoza says can easilyberendered in Heideggerian terms.When he argues that ideas should not be considered to be like picturesonatablet,herejects the consideration of thingsaswhat in Heideggerian parlance is called Vorhanden- heit;thatis, as beingsthatare merely “present at hand.”¹⁴ Ideas do not just present themselvesasindifferent objects in relation to which our faculties can operate and on which we can cast doubt at will. Rather,ideas always alreadyimplythe involve- ment of the mind that has them. Heidegger, as is well known, is particularlyfond of using the expression, “always already,” immer schon. The question of being always alreadyinvolvesthe nature of the kind of being for whom being is an issue.¹⁵ Sim- ilarly, being is always alreadymine (Jemeinigkeit); it always has ahere and athere (da); it is always in-the-world; it always has afor-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen); and it is always alreadysomehow attuned (gestimmt).¹⁶ Just as there is always al- readyanintention behindaquestion, the essential characteristics of existenceare disclosed as thingsthat are always alreadythere, as necessary presuppositions. But what kind of argument is it to saythat something is always alreadysuch and such?How does it save us from infinite regress or vicious circularity?Toaddress this question, let us consider moreclosely the mannerinwhich Spinoza follows a similar line of reasoning. As we have seen, Spinoza understands doubt as something thattakes place onlyinasmuchasithas alreadytaken place. Just as in order to have aclear and distinct idea, one must always alreadyhaveaclear and distinct idea, in order to doubt, one must always alreadyhaveanunclear and indistinct idea; that is, an idea of which one can never be certain. Now,inorder to have such an unclear and indistinct idea, or what Spinoza calls a “confused idea,” one has to have not just the capacity to think, but alsothe capacity to imagine, remember,and feel, which implies, in turn, that one must also be acorporeal, finite, and temporalbeing.Tocaptureall these preconditions at once, let us consider another Heideggerian notion, one which Heideggermost probablyborrowed from Emil Lask; namely, that of equiprimordiality (Gleichursprünglichkeit).¹⁷ Heidegger’snotion of equiprimordiality and

Press, 1995), 302. GivenHeidegger’salmost complete lack of explicit engagement with Spinoza’swork, it appears safer to speak here of affinities rather than of direct influence.  Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,19th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer,2006), division 1, ch. 2, translated by John Macquarrie and EdwardRobinson as Being and Time,repr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), hereafterabbreviatedasBT. Forthe first occurrence in this book of the expression Vorhandenheit, translated as “presence-at-hand,” see BT 7[original]/26 [translation].  This is whatHeideggerrefers to as the “es geht um” of being(BT 191/236).  BT 52/78, 53/78, 86/116,134/173.  See BT 131–33/170–73,137/176,142/182, 220/263. On Emil Lask’sinfluence on Heideggerwith regard to Gleichursprünglichkeit and related concepts, see TheodoreKisiel, “Heideggers Dankesschuld an 152 AvrahamRot

the logic implied by the expression “always already” directlyfollow from each other. One important occasion on which Heideggerpresents the notionofequiprimordiality is his rejection of the traditional hierarchical division of the faculties into the general domains of thinking, willing,and feeling,wherethinking is typicallygiven precedence over the others and feeling is relegatedtothe lowest status. In opposition to this traditional understanding,Heideggerargues thatthe main characteristics of finite existence—including, in his own terminology, understanding (Verstehen), affectedness (Befindlichkeit), and thrownness (Geworfenheit)—are all equiprimordial; that is, equallyoriginary.Accordingly, in our livedexperience, we never encounter thingsinasingle dimension as if they were “present at hand” (vorhanden); that is, as something that is entirelyobjective and about which we can think or not think or think in different ways regardlessofthe other dimensions of our experience. As we have seen, Spinoza likewise rejects the notion that thingsappear to our minds as if they werepresent at hand when he says that “no one can doubt [a true idea] unless he thinks thatanidea is something mute,like apicture on atablet,” etc. ForSpinoza, too, this rejection entails the rejection of the traditionalhier- archical division of the faculties.And, as is more specificallypertinent to our investigation, it also entails the rejection of the possibilityofspontaneouslywillingto doubt something that the intellect perceivesinaclear and distinct manner. As Spi- noza famouslycontends, “the will and the intellect are one and the same.”¹⁸ Thus, in identifying the will with the intellect,Spinoza defines the will as “afaculty of affirming and denying [affirmat vel negat], and not desire.”¹⁹ He makesthis assertion in the context of rejecting the Cartesian conception of the will, particularlythe distinction between the will (as infinite) and the intellect (as finite).²⁰ Spinoza’scontention is not that there is no will, as his common classification as anecessitarian is often taken to imply, but that “there is no absolute faculty of willing and not willing.”²¹ In his account,and this is the crucial point,nofaculty enjoys this status; that is, of being absolutelydistinguishable from the other faculties.Inhis words: “There is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding,desiring,loving,and the like. […]These and similar faculties are either completefiction or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from particulars.”²² As in Heidegger’scase, the alternative to the traditionalviewwith which Spinoza presents

Emil Lask: Sein Wegvom Neufichteanismus zu einer Hermeneutik der Faktizität,” Studia Phaenome- nologica 1, nos.3/4 (2001): 221–47.  E2p49c.  E2p48s.  See corollary and scholium of E2p49. On the unity of the intellect and the will in Spinoza,see John Cottingham, “The Intellect,the Will, and the Passions:Spinoza’sCritique of Descartes,” Journal of the HistoryofPhilosophy 26,no. 2(1988): 239–57,and Stephan Schmid, “Spinoza on the Unity of Will and Intellect,” in Partitioning the Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz,ed. Klaus Corcilius and Dominik Per- ler (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 245–70.  E2p48s.  E3p48s. Spinoza’sAffectiveScepticism 153

us is not amonolithic conception of the mind, but acomplex description of it.Al- though for Spinoza, the finite mind is nothing but an idea, this idea is not an indifferent or undifferentiated form of representation, abundle of confused ideas, but a form of expression that manifests itself on different levels and in multiple dimensions. Usingcontemporary terminology, one maysay that in arguing that the will is not desire, but rather “afaculty of affirming and denying,” Spinoza does not wish to downplaythe significanceofthat dimension of mentation that has often been discussed in late modern philosophical psychologyinterms of intentionality.Rather, while Spinoza rejects the concept of desire, he introduces the corresponding term “striving” (conatus), which can be regarded as the most immediate counterpart of the notionofintentionality in his philosophy.²³ Now,striving itself is also regarded by Spinoza as akind of affirmation.Ashewrites: “The first and principle [tendency] of the striving of the mind […]istoaffirm the existenceofthe body”²⁴ and “the essence of the mind consists in this […]that it affirms the essence of the body.”²⁵ Spinoza’snotion of affirmation designates the common ground, or equiprimordial source, of the various faculties.Famouslyhighlighted by Gilles Deleuze in his interpretation of Spinoza’sworks,this affirmation is expressive (i.e., dynamic and multilayered) rather than, likeapicture on atablet,representational (i.e., static and flat).²⁶ We have alreadyseen that thinkingand willing are nothing but forms of affirmation, and this appears to applytoperception as well.²⁷ Whatiscrucial for the purposes of our investigation is that affectedness—that is, the capacity of finite modes to be affected, or what can be described as their power to be affected—is also defined in terms of affirmation: “An affect [affectus]which is called apassion of the mind is aconfused idea, by which the mind affirms [affirmat]ofits body, or of some part of it,agreater or lesser forceofexisting than before, which, when it is given, determines the mind to think of this rather thanthat.”²⁸ In particular, the final clause of this definition confirms thatwecan understand Spinoza’sargument as similar to Heidegger’scontention that affectedness (Befindlichlkeit)isequiprimor-

 However,unlikeFranz Brentano, whoisthoroughlycommitted to Cartesian dualism and represen- tationalism and who in fact does not go much beyond Descartes, notwithstanding the significance that is attributed to his reintroduction of the concept of intentionality,Spinozadoes not use his concept of strivingtodifferentiatemental phenomena fromphysical phenomena, but rather to describe their fundamental unity.See Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,ed. Linda L. McAlister,trans.Antos C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister,2nd ed. (London: Rout- ledge,1995), 68. On Brentano’sCartesianism, see TimCrane, “Intentionality as the Mark of the Men- tal,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 43 (1998): 229–51.  E3p10d.  E3,General Definition of the Affects,exp.  See Gilles Deleuze, ExpressionisminPhilosophy:Spinoza,trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990).  TdIE §72; cf. E2d3exp.  E3,General Definition of the Affects. 154 AvrahamRot

dial with understanding (Verstehen), or,inHeidegger’swords, that “affectedness always has its understanding” while “understandingalways has its mood.”²⁹ To sum up this point,inarguing that “there is in the mind no absolutefaculty of understanding,desiring,loving,and the like,” Spinoza does not reject the significance of conceiving of the mind in terms of distinguishable faculties,but rather argues for the equiprimordial status of these faculties. Thinking,willing,and feeling are equiprimordialbecause they are all fundamentallynothing but forms of affirmation. Doubt accordinglycannot arise from some originary discordofthe faculties. Whence thendoes it arise?

Crucialfor the understanding of Spinoza’sconcept of doubt are his interrelated concepts of the imagination, memory, and temporality,all of which are explicated in terms of the embodied nature of finite modes, of which asystematic exposition is giveninthe so-called physical digression,that is, the set of lemmata about the bodypresented earlyinthe second part of the Ethics.³⁰ While up to this point,Spi- noza speaks onlyofthe affections of substance, his initial remarks about the imagination provide the first occasion in the Ethics on which we encounter the expression “the affections of the human body.”³¹ Spinoza’sinitial remarks about memory provide the second such occasion. The crucial proposition for our purposes is E2p17:

If the human Bodyisaffected with amode that involves the natureofanexternal body, the human Mind will regardthe same external bodyasactuallyexisting, or as present to it,until the Bodyisaffected by an affect that excludes the existenceorpresenceofthat body.

It is only “to retain the customary words” thatSpinoza goes on to explain in the scholium to this proposition that “the affections of the human bodywhose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things[…]. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall saythat it imagines.” Similarly, Spinoza explains here that “memory is […]nothing other than certain connection of ideas involving the nature of thingswhich are outside the human Body.” Thus rooted in temporality and indissolublyrelated to memory,imaginingisnot creatinganidea ex nihilo, but perceiving something as if it wereinthe present even though it is in fact in the past,or, as is perhaps less intuitivebut also true for Spinoza, in the future. We should further note thatSpinoza suggests thattime itself is “aproduct of the

 BT 142/182: “Befindlichkeit hat je ihr Verständnis […]. Verstehen ist immer gestimmtes.”  The phrase “physical digression” is takenfromDavid R. Lachterman, “The Physics of Spinoza’s Ethics,” TheSouthwesternJournal of Philosophy 8, no. 3(1977): 71–111.  E2p17s. Spinoza’sAffectiveScepticism 155

imagination.”³² It is this conceptual framework thataccounts for the possibility of doubt in Spinoza’ssystem. In this context,Spinoza clarifies again whyheconsiders narrowly cognitive doubttobemeaningless: “It is the nature of reason to regard thingsasnecessary,not as contingent.”³³ Evidently, it is impossible to regardthings as necessary and doubt them at the sametime.³⁴ “From this it follows,” Spinoza says in the corollary to the proposition just quoted, “that it depends onlyonthe imagination thatweregardthingsascontingent,bothinrespect to the past and in respect to the future.” This maylead one to think that Spinoza conceivesofthe imagination as the sourceofall doubt; however,this is not quite the case. Forone thing,contingency is apreconditionfor doubt, but not yetdoubtitself. Foranother,inaccordance with his conception of the faculties as equiprimordial, Spinoza regards the capacity to imagine, too, as one which shares acommon origin with all other human capacities. It is on these grounds that he affirms that “the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error.”³⁵ Just as doubt cannot arise from the intellect,the will, or perception alone,italso cannot arise from the imagination alone. But it alsocannot be regarded as aproduct of some interplaybetween the faculties, such as the kind thatDescartes assumes thatexists between the finite intellect and the infinite will. So, whencedoes it arise?

Doubt does not arise from anyfaculty individually, nor from some interplaybetween them, but preciselyfrom their unity,from the fact that the understandingisalways alreadyaffected or thatthinkingisalways alreadywishful, which amountstothe same thing.Ishall now demonstrate thatthis holistic approach is onlyfullyarticu- lated in the third part of the Ethics,whereSpinoza discusses the affects. In the second part of this book,which is devoted to the mind, this approach is merelystated, or,atbest,indicated by that which is lacking from the description of doubt that Spi- noza presents at that stage. Let us first consider that incomplete description and then see how it is completed in the third part. In the second part of the Ethics,wedonot yetfind afully-fledged notion of doubt,but onlyacloselyrelated one: the “vacillation of the imagination.” Spinoza provides acomplex and rather strangeexample to explain this vacillation. A “child” is accustomed to seeing “Peter,”“Paul,” and “Simon” one after another

 E2p44s;translation is takenfrom Spinoza:Complete Works,ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis:Hackett,2002),269.  E2p44.  But note well that,asweshall see in moredetail below,Spinozadoes not contrast doubt with necessity or certainty,but onlywith the absenceofdoubt.See E2p49s.  E2p17s. 156 Avraham Rot

in the morning,atnoon, and in the evening respectively.Suddenly, one evening,he sees “James instead of Simon.” As aresult, Spinoza explains, the association between the comingofthe evening and the appearance of Simon is now extended to the appearance of James, such that the child’simagination vacillates; namely,between the possibilities that James and Simon will appear in the evening.Heused to feel certain about something—that every day, Simon would be the last to come; now,asthe dayproceeds according to the old order,his imagination vacillates. He thinks: maybe this time, James will come. This example is strangefor several reasons,one of which is particularlyperti- nent for our purposes. Whytell awhole story about how Peter appears in the morning and Paul at noon and onlythen tell us about Simon’sregular appearance in the evening?Why not make the same point by focusing solely on the interruption of the child’sroutine encounters with Simon in the evening?The answer is suggested by Spinoza’sreasoning that “the human Mind will regard the same external bodyas actuallyexisting,oraspresent to it,until the Body is affected by an affect that excludes the existenceorpresenceofthat body.” This notion of the persistenceof the object,which is founded on physical-biological principles pertaining to the inter- action of particlesconstitutingcompositebodies, is strange. Forinstance, it implies that if the child had never seen Peter and Paul, but onlySimon, he would have imagined Simon as permanentlypresent regardless of the time of day, and also that similarly, upon seeing James instead of Simon, he would have continued to imagine Jamesinthe same way, such that therewould have been no vacillation and no room for doubt.Spinoza himself confirms this when he givesthe example of achild imag- ining awinged horse. Regarding this example, Spinoza reasons thatinsofar as “the child does not perceive anything else that excludes the existence of the horse, he will necessarilyregard the horseaspresent.” Spinoza explicitlystates thatthis child will be unable “to doubt [the horse’s] existence, though he willnot be certain of it.”³⁶ The description of doubt becomes more completeinthe third part of the Ethics, after it has been established that “the mind […]strivestoimagine thosethingsthat increase the body’spower of acting.”³⁷ The implication here is that just as thinking is indissolublyrelated to willing, imaginingisnot merelyapassiveexperience,but a matter of striving.The persistenceofthe imagined object can accordinglyberegard- ed as aproductnot of amerelyindifferent fixation of the imagination, but of amo- tivated one. The absenceofan“affect that excludes the existence” of the object is now joined to the presenceofanaffect thataffirms the existenceofthe individual perceiving or imaginingit.³⁸ It is onlyonce this is established thatthe place of doubt in Spinoza’ssystem becomes apparent.

 E2p49s.  E3p12.  Iassume herethat the individual’spower of actingand force of existingare the same thing,as Spinoza never clearlydistinguishes between the two. Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 157

Here, Spinoza describes another “vacillation,” one that ensues not from perceptual conflict,but from affective conflict: “If we imagine thatathing which usually affects us with an affect of Sadness is likeanother which usually affects us with an equallygreat affect of Joy, we shall hate it and at the same time loveit.”³⁹ In this context,Spinoza makes atellingremark concerning how this “vacillation of the mind” is related to the formerlydescribed “vacillation of the imagination”: “This constitution of the Mind which arises from two contrary affects is called vac- illationofmind, which is thereforerelated to the affect as doubt is to the imagination.” While this merelyappears to suggest that the conflict of affects (loveand hate) and the conflict of ideas (Simon and James) are analogous, the next sentence confirms that what Spinoza has in mind here is not sheer analogybut originary unity: “Nor do vacillation of mind and doubt differ from one another except in degree.”⁴⁰ Icannot explain what differenceindegree Spinoza has in mind here, but Ibelievethat this remark confirms that he regards cognitive and affectivedoubt as ultimately, because qualitatively,indistinguishable. Thismeans not onlythat affective conflict is rooted in cognitive conflict,but also thatthe cognitive or perceptual conflict described in part 2interms of the vacillation of the imagination also neces- sarilyhas an affectivedimension. The reason that this is not specifiedatthatearlier stageisthat at thatpoint,the natureofthe affects is yettobeexplicated. To sum up this point,the capacity to doubt has multiple dimensions: perceptual, mnemonic, imaginative,motivational, and affective. Onlyfrom such aholistic perspective does doubthavesignificanceaccordingtoSpinoza. Giventhat this multiplicity has not yetbeen explicated in the second part of the Ethics,the workings of the imagination appear unmotivated at this stage, as no more than amental fixation on asingle idea. The description of doubt is complemented in part 3asfollows. While the imagination is aprecondition for doubt, it is not afree-floatingfaculty.One strivestoimagine certain things. The child continues to imagine awingedhorse because imaginingawinged horse has become part of his nature.Inaffirmingthe existenceofthe horse, he affirms his own nature.Hewould be disappointed to discover that there is no wingedhorseout there. Similarly, the child who is used to seeing Simon in the evening must have aparticularfeeling towards him, and another one towards Jameswhen he sees the latter. Otherwise, he would have not noticed the differencebetween the two in the first place. For “thereare as manyspecies of joy,sadness, and desire, and consequentlyofeach affect composedofthese (like vacillation of mind) or derivedfrom them (like Love, Hate, Hope, Fear,etc.), as there are species of objects by which we are affected.”⁴¹

 E3p17.  E3p17s.  E3p56. 158 AvrahamRot

Accordingly, we find aparticularlyclear articulation of Spinoza’sunderstanding of doubt in the third part of the Ethics,especiallyinthe proposition that immediately follows the one we have just considered on affective conflict.Itishere rather than in the Theological-Political Treatise or in the second part of the Ethics thatthe place of doubtinSpinoza’ssystem is fullyspecified. Doubt is nonetheless not announced as the main subjectmatter of this proposition. Rather,Spinoza is primarily concerned here with the manner in which temporality colours the affective dimension of finite existence.This concern yields the definitions of hope, fear,confidence, and despair,all of which are explicated in terms of the exercise or “removal” of doubt.Let us consider these definitionsasthey are formulatedinthe list of definitions of the affects provided towards the end of the third part of the Ethics:

XII. Hope is an inconstant Joy, born of the idea of afuture or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt.

XIII. Fear is an inconstant Sadness,born of the idea of afutureorpast thingwhose outcome we to some extent doubt.

XIV.ConfidenceisaJoyborn of the idea of afutureorpast thing, concerning which the cause of doubtinghas been removed.

XV.Despair is aSadness born of the idea of afutureorpast thing concerningwhich the cause of doubtinghas been removed.

The psychological observations presented here, quapsychological observations (rather than metaphysical or epistemological ones),are far from original. Similar observations can readilybefound in the writingsofSpinoza’sancient, scholastic, and modernpredecessors, includingAristotle, Seneca, Aquinas, Hobbes,and Des- cartes.⁴² Nonetheless, Spinoza’sformulation of them is unique. Forone thing,itis particularlyclear and elegant,asexpressed in its perfect formal and temporalsym- metry and in its conceptual parsimony. Especiallynotable with regardtothe latter point is Spinoza’savoidance of the encumbering concept of desire, which is used, for instance, by both Aquinas and Descartes (although in conflictingways).⁴³ Foran- other,and this is arguablythe reason whySpinoza’sformulation is so clear and el-

 See Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric,trans. John Henry Freese (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1926), 2.5; Seneca, Letters from aStoic: Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium,trans. Robin Campbell (New York: Penguin, 1969), letter5,p.38; Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas 1–2.40–44,trans.Fathers of the English DominicanProvince, vol. 6(London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1927), 455–98;Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,3rd ed. (London: George Routledge and Sons,1887), ch. 6; CSM1:350–51,389,391.  ForAquinas,despair (desperatio)necessarilyinvolvesdesire (Summa Theologica 1–2.40.4,1– 2.41.2), while Descartes’sposition is that despair (désespoir) “entirelyextinguishes desire” (CSM 1:389). Spinoza’sAffectiveScepticism 159

egant,his treatment of these affects, as well as that of the affects in general, is presented in aunifiedframework which bringstogether their ontological, epistemological, and ethical significance.Inthis, Spinoza differs from most other philosophers, includingall the major figures Ihavejust mentioned, who as arule are primarily if not exclusively concerned with the passions as amoral or practical problem. In other words, what makesthe observations presented here uniqueisthatthey are not merely psychological or ethical, but alsometaphysical, which, giventhat Spinoza identifies existencewith intelligibility,meansthat they have both ontological and epistemological significance. What is particularlysignificant for our purposes is their epistemologicalimplications that pertaintothe nature of doubt. Letusthen consider these observations as they are presented by Spinoza and then explore their implications. Hope and fear are the two complementary and inextricable aspects of the same affective state; namely, that of having doubt (dubito)with regard to the outcome of the idea in relation to which they are experienced. Hope is the pleasurable aspect of this experience;fear the unpleasurable. In otherwords, fear itself is nothing but the hope that that in the face of which the fear is experiencedwill not (and, which is perhaps less intuitive, also did not) take place, and vice versa. Simplyre- movethe cause of doubt and one of the following transformations will takeplace. In the positive case, the hope aspect of the emotional state will takeover, such that the overall state will transform into thatofconfidence, apleasurable state that is altogether devoid of fear.Inthe negative case, the fear aspect of the state will take over,tothe effect that all hope willbeeliminated and the fear itself will transform into despair,awhollyunpleasurable state. Thus, Spinoza further writes in his explanation of the definitionsjust quoted:

Confidence[…]isborn of Hope and Despair of Fear,whenthe cause of doubt concerningthe thing’soutcome is removed. This happens because man imagines that the past or future thingisthere,and regards it as present,orbecause he imagines other things,excluding the existenceofthe thingsthat put him in doubt.For though we can never be certain of the outcome of singular things […]itcan still happen that we do not doubt their outcome. As we have shown […] it is one thingnot to doubt athing, and another to be certain of it.

It is onlyatthis stagethat the nature of doubt is fullyspecified. Thisisdone in a manner that complements the partial (and therefore abstract) description of doubt that we find in the second part of the Ethics. Here, we learn that doubt is not only necessarilyembodied, imaginative,mnemonic, temporal, motivated (i.e., related to striving), and affective,but that it also necessarilyfinds expression in specific kinds of affects: fear and hope, which are reallyasingle affect.However stubborn one maybeinone’sinsistence that the possibility that we are all brains in vats constitutes aserious philosophical problem, this does not necessarilyexpress an actual 160 Avraham Rot

fear that this is the case.⁴⁴ We are now in aposition to see that the problem with Car- tesian scepticism from aSpinozist viewpoint is thatitlacks aproper affective dimension. In his Meditations,Descartespresents us with no more thanathinking exercise; real thinking does not work that way. However,given what Spinoza says about hope and fear—namely,that these affects “cannot be good of themselves”;⁴⁵ that they “show adefect of knowledge and lack of power in the mind”;⁴⁶ that “the more we strive to live according to the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear”;⁴⁷ that hope and fear are linked to superstition and the disciplining of the multitude through negative reinforcement⁴⁸—is it not preciselySpinoza’snegative evaluation of doubt that we find in the passages just cited?Spinoza’sremark about hope and fear at the opening of the Theological-Political Treatise appears to make this point explicit:

If men could manage all their affairs by adefiniteplan, or if fortune werealways favorable to them, no one would be in the grip of superstition. But often they areinsuch atight spot that they cannot decide on anyplan. Then they usuallyvacillatewretchedlybetween hope and fear,desiringimmoderatelythe uncertain goods of fortune, and ready tobelieveanythingwhat- ever.While the mind is in doubt,it’seasilydriventhis wayorthat—and all the moreeasilywhen, shaken by hope and fear,itcomestoastandstill. At other times, it’sover-confident,boastful and presumptuous.⁴⁹

Even if it is granted that Spinoza has solid grounds for dismissing Descartes’scogni- tive doubt as narrow and insincere, what warrants the claim that he positively presents us with amore radical conception of doubt? Furthermore, Spinoza says relatively little about doubt; as arule, he deals with it in the Ethics not in the definitions and propositions, but in the demonstrations and scholia,most of which Ihavealready partlycited or referenced. This appears to implythat if he considers doubt to be significant at all, it is onlysecondarilyso. In response to these claims, one should first note that Spinoza’snegative appraisal of the state of doubt and of the corresponding passion of hope-fear cannotbe understood as atrivial and wholesale rejection of their desirability.For to “depend less on hope” and “freeourselvesfrom fear” cannot mean something similar to the “removal” of doubt which leadsusfrom hope-fear to confidence/despair. Spino- za makes this point abundantlyclear as he takescare to note that whatever he says

 Similarly, contemporary philosophers often use the words “worry” and even “anxiety” to describe aconcern with philosophical problems without ever establishingthat anyone, including themselves, actuallyworries or feels anxiety about the problem at hand.  E4p47.  E4p47d.  E4p47s.  E4p63s.  TTPIII/5. Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 161

about fear and hope alsoapplies to confidence, despair,and related passions, since all the latterpassions depend on hope and fear.⁵⁰ As we have seen in the passagejust quoted from the Theological-Political Treatise,Spinoza speaks against hope-fear and confidenceinthe same breath. It is for this reason that it is inadequate to saythatthe child imaginingawinged horseand nothing else has confidence in the existenceof the horseinthe present moment,for confidence must be acquired: one must first doubt in order to be able to removethat doubt.Aswehaveseen, Spinoza makes this point explicit: the child imaginingthe wingedhorsewho “does not perceive anything else that excludes the existenceofthe horse[…]will necessarilyregard the horse as present.Nor will he be able to doubtits existence, though he will not be certain of it.”⁵¹ As we have alsoseen, these examples remain abstract as they belong to asection of the book in which the affective dimension of doubt is not explicated. In reality,noone is affected by asingle idea, neither children nor adults. Rather,we are all “liable to agreat manyaffects.”⁵² Lacking doubt in the sense of simplybeing unaware of anyother possibility is certainlynot what Spinoza has in mind when he speaksoffreedom from fear.Such astate is not just undesirable, but alsoabstract and unreal. Being “liable to agreat many affects,” we are always alreadysubject to all sorts of doubts. It follows from this thatwenecessarilyexperienceamixture of hope and fear (or what the ancient Greeks called elpis;that is, expectation).⁵³ Now,while Spinoza makes it clear that his negative evaluation of hope and fear applies to confidence and despair,itisnot clear whether it applies to them equally. All otherthings being equal, is it better to have confidenceorbeindespair thantobegovernedby hopes and fears?The answer to this question hinges on whether the “removal” of doubt that leadsfrom hope-fear to confidence/despair is agood thing.This removal, Spinoza tells us, does not lead to certainty, for “we can never be certain of the outcome of singular things” and “it is one thing not to doubt athing,and another to be certain of it.” While it is impossible to doubtclear and distinct ideas, it is also impossibletobecertain of confused ideas; that is, of the ideas of singular things (which Spinoza interchangeablyqualifies as finite, particular, and contingent). But if we can never be certain of singular things, then should we not avoid thinking about them altogether?Now,manycommentators on Spinoza have mistaken this

 E4p47s.  E2p49s.  E4p44s.  On the ambivalent significanceofelpis in classical Greek literature, see Hope,Joy,and Affection in the ClassicalWorld,ed. Ruth R. Caston and Robert A. Kaster (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2016), especiallythe essays by DouglasCairns (“Metaphors for Hope in Archaic and Classical Greek Poetry,” 13–44), Damien Nelis (“EmotioninVergil’s Georgics: Framingand the Politics of Hope,” 45– 74), and LaurelFulkerson (“‘Torn between Hope and Despair’:Narrative Foreshadowingand Sus- pense in the Greek Novel,” 75–94). See also Claudia Bloeser and Titus Stahl, “Hope,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), ed. EdwardN.Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/ar chives/spr2017/entries/hope/. 162 Avraham Rot

to be the case; namely,that the imperative of Spinoza’sphilosophyistolearn how to ignore finitude. In particular, this is the implication of the so-called acosmist reading of Spinoza. Accordingtothis reading,famouslypresented by Hegel in his Lectures on the HistoryofPhilosophy,but first articulated by Maimon in 1792,Spinoza is not an atheist(as suggested by Jacobi, for instance), but an acosmist.Onthe one hand,he affirms the reality of God as an infinite, unified, and static whole, but on the other,he rejects the reality of the cosmos as the manifestation of finitude, multiplicity,and change.⁵⁴ While this readingmay appear plausible basedonthe first part of the Ethics, whereSpinoza statesthat “in naturethere is nothing contingent,”⁵⁵ it is incongruent with the rest of the text.Itiseither the casethat the Ethics is inconsistent or that this book demands amorenuanced reading.Considering “all particular things[…]contingent and corruptible,”⁵⁶ Spinoza nonetheless provides us with numerous definitions of such things, includingdefinitions of finite minds and bodies and of their various affections. And the function of definition in Spinoza’ssystem is not to captureor designatepossiblyinexistent entities, but rather to “express,”“affirm,” or “explain” the “nature,”“reality,” or “essence” of the thing defined.⁵⁷ Furthermore, not onlydoes Spinoza devote agreat deal of attention to the nature of finite beings, but at no stagedoes he suggest thatall we should be doing is to contemplate God in isolation or alongside other clear and distinct (i.e., necessary) ideas by cultivating an indifferent or apathetic attitude towardsall contingencies or by denying their existencealtogether. This would amount to confusing Spinozism with Buddhism, Stoicism, or Christian asceticism. Rather,Spinoza argues that “the more we understand singular things[res singulares]”—thatis, contingent things such as ourselvesand our passions—“the more we understand God.”⁵⁸ However,contingencies can never be understood if the faculty of reason is taken as the sole point of departure. We must begin not onlywith an “Ithink,” but also with an “Iremem- ber,”“Iimagine,”“Istrive,” and “Ifeel.” Though “athing is called contingent only because of adefect of our knowledge”⁵⁹—thatis, because of our affects, which, unlike God’saffections, render our thinkingconfused—the point Spinoza is making is not that we should overcome the affects entirely, “for each one governs everything

 In Hegel’swords: “The world has no true reality, and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the one identity.There is thereforenosuch thingasfinitereality,ithas no truth whatever; according to Spinozawhat is, is God, and God alone.” GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lec- tures on the HistoryofPhilosophy,trans.Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane and Frances H. Simson, repr. ed. (London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1974), 3:281. Regarding Maimon’sfirst articulation of this reading,see Yitzhak Melamed, “WhySpinoza Is Not an Eleatic Monist (OrWhy Diversity Exists),” in Spinoza on Monism,ed. Philip Goff (Houndmills:PalgraveMacmillan,2011), 218n.22.  E1p29.  E2p31c.  E1p8s2i–ii, E1p16d, E3p4d, E3da6,TdIE §95, Ep. 34.  E5p24.  E1p33s1. Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 163

from his affects; thosewho are torn by contrary affects do not know what they want, and thosewho are not moved by anyaffect are very easilydrivenhere and there.”⁶⁰ In practice, moreover,astate of not having anyaffect is not onlyundesirable, according to Spinoza, but also impossible, for “man” as he writes, “is necessarilyalways subjecttopassions.”⁶¹ And even if astate of utterindifference werepossibleorde- sirable, anyattempt at controlling or reducing the affects by means of anything that is external to them, such as the power of the will or that of reason, is stillnecessarily futile in Spinoza’sview,given that “an affect cannot be restrainedortaken away except by an affect opposite to, and strongerthan, the affect to be restrained.”⁶² Since we are “necessarilyalways subject to passions,” we can never form clear and distinct ideas without experiencing accompanyingfeelingsand confusion. In this reading, the summum bonum of the third kind of knowledge (also referred to as “intuitive knowledge,” scientia intuitiva)isnot achievable—at least not as long as one is alive.Aslong as one is alive,one is necessarilyaffected by agreat many singular things, and this capacity to be affectedexpresses the power of the individual, not its weakness: “The human Mind is capable of perceiving agreat many things, and is the more capable, the more its bodycan be disposed in agreat manyways.”⁶³ And: “Whateversodisposes the human Body that it can be affected in agreat manyways, or renders it capable of affecting external Bodies in agreat manyways, is useful to man.”⁶⁴ Just as God’saffections are expressive of God’sab- soluteinfinite nature, the affections of human individuals,includingtheir active and passive affects, their joyful and sad passions, are expressive of their finite nature. Thus, even the basic passiveand negative affect of sadness, defined as “man’spas- sagefrom agreater to alesser perfection,” is not aprivation. “Foraprivation,” Spi- noza reasons, “is nothing,whereas the affect of sadness is an act.” ⁶⁵ In short, being affected is not onlyinevitable; one should be affected by as manysingular thingsas one is capable of being affectedbywithout changingone’sown nature, which boils

 E3pref.  E4p4c. Spinoza repeats this argument in the first chapterofthe Political Treatise (1.5): “Forthis much is quitecertain, and proved to be true in our Ethics,that men arenecessarilysubjecttopas- sions.”  E4p7;emphasis added. Nietzsche similarlyargues: “The will to overcome an emotion is ultimately onlythe will of another emotion or of several others” (“Der Wille, einen Affekt zu überwinden, ist zuletzt doch nur der Wille eines anderen oder mehrererandererAffekte”). See Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft (Leipzig: Naumann, 1886), 94,translated by Walter Kaufmann as Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to aPhilosophyofthe Future,new ed. (New York: Vintage,1989), 98. Likewise, Heideggerwrites in Being and Time (136/175): “When we mas- teramood, we do so by wayofacounter-mood” (“Herr werden wir der Stimmungnie stimmungslos, sondern je auseiner Grundstimmung”). On Spinoza’saffirmation of the passions,see Avraham Rot, “The Ontological Status of the Affects in Spinoza’sMetaphysics: ‘Beingin,’‘Affection of,’ and the Af- firmation of Finitude,” TheReview of Metaphysics 71,no. 4(2018): 667–701.  E2p14.  E4p38.  E3da3. 164 Avraham Rot

down to preservingacertain proportion of motion and rest in the bodyand, correspondingly,acertain order of actions and the passions in the mind.⁶⁶

We can now reconsider our question: giventhat we must and ought to be affected by singular things, of which we can never be certain, and giventhat even whenwehave clear and distinct ideas, we must and oughttoalso have other interrelated ones with regard to which our thinking is imaginative,passionate,and confused in correspondence with our inherentlyfinite and temporal and essentiallyembodied nature—that is, in short, giventhat absolute certainty is unattainable—is it better to be in astate of doubt and correspondingly experiencehope and fear,ortobeinthe statesofcon- fidence or despair,inwhich the doubthas been “removed”? To answer this question, we should give acloser examination of what constitutes the removal of doubtthat leads from hope-fear to confidence/despair. Spinoza presents this removal as an operation of the imagination: “This happens because man imagines thatthe past or future thing is there, and regards it as present,orbecause he imagines other things, excludingthe existenceofthe thingsthatput him in doubt.” We have established that this imaginingisnot whimsical, but rather motivated and intentional, for “the mind […]strives to imagine thosethingsthatincrease the body’spower of acting.”⁶⁷ The purpose of this imaginingisfor one to persevere in one’sbeing.Accordingly, inasmuchasitfulfils this purpose, it must be agood thing. But whyshould anyone imagine something as present even if it is in fact in the past or in the future or imagine something to the effect of excludingone’sdoubt con- cerningsome other thing (which Spinoza suggests amounts to the same thing)? The answer is for the same reason that one might be motivated to undergo the transition from hope-fear to confidence/despair.This reason is not difficult to grasp. We can never be absolutelycertain of our capacity to attainsomething that we hope for, and so, in having the hope, we are alsoafraid that we will never attain it.But sometimes, in order to persevere in our being, we have to put an end to the vacillation of hope and fear and transposeourselvesinstead, through the imagination, into a stable state of either confidenceordespair.Inother words, since it can be impracti- cal to experience the vacillation between hope and fear,wemay imagine that things are certain even if they cannot be so. Thus, we maycomport ourselvesinconfidence even if we are not sure about what we are doing and likewise despair of certain thingssimplybecause we cannot take on the responsibility that hoping for them entails. There is nothing wrongabout this. Insofar as they help us persevere in our

 E2 l7s;E3p2s.  E3p12. Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 165

being,confidenceand despair and the kind of imaginingthey involveare in fact good things. However,wealsosee that confidence and despair are derivative states.What comes first is hope-fear.Given that we are necessarilyaffected in agreat many ways,wealways alreadydoubt.Inother words, doubting is something that we do by default.Sometimes, we stop doubting.But the onlyreason for us to do so is to keep our self-integrity;that is, to preservethe unique proportion of motion and rest in our bodies and the uniqueorder and connection of actions and passions in our minds, thoserelations that define each of us as auniqueindividual. We thus imagine certain things in order to become confident or to sink into despair,and we do so as ameans of copingwith certain situations or with our livesingeneral. We all use this copingmechanism in certain ways and to certain extents.Wecannot doubt the outcome of all the singular thingsbywhich we are affected, even though we can never be entirelycertain of the outcome of asingle one of them. This kind of not-doubting,asIhavealreadynoted, is cruciallydifferent from the kind of not-doubting exemplified by the child exclusively imaginingawingedhorse. Forthat child is unable to doubtand thereforecannot properlybesaid to have confidence in the existenceofthe horse. In fact,such achild can never exist and such a lack of doubtisimpossible, as one is always alreadyaffected in manyways, some of which must appear to conflict with others. By contrast,the lack of doubt that we find in confidence and despair is very real.While no one is exclusively affected by asingle particularthing,confidenceand despair are prevalent feelings. The crucial point is that these feelingsinvolve not the elimination of doubt,but its imaginative suppres- sion, asuppression that is necessarilytemporary and incomplete. Just as one cannot doubt everything, one cannot despair of, or be confident about,everything.Nor does one enter life in astate of confidence or despair.Rather,one acquires confidenceand sinks into despair,having first been in astate of doubt.Weare naturallydisposed to having doubts, which is whydoubting should not be presented as aphilosophical achievement.And since doubt comes first,and this again is the crucial point,it can in fact never be fullyremoved. This is so not just because we are affected in agreat manyways. Doubt cannot be annihilatedevenwith regard to asingle singular thing.For in imaginingsomething “excludingthe existenceofthe thingsthat put [one] in doubt,” one must alsohavea memory trace of the previous imagination of having that doubt.Ifone had really completelyforgotten that conflictingidea, one would have been essentiallyindistin- guishable from the child imaginingawinged horse, who cannot properlybesaid to be in astate of confidence or despair.Aswehaveseen, in astate of confidence or despair,one does not spontaneously imagine “other things, excludingthe existence of the thingsthat put [one] in doubt,” but one does so intentionally; that is, actively and purposefully.Itisnot justany randomthing that will have the effect of excluding the cause of doubt, but onlycertain things. One must thereforeimagine something specific that willhavethis effect.However,inorder to do this,one must somehow be aware of the reason for doubt; that is, one must have at least an inkling of 166 AvrahamRot

what one wants to ignore. To put it differently, if one merelyrandomlythinksof “something else,” one mayjust as well find oneself thinking of the same thing again. Inasmuchasthe imaginative effort is specificallyexerted with the purpose of ignoring aspecific cause of doubt,this very effort registers the existence of that doubt.Toput it even more strongly, it is impossibletoignoreanything entirely inasmuch as ignoringisanintentional act.Thus, confidenceand despair are not only contingent on the general possibility of having doubt; they also require that the specific cause of doubtberemembered, if onlypartly, while it is ignored. To sum up this point,just as certainty concerning clear and distinct ideas cannot give waytodoubt,doubt concerning contingencies can never be eliminated; it can onlybeignored. Being “capable of perceiving agreat manythings” and “affected in agreat manyways,” humans are “necessarilyalways subject to passions.”⁶⁸ This equallyimplies that humans necessarilylack certainty concerning the thingsthey perceive and by which they are affected, and hence that they have reasons to doubt whatever they perceive and feel. Sometimes these reasons must be ignored, imaginatively suppressed. However,this is onlydone for the purpose of maintaining self-integrity;that is, when circumstances are overwhelmingand action requires some arbitrary closure (whichisalways the casetosome extent). This does not result in the elimination of doubt,but onlyinits partial and temporary suspension. If circumstances allow it again and one regains the capacity to thrive,toincrease one’s power of acting and forceofexisting,one ceases to imagine the thing excluding the cause of doubtand thus re-encounters finite reality properly; that is, one re-experiences it as inherentlycontingent as it actuallyis. The moment one is able to be more realistic in such away—that is, to stop imaginingasapsychological means of coping—one returns to the more basic state of doubting and of having hopes and fears. Furthermore, since doubt cannot be eliminated, one is necessarilyhopeful and fearful and cannot be absolutelyconfident or desperate, not even about asingle singular thing.For as we have seen, confidence and despair demandthe effective in- vestment of an imaginative effort specificallytargeting the cause of doubt.This implies that the cause of doubt is somehow known and thatindisregarding this cause, the thing in relation to which the confidenceordespair is experienced is not ade- quatelycaptured in its contingency; that is, realistically. Thus, one cannotexperience these inherentlyobject-related emotions with regard to anyobject without falsifying its nature. We can therefore put our conclusion as follows. ForSpinoza, doubtisnot a means to be used or agoal to be achieved, but afact of life which cannot be avoided. Doubt is affective to the same extent that it is imaginative,perceptual, mnemonic, and motivated, but onlyonce the affective dimension is clarified (i.e., in the third part of the Ethics)isits description completed. Hence, it can properlybelabelled affective doubt.Coming last in the order of demonstration—thatis, after perception,

 E2p14; E4p4c. Spinoza’sAffective Scepticism 167

memory,imagination, and striving—the affectivedimension subsumes all the others. Without regard to this dimension, all the others appear as strangeabstractions—as exemplified by the child imaginingawinged horseorthe one seeing Paul, Simon, Peter,etc. We have further established that beingaffective,Spinoza’sdoubt is an ongoing and continuous process, one which always alreadytakes place and which can onlybesuspended, never permanently stopped. With regard to contingencies, it is all-encompassing;with regard to clear and distinct ideas, it is inapplicable. This argument,that doubt always alreadytakes place or always alreadydoes not takeplace, cannot be dismissed as trivial or circular or as an argument that leadstoaninfinite regress, for it does not implythat the taking-placeornot-taking-placeofdoubt in the mode of always alreadyisanearlier,brute repetition of the doubtexercised at the present moment.Rather,itimplies thatdoubt is repeated not just diachronically, in the past,present,and future, but also synchronically, appearingatonce in all the various indissolublyrelated and yetdistinguishable dimensions of finite existence. Correspondingtosuch aconception of doubt, Spinozist scepticism is more radical than Cartesian scepticism. While the former is real and multidimensional, the latter is just athinking exercise.

We are still left with aconcern thatwehavementioned onlybriefly: if doubt is so importantfor Spinoza, whydoes he appear to devote such little attention to it?In order to address this concern, it is sufficient to point to the centrality of the place of the affects in Spinoza’sphilosophy, evidenced by the fact that the better part of the Ethics is devoted to their explanation. Forbeing affected is indissolublyrelated to being in astate of doubt, as all the temporal affects, including confidenceand despair,originateinhope and fear,which are defined as modes of doubting.According- ly,the human affects and affective doubtare an integralpart of Spinoza’smetaphysics, and hope and fear and the otheraffects are accordinglyput on apar with God and other matters that are typicallyconsidered the subject of first philosophy. In this regard, the differencefrom Descartes is particularlytelling, for Descartes,aswe know,devises his systematic classification of the affectsinaseparate book, ThePas- sions of the Soul,which is also the last one he wrote. By wayofconclusion, Iwould like to show that Descartestreats the passions and affective doubtonlyasakind of afterthought,and, more than that, in amanner that is in fact incongruent with his earlier meditations on first philosophy. In this regard too, Spinoza’sscepticism appears more radical: not onlyisitaffective,but this dimension is also ascribed metaphysical significance. The argument against Cartesian scepticism on which Ihavefocused thus far targets its lack of affective dimension. My suggestion has been that the lack of affect corresponds to the lack of intention that Spinoza identifies as aproblem when he says that he is concernedwith “true doubtinthe mind, and not [with] what we com- 168 Avraham Rot

monlysee happen when someone says in words that he doubts although his mind does not doubt.”⁶⁹ But qualifying Spinoza’sscepticism as affective means more than that; that is, more than it is sincere. It alsomeans thatfor Spinoza, scepticism itself—in the sense of bothdoubt and inquiry—can and should be exercised with respect to the affects themselves. In otherwords, in Spinoza’saccount,not onlyare the passions expressions of doubtand not onlyisdoubt necessarilyaffective,but the passions themselves, being akind of contingent thing,are necessarilysubject to doubt.Bycontrast,Descartesdoes not onlyoverlook the affective dimension of scepticism;healso, as we shall presentlysee, explicitlyexcludes the affectsfrom the domain of applicability of his method of doubtand thereby relegates them to secondary significance. In other words, by excluding the affectsfrom the domain of applicability of his method of doubt,Descartesshows that unlike Spinoza, he does not consider the affects aproper metaphysical or epistemological concern. This makes Spinoza’sscepticism all the more radical, but also less intuitive,for we are accustomed to thinkingoffeelings in accordance with Descartes as thingsthat are beyond doubt.Myfear maybeunreasonable in thatitisbasedonamispercep- tion or misunderstanding,but no one is in aposition to question the fact that Iam afraid.For Spinoza, the opposite is the case. Not onlycan we not be certain of any finite mode due to the inherentlycontingent natureoffinite existence, but it must be even less possibletobecertain of the passions, for the passions are even more finite and contingent than finite modes, being the affections of finite modes, contingencies of the second order.Ifthe Icannot be known with certaintyonthe grounds that it is a finite mode, it follows afortiori thatthe affections of the Icannot be known with certainty,not even by the Iitself. Nonetheless, even though we cannot know our particular feelingswith certainty,wecan know with certainty that we are affected in various specific ways,such that the affects can be defined just as the cause of itself or the nature of atriangle can be defined; that is, as part of nature and correspondingly as part of asingle metaphysical system.⁷⁰ Cartesian scepticism is, by contrast,limited not onlybecause it is exclusively cognitivist,but also because it is articulatedinadualistic framework. Questioning the reality of an external world, it presupposes the reality of internal experience.Des- cartes confirms this in ThePassions of the Soul when he states thatunlike “perceptions which refertoobjects outside us,” the passions are “so close and internal to our soul that it cannot possiblyfeel them unless they are trulyasitfeels them to be.”⁷¹ This idea is foundational and has often been reiteratedinmodern philosophical psy-

 This argument has been reiterated morerecentlybyPeirceand others in the pragmatist tradition. As Christopher Hookwayhas it,the basic contention in this regardhas been that “we should not doubt in philosophywhat we do not doubt in our hearts.” See Christopher Hookway, “Doubt: Affec- tive States and the Regulation of Inquiry,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy,Supplementary Volume 24 (1998): 205.  Cf. E3pref and TP 1.1.  CSM1:338. Spinoza’sAffectiveScepticism 169

chology. AccordingtoFranz Brentano, for instance, since the “objects of inner perception” are amatter of “immediate insight,” in questioning them, one “would reach astate of absolutedoubt,askepticism which would certainlydestroy itself, because it would have destroyed anyfirm basis upon which it could endeavortoattack knowledge.”⁷² While Descartesdoes not hesitate to doubt clear and distinct ideas, he insists that the passions are felt preciselyasthey trulyare.But what about all the reasons for doubt that he listsinthe Meditations?Descartes himself goes on to consider one of them immediatelyafter the passagejust cited from ThePassions of the Soul:

Thus often when we sleep, and sometimesevenwhenweare awake,weimagine certain things so vividlythat we think we see them beforeus, or feel them in our body, although they are not thereatall. But even if we areasleep and dreaming, we cannot feel sad, or moved by anyother passion, unless the soul trulyhas this passion within it.

