Unwilling to War: Rethinking Sir Edward Grey’s

Foreign Policy and Role in the July Crisis

A thesis submitted to fulfil the Masters by Research in History College of Arts, Business, Law and Social Sciences

Respectfully Submitted

By

Steven C. Basford Bachelor of Arts Philosophy and History (Colo)

March 2020 Table of Contents Abstract ...... ii Declaration ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv List of Figures ...... v Abbreviations ...... vi Introduction ...... 1 Chapter One: Context and Controversy ...... 9 Political and Imperial Context ...... 9 Grey’s Political Influences and Ideology ...... 12 Britain’s Economic Policy and its Impact on Foreign Policy ...... 19 Britain’s Post-Isolationist Policy ...... 29 Summation ...... 37 The Controversy: Grey’s Policy-Making ...... 37 Grey’s Legitimacy: The Entente Cordiale and Algeciras 1905-06 ...... 37 Extending the Spirit of the Entente Cordiale: The Tripartite Treaty 1906 ...... 44 Friends at Last: The Anglo-Russian Entente 1907 ...... 47 Reaffirming the Japanese Alliance 1911 ...... 54 Summation ...... 58 Chapter Two: Grey’s Crises 1905-1913 ...... 60 The First Watershed: The First Moroccan Crisis 1905-06 ...... 61 The Second Watershed: The Bosnian Crisis 1908-09 ...... 71 The Third Watershed: The Second Moroccan Crisis 1911 ...... 80 The Fourth Watershed: The Balkan War 1912-13 ...... 90 Summation ...... 98 Chapter Three: Grey and the July Crisis 1914 ...... 100 The Fifth Watershed: The July Crisis 1914 ...... 102 Summation ...... 133 Chapter Four: The Confluence of Leadership Studies and History ...... 135 The Evolution of Leadership Studies ...... 136 The History-Leadership Nexus ...... 137 The Emergence of Situational Leadership ...... 143 Hersey-Blanchard’s Situational Theory ...... 147 Hermann’s Situational Cube ...... 153 Applying a Theoretical Lens ...... 156 Summation ...... 160 Chapter Five: Assessing Grey and the ‘Five Crises’ ...... 163 A Question of Continuity ...... 163 Grey the Democratic Leader ...... 166 The Long Road to War: The First Four Crises ...... 180 Grey’s Fateful Nadir: The July Crisis ...... 188 Summation ...... 193 Conclusion ...... 195 Bibliography ...... 200

i Abstract

Within the extensive historical discourse on Sir Edward Grey’s tenure as Foreign Secretary

(1905-1916), he is considered one of those ‘men of 1914’ responsible for the onset of the

First World War. The assertion is that Grey’s ‘own’ policy-making contributed to the July

Crisis and that his failure to act resulted in Britain’s decision to go to war. In assessing the

scholarship on Grey, this thesis will determine if his role and decision-making power as

Foreign Secretary have been overstated by examining four key policies and his ‘five crises’.

This thesis aims to critically analyse the extent of Grey’s agency in shaping foreign policy in the preceding years that led-up to the July Crisis and the War. To achieve this aim, it utilises an adapted model that provides a theoretical lens for evaluating Grey’s leadership style and the ‘five crises’, but also clarifies the definition of these ‘crises’. The model draws on Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership Theory and Charles Hermann’s Situational Cube.

The findings refute the claim that Grey forged his ‘own policy’, as he inherited policies that were already defined and planned for as part of a continuation of a broader imperial strategy

for foreign policy-making. In demonstrating Grey’s preference for diplomacy in foreign

policy, this thesis highlights the complexity of his role in policy-making and defines his

leadership style as democratic. Grey’s belief in and reliance upon the ideal of a ‘Concert of

Europe’ and the value of Ambassadorial conferences were instrumental in his success until

1913 but proved inoperative and futile in 1914.

ii Declaration

I, Steven C. Basford do attest and certify that the intellectual content contained in this thesis is my own work. Where any information has been derived or quoted from sources it has been subsequently cited. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

Signed:

Dated: 9th March 2020

iii Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Murdoch University for affording me the opportunity to research and write this thesis. I also wish to acknowledge the Barr Smith Library, University of Adelaide, for providing access to a plethora of essential primary and secondary sources; their generosity in affording me extended lending periods was immeasurably beneficial. Other institutions deserving of thanks include the State Library of South Australia and Brigham Young University whose online archive holds electronic copies of primary resources.

My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor Dr Andrew Webster. His unwavering belief in this topic, coupled with meticulous standards and attention to detail was immensely valuable to my scholarly development. His amicable demeanour coupled and intellectually stimulating conversions were of critical importance throughout my remote candidature.

Lastly, to my partner, Lisa. Without her continued support, reassurance, and belief I would never have embarked on this challenge. Your uncompromising and prodigious standards set a benchmark to aspire to. You have been an inspiration, companion, and a source of much love. Finally, an honourable mention to our two cats – a source of much comic relief and at times unnecessary filing.

iv List of Figures

FIGURE 4.1 THE THEORETICAL LENS APPLIED TO GREY’S POSITIONAL POWER BASE ...... 140 FIGURE 4.2 PROCESS FLOW FOR A TASK ORIENTATED AUTOCRATIC LEADER DURING A CRISIS ...... 152 FIGURE 4.3 PROCESS FLOW FOR A RELATIONSHIP ORIENTATED DEMOCRATIC LEADER DURING A CRISIS 153 FIGURE 4.4 HERMANN’S THREE-DIMENSIONAL SITUATIONAL CUBE ...... 158 FIGURE 5.1 SITUATING GREY’S ‘FIVE CRISES’ IN HERMANN’S SITUATIONAL CUBE ...... 182 FIGURE 5.2 SITUATING THE JULY CRISIS IN HERMANN’S SITUATIONAL CUBE ...... 190

v Abbreviations

BD British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914

Cmd Command

Co. Company

DD Deutschen Dokumente

ed. Editor

edn. Edition

eds. Editors

H.M.S.O. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office

Ltd. Limited

GDD German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914.