Indeed, we can wake up from anightmareand be uncertain about what we have just dreamt but nonetheless be certain about having experiencedafeelingofanxiety. Often, we continue to experience it.While the connection of ideas is disrupted upon waking up, the feeling persists. But even if this example can indeed be taken to show that we have some sort of immediate awarenessofour feelings, what about the possibility thatevil demons have manipulated them?Cannot such demons implant false feelingsinusjust as they can implant false ideas about mathematics and the external world?Tellingly,Descartesdoes not invoke this argument here. This is arguably so because he rejects the very notionthat the passions can be meaningfullyqualified as true or false, for in his account,they can onlybefalse if they are taken to represent something in the external world. Giventhat they are impressions produced purely internallybythe “fortuitous” movementsofthe spirits, they do not properlyrep- resent anything—that is, they are not about anything—and accordingly,itis meaningless to doubt them.⁷³ Thus, the invocation of the argument about sleeping is alreadyredundant.The passions simply cannot be doubted as amatter of principle. Descartesthereby confirms what Brentano makesexplicit; namely,that by doubting such “objects of inner perception,” one “would reach astate of absolute doubt,askepticism which would certainlydestroy itself, because it would have de-

 Brentano, Psychology,7.  The contrast with Spinozaisagain instructive.According to Spinoza (E3p56), “thereare as many species of joy,sadness,and desire, and consequentlyofeach affect composed of these […]orderived from them […]asthereare species of objects by which we areaffected.” That is, for Spinoza, the passions aredefined by their intentional objects;they derive their meaningfromthe specific wayin which they situatethe individual in relation to the object.Descartes explicitlyrejects this view (CSM 1:371): “The objects which stimulatethe senses do not excite different passionsinusbecause of differencesinthe objects,but onlybecause of the various ways in which they mayharm or benefit us,oringeneral have importancefor us.” 170 Avraham Rot

stroyed anyfirm basis upon which it could endeavortoattack knowledge.” Spinoza’s scepticism is more radical in that it does not imposethis restriction. To conclude, although Spinoza is often considered an antisceptical thinker,he presents us in effect with amore completeand truthful and thereforemore radical form of scepticism than Descartes. While in Descartes’saccount,the affectscannot be doubtedand doubt is not significantlyaffective,inSpinoza’saccount,the affects themselvesare expressionsofdoubtand it is, in fact,clear and distinct ideas that cannot be earnestlydoubted. Cartesian scepticism is transitory and narrowly cognitive and is henceless radical than Spinozist scepticism, which is all-encompassing, ongoing,and equiprimordiallycognitive, embodied, imaginative,mnemonic, motivated, and affective.While Descartesconsiders boththe affects and doubtasstates that need to be overcome,⁷⁴ for Spinoza, they are aforcethat needs to be reckoned with, as humans are “necessarilyalways subject to passions.” Also unlikeDescartes, Spinoza is committed to the view that human understandingisinherentlyconfused. Accordingly, confusion, wonder,ordoubt is not onlywhereinquiry begins or how it proceeds, but also whereitstays.

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Timothy Franz What wasMaimon After? HisMetaphysical Foundations of NaturalSciencein1790

This essayisanoutline of part of afuturecommentary on the philosophyofSolomon Maimon (?1753–1800).¹ It covers his article entitled “Über die Weltseele (Entelechia Universi),” published in the BerlinischesJournal fürAufklärung in July 1790,and how it directlyfollows on from the problems of his largerwork, the Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie,published earlier that same year.First,ofcourse, these problems must be specified. As amere outline, this essayworks towardsalarg- er commentary on Maimon’sphilosophyfrom 1790 to 1800.Such acommentary is necessary first of all because of the status quaestionis. From at least 1848, historians of philosophyhavebeen discussing Maimon’swork. However,evengiven apprecia- tive and enlighteningbooks by Ernst Cassirer (1920), Richard Kroner (1921), Martial Gueroult(1929),Samuel Atlas (1964), SamuelH.Bergmann (1967), Frederick Beiser (1987), and Aachim Engstler (1990)(to mention onlysome), it is nevertheless true that the seven volumes of his works which we currentlyhaveremainanunknown quantity.² The samemay be said about the manyimportant articles on the subject. One can read the relevant books and articles, understand and learn from them, and stillreasonablyask: “What preciselydoMaimon’sworks argue, and whydo they arguewhatever it is thatthey do?” At the sametime, we know that Kant,Fichte, and some of Maimon’scommentators held him in highregard. Therefore, the Stan- ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy reports Manfred Frank’stantalising suggestion that “Maimon is the ‘last great philosopher’ about to be discovered.”³

 SolomonMaimon, Gesammelte Werke,ed. Valerio Verra. 7vols. (Hildsheim:Olms,1965–76), abbreviated hereasGW. Translations fromthe German aremine except when from Maimon, Essay on Tran- scendental Philosophy,trans.NickMidgley,Henry Somers-Hall, Alastair Welchman, and Merten Re- glitz (New York: Continuum, 2010;original version: Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie [Berlin: Bei Christian Friedrich Voss und Sohn, 1790]), and then citedasETP.This translation also givesthe GW pagination.  Martial Gueroult, La Philosophie transcendantale de Salomon Maïmon (Paris:Libraire Félix Alcan, 1929); Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit, Dritter Band: Die Nachkantischen Systeme (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000;original version Ver- lagBruno Cassirer [1929]); RichardKroner, VonKant bis Hegel,2nd edition (Tübingen: J. C. BMohr/ Paul Siebeck, 1961[1921–24]); Samuel Atlas, From Critical to SpeculativeIdealism, ThePhilosophy of Solomon Maimon (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff,1964); Samuel H. Bergmann, ThePhilosophyofSolo- mon Maimon. Translated by Noah J. Jacobs(Jerusalem: Magnes Press,1967); Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy fromKant to Fichte (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Achim Engstler, Untersuchungen zum Idealismus Salomon Maimons (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990).  PeterThielke andYitzhak Melamed, “SalomonMaimon,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall2015edition), ed.Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/maimon/.

OpenAccess. ©2020Timothy Franz, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-011 174 Timothy Franz

Thus, there is aparadox: alarge amount of good work has at the same time in- creasinglyobscured Maimon’sargumentation. Hereare four (certainlynon-exhaustive)reasons for this situation. First,Maimon led what has been described as a “dou- blyalienated” life.⁴ In Polish Lithuania, as apoor but nevertheless privileged Talmudic prodigy within his owncommunity,heremained alienated from the artistic and scientific culture which he knew existed, but was just beyond his grasp. He left for Germany, whereheintended, as straightforwardlyaspossible, to discover the truth in philosophy. There, however,hewas inescapablyidentifiedwith the foreignness of the place he had left,and so he was again alienated from what he wanted to achieveand was not known as he wanted to be known.⁵ Thisfact,related to afear of actual and potential unappreciative reviews of his works,resulted in aTalmudic style that was even more cryptic and allusive than it would instead perhaps otherwise have been.⁶ Secondly, Maimon’salienatedlife in Germany took its unfortunate course in that “Maimon’sappearance on the philosophical scene was like that of a meteor:sudden, of shortdurationand apparentlyleaving no trace.”⁷ This must be true. When Maimon published his most sophisticated work, the Versuch einer neuen Logik (henceforth: Logik), in 1794,hedisappeared from public recognition just as Fichteacceded to it with his Wissenschaftslehre and his appointment to the UniversityofJena.⁸ Thirdly,interms of Maimon’sreception, manycommentators have voiced certain preconceptions about him basedonhis personality and cultural situation, but have not further justified (or abandoned) those preconceptions through the effort of close reading.⁹ And fourthly, the close reading that is called

 Abraham P. Socher, TheRadical Enlightenment of Solomon Maimon: Judaism, Heresy,and Philoso- phy (Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 2006), 112ff.  In aletter to Reinhold of March28, 1794,after aremarkabout Jews typicallygaining “an air of importance for themselvesatsomeone else’sexpense,” Kant stated: “Ihavenever reallyunderstood what he is after.” See ImmanuelKant, Correspondence,trans.and ed. A. Zweig (Cambridge:Cam- bridge University Press,1999;original vols.10–13 of Gesammelte Schriften [Berlin: GeorgReimer, 1900–1922]), 476.  In the Versuch (1790), one finds: “Incidentally, to whatextent IamaKantian, an anti-Kantian, both at the same time, or neither,Ileave to the judgment of the thinkingreader” (GW2:9–10). And, in the Logik (1794): “Idonot always express my thoughts in asufficientlydetermined or systematic way, and occasionallyleave holes in [their] execution, whose filling in Icannot expect from every reader” (GW5:26). The Weltseele is conductedinthe styleofaTalmudist whowould “positionhis two legs on the two oppositesides of aTalmudic distinctionand ask his disputants where he belonged.” Forthis citation, see Yitzhak Melamed, “Salomon Maimon and the FailureofModern Jewish Philos- ophy” (2012), http://www.theapj.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Melamed-on-Maimon.doc, 13.  Atlas, FromCritical to SpeculativeIdealism,7.  This is not to saythat Maimon was not read; he was likelyeagerlyread by certain interested par- ties. And so, likethe traces of ameteor which surfaceyears after the impact,mixed with local elements,Maimon appears integrallyyet anonymouslyinGerman Idealism, neo-Kantianism, logical positivism, and other traditions.Readingthem aids in reading Maimon, and vice versa.  Friedrich Schlegel’sfragments include “Maimon ein entgeisterter Kant,” citedinEngstler, Untersu- chungen zum Idealismus Salomon Maimons,95. See also Franz Rosenzweig’sremarks to the effect that What wasMaimon After? 175

for is difficult,and not onlybecause of Maimon’sstyle. Maimon eagerlyread the works of ImmanuelKant and claimedtohaveanticipatedtheirmajor themes.¹⁰ He also adopted the claims and method of transcendental or critical reflection, though he carried it out via an idiosyncratic sceptical method.¹¹ Acommentary on Maimon is thereforealso necessary because of his apparently quite difficult and complex relationship to Kantian philosophy. Oneofthe foremost contemporaryMaimon scholars, Prof. Gideon Freudenthal, has put forth the thesis that Maimon not onlyfound nothing impressive in modern philosophy(as opposed to modern science), but also that in his first philosophical book in German,the Ver- such über die Transzendentalphilosophie of 1790,he“deniesKant’srevolution in philosophyand claims to further improveonhim on the basisofLeibniz and Hume.”¹² Accordingtothis interpretation, Maimon deniedKant’srevolution because he had disproved the existenceofsynthetic apriori propositions in mathematics and physics and was thereforeable to treat Kant’sargument for the categories as merelyalimited variation of the age-old ontological question of the relation or community between

Maimon left aself-enclosed culture in favour of barbarism and aphilosophyoftotality destructive of individualvalue, cited in Socher, The Radical Enlightenment of Solomon Maimon,152–53.  In chapter 3ofthe Lebensgeschichte,Maimon says that memoriesofstudyingthe Bible with his father caused him to writeanessay(around 1785–68) that he sent to Professor Garveconcerninghow dogmatic commitment to the principle of sufficient reason leads to acontradiction, an idea “which, though at the time Iknew nothingofthe Kantian philosophy, still constitutesits [dialectical] foundation.” (This was the Professor Garvetowhom Kant sent the letter of September 21,1798, confessing that it was the “antinomyofpurereason” which “aroused me from my dogmatic slumber”;Kant, Cor- respondence,551–52.) In chapter13, he writes that he derivedamerely human use from the tenSe- phiroth of the Kabbalah, treatingthem as logical categories which have ontological application in experience; this angeredthe Kabbalists,who asserted adivine origin for the categories instead of ahuman one. In chapter 16,Maimon’sencounter with mystical excesses of the Hasidim and others led him to develop an ethics which demands consideration of actions estimated intrinsically “in relation to some end” prior to their adoption as means. Furthermore, the ten chapters on Maimonides continuallyassociateMaimonides’sthoughts on God with Kant’stranscendental dialectic. Overall, the Lebensgeschichte is filled with Maimon’santicipations of Kantian ideas.  Forexamples of Maimon’sdescription of himself as a “critical sceptic,” see (amongmanyexam- ples) GW 3:429n.; GW 4:210–11,225–26,220,260;GW5:351 ff. In each, he asserts his willingness to defend critical philosophyagainst all comers and proclaims that it should not be dogmatic (as it would be for Reinhold) but have an internal scepticism, whether of the quid juris or the quid facti. In my reading,Maimon’schallenge was one of purifyingcritical reflection from unjustified hypotheses (the quid facti)and at the same time coming to acritical apriori logic of physics (the quid juris).  Gideon Freudenthal, “Maimon’sPhilosophical Itinerary,” afterword to Solomon Maimon, The Au- tobiography of Solomon Maimon,ed. Yitzhak Melamed and Abraham P. Socher,trans. Paul Reitter (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2018;original version: Lebensgeschichte [Berlin: Friedrich Viewegdem ältern,1792–93]), 246,261.However,atthe end of chapter 12 of the Lebensgeschichte, Maimon argues that it would be just as unfair to condemn Mendelssohn’sphilosophyasnon-Kantian as it would be to condemn Maimonides’sPtolemian astronomyasnon-Newtonian, for both had nevertheless achieved great things. This admits aparity between scientific (Newtonian) and philosophical (Kantian) development. There aremanyfurther examples of this wayofthinking. 176 Timothy Franz

the soul and the body.¹³ However,aninterpretation of the further course of Maimon’s philosophy, includingnot onlythe Versuch,but also the Weltseele,the Logik,the Kri- tische Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Geist (1797), and the smaller works that subservethese major ones, can convincingly (and,inmyopinion, correctly) advance the precise antithesis: that Maimon did not denyKant’srevolution, but in fact intended to perfect it and succeeded—in the Logik—in giving an exemplary version of its perfection. Acommentary on Maimon maythereforebecome alocus for renewed discussion of the nature, feasibility, and desirability of the philosophyoftranscendental reflection in general. But,then, how exactlymight Maimon’swork perfect or completeKantian philosophy? To see this, one must recall that this very possibility was built into Kant’s major works.They are each entitled Critique,sothattheir achievement is to be measured against the idea of transcendental philosophy. Kant presents the distinction between critique and transcendental philosophymostfullyinsection 7ofthe introduction to the Bedition of the first Critique.¹⁴ When transcendental reflection is completed in open-ended critique of the special sciences—i.e., when these sciences are systematicallyunified in experience (Erfahrung)sothat the nature of their syntheses is identifiedand the most basicprinciples of experience are shown to be constitutive of those sciences—then critiquereaches its immanent goal of transcendental philosophy. Maimon, from the beginning of his engagement with the Critique of Pure Rea- son, realisedthatits reflection did not justify the cognitionclaims of the science of

 Freudenthal, 249ff. However,inmyopinion, Maimon’s Versuch did not disprovethe existenceof synthetic apriori propositions in mathematics. Rather,itindirectlyproved them by attemptingto makethem analytic, failing, and thereby discovering “brutefacts of intuition” in away that agrees with Kant’sdistinction between mathematical and philosophical reason (as in the Critique’s “Tran- scendental Doctrine of Method”). As for physics, see Gideon Freudenthal, “Maimon’sSubversion of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: There AreNoSynthetic apriori Judgments in Physics,” in Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic.Critical Assessments,editedbyGideon Freudenthal (Dordrecht: Kluwer,2003): 144–75.This article is powerful and educative and Iagree with its analysis of Maimon’sargument (in the 1793 commentary to Pemberton’sbook on Newton and the 1797 Kriti- sche Untersuchungen); i.e., that in his reflection on physics, Kant simplyhad no right to analytically substitute concepts of dynamics for those of puremathematics. Inotethat in this vein, Maimon’s commentary to Bertholdy’stranslation of Bacon’s New Organon,GW4:357ff., argues that critical reflection on experience, even on scientific experience, does not license apriori commitment to any specific physical theories or hypotheses, e.g., “forces.” Maimon is far less committed than Kant to the dynamical paradigm.But this need not mean that Maimon’s “critical scepticism” denies the philosophyoftranscendental reflection. Rather,Maimon’smain works are ultimatelydevoted to making critique morecritical through scepticism—which is to movetowards transcendental philosophy.  ImmanuelKant, Critique of Pure Reason,ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press,1998). Original work: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga: Hartknoch, 1781;2nd ed., 1787). Also, Werner Flach, “Transzendentalphilosophie und Kritik. ZurBestimmungdes Verältnissesder Titelbegriff der Kantischen Philosophie,” in Tradition und Kritik:Festschrift fü rRudolf Zocher zum 80.Geburtstag,ed. Wilhelm Arnold und Hermann Zeltner (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1967): 69–83. What wasMaimon After? 177

physics.¹⁵ Without aproper critique of the science of physics,there could be no transcendental philosophy. Maimon attempted to provide thatcritique.Kant later came to the same realisation and began workingonwhat we know as the Opus Postumum sometime in or after 1796.¹⁶ The reasons for the deficiency of the Critique vis-à-vis physics are perhaps obvious in retrospect.That work simplydid not give the conditions of the possibilityof the science of physics.Itwas instead propped up on the dynamicalhypothesis that matter (as acondition of experience to which anyactual cognition must be connected [A216/B266]) is aproduct of tworeciprocallyinteracting yetindependent forces, repulsion and attraction.¹⁷ Furthermore, critical reflection on physics (in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science)not onlyindicatedthat the experience of the truths of physics was different from the experience specified in the first Critique,but its analysis also revealedtointerested readers,and to Kant himself, a circularity in the supposedlyindependent forces. The forceofattraction depends upon certain values (the distance between bodies, since repulsiveforceisininverse proportion to the cube of thatdistance) which onlyitcan give (because it is uniquely universallypenetrative).¹⁸ Thus, in the earlier parts of the Opus Postumum,Kant en-

 Itsdevelopment in the Critique of Judgment could not do so either.One aspect of the justification of the cognition claims of physicsmust be outliningatype of symbolic cognition that refers to objects either indirectlygiven to perception or not givenatall. Maimon argues: “So we cannot make such concepts cognizable [kennbar]bymeans of the objects in which they arefound, but onlyby means of signs” (GW2:273,ETP 143). See the entire Anhang ü ber die symbolische Erkenntnis to the Versuch. Aresponse to the thesis that symbolic cognition can entirelytranscendand organise intuition apriori is in Kant,KU§59: “The morerecent logicians have come to use the word symbolic in another sense that is wrongand runs counter to the meaningofthe word. They use it to contrast symbolic with intuitive presentation” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment,trans.Werner S. Pluhar [In- dianapolis and Cambridge:Hackett,1987]; original work: Kritik der Urteilskraft [Berlin and Libau: Bey Lagarde und Friederich,1790],227).  He perhaps realised this earlier than 1790,and had mostlycompleted the Opus by the middle of 1801.See Förster’sintroduction to ImmanuelKant, Opus Postumum,trans. Eckhart Förster and Mi- chael Rosen, ed. Eckhart Förster (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993; original work published in Berlin: De Gruyter,1938), p. xxxvii, where he finds that “earlyinthe 1790s,Kant’sthinking on the philosophyofnaturewent through atransitional period.”  “Hypothesis” heremeans an adjunct to atheory that helps explain that theory but is “higher” than it in the sense that it cannot itself be falsified in experiment. In this sense, one could argue that the “ether,” so important for Kant,was retained by scientists as ahypothesis because the theoretical phenomenaoflight and magnetism,for example, seemed to require asubstratum. What Mi- chelson’sattempt of 1887did, however,was to contradict the conjecture that the speed of light must change relative to the earth. It did not contradict the ether hypothesis, however; that could simplybe dropped. Irelyhere on Hans Wagner, Philosophie und Reflexion,2nd ed. (Munich and Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1967; first published 1959), 199,who referencesHugoDingler’sworkonhypotheses.  See Förster’sintroduction to Opus Postumum,p.xxxvi, and also Kant’sletter to Beck of October 16,1791, in Correspondence,434ff. Also Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, ed. and trans. M. Friedman (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004;Original work: Metaphysische An- fangsgründe der Natur-wissenschaft [Riga: Hartknoch,1786]). 178 Timothy Franz

deavoured to solve the circle problem by adopting the absolutecircularity of the etheric forceasaground for repulsion and attraction. As such, the ether is supposed to be an absolute and unconditioned force, but thereisone problem with that sup- posal. The problem is that it is still ahypothesis, and anyhypothesis is conditioned by the theory for which it is ahypothesis (in this case, the Newtonian theory). If Kant is to have an apriori logic of physics,then what is needed is not aconditioned (and therefore aposteriori)hypothesis, but an apriori theory of theories. He comes closest to this in the suggestion thatthe “object of physics” to be outlined apriori is that of the “appearance of appearances”¹⁹—the ways in which appearances mayappear to us, such that they can be described by physics. This is the thesis Iwould propose for alargercommentary on Maimon’sworks: that the Logik is primarilyanapriori logic of the appearancesofappearances,²⁰ which was preceded by asuccession of fundamentallydifferent metaphysical attempts to solve the same problem of physics for criticism, such that the failureof each informed and gave rise to the following attempt.The Versuch,first of all, was ahybrid transcendental rationalist metaphysics of identity.Itwas incoherent (and we willsee why) and was immediatelyfollowed by the speculative dialectical Welt- seele. The world-soul as athemeoccupied Maimon for at least three years, up to the 1793 article “Über die Schwärmerei,” the second part of which comments on extracts from Giordano Bruno’s Cause, Principle, and Unity.²¹ There, Maimon pronounces the

 This suggestion is fromthe tenth and eleventh fascicles,towhich Förster givesthe heading “How Is Physics Possible? How Is the Transition to PhysicsPossible?”,describingitasgoinginadifferent direction from the ether proofs.  Icannot give an account of this work here, but it involves at least these twoargumentative components:1)reflection, prior to experience, on the logical principles of the thoughtofany object which can be giveninexperience, includingscientific experience (Maimoncalls this the “object of logic”), and 2) reflection on the ways in which such thinkingcan systematicallyapproachthe completedetermination of how that which appears does appear.GW5:§§1–7, 12–13 accomplish the first,while §§ 8–11 accomplish the second. Maimon announces his main thesis of the Logik in GW 5:67–68: “The laws and original forms of thinkingcan be determined apriori (through reflection) and made complete, and in view of them logic can be made, as awhole, complete.”  Maimon’ssource for Bruno was Jacobi’semendedtranslations in his Über die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (Breslau: Gottlieb Löwe, 1789). Yitzhak Melamed, “Salo- mon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism,” Journal of the HistoryofPhilosophy 42, no. 1(2004): 72,notesthat chapter 69 of Maimon’s Giveʿat ha-Moreh (1791), his commentary on Mai- monides’ Guide commissioned by the Berlin Enlightenment,includes Hebrewtranslations of Bruno. He argues that Maimon onlyincluded Bruno as away of esotericallyadmittingSpinozism into philosophy. Idisagree, insofar as Maimon had an evident interest in Bruno’sthesis of the absolute as a dynamic mediation of opposition. Melamedwrites that part of what allowed Maimon to introduce Spinoza via Bruno is that Maimon had ahistoricallyconditioned (mis)understandingofSpinoza’s parallel attributes of thought and extension. However,this maynot be true, sinceinthe Weltseele, Maimon specificallysaysheisnot Spinozistic because he does not admit that “God and the world areone and the same substancetowhich twoproperties can be attributed, namelyinfinite extension (matter)and infinite understanding (form).” Rather,likeBruno, he proposes the world-soul as one force that dynamically unifies what is opposed. Maimon advancesalong his own path. What wasMaimon After? 179

conception of the world-soul to be apiece of unphilosophical Schwärmerei,orenthu- siasm. It is by commenting on Brunothat he intends to “separate the well-grounded from the enthusiastic therein as if through achemical operation” (GW4:616). As he was at that time also writing acommentary on Aristotle’s Categories together with a Propadeutik zu einerneuen Theorie des Denkens which accompanied the Logik of 1794,here is apicture of the whole: Maimon’sphilosophyhas as its highpoints the Versuch,the Weltseele,and the Logik.²² The Logik is neither ametaphysics of identity nor of dialectic, but primarily one of analogy, though Icannot go into adescription of that work here.²³ But importantly, if this theory of Maimon’sdevelopment is correct,then the Weltseele not onlymeaningfullyfollowed on from the Versuch, but its failurealso meaningfullycontributed to the Logik. How is this the case? If this essaycan begin to show this much, if onlyinoutline, then it will make apartial yetessential contribution to the central argument of the largercommentary. The status quaestionis regardingthe Weltseele is as follows. In a2004 article, Melamed wrotethatMaimon’sconception of the world-soul is “relevant” but “of secondary importance,” at least to Maimon’srelationship to Spinoza and the reception of Spinoza in Western philosophy. Foraccordingtothatarticle, Maimon’sprimary philosophical contribution was in bringingSpinozistic monism to Kant in order to justify the categories, thereby explicitlyintroducing Spinozism into the philosophical tradition. In a2006 dissertation, Ehrenspergeroutlined the breadth of the historical background that one mayassume is behind Maimon’snotion of the world-soul. The

 Maimon also wrote the Kritische Untersuchungen ü ber den menschlichen Geist in 1797;this work consists mainlyofdialogues, but its ideas largely follow from the Logik. Indeed, the Prolegomena zu Kritik einer praktischen Vernunft included therein specifiesthe metaphysics implied by the cognising subject as it is giveninthe Logik. One aspect left out of consideration here(which would also be necessary for the Logik)isMaimon’sdevelopment of an intentional theory of thinkingincontradis- tinction to Reinhold’s Satz des Bewusstseins. Forthis,see primarilyhis letters to Reinhold in the Strei- fereien and also the lettersappended to the Logik.  See GW 5:18–20 for Maimon’sanalogical conception. The basic thought is, Ithink, that he no longer givesametaphysicsinwhich the absoluteentirelytranscends the cognisingsubject (as is the unintended resultofthe Versuch), nor does he give one which identifies the absolute with the cognisingsubject(as in the Weltseele), but one in which the absolute transcends and yetisimmanent to the subject,and this is nevertheless ametaphysical view which Maimon criticallyjustifies. This justification involves the claim that the thinkingsubject, in transcendental reflection, completely or absolutelyaccounts for the principles of its thinkingofbeing. As absolutelyjustified in this reflection, the subject’sthinkingcan also rightfullyclaim to be the thinkingofthe absolute—but since beingtranscends the subject which thinks it,the absolute (which is common to the thinkingsubject and to being) transcends the subject too, and so the subject in its thinkingisalso entirelycontingent to the absolute. In this way, Maimon can justify an analogical metaphysicssuch that metaphysics is no longer prima philosophia,but philosophia ultima. Incidentally, the sequenceofmetaphysics of identity,dialectic, and analogy is describedasthe true path towards apost-critical metaphysicsin Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics, OriginalStructureand Universal Rhythm,trans. John R. Betz and David B. Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’sPublishingCo., 2014); original version: Analogia Entis: Metaphysik (Munich: Kösel und Pustet,1932). 180 Timothy Franz

question behind that outline is the following:given that Maimon published the Ver- such in 1790 and the article “Baco und Kant”²⁴ soon afterwards (which was closely related to the concerns of the Versuch), and wrotetoKant recommending the latter article on May9of thatyear,how was it thathecame onlysix days later,onMay 15, to ask Kant to read his just-published 45-pagearticle on the world-soul—awork with apparentlydivergent,evenincompatible, themesand arguments?Ehrenspergercan- not save the Weltseele from relegation to “secondary importance” either,however, since he finds that it contains some basic thematic similarities to the Versuch,but onlyenough to indicate that Maimon’smajor effort was to carry over amedieval Wel- tanschauung into Enlightenment philosophy.²⁵ Like Engstler,then,hesees Maimon mainlyasaproblem thinker whose “argument” was not much more than the form, practice, and ethos of commentary. In contrasttothese commentators, Iwould urge thatMaimon’sbrilliance lay in immediatelyseizingupon the basic underlying problem and task: that critical philosophywas not reconciled with the science and claims of physics,yet if it could be so reconciled, then critique could advancetotranscendental philosophy. If he never phrased it quite so explicitly, that is because of the difficulties inherent in his texts (mentioned above), difficulties which include the fact that this transcendental reflection on physics,which would constitutethe philosophicalmeaning of the science, had not onlynot been conducted before, but also required aconfrontation with ontology of the sortwhich Kant had attempted to ban from philosophy. To see the requirement of this confrontation with ontology,one maynote that the parallel courses that Maimon and Kant (in the Opus Postumum)took in this endeavour point to acertain paradox. As the philosophers abandoned their uncritical hypotheses about em- piricallyconditioned forces or entities (whetherthese werethe ether or the world- soul as aforce, or even differentials), they indicated—and Maimon, specifically, realised—thatwhat the task called for was an unconditioned logic, and thereforeanab- solutelogic, alogic of the absolute. This seems by definitiontobesomething that falls outside the bounds of critical philosophy.²⁶ So, the solution to this paradoxbe-

 Solomon Maimon, “Baco und Kant,” Berlinisches Journal fü rAufklärung 7(1790): 99–122.  Florian Ehrensperger, “Weltseele und unendlicher Verstand,Das Problem vonIndividualität und Subjektivität in der Philosophie SalomonMaimons,” PhD diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2006,tracesthe history of monopsychism as Maimon might have understood it from commentaries on Aristotle up through Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides,findingthat just as the medievals thought of humanity in collective terms while moderns think of individuals as self-made men, in the Weltseele,Maimon urgesfor abiology of “generic preformation” insteadof“individual preformation.” However,Ido not believethat Maimon was arguingfor anypreformation at all, but rather for an absolute force which would give structuretowhatisoriginallycompletelyabstractand unstruc- tured.  In the first Critique,Kant attempted to give alogicofthe absolutethat was regulative of experience, and necessarilyprojected by the faculty of reason prior to experience,soastodemand conceptual generalisation, specification, and continuity.However,toargue for this, he had to leave the bounds of experience and conduct atranscendental investigation: “Thus the first step we take be- What wasMaimon After? 181

comes Maimon’stask over his three works,and one with which he dealsindetail in the Logik:how to develop acritical work, awork of transcendental reflection immanent to human scientific knowledge,which is also alogic of the absolute which transcends thatknowledge.The Weltseele represents afundamental moment in this development,since it solvescertain definite problems of the Versuch by uncovering,for the first time, acompatibility between transcendental reflection and ontology. In order to give the requisiteoutline of acommentary on the Weltseele,this essay must begin with an interpretationofthe Versuch from the point of the overarching problem of the critiqueofphysics.Once the Versuch has been so interpreted, an account of the problem which the Weltseele confronts will follow,then an account of its central argument,and finally aconclusion regarding the status of that argument in terms of the desired apriori logic of physics.

1The Versuch

The Weltseele is aspeculativedialecticalportrayal of the absoluteasalivingwhole, while the Versuch is atranscendental rationalist metaphysicsofidentity.²⁷ Onlythe interpretation of the Versuch according to the central problem of physics will bring out what its argument is and how it wasthatMaimon could transformitinto the met- aphysicallydifferent Weltseele so very quickly after its failure. The central problem is, again, that the Critique had failed to integrate the science and claims of physicsinto itself and that onlythe solution to this problem could advanceittoits goal of tran-

yond the sensible world compels us, in acquiringnew knowledge,tobegin with the investigation of the absolutelynecessary being, and to derive from the concepts of it the concepts of all things insofar as they aremerely intelligible; we will set about this attempt in the followingchapter” [A567/B595]. Kant’s Prolegomena §§ 57–59 attempts to account for this stepping beyond experiencebyarguingthat this aspect of cognition relates not to the thingsinthemselvesofthe soul, world, and God (to which appearances it seems must surelyrelate), but to “such concepts as express the relation of those be- ingstothe sensible world.” See the Prolegomena to Any FutureMetaphysics, With Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason,ed. and trans. Gary Hatfield, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004;original work: Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wirdauftreten können [Riga: Hartknoch, 1783]), 102–12. However,this does not work as either alogic of the absolute or ajustified critical cognition, for on the one hand, one cannot legitimatelypredicatean experiential predicateofthe absolute (Kant admits this), and on the other,cognition of the relation of the absolutetoexperience can onlybelegitimatelymeaningful “if an uncritical, transcendent use of the categories can be provided” (Erich Heintel, Hegel und die Analogia Entis [Bonn: Bouvier,1958], 17)—and Kant cannot have giventhis in either the Critique or the Prolegomena. The solution to this very problem becomes Maimon’stask, sinceacritical logic of physicsrequires alogicofthe absolute (i.e., of the formal conditions of atheoreticallycomplete explanation of the sort Kant intended with his ether theory)that is constitutive of experience. Incidentally, Idonot claim that Maimon forcefully anticipated Kant’s specific circle problem with forces, but he anticipated the basic natureofthe problem nonetheless.  The use of these terms will be addressed below,after afull account has been given. 182 Timothy Franz

scendental philosophy. Hence, Maimon called his work an essay, a Versuch,regarding transcendental philosophy.²⁸

1.1 The CentralProblem of the Versuch,and of the Other Main Works

The commentary tradition has not yetrecognised Maimon’scentral problematic. It has instead consistentlyassumedthat Maimon attacked Kant’s quid juris question directly, in order to replaceitwithout remainder.(The quid juris question [A84/ B116] asks by what right can the critical philosopher make objectively valid judgments about what appears to us.) But did Maimon have this intention?For an example of this interpretation, here is Cassirer on how Maimon reframed the categories as applying not to appearances, but instead to appearancesasreduced to their infini- tesimal elements: “The understanding here does not subsume something given a posteriori to an apriori rule, but it instead lets [this something] arise apriori according to thatrule, which is the onlyway to answer the quidjuris question in afullysat- isfying way.”²⁹ However,ifcompletelyreplacingKant’sbasic argument was Maimon’s underlying endeavour,what is one to make of Maimon’sremark to Kant in his first letter indicating thathis question in the Versuch was bothadifferent question from Kant’sand alsoanexpansion of it?Heasks:

The question quid juris? Because of its importancethis question was worthyofaKant; and if one givesitthe extension [Ausdehnung]you yourself give it,one asks:How can something apriori be justifiablyapplied[lässt sich]with certainty to something aposteriori? The answerordeduction that yougaveusinyour writings is completelysatisfying, as [only] the answer of aKant can be. But if one wants to expand [ausdehnen]the question further,one asks:How can an apriori concept applytoanintuition if it be an apriori intuition?Now the question must await the master oncemoreinorder to be answered satisfactorily. (GW2:424)³⁰

 See GW 2:8–9, ETP 8–9: “The great Kant supplies a complete idea of transcendental philosophy (although not the whole scienceitself)[…]. My aim in this enquiry is to bringout the most important truths of this science.” See also GW 5:383ff. for how,inthe Logik,Maimon’sscepticism answers the quid juris question for physics and “sets the solution […]atthe foundation of my critical philosophy.”  Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem,100.  Idepart from the English translation of this letter(ETP 229), which reads: “Howcan an apriori concept applytoanintuition even to an apriori intuition?” This does not makemuch sense, since Maimon has just admitted that Kant definitively shows how an apriori concept maybeapplied to “something aposteriori,” which must implyempirical intuition. The German is “Wielässt sich ein Begriff apriori aufeine Anschauungobschon aufeine Anschauung apriori,applizieren?” The correct stress must be somethinglike “an intuition, albeit an apriori intuition,” or “an intuition, if it should happen to be an apriori intuition,” in which case the intuition would be determined apriori by processes to be described by physical law. What wasMaimon After? 183

What is the nature of this question?Ifone takes it as adirect attack on Kant’s quid juris and his deduction of the categories, then thatline of interpretation demands an investigation of how Maimon must have found thatdeduction unsuccessful on its own terms (even though he evidentlyadmits that he found it very successful and did not attack it,but expanded it). This investigation has been carried out by the tradition that has come down to us from Cassirer to the works of Engstler and Thielke.³¹ AccordingtoEngstler,Maimon attacks Kant’sdeduction by bringingaHumean objection against the Second Analogy; i.e., Kant’sprinciple accordingtowhich we are justified in assumingevery givenaction or event to be an effect of some cause,such that this assumption makes it possiblefor us to discriminate objective causal events from subjective sequencesofperceptions. Thus, Maimon must have argued thatthis principle does not allow us to proceed from subjective perception to objective causal judgments, because one cannot perceive the categories as one would an image; one cannot directlyperceive acharacteristic of objective causality.But,asEngstler cor- rectlysays, this argument is not an argument so much as it is amisunderstanding. Maimon’sscepticism onlyresults from aconfusion of the transcendental and empirical levels. He does not understand the nature of “transcendental schemata”;namely,that they are transcendental time determinations methodicallyintrinsic to the a priori collective and regulativeconstitutive application of the categories to experience, according to the Analogies.³² Forintruth, instead of goingfrom the subjective to the objective,Kant argues (A193/B238) thatwemust project the categories apriori in such amannerthatweare first enabled to derive even subjective apprehension from the objective sense of experience which it must presuppose. Thielke agrees with Engstler that such aHumean objectionwould be an obvious error,but disagrees insofar as he findsthatMaimon actuallymakes amuch better argument.That argument is that if the cognising subject does apply the objective category of causality apriori and in such amanner, then Maimon does not see what “constrains” the subject to use this application to distinguish anyparticular event or set of events as irreversible in the first place. If we applythe category apriori,itisstill whollyincapable of determining individual perceptions. There is, at the transcendental level, afailure to specify how it is that the category of causality should be applied in order to discriminate it from subjective perception or from other types of causality.Therefore, Maimon is correct thatthe Second Analogy

 Engstler, Untersuchungen zumIdealismus Salomon Maimons;Peter Thielke, “Discursivity and Cau- sality:Maimon’sChallenge to the Second Analogy,” Kant-Studien 92 (2001): 440–63.  It is worth notingthat the Critique is not simplydivided into the constitutive understanding and the regulative reason.Instead, the first two Synthetic Principles of experience (the Axioms and An- ticipations) areconstitutive of intuition (all intuition is of certain extensive and intensive magnitudes, which we can order in basic ways).The second two Synthetic Principles (the Analogies and Postu- lates) areregulative of intuition and constitutive of experience. The Principles of Reason (which are, finally, the threedemands to makeexperiencemoregeneral, morespecific, and morecontinu- ous) areregulative of experience. 184 Timothy Franz

does not work. But Thielke’sinterpretationcannot work as an argument either,and for two reasons.First,for Kant,the ability to applythe categories is epigenetically obtained.³³ Because of the nature of this epigenesis, anyexperience as such—i.e., about which judgmentscan be made—alreadyentails that the categories have alreadybeen applied altogether,including all three categories of relation, and this makes possible the correspondingAnalogies (of substance, one-directionalcausality, and reciprocal causality). Thus, prior synthesis makes it possiblefor judgment to analyse what has been synthesised and to come to inductive empirical cognition about what is substantial and causal in experience and how it is so. The virtue of an expe- rientialcognition is thereforesimplythatitisobjectivelyvalid; i.e., it can be mean- ingfullysaid to be true or false.³⁴ Secondly, Maimon is quite aware that this is Kant’s argument,and he finds it successful on its own terms.³⁵ (Thankfully this is so, otherwise his philosophywould have had an unpromisingbeginning.)

 The process of epigenesis (B167) involves the concepts of reflection and the three “levels” of synthesis (apprehension, imagination, and recognition) and generates the schemata along with the basic structureofthe “concept tree” describedinthe “guidingthread” chapter.Inthis way, it makes it possible to applythe categories in judgment according to the syntheticprinciplesofexperience. The deduction of the categories proves that experienceisboth synthesised and analysedbythe same categories and that therecannot be anymeaningful analysisbeyond the bounds of such syntheses. Fora strong reading of this epigenesis,see, of course, BéatriceLonguenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge:Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1998), which advances this interpretation.  And so Maimon does not makea“thirdman” argument either;i.e., the complaint that another judgment is needed to certify aprevious one, and so on. Kant is not interested in indubitability of judgment,but in objective validity,and Maimon understandsthis.  Forexample, in GW 2:5–8; ETP 6–9, Maimon givesanappreciative account of Kant’sargument which rules out possible objections to Kant (as in Engstler’sinterpretation) in which the categories, through the Synthetic Principles of experience,would alreadybeapplied with apriori empirical markers for certain objects or events (where “experience, that is an objective connection” would nevertheless be only “a particular proposition” that we could intuit) and possible objections(as in Thielke’sinterpretation) in which the categories would, by some constraint,onlyapply apriori to some objects (“afew objects aresoconstituted that if the one is posited, the other must necessarily also be posited”). Also, in GW 2:51–54;ETP 31–33,heagain asks how to justify the category of cause and givesKant’sanswerassomethingthat “removes all difficulties at astroke [auf einmal].” However, he indicates, he can still ask his own question about scientific cognition (and the followinglines,like- ly added after Kant’sreview of the work, doubt the success of his own effort). At the end of chapter2, Maimon argues that Kant has evokedatype of necessity in cognition—one that says something scientific about matter—but has (so far)unjustlyrelated that scientific cognition to ordinary experience, and, of course, in the full sense of “experience” necessary for transcendental philosophy, the two must be related. This is the meaningofthe statement (GW2:73; ETP 42–43)that Kant has argued suc- cessfully, but has as yetonlymade apriori authorisation of associative experiential propositions: “It is just what in animals we call the expectation of similar cases;and even if Kant has proved that we cannot have abstracted these forms from experience because experienceonlybecomes possible in the first placebymeans of them, David Hume (or his representative)can gladly admit this. He will say: the concept of cause is not in the natureofour thought in general such that it would also occur in What wasMaimon After? 185

Maimon’sdifferent quid juris does not direct itself against Kant’sown problem, but rather its expanded scope would preservewhat Kant had achieved. The point of that expansion is the discovery of how the categories have apriori application to how intuition is determined apriori by the physical world; i.e., to the ways in which sensibility in general can be affected, as an object itself, by the physical world. This discovery would (if correctlyachieved) give the conditions of the possibility of physics— i.e., naturalscientific cognition—and secure the relation of ordinary (pre-scientific) cognition to thatcognition.With this in mind, let us see how Maimon asks the main question of the Versuch. That question is: “How can an apriori concept applytoan intuition if it is an apriori intuition?” Can it mean anything but “How can we come to apriori cognition of how intuition is determined apriori according to physical law?” In chapter 1(GW 2:20;ETP 15), Maimon recognises one fundamental presupposition of physics: that what is giventousisalready necessitated; i.e., such that it can be cognised in terms of antecedentconditionsand general laws. Forif“asynthesisin general is unity in the manifold,” then there are necessary,arbitrary,and spontaneous syntheses. The first is “given(reale in sensation),” the second is aproduct of un- guided psychologyorimaginative association, and the third is an effort of the understanding that “spontaneously” (Freiwillig)attempts to discover the ground of the syntheseswhich would accord with the necessitated givenreality.The truly Freiwillig understanding that comes to cognition “counts as an object onlyasynthesis that has an objective ground (of the determinable and the determination) and that must have consequences [Folge], but no others.” Accordingtosuch asynthesis, if aphysical object is cognised as adeterminable and is givenaunique determination as acondition, there then follows another determination as aunique consequence. Maimon indicates what he meansbyasynthesis indicating certain consequences and no others in the middle of chapter 2. There (GW2:42; ETP 27), he argues that in geometry,one can come to completeexplanation of agiven geometrical object.One proves the “possibility of acircle […]analytically”:anominal explanation of acircle (“all lines that can be drawnfrom agiven point within it to its limits are equal”)may be considered completelyexplained by areal definition of it (i.e., arule of construction: “aline movedabout one of its endpoints is identical to itself in every possible position”), since each merelyintuited component can be accounted for (even if ad infinitum)bythe real definition and an underlying identity can be discovered between the nominal relation and the real relation. Andso, the same explanation of

symbolic cognition, and is also not grounded in experience(in the sense in which Kant uses this word).” Maimon attempts to answer this further iteration of Hume in order to accountfor scientific objective validity.Thus,itisnot so much that Maimon criticisesKant’shypothetical judgment as unjustified in itself (as the tradition of commentary might have it), but rather as unjustified from Mai- mon’sown question about an apriori logic of physics. Finally, as he admits in anote to the introduction (GW2:338;ETP 175): “Imaintain that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is, in its way, just as classical as the work of Euclid’sand just as irrefutable.” 186 Timothy Franz

underlying physical reality can be giveninterms of general laws and antecedentcon- ditions.³⁶ Thus, Maimon’squestion becomes:

[W]hat determines the faculty of judgment to think the rule-governed succession as corresponding to the rule of the understanding itself (so that,ifacomesfirst and bfollows,but not the reverse, then the faculty of judgment thinks the relation of cause and effect between them) and to think each particular member of this sequenceascorrespondingtoeach particular member of the rule of understanding (the precedingcorrespondingtothe cause and the succeeding to the effect)? (GW2:54; ETP 33)

That is, how can anominal relation of appearances be completelyexplained by a real relation (which is the work of theory)sothat its particular elements are precisely determined and how is the subject motivated to come to such an explanation?³⁷ This question breaksdown into further questions.Physical reality that is to be explainedbytheory is not directlygiven to the subject as are,for example, geometrical shapes.When Maimon grapples with the application of Kant’scategory of cause accordingtothe Second Analogyofexperience,his ultimateargument is thatwith- out steppingoutside the boundsofthat principle (and also outside of the boundsof the accompanying principles of substance–accident and reciprocal causality;i.e., outside appearances), there can be no theoretical explanation of reality.³⁸ True, Kant is right that we can recogniseadistinction of cause and effect in ordinary experience (and that those concepts make experience possible), but for actual theoretical scientific cognitionofcausal relations “within an action, we must be acquainted with the nature of thingsoutside the action. So, we cannot have anydirect cognition of it [as cause or effect] within the action, but onlyindirect cognition” (GW2:222; ETP 117). Thus, we are giventhe ultimateelements of reality within experience only(if at all) indirectly. We seethe illumination, but are not givenwhatever light

 “Experience is perception of the very same thingconnected with different determinations that are changingintime” (GW2:137;ETP 76). Scientific cognition intends to discover this “very same” identity between the nominal and the real.  In the Critique,Kant entirelydenies the possibility of the scientific/physical cognition which Mai- mon has in mind. See A178/B222,the introductiontothe Analogies of Experience: “Now the wayin which somethingisapprehended in appearance can be determined apriori so that the rule of its synthesis at the same time yields this intuition apriori in every empiricalexample, i.e., can bringthe former about fromthe latter.Yet the existenceofappearances cannot be cognized apriori,and even if we could succeed on this path in inferringtosome existenceorother,westill would not be able to cognize it determinately, i.e., be able to anticipatethat through which its empirical intuition is differentiated from others.” Maimon is askingabout this very application of apriori concepts to apriori intuitions,and has confidencethat the answer can actuallydeterminatelycognise existences.  In the Opus (eleventh fascicle,22:479; p. 135), Kant admits that in this regard, Newton had step- ped beyond the limits of experience, since his discovery transcended sensation in general in order to determine it apriori: “It was Newton who first introducedthis concept [of gravitational attraction at a distance]; not as an empirical proposition (for how can one experienceaneffect which does not occur on the senses,but onlyonthe object of pureintuition?).” What wasMaimon After? 187

is for physics;orwefeel gravitation or observemagnetism, but are not givenwhat gravitationalormagnetic fields are for physics.What is it to cognise such indirectly givenentities or elements?What is it to even recognisethat such cognition is possible or demanded?First,itisintrinsic to such cognition thatitdetermines more than is giveninappearances.³⁹ It determinesthe lawful nature of all such appearances, and givenantecedent conditions, it can alsodetermine them precisely. In order to do so more accurately thanfictionally, such cognition requires an intrinsic “drive” to theoretical completeness. Thus, the most universaltheory-concept should also give the most precise determination of the underlying reality.Maimon recognises this: “In the end all concepts must be reduced to one concept,and all truths to asingle truth,” so thatwebring to light “what kind of connection holds between the claim that air is elastic and the claim that the magnetattracts iron, and between the latter and the Pythagorean theorem for example” (GW2:429;ETP 218). Secondly, because such cognition refers to what can onlybegiven indirectlyormediatelyin appearances, and because it must do so in ways that demand and accommodate the approach to theoretical completeness, it must possess acertain symbolic conceptual form. Thus, Maimon’sexploration discovers that his quid juris requires the following parts for its solution: indirectlygiven real elements of appearanceswhich are to be recognised as determininghow appearances appear,theoretical cognition of those appearanceswhich contains the demand for its owncompleteness, and asymbolic form of that cognition.The difficulty with Kant’sanswer to his quid juris—i.e., his deduction of the categories—was its synthetic nature. Maimon’s quid juris,by contrast,can be answered via the discovery of the conditions within Kantian synthetic cognition for completeanalyticity of theoretical cognition. The desired outcome is that the question then “falls away,” so thatKant’sdeduction does not have to be asked anew or modified.⁴⁰ How does this work?