GDP Gross Domestic Product

G.P.O. Government Publications Office

PM Prime Minister

P.P. Parliamentary Papers

Pt. Part

RAF Royal Air Force trans. Translated (by)

U.S. United States vol., vols. Volume, volumes

vi Introduction

The lack of historical consensus as to why Europe went to war in 1914 not only reflects the

complexity of its genesis but has fuelled scholarship for over a century. Indeed, historians

have become ‘almost obsessive’ in their quest for a definitive explanation of what caused this

era-defining event.1 The historical enquiry into its origins has attempted to understand the escalating tensions and represents a ‘long debate’ which has identified a plethora of

theoretical possibilities.2 Determining its causation extends beyond the bounds of this thesis.

Suggestions of a structural crisis grounded in global capitalism as suggested by classical

Marxist theory or changes within the international system are but two of several possible rationalisations put forth. The consequences of foreign policy-making by individual decision- makers are perhaps the most plausible explanation which has been amply discussed in the historiography.3

Historians and scholars have and continue to attempt to identify the casus belli that brought

Europe to war and which remains unanswered. What is indisputable is that a series of

preceding crises resulted in increasing tensions between Europe’s elite powers culminating in

this apex. The causal events of July 1914 commenced with the resumption of the antagonism

between Austro-Hungary and Servia after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand on the 28

June 1914. The trepidation that existed between the two nations reflected the contrasting

1 Phillip Bell, ‘Origins of the War 1914’, in Themes in Modern European History 1890-1945, ed. Paul Hayes (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 106-28. 2 See J.W. Langdon, July 1914: The Long Debate, 1919-1990, (Oxford: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 3 Alexander Anievas, ‘1914 in world historical perspective: The ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ origins of World War I’, European Journal of International Relations 19:4 (2013), 721–746, at p. 722.

1 disintegration of one empire versus the emergent independent nation-state freed from the

disintegration of another – the Ottoman Empire.

Attributing blame for the War began with Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which stated that Germany and her allies accepted responsibility for the loss and damage brought about by the War.4 From the outset, historical analyses were divided over this fundamental issue. Bernadotte Schmitt supported the view that the Triple Entente was not to blame, thereby re-affirming German war guilt.5 Conversely, Sydney Fay wrote in 1928 that

Germany and its allies were perhaps not solely responsible.6 In 1961, German historian Fritz

Fischer’s Griffnach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–

1918 (published in English in 1967 as Germany’s Aims in the First World War) revisited the

argument of German war guilt. Fischer’s account asserted that Germany’s foreign policy

directive was to dominate Europe and thereby create an empire that matched Britain’s. Kaiser

Wilhelm II’s imperial ambition for Weltmachtstellung (world power) drove a prolonged

competitive quest by Germany to challenge both Britain’s dominance in trade and naval

superiority, but above all to attain prestige in Europe and the world.7 His Weltpolitik (world

policy) was a grand initiative that was intended to elevate Germany as a global power that included Mitteleuropa (Central Europe) and Mittelafrika (central Africa).8

4 Treaty of Versailles, Article 231, Reparations, online edn, November 1998 [http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa7.html, accessed 11 December 2018]. 5 Harold Temperley, ‘The Coming of the War’, Foreign Affairs, online edn, January 1931, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/1931-01-01/coming-war, accessed 11 December 2018]; see Bernadotte M. Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930). 6 Sydney B. Fay, Origins of the First World War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 2. 7 Paul Kennedy, ‘The Kaiser and the German Weltpolitk: Reflections on Wilhelm II's Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy’, in Kaiser Wilhelm II, (eds) John C. G. Röhl and Nicolaus Sombart (London: New Interpretations, 1982), 143-68, at p. 143; Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), p. 119; Imanuel Geiss, July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), p. 365. 8 Fisher, Germany’s Aims, pp. 3-4, 50-92, 119; Kennedy, ‘The Kaiser’, p. 143; Geiss, July 1914, p. 365.

2 Germany’s desire for cultural and political hegemony stemmed from the Franco-Prussian

War of 1870-71 and the resulting unification of the German states. It spurred the economic industrialisation that powered Germany’s military development.9 Germany expanded its

domestic economic production through a series of commercial treaties with neighbouring

states (Russia, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Servia, Belgium, and Romania) during

1891-97, thereby creating a catalyst for increased growth.10 Germany’s pursuit of world

power befitted a nation experiencing a meteoric rise to become Europe’s industrial

powerhouse. Their continual pursuit of industrial growth and the expansion of trade could

only be realised through economic development and territorial acquisition. The need to

support these objectives forged a dependency on the development of the German military.11

There was an economic co-dependency between industry and the military, which while

improving Germany’s economic standing posed a threat to British superiority.