 The experienceofsuch scientific cognition is “perception of something that would determine what is left undetermined by the subjective laws of my mode of representation” (GW2:127;ETP 72). Moreover, “it must not be the case that anypossible experiencefollows every possible experience [i.e., as in the case of Kant’sSecond Analogy], but rather one out of all the other possible appearan- cesmust necessarilyfollow.”  Maimon describeshis quid juris in GW 2:48 (can the symbolic be made intuitive?); GW 2:55 (he recognises the Versuch’sfailure: it tried to makeananalytic deduction instead of criticallyexplaining the possibility of the syntheticfacts of intuition; i.e., to make scientific cognition intoanapriori,but not pure cognition); GW 2:59 (he againrecognises the Versuch’sfailure; the quid juris is impossible to answer analyticallyinthe ‘straight line is the shortest’ case, and so one cannot see how asubjective rule is met with in the givenobject); GW 2:60–61 (with symbolic analytic cognition the question falls completelyaside); GW 2:62 (we achievethe deduction by transforming it into the question of how a world arises from an intelligence); GW 2:355 (it is answered because the categories applytoelements of appearances);GW2:363–64 (it is reallythe quid rationis,askingwhathypothesis must be adopted for both certain and possible experiential facts); GW 2:128(it asks how one can justify formaliter how one thingfollows with objective necessity from another,interms of aparticular determination of the 188 Timothy Franz

1.2 The Argument of the Versuch

Maimon attempts to construct the conditions for the valid theoretical cognition of physics from within the Kantian Critique. Hisapproach takes two lines of argument. We will see that these two arguments correspond to the conditions for the possibility of the subject Sand the predicateP,respectively,ofthe basiccategoricalproposition (“SisP”)ofphysics.The first line extends over the course of the book, though mainly in chapters 1, 2, and 8and in the Short Overview.Itisasfollows. First,consider Kant’stranscendental reflection on experience.This reflection discovers experience (Erfahrung)asnot onlythe medium which makes all the “special sciences” (mathematics, natural science, biology, even aesthetics, etc.) possible, but also as the product of the cognising subject.This is the subject which for the most part does not cognise its experiences in objectiveterms (i.e., accordingtothe categories), but is in principle always able to do so. The structure of what is in principle always possible for the subjectisthe “original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception,” and what is possible, as acondition of objectivity,isthe consciousness “that Iam”and that Iamthe sameI,ineachpossiblesynthesis of different representations which the Ithatthinks determines.The effort of objectivity is always related to the effort and possibilityofself-consciousness,the structure of which is discovered in transcendental reflection. It is necessary to consider Kant’sargument because Maimon essentiallyreverses it.Hereisthe sense of this reversal. If Kant says thatweare always at least implicitly aware of our transcendental unity and that comingtoobjectivity means alsocoming to and maintaining the sense of the objective unity of the self, then Maimon replies that if so, then this implicit awareness must also be aprimordialself-intuition, of the self as uniquelysingle. Instead of Kant’sview that the representation of the “I” is “empty of content,” Maimon says thatithas adefinite formal content—“By contrast, Imaintain that the Iisapure apriori intuition”—and that this is so “because it is the condition for all thought in general” (GW2:209;ETP 111).⁴¹ How is the pure intuition of the “I” aformal condition for thought?The answer is this: for this intuition to even be possiblefor consciousness,itcould not be consciousness of completeun- differentiated unity,because then “there is thereforenocomparison, and conse-

preceding and succeeding and without lookingtoperception); GW 2:135;ETP 75 (the question falls away because the relation between the forms and matter is justified, i.e., “the forms of intuition [time and space] presuppose forms of thinkingand these in turn presuppose somethingobjective [matter]”); GW 2:187(he doubts the fact of experience, but proves the possibility of applyingconcepts to intuitions in general, and so the quid juris falls away); GW 2:192–93 (the quid juris is answeredbe- cause concepts applytothe elements).  We should note the marked differencebetween chapter10and the Short Overview (GW2:208–10; ETP 110–112) on this issue, since the former is in agreement with Kant’sParalogisms,while the latter calls the subject asimple substance—so that the quid juris falls away or “does not arise.” This contradiction is inherent to the argument,asisshown below. What wasMaimon After? 189

quentlynoconsciousness (and alsonoconsciousness of identity)” (GW2:15; ETP 13). However,itcould not be of completeand totaldifference, because “then there is no unity and, once again, no comparison, and consequentlyalso no consciousness” (GW2:15; ETP 13). In other words, this primordialintuition has acertain form, and indeedprojects this form so that what is giventoitisgiven interms of that form.⁴² This form is that of space and time, because it is onlyspace and time which provide the simultaneity and succession which make it possible for the subject to both relate(and so identify) and distinguish (and so differentiate) what is given to it. To echo Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism,” this primordial intuition does not take place without something material giventoit. But the givenisgiven as asingular intuition of a simultaneous unity (i.e., spatiality) of the preceding-succeeding (i.e., temporality) thatisaspatiotemporal “point” or differential relation (dy/dx).⁴³ The con- ditionsofgivenness correspond to the conditions of thought; subsequent relating and distinguishing of the material givenisnothing other than “thought in general.” This intuition, which immediatelyimplies thinking, can be explicated as follows (GW2:16–17): thinking posits time in what it identifiesasanindividual object,and negates space in thatsameobject,but in doing so, it posits space in general, so that the negation of that object becomes apossibility.Itsimultaneouslyposits space in an individual object and thereby negates time in it,but in doing so, it posits time in general, so that again, the negation of that object becomes possible. Thinking thereforebegins by the projectingofanintuitional form on what is given—i.e., an intuitional form in which conceptual spatiotemporal relations of identity and difference are implicit—such thatthinking these concepts also generates spatiotemporal representations in general. Thismakes imagination possible, which, as both passive and active, represents (as “fictions”)universal spatiotemporalregularities based on what it is given, and so also makes possible the understanding’sconceptual recognition of unique objectswhich are opposed to other objects and can be completely

 Iuse the term “primordial intuition” herebecause it describes afundamental “categorial intuition” of reason, or the purethinkingI.Maimon does not use “primordial intuition,” but in chapter 2, GW 2:30;ETP 20,hecalls it “primitive consciousness [primitiven Bewußtseyn].” This primordial or primitive consciousness does not have representations,but rather presentations. “The world ‘representation’ [Vorstellung], used of primitive consciousness,here leads us astray; for in fact this is not representation,i.e.amere makingpresent of what is not [now] present,but rather presentation [Dar- stellung], i.e. the representation of what was previouslynot as [now] existing.”  See GW 2:32; ETP 21. “These differentials are objects of the so-called noumena;but the objects themselvesarisingfromthem arethe phenomena. With respect to intuition =0,the differential of anysuch object in itself is dx =0,dy=0etc.; however,their relations arenot =0,but can rather be givendeterminately[bestimmt angegeben werden können]inthe intuitions arisingfromthem.” As the translator remarks, this “ =0”of intuition—i.e. of what appears—means that “we cannot imagine or be conscious of” these differentials,but we do have “primitive consciousness” of them, as presentations,and we can, it is argued, come to spontaneous and symbolic-conceptual cognition of them. 190 Timothy Franz

differentiated from them.⁴⁴ Thus, Maimon agrees with Kant that space and time are forms of sensibility,but he “onlyadd[s] that these particular forms of our sensibility have their ground in the universal forms of our thought in general, because the condition of our thought(consciousness) in general is unity in the manifold” (GW2:15; ETP 13); i.e., the unity of self-intuition. What does Maimon want to achievebythis argument?First of all, if self-intuition projects space and time as formsofits intuition, such that thinking is giventhe task of differentiatingand relatingall that is giventoitinspace and time to preserve and concretelydevelop the consciousness of self-identity,then the effort of cognition becomes the beginning of an infinite task. Thisinfinite task demands cognitionofthe identity of the self in precise terms which indicate what everythingelse is in relation to it.⁴⁵ Cognisingself-identity becomes the demand to cogniseabsoluteidentity,and the finite subjectdemands its expansion into an infinite subject. Secondly, since the forms of space and time are continuous,such that what is giveninthem is so given in acontinuity of difference,they can be reducedtotheir smallest possible relations; i.e., their differentials.Maimon thereforecalls what we perceive in appearances— i.e., the possiblevisual markers of the differentials which we cannotperceive,but are nevertheless real—relations of “maximum identity” and “minimum difference.”⁴⁶ The task of the understanding becomes the conceptual recognition of objectsinap- pearancesasthey areadvertised by these proximaterelations and then reducedtothe very differentials which are primordiallygiven, so that they are explained by the cor- respondingconceptual expressions.For physics,asMaimon knew,states truths about indirectlygiven objects in terms of differential relations (they express,for example,rates of change; they can be objectsoftheory). The subjectistherefore not onlyrightfullypermitted, but in its self-intuition, it is driventoreduce what is giveninthe forms of sensibilitytotheir smallest possible relations and to cognise them as such, because it is driventoachieveabsolute identity of cognition. It is so

 Again, as in GW 2:21,thereare threetypes of possible syntheses: of the givenand necessary,the imagined and arbitrary,and the spontaneous and understanding.  Individual objects should have their relatively individual grounds, “but the sufficient ground [zur- eichender Grund]ismerely an idea of reason,which we can approach moreclosely(and in doingso extend the use of reason), but can never reach” (GW2:106;ETP 61).  See GW 2:372. If “b” follows “a” in perception,then “b” and “a” must stand under arule of “the relation [Verhältnisse]ofmaximum identity [Einerleyheit],” and this apparent relation is thereforewhat requires theoretical explanation; GW 2:216, which states that if the difference in perception were not “minimal,” then one would refer onlyto“something completelydifferent”;also, GW 2:218, whereMai- mon’srule or principle of experience determines only “the relation of objectstoeach other (maximum of sameness), not however the objects themselvesinrelation to those relations,” and indeed, we do not directlyperceive cause and effect,but determine it symbolicallyand conceptuallybythe- oretical explanation of the differentials which areindicated by the relations of maximum of identity and minimum of difference. (Ofcourse, sinceMaimon is monistic,there is no ontological difference between the differentials and the perceptible relations;instead, in chapter 3and in the notes to it [GW2:394ff.], he argues for afundamental qualitative difference.) What wasMaimon After? 191

driventhanks to the demand of self-consciousness, and its aim is ever-greater theoretical completeness. Thisargument thereforeaddresses some of the desiderata mentioned above: how the indirectlygiven objects of physics,which determine how thingsdirectlyappear,can be giventousatall, and how there is adrive to theoretical completeness. The aboveargument addresses all that is necessary for the possibilityofthe subject “S” in the categorical proposition of natural science, “SisP.”The propositional subject, in scientific experience,can first be taken as anominal relation; i.e., whatever is observed to be closelyassociated. And because it can be reduced to differentials, it is susceptible to theoretical explanation. But what is the natureofthis explanation, which contains what is needed to reducethe “S” from its nominal to its real relations and which must be givenbythe relation expressed by the predicate “P”?⁴⁷ Maimon dealswith this type of predicateinhis second basic line of argument,which also extends over the course of the book, though it is mainlyinchapters 1and 4and in the appended monograph on symbolic cognition. Here, he considers the fact that the truths of physics are theoretical concepts expressed symbolically which possess a certain logical structure. Maimon calls this structure “determinability.” Anyconcept that has objective reference must consist of adeterminable which refers to a “substance,” or what persists over aperiod of time,and adetermination or “accident,” which uniquelydetermines how that persisting object acts.⁴⁸ Determinations must uniquelydetermine the determinable over time, because this relation is an explanation of reality and because it intends to find strict identity between the nominal and the real, and this of course cannot be amerelypartial identity.⁴⁹ Therefore, the relation between the determinable and the determination must be functional.⁵⁰ Func- tions can uniquelydesignatephysical entities, according to theirdifferential elements, in time and space, since as they are determinable, they alreadyhavethe form of particularsynthesesand so can refer to lasting types or patterns of reality on their own.With the predication of determinations, such functions can uniquely

 Asuccinct expression of this is in GW 2:87n; ETP 50n: “However,for the finitesubject,the subject is not what is thought in itself but onlywhatisgiven in itself; and the predicateiswhatisthought merely in relation to it,asobject.”  GW 2:95–96;ETP 54: “Applied to objects of experience, the concepts of subject and predicate provide us with the concepts of substanceand accident.” The substance-concept can be disjunctively expressed in manydifferent syntheses, so that the different determinations areits accidents, and since “time is the form of intuition, different representationscannot be thought at the same time.”  Again, GW 2:20,ETP 15: “[T]he understandingcounts as an object onlyasynthesis that has an objective ground (of the determinable and of the determination) and that must thus have consequences, and no others.”  As evidenceofthis claim, see GW 2:373–74;ETP 192: differentials are, on the one hand, real objects,and on the other,they are not consciouslyrepresented, but “expressed merely by means of a function-relationthat,asanumerical relation, is continuouslyvariable,” and, if “adetermination cannot be thoughtwithout adeterminable,” then “it follows of itself that adeterminationwith respect to our consciousness can onlybearelation” (GW2:94; ETP 54). 192 Timothy Franz

refer to particularphysical entities in time and space. And, because of the demand for theoretical completeness, Maimon admits apossible hierarchyofdeterminable functions, so that, as he says (GW2:429), all conceptscan be reduced to one concept and all truths to asingle truth.⁵¹ Finally, it must be repeated that if Maimon has com- pletelyestablished the conditions of the possibility of the theoretical scientific proposition “SisP”from within the Kantian critique and its categories in the Versuch, then he has answered his ownexpanded quid juris question—and again, the question itself should “fall away,” since there is auniversallypossible analytic connection, which is also demanded,between the subjectrelation and the predicate relation, so that the symbolic can be made intuitive(GW 2:48, 60–61,128,135,187, 192–93,355).

 Maimon givesthreeproofs of the determinable relation which unfold in sequenceand address each other.The first is GW 2:88–89,the secondisGW2:90, and the thirdisGW2:142–44.The first shows that assumingthat objective syntheseshaveunique and new consequences, then two determi- nablescannot have the same determination, because the assumed unique and new consequences could not take place. The consequences could not follow from the same determination(sinceitis the same), nor from the different determinables (because then we would not be referring to unique new consequences), nor even from the determinable–determination relations (because these would onlybecombinations of what had alreadybeen ruled out,and so are ruled out too). Maimon perhaps means by this last argument that such syntheseswould not be entirelyunique and new,but partially identical. Thus,theremust be aunique determinationfor adeterminable in anyobjective synthesis. The secondproofshows that assuming(from the first proof)that different grounds (determinables) must have completelydifferent consequences (determinations), then they cannot have partiallysim- ilar consequences. If such seems to be the case, then the correct interpretation must be that the common element, “c,” is the determinable with twodeterminations, “a” and “b.” This argument seems to clarify what Maimon meant by his last argument in the first proof. The thirdproof then addresses the case of adeterminable with twodeterminations.Again, one assumesthat there is an object that is a unique and new referenceormeaningofasynthesis. Given “Abc,” then either “A” has determination “b” and “b” has determination “c,” or “A” has twosimultaneous determinations. If it has two simultaneous determinations,then (sincethey aredeterminations, not determinables) they do not have anyreasoninthemselvesfor their simultaneity,but they do have reasonsinthemselvesfor beingde- terminations of “A.” Giventhis, then “Abc” is arbitrary and not necessitated by an object.Thus, “A” has “b” for its determination, and “b” has “c” for its determination. These proofs seem questionable, but no doubt they depend on certain definiteassumptions (they seem to assume all they wish to prove). One troublingthoughtisthat givenhierarchies of determinables (which Maimon must legitimate,given the demand of theoretical completeness), then in “Abc,”“b”is both adeterminable and adetermination. However,Maimon has strongly differentiatedthe determinable fromthe determination by saying(GW 2:378; ETP 194) that the subject of asynthesis “constitutes asynthesisinitself,” while the predicateinit“does not constituteasynthesis in itself.” This would seem to make “b” impossible. It should be notedthat the Logik makesanentirelydifferent use of the principle of determinability,whereitisacentral principle of reflective thinking, but not of the object in itself (see GW 5:250). What wasMaimon After? 193

1.3 The Failureofthe Versuch

The ambitious project of the Versuch fails, but it is certainlyaproductive failure, and it is redeemed in the Weltseele and the Logik. The central flawisthatthe twomain lines of argument cannot connect as they should.Onthe one hand,the self-intuition of the finite subjectdemands theoretical completeness in terms of the manifold of space and time which it projects onto the given: this provides the meaning of the subject “S.” On the other hand,the conceptual structure of determinability provides the nature of the predicate “P” which should explain “S.” Natural scientific cognition is, conceptuallyspeaking, amoreprecise form of ordinary cognition: identifying the very same thing in its nominal relation that is identifiedagain in its real relations.⁵² But whypreciselymust the absolute identity demanded by thinking’sself-intuition take the form of determinability?And what is the structure of the determining cognition which intends this goal?This argument seems to be missing.Either Maimon’s proofs for determinability are tautological (determinability should itself be the condition of “an objectivepossibility of asynthesisingeneral,” but this condition is grounded “in the objects” [GW2:85; ETP 49]), or the requirement for this conceptual form comes from Maimon’sargument in chapter 8for the apriori principle of the continuity of the perceptible manifold (GW2:136ff.). This argument is that the spatio- temporalmedium, if it is in principle able to be completelysynthesised in experience, must be composed of determinations that are by definitiondifferent from each other and so reducible to differentials.Thatis, because they are different,the determinations must exclude each other. But in order to overcome this destructive contradiction, they must be separated from each other by the smallest possible break; i.e., they must also be differential relations.Because of this apriori and ab- solutecontinuity,weare enabled to perceive,and thus experience,what persists over time and what changes in this medium, which must thereforebeexpressed by determinable concepts: the “S” for the persisting,the “P” for the changing. But this direct correlation of the terms of determinability with differentials makes little sense, for the argument equates (real) differentials with (conceptual) determinations and also (appearing) substanceswith (conceptual) determinables, destroyingany meaningful differencebetween physical object,appearance, and symbolicexpression and also destroying the idea of anyhierarchyoffunctional determinable propositions. In- deed, Maimon generallystipulatesthatinthe “SisP”proposition, the determinable “S” should independentlyrefer to some general reality—but to consider such asubject as afunction would, underthis argument,betoabstractlydivorce it from the determinations amongst which it was found and for which it is uniquelythe “S” and then to reapplyit. However,given the continuous flux of the immediate spatiotem-

 This is the definition of whatitistoknow givenbySchlick in his General TheoryofKnowledge, trans. Albert E. Blumberg(La Salle, IL: Open Court Classics,1985; original version: Allgemeine Er- kenntnislehre [Berlin: Springer,1918]); see, for example, his chapters 4and 5. 194 Timothy Franz

poral medium, it can no longer applytothe samedetermination values in experience. Hence, one must go backand revise the proposition to read “Sisnot P.”⁵³ This contradiction inherent in the scientific proposition indicatesaproblem with the meaning of its copula: the “is” in “SisP.”Whatdoes this “is” mean?It was to indicate the underlying identity between nominal and real relations,but according to the type of theoretical completeness demanded (GW2:103;ETP 59: “The concept of athing can be distinguished from the thing itself onlywith respect to completeness, either material or formal”;⁵⁴ GW 2:209; ETP 111: “Ihold the representation or concept of the thing to be one and the same as the thing,and that they can onlybedistinguishedthough the completeness of the latter with respect to the former”⁵⁵), this identity “between” rather becomes an identity “of.” Thus, this problem is really about the cognising subject.Does it,inits primordiallyreflexive self-intuition, project the mere demand for an ideal thoroughgoingidentity of cognition, along with the ideal manifold that it must think?Ordoes this thoroughgoing identity of cognition actually produce,byits own absoluteordivine thinking,the differentials

 ForHegel, Maimon’sapproach would be aperfect example of the dogmatic fixation on thinking which he subjected to critique, sincehere indeed arephilosophical propositions which attempt to express the absoluteinterms of “SisP”;i.e., hereis“the opinion that hereisthe usual relation of subject and predicate and the usual attitude of knowing.” However,the “philosophical content of the propositiondestroysthis usual attitude and the opinion which comeswith it.Opinion [Meinung] discovers that things aremeant [gemeint]differentlythan in the wayithas opined [meinte]; and this correction of its opinion requiresofKnowingthat it return to the proposition and apprehend it differently.”“The abovecan be expressed formallybysayingthat the natureofajudgment or aproposition in general, which contains the differencebetween subject and predicate,isdestroyed by the speculative proposition.” That is to say, it would be possible to takethe very movement of the contradiction “SisP”and “Sisnot P” as an intelligible dialectical movement,which, taken speculativelyasa whole, is cognition of the absolute. See George Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit,trans. and comm. Yirmiyahu Yovel(Princeton and Oxford: PrincetonUniversity Press,2005; original work: Phänomenologie des Geistes [Bambergand Würzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt,1807]), 182, 185; 61–63 in original.  The material incompleteness can be completed ad infinitum;the formal incompleteness can be completed by the correct “insight,” whetherobtained graduallyorright away.  Iwould hereargue against the usual interpretation of Maimon as an anti-Kantian sceptic (as in both Freudenthal and Melamed) whoargues that Kant’sconcepts and intuitions areheterogeneous. Maimon does not arguethis,because it is not true (concepts and intuitions in Kant maybediscur- sively related,but they areboth transcendentallyideal and therefore not at all heterogeneous). Rather,the issue for Maimon is that sinceaccording to his own problem, 1) intuitions maybeapriori, and so they areontologicallyheterogeneous with concepts of the understanding,and 2) theremay be an infiniteintellect similarlyheterogeneous to sensible intuitions;and Kant’ssolution does not help us in either case. The translation of GW 2:64 at ETP 38 can perhapsaid in this misunderstanding. It reads “we have alreadyshown that even if they are apriori,intuitions arestill heterogeneous with concepts of the understanding.” However,the German, “Da aber,wie schon gezeigt worden, An- schauungen, sie mögenauch apriori seyn, doch mit Verstandsbegriffen heterogensind,” maybe giventhe emphasis: “But since, as was alreadyshown, intuitions,should they also be apriori,are indeed heterogeneous with concepts of the understanding.” One notesthat Maimon adopts the Leib- nizian infiniteintellect and its relation to intuitions as asolution to his own problem, not to Kant’s. What wasMaimon After? 195

as real objects which the finite subjectisgiven and is supposedtothink?Inthe first case, the finite subject can onlyclaim to project the transcendentallyideal manifold,⁵⁶ but not to be the cause of the real objectswhich are giventoitaccording to its form of intuition. But in the second case, in which the subject produces,the apparent fact that there is anycognitive mediation by afinite subject at all cannot be explained, nor in fact is anymediation possible, since “the infinite thinking being thinks all possibleconceptsall at once with the greatest completeness without anyadmixture of sensibility” (GW2:183;ETP 98).⁵⁷ To put it simply:ifthe finite subject claims some reality,then the infinitesubject is ideal; but if the infinite subject is itself real, then because it is absolutelyinfinite⁵⁸ the finite subject cannot be real. This absolute problem—or contradiction—of the copula and its meaningac- counts for other evident irreconcilabilitiesinthe Versuch. The first is that the quid juris question cannot be answered. The categories cannotbejustified via the complete analytic use of the scientific proposition within synthetic cognition, for if the finite subject does project its intuition of givenobjects as ademand for absolute theoretical identity,then there can of course follow agenesis of the categories from thatprojection. Forexample, in anyintuition at all, the “persisting and the changing” determinables and determinations willbe“substance” and “accident” respectively,while “the necessary succession of determinations one after the other” will be “cause and effect” (GW2:137;ETP 76). However,these will be formal relational concepts,⁵⁹ such that the discovery of actual categorial relations will depend on the discovery of the differentials of whatever is givenasobjectsofscientificexperience.

 One should note that if the subject produces, in the sense of creates,this manifold, this is atrans- gression of the bounds of critique, which never says whence the particular ontological quality of transcendental ideality itself arises. However,itcan be argued Kant alreadyhad this problem of trans- gressinginto the ontological—see note 26 above.  See the models of finite/subjective and infinite/objective orders of cognition giveninchapter3 (GW2:81–82; ETP 48). If the objective order has no sensibility,itisdifficulttosee how it would have anyideas of the understanding at all, sincethese presuppose sensibility and are “the infinitely small of every sensible intuition and their forms,which provides the material for explanationofthe ways objects arise.” To give afurther example of the priority of the reality of the finitesubject,Mai- mon argues that it “projects” itself as infiniteinGW2:418, where(for example) the triangle is not a real object that can precedethe thinkingofit(so that its possibilitydepends on its actual thinkingby the finitesubject). However,heargues for the priority of the infinitesubject againinGW2:415;ETP 216, where he says it “thinks all possible objects […]alwaysaccording to an analytic rule,” and so, for afinitesubject of cognition, the possibility of an object would precede its thinking.  Maimon is indeed dealingwith the absolutelyinfinite. See, for example,GW2:417;ETP 214, where he defines the “absolutely apriori” as final-grounding cognition that can ground the principles of cognition because it is unconditioned, or rather its “condition” is that it is independentofany “particular determination of the subject (because it presupposes an infiniteseries).” The absolute apriori is that which transcends any “infiniteseries” of worldlydeterminations;hence,itisthe absolute, i.e., the good or true infinite.  In GW 2:39–40 and GW 2:86,such concepts aredescribedasbeinglike functional relations of var- iables(xand y) such that the determinationofone givesthe determination of the other. 196 Timothy Franz

But in this case, there is no guarantee apriori that objects will be giveninsuch away as to grant theoretical completeness. In fact,there is acontradiction in the very idea of theoretical completeness.⁶⁰ Therefore, chapter 1ofthe Versuch argues that the cat- egorieshaveasmuch reality as spatiotemporalrepresentations: insofar as they are generalised, they are products not of understanding,but of imagination, and they are condemnedtoremain so.⁶¹ On the other hand,should Maimon give an apriori guarantee that objectsare giveninsuch away as to grant theoretical completeness, then he must resort to the productive power of the absolute subject’sthinking. In such acase, the categories cannot be derived from the finite subject’sprimordialreflexive intuition (since one can consistentlyhaveeither an active finite subject or an active infinite subject, but not both), but onlyfrom the absolute apriori itself, which has as its sole principle “the principle of contradiction (or identity)” (GW2:169; ETP 91). This leadstoanat- tempt to derive the categories from absolute identity in chapter 6, which is anascent attempt at an objectivelogic of being.Inspeakingabout absolute identity,Maimon finds something strange. Identity is not contradictory opposition, of course. It excludes it by definition. They are opposed to each other,and their relation is one of opposition. However,this alsomeans that they are not opposed to each other,for identity signifies absolute(or “transcendental,” as Maimon says,after Kant)reality and opposition signifies absolute (“transcendental”)negation, but since they transcend finite cognition, “these […]teach us nothing about the matter or the content of judgments[…]but merelyexpress their form, or the waythey relate to one another.” In expressingtheirrelation, “one does not cancel out [aufheben]the other,but they are instead defined by one another.” They are defined such that “opposition is what the twocorrelatesreality and negation have in common” and “the one is instead adifferent positing than the other” (GW2:113–15;ETP 64–66). Thus, Maimon realises the odd idea thatthe absoluteisacontradiction. But because it is acontradiction of being and nothing,orreality and negation, it is also adefining relation between the two, such that their relation becomes athird thing,amedium of difference. This, of course—the assertionthat “being is not nothing” and “being is nothing,” i.e., that they are opposed but not opposed, and so productively preservethem- selvesinthe opposition or nothingness they equallyshare—is an argument which will echo in the opening of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. It will also be an under-

 GW 2:164–65;ETP 89.The completion of what is approached “is not merelyanidea, but contains a contradiction,sinceitisboth an object and not an object at the same time,” and this is analogous to how if an angle becomes 90 degrees,then the sine function has asymbolic meaning, but no real meaning. The real problem here is that Maimon demands the identity of thoughtwith being, but at this point,thoughtcannot express being, and so it ceases to be thought.  See the argument of chapter1from GW 2:22–26;ETP 16–18. “Ican maintain that representations of spaceand time have just the same degree of reality as the pureconcepts of the understanding or categories […]. Space and time can thereforeonlybecalled empirical intuitions (as predicates of intuitions) and not pureintuitions.” What wasMaimon After? 197

lyingargument of the Weltseele. That is to say, this attempt to derivethe categories does not relateitself to the finite subject’scognition at all in the Versuch,and so it also cannot answer the quid juris for that work. But it is (at least) an alternate argument for alogic of being,orofthe real and objectiverelations of things, and one that could replacethe logic of determinability to provide an explanation or theory of real relations. There is one more important irreconcilability to point out.If, again, self-intuition sets up for thinking the task of theoreticallycompletecognition in absolute identity, then it can be assumed apriori that this will be cognition of nature accordingtothe laws of mechanicalcausality.Determinability relations that do the work of theoretical explanation are such that the determinable is always the ground of its determination as consequence, such that determinations are in acause–effect sequence. The cause is external and prior to the effect,and so it is in what Kant calls the “descending order” of the nexus effectivus,asopposed to the order of the nexusfinalis,which would “carry with it dependence bothasitascends and as it descends [that is, the cause would also depend on the effect].”⁶² Thus, anything that appears in sensibility must have acause that is external to it—i.e., an efficient cause—and Maimon demands cognition of theoretical completeness in terms of this causal order for everything that falls under the absolute subject, includingthe absolutesubject itself. But it follows that the biologicallyembodied process of cognition thatposits absolute identity as its purpose or final cause alsofalls underthe absolutesubject and also demands explanation, although it is irreduciblyteleological.⁶³ Therefore, since Mai- mon proposes amonism, the task of cognisingmechanism must be equallythe task of cognising teleology and thus of reconcilingthe apparent contradiction between them in the absolute. The effort to present the absolute as acontradiction, but alsoasthatwhich expresses and resolvesthe contradiction between mechanical and teleological causation in the real and living human “body” which cognises, is agood first definition of the Weltseele.

 Kant, Critique of Judgment,§65.  This problem arises seeminglyunexpectedlyinchapter 8, GW 2:140–42;ETP 78–79.There, it comes to mind that there is adistinctionof“cause in itself or outside itself,” and the continuity between the two “must be sought[…]inthe analogy between bodilymovements and sensations […]and rests on the question de commercio animi et corporis.” Thus,this is an unanswered question that has to do with relation between livingmovement and materiality.Yet this problem is alreadyobliquely referenced in chapter 2, GW 2:62–63;ETP 37,whereMaimon changesthe quid juris to ask instead about “the world’sarising(with respect to its matter)fromanintelligence,” and in the notes to this idea in GW 2:362; ETP 187, where he says that this is rather a “quid rationis” that asks “what sort of hypothesis must Iadopt for it to be comprehensible” that thereare not onlypossible, but objectively necessary and certain facts of experience. Thus,the Weltseele is alreadyreferred to as an- sweringthe same basic question about how apriori concepts relate to apriori intuitions in adifferent way; sc., this question is now takenasaskinghow objectivereality in itself can accountfor the transcendental subject. 198 Timothy Franz

2The Weltseele

“Über die Weltseele (Entelechia Universi)” is a45-pagearticle that was published in 1790,after the publication of the Versuch (and “Baco und Kant”)inthat same year.Adescription of its contents does not at all reveal the nature of its argument, but for the sake of the clarity of further discussion about it,here—very briefly—is what it contains. First (47–52), there is adefence that need not concern us too much. Maimon re- calls the idea of monopsychism from the distant past and wishes to analyse and develop it anew in comparison with the contemporary preference for the essentialin- dividuality of souls and with the Leibnizian effort to ground thatpreference. He quickly defends its harmlessness to the religious concern with the soul’spersonal immortality and asserts its essentiallymoral nature (citing Malachi 2:10: “Do we not all have one father [Origin (Ursprung)]? Has not one God created us?Why should each of us fall asunder [zerfallen]with his brother?” [52]).⁶⁴ He argues that it is en- tirelycompatible with Kantianism and in sympathywith its basic convictions.⁶⁵ He also argues that he does not advanceSpinozism, because Spinoza upheld parallel attributes (of extension and intellect), while the world-soul is the ground of the three forms of objective reality—i.e., matter,life, and understanding—and it is itself “assumed aposteriori” rather than by ontological proof connected to the causa sui.⁶⁶ Second (52–63), since Maimon had apparentlyonlyjustrecentlyskimmed Kant’s Critique of Judgment and seized upon Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’sidea of aforce of biological growth or Bildungstrieb,heproposes to analysethat forceasareality that was quite compatible with the idea of aworld-soul. He then givesahistory of the origin of the Bildungstrieb as atheory of the “epigenesis” of life from matter which emergedinopposition to two contemporary theories of “evolution”;namely those of sperm and of eggpreformation. Epigenesis promises amundane and therefore more scientificexplanation of how aliving organisation arises as astructure wheretherewas previouslynostructure at all.⁶⁷ Since it is a “force” in the Newtonian

 This article is in the Berlinisches Journal fü rAufklärung 8(1790): 47–92.Itdid not makeitintothe collected works, but one can find atruncated version under “W” in the Philosophisches Wörterbuch, GW 3:203–32.  His opponent is not at all Kant,hesays, but the pre-critical dogmatism which, “sinceitholds that mere thinkingissufficient to determine an object by its means,has no reasontoreject this notion” (51). Ihold this to mean that he develops an objective logic of being, or of ontology, about how the world “comestobe”which the finiteortranscendental subject must presuppose.  This is the literaltruth; the world-soul is ahypothesis whose justification is in its explanatory ability.However,Maimon would eventuallyrejectitbecause it is an uncritical hypothesis;itdoes not resultfromreflection on cognition.  Blumenbach made this hypothesisafter cuttingoff the limbs of fresh-water polyps.They always grewback in such away that the bodyofthe organism was diminishedinsize according to adefinite and measurable proportion. No preformation could account for such spontaneous change and meas- ureddevelopment of structure, but perhaps aforce could. Foranaccount of how measurement pre- What wasMaimon After? 199

sense of the word, however,itrequires philosophical grounding, or rather critique: what is the relation between the cognitionofthe forceand the forceitself?But because it is aforcethat would explain even the origin of the life in which human cognition is embodied, Maimon engages in this critique in arather unique way. He asserts again that the world-soul grounds the three real forms of matter,life, and understanding.Then, he opposes what he calls an Aristotelianview of the world- soul to aLeibnizian view of it.The former assumesanontological oppositionof one transcendent Being to all other beings—i.e., the three real forms—which grounds those beings. The latter assumes instead that thinkingbeingsground themselves, relating to yetdifferentiatingthemselvesfrom an infinite thinking being,and thatthe real forms of the world become merelyphenomenal or illusory.Neither viewpoint can justify the nature of the world-soul which it presupposes.Fromthis Aristoteli- an-Leibnizian opposition, Maimon makes four seemingly arbitrary conclusions about the world-soul (whichis, upon first reading, in no wayspecifiedatthis point);namely, (1) that thanks to it,Leibniz’s petites perceptions can be explained materiallyinstead of ideally; (2)thatthe true judgmentswhich the transcendental subjective forms of intuition and understanding make in conjunction provethat they must have this common condition; (3) that it confirms along-held belief in the preservation of movement or force; and (4) that there is acoincidencebetween teleology and mechanism in terms of the three characteristics of it givenbyBlumen- bach (and Kant in §64ofthe Critique of Judgment). These three characteristics are (1) that an organism generates itself accordingtoits species, so that it is cause and effect at the sametime; (2)that an organism generates itself as aparticularor- ganism; and (3) thatitgeneratesitself as an individual, since its parts also generate themselves(in regeneration and healing). Third (63–74), the opposition of the Aristotelian view to the Leibnizian view also has as consequencethat the world-soul, whatever it is, is auniversal nature that is in analogywith human nature; i.e., with embodied human understanding.Thismeans: (1) that the world-soul is asubstance thatresults from apure intelligencethat must be thought,yet the world-soul is also an intelligent subject limited in its effect to the world as an organised form, so that(2) it is the formal and final cause of all objects, (3) the individual human and animal consciousnesses as “souls” are not true but appearing substances and the unity of consciousness of individuals is indeedformally specified, but not real, and (4) the psychological lawofassociation is mechanical, as it is alaw of bodilyideas (nervetraces) and not of proper ideas of the soul (which are ideas of real living purposesinthe world).

cedes hypothesisorfiction in Newtonian science, see AlexandreKoyré, Newtonian Studies (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), especiallychap. 2. And for an accountofthe Bildungstrieb as a structure-givingforce,see Robert J. Richards, “Kant and Blumenbach on the Bildungstrieb:AHistor- ical Misunderstanding,” Studies in Historyand Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31, no. 1(2000): 11–32. 200 Timothy Franz

Fourth (74–80), in order to develop the details of the hypothesis of the world- soul, Maimon also analyses the debate between Lockeand Leibniz—regarding the soul either as a tabula rasa or as substantiallypossessing innateideas—in relation to the world-soul. Leibniz had been conciliatory in this debate: he had argued that some of Locke’s “ideas,” or objectsofthought,cannot come from the senses, but from reflection on what comes from the senses, while he admittedthat his innate ideas weredispositions that become attained as ideas in reflection thanks to the actions of petites perceptions that must accompanyall consciousness,nomatter how minimal. Leibnizthen offered aposteriori and apriori arguments for such petites perceptions,which are ideal and infinitesimallysmall thought-elements that are necessary for psychological explanation, just as corpuscles are necessary for mechanical explanation. Fifth (80–88), Maimon reduces the Locke–Leibniz debate to rather simplified Ar- istotelian–Platonic terms: it is reallyabout the nature of the relation of the bodyto the soul, in which the former(Aristotle and Locke) claim that the soul is amere epiphenomenon (as it were) of the bodyand the latter (Plato and Leibniz) claim that the bodyisinstead amere epiphenomenon of the soul. Maimon conciliates these broad views by arguing that on the one hand, Leibniz does not maintain apre-established harmony between the consciousnesses of the monads and the events of their shared phenomenal and perceivedworld grounded in God as athird being,but rather an “essentiallyinner harmony” which Maimon does not strictlyspecify except for the fact that it is monistic,not dualistic, and “has its ground in the nature of the objects themselves” (82). Because of this inner harmonyofthe world-soul, real forms of un- derstandingmay come about in representational relations to some of the world, since their living bodies are their very unconsciousnesses, or composed systems of what Leibniz called petites perceptions. But these petites perceptions (“dark representations,” in Maimon’sterminology) can now be held to be of the same stuff as material corpuscles. On the other hand,though Lockeonlyadmits the soul as apassive feature developedinthe body, the very forcewhich must impress itself on the body in order that the bodymay develop an intelligence must itself be an intelligent force, a “living and thinking substance” (84). Thus, bothLockeand Leibniz become modified in their opinionssothat they agree with the conception of aworld-soul, according to which the three types of real forms of matter,life, and understanding are ma- teriallyhomogeneous, but formallydifferentiated such thateach is the condition for the higher form (or each form presupposes the lower). Sixth (88–92)and finally,the idea of aworld-soul is up to this point onlycompatible with the two views of Lockeand Leibnizindifferent ways that remain to be reconciled. That is, for Locke, so farthe world-soul inheres in the real forms of the world as the forceoftheir totality,while for Leibniz, it is the “pure thinking” common to all understanding beings. Forthe former,the world-soul “does not exist for itself outside the world” (89), and for the latter,it“relates itself […]tothe universe, i.e., to the totality of all possiblethings, and is thereforeinfinite” (89). Maimon does not ex- plicitlyreconcile these twoviews after these remarks,suffice to saythat Leibniz had What wasMaimon After? 201

good reason to count individual beingsassubstances,though not “self-standing [selbstständige]” (89) in themselves, but conditionallystandingontheir own, for themselves(fürsich bestehende), since without limiting itself, the “infinite thinking being”“would not be, itself, anything outside itself” (89). And so, again, the world- soul agrees with the Bildungstrieb because of the conditional relations between forms. This guarantees that in some measure, the understanding of biological classi- fications (of species, etc.) is an arbitrary act of the understanding,but in some measure, it is alsogrounded in and determined by nature itself; it alsoexplains the fact that the development of species displays regularity,but that there can also be irregularities, hybrids,and “bastards,” and it furthermore explains how there can be spontaneous generation of life from matter and higher organisations of life from lower.Matter,then, is not the efficient cause of organisation, but it can be a “conditional cause,” depending on the organisation of the organism for which it is acondition. “Andhow can this be denied?Since one cannot admitthe arising of the first men and animals in anyother way, if one does not want to take refuge in the supernatural, through which nothing is explained, but merelybetrays one’signorance, or assumesanalreadycompleted infinite sequence, which contradicts itself” (92). It is evident from this summary of the Weltseele thatitdoes not explicitlyad- vanceits thesis, though it surelyhas one. At the outset,Maimon declaresthat he onlyintends to develop the “notion” of the world-soul by comparing it to the “opposed notion,” so that “the thinking reader maydrawthe resultofthis comparison himself” (48). In truth, however,there are threemeaningful oppositions in the article. They are not necessarilybetween the world-soul and the opposed notion, however,but between 1) the Aristotelian and Leibnizian philosophies in general, 2) the Lockean and Leibnizian philosophies of the understandingorrepresenting soul reduced to Aristotelian and Platonic positions, and 3) the Lockean and Leibnizian positions as reconciled to materialistic and idealistic conceptions of the world- soul. These various oppositions must be thought together, since neither notionin anyofthe oppositions can by itself give the unified conception of the world-soul upon which Maimon nevertheless relies for the various partial conclusions that he does draw along the course of the argument.Thus, there are threeessential steps in each case: the first opposition, the second opposition, and the conclusionthat the thinkingreader must draw by wayofreconciling or otherwise relatingthe first two. Therefore, this third step is areflection that is an essential part of the article and its thesis.⁶⁸ How can the three sequences of oppositions and what follows from them be understood as ameaningful thesis?

 In this sense, the article is esoteric. See, for comparison, Schelling’sdefinition of philosophyas necessarilyesoteric in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Bruno,orOnthe Natural and Divine Prin- ciple of Things,ed. and trans. Michael G.Vater(Albany, NY:SUNY Press,1984;original version: Bruno, oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge,1802),134;233–34 in original. 202 Timothy Franz

2.1 The CentralProblem of the Weltseele

The status quaestionis demands an account of how the Weltseele follows from the Versuch—especiallyasthe formerappeared immediatelythereafter as acompletely distinct metaphysical vision. And now,the question has been further specified, since the world-soul unfolds accordingtoasequenceofthree oppositions, each of which must entail third moments as definite conclusions for the thinkingreader. So, what in the Versuch,and its failure, would at least explain the need for such a structure, whatever it happened to be? Aclue is found in the fact that Maimon does not intend to give adogmaticallyrationalist thesis, as in the Versuch,according to which “mere thinking” is held to be “sufficientthereby to determine an object” (51). Instead, the argument is intended to be not onlycompatible with the nature of transcendental subjectivity,but also to give an account of something that is anecessary and objective presupposition for it.There werearguments and statements in the Versuch which pointed in thatdirection, for in the suggestion in chapter 2that Maimon should adopt aLeibnizian infinite subject that was to be equated with the finite subject but differ from it onlyindegree, he also suggested thathegive an “explanation of the community between soul and body,” by which is meant “the explanation of the world’sarising (with respect to its matter)from an intelligence” (GW2:62; ETP 37). The note to this remark explained that it would be possible to answer the quid rationis question; i.e., aversion of Maimon’s quid juris which would justify ahypothesis about the nature of the objective world in order to explain the certainty and possibility of the facts giveninexperience to the subject(GW 2:362). The wayMaimon answered his quidjuris in that work did not remotelyfulfil these suggestions, but the Weltseele does. The major thesis of this outlineisthat the Versuch intended to develop the critique of physics which was missing from Kant’sphilosophyand that the transition between the twoworks of Maimon in question can onlybegrasped in terms of this central problem. Maimon approachedthis problem as areflection on the possibility of the scientific proposition “SisP.”So how does the question of this proposition account for the transition to the next work? Look again at this proposition and its status. The outline of the Versuch abovehas shown thatthe finite subject which makes scientificjudgmentsintends to discover the identity of asubject “S” composed of nominal relations— i.e., hypotheticallyassumed relations between phenomena thatare proximate to each other—with apredicate “P” composed of precisely formulated conceptual relations.The subjectcan therefore designatewith ever greater precision how appearingobjectsactuallyfunction in terms of their smallest possibleelements and their relations and can thereby approach theoretical completeness under one single truth and concept.However,Maimon alsoattemptsto understand this one single truth and concept and what theoretical completeness ac- What wasMaimon After? 203

tuallyis.⁶⁹ We have seen whyand how he attemptstodothis and justwhat contradictions this involves him in. Nevertheless, if he is going to have atheory about this infinite subject—i.e., the absolute—it will follow that if everything can be completely explainedbytheoretical terms and relations,then the absolutewill be the infinite subjectwhich creates by its means from such relations;i.e., by thinking them. Mai- mon says just this: “The infinitethinking being thinks all possible concepts all at once with the greatestcompleteness without anyadmixture of sensibility” (GW2:183;ETP 98). Therefore, the infinite thinkingbeing does not judge,asfinite thinking does,but constructs concepts. The thoughtprocess of the infinite thinking being is one of constructingconcepts, and that of the finite thinkingbeing is judging. “The understanding’sprocedureinforming [Bildung]concepts is opposed to its procedure in judging.Inthe former case it acts synthetically, but in the latteranalytical- ly” (GW2:93; ETP 53); i.e., the former implies the completedetermination of determinables,and the latter impliesthe discovering of the determinables for given, or nominal, determinations and so replacingthe nominal with the real. Because of this, “the terms subject and predicatemustbeexchanged in the two cases” (ibid). Forthe infinite subject,the “S” in the “SisP”stands for determinability relations, while for the finite subject the “S” stands for nominal relations.But giventhe thesis of total theoretical completeness, “concept and judgment are identical” (ibid), and what occurs in judging is the Platonic “re-membrance [Wiedererrinerung]ofthe concept” (GW2:94; ETP 53).⁷⁰ However,afundamental question remains.Ifthere are no nominal relations for the infinite subject to encounter—i.e., no “admixture of sensibility” for it—and conceptual determinability relations comprise the “S” of the “SisP”which it thinks, then what comprises the predicate “P” for it?Ostensibly, this “P” refers to differentials.⁷¹ However,chapter 8argued that differential relations simply are determinability relations;thereisnomeaningful differencebetween them. Thus, Maimon begins to give ameaningful account of subjective judgment,but he cannot give ameaningful account of the objectiveconceptual structure about which the subject judges. The divine or absolute “SisP”has no structure to speak of. Therefore, as recounted above, thereisnoplace for cognitive mediation in and by the infinite subject without the finite subject, and when Maimon equates the two subjects, as he must,hecom- pletelyloses this possibility as well. The problem is, therefore, that Maimon does not develop what Hegel would famouslycall the theory or “exposition of God as he is in

 In his General TheoryofKnowledge,Schlick argues that this is philosophy’sbasic error: it tries to saywhatreality is.  That concept and judgment arethe same and different is, of course, another central contradiction.  See notes 43 and 50 above. 204 Timothy Franz

his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of afinite spirit”⁷² in the Ver- such. If he could develop ahypothesis which would give acompletestructure to the “SisP”construction of concepts, such that this structure would be the objective presupposition for the judgmentsmade by the transcendental subject, then he could answer his own quid juris. The judgments made by the finite subject could be argued to be in completeaccordancewith the concepts of the infinite subject. This, of course, would not be an answer givencriticallyinterms of reflection on the thought of the transcendental subject(which is apossible direction for the question considered by the Versuch and fullytaken up by the Logik), and it would not be an answer that further specifieshow it is that the finite subject can make judgmentsinthe science of physics.Itwould be an answer given via hypothesis about how the world arises so as to account for the “certain and possible” judgments the subjectcan make. It would insteadbeananswer to his quidjuris as quid rationis;itwould be an account of aworld-soul. It would also be astrongcommitment to the dynamic paradigm. The world-soul, as Maimon hypothesises, is the forceofthe Bildungstrieb, as it explains how it is that life in general can relateboth to matter and to the understanding which comes to have cognitionofit. The structure of the absoluteorinfinite “SisP”which Maimon desires must thereforereveal or indicate itself in the argument of the Weltseele. The argument, again, takes the peculiarform of three different oppositions which have acertain pattern. In each case, there are two opposing arguments and the third argument which follows from them for the thinkingreader.This third argument,orconclusion, fullycharacterises the world-soul. Now,the natureofthis conclusion must be investigated.

2.2 The Argument of the Weltseele

Maimon’sargument in this text is profoundlysuggestive,and an outline cannot cap- ture every detail or aspect of it.However,here is an attempt to express its core, step by step. First,wemay note Maimon’sdefinitionofthe world-soul: “The world-soul is aforce[Kraft]residinginthe matter in general (the stuff of all real objects) and acting [wirkende]onit, whose effects [Wirkungen]are different accordingtothe different modifications of the matter.” It is the “ground of the particulartype of combination [Zusammensetzung]inevery body”—i.e., in merelymaterial bodies and in organic bodies—including “life in animals, and the understanding and reason in humans” (48–49).⁷³ The world-soul, therefore, unifiesthree types of objectively

 GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic,trans. Arnold V. Miller (Amherst,NY: Humanities Press, 1969; original work: Wissenschaftder Logik, 3vols.[Nuremburg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812–16]), 50;21.34 in original.  Alternatively,one can read the definitionofitgiven to Kant in Maimon’sletterabout his article: “The world-soul is aforce [Kraft]inherent in matter in general (the material of all real objects), aforce What wasMaimon After? 205

real forms: forms of matter,forms of life, and forms of understanding.⁷⁴ Since Mai- mon advances atheory of the world as intelligible and as presupposed by the transcendental subject, it seems he has chosen traditionallyacceptable forms with which to describe it.First,one can see how matter is aunique real form on its own, since it is evident that matter as such is elemental, such that each element,whether on its own or in combinations, falls into various structures and patterns.Thus, physics maytake these elements as its subject-matter. Second, one can also evidentlysee the form of life which is “higher” thanmere matter.Alife or life-formsuch as a bee colony, like matter,consists of elements or parts, but its parts are functional parts of aliving whole. An organism is aliving whole “because [its] members are different from each otherand reciprocallycomplementary in virtue of their differences.”⁷⁵ Thus, adifferent science—for example, biology—maytakeanything exhibiting organic structure as its subject-matter.(It seems that one mayreduce the biological sciences to physical sciences,and perhaps do so completely, but then the subjectmatter in question would no longer be an organism or organic system.) Furthermore, beingswith understanding manifest an even higher form; namely, the form of that which can autonomouslyconceptualise the lawfulness of its own organisation and thus come to have its own unique structure and life to the degreetowhich it does so. And in turn, disciplines such as ethics or political philosophymay take such forms of understanding (ethical persons, republics) as their subject-matter.⁷⁶ But Maimon did not choose these forms, however traditional, as arbitrarilyasit might first seem, for each correspondsnot onlytocertain specialised sciences,but also to definite philosophicalapproaches to reality.Erich Heintel has shown how this is: he has analysed these approaches as the inevitable course of philosophy’s “falls from grace[Sündenfälle]”;⁷⁷ i.e., its progressive falls from states of apparent im-

that affects matter in general in different ways according to the various ways that matter is modified. It is the ground of the particular sort of combination in each sort of matter (even in unorganized matter),the ground of the organization in every organized body, the ground of the life in an animal, of the understanding and reasoninhuman beings,etc.; in short,the world-soul confers forms on all things according to the constitution of their matter,insuch away that it adapts matter,enablingittochange from asingle form, to takeonother forms,forms of ahigher order.And since matter can undergo unlimited modification,sothis entelechytoo can supplyanunlimited variety of forms.Itisthus the ground of all possible agency” (GW6:429–30; Correspondence,352).  One must note,ofcourse, that Maimon is hereproposingobjectively real forms that arealso syntheses that can be thought by the subject.They aretherefore different from the subjective forms of sensibilityand understandingwhich Maimon defines in chapter1of the Versuch,though of course they arealso related.  Michael BeresfordFoster, ThePolitical Philosophies of Plato and Hegel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935),2ff.  Astandingdifficulty is the differencebetween understanding as demiurge,which is giventhe pattern of the structurewhich it is to understand and synthesise, and understandingasspirit,which freelycreates its own structure. Foster’sbook asks which one Hegeldescribes;one can ask the same of Maimon here.  Heintel, Hegel und die AnalogiaEntis,43ff., and passim. 206 Timothy Franz

mediacy to more complicated and alienatedstates of reflective distance from that im- mediacy. First,nascent philosophical reflection, departing from mythologywhich blurs natural and divine generation, asks after afirst principle of the origin of things; i.e., that which givesauniversal explanation of particulars. And it is natural that it looks for this principle among the material elements of natural things. One unique being among beingsmust be the principle of all beings(such as water was for Thales); this is called thinking in terms of the ontic difference. But this reflection reveals that anyelement thus chosen has been chosen onlycontingently, since it is a part of processes which could have anyother element as their principle or starting point; or,admittedly, the processes in question could have been and might be otherwise. Thisreflection therefore (and for other reasons,certainly) givesway to another, accordingtowhich the principle must not be abeing among otherbeings, but must transcend them. Second, thinking thus adopts the terminologyand problematic of the ontological difference—of the differencebetween atranscendent Being from beings. This philosophical approach corresponds not to the question of matter,but to thatofthe form of life; traditionally, philosophershavesoughtthe principle of the unity of the living organisation in terms of the ontological distinction(since afinal cause is not ever now,orhere). But this approach has also posed an insoluble problem. Forreasona- ble speech about the ontological principle must not simplyspeak about it positively- onticallyasabeing among beings (such speech cannot be univocal), since it must be a principle of them, nor must it speak about it negatively-onticallyasentirelyunlike other beings(such speech cannot be equivocal), since, again, it must be aprinciple of them. This dual-negative prescription is that of the doctrine of the analogia entis. But the prescription cannot be fulfilled in these terms;any attempt to predicate something of the ontologicallydistinct principle (whether by makinghuman speech more eminent or by restrictingit) can nevertheless onlyeither treat the ontologically different in an ontic mannerorentirelyand abstractlynegateit. However,third, throughout the course of this reflection, thinking has approached reality in away that corresponds to the question of the form of the understanding.It has asked what must be presupposed in order to cognise ontic and ontological explanations in the first place, and so (without recognisingorreflectingonitself)it has implicitly asked what human or finite thinking is. Therefore, this approach, first made explicit by Kant,recognises the transcendental difference, because the question of the understanding involves adifferencebetween object-directed thinking and thinkingabout such thinking;i.e., reflection. This differenceispeculiar. On the one hand, reflective thinkingtakes itself as object,because it is finite, and presupposes itself as given, thereby distinguishing itself from the infinite and productive thinking of the ontological principle (which presupposes nothing); on the other hand, it is productive in that its critical reflection autonomouslydetermines itself as objectivelyvalid thinking,and in doing so, it is something that in principle cannot be treated like an object.(The original synthetic unity of transcendental appercep- What wasMaimon After? 207

tion cannot be determined, but onlythought,bythe categories.) The transcendental differenceistherefore reallythat between beingsand thinking.This differenceisnot the same as that between objects. However,the transcendental differencealso has its problems in that, just as the ontological differencecannot be differentiated from the ontic, it has not quite been differentiated from the ontological. One sees this problem exemplified in Kant.In order to account for itself as aprinciple (though not for Kant as the absolute principle), reflective thinking must independentlydetermine and justify the criteria for the objective validity of thoughtitself, but in doing so, it has to transform the failed attempt to think the ontological principles (the ideas of the soul, world, and God, unified in the ideal of reason) into regulative principles. However,the attempt to do so (see note 26 above) cannot justifyitself. In order to avoid predicatingthe experiential concepts of the absolute (toavoid univocal speech), Kant proposes predicatingthem of the relation of the absolute to appearances (toavoid equivocal speech), but this would still requireatranscendent use of the categories. The problem of the analogia entis returns, and Kant is unable to fullydistinguish the principle of the transcendental difference, thinking, from the absoluteontological principle and its insoluble problems.Heintel observes that the transcendental difference signals that it could potentiallyjustify the ontological difference as aphilosophicalprinciple—for the first time—since it promises away to differentiatethe ontological from the ontic in anon-ontic manner (since thinking must differ from being in adifferent wayto how beingsdiffer from beings). Thus, the ontological principle is further confirmed as adivine intellect or intellectus archetypus. However,the distinction between finite and infinite intellects,and between these twoprinciples (the transcendental and the ontological), is not yetfullyworked out.Both succumb to the problem of the analogia entis. But to conclude regarding the Sündenfälle,thus it is thatthe three forms of Maimon’sworld-soul correspond to three types of philosophical reflection, and it is of course notable that Maimon explicitlyrecognises all threetypes of thinking and, pace Kant,attempts in the Versuch to reconcile the principles of the transcendental and ontological differences. Of course, Maimon’sreconciliation of the transcendental and ontological differences in the Versuch failed, but how exactlydid this occur?This was outlinedinsec- tion 1.3above,but can be stated anew.First of all, that work is atheory of the absolute, meaning that the theory attempts to give the ground of our cognitionofthe absolute(the single true concept)and also to give the absoluteground of our cognising in general (the groundingofour cognisingboth for itself and in the single true concept).⁷⁸ This, as Heintel says,istounite the subjective genitive (cognition of the absolute ground;the absolute’scognition) with the objective genitive (ground of our cognising;our cognising’sground) in one foundation.Eversince Parmenides, the “absolute” has referred to preciselythis uniting foundation.

 Heintel, 7and 15. 208 Timothy Franz

In the Versuch,Maimon approaches this absoluteintwo ways.Onthe one hand, he asks about it in terms of the ontological difference. He proposes an infinite thinking being thatisone with the world and with thinking,sothatitwould think and thus give existencetoall relations which follow from its own pure identity,equated with all thatisnon-contradictory.Thus, being and thinkingfall together according to this principle, as do the objectiveand subjective genitive.But this falling together onlyoccurs by negatingall determinacy,sothat the absolute identity of being and thinking is an empty Being without difference, which (as Maimon recognises in chapter 8) is indistinguishable from nothing.But since Maimon has onlybeen able to recognisethat this being is identical with thinking because of the transcendental difference—of which, as apost-Kantian, he is explicitlyaware—he actuallydenies the immediate and finite thinkingwhich is apresupposition for transcendental re- flectionand which is considered as an object in reflection. Furthermore,hemakes absolutethe pure reflexive thinking that cannot be taken as object and is revealed by the transcendental difference. So, what occurs in the Versuch is that Maimon’s positing of this ontological principle contradicts itself (being is being,being is nothing), but,asitcontradictsitself, it reveals the pure formoftranscendental reflection (thinking). On the other hand, Maimon approaches the absolute in terms of the transcendental difference. When he “reverses Kant” and posits the original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception as aprimordial intuition, such thatany empirical givenisgiven to the subjectinnascent conceptual spatiotemporalrelations,this is to posit the transcendental distinction in the self. For, since thought-relations are im- mediatelygiven to the subject, the subject must think about those giventhought-relations, taking them as objects. And the product of this thinking is atranscendentally ideal spatiotemporal manifold which, as in Kant,isathought-thing,tobedistin- guishedfrom thingsinthemselves. However,there is aproblem. On the one hand, Maimon posits this self-grounding of the subject pre-reflexively,primordially, so that it possesses immediate self-certainty, and this is the same immediate self-certainty which it must pursue as its final cause.This immediate self-certainty,asbegin- ning and end, is therefore that which Maimon takesashis justification for identifying it with the ontological principle, absolutebeing.Onthe other hand,the reflexive self must,inits account of how it thinks itself, develop adoctrineofits categories and of the structures of thoughtbywhich it thinks what is given. It must account for its own validity.But to take the immediate self-certainty of thought’sintuition as justification for its identity with absolute being is to ultimately(once again) negateall givenand thoughtdeterminacy. Thus, there is adenial (once again) of the finite thinkingpre- supposedbythe transcendental difference.Asrecounted in section 1.3, to take the judgmentsofthe finite subject and identify them with the conceptsofthe infinite subjectistodestroy their possibility;there is no structure of propositional truth in this absoluteidentity,and so no expression of truth as unity in amanifold. Therefore, this beginning with the transcendental difference contradictsitself (being is think- What wasMaimon After? 209

ing,being is not thinking), but as it does so, it reveals itself as the pure absolute a priori of the ontological principle (being). The account of the mutual self-contradictions of the ontologicaland transcendental arguments of the Versuch explains justwhy it is that Maimon’sfirst opposition in the Weltseele takes place between the Aristotelianand Leibnizian philosophiesof the absolute. Forafter first describingthe nature of the Bildungstrieb as aforceof generation, growth, and healing and then asserting that the forcerequires aphilosophical critique, Maimon states that the three real forms must be grounded, and there is aquestion about whetherthey have their grounds in themselvesorinsome- thing outside themselves. From thatquestion “sprang two opposed opinions: namely,the Aristotelian school maintained that matterand form are entirelyheterogene- ous; matter is entirely without all effect,and acts merelyinapassivemanner,but the form is the ground of all actuality” (65). The Leibnizian–Wolffian school, by contrast, supposesthat “the forms of bodies have the ground of their existences in themselves, and they arise and pass away not accordingtothe laws of nature (without, because of that, existing as necessary beings, however)” (66). Both approachescontradict themselves, however.The Aristotelian approach, which proceeds in terms of the ontological difference only, upholdsthe existenceofthese three forms grounded in an absolutebeing transcendent to them, but “this anima mundi” is “aform without matter” (66) and thereforeaform without determinacy,and so it is instead absolutely nothing.The Leibnizian approach, which proceedsinterms of the transcendental dif- ferenceonly, “makes matter and form into onlyone substance (insofar as the difference between them onlyoccurs relative to the subject)” and so the world-soul is “en- tirelybanned” and the “infinite being is by no means accordingtothis an anima mundi,but an ens extramundanum” (66). Therefore, one can now understand how the Aristotelian view reflects the ontological principle in the Versuch,which contradicts itself (being is being,being is nothing) and in this contradiction reveals the pure form of transcendental reflection, since what reallyoccurs is the elimination of all determinacy of finite thinkingwhich this reflection presupposes.The Leibni- zian view reflects the transcendental principle in the Versuch,which contradicts itself (being is thinking,being is not thinking)and so reveals the pure form of the ontological principle, being. However,inthe Weltseele,there is anew reconciliation of these two oppositions in the third step;i.e., the recognition of the structure of the Weltseele thatisleft to the thinking reader.The reconciliation must be this: the three real forms (matter,life, understanding) can onlybegrounded in relation to each other if they have grounds both outside themselves and in themselves. This would be to propose afoundational identity of contradiction. Maimon’sown example should help to explain what this means. Forimmediatelyafter giving the opposition between the Aristotelian and Leibnizian opinions, he lists four conclusionsthat follow,and the main conclusion is thatmechanical(material) and teleological (living) processes have the sameorigin. As an indication of this same origin, he recites the three unique properties of organic life described in §64ofKant’s Critique of Judgment,entitled “On the Character Pecu- 210 Timothy Franz

liar to Things[Considered] as Natural Purposes.” These also correspond to Blumen- bach’sdescription of the Bildungstrieb accordingtoits functions of “generation, nourishment,and reproduction” (the latter alsointhe sense of healing). These three properties of organisms are as follows. “Atree, firstly, generates another tree accordingtoknown laws of nature, i.e., it generates itself accordingtoits species, and is therefore cause and effect simultaneously” (69). Secondly,

Atreealso generates itself as aparticular tree. This is the growth which is entirelydifferent from every other increase of magnitude according to natural laws, and is to be recognized as ageneration, insofar as it first processesthe material which it adds to itself into aspecificallychar- acteristic quality,which is somethingthat no mere natural mechanism can do, and it builds itself up by mediation [vermittelt]ofamaterial, which according to its composition is its own product (69–70).

This process of self-generation is twofold. First,the natural thing severs from its context and consumes an amount of natural resources,which must be seen onlyasan “educt,accordingtoits properties.” This is afirst “negation,” to use Hegelian terminology. Second, the natural thing transforms this educt so that “thereisinthe separation and new composition of this rawstuff such an originality thatleavesall art far behindit.” Thisisasecond negation, i.e., a “negation of the negation,” to again use Hegelian terminology. And finally, or thirdly, “apart of this creature also generates itself,something with which everyone aware of nature should be sufficientlyfa- miliar.” The particular tree as such is then also propagated as aunique singular tree. There is an important distinction of the universal, the particular,and the singular in this example. The particulartree carries out the essential functionofmediation. It takes external matter from its medium or environment,then digests and processes that matter into its ownsubstance, and so it grows.However,inits essence, this growth must alsobedecay. Matter is excreted, and the organism dies.Therefore, the material environment of the tree enacts the very same, yetopposite mediation; it also takes external matter from the creature, and in decay, that matter is trans- formed(another mediation) back into the elemental. Hence, this mediation of the particularthing is an identityofcontradiction, at its heart.This expression and resolution of contradiction givesthe organic its organic nature. An organism is brought about mechanically, and yetisanintrinsically purposive thing,thanks to what its inherent contradiction enacts. Thus, each act or event,such as consumption or diges- tion, is in itself mechanicallycausal, and maybedescribed as mechanical.Or, as Maimon says,the forms(whether of organism or matter—or even of understanding) are “broughtforth according to mechanicallawsofnature, but onlythrough aproc- ess by which its objectsare brought forth in acertain way[auf eine bestimmteArt], accordingtomechanical laws of nature, and acquired” (68–9). The process of mediation thereforepropagates the tree as a universal genus, while at the same time, the particular treeassuch generates and heals its ownparts, specificallydifferentiating it over time as an irreduciblyunique singular tree. And, at the same time, the opposite process of mediation alsobringsabout matter in particularlygeneric and specific What wasMaimon After? 211

ways.Maimon argues thatthis contradictory mediation is the forceofthe world-soul, universalised.Itexplains matter’srelationship to the organism, and the organism’s relationship to matter.The forceofthe Bildungstrieb is the forceofthe world-soul in this movementofnegation of negation at the heart of the differentiatingand relating of forms. Taken as awhole, as absolute, it must explain the relation of both matter and organism, as itself, to its own understanding. The second and third oppositionscan alsobetaken as examples and as elucidat- ing the first foundational opposition.The second opposition considers Leibniz’sde- bate with Lockeabout the nature of the understanding’srepresentations and the former’sconciliation, which nevertheless entails an abstract dualism of material cor- pusclesand psychical petites perceptions. The intentionallyunspoken resolution of this dualism must be that again, the forms are grounded both in and outside of themselves. Therefore, arepresenting organism willrepresent in the samemannerthatan organism consumes its food. It willnegatesome givenmatter,which tradition describes in terms of “primary qualities,” and negateitagain, transforming it via this mediation into psychological “secondary qualities” which it maythen perceive and think. Andso, thanks to the limitation of itself to abody, each particularrepre- senting beingrepresents onlyalimited portion of the world-soul. In this way, the rep- resentingorganism mayalsobesusceptible to mechanical explanation, in all its individual processes. Instead of adualism, Maimon can maintain “that it is yetthese [material] elements and their modifications thatservejust as well for explanation in the soul as they do for the doctrine of nature, as Ihavejust sufficientlyshown” (87). The third opposition, finally,questions the very nature of this material; i.e., the form of matter and the forceofthe world-soul that matter becomes.Isitsomething entirely being-like, or thought-like? It is, of course, both, but conditionallyone or the other, as the second oppositionhas shown. Andso, this opposition leads the reader back, in acircle, to the first opposition, which was the opposition of ontological and transcendental principles. What,therefore, does the reconciliation of the evidentlyfundamental opposition of the Aristotelian/ontologicaland Leibnizian/transcendental viewpoints mean?It must mean, first of all, thatthe two are reconciled so that the Aristotelians’ absolute being is the Leibnizians’ transcendental principle of thinking.But at the sametime, absolutebeing is not thinking,because it is different from it.Because of this sameness and difference, the absolutebeing is also nascent reflexive thinking.Its determinations, which (according to the problem of the analogia entis)are ontic and so necessarilycontradictory,beginning with “being is being” and “being is nothing,” are no longer onlyexternallyconnected predications and qualities; they are also in- ternallyconnected in amovement of predication in athinking of being which expresses itself. The understanding which was held entirely apart from being and took its contradictions for ultimate impediments to speech about it is now the immanent life and dialectical mediation of itself. Thusitisthat the world-soul can be, con- ditionally, matter,life, or understanding (or not): the mediation by negation of negation of mattercan become, under certain circumstances, living matter (and vice 212 Timothy Franz

versa), and the dialecticalmediation of this living matter by negation of negation can become, under certain circumstances, representation of the understanding (and vice versa). And this justifies the three typesofphilosophicalreflection. The ontic difference can be distinguished from the ontological differencebecause there is now away of expressingthe ontological principle in away that distinguishesitfrom all mere beings. Furthermore,the transcendental difference can be distinguishedfrom the ontological because it is the expression of the ontological principle (of Being) that comes about in and for it; thatis, it specifies how the world-soul is the absolute ground of cognition of it and how it alsoabsolutelyfoundsour cognising in general. To see in detail how the world-soul is the absolute and thereforejoins the subjective and objective genitive of cognition, recall section 2.1onthe problem of the Weltseele. There, Maimon considered how concepts and judgmentsare different and yetthe same. The concept is constructed by the objectiveorabsolute intellect, and it proceedswith the “S” and (it is stipulated) the “P” follows from that “S” according to an analytic rule. However,judgments are made by finite intellects,sothat the “S” is nominal and the “P” determines it,inawaythat approaches completeness. In this completeness, the subject and predicateofthe infinite intellect’sconcept are respectively the predicateand subject of the finite intellect’sjudgment. But the Versuch could not carry out this conception, since the infinite subject could onlyspeaktautologies; i.e., nothing at all. However,the Weltseele lays out a possiblesolution that can be extrapolated from its oppositions, which is also found in Hegel. Accordingtothe fundamental opposition,thereare Aristotelian/ontological and Leibnizian/transcendental approaches to the absolute. The first approach would begin with the determinable of absolute being or identity.This is the subject “S,” and (as in chapter 8ofthe Versuch)itisindistinguishable from nothing. “SisS”is then “Sisnot S.” But this contradiction must be productive and yield amedium of difference, “P,” which is adetermination in which the original determinable would (unreflectively)disappear.⁷⁹ In this way, Maimon would, like Hegel, set up a “Doctrine of Being.” Itssuccessive predicates would be predicates of anybeing whatsoever,which could thereforeincludequality, quantity,and measure,⁸⁰ and its resultwould be the revealing of the form of pure transcendental reflection, because all along,this doctrine has been the reflective thinkingofany being whatsoever to the exclusion of the determinations of the finite thinking which it must nevertheless presuppose. Thus, the first approach givesway to the second. The second approach, as explicitlyreflective,would not proceed by sequential determination of adeterminable which disappears in its determinations. Rather,it

 Hegel’s Science of Logic includes these three doctrines of being, essence, and concept.See Ency- clopedia Logic §161 for description of the corresponding types of dialecticalprocessesand their tran- sitions intoeach other.  Astudyofthe similaritiesbetween Maimon and Hegelwould have to reference how in Maimon, quality (as adifferential) becomes quantity(GW 2:29n, 395) and how this becomes measureaswell (GW2:29n), anticipating the basic content and movement of the “Doctrine of Being” in Hegel’s Logic. What wasMaimon After? 213

would proceed by specifying the ways of reflection which are necessary in order for thinking to discover adeterminable “S” for agiven determination “P,” and via this procedure, it would begin to recall, in mediated ways,the progressively more universal determinables of the “Doctrine of Being” which had disappeared into their determinations. This would yield further terms applicable either to beingsortothoughts, which could thereforebeused as subjects or predicates.Viathis procedure, the terms that are generatedcontradict each other by being similar (and appearingineach other)and yetdifferent.One example of this would be “ground” and “condition”;⁸¹ others would be “substance and accident” and “cause and effect.” This second approach could be called,asinHegel, the “Doctrine of Essence,” and its reflective procedure would resultinthe reconciliation of the ontological and transcendental approaches to the absolute, such thatany determination of being at all, even being that appeared viarepresentation to reflective thought,could be conceptualised, or placed in conceptual form such that abeing could be said to be determined in me- chanicalways(mere being), in living ways (beingsthathavereflexive structures), or in understanding ways (beingsthatspeak beings). Consequently, the world would have its genesis in such away that the judging subject would be enabled to represent anyaspect of that reality—even includingthe judging subject itself which would exist in it,oreventhatreality as awhole—and to take that representation as anominal subjectofits judgment, and would be enabled to predicatesomething real of it. The possibilities of anysuch predication would have alreadybeen accounted for in the genesis of the world-soul. The ways that the judging subjectcould judge in ways thatwould be, as Maimon says,a“re-membrance [Wiedererrinerung]ofthe concept” (GW2:94; ETP 53) would comprise what Hegelwould call the “Doctrine of the Concept.” In this way, the Weltseele maybecalled adialectical speculative metaphysics, as indicated above: it calls for certain dialectical movements whose unification is absolutecognition.

 In Maimon, grounds aregenerallydeterminableswhich necessitatecertain determinations, but then he in turn counts those determinations as necessitatingtheir determinables (GW2:91; ETP 52: “The necessity […]rests on the other part […]that cannot be thoughtwithout the first”). Thus,ground becomes condition and condition ground, as in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence.” The substance–accident and cause–effect relations displayasimilar movement.Oded Schechter, “The Logic of Specula- tive Philosophyand Skepticism in Maimon’sPhilosophy: Satz der Bestimmbarkeit and the Role of Synthesis,” in Freudenthal, Salomon Maimon,18–53,argues that Maimon’s “determinability” can be takenasthe coreofHegelian speculative logic. If so, it must also cometocomprise these three types of dialectical movements.That is, if it strikes the readerthat Hegel’s Logic is indeed astrange catalogueorclassificatory scheme of different “logical” sequences, then the nature of Maimon’sprob- lematic can show whyand how that should be. 214 Timothy Franz

2.3 The Failure of the Weltseele

Of course, Maimon did not completethe extrapolation of the ideas in the Weltseele which has just been suggested. He did not explicitlydevelop a “logic of the concept” that would objectively account for the possibility of the subjective judgment of atranscendental subject.The work in question left that task to the “thinkingreader.”⁸² But regardlessofthe particulardetails of how such ataskwould be carried out,the article does make one thing clear,which is that anytranscendental philosophyatall, especiallyone which would be reconciled with the nature and claims of physics about the objective world, must reconcile and justify the transcendental and ontological differences, and this means that it must have alogic of the absolute, specifically such that it can claim that its logical speech is amediation of being.Thus, Maimon learns this lesson and retains it for the workingout of his Logik. However,atthe same time, he did explicitlyabandon the conception of the world-soul, as we know from his article on Schwärmerei and its commentary on Bruno. Without giving aclose readingofthat article, what are some reasons for retracting the claims of the Welt- seele,and which particular claims are retracted? First,Maimon’sexplanation of how aworld arises in order to answer the quid rationis and to show how it is objectively comprehensible that the subject can have true and certain judgmentsreplaces the more evidentlyscientific use for conceptual determinability relations that he had proposed in the Versuch. There, he had come to amodel, which he would improveupon in the Logik,ofhow these concepts are usedtocognise, theoreticallyand by symbolic means, preciselyhow it is that the physical elements of appearances determine those appearances.This is no longer possible, since cognitive representation in the Weltseele is ahigher type of negation of negation. It is aform of life, and so it comes to be and passes away as life does, by consumption and transformation of the material of representation. But theoretical or scientific cognition, which the Versuch proposes and the Logik answers, is not an eating of its object,but the opposite: it asks after the conditions of the possibilityofsymbolicallypresentingobjects as they are in themselves. It aims at theoretical fidelity to the object,and because of this, it demands adefinite Gelassen- heit rather than heteronomous consumption. However,the philosophicalspeculation of the Weltseele offers no route to this type of theoretical cognition of the physical world. Second, consider the apparentlyperfect wayinwhich the Weltseele indicates that the ontic, ontological, and transcendental differences can be reconciled. Giventhis perfect coincidingofprinciples, how could one abandon it?But then

 In this suggestion, Iattempt an approximation to Hegel’s Science of Logic,sinceIthink Maimon in his own wayisdealingwith the natureofHegel’sspeculative proposition. Likethis proposition, which cannot as such be stated, but onlyshown in regular propositions which aretobetakenspec- ulatively,Maimon shows but does not statethe truth of the world-soul to the thinkingreader who reflects on the product of his three oppositions. What wasMaimon After? 215

again, the nature of ontic processes is that they could always be otherwise. One must,infairness, admit this.And if they could be otherwise, then perhaps they might not have existed at all, or at least the type of processes which resulted in or made possible understanding might not have existed. This thought evokes the question of creation, and so is also an ontological thought.⁸³ The Weltseele,which (like Hegel’s Science of Logic)offers adistinct ontic theory about force, is thrown into doubt along with its ontological hypotheses. At this point,the entire “battlefield of endless controversies” of metaphysics mayreturn. The onlyresponse which will answer philosophicalquestions with scientificdignityinthe face of these controversies is the Kantian one, which autonomouslyestablishes the possibility of the objective validityofthought.And so, the question for Maimon’s Logik is, again, can he carry out such acritical reflection while also giving the demanded logic of the absolute?

3Conclusion

This outline willhavebeen successful if it contributes to afuture commentary on Maimon. It should have proved that Maimon articulatedacertain basic problem of the critique of physics that anticipates Kant’s Opus Postumum. It should also have shown that the interpretation which takes Maimon as half-“rational dogmatist” and half-“empirical sceptic” is onlypartiallycorrect,and ultimatelymisleading. Though Maimon gave himself this designation at the end of the Versuch (GW 2:432 [436]; ETP 222),itisadesignation which is asymptom of afailuretosolve the basic problem.⁸⁴ Thus, to takeMaimon as such would be to takeasymptom of the failureofawork to be that work’scause and motivation. Finally, this essayshould have shown that the Weltseele follows from the Versuch (if it has not done so in every detail) and that it represents one of three major high pointsofMaimon’sphi-

 See Wagner, Philosophie und Reflexion,414.There,herecalls that it was the pre-Kantian metaphysics which prescribed the laws of thinkingtobeings,tothings in themselves(and those who misun- derstand Kant accuse him of doing just that). Thus it was that Aristotle wrongly denied the possibility of an actual infinitebecause it was not thinkable, and thus it is that even those whocurrentlyground their philosophies on the question “whyisthereBeingatall, and not nothing?” do so fallaciously, because they uncriticallyexclude “the possibility of anecessity of Being” simplybecause “they be- lievethemselvesable to think the Not-beingofBeing.”  In GW 3:455(the year 1792), Maimon replied to the Swiss philosopherJacob Hermann Obereit, whohad coined the term “nihilism” as adescription of Kant’sapparent isolation of the subject from God, that he toohad “shuddered beforethe [Kantian] nothing” and had takenasalto mortale into acombination of Spinozist rationalist dogmatism and Kantian transcendental philosophyinthe Versuch. His recognition of the failure of that leap, however,saw him instead attempttocombine “Kantian philosophywith Humean scepticism.” In the interpretation of this article, the latter combination is aheightenedcriticism, one that proceedstosolve the central problematic physics poses for criticism, and one sees now how this comestopass. 216 Timothy Franz

losophy. The third highpoint,the Logik,would have as its task an apparent paradox: acritically justified philosophyofreflection that is also aphilosophyofthe absolute, in order to finallybring criticism to transcendental philosophy.

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Socher,Abraham P. The Radical EnlightenmentofSolomon Maimon: Judaism, Heresy,and Philosophy. Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press,2006. Thielke, Peter. “Discursivityand Causality: Maimon’sChallengetothe Second Analogy.” Kant-Studien 92 (2001):440–63. Thielke, Peter,and Yitzhak Melamed. “Salomon Maimon.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 edition),edited by Edward N. Zalta. Available online:https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/maimon/. Wagner,Hans. Philosophie und Reflexion. 2nd ed. Munichand Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1967; first published 1959. Michah Gottlieb Does Judaism HaveDogma? Moses Mendelssohn and aPivotal Nineteenth-CenturyDebate

Dogmas serveimportantfunctions in religious communities.R.Marston Speight identifiesseveral such functions, including(a) providing abasis for membership in the community;(b) testing for orthodoxy;(c) expressing communal self-understanding;and (d) affirming communal unity.¹ Since the Middle Ages, Jewish thinkers have debated the question whether or not Judaism has dogma.² Moses Mendelssohn launched the modern Jewishdiscussion of this question with what manyinterpreted to be anegative response to this question. In the first part of this essay, Iwill show how Mendelssohn’seighteenth-century discussion is informed by interreligious concerns; namely, seeking to express adistinct Jewishcommunal self-understanding in relation to Christianity. Mendelssohn rejects dogma in aChristian sense while affirming thatthere are principles that define Juda- ism analytically. In the second part of the essay, Iwillexploreapivotalnineteenth- century debate over dogma in Judaism, in which the problem is addressed from an intrareligious perspective showinghow it is informed by the problem of Jewishcom- munal unity.³ My discussion will focus on four thinkers,each of whom was an outstanding representative of amajor school of GermanJudaism: Mendelssohn,the leading figure of the Haskalah; Samson Raphael Hirsch, the ideological leader of German Neo-Ortho-

 See R. Marston Speight, “Creeds: An Overview,” in Encyclopedia of Religion,2nd ed., ed. Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Macmillan 2004), 3:2053.Speight writes specificallyabout the function of creeds, which he defines as “confession[s]offaith, put intoconcise form, endowed with authority,and intended for general use in religious rites.” See Speight, 2052. Giventhat creedshaveconfessional, liturgical roles, their functionsare broader than dogmas. Nevertheless, thereisagreat deal of overlap between the functionsofdogma and creed. In the nineteenth-century debateoverdogma in Judaism that will be explored, some writers focus on creed.  MenachemKellner has done morethan anyone else to explorethis topic. See MenachemKellner, DogmainMedieval JewishThought: From Maimonides to Abravanel (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1986); Kellner, Must aJew BelieveAnything? 2nd ed. (Oxfordand Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jew- ish Civilization, 2006). On Maimonides’saccount of dogma, see Marc B. Shapiro, The Limits of Ortho- dox Theology:Maimonides’ Thirteen PrinciplesReappraised (Oxfordand Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004); Louis Jacobs, Principles of the JewishFaith: An Analytical Study (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1964).  While scholars have largely forgotten the nineteenth-century debateoverdogma in Judaism, the one exception is Kerstin vonder Krone. See her brief treatment in vonder Krone, “Jü dische Wissen- schaft undmodernesJudentum: eine Dogmendebatte,” in Die “Wissenschaft desJudentums”:EineBes- tandsaufnahme,ed. Thomas Meyerand AndreasKilcher (Paderborn:Wilhelm Fink Verlag,2015),118– 20.

OpenAccess. ©2020Michah Gottlieb, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-012 220 Michah Gottlieb

doxy;ManuelJoël, aleading figure in Positive-Historical Judaism, and Abraham Gei- ger, the intellectual leader of Reform Judaism. Iwill show how each author’sdiscussion of dogma is informed by his concept of Judaism.

Mendelssohn’sHaskalah: JudaismasNon-Dogmatic Religion

In an important 1926 article titled “Besitzt das überlieferte Judentum Dogmen?” (“Does Traditional Judaism Possess Dogmas?”), Leo Baeck refers to the “long and widelyheld belief” that for Mendelssohn, “Judaism was areligion without dogmas.”⁴ The problem with this claim, Baeck notes,isthatthe term “dogma” is notoriously undefined. He observes that in the original Greek, “dogma” (dokein)has several meanings. In the Septuagint and the New Testament, it means “order” or “decree” and usuallyrefers to governmental regulations. In ancient philosophy, dokein is used in aderivativesense to refertointellectual axioms that wereregarded as “decrees of cognition.” AccordingtoBaeck, it was onlywhen ancient philosophyjoined Christianitythat “dogma” came to refer to “statements of faith.”⁵ Catholicism enum- eratedrevealed doctrines found in sacredtexts or traditions that were confirmed by an authoritative religious bodyasdogma.⁶ Affirming dogma was regarded as adivine commandment and anecessary condition for salvation, while denying it was deemed aheresy that would consign aperson to eternal perdition. Baeck notes that Protes- tant theologians largely accepted their Catholic counterparts’ understanding of dogma,⁷ and recent scholars have tended to affirm the general contours of Baeck’s genealogy.⁸

 LeoBaeck, “Does Traditional Judaism Possess Dogmas?” in Studies in JewishThought: An Anthol- ogyofGerman JewishScholarship,ed. Alfred Jospe (Detroit: Wayne StateUniversity Press, 1981), 41.  Baeck, “Does Traditional Judaism Possess Dogmas?”,45. M. E. Williams notesthat in ancient Greek, “dogma” (dokein)can also mean “private opinion” and that in earlyChristianity, it could referboth to particular teachings(e.g. the immortality of the soul) and to an entiresystem of teachings(e.g. Christian dogma as opposed to pagan dogma).See M.E. Williams, “Dogma,” in New Cath- olic Encyclopedia,2nd ed., ed. Thomas Carson (Detroit: Thomson/Gale, 2002), 1:810–11.  Baeck, “Does Traditional Judaism Possess Dogmas?”,46–47.  Baeck notesthat some Protestant theologians denied that Christianity had dogma because they denied the existenceofinfallible religious institutions to confirm it.See Baeck, 46.The relationship between Jewish thinkers such as Mendelssohn, Geiger,and Baeck whodenied that Judaism had dogma and Protestant thinkers whodenied that Christianity had dogma is an important subject that exceeds the bounds of this essay.  See Williams, “Dogma”;Adolf Darlapand Karl Rahner, “Dogma,” in EncyclopediaofReligion,2nd ed., ed. LindsayJones (Detroit: Macmillan, 2004), 4:2387–90. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 221

Despite the widelyheld view that Mendelssohn denied that Judaism has dogma, he never uses the term “dogma” in connection with Judaism.⁹ Mendelssohn’sdenial of dogma in Judaism is most commonlyinferred from his distinction between revealed religion and revealed legislation. ForMendelssohn, revealed religion refers to revealed theological doctrines, while revealed legislation refers to revealed law. For Mendelssohn, Christianity is grounded in revealed religion, while Judaism onlyrec- ognises revealedlegislation.¹⁰ In Menachem Kellner’sinfluential book Must aJew Believe Anything? (first edition 1999;second edition 2006), he interprets Mendelssohn’sdistinction between revealedreligion and revealed legislation as “orthopraxy.” Kellner does not claim that Mendelssohn deems doctrines unimportant in Judaism. Rather,hecontends that Mendelssohn interprets Judaism as comprisingtwo elements: principles of universal natural religion known through reason (includingGod’sexistenceand the immortality of the soul) and ritual laws specific to Jews known through revelation. Kellner criticises Mendelssohn’sphilosophyofJudaism as schizophrenic, splitting the Jew into apublic human being and aprivateJew.¹¹ Kellner’sinterpretation of Mendels- sohn has alonghistory.In1840,the Reform theologian Solomon LudwigSteinheim chargedMendelssohn with being “aheathen in his brain and aJew in his body.”¹² This interpretation seriouslymisunderstands Mendelssohn for three reasons. First,Mendelssohn does not limit the doctrines at the coreofJudaism to universal teachings of natural religion. In his 1783 Jerusalem,heasserts that Judaism comprises three elements: (a) universal eternal truths of natural religion, includingGod’sexistence, divineprovidence, the immortality of the soul, and naturalmorality,which

 However,shortlyafter Mendelssohn’sdeath in 1786,his disciple David Friedländer attributed this view to his teacher.In1788, Friedländer wrote: “Amongour great men, Mendelssohn was the first, not indeed to discover,but to emphasise and teachwith full clarity that the distinguishingprinciple of Judaism is that we havenodogmas [wir keinen Dogmen], no articles of faith, no teachings about salvation that areindispensable and necessary for blessedness” (myemphasis). See David Friedländ- er, Der Prediger (Berlin: Friedrich Maurer, 1788), 23.Ithank UtaLohmann for callingmyattention to this source.  See Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften: Jubiläumsausgabe,ed. Alexander Altmann et al. (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1971–), 8:164,96(henceforth: JubA); Mendels- sohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious Powerand Judaism,trans. Allan Arkush, ed. Alexander Altmann (Hanover,NH: University Press of New England, 1983), 97,248;Mendelssohn, JubA,7:90–102; Men- delssohn, Moses Mendelssohn: Writings on Judaism, Christianity,and the Bible,trans. Curtis Bowman, Elias Sacks,and Allan Arkush, ed. Michah Gottlieb (Hanover,NH: University Press of New England, 2011), 16–27.  See Kellner, Must aJew Believe Anything?,112, note 3. In claimingthat Mendelssohnsplits the Jew into apublic human beingand aprivate Jew, Kellner citesYehuda Leib Gordon’sfamous expression (oftenmistakenlyattributed to Mendelssohn): “Behave likeahuman beingonthe street,and likea Jewinyour tent.”  See Salomon Steinheim, Moses Mendelssohn und seine Schule (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1840), 37,cited in Michael Meyer, Response to Modernity:AHistoryofthe Reform Movement in Judaism (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1988), 69. 222 Michah Gottlieb

can be known “at all times and in all places” through reason or common sense; (b)historical truths about the Jewish nation, includingthe miraculous exodus from Egypt and the revelation at Mount Sinai, which are known through tradition and recorded in the Torah; and (3) the revealed laws of the Torah.¹³ As the second and third elements include historicaldoctrines that cannotbeknown “at all times and in all places,” it is evident that Mendelssohn does not identify the doctrines at the coreofJudaism solelywith universal principles of naturalreligion.¹⁴ Second, Mendelssohn does not completelyseparate universal principles of natural religion from revelation, as he asserts that these universal principles can be communicated through revelation. Thus, Mendelssohn interprets Ecclesiastesasa dialogue teachingthe immortality of the soul and he asserts that rational truths about God’sexistenceand providencewererevealed to Moses and recorded in the Pentateuch.¹⁵ Finally, Mendelssohn does not completelyseparate universal principles of naturalreligion from ritual law, as he asserts thataprimary function of ritual lawisto bring the principles of natural religion to life and provide an occasion for contem- plating theirmeaning.Asheputs it: “Alllawsrefer to, or are basedon, eternal truths of reason, or remind us of them, and rouse us to ponderthem. Hence, our rabbis rightlysay:the laws and doctrines are related to each other,like bodyand soul.”¹⁶

 Mendelssohn, JubA,8:191–93; Jerusalem,126–27.  Alexander Altmann notes, however,that in his earlier “Counter-Reflections to Bonnet” (1769) and his 1771 lettertoElkan Herz, Mendelssohnseems to posit amoredualistic concept of Judaism com- prisingeternal truths and revealed law. See Alexander Altmann, “Moses Mendelssohn’sConcept of Judaism Reexamined,” in Vonder mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklärung: Studien zur jüdischen Geistesgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr,1987), 234.  Mendelssohn’s1769Hebrewcommentary on Ecclesiastes is found in Mendelssohn, JubA,14:148– 207. EdwardBreuerand David Sorkin have recentlypublished atranslation of asignificant portion of this text. See Moses Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohn’sHebrewWritings,trans. Edward Breuer,ed. EdwardBreuer and David Sorkin (New Haven: Yale University Press,2018), 123–218. Mendelssohn’s most famousdiscussion of the rational content of revelation in Judaism is in his commentary on Exo- dus3:14onGod’srevelation of the Tetragrammaton to Moses.Translatingthe Tetragrammaton as “The Eternal” (Der Ewige), Mendelssohnnotesthat this concept includes God’seternality,necessary existence, and providential governance. See Mendelssohn, JubA,16:26–27; Moses Mendelssohn: Writ- ings,217–18. See also Jerusalem,where Mendelssohnwrites: “Althoughthe divine book that we re- ceivedthroughMoses is, strictlyspeaking, meant to be abook of laws containingordinances, rules of life, and prescriptions,italso includes,asiswellknown, an inexhaustible treasure of rational truths and religious doctrines that aresointimatelyconnected with the laws that they form but one entity” (emphasis mine). Mendelssohn, JubA,8:165–66; Jerusalem, 99.  See Mendelssohn, JubA,8:165–66; Jerusalem, 99.For an elaboration of Mendelssohn’sargument, see Michah Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn’sTheological-Political Thought (New York: Oxford University Press,2011), ch. 2; Gideon Freudenthal, No Religion Without Idolatry: Men- delssohn’sJewishEnlightenment (NotreDame, IN:University of NotreDame Press, 2012), ch. 6; and most recently, Elias Sacks, Moses Mendelssohn’sLiving Script: Philosophy,Practice, History,Judaism (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 2017), ch. 2. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 223

GivenMendelssohn’saffirmation that the universal principles of natural religion can be revealedand that they are intimatelyconnected to ritual law, in what sense does he denydogma in Judaism?Inthe Christian sense, as he asserts that Judaism recognises no divinelycommanded irrational doctrines known onlythrough revelation and confirmed by an authoritative religious bodythe affirmationofwhich is a necessary condition for salvation. Mendelssohn has three reasons for denying that Judaism possesses dogma in this sense. First,heclaims that Judaism teaches that there are no truths known exclusively through revelation thatare necessary for salvation. Were there such truths, they would either contradict God’sgoodness, by implying that God consigns all those to whom God did not revealsalvational truths to eternal suffering, or they would contradict God’somnipotence,byimplying that God lacked the power to provide all people with the tools necessary for salvation. As Mendelssohn memorably put it: “Whymust the twoIndies wait until it pleases Europeans to sendthem afew com- forters to bringthem amessagewithout which they can, according to this opinion, live neither virtuouslynor happily?”¹⁷ ForMendelssohn, Judaism teaches that salvation depends on the practice of uni- versalmorality,which constitutes the true worship of God.¹⁸ This is reflected in the rabbinic teachingthatGentiles who observe the seven so-called “Noahide laws” merit salvation in the afterlife.¹⁹ Mendelssohn asserts that the Noahide laws “more or less comprise the essential laws of natural right” and that the talmudic rabbis call those who follow them “virtuous men of other nations” and “children of eternal bliss.”²⁰ ForMendelssohn, Judaism teaches that the affirmation of universal principles of natural religion is connected to salvation not because affirming these doctrines bestows salvation by itself,but because affirming them provides acrucial mo-