Despite Germany’s rising industrialisation and pursuit of global power, the complexity of the

War’s origins also requires consideration from a transnational perspective. It can be argued,

for example, that the War’s origins were the result of any of the following: the assassination

of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June; the precipitous German ‘blank cheque’ on 5 July;

the Austrian ultimatum of 23 July, and the subsequent reluctance of Austria to accept

Servia’s compliance to their demands on 25 July; or the announcement of Austria’s

mobilisation on 28 July followed by Russia’s on the 30th.12 All of these events are plausible

triggers, if not determinants for the ensuing conflict that followed. Each perspective asserts

9 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, pp. 50-92. 10 Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy 1871-1914 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), pp. 69-70; Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Manufacture, Monthly Consular and Trade Reports: Consular Reports 298- 300, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 189-90. 11 Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline (New York: Norton, 1974), pp. 3-4. 12 Servia will be adopted throughout the thesis as it was commonly used in the British Documents. This was due to the etymology of Servia being from Modern Greek, as well as Medieval Latin.

3 its own national or transnational accountability and so broadens the historical discourse,

thereby extending the debate with no clear, discernible resolution that pinpoints the actual

causation. However, solely focusing on the immediate causes within the July Crisis overlooks

the longer-term structural factors that pointed towards some type of clash prior to July 1914.

The discussion of accountability has been extended beyond nation-states to those individual

actors, placing the personality of principal figures such as the Kaiser, Emperor Franz Joseph

I, Czar Nicholas II, and Sir Edward Grey at the forefront of the debate. It has been argued

that the outbreak of the war was the consequence of ‘a series of deliberations by a handful of

men’.13 Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933), who remains a controversial figure, is primarily

remembered for the events that led to the First World War. Grey’s enduring reputation during

his tenure as British Foreign Secretary (1905-16) has been the subject of scholarly debate for

over a century and posterity has been less than benevolent.

Multiple distinguished historians have asserted that Grey was one of those ‘men of 1914’

who bears accountability for the outbreak of that grave conflict.14 Some have stated that

Grey’s leadership shaped British foreign policy during his tenure and also their position

during the July Crisis.15 In 1997 one political commentator went so far as to say that Grey

13 John C. G. Röhl, Kaiser Wilhelm II: A Concise Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 85; David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols. (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1938), vol. I, p. 55; L. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Isabella M. Massey, new edn, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), vol. III, p. 385; William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 232; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, pp. xxii-xxiii; Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 276. 14 Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins, p. 276; James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London: Pearson Longman, 1984), p. 205; Gordon Martel, The Month that Changed the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 420-21; Samuel R. Williamson and Russel van Wyk (eds), July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Bedford St Martin’s, 2003) p. 259; Max Hastings, Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War (London: Harper Collins, 2013), p. 38; Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Allen Lane, 1998), pp. 70-71; Annika Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey, Germany, and the outbreak of the First World War: A Re-evaluation’, The International History Review 38:2 (2016), 301-25, at p. 320; Albertini, The Origins, III, p. 385. 15 Martel, The Month, p. 45.

4 was ‘a b***dy awful Foreign Secretary’.16 In 1938, E.F. Willis charged that ‘Grey committed

a serious dereliction of duty’ by not having brought the Anglo-French military discussions in

January 1906 before Cabinet.17 Yet Grey had informed Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman

of the discussions in late January 1906 and that he was merely extending the conversation

that had begun under Lord Lansdowne in 1905.18 In this example alone a fundamental

question of accountability is raised in terms of responsibility – did it lie with Grey, as Foreign

Secretary, or Henry Campbell-Bannerman as the Liberal party leader? Thus, the accusation that Grey was derelict warrants reconsideration. We must, therefore, understand Grey’s contributions to policy-making as a measure of the potential agency he exercised during those fateful events of July 1914.

To date, a comprehensive analysis of Grey’s leadership style has not been undertaken. The

study of leadership, especially of foreign secretaries, within the context of the international

political arena of the First World War, has seldom been embarked on in historical

scholarship.19 What is missing in much of the historiography is a systematic examination of

leadership parameters exerted by the various stakeholders and decision-making processes by

key governmental figures, particularly within moments of crisis. Grey himself outlined ‘five

crises’ of his tenure as Foreign Secretary in his autobiography: the First Moroccan Crisis

1905-6, the Bosnian Crisis 1908-9, the Second Moroccan Crisis 1911, the Balkan War 1912-

13, and the July Crisis of 1914.20 Indeed, Grey’s narrative of a series of escalating crises

16 M. Parris, ‘Another Voice’ The Spectator, online edn, February 1997, [http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/22nd-february-1997/8/another-voice, accessed 8 August 2018]. 17 E.F. Willis, ‘The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey’, The Historian (Spring 1939), 99-109,at p. 106. 18 Viscount Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1925), vol. I, pp. 76-86. 19 Stephanie Schnurr, Alexandra Homolar, Malcolm N. MacDonald and Lena Rethel, ‘Legitimizing Claims for ‘Crisis’ Leadership in Global Governance’, Critical Discourse Studies 12:2 (2015), 187-205, at p. 187. 20 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. viii-xi.

5 leading to a near-inevitable final breakdown has proved influential on all later scholarship regarding the origins of the War.

This thesis aim is to re-examine Grey’s culpability as one of those ‘men of 1914’ to determine if the typical historical accounts have exaggerated Grey’s role in shaping British foreign policy and thereby making it his ‘own’. Secondly, it will reconsider his role in the series of events that occurred in July 1914 and whether his accountability has been overstated. To explore this first argument, four major policy initiatives that Grey either assumed or enacted as Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 1914 will be examined: the enforcement of the Entente Cordiale (1904), the fulfilment of the Tripartite Treaty (1906), the establishment of the Anglo-Russian Entente (1907), and the extension of the Treaty with

Japan (1911). To explore the second argument, an evaluation of Grey’s ‘Five Crises’ will be undertaken using a theoretical lens drawn from leadership theory to determine both his agency and to situate the crises in terms of decision-making. In doing so, it will discern those patterns that can help to explain Grey’s accountability during the July Crisis. To date, it is believed that there has been no investigation of the preceding ‘four crises’ combining leadership studies and a crisis decision-making model.

In asserting Grey’s accountability for events during July 1914, some historians have tended to devalue his tenure as Foreign Secretary in the years before the July Crisis. Grey’s role as the principal decision-maker for British foreign policy during that period is one that saw him successfully navigate the complexities of Britain’s post-isolationist foreign policy. In his autobiography (published in 1925), Grey noted that the ‘five crises’ were a decisive series of events that contributed to the outbreak of the First World War.21 Since Grey played an

21 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xv

6 instrumental role in averting war in the first four crises, we are left to ponder the difference

between those four crises and the fifth and final ‘July Crisis’. How was it he was successful

in the first four instances of extreme decision-making and yet apparently failed in the fifth?

Was this a case that as Foreign Secretary Grey’s agency to affect international diplomacy has

been overstated? There are several possible explanations worth exploring: Did Grey adopt a

divergent approach in 1914, leading to the failure of his diplomacy? Conversely, were his

earlier methods that contributed to successful resolutions simply not applicable to the 1914

crisis, showing a failure on his part to adapt? Perhaps most intriguing of all, was 1914 indeed

a kind of natural continuation of his diplomacy from the previous years, meaning that this

notion of an ambiguous policy and intensifying tension resulted in a natural outgrowth, which

brought about the very outcome it was meant to prevent? Finally, were the events of July

1914 surreptitious, for example, the German ‘blank cheque’ and the Austrian ultimatum, such

that, no amount of external influence by Grey could avert the ex parte decisions already

made? The issues raised in these questions will be explored in the ensuing discussion.

Ultimately this thesis aims to contribute to the debate over the nature of Grey’s role in the

outbreak of the catastrophe of 1914-18. Chapter one discusses Grey’s background, with an

in-depth discussion of the imperial political economics influences and how those forces

shaped his diplomacy. Also, it focuses on the four core diplomatic policy initiatives: the

Entente Cordiale, the Tripartite Treaty, the Anglo-Russian Entente, and the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance. Chapter two examines the historical context of the first four of his ‘Five Crises’; while chapter three discusses the July Crisis, his fifth and final crisis. Chapter four discusses the confluence of history and leadership and lays out the research methodology for evaluating

Grey and his ‘crises’.

7 The framework incorporates Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership Theory and

Charles Hermann’s Situational Cube, which forms the theoretical lens. Applying these models will increase our comprehension of Grey and his role in the five crises, with a particular focus on the July Crisis. Hersey and Blanchard’s theory determines his leadership style (autocratic versus democratic). Hermann’s Cube provides a framework to situate the crises, as well as assesses whether they meet a consistent definition of a crisis. Chapter five situates the five crises within Hermann’s Cube, enabling a correlation between the crises and

Grey’s leadership style and whether it was appropriate for crisis decision-making.

Furthermore, it provides an analytical assessment of Grey’s agency and considers those factors that shaped it and thereby influenced his decision-making in July 1914. The conclusion provides a final assessment of Grey – the politician, historical figure, and ‘man of

1914’.

8 Chapter One: Context and Controversy

Political and Imperial Context

Grey’s biography was comprehensively encapsulated in the studies by Trevelyan in 1937 and

Robbins in 1971. The account here will not attempt to restate what has been most aptly

conveyed; instead, it serves to elucidate those aspects of him that shaped his political

perspective as Foreign Secretary. These include his political ideology and experience during

his time as Parliamentary Under-Secretary under Lord Roseberry. It will identify specific

traits and beliefs that he developed and later employed during his time in office as Foreign

Secretary.

This chapter summarises the intrinsic association between British imperial policy and Grey’s approach to foreign policy. It outlines his role in cementing the Entente Cordiale and forging the Anglo Russian Entente. During his tenure, Grey enforced one and implemented three other political agreements, thereby signalling and re-affirming Britain’s post-isolationist policy. These agreements brought regional stability with other nation-states and thereby eliminated potential points of friction. By solidifying the agreement with France over

Morocco and then again with the Tripartite Treaty over Ethiopia, it reinforced the binding friendship between the two Great Powers. By establishing an agreement with Russia, he allayed fears of any further conflicts in the Far East and created a ‘Triple Entente’. Despite it having been argued that the Russian agreement represented an encircling of Germany and later a means to antagonise Germany, that was not Grey’s intention. Grey had actually set about drafting a paper for a German Entente in 1910 to align British relations with them as

9 they had done so with France and Russia.1 According to Count Paul Metternich the German

Ambassador to Britain (1901-1912), this was Grey’s intent when he assumed office in 1905;

the Algeciras crisis, which saw Britain draw nearer to France, brought an end to that avenue

of rapprochement.2

For Grey, maintaining the balance of power was essential given his apprehension of

Germany, but it also meant Britain would be forced to relinquish complete neutrality. Grey

had stated that Germany was ‘our worst enemy and our greatest threat’.3 Britain held the

balance of power and was faced with two contrary propositions: neutrality or alignment with

two Great Powers in what were perceived as de facto alliances.4 The ententes created

ambiguity for Germany while forcing Grey to walk a tightrope in maintaining that balance of

power and became points of contention as to the War’s origins.5

Grey has been criticised for both the French and Russian agreements, as well as for not

making them formal alliances.6 These two criticisms are somewhat contradictory. Firstly,

Grey did not initiate the French agreement, only that of the Russian. More importantly, by asserting that he should not have made the ententes, it can be inferred that by having done so, it agitated Germany. So, it follows that had he made formal alliances then this most assuredly could have been perceived by Germany as an increasingly aggressive posture by the three

Great Powers after 1907. Any formal alliance would have signalled a formal declaration between the nations and would have provided a clear message as to the scope of their

1 Cameron Hazelhurst and Christine Woodland, A Liberal Chronicle: Journal Papers of J.A. Pease 1908-1910, (London: The Historians Press, 199), p. 194 2 E.T.S Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, 4 vols., XXVIII, 388, Count von Metternich to the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, 17 Dec 1910, vol. III, p. 421. 3 Mulligan, The Origins, p. 52. 4 Samuel R. Williamson, ‘German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered’, Foreign Policy Analysis 7:2 (2011), 205-214, at p. 205 5 H. Butterfield, ‘Sir Edward Grey in July 1914’, Historical Studies 2 (1965), 1-25, at p. 14. 6 George Macauley Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 125.