 See Mendelssohn, JubA,8:161; Jerusalem,94.  As he put it in his 1770 “Counter-Reflections to Bonnet”: “The divine religion into which Iwas born teaches me that all the peoplesofthe earth aresaved if they live in accordance with the laws of reason, that is, if they practice virtue.” Mendelssohn, JubA,7:90–91; Moses Mendelssohn: Writ- ings,16.  The talmudic doctrine is found in Babylonian Talmud, ʿAvodah Zarah, 64b.  The rabbinic appellation for Gentiles who follow the Noahide laws is “the pious of the nations of the world” (ḥasidei ummot ha-ʿolam). However,Mendelssohntranslates the term as “virtuous [tu- gendhafte]men of other nations,” thereby emphasisingthat moral virtue is the basis for salvation. The seven Noahide laws as enumerated by Mendelssohn involveprohibitions on (1) idolatry;(2) blasphemy; (3) murder; (4) incest; (5) robbery;and (6) eatingliveanimals,aswellas(7) the obligation to establish and administer justice. See Mendelssohn’s “OpenLetter to Lavater” in Mendelssohn, JubA, 7:11; Moses Mendelssohn: Writings,9.Thereisalarge literatureonMendelssohn’streatment of the Noahide laws.The classic studyisStevenSchwarzschild, ThePursuit of the Ideal: JewishWritings of Steven Schwarzschild,ed. Menachem Kellner (Albany, NY:StateUniversity of New York Press, 1990), 29–60. 224 Michah Gottlieb

tivation for ethical action which merits one salvation.²¹ So, while for Mendelssohn, Judaism teaches that principles of natural religion can be communicated through revelation, it alsoteaches that revelation is not needed in order to know them. As he puts it: “Judaism boasts of no exclusive revelation of eternal truths thatare indispensable to salvation, of no revealedreligion in the sense in which that term is usu- allyunderstood” (emphasis Mendelssohn’s).²² Second, Mendelssohn claims that accordingtoJudaism, belief in religious dogma cannot be commanded because no beliefs can be commanded. Mendelssohn asserts that human beingshavetwo distinct capacities: intellect,which judgestruth, and will,which intends actions. Will can be manipulated through force, threats, and bribes, but intellect onlyaffirms belief on the basisofrational considerations. For example, by holding agun to my head aperson can forcemetosay the words “one plus one equals three.” But they can never forcemetobelieve it.God therefore cannot command belief in dogma, as “ought” must imply “can.”²³ Mendelssohn finds this teachingreflected in the opening of the Decalogue: “Iamthe Eternal your God who led youfrom the land of Egypt” (Exodus 20:2). Mendelssohn makes clear that this statement is “not acommandment of belief,” since belief cannot be commanded. As he puts it, “amiraculous voice would not have instilled anycon- cepts […]since [a person] demands rational proofs” (emphasis Mendelssohn’s).²⁴ ForMendelssohn, just as the eternal truths at the heart of Judaism, such as God’s existence, must be affirmed through reason, so too must the historicaltruths, such as the miraculous exodus from Egypt and the revelation of the TorahonMount Sinai. Mendelssohn defends the rationalityofthese teachingsbyclaiming that they can be rationallyaffirmedonthe basis of eye-witness reports and trust in asubsequent chain of tradition.²⁵

 This is asomewhat complex argument that Iwill not repeat here. Forits elaboration, see Michah Gottlieb, Faith, Reason, Politics:Essaysonthe HistoryofJewishThought (Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press,2013), 132–38.  Mendelssohn, JubA,8:164; Jerusalem,97.  See Mendelssohn, JubA,8:129–30; Jerusalem,61–62.  See Mendelssohn, JubA,8:164–65; Jerusalem,97–98; JubA,16:186; Moses Mendelssohn: Writings, 222 (Commentary on Exodus20:2).Mendelssohn’sapproachcan be seen in arendering of Maimoni- des’sThirteen Principles of Judaism that he composed for students at the first maskilic school, the Jüdische Freischule. Maimonides’sprinciples, outlined in his introduction to the tenth chapter of the Talmudic tractateSanhedrin, weregiven creedal formulation in the fifteenth century in the anonymous text Ani Maʾamin. In this text,each of Maimonides’sprinciples was prefaced with the phrase “Ibelievewith perfect faith” (ani maʾamin be-emunah šelemah). However,inMendelssohn’srender- ing of these principles,hereplaced this formulation with the words “Iknow as true and certain” (Ich erkenne fürwahrund gewiß). Mendelssohn’sversion of Maimonides’sThirteen Principles can be found in MayerKayserling, Moses Mendelssohn: sein Leben und seine Werke (Leipzig:H.Mendels- sohn, 1862),565–68.  Iwill not elaborate on Mendelssohn’sargument here, but its elementscan be found in his commentary on Maimonides’s Treatise on Logic in Mendelssohn, JubA,14:71–72; Moses Mendelssohn’sHe- brewWritings,84–85; Mendelssohn’sintroduction to his commentary and translation of the Torah, Does Judaism HaveDogma? 225

Third, Mendelssohn claims thatJudaism has never demanded that its adherents swear allegiance to “articles of faith” (Glaubensartikel), the denial of which made one aheretic. He acknowledgesthat some medieval Jewish thinkers,mostnotably Maimonides, attempted to create alist of bindingarticles of faith and claimedthat aJew who did not affirmhis articles was not an “Israelite.”²⁶ However,Mendelssohn deems Maimonides’sidea to be contrary to “the spirit of true Judaism” (Geiste der ächten Judentums), as evidencedbythe fact that his principles weredisputed by other medieval Jewishthinkers and the debate never led to sectarian divisionsorac- cusations of heresy.²⁷ UnlikeMaimonides’sprinciples, the first two elements of Mendelssohn’sconcept of Judaism are general categories rather than specific teachings.Rather thanbeing a litmus test for whether or not aJew is included in the community,they represent Mendelssohn’sanalytical understanding of Judaism. Indeed, one of Mendelssohn’s most famous teachings is that Judaism deems excommunication illegitimate.²⁸ Mendelssohn’sdenial that Judaism has dogma served an important interreligious function. Mendelssohn was challenged to convert to Christianity several times. The first challengecame in 1769,when the Swiss pastor Johann Caspar Lavater dedicated aphilosophicaldefence of ChristianitytoMendelssohn asking him to either refute the defenceorconvert.The heart of Mendelssohn’sresponse to Lavater was his assertion that he adhered to Judaism because it was arational, tolerant religion which held that all who practised universal morality merited salvation, which was whyJudaism did not proselytise.²⁹ Mendelssohn’snot-very-subtle implication was that this was not true of Christianity.³⁰ So, for Mendelssohn, Judaism’slack of dogma distinguished it from Christianity. Mendelssohn repeated and elaborated this point fourteen years laterinJerusalem, or on Religious Power and Judaism in response to asecond challengetoconvert to Christianity, this time from the enlightened Protestant writerAugust Friedrich Cranz. There wasaclear political subtext to Mendelssohn’sdenial of dogma in Judaism. While the logic of Enlightenment political theory,with its emphasis on human equality and freedom, naturallyentailed that Jews should be grantedcitizenship,many Christians, includingFrederick the Great,the enlightened ruler of Prussia, resisted

Mendelssohn, JubA,14:211–28; Moses Mendelssohn’sHebrew Writings,241–70;and his discussion of miracles in Mendelssohn, JubA,7:324–25; Moses Mendelssohn: Writings 255–56.For arecent attempt to defend Mendelssohn’sposition, see Sacks, MosesMendelssohn’sLiving Script,122–70.  On Maimonides’sclaim, see Kellner, Must aJew BelieveAnything?,52–56.  See Mendelssohn, JubA,8:167–68; Jerusalem,100–101.For the history of the disputeoverMaimo- nides’sprinciples,see the books citedinnote 2.  See Mendelssohn’s “Preface to Menasseh ben Israel” in Mendelssohn, JubA,7:16–25; Moses Men- delssohn: Writings,44–52; JubA,8:103–42; Jerusalem,33–75.  See note 20 above.  Mendelssohnmade this claim explicit in an unpublishedwork that he wroteatthe time. See Men- delssohn’s “Counter-Reflections to Bonnet” in Mendelssohn, JubA,7:90–105; Moses Mendelssohn: Writings,16–28. 226 Michah Gottlieb

this logic. Part of their argument was that Jews could not be granted citizenship because they adhered to atyrannical, irrationalreligion which was at odds with En- lightenment principles.³¹ Mendelssohn’sclaim that Judaism did not possess dogma must therefore be understood in the context of his plea for Jewish civil rights. For Mendelssohn the Maskil and Aufklärer,Judaism’sstatus as arational, tolerant religion showed it to be more closelyaligned with Enlightenment principles than was Christianity.

The Nineteenth-CenturyDebate

While Mendelssohn’sdiscussion of dogma in Judaism was informed by the interreligious need to draw adistinction between Judaism and Christianity and advocate for Jewishcivil inclusion, in the nineteenth century,the debate wasshaped by intrareligious considerations, most notablythe problem of Jewish communal unity. Until the lastthird of the eighteenth century, most GermanJewishcommunities wereorganised into traditional structures called qehillot (sing. qehillah). The authority of the qehillah was recognised by Christian rulers and included the right not onlytotax its members and administer communal institutions, but also to enforce Halakhah. With the ascension of enlightened absolutist rulersinthe eighteenth century who sought to extend asingle, rational state lawoverall the inhabitants of their countries and sweep away estate-based medieval institutions, the authority of the traditional qehillah waned. In this context,new Jewish congregations beganto emerge.³² Reforming the traditionalsynagogue service was acentral concern for these new Jewishcongregations. Between 1810 and 1818, Reform Temples were openedinSee- sen, Berlin,and Hamburg. The first reformsintroduced included aweeklysermon in German to replace the semi-annual talmudic discourse in Yiddish, some prayers in German rather than all prayers being in Hebrew,and the playing of organ music during the Sabbath prayers. Gradually, substantial changes wereintroduced into the lit-

 The literatureonthis is vast.For asample of the eighteenth-century arguments against Jewish civil rights,see Jacob Katz, FromPrejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700–1933 (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1980), 13–62.  On the pre-modern qehillah and its decline, see JacobKatz, Tradition and Crisis:JewishSociety at the End of the Middle Ages,trans.BernardDov Cooperman (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), and morerecently, ElishevaCarlebach, “La communauté juive et ses institutions au début de l’époque moderne,” in AuxOrigines du Judaïsme,ed. Julien Darmon and Jean Baumgarten (Paris:Actes Sud, 2012), 358–89.Inaddition to the government strippingthe qehillah of prerogatives, its authority was weakened by internal disputes over Sabbateanism, Hasidism, and Haskalah, as well as tensions between the wealthy and the poor.See Katz, Tradition and Crisis,181–236; Meyer, Re- sponse to Modernity,10–13;Carlebach, “La communauté,” 365–66,387–89. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 227

urgy,most notablyeliminating the hope that the Jews would return to Palestine, rebuild the Temple,and restore the sacrificial cult in Jerusalem.³³ In 1844,Reform rabbis convened the first of several rabbinical assembliestoes- tablish unifiedstandards for Reform Judaism. This assembly, held in Braunschweig, proved contentious. However,afew reforms wereagreed upon, the most controversial being the ruling that marriagebetween aJew and aChristian was not halakhi- callyprohibited as long as children born into the marriagecould also be raised as Jews.³⁴ Historians generallyunderstand Orthodox Judaism as areaction to groups per- ceivedtobetamperingwith Jewish tradition.³⁵ Jeffrey Blutingernotes that in the nineteenth century, the term “Orthodox” came to be used specificallytodesignate Jews opposed to Reform.³⁶ As such, the beginningsofnineteenth-century Orthodoxy are oftendated to the 1819 publication of acollection of rabbinic responsaopposing the HamburgTemple titled Eleh Divrei ha-Brit (These Are the Words of the Cove- nant).³⁷ However,itwas opposition to the Reform rabbinical assemblies of the 1840s thatgalvanised and consolidated Orthodoxy. In responsetothe Braunschweig Assembly, seventy-seven Orthodox rabbis signed amanifesto denouncing it,and a collection of thirty-seven condemnatory rabbinicresponsa waspublished.³⁸ The most important of these responsa was that of Samson Raphael Hirsch, the leading exponent of German Jewish Neo-Orthodoxy at the time. Hirsch harshlycriti- cised Reformers for deviating from Halakhah and expressed concern thatthe actions of the Reformerswereprecipitatingschism among German Jews. As he put it: “You

 See Meyer, Response to Modernity,28–61.  Meyer, Response to Modernity,131–35;David Philipson, TheReform MovementinJudaism (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 211–12; Katz, Divine Law in Human Hands (Jerusalem: Magnes Press), 234– 35,373. Other reforms included eliminatingrecital of the KolNidrei prayer annullingvows at the be- ginningofYom Kippur and eliminatingthe practiceofmeṣiṣah be-feh,which involved the person per- formingthe rite of circumcision suckingthe penile blood of the baby beingcircumcised.For adis- cussion of this ritual and the controversy surroundingitinthe nineteenth century,see Katz, Divine Law in Human Hands,357–402.  See Jacob Katz, “Orthodoxy in Historical Perspective,” in Studies in Contemporary Jewry, Volume 2, ed. Peter Medding(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 3–4; Michael Silber, “Orthodoxy,” in TheYivo Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe,ed. Gershon Hundert (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2:1292–97.  Jeffrey Blutinger, “‘So-Called Orthodoxy’:The History of an Unwanted Label,” Modern Judaism 27, no. 3(2007): 320.  See W. Gunther Plaut, The Rise of Reform Judaism: ASourcebook of Its European Origins (New York: World Union for Progressive Judaism, 1963), 34.Apartial translation of the textcan be found in Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, TheJew in the Modern World: ADocumentaryHistory, 3rd ed. (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2011), 187–89.  Signatories continued to be gathered and eventuallythree hundred Orthodoxrabbis signed the protest. See Judith Bleich, “Jacob Ettlinger, His Life and Works:The EmergenceofModern Orthodoxy in Germany” (PhDdiss., New York University,1974), 186–91;Philipson, The Reform Movement,225–29; Katz, Divine Law in Human Hands,236–43. 228 Michah Gottlieb

children of the nation, whose assemblyhas caused all this [protest] […]. Do your eyes not see that evil and bitterness willfollow the path on which youhavebegun?Do younot know and understand thatifyourwords bear fruit this time, the house of Israel will be torn into two?”³⁹ Undeterred by Orthodox opponents like Hirsch, Reformersheld asecond rabbinical assemblyinFrankfurt the following year in 1845. At that assembly, amajor controversy erupted over whether Hebrew should remain the languageofJewishprayer. Abraham Geiger,the chief rabbi of Breslauand leadingtheoretician of Reform Juda- ism, argued that all Hebrew prayers should be eliminated from the synagogue service, since German was the mother tongue of GermanJews and, as he put it, “aGer- man prayer strikes adeeper chord than aHebrew prayer.”⁴⁰ Geiger’spush to eliminate Hebrew from the liturgy was opposed by the leading moderate Reformer,the chief rabbi of Dresden, Zacharias Frankel. Frankel argued that Hebrew must retain acentral place in the Jewish liturgy since it was historically the languageofJewishprayerand Scripture, and he dismissed Geiger’scontention that Germanprayers struck adeeper chord thanHebrew prayers as “purelysubjec- tive.”⁴¹ Ultimately, the majority of the assemblysided with Geiger,and an outraged Frankelwithdrew from the conference, severed his ties with Reform, and foundeda separate denomination he called “Positive-Historical Judaism” that chartedamiddle path between Orthodoxyand Reform.⁴² It would, however,beamistake to see nineteenth-century German Jewry as marchinginexorably towards fragmentation. Apowerful impetus for Jewish communal unity came from the Christian governmental authorities. In 1847, Prussia passed a lawmaking it mandatory to belong to the local Jewish community.Jews werere- quired to paytaxes to their local Jewish community,and these taxes were partially used by the supreme Jewish council or Oberat to fund the community’sreligious institutions, includingthe local synagogue. Accordingtothe governmental regulations,

 Samson Raphael Hirsch, Sefer Šemeš Marpeʾ: šeʾelot u-tešuvot, ḥiddušei ha-Šas,iggerotu-mikhtavim,ed. EliyahuMeir Klugman (New York: Mesorah, 1992),195–96.See Katz, Divine Law in Human Hands,242–44.  Geiger also opposed retainingHebrew for prayer because he sawitasamarker of Jewish nation- hood. See Philipson, TheReform Movement,239–40.For apartial translation of Geiger’sarguments, see Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz, TheJew in the Modern World, 203. On the Frankfurt Assemblymore generally, see Meyer, Response to Modernity,136–38;Philipson, The Reform Movement,231–72.  Frankel also rejected Geiger’scontention that reciting prayers in Hebrewprevented Jews from beingpatriotic Germans. Forapartial translation of Frankel’sresponse to Geiger, see Mendes- Flohr and Reinharz, TheJew in the Modern World,203–4.  On Frankel, see Ismar Schorsch, From Text to Context: The Turn to HistoryinModern Judaism (Hanover,NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 255–65;Andreas Brämer, RabbinerZacharias Frankel: Wissenschaft des Judentums und konservativeReform im 19.Jahrhundert (Hildesheim: Olms, 2000). Does Judaism HaveDogma? 229

aJew could onlybeexempted from paying these taxesbywithdrawing from the Jew- ish community by converting to Christianity.⁴³ The Oberat did not have auniformdenominational affiliation. In some communities, it was controlled by Reformers, while in others, the Orthodox controlled it.This created tension, since the local community synagogue generallyfollowed the religious orientation of the majority of the Oberat. In afew communities,Jews belonging to adifferent denomination from the Oberat,whether Reform or Orthodox, receiveda special governmental dispensation to form an independent congregation and conduct separate services. However,they still had to be members of the official community and paytaxes to it,and werethereforeleft with adouble tax burden, forced to fund religious institutions of which they did not approve.⁴⁴

S.R. Hirsch’sNeo-Orthodoxy: Dogma as the Foundation of Denominational Sectarianism

In 1869, therewas anew development in Karlsruhe, the state capital of Baden. The previous year,the Reform-controlled Oberat had introduced reformsinto the community synagogue that included the playing of an organonthe Sabbath. The Karlsruhe Orthodoxprotested and decided not onlytoform aseparate congregation, but also to refuse to paytheir communal taxes. This amounted to secedingfrom the official Jew- ish community,and the Oberat promptlysued the Orthodox secessionists. However, Baden had atradition of progressive liberalism, and the State Supreme Court acquit- ted the OrthodoxJews, acceptingtheir argument that they had aright to secede for reasons of liberty of conscience. In response, the Oberat issued aharsh public con- demnation of the Orthodoxsecessionists.Atthe heart of the Oberat’sattack was a claim about the theological tenets of Judaism.⁴⁵

 See Salo Baron, “Freedom and Constraint in the Jewish Community:AnHistoric Episode,” in Es- says and Studies in MemoryofLinda R. Miller,ed. Israel Davidson (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary,1938), 11–12; Robert Liberles, Religious Conflict in Social Context: TheResurgence of Ortho- dox Judaism in Frankfurt Am Main, 1838–1877 (Westport,CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 167–69; Jacob Katz, AHouse Divided: Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth-Century Central European Jewry,trans. Zi- porah Brody(Hanover,NH: Brandeis University Press,1998), 9.  Reformers formed aseparate congregation in Berlin from 1847to1858and in Hamburgfrom1819 until 1865, when the official Jewish community was dissolvedafter emancipation was granted. The Orthodoxformed separate congregations in Frankfurt,Mainz, Cologne, Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, and Wiesbaden. Adifferent type of arrangement existed in Breslaufrom1846 to 1856,whereOrthodoxy and Reform had equal status and aperson could choose which congregation to join. Robert Liberles notes, however,that in 1858, members of the Reform congregation in Berlin wereexempted from paying taxes to the official Jewish community,despiteremainingmembers of it.Given that the Hamburg official community was dissolvedin1865, by that year,noReformers in German lands suffered from double taxation,onlyOrthodoxJews did. See Liberles, Religious Conflict,172–73.  See Katz, AHouse Divided,237–38. 230 Michah Gottlieb

The Oberat chargedthe Orthodox with “religious indifference” and with lacking aproper “sense of community” (Gemeinsinn), since for generations, Jews had regarded membership in the local Jewish community as an inviolable religious obligation.⁴⁶ The Oberat understood that the Orthodoxsaw secession as amatter of religious principle. However,itrejected this argument,claiming that the dispute between Or- thodoxy and Reform amounted to “aminor differenceofopinion over certain provi- sions in religious services which has not the least bearing on principles of religion [Religionsgrundsatz].”⁴⁷ Accordingtothe Oberat,Orthodoxand Reform Jews affirmed the same basic religious dogmas.For the Orthodoxtotear the community apart over minor disagreements concerning the synagogue service was petty and unconsciona- ble. In response, the Orthodoxfaction in Karlsruheappealed to Samson Raphael Hirsch,the leader of aseparatist Orthodoxcongregation in Frankfurt,for support. In the late 1860s, as Orthodox secession was debatedinHungary,Hirsch nursed the hope that his own Orthodox congregation in Frankfurt would be able to secede from the official Reform-controlled community there.⁴⁸ As such, he waseager to support the Orthodox faction in Karlsruhe.InApril 1870,hepublished ablisteringreply to the Karlsruhe Oberat titled “Die TrennungsfrageinKarlsruhe” (“The Secession Question in Karlsruhe”).⁴⁹ ForHirsch, the dispute between Orthodoxyand Reform was no matter of minor differences over the synagogue service, but rather a “symptom” of amuch deeper disagreement between them.⁵⁰ Hirsch had long battled to affirm the principle of the timeless, unchangingnature of the Torahwhose laws werebinding on all Jews.⁵¹ AccordingtoHirsch, the Orthodox followed the traditional Jewish view that “the first and most fundamental principle of Judaism” wasthe acceptance that all Jewishlife—includingnot onlythe synagogue service, but also all domesticand public life—should be governedbyHalakhahasfound in the Bible, Talmud, and later rabbinic rulingsand customs (minhagim)whose final authoritative codification was in the sixteenth-century Šulḥan ʿArukh.⁵² By contrast,Reformersregarded Juda-

 Samson Raphael Hirsch quotes the Oberat’sargument.See Samson Raphael Hirsch, Gesammelte Schriften,ed. Mendel Hirsch, 6vols.(Frankfurt am Main: J. Kauffmann, 1902–12), 5:532(henceforth: GS).  Hirsch, GS,5:532.  Katz notes that in the 1850s,Hirsch soughtexemption frompayingtaxes to the community that would be used to support Reform institutions,but did not yetconceive of full Orthodoxsecession. See Katz, AHouse Divided,27. On the effect of events in Hungary on Hirsch, see Katz, AHouse Divided, 108–10,237.  The textisreprinted in Hirsch, GS,5:532–42.  Hirsch, GS,5:535.Hirsch used the term “Neologie” to refertoReformers.  Foradiscussion of Hirsch’sarguments,see Michah Gottlieb, “Oral Letter and Written Trace:Sam- son Raphael Hirsch on the Bible and Talmud,” JewishQuarterly Review 106,no. 3(2016): 316–51.  Hirsch, GS,5:534.Inhis 1836 Neunzehn Briefe über Judentum,Hirsch wrotethat while Maimoni- des’sThirteen Principles “perhaps” (vielleicht)serveasabasis for Judaism, they do not constitute the Does Judaism HaveDogma? 231

ism as comprisingafew simple theological beliefs and the universal moral law, while Halakhahwas largely seen as antiquated and hence no longer obligatory.⁵³ As such, Hirsch contended that the dispute between Orthodoxy and Reform was no minor spat,but rather reflected differences “far greater […]than the opposition between Catholic and Protestant,Lutheran and Reformed, or anyotherdifferent Christian ec- clesiasticalconfessions.”⁵⁴ ForHirsch, it was Reformers, not the Orthodox, who had precipitated religious schism by changing Judaism’straditionalreligious principles. While the Oberat claimed that it was fighting to preservehistorical Judaism, since pre-modern Jews regarded membership in the local qehillah as areligious obligation, Hirsch argued that this was adistortion of history because the basis of membership in the Jewish community had changed. Hirsch assertedthat pre-modern Jews freelyconsented to be members of the qehillah because the community defined itself by the dogma that obedience to divinelyrevealed Halakhah was mandatory.⁵⁵ By contrast, the Oberat defined communal membership as the payment of taxes, enforced by non-Jewish governmental authorities. ForHirsch, this artificial, oppressive basis of Jewish communal unity had nothing to do with historical Judaism, and so the Orthodox were entirelyjustified in seceding.⁵⁶ As he put it, “it is not acommon tax box, but a com-

totality of it.See Samson Raphael Hirsch, Neunzehn Briefe,2nd ed. (Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann, 1889), brief 17,94. The English translation edited by Joseph Elias omits Hirsch’s “vielleicht.” See Samson Raphael Hirsch, TheNineteen Letters about Judaism,trans. Karin Paritzky,ed. Joseph Elias (New York: Feldheim, 1995), letter17, 244.Inhis 1854 essay “Religion Allied to Progress,” Hirsch was moreforceful in rejecting Maimonides’sThirteen Principles,claimingthat therecould be no principles of Judaism sinceevery commandmentisfundamental.Asheput it: “The rabbinical authorities opposed the proclamation of Jewish articles of faith [Glaubensartikeln]not because Judaism has no basic tenets, but because they regarded every aspect of Judaism as basic. Judaism, they held, knows neither thirteen articles of faith, nor three. In Judaism, every commandment and every prohibition constitutes afundamental religious principle and the denial of even one of the 613command- ments and prohibitions thereby places oneself outside Judaism.” Hirsch, GS,3:492;Hirsch, TheCollect- ed Writings,ed. Marc Breuer,Jacob Breuer,Meta Bechhofer,and Elliot Bondi (New York: Feldheim, 1984–2012), 6:112. Mendelssohnmade asimilar point in Jerusalem which he attributed to “Luria and the latter-day Kabbalists.” Zev Harvey notes that Mendelssohnwas actuallyreferringtothe view of the sixteenth-century rabbi David ibn Zimra(Radbaz), who was Isaac Luria’steacher.See Warren Zev Harvey, “Hasdai Crescas and Moses Mendelssohn on Beliefs and Commandments,” in Moses Mendelssohn: Enlightenment, Religion, Politics, Nationalism,ed. Michah Gottlieb and Charles H. Manekin (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 2015), 85–86.Mendelssohnmade his sympathy for this position evident,writingthat “laws cannot be abridged. In them everythingisfundamental, and in this regardwemay rightlysay:tous, all words of Scripture, all of God’scommandments are fundamental.” See Mendelssohn, JubA,8:167–68; Jerusalem,100–101. The originator of this view was Maimonides’sfifteenth-century critic Isaac Abravanel in his 1494 work Roš Amanah. See Kellner, DogmainMedieval JewishThought,179–95.  Hirsch, GS,5:535.  Hirsch, GS,5:539.  See Katz, AHouse Divided,238–39.  Hirsch, GS,5:536–38. 232 Michah Gottlieb

mon creed [das gemeinsame religiöse Bekenntnis]that makes acommunity acommunity” (emphasis mine).⁵⁷ The dogma that Hirsch affirmed as central to Judaism was very similar to Men- delssohn’sthird element of Judaism, and Hirsch followed Mendelssohn in rejecting dogma in the sense of acommandment to believeinrevealed doctrines, instead asserting that the revealedlaw was to be accepted on the basis of rational considerations.⁵⁸ Hirsch’ssense of affinity with Mendelssohn can be seen in an article attacking the Reformersthat he published sixteen years before the events in Karlsruhe. While the Reformerslionised Mendelssohn as theirpioneer,Hirsch asserted that “the thesis of all of Mendelssohn’swritingsisthat Judaism is essentiallyalaw.” Hirsch then asked the Reformers: “Do youseriously believethatif[…]Mendelssohn weretocome into your midsttodayhewould accept youasone of his own?”⁵⁹ ForHirsch, the obligation to fulfill all the laws of the revealedTorah was the basic dogma of Judaism. Acceptingitconstituted the basis for membership in the Jewishcommunity and served as atest of Orthodoxy.Ifthe leadership of the official, government-recognised Jewishcommunity brokewith this traditionalJewish dogma, then those who remained loyaltoithad no choice but to form aseparate Jewish community.

Manuel Joël’sPositive-HistoricalJudaism: Dogmaas aBasis of Pan-CommunalUnity

As secession was being debated in Karlsruhe and Hungary,manyGerman Jewish leaders weregrowingincreasinglyworried thatOrthodox separatism would spread, with disastrous results.⁶⁰ They worried that without aunifiedtax base,manysmaller Jewishcommunities would become financiallyinsolvent and disintegrate.Among those most concerned about this was Manuel Joël, the chief rabbi of Breslauand a close associate of Zacharias Frankel who identified with his “Positive-Historical” banner.The idea of Jewish communal unity was central to Frankel and to Positive- Historical Judaism, and Joël’sposition must be understood in light of Frankel’s. At the Frankfurt Conference, Frankel, who called himself a “moderate [gemä- ßigte]Reformer,” presented his view of how reforms should be introduced into Juda- ism.⁶¹ ForFrankel, onlyJudaism’s laws weresubject to evolution, not its beliefs,so anyreform of Judaism had to apply onlytoHalakhah. He noted that in undertaking

 Hirsch, GS,5:539.  See Hirsch, Neunzehn Briefe,brief 15,79; Nineteen Letters,letter 15,200.  Hirsch, GS,3:494,504; Collected Writings 6:114, 124.  On secession in Hungary,see Katz, AHouse Divided,31–236.  On this label, see Zacharias Frankel, “Über Reformen im Judenthume,” Zeitschrift fürdie religiös- en Interessen des Judenthums 1, no. 1(1844): 27. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 233

anyreforms, concern had to be directed to the needs of the people as awhole,not to the needs of isolated individuals.Aprimaryconcern had to be to “prevent anysplit [Zerspaltung]” in Judaism and to avoid creatingnew factions. Instead, one should seek to reconcile existing groups.⁶² Joël’s1869pamphlet “ZurOrientirung in der Cul- tusfrage” (“On the Question of Religious Worship”)clearlyreflected his sympathy with Frankel’scommitment to Jewishcommunal unity and his sense thatJewishbe- liefs werenot subjecttoreform. At the heart of Joël’sargument was his contention that dogma was central to Judaism.⁶³ Like the Karlsruhe Oberat,Joël argued that the Orthodox had no reason to secede from the official Jewishcommunity since Orthodoxy and Reform accepted the same basic religious principles. However,while the Oberat had left these common principles vague, Joël soughttogiveamore precise definition of what he called the “dogma” of Judaism. He noted that religious dogmas werenot specific to Judaism, since “every positive religion has specific dogmas [gewisse Dogmen]which it regards as fixed and the denial of which causes one to cease being amember[of the religion].”⁶⁴ Like Mendelssohn,Joël rejected the bindingauthority of Maimonides’s Thirteen Principles of Judaism, observing thatimportant later Jewish thinkers had disputed them.⁶⁵ But rather thanseeing all of Jewish lawasofbindingauthority or describing general categories of Jewishbeliefs as had Mendelssohn, Joël identified two specific theological “beliefs” (Glaubensvorstellungen)asJewishdogma.⁶⁶ We have seen thatthe question of how to conduct the synagogue service was central to the emergence of GermanJewishdenominationalism. Joël’sapproach to dogma clearlyreflected his concern with debates over the synagogue, as indicated by the title of his essay(“On the Question of Religious Worship”—emphasis mine). Forthis reason, rather than presentingdogmas as conceptual principles upon which Judaism was constructed, Joël interpreted dogmas as creedal declarations expressed in the synagogue liturgy,⁶⁷ and soughtout the theological principles that formedthe foundation of this liturgy. Joël concluded that Judaism rested on twodogmas:amonotheisticrepresenta- tion of God and the existenceofprophecyand revelation.⁶⁸ He contendedthat both the Orthodoxand the Reform liturgy affirmed these dogmas and thatthey therefore belonged to the sameconfession. Disputes between the Orthodoxand Reformers over whether the liturgy should express hope for apersonal messiahwho would re-

 See Protokolle und Aktenstückeder zweiten Rabbiner-Versammlung (Frankfurt: E. Ullmann, 1845), 20.  Manuel Joël, Zur Orientirung in der Cultusfrage (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung,1869).  Joël, 10.  Joël.  Joël, 11. Joël notes the importanceofhistory in Judaism, but does not consider belief in specific historical narrativestobeJewish dogma. See Joël, 7–8.  On creed vs. dogma,see above, note 1.  Joël, 11–12. 234 Michah Gottlieb

storethe Jews to Palestine and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem or over the question whether or not sacrifices had atoningpower werenot disputes over fundamental Jewishdogmas.Rather,theywereminor disagreements, since these ideas had what Joël called a “contestedhistory” within Judaism.⁶⁹ As such, arguments over these ideas did not provide legitimate grounds for tearingthe community apart. Joël acknowledgedthat Reformers and the Orthodoxhad radicallydifferent interpretations of the two dogmas of Judaism he had enumerated. This was most evident with the dogma of prophecy/revelation which Orthodoxy understood to involve God’srevelation of the Written and Oral TorahtoMoses, an idea that Reformers largely rejected. However,for Joël, this was not aproblem, for while monotheism and prophecy/revelation wereJewish dogmas,they werenever givena“final,fixed form,” and thus there was much latitude in how to interpret them. Joël claimed that this vagueness was “salutary for Judaism” as it allowed different points of view to be included in the tradition.⁷⁰ Yethemade clear thattherewerelimits to how these dogmascould be interpreted. The Bible and what Joël called “later Jewish religious texts” constituted adefinite boundarytoJudaism. As such, he assertedthat “ideas that clearlyand unquestionably[fraglos]contradict the letter and spirit of Jew- ish religious texts” layoutside Judaism.⁷¹ Like Mendelssohn, Joël rejected dogmas in the sense of irrational revealed truths commanded by God whose affirmationwas aprecondition for salvation. However, unlike Mendelssohn he focused his account of the principles of Judaism on particular—albeit vaguelydefined—creedal declarations of belief as expressed in the liturgy, which Joël was happy to call “dogma.” The reason for this shift was that Joël’sprimary concern was to provide abasisfor Jewish communal unity in the face of the threat of Orthodox secession, wherethe synagogue servicewas acentral point of contention.

Abraham Geiger’sReform: Judenheit as Basisof CommunalUnity

Shortlyafter the appearance of Joël’spamphlet,Abraham Geiger published along, devastatingattack on it titled “Etwas über Glauben und Beten: Zu Schutz und Trutz” (“On Belief and Prayer: Protectionand Defence”).⁷² Twelve yearsearlier,Gei-

 Joël, 11.  Joël, 10.  Joël, 10.Joël uses the term Schriftwidriges,but in light of the fact that he considers not onlythe Bible, but also later Jewish religious texts as constitutingaclear boundary of Judaism, Ithink he means Jewish sacredtexts moregenerally, especiallyrabbinic texts.  Abraham Geiger, “Etwas über Glauben und Beten: Zu Schutz und Trutz,” Jüdische Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Leben 7(1869): 1–59.Geiger’sreview clearlyhad apersonal dimension. At the time, he and Joël were competingfor arabbinical position in Berlin, which Geiger was ultimatelyoffered. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 235

gerhad publishedhis groundbreaking Urschrift und Übersetzungen der Bibelinihrer Abhängigkeit von der innern Entwicklung des Judenthums (Original Text and Transla- tion of the Bible in Its Dependence on the Inner Development of Judaism). The key argument of the Urschrift was that different schools of Judaism had rewritten the Bible to fit their needs.⁷³ This reflected aradical expansion of Geiger’sunderstandingof the evolution of Judaism thathehad expressedtwo decades earlier in acritique of Hirsch’s Neunzehn Briefe. There, Geiger had emphasised the development of Judaism by contending that the talmudic rabbis usedfanciful exegesistomodify the biblical letter to make it speak “for their time.”⁷⁴ Geiger began “Etwas über Glauben und Beten” by accusingJoël of incoherence. How could Joël claim that Judaism had dogma without fixed forms, but then claim that this lack of fixed forms had been beneficial for Judaism?AsGeiger put it, “dogma without fixed forms, conceptswithout conceptual determination, signify nothing.”⁷⁵ However,Geiger’sdeeper criticism was animated by his critical understanding of history.Henoted that Joël sought to set boundaries on the interpretation of Jewish dogma by asserting thatinterpretations which “clearly and unquestionably” violated the spirit or the letter of the Bible must be rejected. But Geiger observed that what clearlyviolated the spirit and letter of the Bible for one person might not for another.Who gottodecide which interpretations of dogma werelegitimate and which werenot?⁷⁶ Geiger noted that Joël had claimed that not just the Bible, but also “later Jewish religious texts” constituted a “definite boundary” of legitimate Jewish ideas. But Joël did not specify which laterJewish texts he was referring to. Geiger observedthat the Orthodoxcould easilyclaim thatthese texts included not just the Talmud, but even the Šulḥan ʿArukh,concluding that anyreligious ruling thatcontravened the Šulḥan ʿArukh layoutside Judaism.⁷⁷

See Max Wiener’sintroduction in Abraham Geiger, AbrahamGeiger and Liberal Judaism: TheChal- lenge of the NineteenthCentury,rev.ed., trans. Ernst J. Schlochauer,ed. Max Wiener (Cincinnati: He- brewUnion CollegePress,1981), 65–66.  Fordiscussion of Geiger’s Urschrift,see Susannah Heschel, Abraham Geiger and the JewishJesus (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1998), 76–83, 121–22;Ken Koltun-Fromm, Abraham Geiger’sLib- eral Judaism: Personal Meaning and Religious Authority (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 44–50;Nahum M. Sarna, Studies in Biblical Interpretation (Philadephia: Jewish Publication So- ciety,2000), 161–72.  See Abraham Geiger, “Recension der Briefe über Judenthum (3),” Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische Theologie 3, no. 1(1837): 90.For discussion of Geiger’scomplex earlyattitudes towards rabbinic exegesis, see JayM.Harris, How Do We Know This?Midrashand the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism (Albany, NY:StateUniversity of New York Press,1995), 157–65;Heschel, Abraham Geiger and the JewishJesus, 25–26;Koltun-Fromm, Abraham Geiger’sLiberal Judaism,40–63.  Geiger, “Etwas über Glauben und Beten,” 7.  Geiger,14.  Geiger. 236 Michah Gottlieb

Geiger then turned to Joël’sspecific account of Jewish dogma.Henoted that while Joël claimed that Judaism had universallyacknowledgeddogmas that received their imprimaturinthe liturgy,heenumerated onlytwo such dogmas: monotheism and prophecy/revelation. However,Geiger observedthat the traditionalJewishliturgy included aplethoraofother ideas,including the resurrection of the dead, belief in angels, and the existenceofmiracles. “Whydid Joël not include these as dogmas of Judaism?” he asked.⁷⁸ Geiger further argued thatwhile Joël asserted that the ex- pectationofapersonal messiah and the atoningpower of sacrificeshad adisputed history,this did not reflect the historicalrecord. Until the modernperiod, almost no Jews seriously doubted the comingofamessiahwho would lead the Jews to Pales- tine, rebuild the Temple,and restorethe sacrificial cult and these ideas were clearly affirmedinthe traditionalJewish liturgy.⁷⁹ Geiger then criticised Joël’sclaim thatthe dogmas of monotheism and prophecy/ revelation had never been disputed. Maimonides claimed that monotheism required the belief that God is incorporeal and that aperson who believed thatGod has abody was no longer aJew.But his older contemporary Rabbi Abraham ibn Daud responded thatthereweremen better thanMaimonides who believed that God had abodyand Jewish corporealists werenever excluded from the synagogue. More- over,while Joël made monotheism aprinciple, presumablytoexclude the Christian belief in the Trinityand the Incarnation, Kabbalah posited aGod composed of ten persons.⁸⁰ Geiger concluded that Judaism has no dogma, aposition he ascribed to Mendels- sohn. But interpreting Mendelssohn as contending that revealed ritual lawisthe defining feature of Judaism, Geiger called Mendelssohn’sapproach an “unhappy thought” that “turned [Judaism] into alifeless skeleton,” since for Geiger,the ritual lawhad lost its relevance.⁸¹ In rejectingdogma, Geiger did not denythe importance of doctrines in Judaism. Indeed, he regarded doctrines as Judaism’sdefining characteristic. WhatGeiger was contesting was the notionthat any specific, fixed ideas wereconstitutive of Judaism. Instead, he adopted ateleological view of Judaism, seeing its religious ideas as con- tinually developing and undergoingpurification. ForGeiger,Judaism’s “spiritual power” (Geistesmacht)derivedfrom its capacity to tolerate and nourish adiversity of ideas, even contradictory ones, and to continuallyevolvenew,morepotent concepts.⁸² But,Geiger asked, how did one determine which ideas were Jewishand which werenot?The standard could not be conformity to some arbitrary definition of “Ju- daism” (Judentum). Rather,what madeanidea Jewish was that the person introduc-

 Geiger,7.  Geiger.  Geiger,9.  Geiger,7.  Geiger,7–8. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 237

ing it “feels connected to Judenheit and […]knows himself to be in accordancewith the spirit [Geist]prevailing in Judenheit […]evenifhedeparts from conventional approaches in essentialquestions.”⁸³

 Geiger,9.Geiger’sposition in this text seems to contradict views he presents in other texts. In 1858, he published afictional correspondencetitled Über den Austritt aus dem Judenthume: ein auf- gefundener Briefwechsel (On Secession from Judaism: ANewly Discovered Correspondence). This corre- spondencewas between aJewish merchant whohad recentlyconverted to Christianity and aReform rabbi whoquestions the decision.The rabbi asks the convert how he could abandon Judaism with its “basic principle” (Grundgedanke)ofbelief in a “unique, holy, livingGod” in favour of Christianity with its belief in irrational doctrinessuch as the Trinity,the Incarnation, Original Sin, and Vicarious Atonement through faith in Jesus. See Abraham Geiger, Abraham Geiger’snachgelassene Schriften,ed. Ludwig Geiger (Berlin: Louis Gerschel Verlagsbuchhandlung,1875), 1:234–35.Shortlyafter Geiger’s essayappeared, aJewish convert to Christianitynamed Martin Maass attacked it.Notingthat the rabbi in Geiger’sdialoguedid not consider Jewish ceremonial lawtobebinding, Maass contended that absent ceremonial law, Geiger’sReform Judaism was nothingbut “abstract Deism” or “vestigial Voltairianism” (zurückgebliebenen Voltairianismus)that lacked anythingdistinctlyJewish. Geiger responded to Maass with a35-page “open letter” in which he asserted that “the actual kernel of Juda- ism is purefaith in God [reine Gottesglaube]and whoever firmlycleavestothis basic kernel is aJew.” See Abraham Geiger, Über den Austritt aus dem Judenthume: Offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn. M. Maaß (On Secession from Judaism: Open Letter to Mr.M.Maass)(Breslau: J. U. Kern, 1858), 10.Gei- gerthen detailed aseries of doctrinesthat he deemed foundationalinJudaism, includingbelief in a unique, holy, livingGod who is the creator and preserver of the universe; God as the source of laws governing nature and human life; God beingrevealed in all stirrings of human good; God as the source of the spiritual development of humanity throughout all of history; that the divine spirit exists in all human strivings in art and science; that humans are the onlybeings created in the image of God; that human beings have two divine gifts,freewill and reason,bywhich they strive for perfection; that human beings alone can commune with God; that God’sfundamental commandment is to loveone’sneighbour as oneself; that the messianic task is to perfect humanity so that all humanity will revere the unique God in peaceand love, etc. Geigercalled these doctrines the “faith content [Glaubensbehalt]ofJudaism” and made it clear that these beliefs werenever systematised. Nonethe- less,his emphasis on certain doctrines beingessential in Judaism seems to differ from his moreopen- ended, amorphousaccount of Jewish doctrineslaid out in “Etwas über Glauben und Beten.” Similar- ly,inan1846 work on Jewish religious instruction, Geiger presents threeprinciples of Judaism, namely belief in: (1) aunique holyGod; (2)human beings havingsuperior dignity on account of their being created in God’simage; (3) human beings beingcalled to work towards the universal brotherhood of mankind united in love. See Geiger, “Abhandlungaus den Programmen der jüdischen Religionsun- terrichtsanstalt,” in Geiger, Abraham Geiger’snachgelassene Schriften,1:323,citedinBrämer, “Abra- ham Geiger-skeptischer Pionier einer Glaubenslehredes Reformjudentums?,” in Yearbookofthe Mai- monides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2018,ed. Bill Rebiger (Berlin: De Gruyter,2018), 228–29.The differences between “Etwas über Glauben und Beten,” and these other texts maybedue to Geiger’s different aims in each textwhich leads him to employ different methodological approaches.InÜber den Austritt aus dem Judenthume: Offenes Sendschreiben,Geiger seeks to give Judaism positive content in order to distinguish it from Deism and in “Abhandlungen ausden Programmen der jüdischen Religionsunterrichtsanstalt” he seeks to specify principlesofJudaism for the instructionofJewish youth. As such he presents his own normative,theological conception of Judaism. By contrast,in “Etwas über Glauben und Beten” he uses an academic,historical approach to refute Joël’sassertion that Judaism can be defined by specific dogmas. 238 Michah Gottlieb

Geiger’sterm Judenheit is parallel to the term Christenheit,which is generally translated as “Christendom.” Just as Christenheit signifies all the members of the Christian religion, so Geiger’s Judenheit signifies all the members of the Jewish religion. ForGeiger,one could never be certain from the outset what constituted an authentic Jewish idea, and this was subjecttochange. Forexample, he observed thatat one time, Kabbalah had enjoyed wide acceptance within Judaism, but thatatpre- sent,its fantastic excesses had “been foughtand overcome.”⁸⁴ Instead, Geiger asserted that history wasdecisive and that Jews should “trust Judaism’spower to spiritu- allyweed out the foreign and smooth out perversions.” The greatest danger was trying to draw clear boundaries to Judaism, as this would end up suffocating it. Granting Jewish thinkers the full freedom to develop theirideas would be what would preserveJudaism’slife and vitality for the future. ForGeiger,identification with Jewish religion in general rather than affirming specific ideas or practicescon- stituted the basisofJewish communal unity. Geiger concluded by addressing the problem of schism. He acknowledgedthat his approach would not deter Orthodox secessionists,since they defined Judaism by adherencetoall the laws in the Šulḥan ʿArukh and considered Jews who denied this to be outside of Judaism. However,heasserted thatJoël’sattempt to avoid schism by arbitrarilyselecting vaguelydefined dogmas which he declared to be binding on all Jews was no solution, since the Orthodox would simply reject this.⁸⁵ Geiger made clear thatwhile he was not in favour of schism,hedid not fear it.⁸⁶ Protestan- tism had broughtschism to Christianity,but in doing so, it had freed itself from Ca- tholicism’sstifling hierarchyand laid the ground for spiritual progress and Bildung. What wasmost importantfor the future of Judaism was freedom. As he put it: “In religious life, freedom certainlyprecedesunity [geht sicher die Freiheit vor der Ein- heit]!”⁸⁷

 Geiger, “Etwas über Glauben und Beten,” 9.  Geiger,15–16.For his part,Joël was likelynot concerned with convincingOrthodoxJews of his views,but rather with convincingthe governmental authorities so that they would denyOrthodox Jews the right to secede from the official Jewish community.  Geiger,22, 25.Geiger’sattitude towards religious schism was highlyambivalent.Liberles notes that in 1831, when Reform was asmall minority,hehad favoured Reformers formingseparate communities.Between 1839 and 1841, Geiger vacillated on the question. By 1846,asReform had established adominant position amongGerman Jews,heopposed secession. However,aswecan see from his 1869essay, Geiger did not oppose secession at all costs. See Liberles, Religious Conflict, 165–67.See also Michael Meyer, “Universalism and Jewish Unity in the ThoughtofAbraham Geiger,” in TheRoleofReligion in Modern JewishHistory,ed. Jacob Katz (Cambridge,MA: Association for Jew- ish Studies,1975), 91–107.  Geiger, “Etwas über Glauben und Beten,” 25–26. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 239