10 relationships. Nonetheless, alliances would have only served to create a greater perception of a threat of encirclement to Germany and increased their agitation.

The final Japanese Treaty extension in 1911 simply reiterated Britain’s desire for geopolitical stability in the Far East to further their economic trade with China and indeed Japan. All these acts under Grey’s tenure served to establish the continuity of his foreign policy, a pre- existent policy that he simply reinforced, not an original one of his own making. The

essential continuity of Britain’s foreign policy was forged from 1815 and remained

unchanged until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.7 Britain’s foreign policy

framework was one that was built on two clear features: maintaining ‘national security, and

the creation and preservation of fair and equal opportunities for British trade in the markets of

the world’.8

The significance of Grey’s decisions to reinforce existing agreements and conclude new ones

illustrates his keen understanding of Britain’s imperial strategy. Furthermore, by doing so, it

neutralised tensions and thereby created stability and freed up naval resources, to ensure against the growing threat of the German navy. Grey knew the importance of negating potential threats and points of friction that could otherwise derail strategically essential markets, thereby Grey’s foreign policy fulfilled its remit in supporting the overriding imperial policy by continuing what had begun decades earlier. Had Grey allowed the Anglo-French

agreement to ‘languish and die’ at Algeciras, in all likelihood the Tripartite Treaty and the

Russian Entente would never have come to fruition. All of which would have resulted in

7 D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914, (Clarendon Press Oxford 1968), p. 367. 8 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 367.

11 continual points of friction in the respective regions, and there would have been no balance of

power in Europe.

The idea that Grey had his ‘own policy’ is misleading and has overlooked two crucial facts.

The first that it was born of imperial economic intent, and of the post-isolationist

Conservative Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne. The second, that Grey’s ‘own policy’ is

contradictory, the historical facts show that Grey asserted a policy of continuity – the

continuation of which, had been undertaken by his predecessor and which addressed Britain’s

imperial and diplomatic needs and followed a course that was set out in 1851.9

Grey’s Political Influences and Ideology

Grey was born in 1862 at the height of British imperialism, when the empire’s global

dominance was unequalled. It was at the time of Palmerston’s first Liberal government and

the International Exhibition of 1862 when Britain was unsurpassed on every level. Grey was

born into a privileged life, landed title, and from a family steeped in political pedigree. His grandfather Sir George Grey had held the posts of Home Secretary and Colonial Secretary under four different prime ministers up until 1866.10 Grey was unquestionably adept at

sports, ‘real’ tennis, cricket, and football, as well as his beloved pastimes of fishing and bird

watching. Besides the obvious competitive nature of sports, it is quite apparent that Grey was

highly focused and patient, particularly given the nature of the latter two pastimes. While he

never really excelled academically it is clear that when he applied himself to an endeavour,

9 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 436. 10 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxiii.

12 his natural abilities prevailed. The question then was what if anything would that be. Grey

was someone who lacked ambition and direction until deciding to enter public life.11

It was not until 1884 that he became politically aware when he took up the baton his grandfather had held as the last Liberal MP in Alnwick.12 In 1885 he was elected to

Parliament for a new constituency that included Alnwick in his home county of

Northumberland at a time when Gladstone was serving his fourth term as prime minister.

Grey, as a young boy of eleven, had met the lauded Liberal prime minister when travelling

with his grandfather back from Inverness.13 Grey would remark some years later in 1886, now aged twenty-four, ‘that Gladstone was the greatest man in whose presence I have ever been’.14 Grey was astutely aware of Gladstone’s intellectual capabilities, but Grey was

particularly impressed by Gladstone’s shift in advocating for Home Rule, having previously

opposed it.15 Gladstone had recognised the political strength and support that the Home Rule initiative had garnered, something that the Conservatives had ardently opposed during the

1885 election.

Gladstone recognised that the old system of governance of Ireland was no longer functioning

which meant there needed to be a change.16 Grey recognised that Gladstone’s position was

divisive within the Liberal party, and it was that which was pertinent. Despite the fractious effect within the Liberal party Gladstone stood to lead with conviction. He recognised the need for change regardless of the consequences within the party. When leading, great men will not always set a course that will be popular, but what is necessary when doing so,

11 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxiv; K. Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon, (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 18. 12 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxv 13 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxiii. 14 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxvii. 15 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 16 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxvii.

13 particularly with contentious issues, is that the course taken be flexible to change if

required.17 Gladstone’s ‘moral earnestness’ would be a trait that Grey would similarly exude:

his sincerity was a quality admired both at in Whitehall and by foreign diplomats and

leaders.18

Grey, much like Gladstone, was acutely aware of Britain’s responsibilities to their territories.

By 1905 Britain had an even greater need to secure and protect those territories as imperial assets given their economic dependency.19 Grey also knew the importance of the navy, as it

not only served to defend national security but especially as it related to foreign policy in

protecting British dominions.20 Grey’s tenacity in fighting for naval estimates was a battle he

continually embraced throughout his time in office. The Liberal party were divided over

naval defence spending. Naval estimates had been a contentious issue since the Second Boer

War (1899-1902). By 1906 this division was still evident and had escalated after the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance. Grey and the Foreign Office saw no benefit to decreasing naval estimates

at a time when Germany was increasing its naval expenditure.21 The pressure exuded within

the Cabinet to achieve an Anglo-German agreement, whereby naval estimates could be

decreased, posed a challenge to Grey and his foreign policy initiatives, which were grounded

in sustaining naval estimates. Grey had long held the belief that sea power was what

determined foreign policy, ensuring Britain’s safety, including that of the empire.22

17 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 18 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 436; Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (London: Cambridge University, 1969), p. 85. 19 Paul Knaplund, Speeches on Foreign Affairs 1904-1914 by Sir Edward Grey (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1931), p. 14. 20 Knaplund, Speeches, pp. 203-4; BD, VI, Extract from Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence at a Meeting of 26 May 1911, pp. 781-4. 21 Steiner, The Foreign Office, pp. 90-91; D.W. Sweet, ‘Great Britain and Germany, 1905-1911’, in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 216-35, at p. 234. 22 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 126; BD, VI, Extract from Minutes, pp. 781-4.

14 Unlike naval estimates and Irish Home Rule, foreign policy was not a divisive bipartisan issue. Grey, as Under-Secretary had witnessed a bipartisan agreement in terms of continuity of foreign policy. It had begun under Gladstone in 1891 when he declared that he would accept Lord Salisbury’s policy thereby uniting the two parties into ‘agreement on the broad issues of foreign policy’.23 The continuity of foreign policy resonated with Grey and was one

he would follow when taking office in 1905. In 1892, not long after Gladstone had agreed to

the bipartisan approach to foreign policy Grey commenced his first foreign office

appointment. It was during that period that Grey honed his skill at placating both sides of the

House of Commons.24 It was an essential skill: the ability to conciliate two sides to achieve

an objective for one side that the other side needed to accept. Grey shared this trait with his grandfather Sir George Grey who had similarly mastered the House as Home Secretary.25

Grey’s ability to navigate the House would prove a testing ground for his role as Foreign

Secretary where he was often at odds with the Cabinet, particularly with regards to naval estimates. It was in the 1890s during his time as Under-Secretary that he formed his opinion that Germany posed a threat to both Europe and British interests.26

Grey believed Germany’s primary concern was self-serving as they promoted both their national interests along with an aggressive desire to assert their commercial concerns and to do so without any moral compunction.27 Grey was not staunchly anti-German in his foreign

policy; he only disliked how they imposed it. He believed that there was sufficient opportunity for both British and German interests to thrive, such that when trade was good

23 Knaplund Speeches, p. 13; Taylor, The Struggle, p. 436. 24 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 2-3. 25 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 7. 26 Cedric J. Lowe and Michael L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power, 3 vols. (London: Routledge, 1972), vol. I, p. 18. 27 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 133; Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1977), p. 41.

15 for one nation, it meant it would bring prosperity for both nations.28 For Grey, this meant

balancing the need to quell the German ambition to dominate Europe while affording a

latitude to commercial opportunity, but not at the expense of ensuring British security and

interests. Nonetheless, Grey was all too aware of Germany’s rapid progression, and with that,

it was essential to preserve the balance of power, which he knew well before entering office

in 1905.29

Grey was stalwart about the Concert of Europe and believed it was the only means by which

Britain could quell disputes safely and effectively.30 The hundred-year-old process for

dispute resolution was something that required collective participation by the Great Powers.

The Concert bound them together in a way to counteract any one nation exerting too much

power over another but required simultaneous conciliation to alleviate tensions. The

effectiveness of the Concert held true for the 1897 rebellion against the Ottoman rule in

Crete, as the Concert Powers exerted influence and established Crete’s autonomy.31 Grey

recognised the balance of the settlement where both sides were checked, Greece in not

annexing Crete and Turkey not annexing Athens, thereby preserving Crete’s independence.32

The Concert had essentially brokered a quid pro quo resolution with both sides not achieving

their aims. Grey knew the value of both the Concert and favourable exchanges and employed

similar tactics in his handling of diplomatic disputes.33

28 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 134. 29 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 132; Steiner, Britain, p. 42. 30 Trevelyan, Grey of, pp. 73-4; Taylor, The Struggle, p. 436. 31 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 68 32 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 68 33 The Concert of Europe commenced at the Congress of Vienna 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic period. It was created by four of the current Great Powers of Europe. Austro-Hungary (albeit a remnant of the Hapsburg Empire), the Prussians (now the unified Germans), the Russians, and the British. These four nations all agreed to this diplomatic process by prescribing rules and principles to maintain peace between the powers as a means to avoid another conflict like that of the Napoleonic Wars. This international diplomatic system adopted a multilateral approach which would use congresses and conferences to resolve future disputes.