Conclusion

Writing in the eighteenth century,Mendelssohn addressed the question of dogma in Judaism from an interreligious perspective as ameans of distinguishing Judaism from Christianity. ForMendelssohn, Judaism’slack of dogma involved its rejecting the idea that affirming irrational revealeddoctrines commanded by God and confirmed by an authoritative religious bodywas aprecondition for salvation. According to Mendelssohn, Judaism taught that all human beingscould attain salvation by practising natural religion which could be known universallythrough reason or common sense. Mendelssohn also denied that Judaism was defined by an authoritative list of articles of faith which, if denied, made one aheretic. Mendelssohn’sown account of the three components of Judaism referred, for the most part,togeneral classes of principles and expressed his analytical understanding of Judaism rather than being anormative means of excludingheretics.Indefining Judaism as he did, Mendelssohn sought to show thatJudaism was more consistent with the enlightened principles of rationalityand tolerance than was Christianity and hence that Jews wereeligible for civil inclusion. His approach reflectedhis maskilic view that Judaism wasanenlightened religion of reason (Vernunftreligion).⁸⁸ In the nineteenth century, the debate over dogma in Judaism came to be shaped by intrareligious concerns; namely, the problem of Jewish communal unity.Several writers,includingthe members of the Reform-controlled Oberat in Karlsruhe, the Positive-Historical rabbiManuel Joël, and the Neo-Orthodoxrabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch all affirmedthat Judaism had dogma in the sense of aset of fixed doctrines and/or practices.This claim served as ajustification either for pan-Jewish communal unity or for Orthodox Jewishsectarianism. Joël’sview reflected the Positive-Historical commitment to Jewishcommunal unity,while Hirsch’sview reflected his Orthodox commitment to the authority of the timeless, unchanging, revealed laws of the Torah. Geiger’sapproach to the question of dogma in Judaism was the most radical. He rejected dogma not onlyinthe Christian sense,but also in the sense in which Joël and Hirsch had defined it; namely, the idea that specific doctrines wereconstitutive of Judaism. While not denying the centrality of doctrines in Judaism, Geiger sawthe basis of Jewish communal unity in what he called Judenheit,which was grounded in asubjective sense of belonging to areligious community rather than espousingcer- tain beliefs or engaging in specific practices.Geiger’semphasis on the centrality of intellectual freedom lead him to amuch weaker commitment to Jewishcommunal unity thanthat espoused either by the Reform-controlled Oberat in Karlsruheor

 Mendelssohnacknowledgedthat some Christians, such as Unitarians,adhered to areligion which, like Judaism, was rational, and he declared: “We must almost regardUnitarians as fellow believers.” ForMendelssohn, the differencebetween OrthodoxChristian teachingsand Unitarianism was much greater than the differencebetween Judaism and Unitarianism. See Mendelssohn, JubA, 7:102–6; Moses Mendelssohn: Writings,26–30. 240 Michah Gottlieb

by Joël. This nineteenth-centurydebate over whether or not Judaism has dogma is thus apivotal debate intimatelytied to the problem of Jewishcommunal unity. Afascinating sequeltothe nineteenth-century debate occurred in the first third of the twentieth centuryand involved manyofthe leadingGermanJewish scholars and rabbis of the time, includingLeo Baeck,Julius Guttmann,Max Wiener,and Alexander Altmann. Herethe question of dogma in Judaism again returned to being an interreligious one. Exploring this debate will have to await another occasion.⁸⁹

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 On this debate, see vonder Krone, “Jü dische Wissenschaft und modernes Judentum: eine Dog- mendebatte,” in Die “Wissenschaft des Judentums”:Eine Bestandsaufnahme,ed. Thomas Meyer and Andreas Kilcher (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,2015), 125–38. Does Judaism HaveDogma? 241

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Koltun-Fromm,Ken. Abraham GeigerʼsLiberal Judaism: Personal Meaning and Religious Authority. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press,2006. Krone, Kerstin vonder. “Jüdische Wissenschaft und modernes Judentum: eine Dogmendebatte.” In Die “Wissenschaft des Judentums”:Eine Bestandsaufnahme,edited by Thomas Meyer and AndreasKilcher,115–38. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2015. Liberles, Robert. Religious Conflict in Social Context: The ResurgenceofOrthodoxJudaismin Frankfurt Am Main, 1838–1877. Westport,CT: Greenwood Press,1985. Mendelssohn, Moses. GesammelteSchriften: Jubiläumsausgabe. EditedbyAlexander Altmann et al. 25 vols. Stuttgart and BadCannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1971–. Mendelssohn, Moses. Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism. Translated by Allan Arkush. EditedbyAlexander Altmann. Hanover,NH: UniversityPressofNew England, 1983. Mendelssohn, Moses. MosesMendelssohn: Writings on Judaism, Christianity,and the Bible. Translated by CurtisBowman, EliasSacks, and Allan Arkush. Edited by Michah Gottlieb. Hanover,NH: UniversityPressofNew England, 2011. Mendelssohn, Moses. MosesMendelssohn’sHebrew Writings. Translated by Edward Breuer. EditedbyEdward Breuer and David Sorkin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018. Mendes-Flohr,PaulR., and Jehuda Reinharz, eds. The Jew in the ModernWorld:ADocumentary History. 3rded. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Meyer,Michael. Response to Modernity: AHistory of the ReformMovementinJudaism. New York: Oxford University Press,1988. Meyer,Michael. “Universalism and Jewish Unity in the Thought of Abraham Geiger.” In The Role of Religion in Modern JewishHistory,edited by JacobKatz, 91–107.Cambridge, MA: Association forJewishStudies, 1975. Philipson, David. The ReformMovementinJudaism. New York: Macmillan, 1907. Plaut, W. Gunther. The Rise of ReformJudaism: ASourcebook of ItsEuropean Origins. New York: World Union forProgressive Judaism, 1963. Protokolle und Aktenstücke der Zweiten Rabbiner-Versammlung. Frankfurt, E. Ullmann,1845. Sacks, Elias. Moses Mendelssohn’sLiving Script: Philosophy, Practice, History,Judaism. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press,2017. Sarna, Nahum M. StudiesinBiblical Interpretation. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,2000. Schorsch, Ismar. From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism. Hanover,NH: UniversityPressofNew England, 1994. Schwarzschild, Steven. The Pursuit of the Ideal: JewishWritings of Steven Schwarzschild. Edited by Menachem Kellner.Albany,NY: State University of New York Press, 1990. Shapiro, MarcB.The LimitsofOrthodoxTheology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised. Oxford and Portland, OR: Littman LibraryofJewish Civilization, 2004. Silber,Michael. “Orthodoxy.” In The Yivo Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe,edited by Gershon Hundert, 2:1292–97.New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2008. Speight, R. Marston. “Creeds: An Overview.” In Encyclopedia of Religion,2nd ed., edited by Lindsay Jones, 3:2052–54. Detroit: Macmillan2004. Steinheim, Salomon. MosesMendelssohn und seine Schule. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1840. Williams, M.E. “Dogma.” In New Catholic Encyclopedia,2nd ed., edited by Thomas Carson, 1:810– 11. Detroit: Thomson/Gale, 2002. Anne Fiebig From ScepticismtoToleranceof“the Other”: The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz

Introduction

The European-born Israeli thinker Yeshayahu Leibowitz wasasprovocative as he was popularamong the Israeli public, and he influenced more thanone generation of society both in Israel and abroad. Born in Rigain1903,hestudied chemistry in Berlin, medicine in Cologne and Heidelberg, and later took his MD in Basel. After participatinginthe religious-Zionist Mizrachi movement in Germany, he latermigrat- ed to Palestine, wherehelived from 1934 until his death in Jerusalemin1994.Leibo- witz was widelyinterpreted as provocative yethighlytopical due to his harsh criticism of the Israeli government—particularlyafter the Six-DayWar (1967)—and his interpretation of the Jewishreligion, which was “ahighlyresilient form of Jewishre- ligiosity,capable of enduringthe most vigorous philosophicaland ethical criticism from the Enlightenmenttoour time.”¹ To this day, there is discussion as to whether Leibowitz can be defined as aphilosopher and whether he waspart of the tradition of serious Israeli philosophy, as his roots wereinnatural science. Perhaps this is one reason whyhis thought has regrettablynever gained much popularityoutside of Israel. YetLeibowitz is worth engagingwith. At the very least,hewas an important thinker in ageneration and time that was occupied with asking: “What would be the character of the new Jewish society?”² He is worth engagingwith because of his vast spectrum and originality of thoughtabout the Israeli state and the role of its religious Jewry,and because of his interesting personal development from ayoung ambitious religious-Zionistthinker into anear-existentialist.³ Finally, he is worth engagingwith because his interpretation of Jewish religion allows space for amodern form of Jew- ish religiosity within amostlysecular Jewish democratic state, as he himself said that his approach was not historical, but contemporary,for the “here and now.”⁴

This article wasintended as part of an ongoing dialoguewith Roi Benbassatonhowtointerpret scepticism in Leibowitz.

 Roi Benbassat, “YeshayahuLeibowitz: Jewish Existentialism,” Religious Studies 51,no. 2(2015): 141.  Ernst Akiva Simon, “AreWeIsraelis Still Jews?The Search for Judaism in the New Society,” in Ar- guments and Doctrines:AReader of JewishThinking in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,ed. Arthur A. Cohen (New York: Harper &Row,1970), 392. Leibowitz was lookingfor the roleofreligious Jewry and of faith in general within an autonomous Jewish statehood.  See Benbassat, “Jewish Existentialism.”  YeshayahuLeibowitz (1953), Judaism, Human Values,and the JewishState, ed. Eliezer Goldman, trans. Eliezer Goldman, YoramNavon, Zvi Jacobson, Gershon Levi and Raphael Levy (Cambridge,

OpenAccess. ©2020Anne Fiebig, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-013 244 Anne Fiebig

The highlytopical nature of Leibowitz’sthought can inspire ageneration of young religious Israelis who aspire to be both followers of the Halakhah and modern citizens of ademocratic state. In 2017,Roi Benbassat published an article that identified scepticism in the thoughtofthe religious thinker.⁵ The essentialquestion of this paper will be:IfLei- bowitzcan provide an example of Jewish faith and scepticism, does he alsoprovide an example of tolerance that stems from his sceptical approach?This question is based on the premise that scepticism is aroute to tolerance. Inquiries into the roots of toleration⁶ have shown thatanattitude that doubts or questions the possibility of knowledge opensthe possibility of tolerating, for example, differences in religion or culture.⁷ The topic raises particulardifficulties because Leibowitz, unlike other religious thinkers,never analysed the great phenomenonoftolerance himself. As in the analysis of scepticism, we have to look for implicit evidence in the literary heritageofthis great thinker. Iwill first give an introduction detailing Leibowitz’sdefinition of the Jewish religion and present his assumption of the co-existenceofdifferent value systems which is acrucial element of the analysis of tolerance in his thought.After this, Iwill present some arguments which have been made in the analysis of scepticism in Leibowitz’sthought. As scepticism has been widelydiscussed as aroute to tolerance,⁸ Iwill then look for tolerant approaches in Leibowitz’sphilosophy. Iwillthen show evidence of errors in Benbassat’sapproach to scepticism in Leibowitz’sthought and willfurther present anew methodological approach to analysinghis sceptical

MA and London: HarvardUniversity Press, 1995), 1. Iwill always writethe essay’sdate of publication, as thereisawide variety of dates and Leibowitz’searlythought differs from his later thought.  See Roi Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism—The Example of YeshayahuLeibowitz,” in Year- bookofthe Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies 2017,ed. Bill Rebiger(Berlin: De Gruyter,2017), 161–81.  Iamusingthe words “tolerance” and “toleration” as synonyms.  See Giuseppe Veltri, “The Limits of Scepticism and Tolerance,” Bollettino della società filosofica italiano 2(2017): 49.Referringto, for example, Jean Bodin, John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), and the Essais of Michel de Montaigne (1580–88), Veltri states: “[The] attitude to doubt (starting from the recognition of the human incapacity to discern the truth and based on the admission that humans can err in choosingthe right way) or questioning the possibilityofknowledge opens up the possibilityofrecognizingdifferences in religion, culture, and economy.” And further: “Despite differences amongthem, these texts contributedtothe development of the question of tolerance […]. At their base, they concernliberty of conscience, libertas philosophandi,and the possibility of erring from the correct way.”  See, for example, Sam Black, “Lockeand the Skeptical Argument for Toleration,” HistoryofPhilos- ophyQuarterly 24,no. 4(2007): 355–75;Bican Sahin, “ADefense of Toleration on the Basis of Scep- ticism: The Case of Michel de Montaigne,” Hacettepe University Journal of Economics and Administra- tiveSciences 23,no. 2(2005): 283–304. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 245

attitude. Finally, Iwill present further important questions regardingthe practice and principle of tolerance within Leibowitz’sthought.⁹

1Leibowitz’sDefinition of JewishReligion

One essential element which enables us to integrate scepticism and tolerance in Lei- bowitz’sthoughtwas his conception of Jewish faith.¹⁰ This was original when compared with previous Jewish thinkers and quite radical for an Orthodox thinker like Leibowitz. In contrast to the most popularpost-Haskalah Jewishthinkers, “Leibowitz did not attempt to reconcile Judaism within universal moral values, basically positing it instead as conflicting with all aspects of humanism.”¹¹ He launched aso-called “Leibowitzian” or “Copernican” revolution¹² in Jewishreligious thought that was constituted in an absolute removal of theological and metaphysical elements from

 Regarding the current state of research, allow me to makesome general remarks. In Israel, there arenumerous discussions about Leibowitz’sdefinition of faith and statehood, comparisons to other philosophers—such as,for example, Kant,Kierkegaard, or Levinas—and analysesofhis relationship to individualism, subjectivity,and even feminism.Outside the Israeli state,not much has been published about Leibowitz’sthought, and hardly anythinginGermany. From his literary legacy,onlyone large anthology of his essays has been translated intoEnglish (Leibowitz, Judaism, Human Values, and the JewishState). Also translatedwere an anthology of his commentaries on the weeklyTorah portion (Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Accepting the Yoke of Heaven: Commentaryonthe Weekly TorahPor- tion,trans. Shmuel Himelstein [Jerusalem: Urim Publications,2002])and his monographabout Mai- monides’sfaith (Yeshayahu Leibowitz, The Faith of Maimonides,trans. John Glucker [Tel-Aviv:MOD Books, 1989]). There areseveral translations of his works intoFrench and Spanish, but onlytwo translations into German fromhis entireliterary corpus.See Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Vorträgeüber die Sprü- che der Väter: Aufden Spurendes Maimonides,trans.Grete Leibowitz (Obertshausen: Context-Verlag, 1984); YeshayahuLeibowitz and Michael Shashar, Gespräche über Gott und die Welt,3rd edition (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1994). Idonot know of anyother German textabout this Israeli thinker, with the followingexceptions:one textaboutaxiology in Leibowitz’sthought(Ottfried Fraisse, “Ent-Geisterungder Rheologie. ZurAxiologie vonYeshayahuLeibowitz’ Denken,” In Alles Wirkliche Leben ist Begegnung.Festschrift zumvierzigjährigen Bestehen von Studium Israel e.V.,ed. Jo- hannes Ehmann,Joachim J. Krause, and Bernd Schröder [Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2018], 305–17), one lexical entry (MatthiasMorgenstern, “Jeschajahu Leibowitz,” in Metzler Lexikon jüdisch- er Philosophen: Philosophisches Denken des Judentums von der Antikebis zurGegenwart,ed. Andreas B. Kilcher,Ottfried Fraisse, and Yossef Schwartz [Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler,2003], 403–7), and acontri- bution to an anthology about religion and democracy(Ines Jaqueline Werkner et al., eds., Religionen und Demokratie. BeiträgezuGenese, GeltungundWirkung eines aktuellenpolitischen Spannungsfeldes [Wiesbaden: VS Verlag,2009]).  See Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 163.  Benbassat, “Jewish Existentialism,” 142.  See AviSagi, JewishReligion after Theology,trans. BatyaStein (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2009), 46;RonnyMiron, “Yeshayahu Leibowitz on the Possibility of Religious Subjectivity:Cri- tique and Defense,” in Watchtower Religionswissenschaft. Standortbestimmung im wissenschaftlichen Feld,ed. Anne Koch (Marburg: Diagonal-Verlag,2007), 95. 246 Anne Fiebig

Jewishreligion.¹³ Forprofessor of philosophyAvi Sagi, this revolution took place in two steps: “First,inthe denial of theology, and second,inthe denial of ‘religious facts.’”¹⁴ Jewishreligion, for Leibowitz, was reduced to nothing but the execution of the Halakhah: the service of God. This “revolution” alsocontains the Jewishreli- gion’sshift from ametaphysical and theological realm to astrictlynormative realm. That means that Jewishreligion was one value system among others, unjustified by anytruth claims. It was hence absolutelynon-cognitive.However,this radical standpoint was not always the key concept of Leibowitz’sthought. Like so manyphilosophers, Leibowitz underwent atransformation from an “early” to a “later” thought.Often ignored by people concernedwith his thinking, this development is acrucial point within the understanding of his system of thought, because it includes Leibowitz’sdefinition of faith, which is the foundation of readingscepticism and tolerance in his thought.Inhis earlier thinking, one finds a distinction between faith and belief, in which belief is acognitive determination of our minds, while faith is aconative determination.¹⁵ In 1953,Leibowitz was stillpre- senting religious praxisasasuperstructure rising abovethe “cognitive and emotional components,orthe spiritual and mental worlds of the Jewish religion,”¹⁶ arguing that the categories of religious cognitionand sensibility are interpretations of the system of the Torahand its mitzvot. In his later writings, Leibowitz makes no such distinction and argues stronglythat there are no cognitive or emotional elements in the Jewish religion at all: “ForJudaism, faith is nothing but its system of mitzvot, which wasthe embodiment of Judaism. […]Faith, in Judaism, is the religion of mitzvot,and apart from this religion Jewishfaith does not exist.”¹⁷ While in his earlier writings, Leibowitz still makes avaguedistinction between faith and mitzvot—at least philologically—in his later writings, there is no faith beside, above, or under the mitzvot. He accuses people “who contend that one can separate faith from religion” and who think that “adherencetoTorah and mitzvot is akind of superstructure built upon faith”¹⁸ of naiveté. This “radicalisation” in his definition of faith is proof of adevelopment in Leibowitz’sthought from the “earlyLeibowitz” to the more radical “laterLeibowitz.” This transformation is most distinct in Leibowitz’sview of the composition of aJewish state, but it can also be found in his use of terms from or interpretations of the fundamentsofJewish religion. Onlywithin this development can Yeshayahu Leibowitz’sthought be understood, as it radicallychanged between his earlyand his later expectations, while the resilient turn around happened sometime

 See AviSagi, “YeshayahuLeibowitz—ABreakthrough in Jewish Philosophy: Religion without Met- aphysics,” Religious Studies 33,no. 2(1997): 205f.; Eliezer Goldman, “Introduction,” in Leibowitz, Ju- daism,vii–xxxiv, xix.  Sagi, “YeshayahuLeibowitz—ABreakthrough,” 206.  See Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 161f.  Leibowitz (1953), Judaism,4f.  Leibowitz (1981), Judaism,38.  Leibowitz (1981), Judaism,44. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 247

in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁹ And it is onlywithin this clear definition that scepticism and tolerance can be detected in Leibowitz’sthought.Because of this transformation, his textsmustberead with sincereattention. Terms like “Halakhah,”“faith,” and “religion” and their meaningschangeoverthe course of time, as Hannah Kasher illustrated in 2000.²⁰ Forthis analysis,Iwill concentrate on Leibowitz’slater and more popularposition. One of the most important distinctions for Leibowitz was the distinction between the holyand the profane: “There is no holiness outside the sphere of divinity.”²¹ He stated that nothing is holyinitself,but thereisonlythat which is holytoGod, which is the practice of the Halakhah,because “God has nothing in his world beyond the four ells of Halakhah.”²² The abrogation of the distinctive category of holinessand the imputation of holinesstocertain things, persons, locations, institutions,events, military loyalty,orthe nation itself is, in Leibowitz’seyes, idolatrous: “By distinguishing the sacred from the profane the Halakhah functions as abulwark against

 See Moshe Hellinger, “AClearlyDemocratic Religious-Zionist Philosophy: The EarlyThought of YeshayahuLeibowitz,” Journal of JewishThought and Philosophy 16,no. 2(2008), 270: “As amatter of fact,the late Leibowitz is aradical liberal thinker, whereas the earlyLeibowitz is aradical democratic thinker.Inhis earlyteaching Leibowitz stresses collective principles,such as popular sover- eignty and the decision of the majority,and mobilizesthem for the purpose of not onlyshaping the political character of the desirableHebraic statebut also guidingthe specific community of the faithful observant.Incontrast,his later teachingemphasizes liberal, individualistic elements, such as freedomofthought and speech, human rights (of Israelis and Palestiniansalike), and so forth.”  Kasher shows that in his earlythought, Leibowitz used the word emunah to mean a “mental quality” and “the practical trainingthat maybringthe mind closer to emunah is the studyofTorah and observanceofthe practical commandments” (Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Torahand Commandments in Our Times [Hebrew] [Tel Aviv:Schocken, 1954],55; this article was first givenasalectureinaseminary, see Hannah Kasher, “On YeshayahuLeibowitz’sUse of Religious Terminology,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 10 [2000], 30f).Inhis later writings,Leibowitz consistentlyuses the term emunah to mean “practiceofthe Halakhah,” because—as he states—“faith [emunah]isidentical with its system of commandments, in which it was embodied” (YeshayahuLeibowitz, Faith, History, and Values [Hebrew] [Jerusalem:Academon, 1982], 11–12, in Kasher,34). Kasher described the later meaningofthe term emunah as anon-lexical “stipulative” meaning, which is probablycloser to its biblical meaningof“steadfastness” or “dependability.” See Kasher,59: “As we shall see, in his earlyworks, Leibowitz normallytreated such wordsasdati (religious), emunah (faith), Torah, ‘God,’‘fear and loveofGod’ as concepts which apriori ‘well-defined things,’ using these words in accordancewith their lexical definitions.Intime, he came to view them as mere terms and, having constructedhis special, personal words of values, endowed them with stipulative meaninginkeeping with that world.”  Leibowitz (1953), Judaism,24.  Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berakhot 8a: “OnceIheardwhatRabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: Sincethe daythe Temple was destroyed, the HolyOne, Blessed be He,has onlyone placeinHis world, onlythe four cubits of halakha alone, from which Iunderstood the significance of the four cubits of halakha,and Iprayonlywhere Istudy” (William Davidson Talmud). 248 Anne Fiebig

idolatry […]. Foridolatry is simply the representation of thingsprofane as sacred.”²³ As an idolatrous act,the prevalent imputation of holiness on unholycategoriesin the education of young people and the dissemination of public information laid the foundations for dangerous misbehaviour.²⁴ Beneath the fact thatfaith was absolutelynon-cognitive, for Leibowitz was the fact that God was absolutelytranscendent.Inthis transcendence, he was in agreement with Maimonides, whom he had frequentlydiscussed.²⁵ But how does the religious Jewapproach atranscendent God?Leibowitz faces this problem by making a distinction between faith li-šmah and faith loʾ li-šmah and atheory of distinct value systems. This distinction between two “grades” of religiosity did alreadyexist in rabbinic literature.²⁶ The first grade is the sanctification of God li-šmah (for its own sake), which meanshonouring God without expecting personal benefit,or, vice versa,punishment (in the case of non-tribute). The sanctification of God loʾ li- šmah (not for its ownsake) means honouringGod because one expects apersonal benefit.²⁷ Thisincludes spiritual needs such as “‘happiness,’‘perfection,’‘morality,’”²⁸ or material needs such as “‘life, children, nutriment,’ or the redemption of Is- rael.”²⁹ This assumption of faith li-šmah and faith loʾ li-šmah is imbeddedinLeibo- witz’sdefinition of the plurality of value systems. Hence, Judaism is one normative system of values which co-exists among aplurality of other value systems.This theory of parallelism is crucial, because it is onlywithin this system of plurality thatfaith li-šmah is possible. Onlyinaworld that provides different systems that satisfy

 Leibowitz (1953), Judaism,25. This also applies to mysticism, which he calls incompatible with halakhic Judaism; Leibowitz (1953), Judaism,24ff. See also Leibowitz (1981), Judaism,46.  One notable example was the reprisal attack on KibiyehonOctober 13,1953, where Israeli forces attacked Kibiyehinretaliation for the murder of aJewish mother and two of her children. In this kick- back, morethan fifty inhabitants of the village werekilled. Leibowitz strongly criticisedthis attack, callingitunjustified, not because acertain kind of traditional “Jewish morality” forbade Jews to re- taliate, but because retaliation was forbidden per se (see Leibowitz [1953–54], Judaism,189). ForLei- bowitz, this action, executed by youngIsraeli soldiers,was onlypossible through the imputation of holiness on profane categories such as the nation and its security,because for the sakeofthat which is holy, “man is capable of actingwithout anyrestraint,” see Leibowitz (1953–54), Judaism,190.  “ForMaimonides, God is ‘true Being’ by Himself and for Himself, and not for the sake of the world. […]Maimonides posits apure concept of atranscendental God whose link with the world is not naturalistic causation.” YeshayahuLeibowitz, “Maimonides: The Abrahamic Man,” Judaism 6, no. 2(1957):151f.  See, for example, Babylonian Talmud, tractate Taʿanit 7a: “It is taught in abaraita that Rabbi Bena’awould say: Anyone whoengages in Torahfor its own sake,his Torahstudywill be an elixir of life for him, as it is stated: ‘It is atreeoflife to them wholay hold upon it’ (Prov.3:18) […]. And anyone whoengages in Torahnot for its own sake,e.g., for self-aggrandizement,his Torahwill be an elixir of death for him, as it is stated: ‘My doctrine shall drop as the rain’ (William Davidson Talmud). See Goldman, “Introduction,” xviii.  See Goldman, xviii.  Leibowitz (1977), Judaism,63.  Leibowitz (1972), Judaism,55. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 249

human needs does the Jewish religion stayunaffected for itself,and onlywhen religion stays unaffected and it is not idolatrouslyused to satisfy human needs is the “pure” faith, faith li-šmah,for its own sake, possible. Let me introduce youtoLeibo- witz’sexample of the religious father which describes life within different value systems:

Throughout his life, he [the religious Jew] rises earlyinthe morningtoobservethe Mitzvah of prayerwith the congregation even when he feels no need to “pour out his complaint before God,” and perhaps has never felt this need in his life. […]Heprays,itmay be, contrary to his perception that there is no relation between his prayer and the events which befall him or occur in the history of Israel. If one dayheorone of his children falls ill, he consults the physician and resorts to the scienceofmedicineaswould anyatheist […]. To provide for his livelihood he makes use of all the means employed to this end by the atheist […]. The Jewwho regularly prays his dailyprayerdoes so in recognition of the obligationtopray, as an aspect of his obligation to serveGod.³⁰

In different realms of life, the religious practitionercan choose between different value systems and because he believes in the doctor’sknowledge in amoment of illness and despair,his faith stays unaffected (he does not,for example, do service to God or pray in the expectation of good health=loʾ li-šmah). Faith li-šmah and loʾ li-šmah exist side by side due to religious opportunism. Because not all humans can reach the faith li-šmah,onlythose who follow Halakhah can reach this level. As real faith is nothing but the practice of the Halakhah,Leibowitz assigns the human interpretation of the Torahand the tradition to the area of loʾ li-šmah. Also, the messianic vision of salvation is loʾ li-šmah and is merelyaconstruct to fulfil apsychological need. Leibowitz’sdefinition of faith as purelythe service of God, the distinction between faith li-šmah and faith loʾ li-šmah,and the assumption of co-existing value systems laid the foundations for introducing scepticism and tolerance into his thought. Within Leibowitz’sdefinition of value systems, his axiologywill playanimportant role later in this paper.

2Jewish Faith and Scepticism

Benbassat presented Leibowitz as arepresentative of areligious approach “that not onlyacceptsscepticism as an essential feature of religious development, but also regards alack of scepticism as corruptive for agenuinelyfaithful position.”³¹ The comparison to scepticism alreadycreates aproblem, as scepticism has been defined differentlyindifferent periods and from different groups of people: “If, on the one hand, scepticism makes aforceful case for our knowledge being limited, on the

 Leibowitz (1977), Judaism,64f.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 161. 250 Anne Fiebig

other,itrefuses every delimitation of ‘reality’ and implication of authority.”³² In his analysis,Benbassat considered scepticism to be the ancient form of epochē. In the ancient interpretation of Sextus Empiricus—to whom he refers—epochē is “the state of mind in which one neither deniesnor affirms anybelief or knowledge—as leading to the most perfect tranquillity of the mind”:³³ ataraxia. In the context of Ye- shayahu Leibowitz, Benbassat reinterprets epochē not as the traditionalmeans of achieving ataraxia,³⁴ but as ameans “of achieving purified,genuine religious faith,”³⁵ which he translates,inLeibowitz’scase, to the achievement of the highest form of Jewishfaith, faith for its own sake (li-šmah). Asceptical form of epochē hence leadstofaith li-šmah. The essentialelement which enables the integration of scepticism in Leibowitz’sthought, Benbassat claims, is his religious conception of the Jewish faith as apure conative determination.³⁶ Forthis analysis,Benbassat usesthe later definition of Jewishfaith in Leibo- witz’sthought.Inhis later thought,asdescribed above, Leibowitz does not draw anydistinctionbetween faith as a “superstructure rising abovethe mitzvot”³⁷ and the practice of the mitzvot itself. He states that faith is this very engagement, or, as Benbassat notes, “one’scommitment to live under the constraints of religious practice.”³⁸ This definition, Benbassat claims, does not even depend on priorac- knowledgement of God’sexistence,because religious practice is “prior to anycognitive and emotional aspect of Jewish religiosity.”³⁹ That means thatfaith in Judaism “does not rely on the cognitive determination (belief or knowledge)ofGod’sexistence.”⁴⁰ Benbassat concludes with the assumption “that areligious practitioner is allowed (in Judaism) to be sceptical with regard to God’sexistence.”⁴¹ He continues that “in Leibowitz’sview,itisthe Halakhah that posits God as its sourceand not vice versa.”⁴² In this interpretation, aJewish practitionerisallowed to avoid affirming or denying the existenceofGod and other assumptions with regard to God’snature and deeds. He is alsoallowed to avoid affirming or denying God’screation of the

 Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: EnquiryintoJewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Bos- ton: De Gruyter, 2018), 286f.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 161. He is referring to Sextus Empiricus, TheSkeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’sOutlines of Pyrrhonism,trans.Benson Mates(New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1996), 3.  See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism,3.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 161.  See Benbassat, 163.  Leibowitz (1953), Judaism,6.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 164.  Leibowitz (1953), Judaism,4,inBenbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 164.  Benbassat,165.  Benbassat.  Benbassat. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 251

world as written in the Bible.⁴³ For epochē—as the chosen sceptical approach—means “neither to affirm nor to denyit—as long as it is amatter of mere cognition.”⁴⁴ Be- cause this form of epochē is ameans “of achieving purified,genuine religious faith,”⁴⁵ this sceptical approach, Benbassat states,might not onlybevalid, but mayevenbenecessary for reachingfaith li-šmah.⁴⁶ Ultimately, even if aperson trusts the words written in the Bible, this belief would not have anyreligious significance within Jewish faith, because the only essential feature of the Jewish faith is the adherencetoits practice, which does not relyonany cognition at all. Thus, “faith remains indifferent to anycognitive data”⁴⁷ and therefore, the Jewishreligion tolerates several viewpoints.⁴⁸ The same attitude counts in regardtothe origin of the Scripture or “religious” events such as the Israelites’ reception of the lawfrom God on Mount Sinai or divine providence,because “the world and all it contains are insignificant before God.”⁴⁹ Within this interpretation, aman of faith can—and must—be sceptical. In his analysis,Benbassat stresses Leibowitz’sassumption of truth. The truth value of the proclamation of the laws is not affirmed as asheer fact,but as amatter of individual will: “That the law is rendered divinebyone’swillingness to accept it as such.”⁵⁰ And for Leibowitz, this feature generallyapplies to the realm of anymoral imperativesorduties:the validity is establishedonlybyone’ssubjective choice. “Truth” in the realm of values is amatter of personal intention. The truth of science is not avalue, and “[v]alues are not anchored in reality.They are what manaspires to imposeupon reality.”⁵¹ Benbassat states:

Aman of faith can be sceptical with regard to the assumption of the Halakhah as adivine command, consideredasamatter of cognition, but he can still affirm this assumption within the realm of values,inwhich assumptions do not determine whethersomethingisobjectively true, or whether somethingis“real,” but rather reflect one’ssubjective determination to impose his or her values upon reality.Inthe realm of values, the truth valueofour assumptionsdoes not refertothe state of affairs in reality,but to one’swill and intention.⁵²

As the Jewish faith is aconsequence of asubjective irrational value determination and is independent of anyknowledge or truth claim, scepticism can be seen as anat- ural companion of faith and thereforefights fundamentalism regarding the belief

 Also, he claims that we areinany case unable to understand the realmeaningofthe first section of the Bible. Therefore, as amatter of cognition, thereisnothingtoaffirm or to deny.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 165.  Benbassat,161.  See Benbassat, 165.  Benbassat,169.  See Benbassat.  Leibowitz (1988), Judaism,45.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 174.  Leibowitz (1976), Judaism,139;see Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 174.  Benbassat,175. 252 Anne Fiebig

in God’screation of the world or the perception of the Torahasadivine command. By acceptingfundamental truth claims as true, one renders religion aservice to oneself, and in Leibowitz’sdefinition, anyend besides the worship of God is idolatry. Therefore, scepticism towards general beliefs in Judaism “is not onlypossible, but also crucial for the maintenanceofagenuine religious position,”⁵³ which means a “pure” Jewishfaith for the sake of itself (li-šmah).

3FromScepticism to Tolerance

Just as “religious faith is generallyperceivedasbeing in contrast with sceptical approaches,” so it is the same with tolerance. The question is thereforehow to determine tolerance for someone who has absolute faith and for whom the possibility of being mistaken in this faith does not arise. Gabriel Marcel states that for someone who has absolute faith, it is insufficient “to determine the principle on which we can base atolerance which is reallyacounter-intolerance, but which is not,atthe same time, the expression or mark of acompleteskepticism, but rather the living incarnation of afaith.”⁵⁴ The root of tolerance in abeliever’sstance, he states,is“an expression of love’smediationofthe ‘blinded consciousness’ of unbelief and God’ssalvific end.”⁵⁵ Forabeliever,servingthe divine will means “to act as amediator between it and the other consciousness whom Iassume is blinded.”⁵⁶ With this definition, Ga- briel charts acourse into the understanding of tolerance as atheological virtue.⁵⁷ Alan Udoff introducesanother theological concept of tolerance as an active “waiting for the other”: “In this reception, the other is receivedas(potentially) en routetothe point that has alreadybeen attained by the one who receives.”⁵⁸ As fullnessand power lie in faith, the faithful are waiting for the enrouted, who belongstothe future, and therefore tolerance is placed into the realm of hope.⁵⁹ These maybetwo valid and plausible definitions of religious tolerance. However,aswealreadystated, the theological and metaphysical elements of the Jewish religion have been entirelyre- moved from Yeshayahu Leibowitz’sthought. Hence, for Leibowitz, theological concepts of tolerance willnot work and tolerance cannot be considered atheological virtue; therefore, it seems to be alogical consequencetoconsider that Leibowitz’s

 Benbassat,180.  Gabriel Marcel, “The Phenomenologyand DialecticofTolerance,” in CreativeFidelity,trans. Rob- ert Rosthal (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1970), 216.  Alan Udoff, “Tolerance,” in 20th CenturyJewishReligious Thought: Original EssaysonCritical Con- cepts,Movements, and Beliefs,ed. Arthur A. Cohen and Paul Mendes-Flohr (Philadelphia: First JPS edition, 2009;originallypublished as ContemporaryJewishReligious Thought: Original EssaysonCrit- ical Concepts,Movements, and Beliefs [New York: Scribner,1987]), 992.  Marcel, “Phenomenology and Dialectic of Tolerance,” 216.  See Udoff, “Tolerance,” 993.  Udoff, 993.  Udoff. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 253

concept of tolerance originated in the sceptical elements of his thought.This is espe- ciallyreasonable because some religious thinkers have alreadybeen discussed within the framework of scepticism and tolerance, such as, for example, Montaigne.⁶⁰ Now,introducing the term “tolerance” is another difficulty,astolerance—like scepticism—is not clearlydefined. Orienting myself using the distinction between “concept” and “conceptions of justice” by John Rawls,⁶¹ Idistinguish between the concept of tolerance in general and different conceptions in particular. The concept of tolerance therefore constitutes an umbrella term rising aboveavast spectrum of conceptions, which existed in different places and times and which can exist in the same place and time all at once. The scale of conceptions of toleration⁶² reaches from avery pragmatic or negative standpoint (bearing,suffering) at one end of the scale to an almost utopian or positive standpoint (welcomingand support) on the other.⁶³ While this paper givesnoroom for adeeper analysis of the specific conception (or conceptions) of tolerance in Leibowitz’sthought,Iwill examine general indications of tolerance. Researchers sometimes recognise the distinction between a

 See Alan Levine, “Skepticism, Self and Toleration in Montaigne’sPolitical Thought,” in Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration,ed. Alan Levine (Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 1999), 51–76.  See John Rawls, ATheoryofJustice (Cambridge,MA: BelknapPress, 1971).  Some people differentiate between “tolerance” as theory and “toleration” as the distinct act of tolerance, but Isee no benefit in this.  This paper has no room to explain all the historical definitions of the term and the meaningof tolerance, and there is no history or “encyclopaedia of tolerance” to which Ican refer,but Iwill give avery short insight intoits current trends in this footnote. The spectrum of the modern definitions of tolerance stretches fromsheer “bearing” (see John Horton, “Whythe Traditional Conception of Toleration Still Matters,” Critical Review of International Social and PoliticalPhilosophy 14,no. 3 [2011]: 289–305), througha“respect concept” of tolerance (see Rainer Forst,ed. Toleranz:Philosophi- sche Grundlagenund gesellschaftlichePraxis einer umstrittenen Tugend [Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2000]; Rainer Forst, Toleranz im Konflikt: Geschichte, Gehalt und Gegenwart eines umstrittenen Begriffs [Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag,2003]; Matthias Kaufmann, “Einleitung,” in Integration oder Toleranz? Minderheiten als philosophisches Problem,ed. Matthias Kaufmann [Freiburgand Mu- nich: Karl Alber,2001]: 11–30), to the point of “recognition” (see Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition [Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002];David Heyd, “What Toleration Is Not,” paper presentedatthe “Tolerance and IntoleranceasChallenge in Past and Present” conference,Uni- versität Hamburg, March 27,2019,https://lecture2go.uni-hamburg.de/l2go/-/get/v/24408) and even “welcoming and support” (see MonikaKirloskar-Steinbach, Toleranziminterkulturellen Kontext [Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2005]; Susan Mendus, “The ChangingFace of Toleration,” Reset DOC,June 26,2014, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/the-changing-face-of-toleration/). As an all-en- compassingconcept,toleranceisanobject of concern in very different fields of research including sociology,politics,theology,philosophy, philology,and religious or migration studies and therefore the definitions differ radically. Cary J. Nederman points out that “the myth of liberal ‘uniqueness’” should be broken and complains about the “historical and geographical rigidity of the main stream of toleration scholarship.” Forthis reason,hegives some “alternative theoretical approaches to the rights-laden, modern, Western discourse of liberalism”:Cary J. Nederman, “Toleration in aNew Key: Historical and Global Perspectives,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14, no. 3(2011): 351. 254 Anne Fiebig

“public” or “political” and an “individual” agencyoftolerance, although they often ignore it.Although Leibowitz givesenough material to support an examination of the degree of public or political tolerance in his descriptions of amodern democratic Jewishstate,inthis analysis,Iwill look at the individual degree of tolerance of “the other” within the context of aliberal democratic state. BeforeIbegin, Istate that tolerance is not avalue determination itself, but astrategy of agency,and the degree of tolerance is dependent on other value determinations,such as,for example, faith, ethics, or anyother value determination aperson is willing to follow.⁶⁴ As mentioned before, there exists along tradition of connectingbetween scepticism and tolerance, defining tolerance as the “child of doubt.”⁶⁵ However,the history of this connection willnot be the topic of this paper.⁶⁶

The Creative Halakhah

As Leibowitz himself never examined the issue of tolerance himself (unlike, for example,Montaigne), we have to lookfor “implicit” indications of tolerance in his thought. In my earlier research, Idiscovered some interesting features of Leibowitz’s philosophythat leave room for atolerant attitude. One of these indications is his stance concerning the flexibility of the Halakhah. In his opinion—and against an or- thodoxpoint of view—the Halakhah has to be “creative” in order to adjust to contemporary society.⁶⁷ Because the “‘Torahstate’ is not areality—neither in the historical past,nor in the present or in anyforeseeable future,”⁶⁸ the principles of the Hala- khah required restatement.But Leibowitz was sceptical about whether the religious elite was capable of prescribingwaysoflife for the new politically independent community.Hecriticised them for being narrow-minded and stronglycalled on them to seek new rules for Jewish religion. He denied the ideas of the Reform movement and called on the halakhic community to invent new answers to upcomingquestions when the religious elites failed to do so. The reason for this “creative” halakhic approach might come from Leibowitz’sunbroken desire for the Jewishreligion to sur- vive in the modern world. One example of the “creative Halakhah” is his attitude regarding the rights of women:

 See, for example,Hamid Reza Yousefi, “Tolerance und Individuum,” in ToleranzimWeltkontext: Geschichten—Erscheinungsforme—Neue Entwicklungen,ed. Hamid Reza Yousefi and Harald Seubert (Wiesbaden: Springer,2013), 221; Nederman, “Toleration in aNew Key.”  Susan Mendus, “Introduction,” in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives,ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6.  Forthe evident connection between scepticism and tolerance, see, for example, Levine, ed., Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration.  See Goldman, “Introduction,” xxiv.  YeshayahuLeibowitz, “People, Religion and the State” [Hebrew],154,inHellinger, “AClearly Democratic Religious-Zionist Philosophy,” 278. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 255

Nowadays even our religious society is part of aworld in which all political and public issues are shared by men and women. Thus it is “the wayofwomen” to participateinpublic affairs.Jewish religious society will not be abletosurvive if, for pseudo-religious reasons, we continue to de- prive women of their duerights.This is the point at which we—those of us resolvedtopractice Torah—cannot perpetuatethe halakhic decisions of our fathers datingfromasocial reality which differed radicallyfromour own.⁶⁹

Leibowitz also follows this sceptical stance concerning the studyofthe Torahand the Talmud. He states that the Jewish religious community cannot refuse to allow women to studyTorah and Talmud,although women’sstudies are of no religious significance:

The perpetuation of this attitude within Judaism and the Jewish religion is intolerable in the Jew- ish world of today. The religious Jewish public to whom these remarks areaddressed belongs to asociety whose culture is common to both men and women. Such is our mode of Jewish exis- tenceaswell. Therefore, barringwomen todayfromTalmud Torahsegregates Judaism fromthe spiritual reality shared by Jews of both sexes. […]What is reallyimportant is that Talmud Torah should be available to the entirereligious community,the duty and privilegeofboth men and women.⁷⁰

To summarise, Leibowitz is sceptical concerning the fathers’ halakhic decisions, which date from asocial reality that is radicallydifferent from his own, and calls for amore tolerant up-to-dateapproach and the restatement of the Halakhah. Leibo- witz’stolerant approach concerning homosexuality wasalsowell-known. He declared that “homosexuals weremembers of the Jewish community like all other Jews, and should strive to follow the commandments, even if there weresome that they could not abideby.”⁷¹

Co-existenceofValid Value Systems

Rejecting the roots of asceptical approach, AviSagi nevertheless found evidence for aso-called pluralism in Leibowitz’sthought.Heraises the question of whether the Jewishreligion can develop tolerance for non-religious Jews without sacrificing fun-

 Leibowitz (1980), Judaism,130f.  Leibowitz (1980), Judaism,129–30;see also Leibowitz and Michael Shashar, Gespräche über Gott und die Welt,3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag,1994), 163f.Itisnecessary to note Tamar Ross’scriticism of the distinctions and limits that Leibowitz makesinthis argumentation:see Tamar Ross, “The Status of Woman in Judaism:Several ReflectionsonLeibowitz’sConception of the Mechanism by Which Halakha Adjusts to Reality” [Hebrew],inYeshayahu Leibowitz: His World and Philosophy,ed. AviSager (Jerusalem: Keter, 1995), 148–62.  Yaakov Ariel, “Gay, Orthodox, and Trembling:The Rise of Jewish OrthodoxGay Consciousness, 1970s – 2000s,” Journal of Homosexuality 52,no. 3/4(2006/7): 96–97. 256 Anne Fiebig

damental traditions.⁷² In Sagi’sinterpretation, tolerance is not aproduct of relativism or scepticism, since man can onlytolerate what he rejects.⁷³ Instead, he recognises two other reasons for tolerance: a utilitarian reason and a value-based reason. Ac- cording to Sagi, Leibowitz offers the answer of tolerance through his separation between anormative religious value system and co-existent non-religious value systems,asmentioned before. Leibowitz’sacceptance of apluralistic Israeli society containing religious practitioners and non-religious Jews hence arises from two assumptions. First,heassumesthat cultures are always subject to dynamic processes. Thus, Jewish society is always developing and acultureisnot onlydefined by its religious members. Secondly, Leibowitz develops aform of tolerance that is not based on excludingothers as “alien,” but rather exclusivelytransfers the “foreignness” to the religious realm, while all other realms are shared:

Our commitment to our values is not measured by the extent of our rejection of the other’s worlds but by the willingness to endorse these values consistentlyinour life and by our unwav- eringcommitment to them. Loyalty to our values is related to our disposition toward them and not necessarilytotheir cognitive superiority.⁷⁴

Sagi can take this stance because Leibowitz formulates aco-existence of parallel value systems thathavenogeneral hierarchyand are onlyordered through individual preference. The choice of one value system is not the negation of another,for the other value system mayindeed be void for the selecting subject, but important for another individual who, because of another tradition or cultural identity,would opt for it in this very situation. This approach is underpinned through Leibowitz’saxiology. Leibowitz conveys anon-cognitiveapproach to the adoption of values. He claims that values cannot be rationallyanchored; they are instead the resultofsub- jective irrational decisions.⁷⁵ Because the choice of one value system is absolutely non-cognitive,all value systems have to be held as valid. Yonatan Brafman calls this parallelism of value systems the “relativistic ‘polytheism’ of competingvalues.”⁷⁶ Through this theory of genuine value conflictand the subjectivity of axiological decisions, Leibowitz leavesroom for tolerance. Let us look at an example whereLeibo- witz adapts the theory of genuine value conflict.Inaninterview with the Journal of Palestine Studies in 1989,hestated: “We have the fact of two peoples, each of them believingintheir heart thatthis country is theirs. Therefore, it’seither partition or

 See Sagi, JewishReligion after Theology,4.  See Sagi,8.  Sagi, 63.  See Yonatan Brafman, “YeshayahuLeibowitz’sAxiology. A ‘Polytheism of Values’ and the ‘Most Valuable Value,’” Journal of Religious Ethics 43,no. 1(2015): 146–68.  Brafman, 165. However,Brafman reveals aparadoxinLeibowitz’saxiology:while affirmingarel- ativistic polytheism of competingvalues, Leibowitz nonetheless implies that the religious value is the “most valuable value.” From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 257

war to the finish.”⁷⁷ This stance comes from the assumption that values cannot be rationallyadjudicated and this leads to atolerance of others’ value decisions. Fur- ther: “The existenceofthe ‘other’ cannot be denied”⁷⁸ and when “Palestine consider themselvestobeapeople, […]thatisthe decisive point.”⁷⁹ This tendency shows more tolerance for “the other” embodied in the Muslim society of Israeland Pales- tine than is found in most Jewish Orthodoxthinkers.⁸⁰ AviSagi recognises Leibowitz as not onlyatolerant thinker,but perhaps even a pluralistic one.⁸¹ In contrast to Sagi’sdistinction between scepticism and tolerance, there are clear correlations between the sceptical approach and the “value-based reason” that AviSagi wantstoseparate from scepticism. Nonetheless, it is important to stress here that his assumption of aplurality of value systems allows for tolerance among different value orientations, but does not allow for pluralism within value orientations. Though Leibowitz strongly suggests changes within the halakhic system, he does however condemn non-Orthodox halakhic changeasinauthentic.⁸² As the religious elites failed to answer the questions of statehood, it was the halakhic community’stasktoprovide these answers. Leibowitz wasagainst the changes of Reform Judaism, which “regards the Halakhah as ahusk hiding the essential coreofreli- gion.”⁸³ Though Leibowitz is an axiological pluralist,anindividual can onlyhave one absolutevalue. Concerningmydefinitions of negative and positive conceptions of tolerance, Iplace Leibowitz within the tradition of tolerance as apositive and even supportive conception. The negative or pragmatic conceptions of tolerance stem from the premise that one can onlytolerate what one rejects and thattoleration is “an onlygrudg- ing acceptance of […]difference,” which means an “acceptance of it onlyasaprac- tical expedient.”⁸⁴ This pragmatic conception of tolerance was often associated with the politicallyinstituted toleration duringthe French religious wars of the sixteenth century.⁸⁵ Leibowitz, in contrast, even supported “the difference” in different religious and social paths. Because of his sceptical approach, Leibowitz was open “to

 YeshayahuLeibowitz and John P. Egan, “Yeshayahu Leibowitz: LiberatingIsrael fromthe Occu- pied Territories,” Journal of Palestine Studies 15,no. 2(1986): 105.  Leibowitz and Egan,107.  Leibowitz and Egan,105.  This tendencytowards toleranceshould be further examined because it seems to me that this tol- erancestemsfromamorepragmatic conception of toleratingothers in order not to be punished for these events later.See Goldman, “Introduction,” xxxf.  See Sagi, JewishReligion After Theology,52f.  Ithank Yonathan Brafman for this remark.  Goldman, “Introduction,” xvii.  Alan Levine, “Introduction: The Prehistory of Toleration and Varieties of Skepticism,” in Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration,6.  See Levine. 258 Anne Fiebig

the possibility that the thing in question, whether it be an idea or practice, mayrep- resent some truth or good.”⁸⁶ With this stance, he actually defends aliberal attitude.