16 Upon entering office, Grey immediately inherited an ongoing territorial dispute, the First

Moroccan Crisis, which would establish his authority as Foreign Secretary and commence his

long tenure over the next eleven years. His time in office was besieged by crises and his

endurance throughout this period saw him garner ‘increasing prominence in the world’s

counsels’, which was due in part to the length of time he served, but also due to ‘the

unchanging nature of the policy he pursued’.34 Grey would be recognised internationally for

his diplomatic achievements, particularly after the Balkan War. Grey had played the ‘honest broker’ role in cementing peace and stability in the Balkans, and yet, a foreboding continued

to linger.35

With the Balkan War, Grey received support from Germany in restraining Austria; by 1914

that assistance was not forthcoming. Grey was all too aware that there was the likelihood of

continued insurrection in the region. The tinder box of Europe was the Balkans on two occasions during Grey’s time as Foreign Secretary and would be the catalyst for what would be the end of his influence. The instability in the region was due to several factors. None

more so than the vacuum that the Ottoman Empire had left, resulting in a wave of

nationalistic fervour and the designs of Austria who were in a ‘profound process of decay’,

all vying to stabilise their legitimacy.36

The collective designs of Austria and Germany outweighed Grey’s exalted status in Europe

and the United States. He would be unable to counterbalance their overriding intensions

armed with his belief in a fractured Concert and Ambassador conferences as a means to preserve peace, which was his de facto position. Grey was an ardent believer in international

34 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 123. 35 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 267. 36 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 6 vols. (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923), vol. I, p. 200.

17 law and that every Power should be held to account, particularly when bound to Treaties.37

Grey had an immense sense of honour, duty, a nobleness of right and wrong, a resolute belief

in imperial Britain from a bygone era. However, one cannot help wondering if it was

misplaced and perhaps ill-judged by 1914. Grey himself noted that:

Those of us who grew to maturity in the nineteenth century acquired our sense of values and formed our first opinions in the latter part of the Victorian age. The general point of view in domestic affairs was already changing rapidly before 1914. The war may be regarded as the division between two epochs in foreign affairs as well. We, who were in foremost places in 1914, belonged to one epoch and have lived into another. We are now confronted by problems that are new to us, our vision may be rendered unsteady by things that seem disquieting or alarming, because they are strange to us.38

The Concert of Europe and the seventy-five-year-old Treaty of London were of Grey’s other epoch. German unification and their subsequent industrialisation, coupled with the emergence of the United States, meant both had emerged as formidable economic powerhouses and created challenges to Britain’s dominant Empire. The U.S. exerted their

newly found power in the form of the Open Door Policy. The United States global political

influence meant Britain had to adjust its policy on economic trade by adopting a post-

isolationist approach. Britain post-isolationist policy had been devised to redress the

changing economic landscape, but as Grey suggested, they had failed to recognise the need to

change or at least adapt their diplomatic approach to resolving disputes. But why would you

change or adapt when it had worked up until 1913? Only retrospectively is it easy to suggest

that Grey and those of his epoch were out of step with the changing political landscape.

37 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 254. 38 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xxi.

18 Britain’s Economic Policy and its Impact on Foreign Policy

Britain’s economic strategy was structurally dependent on the Empire, and as such, it shaped

foreign diplomacy. Britain’s foreign policy had been driven by commercial interests long

before the Industrial Revolution.39 For Grey, foreign diplomacy was as much about

commercial diplomacy as it was national security, and he was compelled to support it, or the

consequences could have been dire.40 Grey saw that Britain’s commercial trade had two

primary objectives. First, that there was a need for ‘arteries of trade’ which should be

accessible to all nations, and that second, those arteries should not be subject to fortification

by another sovereign power.41 Hobson had said that ‘It is not too much to say that the modern

foreign policy of Great Britain is primarily a struggle for profitable markets of investment.’42

Hobson’s remark would have been just as pertinent in the 19th century, but what makes it

more salient in 1902, is that it was at a time of flux in British foreign policy. Grey had

assumed Lansdowne’s primacy in forging foreign policy relations for Britain. Post-

isolationism reflected the changing dynamic of Britain’s global economic position

commercially as well as the challenges it faced militarily from emerging powers. Grey

understood his role as Foreign Secretary, as had his predecessors, ‘that peace and stability in

Europe were the conditions best suited to British trade’.43 The new world economic order had

already impacted Britain’s global position, which was not lost on him. For Grey, preserving peace was paramount to ensuring the viability of commercial trade and overseas interests so

39 Thomas Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of Black Hole”?: Commercial Diplomacy Before 1914’, in The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, eds. John Fisher, Effie G. H. Pedaliu, and Richard Smith (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 25-68, at p. 27. 40 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 27; Sir Edward Grey's Speech Before Parliament, Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series, vol. LXV, 1914, columns 1809 – 1834, online edn, August 1914, [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sir_Edward_Grey%27s_Speech_Before_Parliament, accessed 11September 2018]. 41 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 52 42 John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York, James Pott & Company, 1902), p. 53. 43 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 6.

19 that it could flourish particularly in light of increased competitive threats. Stability in Europe was a primary consideration toward fulfilling the interests of British trade.44

Almost a century before William Pitt the Younger, a staunch disciple of Adam Smith, espoused the ideas of free trade and the need for Britain to abandon protectionism. For Pitt the Younger the notion that ‘British Policy is British trade’ was the essence of British diplomacy, and as such commercial interests were as Palmerston had stated the ‘polar star and guiding principle of their conduct’ in referring to British Ministers.45 The Foreign Office had been a central agency for promoting commercial trade interests since Lord Granville’s appointment in 1851 as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister John

Russell’s government. In assuming his post, Queen Victoria asked Granville to draft a memorandum that set out a plan that was the basis for Britain’s foreign commerce and with that foreign security, by which that trade could flourish.46 Several years later, Lord

Malmesbury considered the principles of Britain’s foreign policy to include the importance of the preservation of commercial interests between nations, such that peace was essential in maintaining this objective.47

Granville’s lengthy service in the Foreign Office set a course that would both be profitable for Britain’s trade while establishing a culture that shaped the attitude of those who followed.48 Grey would be just one of those successors who having worked under Roseberry came into that office at the time Granville was exiting, but naturally would have not only been influenced by it but would be bound to comply with it. The clear directive for foreign

44 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 6 45 Platt, Finance, Trade, pp. xiii-xiv. 46 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. xv. 47 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. xv. 48 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. xv.