4Another Approach to Scepticism in Leibowitz’s Thought

In this analysis so far,wehaveassertedthat scholars have alreadyidentified Lei- bowitzasasceptical thinker.Wealso assertedthat scepticism is aroutetotolerance and that this approach is suitable for finding arguments in support of tolerance in Leibowitz’sthought. Afterwards, we looked at examples of tolerance of “the other” in Leibowitz’sthought.However,wehavenot revealedwhich sceptical approach leads to which conception of tolerance, as “toleration cannot be founded on pure scepticism, [and] all the paths which flow from scepticism do not necessarilylead to toleration.”⁸⁷ In his monograph Alienated Wisdom,Giuseppe Veltri states: “There are two possible political consequences of asceptical attitude: either it aims to avoid every constriction of society and to adopt acompletely ataraxic attitude, or it accepts every possible and plausible solution without precluding anything.”⁸⁸ Clearly, Veltri is here referring to the distinction between the different schools of scepticism made by Sextus Empiricus in book 1ofOutlines of Pyrrhon- ism.⁸⁹ Veltri further states: “Iwould call the first radical Pyrrhonism which does not support anykind of social life; the second is the basisoftolerance as the limit of behaviour in amultifariousculturalsociety.”⁹⁰ With this assumption in mind, Iwant to revoke Benbassat’sconclusion that Leibowitz was aPyrrhonian sceptic. Iwant to show that the claim of Pyrrhonian scepticism, compared to the ancient attitude of epochē and the “suspension of judgement,” should be replacedbythe more plausible attitude that Leibowitz was someone who “acceptsevery possibleand plausible solution without precluding anything.”⁹¹ Idonot think thatLeibowitz’sob- jective wasa“state of mind in which one neither deniesnor affirms anybelief or knowledge,” aiming at faith li-šmah. Ithink thatLeibowitz indeed supported people believing or not believing in thingsand individual truth and that he did not advocate “suspension of judgement.” As Benbassat states: “Whether one believes in the cos- mological meaning of the opening passageofthe Bible or prefers scientific theories

 Levine, 7. Levine associated apositive sceptical approach with “openness” and contrasts “openness” to “toleration in astrict sense.” Idefine an open approach as the positive conceptionoftoler- ation/tolerance.  Levine, 2.  Veltri, Alienated Wisdom,287;see also Veltri, “The Limits of Scepticism and Tolerance,” 41.  See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, especiallychapters 1–12 and 29–34.  Veltri, “The Limits of Scepticism and Tolerance,” 41.  Veltri, 41. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 259

in this respect,the Jewish religion, in principle, tolerates both viewpoints.”⁹² And further: “This tolerant characteristic with regard to cognitiveassumptions is rendered possiblebyacknowledging that the onlyessentialfeature of the Jewishreligion is the adherencetoits practice, which, as stated, does not relyonany cognition.”⁹³ Faith, in Leibowitz’sthought, is hence not dependent on the “suspension of judgement,” but fullyindependent of anyindividual judgement,evenindividual or collective truth claims, for the Jewishfaith is nothing but the practice of the Halakhah and has no cognitive meaningatall. One may “conduct [oneself] in accord with the plausible [and] employ it in everydaylife” and one does not have to “live without belief, following the laws, customs,and […]natural pathé.”⁹⁴ Hence, neither scepticism nor one’sjudgmentsand beliefs “jeopardise faith,”⁹⁵ as faith is isolated from anycogni- tion. Leibowitz is not aPyrrhonist.Hedoes indeednote the multiplicity of views on the subject underconsideration, as the Pyrrhonists do, and he likewise seeks to keep an open mind. But unlike the Pyrrhonists, who do not know whether they can know anything or not and ultimatelysuspend judgement,Leibowitz had true concerns and beliefs about human problems such as the responsibility of religious Jewry,the duty of education, or the ideal politics of an Israeli state.InLeibowitz’s thought, we,the people, know: “But the little we know,weknow.”⁹⁶ Andevenin the realm of Jewish faith, which is independent of every cognition and meaning in the world, the religious practitioner at least knows thatGod is “the giverofthe Torah.”⁹⁷ As ascientistand aphilosopher,Leibowitz himself had true beliefs outside Jewish faith and could not ignoreorsuspend prevailing problems such as what the character of the new Jewish society would be. Leibowitz even supported individuals having their own beliefs and values in different realms of life and accepting “every possible plausible solution without precluding anything.” Forthis assertion, Iwill repeat the example of the religious father:

If one dayheorone of his children falls ill, he consults the physician and resorts to the science of medicine as would anyatheist […]. To provide for his livelihood he makesuse of all the means employed to this end by the atheist […]. The Jewwho regularlyprays his dailyprayerdoes so in recognition of the obligation to pray,asanaspect of his obligation to serveGod.⁹⁸

To provide for his livelihood and thatofhis children, the religious practitioneruses all the means that the atheist employs to this end. He believes in the doctor’sabil- ities, and because life giveshim the choice between several value systems, he

 Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 169.  Benbassat,169.  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism,33.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 180.  Leibowitz, Judaism (1976), 137.  See Leibowitz, Judaism (1953),5.This is aknown paradoxinLeibowitz’sphilosophy.  Leibowitz, Judaism (1977), 64f. 260 Anne Fiebig

does not fall into idolatry by sanctifying the religious realm. Within this very division between the religious realm and all other realms of life, onlythe “purified,genuine religious faith,”⁹⁹ aiming at faith li-šmah,ispossible. Leibowitz hence believed in scientific knowledge and individual truth claims, but for him, religion regards this knowledge with indifference.¹⁰⁰ Forthe sake of God as an absolutevalue, “anything in the world might be re- nounced, for anything else is onlyrelatively,conditionallyvaluable”¹⁰¹—for which Abraham and the ʿAqedah serveasthe best example. This attitude does not negate evaluability (nihilism), but strengthens an individualistic perspective of truth. Be- sides the “instrumental truth,” the truth of science, which is “adatum within science,”¹⁰² “truth” in the realmofvalues—as stated before—is amatter of personal intention. Avalue determination is hence an individual decision. “Aperson’sunderstanding and feelingderivefrom his own subjectivity,which differs from anyone else’s,”¹⁰³ and this counts for “the set of beliefs and the religious experience”¹⁰⁴ as much as for “consciousness,sensibility,and valuation [as] radicallyprivate.”¹⁰⁵ Lei- bowitzhence does not claim, as the Pyrrhonists do, that we do not know that we know,but rather that every person holds his “truth” for himself. Leibowitz does not negatetruth, nor does he ascribe truth to faith. As Goldman states,for Leibowitz, it is “absurd to regard revelation as asurrogateorsupplement for natural knowledge.”¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

By shifting the Jewishreligion from ametaphysical theological realm to astrictly normative realm, defining the Jewish faith as aclosed normative realmco-existing with other closed normative realms,and his definition of individual truth, Leibowitz laid the foundation of aplausible form of scepticism and tolerance. The keyconcept is the premise that there is no universal hierarchybetween value systems, but that

 Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 161.  See Judaism (1976), 141. Here, Leibowitz is referring to Maimonides’swritings,particularlythe Guide of the Perplexed and the Codex Maimoni.  Benbassat, “Jewish Faith and Scepticism,” 170.  Leibowitz, Judaism (1976), 139.  Leibowitz, Judaism (1953), 9.  Leibowitz, Judaism (1953), 10;see also Goldman, “Introduction,” xv.  Leibowitz, Judaism (1953), 9.  Goldman, “Introduction,” xiv. Religious thinkers have often been discussed as sceptic fideists. Fideists believethat the onlytruth available to us can be revealed by foregoing rational inquiry and relyingsolelyonfaith. Leibowitz is no fideist either.See Levine, “Scepticism, Self and Toleration,” 54; RichardAmesbury “Fideism,” in TheStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), ed. Ed- wardN.Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/fideism/. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 261

the human prioritisation of the value system is time-, place-, and need-bound.¹⁰⁷ As the value determinations cannot be rationallyadjudicated, all of them are valid. The choice of avalue system in one particularsituation does not negatethe other value systems, but allows them to exist in parallel, for “truth” in the realm of values is a matter of personal intention. There is aconstant and genuine conflict of values, which the individual faces in every new decision in his life. Leibowitz’spluralistic definitionisunderstandable, for he found himself in the difficult situation of filling his own value system with inherent value and of giving legitimacy to this value system within amodernsociety and politics.¹⁰⁸ Thereby,henot onlyfollowed his aim of strengthening Jewish faith within amodern Israeli state, but he alsoleft room for a positive and supportive form of tolerance as aform of “acceptingthe other.” This paper has shown that scepticism maybefound in Leibowitz’sthoughtand that this sceptical attitude can be considered as aroutethat leadstotolerance. But while Benbassat concentrated on the so-called Pyrrhonian tradition of scepticism (epochē and “suspension of judgement”), Iassume that,rather,the clearlysceptical methodologyofYeshayahu Leibowitz’sthoughtrequiresfurther analysis.Weshould examine the object of “methodical doubt at the beginning of every philosophical debate and treatise concerning all aspects of human life or,alternatively,anepistemo- logical attitude which doubts the possibility of knowledge.”¹⁰⁹ In the analysis of tolerance in Leibowitz’sthought,there are further questions to be dealt with. Where there has been adevelopment from the “earlier Leibowitz” to the “later Leibowitz,” there might also be adevelopment within his sceptical and tolerant attitude. At the very least,the “targetaudience” of scepticism and tolerance could have shifted from one group to another.Inthe history of tolerance, its blind spots have alreadybeen emphasised by Christian Laursen in his paper “Blind Spots in the Toleration Litera- ture,” in which he posits John Milton, Benedict Spinoza, Denis Veiras,John Locke, and Pierre Bayle as examples of the limitations of tolerant thinking.¹¹⁰ Tolerance, in his interpretation, always goes hand in hand with intolerance. Clearly, one will find blind spots (for example, Christianity externally, Reform Judaism internally) in Leibowitz’sthinking too, which should further be examined. Ultimately, Yeshayahu Leibowitz was popular for his harsh criticism of the Israeli government.Regarding the room for tolerance and individual truth in his thought,one mayexamine the political consequences that Leibowitz suggested for the state of Israel and investigate his ideas of an ideal Israeli state. In “The Limits of Scepticism and Tolerance,” GiuseppeVeltri refers to aBBC broadcast givenbyBertrand Russell in which he defines scepticism as apowerful means of combatingfanaticism, stating that the alternative to fanaticism is arational

 See Sagi, JewishReligion after Theology,49f.  See Sagi,46.  Veltri, Alienated Wisdom,287.  John Christian Laursen, “Blind Spots in the Toleration Literature,” CriticalReview of Internation- al Social and Political Philosophy 14,no. 3(2011): 307–22. 262 Anne Fiebig

scepticism that is open to scientific discovery: “Fanatics are unwilling to accept scientific discoveries made by their enemies, and therefore soon fall behind those whose outlook is more cosmopolitan.”¹¹¹ Scepticism is thereforeconsidered as a strategywhich leads to aform of success. In this methodology, Leibowitz’sdefinition of faith leadstoasceptical attitude thatcan be seen as astrategyfor developing a tolerant attitude towards “the other.” The statement that “fanatics are unwillingto accept scientific discoveries […]and therefore soon fall behind” could alsohave been madebyYeshayahu Leibowitz, whose aim was to examine anew role of religious Jewry in the modern Israeli state in order to avoid “falling behind.” He defines this new role as aflexibility, which—for example—shows itself in the modification of a “creative” Halakhah to strengthenJewishfaith in amodernsecular society.¹¹²

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 Bertrand Arthur William Russell, “WhyFanaticism BringsDefeat,” TheListener 40 (September 23,1948): 452–53,inVeltri, “The Limits of Scepticism and Tolerance,” 39.This textisatranscript from aBBC broadcast.  Iwould liketothank the anonymous reviewers as well as Yonatan Brafman and Yoav Meyravfor their helpful suggestions in refining this essay. From Scepticism to Toleranceof“the Other”:The Example of Yeshayahu Leibowitz 263

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In 1616,abook about an expedition to China was published by the Walloon Jesuit Nicolas Trigault (Trigau(l)tius in Latin), whose Chinese name was JinNígé, 金尼閣.¹ This book was areport of the Chinese “expedition,” to use his own title, made by the famous Jesuit Matteo Ricci.² Ricci’s “expedition” is relatively important because 1) it testifies to the Muslim and Christian presenceinChina in the earlymodern period and that of the Jews in Kaifeng in the provinceofHenan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and 2) it givesusaportrait of three “European” or occi- dental religions (which are referred to as “sects”)and their development in the eyes of an intellectual Christian who was amissionary traveller.Ifthe reports could qualify as more or less historicallyplausible, they could help us to understand religious commonalities between social groups in their past and present and their consciousness of belongingtoareligion. YetRicci and Trigault pursued different goals, revealed by their different styles and strategies,which are the object of the present paper. The interpretative categories usedhere will be narratively illustrated later in the context in which they are adopted. Yetitshould first be noted that sceptical strategies are dialectical tools,mostlytacitlyimplied,which aim to demolish or at least weaken an argumentation, abelief, or the claimed verity of afact.Ancient scep-

 Iwould liketothank my friend and colleague Michael Friedrich, professor of Sinology at Univer- sität Hamburg, for inviting me to the HamburgShanghai Forum (Universität Hamburgand Fudan University) from April 10 to 13,2019.His invitation and his accurateand fruitful advice werethe initial motivation for my interest in the story of the Jesuit mission in China in the earlymodern period. My reading of the text is exclusively devoted to its literary strategyand is concerned with little, if any, historical research on the circumstances of the origins and propagation of both writings.Ihave not addressed the problem of their plausibility,nor will Ideal with Chinese primary sourcestocon- trast or confirm the observations and claims of both Jesuits. My approach is from the perhaps narrow- er angle of the history of ideas and strategies.Ireferthe readertothe vast literatureonthe topic. For the history of the Jesuits,see now the recent volume by Markus Friedrich, Die Jesuiten. Aufstieg,Nie- dergang,Neubeginn (Munich: Piper,2016) and the literaturementioned there.  Nicholas Trigault, De Christianaexpeditione apud Sinas suscepta ab Societate Jesu. Ex P. Matthaei Riccij eiusdem societatis commentarijs,libri V: Ad S.D.N.Paulum V. In quibus sinensis regni mores, leges, atque instituta, &novae illius Ecclesiae difficillima primordia accurate &summa fide describuntur (Leiden, 1616). See further details below.

OpenAccess. ©2020Giuseppe Veltri, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-014 266 Giuseppe Veltri

tics did not aim to reconstruct the theory,idea, arguments, or philosophythey were defeating.Inthe following analysis,Iwillintroduce the concept of strategic scepticism as atactic for disavowingauthorities, facts, ideas, or groups with the intention of suggesting alternative authorities and interpretations as premises for new dogma- tisms. As is well known, the philosophical term “sceptic” philologicallymeans “researcher,” without the methodological implication of the double aspect of the Scho- lastic parsdestruens as apremise of the parsconstruens.³ In the present case, Isuggest understanding strategic scepticism in the sense of the current strategic procedure usedinspreading “fake news”;namely,insinuating doubts and uncertainty, but supportingother concurrent systems of power.⁴ In what follows, Iwillpresent and discuss the report on the threereligious groups in the eleventh paragraph of the first chapter of Trigault’sbook and the cor- respondingparts of Ricci’soriginal Italian, mostlyscattered throughout his diary. Iwill also raise questions about the internal logic, additions, points of contrast, and possibleplausibilityofboththe original Italian version and Trigault’sLatin translation.

Ricci’sText and Trigault’sTranslation

To begin with, Imustanswer the implicit question of whyweshould consider a translation together with the original, or Vorlage. The answer is simple: the Latin translation of the book was highlyinfluential, as the history of its printingsand translations testifies: it was printedfour times (in 1615,1616, 1617,and 1619); there werethree French versions (publishedin1616, 1617,and 1618); it was published in German (1617), Spanish (1621), and Italian (1621); excerpts from it appeared in Eng- lish in Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes, contayning aHistoryofthe WorldinSea Voyages andLande Travells,byEnglishmen and others (4 vols., 1625);⁵ and finally,acompleteEnglish version was publishedin1953. In contrast,the first Italian edition of Matteo Ricci’swork was published in Macerata, Ricci’sbirthplace, as late as 1911.⁶ The world of scholarship had to wait three more decades for his com-

 See Giuseppe Veltri, Alienated Wisdom: EnquiryintoJewishPhilosophy and Scepticism (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 146–56.  See below.  Full title: Hakluytus Posthumus in fiue bookes.The first, contayning the voyages and peregrinations made by ancient kings,patriarkes,apostles,philosophers,and others, to and thorow the remoter parts of the knowne world: enquiries also of languages and religions,especially of the moderne diuersified professions of Christianitie. The second, adescription of all the circum-nauigations of the globe. The third, nauigations and voyages of English-men, alongstthe coasts of Africa […]The fourth, Englishvoy- ages beyond the East Indies,tothe ilands of Iapan, China, Cauchinchina, the Philippinæ with others […] Thefifth, nauigations,voyages,traffiques,discoueries,ofthe Englishnation in the easterne parts of the world […]The first part Hakluytus posthumus or Purchas his pilgrims (London, 1625).  Operestoriche del padre Matteo Ricci S.I,ed. PietroTacchi (Macerata: F. Giorgetti, 1911–13). Jesuit Strategic Scepticism towardReligious Self-Consciousnessand Commonalities 267

plete works: in 1942, the first volume of FontiRicciane,edited by Pasquale d’Elia, appeared, and the second and third volumes were published in 1949.⁷ In the very first lines of the book, Trigault writes:⁸

Ricci’scommentaries wereintended for Europe, and for fear that the record of the labor of so great aman might be lost amid the perils of such along journey,and the dangers of overland travelonpack animals,itwas decided to translate them into Portuguese,and to retain acopyof what he had written in Italian.⁹

Despite Trigault’sstatement about the danger of the text being lost,the reason for publishing the Latin translation before the Italian edition is not clear.Wemust re- memberthat the Christian Portuguese presenceinChina (primarilyinMacau)played amajor role in this period, and we should also remember that Ricci, together with Michele Ruggieri, composed the first Dicionário Português–Chinês (Pu-Han cidian) in 1594,¹⁰ although it remained unpublished until 2001. From the point of view of market economy, we can guess thatone important reason was that the translation into Portuguesehad the potential to conquer the market.However,Ido not think so. To explain his translation, Trigault made recourse to his personal commitment to his mission in China; he claimed that he himself was the sole authority regarding the transferofknowledge between China and the occident.Heopenlywrites:

The status of the Christian Mission to China at that time demanded that aProcuratorbesent to Europe to promote the mission interests,and beingselected for this office, my first thought was to read the manuscript of father Matthew Ricci’scommentaries and translatethem into Latin. My reasons for thinkingsowere, first,because Irealized that this task could not be done by anyone who was not wellacquainted with the affairs of the Mission,orwith the various parts of the country that are mentioned,and secondly, as we have alreadysaid, because it was necessary to fill in various parts that were left unfinished,also to add certain items and to amplify others,which our good father,inhis modesty,had either omitted entirely, or onlytouched upon in passing. And so, although the sea voyage was long,the weather clear,and the sea calm, the work of transla-

 FontiRicciane: documenti originali concernenti Matteo Ricci elastoria delle prime relazioni tral’Eur- opa elaCina (1579–1615),ed. Pasquale M. d’Elia, 3vols (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1942–49). There areofcourse new translations of the original into modern languages as wellasinto Chinese, which Iwill not take into consideration for obvious reasons.  Here,Iam usingthe English translation offeredinMatthew Ricci, Chinainthe Sixteenth Century:The Journals of MatthewRicci,1583–1610,trans. LouisJ.Gallagher (New York:RandomHouse,1953),downloaded from http://www.questia.com/read/11620863/china-in-the-sixteenth-century-the-journals-of- matthew.  Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century,xiii. All emphases aremine.  Michele Ruggieri and MatteoRicci, Dicionário Português–Chinês: 葡漢辭典 (Pu-Han cidian): Por- tuguese–Chinese Dictionary,ed. John W. Witek (Lisbon and San Francisco: Biblioteca Nacional Portu- gal, InstitutoPortuguês do Orienteand RicciInstitutefor Chinese–Western Cultural History,Univer- sity of San Francisco, 2001). It is beyond my intent and capacity to answerthe question of whether Ricciwas aco-author of this dictionary or onlyits front man. 268 Giuseppe Veltri

tion was no small undertaking, and Irealized that Ihad endeavored to accomplish something that demanded moreleisureand morequiet than was customary among acrewofnoisy sailors.¹¹

We willreturn to Trigault’s “real” intention at the end of this essay. An intention that is, in my opinion, secondary—or perhaps entirelyabsent—is to acquaint his audience with the richness and multifariousness of the Chinese world. One should also exclude the possibilitythat Trigault intended to offer an “ethnography” of Chinese customs and beliefs, similar to modern researchers’ claims concerning Christian reports about the Jews in the seventeenth century.¹² Yet, ethnographywas not aseventeenth- century science;the central aspect of collectingcustoms and beliefs was not aconcern with expressionsofhuman diversity as represented by ethnic divisionsand culturaland social cults and beliefs,but almost always apolemicand apologetic literature. The report about Chinese philosophyand customs shows some interesting parallels in theirpolemical and apologetic aspectstothe Christian European interest in the so-called ceremonialia of the Jews and Turks. We will analyse them in the conclusion. Here, it is enough to note thatitmust have been evidenttothe reader that the intention of this report is exclusively concentratedinthe phrases “to promotethe mission interests” and “fill in various parts [ofRicci’sworks]that wereleft unfinished.”¹³ It is clear that Trigault wanted to establish apermanent Jesuit mission to dis- seminate Christian RomanCatholic tradition in China, givenhis claim thatheispre- senting an accurate report on the mission. Trigault goes beyond Ricci’saccount: he claims thathis own additions are also basedonevidence from eyewitnesses:

As for myself, Ican assureyou that what Ihaveadded, Ihaveseen with my own eyes, or have obtained it fromthe true report of other fathers,who either witnessed it themselves, or approved of it for the annals of the Mission. Ihavenot onlyvisited China but have traversed six of its principal provinces, seen all the Mission Centers and, as Ibelieve, garneredathorough knowledge of the affairs of the Mission in general. We thoughtitbest to inform youofall this, even at length, lest youbeled into doubt by the contrary opinions appearinginthe various writings thus far editedconcerning the Kingdom of China.¹⁴

The historical accuracy of the report—namely, how precise it is in its historical details or,onthe contrary,how in some ways it was ingeniously fabricated as though by an inventive storyteller—remains unclear.Itisnot my task to answer this question, but rather to present some thoughts and considerations that occurred to me following my reading of both versions, leaving to otherscholars, who are assuredly much more acquainted with Chinese history in the earlymodern period, the heavy

 Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century,xiii.  See, e.g.,YaacovDeutsch, Judaism in Christian Eyes: Ethnographic Descriptions of Jews and Juda- ism in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2012) and my criticism in Veltri, Alien- ated Wisdom,69–89.  Both texts arequoted from Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century.  Ricci, xiv. Jesuit Strategic Scepticism towardReligious Self-Consciousnessand Commonalities 269

task of looking into bothbooksand the possiblesources and materials usedbyeach author.

The ReportonChinese Religion, Muslims, Jews, and Christians

At the end of the first chapter,Trigault reports on Ricci’smeetings with Muslims, Jews, and Christians in China (“11.Signs of the Doctrines of the Saracens,the Jews, and of Christianityamong the Chinese”). In the FontiRicciane,the corresponding text is very short.Ricci begins with aprefaceonthe religions which he called sects “which are around the religion,” meaning the ancient Chinese religion. His admiration cannot be underestimated, as he compares the ancientChinese religion and philosophywith those of the Greco-Roman world by emphasising the superiority of the Chinese. He believes the ancient Chinese concept of divinity to be superior because it is not blemished by sexual obscenities like the Greco-Roman Olympus. Chi- nese adepts, on the contrary, followed reason. As he was of the school of atypical Scholastic interpretation of religious consciousness,Ricci expressed his hope that the ancient Chinese believers had reached salvation through natural law. Peter Duig- man asserts that “the Jesuits […]had amore flexible system of moralphilosophyand abroader concept of natural lawthandid otherCatholic missionaries.”¹⁵ Iamsome- what perplexed by this general statement—aJesuit commitment of sorts to relativism àlaMontaigne—when confronted with the evident goal of Ricci’snote about ancient philosophyand religion. He states that the antiqueChinese (and onlythey) could reach this natural salvation through their good works, “the loveoftheirhomeland, of the public good, and the benefit of the people.”¹⁶ Ricci has high esteem for ancient Chinese philosophy, which in his opinion cannot be considered to be inferior to European philosophy(senza niente cedere ai più famosi dei nostri philosophi antichi). Nevertheless, the conclusion of the paragraph is clear: the corrupt nature of human beings without divine grace can onlyproduce idolatry and atheism. The door to true Christianityishence open. That is not relativism, but asceptical strategy for indirectlyattacking Greek philosophybycreating an opponent,i.e., Chinese philosophy, thatdemolishesthe uniqueness of Greek reason on behalf of aphilosophythat is even better due to its superior morality.The pars construens is of course Christianity, the onlyreligion in which faith, morals, and reason are perfectlysuited to the goal of salvation.

 Peter Duigman, “EarlyJesuit Missionaries: ASuggestion for Further Study,” American Anthropol- ogist 60 (1958): 729.  “Le buone opere che fecero quei primi Cinesi per amoredella patria, del bene pubblicoetutilità del popolo” (Nr. 170). 270 Giuseppe Veltri

As for Trigault,heintriguingly refers to salvation accordingtothe Scholastic doctrine of conscientia:

One can confidentlyhope that in the mercyofGod, manyofthe ancient Chinese found salvation in the natural law, assisted as they must have been by that special help which, as the theologians teach, is denied to no one whodoes whathecan toward salvation, according to the light of his conscience. That they endeavored to do this is readilydetermined from their history of morethan four thousand years, which reallyisarecord of good deeds done on behalf of their country and for the common good.¹⁷

This self-consciousness is an important element of Thomas Aquinas’stheologyof other religions, which statesthat aperson can be savedbythefactofbelonging to the true religion, amotif which goes back to the Islamic philosopher Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammadibn Muḥammadal-Ghazālī (1058–1111). There is no space to go into this concept in more detail here, which at first glance attempts to be asolution to the problem of the diversity of monotheisms and revealed religions. Isaid “at first glance,” because the hiddenreason for introducing it is not relativism, but the strategic wayofintroducing the Christian truth: the non-Christian can onlyreach salvation via natural lawand “according to the light of his conscience.” How can the conscience be illuminated if not by the light of the Gospel?¹⁸ Trigault emphaticallymentions the ancient Chinese religion and philosophy, although his tone is less enthusiastic than Ricci’s. In this context,hereports on the three Chinese “sects.” Listing the Chinese cults,i.e.the practical observances, he reduces them to “the Literati, the Sciequia,and the Laucu,”¹⁹ whose common element is the Chinese script used by the Japanese, Koreans,and Formosans who belong to these three sects. Here, for the first time, he speaks of the “traces of Saracen, Judaic, and Christian worship evident in China.”²⁰ At first glance, it is not evidentwhy Ricci and Trigault list these three religions in anon-chronological order.

 Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century,93.  On the principle of conscientia,see Giuseppe Veltri, “The Principle of Coscientia: The Averroist Joshua ha-Lorqi” (in preparation).  That is, the Confucians,Buddhists (from Shijia), and Daoists (from Laozi). Iamgrateful to Mi- chael Friedrich for this information.  Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, 94: “In this chapter, we shall treat onlyofthe triple cult of the Chinese as distinguished from all other pagan sects.[…]Chinesebooks enumerate onlythreecults or systems of religious observance for the whole world and this people knows of no others. These are, the Literati, the Sciequia, and the Laucu. All Chinese and all people of the surroundingnations who makeuse of Chinese writing – the Japanese, the Koreans,the Leuquici or Formosans, and the Cochin Chinese – belongtoone or other of these threesects.” Jesuit Strategic Scepticism towardReligious Self-Consciousnessand Commonalities 271

Muslims

The mention of the ancient Chinese religion is also the context in which Ricci introduces the three groups or sects present in China. TheMuslims are presented as making adecisive contribution to the decadence initiated by the Chinese, comingfrom Persia and pouring into China in increasingnumbers throughout the generations, leading to the formation of manythousands of families (esimoltiplicarono tanto per generatione ne’ suo figlioli enipoti, che già hanno impita la Cina con molte migliaia di famiglie).²¹ Ricci adds thatthey are not missionaries and are obedient to Chinese law. They are ignorant and thereforeirrelevant for the Chinese authorities, who allowed them to study and become graduates and magistrates of the Empire, and accordingly,they abandoned their religion, with exception of eating pork,towhich they werenot accustomed (non gli restando altriodiessa che il non mangiare care di porco per non essere avezzi ad essa).²² The corresponding paragraph in Trigault is also devoted to Muslims. Forthe most part,hetranslates Ricci’smain ideas with some more particularnarrative elements on the introduction of Islam into China:their character as outsiders on the one side, and their full integration into society on the other.²³ The reader understands that integration is tantamount to conversion, although the commonality between converted and non-converted Muslims is the custom of avoiding the consumption of pork.Are they outsiders or insiders?This is aparadoxIcannot understand.

Jews

Ricci states that very few Jewish families have remained in China and that they are onlypresent in Henan (Kaifeng) and the provinceofHanceufu.²⁴ Thesefamilies possess aparchment scroll, which they consider very precious,bearing the Pentateuch of Moses written in Hebrew letters without vocalization. They still practise the rite of circumcision and do not eat pork or meat with nerves, accordingtotheir old tradition.

 Nr.171.  Nr.171.  It is not my intention heretogiveahistorical analysis of what Ricci and Trigault wrote, but onlyto follow their argumentation.  On the history of Chinese Jews,see Hyman Kublin, Studies of the Chinese Jews: Selected Articles from Journals East and West (New York: Paragon, 1971), with contributions from Laurence Kramer, Donald Leslie, and Adolf Neubauer,amongothers;Anson H. Laytner and Jordan Paper,eds., TheChi- nese Jews of Kaifeng:AMillennium of Adaptation and Endurance (Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 2017). 272 Giuseppe Veltri

Trigault’sreportsubstantiallydiffers from Ricci’sinthe context of the three religions or sects: here, he introducesnarrativesofthe Jews’ first introduction into China by retelling Ricci’smeeting with aJew of Kaifeng:

Some few years after our Societyhad taken afixed residence in Pekin, aman whowas Jewish by race and by profession, learningofthe reputation of Father Ricci, decided to payhim avisit.He had read about Ricci and his companions in abook about the Europeans,written by aChinese scholar.The man’sname was Ngai and he was born in Chaifamfu,the metropolitan city of the ProvinceofHonan. At that time he was on his waytoPekin to take the examinations for the doctorate. He had alreadyattained to the order of the licentiate.BeingaJewand havingread in the book mentioned that our Fathers werenot Saracensand that they believed in onlyone God of heavenand earth, he concluded that we must be believers in, and followers of, the Mo- saic Law. On enteringour home he seemed to be quiteexcited over the fact,asheexpressed it, that he professed the same faith that we did. His whole external appearance, nose, eyes, and all his facial lineaments,wereanythingbut Chinese. Father Ricci took him into the church and showed him apictureabovethe highaltar,apaintingofthe Blessed Virgin and the child Jesus, with John the Precursor,prayingonhis knees beforethem. BeingaJewand believing that we were of the same religious belief, he thoughtthe picture represented Rebecca and her two children, Jacob and Esau, and so made ahumble curtsy before it.Hecould not refrain, as he remarked, fromdoinghonor to the parents of his race,though it was not his custom to venerate images. This happened on the Feast of St.John The Baptist.²⁵

It is not important to ascertain whether or not this story is true. The goal is clear: to underline the Jew’signorance. An important part of the story is that the JewNgai cannot read Hebrew:²⁶

When he broughtthe visitor back to the house and began to question him as to his identity,it graduallydawned upon him that he was talkingwith abeliever in the ancient Jewish law. The man admitted that he was an Israelite, but he knew of no such word as Jew. It would seem from this that the dispersionofthe tentribes penetratedtothe extreme confines of the East.Later on Ngai sawaroyal edition of the Bible, printedbyPlantin, and though he recognized the Hebrew characters he could not read the book.²⁷

It is obviouslypossible thatthe JewofKaifeng did not understand Hebrew,but not certain. In 1895,Adolf Neubauer published an article on the Jews of China²⁸ which predominantlyfocused on Hebrew documents broughtfrom China. These manu- scripts are,inhis opinion, very importantbecause of their Persian influence. Neuba- uer was also of the opinion that Kaifeng’sJews had not mastered Hebrew.His argument relies upon anineteenth-century report and also, of course, upon Ricci’sreport. Iamnot entirelyconvinced, because Ricci had onlymet one Jew; namely,Ngai, who

 Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century,107–8.  On Ricciand Trigault’slack of accuracy,see Paul Pelliot, “Le juifNgai, informateur du P. Mathieu Ricci,” T’oung Pao 20,no. 1(1920–1921): 32–39.  Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, 107–8.  Adolf Neubauer, “Jews in China,” JewishQuarterly Review 8(1895): 123–39. Jesuit Strategic Scepticism towardReligious Self-Consciousnessand Commonalities 273

does not reallyseem acquainted with the religion of his fathers. Moreover,why would they conserveHebrew textsifnobodycould read them? Another cliché is the typicalChristian topic of the Messiah:

Riccithen sent the same brother on asecondvisit,this time to the ruler of the synagogue, with a letter, informinghim that he had all the books of the Old Testament at his house in Pekin, together with acopyofthe New Testament,containingthe life and works of the Messiah, whohe asserted had alreadyappeared. The Archisynagogustookexception to this last remark and replied that the Messiah would not comefor another tenthousand years.

Ithink thatthe synagogue speaker committed an error in speakingoften thousand years before the comingofthe Messiah. Perhaps this is an error on Ricci and Tri- gault’spart,because accordingtoJewish belief, the ageofthe world amountsto 6,000 years. This is similar to the fantastic story that Ricci was conferred the dignity of high priest (which cannot be attained!):

He added, however,that sincethey had heardsomuch of Ricci’sreputation and learning, they would confer upon him the dignity of highpriest of the Synagogue, if he would join their faith and abstain from eatingpork.

The whole story ended—of course,Iwould say—with the Jews’ conversion to Chris- tianity:

Three other Jews came from that same city to Pekin later on, and as they weredetained here for several days on business and were readytoreceive the Christian faith, they decided to be bap- tized. One of these was anephew of our first visitor,onthe father’sside. Our Fathers received them with hospitality and taught them agreat deal about the Scriptures that was unknownto their Rabbis. When they learned that the Messiah had reallycome,they kneltdown and prayed beforehis statue, as Christians do, and they were delighted with acompendium volume of the Christian faith, and with the other books on Christian doctrine, written in Chinese, which they broughtback to their people.²⁹

The referencetothe Jewishscholars is aclear topos of Christian apologetics: the Jews do not know the most important parts of the Scriptures because they are hermeneuti- callyand exegeticallyinthe Christians’ possession. Ricci’sstrategyistoillustrate the “ignorance” of afew Jews in order to imply that of the Chinese Jews in general. ThisLatin argumentationofab uno disce omnes (Virgil, Aeneid 2:65–66)—which means that the whole maybeinferred from one instance—is asophism based on the pseudo-logical and pseudo-scientific infer- ence accordingtowhich an attribute of asingle object/substance maybeascribed to the whole. Idonot have to explain how this well-known “principle” could be dangerous to human society.

 Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, 108–9. 274 Giuseppe Veltri

Christians

ForRicci, Christianity alsodoes not merit along presentation, although there were manyChristians families in the Northernprovinces,³⁰ who flourishedinterms of number,education, and military strength (efiorivano tanto in numero di famiglie, let- tere et armi). Yetitisfor this very reason that accordingtoRicci, they weresuspected of rebellion, “perhaps accusedbythe Muslims who are in every part our enemies.” This provoked mass conversions to Islam (whose converts are here called Turks), Ju- daism, or even atheism (whose converts are here called Gentiles), and their churches become temples for idolatry.Ricci states that their heirs have preserved the tradition of making the sign of the cross over food and drink, but they are also afraid of being considered their descendants and are ignorant of what this cross means. In contrast, the corresponding passageinTrigault is much longer,but he does not offer anynovel information, speculating more on the word “cross” and its meaning for the Chinese.³¹

Names of the “Sects”

Near the end of the report,animportant element is recorded by both Ricci and Tri- gault: the namesofthe “sects” accordingtoChinese custom. Ricci wrote:

All these foreigners [i.e., Muslims,Jews,and Christian]are called hoeihoei [回回]bythe Chinese, aname whose origin we cannot ascertain.³² They call the Muslims [“macomettani”] hoeihoei of the three laws,they call the Jews hoeihoeiwho cut the nerves of the meat which they eat,the Chris-

 See HuiLi, “Jesuit Missionaries and the Transmission of Christianity and European Knowledge in China,” EmoryEndeavors in WorldHistory 4(2012): 48–63, downloaded from http://history.emory. edu/home/undergraduate/endeavors-journal/volume-4.html.  “Now to offer some evidenceofthe traces of Christianity,which we do very willingly,believingit should be of special interest to our friends in Europe. […]Therewas no special word in their language to express the idea, and so our Fathers had to give them aChinese word for it.Indoingsothey chose the Chinese character expressingthe number ten, which is written in the form of across,thus †.It probablywas not without the guidanceofdivine providencethat aChristian in our day, selecting aname for the cross for the Chinese, should hit upon the very word that their ancestors had invented because of asimilar paucity of symbolic expressions.Ineach instancethe word selected was Scie-cu, meaning, the tenth.Insodoingthey reallywerenot far afield fromthe practice observed in sacred literature, in which the cross is expressed by the letter T, which is even amoreexact form than the one in question. When the conversation came around to designatingthe cross by this particular sym- bol, our friend the Israeliteremembered that in Chaifamfu, the capital of his district,and in Lincin, a trading post in the ProvinceofSciantum, therewere certain strangers whose ancestorscame from abroad and whoobserved the religious customofvenerating across. They were accustomed, he said, to make agesture with the hand in the form of across over their food and drink. He had no realization of the significanceofsuch arite and assured us that neither had the people in question whowere accustomedtouse it.”  See Victor Escroignard, “LesSarrasins des trois normes ou San Jiiao huihui,” Acta Orientalia Aca- demiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45 (1991): 253–70. Jesuit Strategic Scepticism towardReligious Self-Consciousnessand Commonalities 275

tians arecalled hoeihoei of the number ten because the letteroften in China is aperfect cross and herethereisnoname that either uses for the word “cross.”³³ Beyond the name isai, which means iesuini,the Muslims [“maomettani”]call those Christians terzai. IheardfromanArmeni- an that in Persia they call Armenians by this name. It maybethat the Christians originallycame from Armenia.

Trigault’s “translation” is accordinglyacorrection and an addition of further details:

The three sects first discussed, called barbarian sects by the Chinese, areall designated by one common term, and their followers areall known as Hoei-hoei. What the origin of that name may be is still apuzzle to us.The morelearned Chinese generallydistinguish them as follows: The Saracens arecalled Hoeibecause they abstain from pork. The Jews areHoei also because they do not eat the portion of meat containingthe thigh nerve. This customwas introduced by the Jews because Jacobwas stricken in that nerve. Those whovenerate the cross are called Hoei because they do not eat of the flesh of animals with rounded hoofs. Although the Chineseand the Saracens and the Jews all partakeofthe flesh of horses, asses,and mules,this last class probablyrefrain from such meats in accordance with acustom peculiar to their race.The Chinese have other names also for this thirdclass. In general, they use the word Hoei with reference to those whofollow the cultofthe cross, while both Chinese and Jews say Hoei,referring to the Saracens. By this they mean that the Sar- acens belongtoall three sects sincethey have adopted somethingoftheir belief from gentiles, Jews,and Christians. Besides the ordinary term Isai or Jesuini which the Saracensapplytoall Christians,hereinChina the followers of the ancient cult of the cross areknown to them as Ter- zai. The origin of this term is also uncertain, except that we have learned from acertain Arme- nian that in Persia the Armenians call the Christians by that same name. It might be concluded from this,with some probability,that the devotees of the cross had their origin in Armenia, and at various times found their wayinto China from the West.This could have happened when the vast armies of the Tartars poured over China, about the time, as it would seem, when the Vene- tian Marco Polo found his wayhither.³⁴

My surprise in reading this rendition of Trigault is his completerewording of the text,which resolvessome problems and complicates others. There are no “barbarian sects” (tres Barbarorum sectas, ut Sinae appellant)inRicci,and the Muslims are called “Mohammedans” and not “Saracens.”“Saracen” was amedieval term which had been used since the twelfth century,while “Mohammedan” was more recent,aproduct of the sixteenthcentury.³⁵ Ricci defines the Muslims accordingtothe three laws, which, as can be seen from another text (Nr.725), were reportedbyaJew called Nghaettien in 1605: “law” means “religion” and refers to Judaism, Nestorian Christianity, and atheism, i.e., Buddhism. Trigault defines Muslims by theirfood customs:they do not eat pork.

 FontiRicciane,Nr. 174.  Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, 112  See David Thomas and John A. Chesworth, eds., Christian–Muslim Relations.ABibliographical History. Volume 11: South and East Asia, Africa and the Americas (1600–1700) (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 434. 276 Giuseppe Veltri

Ricci defines the Jews as those who “cut the nerves of the meat which they eat.” This is obviouslyerroneous, because the Jewish kashrut did not and does not address or include every nerve, but,accordingtothe biblical book of Genesis, pertains onlyto the sciatic nerve: “Thereforethe Children of Israel are not to eat the sciatic nerve to this day, because he struck Jacob’s leg on the sciatic nerve” (32:33). Perhaps Ricci’s aim was to find adifference between Muslims and Jews in the eyes of the Chinese because neither of them eat pork. The complication is much more intriguing because those who venerate the cross, i.e., the Christians, are alsodefined by Trigault in referencetofood customs: “Those who venerate the cross are called Hoei because they do not eat of the flesh of animals with rounded hoofs.” This is ablatant error, because the Jews did not eat animals with rounded hoofs “accordingtotheircustoms,” which are prohibited as food in Jewishlaw (Leviticus 11), and they decisively do not venerate the cross. The names of the sects testify onlythat the commonalities between the sects are based on food customs,aswellasthe differences. In otherwords: nobodyknows what the difference is.

Conclusion: ConsciousnessofCommonalities

In 1940,the Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu³⁶ publishedasomewhat trenchant article by Edmond Lamalle attackingNicolas Trigault.The author clearlydefines Tri- gault’swork as “propaganda” for his agency in favour of the mission in China.As Isuggested at the beginning of this paper,Trigault did indeed produce his reworked translation of Ricci’swork as pure propaganda for his missionary project.The book is not areport to narrate what Matteo Ricci did, but areworked propagandic account intended to obtain money for the mission. Ricci’snotes and experiences, hence, were instrumentalised to this goal. Idonot intend to go beyond my task as ahistorian of ideas, but it is strangetodescribe the presenceofMuslims, Jews, and “other” Chris- tians basedonlyontheir differences in food customs. Icannot understand whyRicci and Trigault devoted so few lines to the Muslims, amajority among the minorities, while Trigault mainlyfocused on presentingthe Jews in an unequivocallynegative light.There is an obviousnegative vein in Ricci’s original Italian work on the Muslims, which he defended with an indirect historical referencetothe Turkish attacks on Christians, hencethe sentence “the Muslims are in every part our enemies.”³⁷ YetRicci offered avery shortreportonall of them and did not negatively privilegethe Jews in the context of the three “sects.”

 Edmond Lamalle, “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault en faveur des missions de Chine (1618),” Archivium Historicum Societatis Iesu 9(1940): 49–120.  Nr.171. Jesuit Strategic Scepticism towardReligious Self-Consciousnessand Commonalities 277

It is importanttounderlinethat the use of strategic scepticism is always intended to demolish facts and logical discourse in order to establish new dogmatism and imperial power.Ricci’sreal aim is, of course, to keep his account about his meetings with religious groups in China, if any, very brief, because they are not the coreofthe book and are not representative of the Chinese Weltanschauung in this period. Tri- gault’sreal aim is to discredit all three religions or sects, the remnants of which—par- ticularlyinthe case of the Jews—are incapable of understanding their own religion and writings.This givesabasis for asking European supporters to give money for a further aJesuit mission to China.The Jesuit missionary show must go on.

Bibliography d’Elia, Pasquale M., ed. Fonti Ricciane: documenti originali concernenti Matteo Ricciela storia delle prime relazioni tral’Europa elaCina (1579–1615). 3vols. Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1942–1949. Deutsch, Yaacov. JudaisminChristian Eyes: Ethnographic Descriptions of Jews and Judaismin Early Modern Europe. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 2012. Duigman, Peter. “Early Jesuit Missionaries: ASuggestion forFurther Study.” American Anthropologist 60 (1958): 725–32. Escroignard, Victor. “Les Sarrasins des trois normesouSan Jiao Huihui.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45 (1991): 253–70. Friedrich, Markus. Die Jesuiten. Aufstieg, Niedergang, Neubeginn. Munich: Piper,2016. Kublin, Hyman, ed. Studies of the Chinese Jews: Selected Articles fromJournals Eastand West. New York: Paragon,1971. Lamalle, Edmond. “La propagande du P. Nicolas Trigault en faveurdes missions de Chine (1616).” Archivium Historicum Societatis Iesu 9(1940): 49–120. Laytner,Anson H., and Jordan Paper,eds. The Chinese Jews of Kaifeng: AMillennium of Adaptation and Endurance. Lanham,MD: Lexington Books, 2017. Li, Hui. “Jesuit Missionaries and the Transmission of Christianity and European Knowledge in China.” Emory Endeavors in World History 4(2012): 48–63. Neubauer,Adolf. “Jews in China.” Jewish Quarterly Review 8(1895): 123–39. Pelliot, Paul. “Le juif Ngai, informateur du P. Mathieu Ricci.” T’oung Pao 20, no. 1(1920–1921): 32–39. Purchas, Samuel. Hakluytus Posthumus in fiue books […] London, 1625. Ricci, Matteo [Matthew]. China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of MatthewRicci, 1583–1610. Translated by Louis J. Gallagher.New York: Random House, 1953. Ricci, Matteo. Operestoriche del padre Matteo Ricci. EditedbyPietro Tacchi. 2vols. Macerata: F. Giorgetti, 1911–13. Ruggieri, Michele, and Matteo Ricci. Dicionário Português–Chinês: 葡漢辭典 (Pu-Han cidian): Portuguese–Chinese Dictionary. Edited by John W. Witek. Lisbonand San Francisco: Biblioteca Nacional Portugal, Instituto Português do Orienteand Ricci Institutefor Chinese– Western Cultural History,UniversityofSan Francisco, 2001. Thomas,David, and John A. Chesworth, eds. Christian–Muslim Relations. ABibliographical History.Volume 11: South and EastAsia, Africa and the Americas (1600–1700). Leiden: Brill, 2016. Trigault, Nicholas. De Christiana expeditione apud Sinas suscepta ab Societate Jesu. Ex P. MatthaeiRiccij eiusdem societatis commentarijs, libri V: Ad S.D.N. Paulum V. In quibus 278 Giuseppe Veltri

sinensis regni mores, leges, atque instituta, &novae illiusEcclesiae difficillima primordia accurate &summa fide describuntur. Leiden, 1616. Veltri, Giuseppe. Alienated Wisdom: Enquiryinto JewishPhilosophy and Scepticism. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2018. Veltri, Giuseppe. “The Principle of Coscientia: The Averroist Joshua ha-Lorki.” Forthcoming. Part II: Reports

Activities and Events compiled by Maria Wazinski

Annual Lecture Opening of the Fourth Academic Year 30 October 2018

Julie R. Klein, VillanovaUniversity/USA Scepticism in Spinoza and the Project of Critique

Spinoza famouslyopposes political rebellion, or what we would call “revolution,” on the grounds that it reproduces, and mayevenworsen, just the conditions it was intended to replace. YetSpinoza’stheoretical and practical philosophyismarked by philosophical rebellion and conceptual revolution: he invites, even demands, that we criticise and move beyond our usual horizons, lestwereproduce old problems. In this talk, Julie Klein considered Spinoza’srelation to scepticism and his practice of critique as aphilosophical strategy. She focused particularlyonhis account of the freedom to philosophise in order to clarify his view of what makes philosophising possible.

Regular Events

In order to explorethe different manifestations of scepticism in different contexts, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies organises internal events in which jun- ior and senior fellows as well as members of the Centre discuss theirresearch. These events are not open to the public.

Dialectical Evenings

The Dialectical Evening is an informal meeting every four weeks (in fortnightlyrotation with the Reading Evening) for discussions and readingswhich is designed to promotedialecticalcultureand sceptical thoughtwithin the research unit.Members of the Maimonides Centre and occasional guests convene to challenge, doubt,and explore theses in various subjectareas.

OpenAccess. ©2020, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-016 282 Activitiesand Events

[DE 24] 4September 2018 Israel Netanel Rubin and Bill Rebiger Why Is ASceptic WorseThan An Atheist?

In contrast to the religious philosophers who exploited scepticism to servefaith, such as Pascal in his famous gamble, Saʿadya Gaon expresses views in TheBook of Beliefsand Opinions which indicate afirm position against scepticism. In Saʿa- dya’sopinion, the sceptic who claims that “nothing possesses anyreality whatever” and therefore, for example, that the problem of the eternity of the world cannot be resolvedisevenworse thanaheretic who claims thatthe world is definitelyeternal or an Epicurean who teaches that the world was created by accident.Itisenough to refutesuch heretics philosophically, but sceptics must “be struck so painful a blow that they would weep and cry out.When they finallyacknowledge the experience of… the smart of ablow,they will have admittedthe reality of sensation.” Why does the sceptic upset Saʿadya so much?During the Dialectical Evening,the convenors discussed Saʿadya’sperception of scepticism as cynicism and the position of Jewishrationalism that the belief in reason and its ability to reach certainty precedes even the belief in God, for it is God who wantsman to know Him through reason.

[DE 25] 20 November 2018 Máté Veres and Yoav Meyrav “The Second Speaker Must not be Heard”

In response to him whosaid, “Do not pass judgement until youhaveheardboth sides,” Zeno stated the contrary thesis,with this sort of argument: “The second speaker must not be heard, whether the first speaker proved his case (for the inquiry is then finished) or did not proveit(for that is just like his not havingcomplied when summoned, or his havingcomplied by talkingnonsense). But either he provedhis case or he did not prove it.Therefore the second speaker must not be heard” (Plutarch of Chaeronea, On Stoic Self-contradictions,1034E).

We tend to assume that,other thingsbeing equal, one stands to benefit from hearing both sides on anygiven question. Yetitappears that,ifPlutarch is to be trusted—and that is astrong “if”—the founder of the Stoic school condemned the practice of of- fering counterarguments. In this Dialectical Evening,the convenors discussed the possiblemotivations behind Zeno’sstriking claim and its background in his epistemological theory;they then left history behind and reflectedonwhether we can conceive of situations in which it is indeed rational not to attend to opposing considerations. Activities and Events 283

[DE 26] 22 January 2019 Daniel Davies andFlorian Lützen Al-Ġazālī (d. 1111) and Maimonides (d. 1204) on the Simile of the Water Clock— Knowledge and Negative Theology ‒ Al-Ġazālī says in TheHighest Goal: “The cause that causes the movement of the spheres,the stars, the sun, and the moon accordingtoaknown calculation is like that aperture, which necessitates the flow of wateraccordingtoaknown measure. That the movement of the sun, the moon, and the stars lead to tempo- ralresults on earth is similar to the fact thatthe movement of the waterleads to those movementsthat resultinthe ball’sfalling,indicating that the hour has come.” ‒ Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed says: “Wheneverthe onlooker sees a movement,heobtains new knowledge.And by not ceasing to look on and grad- uallytoobtain increase of knowledge,heacquires in this wayaknowledge of the whole of the instrument.However,ifyou suppose that the motions of this instrument are infinite, the onlooker could never contain them in his knowledge.”

Both al-Ġazālī and Maimonides usedthe simile of the waterclock.Al-Ġazālī,intwo of his later works,used it to explain how humans can relate to the divine attributes, whereas Maimonidesemployed it in the Guide to illustrate how one might think about the relation between God’sknowledge and creation and to indicate whyitis impossible for humans to grasp such arelationship. In this Dialectical Evening,the convenors first looked at each of the two cases, the methodologyunderlying them,and how the twoscholars presented theirargu- ments. Subsequently, they discussed ensuing questions about the comparability or incommensurability of the cases presented. Can we look at the world as amechanical device, or is the simile rather an allegory alluding to ahigher purpose concerning the limitations of knowledge?

[DE 27] 26 February2019 Haim Kreisel and Daniel Davies Reading Maimonides: Esotericism vs. Exotericism. The Case of God’sKnowledge of Particulars

In the first part of the presentation Haim Kreisel gave abrief introduction to the esoteric reading of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed:the justification for this approach and its history.Hethen discussed Maimonides’stheory of divine providence and tried to show whyMaimonides’spresentation stronglysuggests that he holds an esoteric position on the subject—namely,his approach is acompletelynaturalistic one. Giventhe fact that Maimonidespresents his view of God’sknowledge of particulars within the context of his discussion of divineprovidence,hefurther argued that Maimonides hints to an esoteric position on this topic as well. Daniel Davies responded by suggesting that this conclusion is not warranted, and that one should 284 Activitiesand Events

read Maimonides’sview of God’sknowledge of particulars exoterically, irrespective of his position on divine providence.

[DE 28] 19 March 2019 Carlos Lévy and GiuseppeVeltri Philo of Alexandria: The First Jewish Sceptic?

The studies on scepticism are currentlyflourishing,but the benefit from them for the analysis of Philo is quite small. In studies on and companions to scepticism, the focus is mainlyonSextus Empiricus, athinker who livedtwo centuries afterAe- nesidemus(ca. middle of first century BCE), who refounded scepticism almost three centuries after Pyrrho. Philo ought to be considered aprivileged witness in the history of scepticism, but he is not,though he is the closest to Aenesidemusfrom both a historical and ageographical point of view. The first question of this Dialectical Evening was: whythis quasi omission nowadays,while acentury agoHans vonArnim devoted an entire book to the analysis of sceptical tropes in Philo? Second: are there sceptical strategies in Philo, or something else? In the first case, are they comparable to thoseofGreek pagan texts? In the second, can we es- cape overlygeneral concepts such as eclecticism and utilitarianism? Third: what are the possiblemeaningsof“Jewish scepticism” and can Philo be considered the first “Jewish sceptic?” What are the elements of aJewish sceptical tradition? Fourth: fideismisaconcept of great importance in the history of Western culture, especiallyduring the Renaissance. Can it be affirmed that Philo laid the foundations of this concept?

[DE 29] 4June 2019 José María Sánchez de León Serrano and Jason Yonover GenealogicalScepticism

Each of us wasborninaparticularplace at aparticular moment,and mayboastofa uniquetrajectory from there to here. Common sense would indicate that the special trajectory specific to someone has adecisive influenceontheirbeliefs.Yet what does this mean for the truth of said convictions?This sortofquestion is in the background of genealogicalthinking.Genealogical thinking questions the validity of a givenbelief, concept,oridea by tracing its emergencefrom contingent circumstances.Thus, we might criticise aphilosophical conception by showing how it originated in ahistoricaland cultural context thatnolonger corresponds to ours. Can genealogical critiques ever be valid?Dothey commit the so-called “genetic fallacy,” the alleg- edlymisled assessment of aclaim basedonits origin alone? And is the scepticism genealogical thinking maylead to—wherewebegin to broadlyquestion our convictions giventheir apparently contingent origins—justified? Activities and Events 285

[DE 30] 2July 2019 Aryeh Botwinick and Daniel Boyarin ARabbinic Genealogy: Rabbi Akiva as aPrecursorofMaimonides’sNegative Theology

Twooverarchingthemesconcernedthe convenors during this Dialectical Evening. The first was to enquire if there are indigenous Rabbinic sources that could be said to serveasprecedents for Maimonides’snegative theology. The second theme (which is closelywrapped up with the first one) was whether there could be said to be agenre or sub-genre of Talmudic discourse that could be categorised as aphilosophical maḥloqet—aphilosophical division of opinion over asecond-order philosophical question. Aside from the issue of whether one can deducethe possiblefrom the impossiblewhich was dealt with at the Dialectical Evening,fiveimmediate examples thatcome to mind are brera (Does the arrow of time moveintwo directions simultaneously—from futuretopast as well as from past to future?); zeh we-zeh gorem (Whatisthe most elegant waytotheorise overdetermination—patterns of multiple causation?); Is nominalism trueorfalse? and, related to this, how does one demar- cate between identity and difference? and, Kulmilsaʾ d’amar raḥmanaʾ loʾ sʿevid,ei ʿavid mehani oloʾmehani,which forms the subjectmatter of a maḥloqet between Abayeand Rava in Temurah 4b, but which is echoed elsewhereinthe Babylonian Talmud. This latter topic raises the spectre of how to theorise the relationship between the normative and the descriptive.UnearthingaRabbinic pedigree for Maimo- nides’snegative theologyisimportant not onlyacademically, but also existentially. Following the sterlingexample of Joseph Levenson in his classic work, Confucian China and its Modern Fate,wecan assume that unless Maimonideshad established for himself ahomegrown Rabbinic pedigree for negative theology(that in an important sense there was an equivalence between the two), he would not have done it.He could onlydoitbecause Ḥazal had been therefirst.The anxiety of influencecan also work to curb the desire for innovation.

[DE 31] 6August 2019 Reimund Leichtand Ariel Malachi Is Logic aTool for Producing Certainty and/or Conviction in Judah ha-Levi’s Sefer ha-Kuzari?

Judah ha-Levi’s Sefer ha-Kuzari is awork about controversy thatarouses controversy. If its author wanted to use this literarydialogue between the king of the Khazars and aphilosopher,aChristian, aMuslim, and finally aJew to show that philosophers (and historians of philosophy, for thatmatter)are not able to reach areal consensus about the most fundamental questions, the interpretation history of this book can be taken as aproof in itself:What is its basicintention?What is the appropriate wayto describeits literary genre? What were its intellectual sources?Does the book form a literaryand intellectual unity,orisitpiecemeal?Isthis abook of philosophy, and if 286 Activities and Events

so, to which philosophicalstrand does it belong?Orisitrather areligious critique of philosophy? Is it anti-philosophyinaphilosophicalgarb? Is it apiece of medieval rationalism, anti-rationalism, or both at the same—or different—times? In spite of all these uncertainties, there can be little doubtthatthe Sefer ha-Ku- zari is intended to convince. Moreover,the question of how to produce conviction and certainty looms large in abook tellingthe story of apagan king who converts to Judaism after he finds it to be more convincing than all the competingalternatives (philosophy, Christianity, and Islam). But how does Judah ha-Levi arguefor his ideas and how is conviction and perhaps even certainty achieved?What is the role of rational argumentation basedupon and drawnfrom the tools provided by philosophical logic and epistemology in adialogue that opposes Jewish religion to other worldviews?The apparent ambivalencebetween the religious motivesofthe book and the necessity of using rational, logical, and philosophicaltools of persuasion leads to the question of whether and how logic can serveasatool to produce certainty and/or conviction in Judah ha-Levi’s Sefer ha-Kuzari.

[DE 32] 20 August2019 Stephan Schmid and Yoav Meyrav Metaphysicsand Truth?

Foralong and venerable tradition in philosophy, metaphysics—the studyor“science” of being qua being and its ultimatecauses—has been considered to be not onlythe most fundamental, but also the most noble form of intellectual activity. At the same time, various philosophershavedoubted the very possibility of this science: even if therewereany,the purported objectsofmetaphysical investigation, they maintained, are too remotetobegrasped by us through our limited cognitive capacities.Thiskind of suspicion towardsmetaphysics is well-known, but relies on the question what metaphysics is supposed to be. In this evening,the convenors took up this issue by exploring alogicallypriorquestion regarding the allegedlyes- sentialconnection between metaphysics and truth.

Reading Evening

The Reading Evening is an informal meeting every four weeks (in fortnightlyrotation with the Dialectical Evening). Fellowsand researchers read and discuss primary texts that are specificallyrelevant to their respective projects.Each meeting,one fellow or research team member selects and presents atext of particular importance for her research. In reading together,the group benefits from the expertise of the individual researcher. Activities and Events 287

[RE 27] 21 August 2018 Ronny Vollandt Divine Determination and Wisdom

The Reading Evening offered acritical re-evaluation of the very beginning of commentary on the Book of Genesis by Saʿadya Gaon. In contrast to Saʿadya’stranslation, the commentary of which the former wasinitiallypart survivedinavery sketchy form. In 1984,Moshe Zucker furnishedanedition of the first half of the book of Genesis, in which he assembled hundreds of Genizah fragments and broughtthe commentary back to life for modern scholarship. Since then, numerous additional texts have appeared that can improveour understanding of Saʿadya’sexegesisand its context.The passages that were read attempt to provethatthe biblical account of creation is auniversallyacceptable theory,contrary to the belief of some sceptics, which can be defendedalso on the grounds of scientific literature.

[RE 28] 25 September 2018 Rachel Aumiller The Body of Belief: Augustine’s Confessions and Derrida’s Circumfession

In this Reading Evening,several passages from Augustine’s Confessions werecom- pared to passages in Jacques Derrida’s Circumfession:anexperimental homageto and parodyofthe Confessions. While Augustine describes the decisive event in which he turns towardthe God of his mother,Derrida reflects on the moment when he turns away from the God of his mother (his “cut with Kippur”). And yet, both (de)conversion stories are also confessions of the failed attempt to leave behind aformerway of life, the memoriesof which reverberate on the narrators’ bodies. Augustine and Derrida question how belief first enters us in our infancy.Belief is articulated on our skin through both agentle and violent touch: the caress of the caregiver, the switch of the schoolmaster.Because belief exists on the level of bodily memory,itisdifficult to shed when we laterscepticallyengageour inherited values. Our skincontinues to cling to beliefs that we denounce. The Reading Evening explored (1) Derrida’ssceptical framing of his relationship to Judaism, (2)dogma in the form of bodilyaffect/memory, (3) the disjunction between what we saywebelieve/disbelieveand bodilyaffect.

[RE 29] 9October 2018 Yoav Meyrav Is God an Intellect? Themistius between Aristotle and the Platonists

Themistius (c. 317–388 CE), aphilosopher and political figure in the imperial court in Constantinople, composed paraphrases of several of Aristotle’sworks. These paraphrases werepedagogicaltools intended to elucidateAristotle’sarguments, but also 288 Activitiesand Events

functioned as vehicles for Themistius’sown philosophical innovations. Since his paraphrases adopt Aristotle’svoice, it is difficult to discern at which point in the text Aristotle ends and Themistius begins. What is more, since Themistius’sphilosophical training was independent from the established schools of his time, his doc- trinal affiliation has been the subjectofmuch scholarlydebate, especiallyconcerning the question whether he was aPeripatetic or aPlatonist.Whereas formulating the question in this manner is somewhat over-reductive,itmight nevertheless be valuable to explore how Themistius engages with those of Aristotle’sideas thatare known to have been criticisedinthe Platonic circleswith which Themistius was familiar. In this Reading Evening,selected passages wereread from aforthcomingEnglish translation of Themistius’sparaphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 alongside passages from Aristotle himself and afew passages from Plotinus (204/5–270CE), whose Enneads shaped the Platonic school in Late Antiquity. Yoav Meyrav explored the possibilitythat in his paraphrase, Themistius implicitlyresponds to some Platon- ic critiques of Aristotle, especiallyconcerning Aristotle’sidentificationbetween God and Intellect and its various ramifications. He thus, perhaps,attempts to soften the notion of divine othernessand resist the idea of divine transcendence. Consequently, his paraphrase might have had amoderating effect on the sceptical expressions of these elements in medieval Arabic and Hebrew thinkers.

[RE 30] 11 December 2018 Behnam Zolghadr Denying the Undeniable: ContraAristotle’sArguments for the Law of Non-Contradiction

Aristotle devoted book Gamma of his Metaphysics to the defence of what we now know as the lawofnon-contradiction. His prominent defenceofthis lawwas so influential that it became the dominant view among western philosophers, albeit with very few arguable exceptions,such as Hegeland some of his followers.Itisdif- ficult to find adefence of the lawafter Aristotle’swhich is worth mentioning.How- ever,with the contemporary developments in logic and metaphysics,some philosophers advocate views holding some contradictions to be true, and thus they challengethe lawofnon-contradiction. Hence, we maywant to look back to the origins of the lawofnon-contradiction and question whether this so-called undeniable lawisdeniable or not.Inthis Reading Evening,the most important parts of Aristo- tle’sarguments for the lawofnon-contradiction wereexplored. These arguments are not as crucial as they are usually thoughttobe. Then, the first arguments for explosion—i.e. that from an arbitrary contradiction, anything mayfollow—werediscussed. These belong to Avicenna and the twelfth-century French logician William of Sois- sons. It is worth mentioning that Aristotle never argued for explosion. Thus, some passages of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of TheHealing wereread as well. Activitiesand Events 289

[RE 31] 15 January2019 Avraham Rot Affective Scepticism: Between Descartes and Spinoza

Descartesexcludes the passions from both the exposition and the domain of applicability of his method of doubt. Questioning the reality of an external world, he argu- ablypresupposes the reality of internal experience.Aswith respect to otherCartesi- an convictions that have come to dominate modern thought,Spinoza’sphilosophy indicatesanalternative wayofthinking.Though Spinoza is commonlyregarded as an anti-sceptical thinker,hepresents us in effect with amore radical and truthful form of scepticism than Descartes. While on Descartes’saccount,the affects cannot be doubted and doubtisnot significantlyaffective,onSpinoza’saccount the affects themselvesare expressionsofdoubtwhile it is in fact clear and distinct ideas that cannot be doubted with earnestness. Cartesian scepticism is transitory and narrowly cognitive,and hence less radical than Spinozist scepticism, which is all encompassing,ongoing and,atonce, cognitive, embodied,and affective.Toassess these tenta- tive claims, which potentiallychallengereceivedinterpretations of Spinoza’sphilosophy, as well as to further explorethe differencesbetween the forms of scepticism respectively at work in the writingsofDescartes and Spinoza, relevant excerpts from Descartes’s ThePassions of the Soul and Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Ethics wereread. Special attention was giventothe emotional logic governing the relations between the affects of hope, fear,confidence, and despair as it pertains to doubt,the lack thereof, and certainty.

[RE 32] 5February2019 Steven Harvey The Path of the Falāsifah to Knowledge and UltimateHuman Happiness… or Not How did the medieval Aristotelians seek certain knowledge and pursue ultimate human happiness? How did they see theirtaskasphilosophers and scientists? Could intellectual perfection be sought and found in the confines of one’sown abode, with little more than parchment,ink, and areed brush?Asone respected contemporary historian of medieval philosophyput it: [JewishAristotelians of the thirteenth and fourteenthcenturies,] “following their two philosophical authorities, Mai- monides and Averroes, sought truth and human perfection through the orderly study of Aristotle’sbooksonlogic, natural science, and metaphysics,asthey werepara- phrased and explained by Averroes.” And, one might ask: “If so, and if such bookish learning could be carried out alone in one’shome, was the goal to learn what others have written and transmitted? Or,perhaps,was it to correct this knowledge and/or to progress to new knowledge?” Some of the selected texts strengthen the conventional view thatall the knowledge needed for attaining truth maybefound in the Aristotelian corpus as interpreted by the great Greek, Islamic, and Jewish commentators; others suggest that these 290 Activitiesand Events

texts should be studied carefullyand corrected when necessary;and still others hold that all such studyis, in fact,invain, for the desired knowledge is illusory and cannot be attained by humans. But some of the textsallude to another wayofsearching for and attaining knowledge,one of observation and experience. To what extent were observation, experience, and experimentation apart of the medieval quest for certain knowledge?

[RE 33] 16 April 2019 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández “Elusive Knowledge” by David Lewis Epistemic contextualism is aposition developed by contemporary epistemologists to deal with the problem of philosophical scepticism, which in turn is understood as aproblem that resultsfrom imposingunattainable standards for knowledge.In response to such excessive demands, epistemic contextualism proposes that knowledge attribution sentences of the form “S knows that p” are context-sensitive,sotheir truth conditions can vary from one context to another.Byclaiming that the samesen- tencecan have different truth-conditions in different contexts, epistemic contextualism aims to show that there are contexts(both ordinary and scientific) in which we are safe from the sceptical threat because in those contexts, we do not have to meet unattainable standards for knowledge.This position has had adeepinfluencenot onlyinepistemology,but also in philosophyoflanguageand other areas of contemporary philosophy. In this Reading Evening,one of the papers thatlaid the foundations of epistemic contextualism, David Lewis’s “Elusive Knowledge” (1996), wasstudied.

[RE 34] 30 April 2019 Jason Yonover Spinoza and Nietzsche on the Erroneous Belief in Free Will(Selectionsfrom Ethics,Letter 58, and Twilight of the Idols)

Despite ahighlysuggestiveletter in which Nietzsche labels Spinoza his only “precursor,” there is surprisingly little commentary on the relationship between the two thinkers. In this Reading Evening,the possibility was explored that the most important connection between Nietzsche and Spinoza has been missed and is methodological in nature. It was done on the basis of their rejections of freewillinwhich, notably, they both not only(1) denythat we mayboast of such afaculty,but furthermore (2)clarify the origins of our erroneous belief to the contrary (and indeed in a closelyrelated fashion). Throughout questions pertaining to scepticism that are of epistemologicalinterest wereparticularlyexplored. Activities and Events 291

[RE 35] 21 May 2019 Bakinaz Abdalla Prophecy,Philosophy,and Truth in the Thought of Isaac Albalag

Wasthe world created in time or does it exist from eternity?This question provoked heated disputations in medieval philosophical and theological writings. Answering this question in favour of either creation or the eternity doctrinehad epistemological and theological implications respectively.Perhaps aless problematic answer would be that the universe is both created and eternal. Aphilosopher who is faithful to both science (philosophy) and revelation mayfind it legitimate to deem the teachings of Scriptureand philosophy, though contradictory,tobetrue. Oddthough this suggestion mayappear,itisnot unprecedented. The Jewishphilosopher IsaacAlbalag (thirteenth century) admits that prophetic knowledge and philosophyare sometimes in conflict.Incases wherereason and revelation provetobecontradictory,aswith the issue of eternity versus creation, one admits their veracity;neither philosophy nor religion overrides the other. To support this claim, Albalagadvances an unusual theory of prophecythat views prophets as extraordinary human beingscapable of apprehendingabodyof knowledge that surpasses human knowledge in both quantity and quality.Insome cases, this knowledge contradicts the conclusions of demonstration. Albalag’stheory of prophecy, together with his view of the relationship between religion and philosophy, led manyscholars to read his thought in terms of the double truth doctrine which was advocatedbymedieval Latin Averroists. In this Reading Evening,the double truth hypothesis was investigated. The goal was to examine whether Albalag’stheory of prophecyiscompatible with the fundamental metaphysical premises and strongsceptical elements of his sole treatise, Sefer Tiqqun ha-Deʿot.

[RE 36] 25 June 2019 Uta Lohmann Scepticism in the EducationalPhilosophy of Joel Löwe as aRepresentative of the Berlin Haskalah

Joel BrilLöwe (1762–1802) was one of the most important proponents of the Berlin JewishEnlightenment.Hewas amember of asmall group of maskilim who spent afew years in close proximitytoMoses Mendelssohn and who wereregarded as his “true disciples.” The most outstanding characteristics of this group of young maskilim include their activities as translators of some of the HolyScriptures and their engagement as private or public teachers. The Reading Evening focused on the influenceofMendelssohn’sphilosophy on Löwe. How did the Haskalah’sfundamental thoughts about humankind being destinedfor perfection (Bestimmung des Menschen zurVervollkommnung)and Men- delssohn’ssceptical posture towards writtenness and languageshape Löwe’speda- 292 Activitiesand Events

gogicalconcepts, linguistic approaches, and translation method?What relevance did scepticism have to the educational philosophy(Bildungsphilosophie)ofthe Haskalah in general?What did scepticism mean for the perception of knowledge and for the pursuit of genuine truth in apedagogicalsetting in particular? Last but not least: How can scepticism be systematicallydescribed not as aphilosophical idea, but as aculturalform of application-oriented strategies and concepts of everyday(educational) practice?

Occasional Events

Conferences

12–14 November 2018 Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Jewish Averroism Convenors: Racheli Haliva(Universität Hamburg/Germany), Yoav Meyrav (Universität Hamburg/Germany),Daniel Davies (Universität Hamburg/Germany)

“JewishAverroism” is aconcept thatusuallyrefers to Jewish philosophersfrom the thirteenth century onwards who philosophised within the context of Averroes’sinterpretation of Aristotelian philosophy. At the sametime, manyofthem werecommit- ted to Maimonides’slegacyofreconcilingphilosophical investigation with the Law of Moses. In order to settle this apparent tension, they interpreted Judaism in light of Averroes’sAristotelianism on the assumption that Judaism and true philosophy must always coincide. Although Averroes’sphilosophyand commentary wereattractive to some circles, others found it unsatisfactory or simply threatening to the traditionalway of life. These thinkers responded with various critiquesofAverroes, his followers,and the Averroistic approach to philosophyand its relationship to revealedreligion. The purpose of the conference was to crystallise the understanding of Jewish Averroism as aphilosophical and culturalphenomenon. Special emphasis was put upon the Jewish Averroists’sengagement with Maimonides’sapparent sceptical approach, mainlyconcerning metaphysical knowledge about which Averroes is patent- ly dogmatic. Finally, lectures about various aspectsofanti-Averroism served as anecessary counterbalance. Most of the conference’slectures can be viewed online at Universität Hamburg’s lecture2gowebsite: https://lecture2go.uni-hamburg.de/en_US/l2go/-/get/l/5089. Activities and Events 293

Programme

KeynoteLecture Steven Harvey (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan/Israel) WasAl-Ġazālī an Avicennist? Some Provocative Reflections on Jewish Averroism

Panel: What is Jewish Averroism? DanielJ.Lasker (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,Beer-Sheva/Israel) Averroism and Interreligious Polemics in Late Medieval Iberia

Giovanni Licata (Scuola NormaleSuperiore di Pisa/Italy) Similarities and Dissimilarities between Jewish and Latin Averroism

Reimund Leicht(Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) Who and What is aJewish Averroist?RemarksonAverroes’sFirst Jewish Readers

Panel: Reason, Scriptures, and Jewish Law David Lemler (Université de Strasbourg/France) The Interpretation of the Garden of Eden among Averroistic Maimonideans and the Scope of HumanKnowledge

Mercedes Rubio (POLIS Jerusalem/Israel) Is Maimonides’sBiblicalExegesis Averroistic?

ShalomSadik (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,Beer-Sheva/Israel) Double Truth in Jewish Averroist Philosophy

Panel: Averroistic Maimonideanism Resianne Smidt vanGelder-Fontaine (Universiteit vanAmsterdam/Netherlands) Between Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Judah ha-Cohen’sPresentation of Averroes in the Midraš ha-Ḥokhmah

Yehuda Halper (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan/Israel) Socratic Scepticism in Hebrew:Al-Ḥarizi and Shem Ṭob Falaqueraand Their Influence 294 Activitiesand Events

ShiraWeiss (Herzl Institute, Jerusalem/Israel) Averroes’sInfluence upon Theological Responses to Scepticism in Late Medieval Jewish Philosophy

Panel: Averroistic Maimonideanism II Rebecca Kneller-Rowe (IndependentScholar) Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Samuel ibn Tibbon’sWork

Yonatan Shemesh (University of Chicago/USA) Averroes’s Incoherenceofthe Incoherence and Narboni’sCommentaryonthe Guide of the Perplexed

Racheli Haliva(Universität Hamburg/Germany) Isaac Polqar’sAnti-Sceptical Approach towards Miracles

Panel: Physics Alexander Green (University at Buffalo/USA) Gersonides and IbnKaspi on Scepticism about the Future

Maud Kozodoy (Independent Scholar) Sources of Knowledgeabout the Heavens: Profayt Duran and Averroes

Warren Zev Harvey (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) Crescas’sAttitude towards Averroes

Panel: Metaphysics and Theology Michael Engel (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Averroes’s Long Commentaryonthe Posterior Analytics and ItsImpact on Jewish and Latin Averroism during the Italian Renaissance

Esti Eisenmann (The Open University of Israel) Gersonides’sCritiqueofAverroes: BetweenPhysics,Metaphysics,and Theology

Yoav Meyrav (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Against Averroes: Moses Ha-Levi’sDefence of Avicenna’sNecessaryExistent

Panel: Prophecy and Human Perfection Giada Coppola (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Certainty and Uncertainty Regarding Metaphysics in Sforno’s Or ʿAmmim Activities and Events 295

Bakinaz Abdalla (McGill University,Montreal/Canada) Reconsidering Isaac Albalag’sTheory of Prophecy:ASceptical Approach

Adrian Sackson (Tel Aviv University/Israel) What is the StatusofProphets from Other Religions for the Jewish Averroists?

KeynoteLecture Hanna Kasher (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan/Israel) The Jewish Averroists—Linking Thoughts between Maimonides and Spinoza

23–25 September 2019 Simone Luzzatto’sScepticism in the Context of Early Modern Thought Convenors: Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg/Germany), Michela Torbidoni (Universität Hamburg/Germany),AnnaLissa (UniversitéParis 8/France)

This conference aimed to call attention to the sceptical thought of Rabbi Simone Luz- zatto (ca. 1583–1663) and its value within seventeenth-centuryphilosophyand political thought.The three-dayconferencebrought togetherestablished scholars and young researchers workinginthe field of the intellectual history of Judaism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The lectures offered the opportunitytoexplore the philosophicalsources and strategies of Luzzatto’sscepticism, his intense dialogue with Christian philosophy, and his relationship to Judaism. The discussion of Luzzatto provided the chance to investigate the role of scepticism within an eramarked by paradoxesand contrasts between religious devotion and scientific rationalism, between rabbinical-biblical Jewish tradition and the open tendencytowards engagement with non-Jewish philosophical, literary,scientific, and theological culture. The conference’sprogramme included around table on Rabbi Simone Luzzatto’s newlypublishedworks, Discourse on the State of the Jews (1638) and Socrates, Or On Human Knowledge (1651), discussed with the authors and translators.

Programme andAbstracts

Panel 1: Liberty,Religion, and Scientific Thought Cristiana Facchini(Università di Bologna/Italy) Practices of Critical Thought: The Rise of New Science, the Bible, and Jewish Thought

Evelien Chayes (RadboudUniversiteit/Netherlands) ARabbi’sMarks in EarlyModern Subversive Literature. Simone Luzzattoand his Nachleben 296 Activities and Events

Panel 2: Scepticism and Religion Anna Lissa (Université Paris 8/France) The Scepticism of Simone Luzzattoand his Appraisal of the Book of Job

Mina Lee (University of Tokyo/Japan) The Concepts of Religion in Simone Luzzatto’s Discorso

Panel 3: Sceptical Philosophy Michela Torbidoni (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Simone Luzzatto’sConcept of Nature as aSource of Morality and Religiosity

Josef Stern (University of Chicago/USA) What Kind of a(Sceptical) work is Simone Luzzatto’s Socrate?

Evening Session EnsembleAccademia dei Carpìti (Anna Tarca, Silvia Valenti, Paolo Davolio,Lorenzo Ziller) Musical Interlude: Sacred and Profane PolyphonybySalomone Rossi and Luca Marenzio

Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Introduction

Warren Zev Harvey (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) KeynoteLecture: The ImageofKing Solomon in Simone Luzzatto’sWritings

Panel 4: Ancient and MedievalSources Joanna Weinberg (University of Oxford/UK) The Jewish Debate over Philo in EarlyModern Italy

Fabrizio Lelli (Università del Salento/Italy) Simone Luzzatto’sScepticism in Light of Medieval Jewish Apologetics

Panel 5: Politics and Economics Vasileios Syros (University of Jyväskylä/Finland) AVenetian Rabbi and aBaroness from the Low Countries on the Condition of the Jews Activities and Events 297

Guido Bartolucci (Università della Calabria/Italy) Simone Luzzatto’sPolitical Thought: Between Scepticism and Reason of State

Panel 6: Politics and Economics Luca Andreoni (Istituto Comprensivo “Caio GiulioCesare”/Italy) Simone Luzzattoand the Debate on the Economical Role of the Jews in Eighteenth CenturyItaly

Myriam Silvera (Università degli StudidiRoma “TorVergata”/Italy) “Seek the Peace and Prosperity of the City…”:The Political UseofJer 29:7 by Simone Luzzattoand Other Jewish Sources

Panel 7: Anthropology,Society,and Tolerance Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Self-Love, Blood-Ties, and Amity in Simone Luzzatto’sPhilosophy

Book Launch Scepticism and Tolerance: New Perspectives for the Jewish IntellectualHistory Evelien Chayes (RadboudUniversiteit/Netherlands) Intellectual Life and Literature

Cristiana Facchini(Università di Bologna/Italy) History

Guido Bartolucci (Università della Calabria/Italy) HistoryofPoliticalThought

Josef Stern (University of Chicago/USA) Philosophy

Lecture Series “Feminism and Scepticism” The Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies established alecture series which focuses on feminist approaches to and perspectivesonscepticism. The Centre invites researchers to give apubliclecture on this topic, and—following this lecture—to meet with the femaleresearchers in order to share theirexperiences and career paths in their academicsystems. 298 Activitiesand Events

2April 2019 Ruth Kara-Ivanov Kaniel (Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem/Israel) Scepticism and Gender.King David in the Imageofthe Shekhinah

King David is one of the most colourful heroes of Jewish myth; warrior and poet, sinnerand penitent,conqueror and musician, adulterer and Messiah. The manyfac- ets of his character are rooted in biblical scripture and continued to develop in the literatureofthe Midrash and the Kabbalah. Each generation has added new layers to David’sportrait,sketching him in anew light.Indeed, David’spersonality reflects the characters and hopes of his interpreters throughout generations. Embodying the hero “with athousand faces” and representing the messianic idea, David is not merelyaprivate character,but acollective entity,wearingmanydifferent forms. In the Zohar,David’scollective imageisidentifiedwith the Shekhinah,the As- semblyofIsrael [Knesset Israel] and the Divine Spouse. Whywas this figure of the warrior—the ultimatemale, conqueror of cities and kingdoms, the redeemer,who was presented as amasculinehero in bothChristian and Jewish literature—“converted” by the Zohar to signify afeminine image? In her lecture, Ruth Kara-Ivanov Kanieltried to solve this riddle by using questions of scepticism, identity,and gender.

This year’slecture on scepticism and feminism was accompanied by aworkshop.

1April 2019 Biti Roi (Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem/Israel) Scepticism in Zoharic and Hasidic Literature

The Zoharicliterature of twelfth- to fourteenth-century Spain, which has been defined as the most influential Kabbalistic movementinthe Middle Ages, and its followers—the eighteenth-centuryEastern European Hasidic movement—demonstrate an interesting window into the complicated relationship between scepticism and theological absolutism. In this workshop, the wayinwhich scepticism defines affinity with God in the Jewishmystical tradition and the waynon-philosophical texts deal with philosophicalperceptions wereexplored. The role of gender issues in the Kabbalistic movement werealsoarticulated. Texts which were examined included works of rabbinic, Zoharic, medieval, and Hasidic literature as well as the well- known liturgical foreword “Elijah openedand said” and its similarities to Al-Fātiḥah, the famous Islamic prayer.

Maimonides Lectures on Scepticism

Researchers focusing on various aspectsofscepticism are invited to present and discuss theirresearch in an evening lecture. The lecturesare usuallyrecorded and pub- Activitiesand Events 299

lished on the webpageofthe Centre in order to make them available to alargerau- dience.

22 November 2018 Richard Bett (Johns HopkinsUniversity,Baltimore/USA) CanwebeAncient Sceptics?

The lecture considered how far Pyrrhonism might be aviable outlook today. The answer depends in part on what rangeofissues suspension of judgment might plausi- blybegenerated in today’sintellectual climate. On manyethical, religious, and philosophical issues, the prospects seem just as good as in Sextus’sday.Concerning natural science,the matterismorecomplicated. Herethere are manyissueswhere we know too much for suspension of judgment to be realistic, and wherescience has infiltrated ordinary life. On the other hand,suspension of judgment is possible on some issues, such as climate change, wherethere is avocal popularopinion about ascientific question. In addition,itispossibleonphilosophical questions concerningthe statusofscience itself, questions that did not occur to the ancients. A further issue is the value of suspension of judgment.HereSextus seems overlyam- bitious, because of exaggeratedclaims about ataraxia as its outcome. Whether suspension of judgment would yield ataraxia depends on people’scharacter and circumstances, regardless of the perceivedimportance of the topic. What remains is a worthwhile recommendation to be open-minded.

9July 2019 Nadja El Kassar(ETH Zürich/Switzerland) How to Dealwith Ignorance? Some HistoricalSuggestions

Ever since its earlydays, philosophers have been fascinated by ignorance. In her talk, Nadja El Kassar discussed historical answers to the question of how it should be dealt with. Thequestion itself is seldom raised explicitly, but anumber of philos- ophershaveaddressed the issue of dealing with ignorance. The lecture focused in particularonSocrates’s, John Locke’s, and ImmanuelKant’ssuggestions on the subject.Socratic ignorance can be read as asuggestion that knowledge and wisdom are the best ways of dealing with ignorance. Lockesuggests that four principles (the principle of indifference, the principle of evidence, the principle of appraisal, and the principle of proportionality) are the best ways of dealingwith ignorance and also with error.Finally, Kant argues that orienting oneself is the keytodealing with ignorance. Nadja El Kassar discussed and compared these threehistorical pro- posals and concluded by examining their relevance to today’squestion of how to deal with ignorance. 300 Activities and Events

LectureSeries “Skepsisund Toleranz. Moses Mendelssohn, Salomon Maimon unddie jüdische Aufklärungsphilosophie”

Organised by the Institute for Jewish Philosophyand Religion, in cooperationwith the Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies

Convenors: Ze’ev Strauss (HfJSHeidelberg/Germany), José María Sánchez de León Serrano (Universität Hamburg/Germany), LiberaPisano (Universität Hamburg/Ger- many)

The lectures within the framework of the lecture series provided an introduction into the innovative thoughtofthe two central philosophersofthe German-Jewish Enlight- enment:MosesMendelssohn and Solomon Maimon.Two concepts of their philosophical systems—tolerance and scepticism—gainedcentre stage. The main question that these lectures addressed is the reciprocal relation between tolerance and scepticism,and how each of these thinkers takesastance in this regard.Toanswer this question, special attention was devoted to Jewish religion, inasmuch as it constitutes an elemental component of their Weltanschauungen.

Programme

1April 2019 GiuseppeVeltri (Universität Hamburg/Germany) and Anne Fiebig (Universität Ham- burg/Germany) Toleranz als gesellschaftliche Herausforderung in jüdischen Quellen und Vorstel- lung des Toleranzprojekts

6May 2019 Shmuel Feiner (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan/Israel) Moses Mendelssohn: The Myth, the History, and the Jewish Battle for Religious Tol- erance

13 May 2019 Jason Yonover (Johns Hopkins University,Baltimore/USA) Mendelssohnand Maimon on Superstition

20 May 2019 Timothy Franz (New School for Social Research in New York City/USA) “They Go From Strength to Strength”:Solomon Maimon’sWay from Critique to TranscendentalPhilosophy Activities and Events 301

27 May 2019 José María Sánchez de León Serrano (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Abgötterei bei Mendelssohn und Spinoza

3June 2019 Warren ZevHarvey (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) Mendelssohnand Maimon on the Garden of Eden

17 June 2019 Ze’ev Strauss (HfJS Heidelberg/Germany) Das Judentumals Grundlage im Religionsgebäude

24 June 2019 Grit Schorch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Israel) Keine Philosophie ohne Sprache – Eine neue Perspektiveauf Moses Mendelssohns Denken

26 June 2019 Idit Chikurel (Universität Potsdam/Germany) Scepticism and Certainty in Salomon Maimon’sTheoryofInvention

1July 2019 GeorgeY.Kohler (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan/Israel) Skeptische Aufnahme – Kritik an MendelssohnsReligionsphilosophie im deutsch-jüdischen Denkendes 19.Jahrhunderts

8July 2019 Libera Pisano (Universität Hamburg/Germany) “Ein Wohltäter aller Deutsch redenden Juden:” Zunz’ Deutung von Moses Mendelssohn

10 July 2019 Michah Gottlieb (New York University/USA) Mendelssohnand Minority Toleration

MCAS Participation in External Conferences 4–7March 2019 Annual Conference of the European Academy of Religion Panel: Jewish Scepticism as PhilosophicalQuestion

ResearchonJewishphilosophicalscepticism is still in its very earlystages. This also holds true for culturalexpressionsofscepticism, i.e., modes of sceptical strategies 302 Activities and Events

present in Jewish literature,culturalpractices,history,the organisation of social groups,and especiallyeducation. Thislack of interest in the intricacies of Jewish scepticism in Jewish studies mayberooted in the modality of Jewishphilosophy as such, its being notoriouslyin-between, subsumingtraditional wisdom, philosophy, theology, Jewishand general Weltanschauung,aswell as cultural history,and representing ahazardous bridge between orthopraxy and orthodoxy.Inthis panel, the controversialbinomial of Jewishscepticism was investigated from aphilosophical perspective.

Chair: Libera Pisano (Universität Hamburg/Germany)

GiuseppeVeltri (Universität Hamburg/Germany) Shortintroduction

Yoav Meyrav (Universität Hamburg/Germany) The Danger of Perplexity: aFarabianProblem—and aMaimonidean Solution?

MichelaTorbidoni(Universität Hamburg/Germany) The ScepticalSocrates of Simone Luzzattobetween Reason and Revelation

José María Sánchez de León Serrano (Universität Hamburg/Germany) God’sTransparency and Hyperbolic Doubt in Spinoza’sMetaphysics Silke Schaeper Reportonthe LibraryofJewishScepticism

The Library of Jewish Scepticism is aspecial collection administered by asingle librarian—aso-called one-person-library (OPL). During the Maimonides Centre’s first period, from October 2015 to February 2019,the position of librarian wasjointly fundedbythe GermanResearch Foundation and Universität Hamburg (90 %). Be- tween March and August 2019,the position of librarian was vacant due to lack of funding.Since 2019,the position of librarian is funded by Universität Hamburg part-time (50 %). Tasks and budgetremainthe same.

Student Assistants

The librarian was supported by Ms.Vanessa Zerwas, asign-languagestudent,until February 2019.

Catalogue Merger

German academic libraries contributecataloguing records to regional library networks,for historic reasons.The meta search engine “Karlsruhe Virtual Catalog” serves as avirtual national union catalogue, drawing together the content of these regional catalogues. In March 2019,two very large German regional library networks (GBV,SWB) mergedtheir catalogues to form K10plus,adata pool containingover 200millionholdings. While catalogue users will not notice alot of changes, library professionals need to handle technical changes to cataloguing and retrieval patterns. The librarian attended K10plus training in February 2019.Development,deduplica- tion, and debugging continues.

Specialised Information ServiceinJewish Studies/Israel Studies

Since 2016,the “Fachinformationsdienst Jüdische Studien” (FID) provides managed access to electronic resources in Jewish Studies to senior academics and bona fide researchers in Germany. In February 2018, the Judaica team at Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt a.M. led by Dr.RachelHeuberger, which runs the FID,conducted asurvey among the research and library community.Based on survey feedback and available financial resources, the FID has negotiated access to three additional e-resourcesin 2019:

OpenAccess. ©2020SilkeSchaeper,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-017 304 Silke Schaeper

Coverage of K10plus. For further information, see https://www.bszgbv.de/.

COTARonline =Collection of Toraharticles *New in 2019* Index to Hebrew Periodicals JSTORComplete JewishStudies Collection Magnes Press e-Book collection Hebrew titles *New in 2019* Otzar HaHochma RavMilim Dictionary Online JournalofAncient Judaism (Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht) *New in 2019*

In 2019,the Frankfurt FID team won the bid for another period of funding from the German ResearchFoundation (2019–2021). The librarian continues to manageFID access permissions for staff and fellows of the Maimonides Centre.

FID subscriptions July 2018 to September 2019

Staff  Fellows, post-docs  Report on the LibraryofJewish Scepticism 305

Faculty LibraryCommittee

Since September 2019,the librarian is an advising memberofthe Library Committee of the Faculty of Humanities at Universität Hamburg.

Book Donations

We wish to express our sincerethanks for donations of books receivedfrom Daniel Boyarin (University of California), Moshe Idel (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Ariel Malachi (Bar-Ilan University,Ramat-Gan), Yitzhak Melamed(Johns Hopkins Univer- sity,Baltimore), Yoav Meyrav (Universität Hamburg), Dalyah Netser-Tsafrir (Moshav Kefar Yehoshu’a), Lilian Türk (Universität Hamburg), Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg), Irina Wandrey (Centre for the StudyofManuscript Cultures, Hamburg), and unnamed formerfellows.

Statistics

July 2018 to September 2019

Institute for Jewish Philosophy and Religion

Acquisitions (physical volumes)  Items catalogued (incl.earlier acquisitions) 

Maimonides Centrefor Advanced Studies

Acquisitions (physical volumes)  Items catalogued (incl.earlier acquisitions) 