20 policy was principally about the preservation of international markets for trade. British

statemen and indeed the Foreign Office were fixated on safeguarding the existing Empire; albeit so it could expand its markets for trade, not expand its territory, which would remain the course until the First World War.49 When we consider Malmesbury’s Circular that espoused the need for the ‘maintenance and extension of commercial and social intercourse between nations’ and coupled with Grey’s belief in the ‘Concert of Europe’ these ideals

enabled him to maintain clear policy convictions as Foreign Secretary.50

By 1902 Britain’s global dominance was being threatened, and the increased competition was

challenging those markets it once monopolised.51 The United States’ 1899-1900

promulgation of an Open Door Policy had promoted the equality of fair trade in China. 52 The

Open Door Policy explicitly ensured a nation’s right to self-governance and that other nation-

states must allow for equal opportunity for commerce and trade. What this meant was instead

of China being divided by Britain and Japan, with imposing threats from Russia, the United

States had ensured open access to trade for all nations to exploit. The Bolsheviks would later

correctly identify it as a form of economic imperialism, which it was.53 This form of

protectionism of nation-states for open economic trading was a way to level the playing field

for emerging nation-states; for Britain though this would pose new challenges to their

imperial economic domination. Such market competition forced Britain by 1902 to re-think

their isolationist laissez-faire policy that had proved so fruitful.54 By seeking a series of

diplomatic relations with Japan in 1902 and France in 1904, it would not only strengthen

49 Platt, Finance, Trade, pp. 354-5. 50 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. xv; Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 83; Taylor, The Struggle, p. 436. 51 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 30. 52 Bruce A. Elleman, International Competition in China, 1899-1991: The Rise, Fall, and Restoration of the Open Door Policy, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015, p. 1. 53 Elleman, International Competition, p. 178. 54 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 28.

21 Britain’s political partnerships but more importantly protect their interests in the form of

economic access to trade and alleviate potential conflicts.

Britain was faced with new economic challenges but responded by making a paradigm shift

and pivoting their economic advantages. In doing so, they adopted a post-isolationist approach which secured specific trading regions. By maintaining their superiority as a creditor empire, they were able to retain power and economic dominance, up until the outbreak of war in 1914. Britain’s spurious ‘splendid isolationism’ had gone unchallenged after the defeat of Napoleon until the 1870s. It can be said that Britain’s foreign policy throughout this period was not one solely bent on propagating British values, rather in furthering a protectionist approach to supporting and securing tangible foreign lands and economic interests. Using diplomacy as a means to mitigate any action that may result in a war, which would undoubtedly derail economic and imperial interests, was the order of the day for Victorian and Edwardian politicians.55

British overseas financial investment between 1862 and 1893 increased almost twelve-fold from £144 million to £1698 million.56 Britain had been and was still the world’s leading economy, and this growth represented a £74 million year-on-year average increase even during the so-called Long Depression (1873-1896). The Long Depression represented an economic conundrum; there was a decline in prices which translated to lower profits, despite productivity output increasing. Britain had experienced an economic depression and an end to free trade as emerging industrial countries like the United States, and Germany challenged

55 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 28. 56 D.K. Fieldhouse, ‘Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision’, The Economic History Review 14:2 (1961), 187-209, at p. 190.

22 Britain’s imperial economic status.57 By 1900, the United States and Germany were the dominant producers of coal and iron, while Britain’s market share had decreased.58 So too in

manufacturing, Britain had in 1870 produced a third of the world’s output, by 1900 this had

decreased by over forty per cent despite the market increasing by four hundred per cent.59

And yet, commodities, shipbuilding, exports, bank deposits, newly formed joint-stock

companies, and individual consumption all increased.60 It was a period of economic change

brought about by an accumulation of several factors.

While Britain’s export markets shrank under increasing competition, the size of financial

investment rose. British foreign overseas investments presented a highly speculative but

lucrative opportunity. The effect of this shift in Britain’s trade and investment saw the

average trade deficit double between 1871-75 and 1891-95 from £62.5 million to £130.3 million.61 The transformational adjustment extended to the banking sector, which by the

1880s was undergoing the start of a continuous amalgamation and consolidation that lasted

until 1920. The economies of scale achieved through these mergers meant a more

competitive domestic banking sector that could offer cheaper services and the consolidation

meant an increase to capital available to lend. However, the economic decline during the

Long Depression has been attributed to the banking systems overhaul, whereby capital

57 M.W. Kirby, The Decline of British Economic Power Since 1870 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 1. 58 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 30; A. J. P. Taylor, ‘The Coal Industry’ in The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition 1875-1914, ed. D. H. Aldcroft (Allen & Unwin, 1968), 37-70, at pp. 43-7. 59 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 30; W. Ashworth, An Economic History of England 1870-1939 (London: Meuthen Young 1960) pp. 34-5; Albert H. Imlah, ‘The Terms of Trade of the United Kingdom, 1798-1913’, The Journal of Economic History 10:2, 170-194, at p. 183. 60 A.E. Musson, ‘The Great Depression in Britain, 1873-1896: A Reappraisal’, The Journal of Economic History 19:2 (1959), 199-228, at pp. 199-200. 61 A. H. Imlah, ‘British Balance of Payments and Export of Capital, 1816-1913’, Economic History Review 5:2 (1952), 208-39, at pp. 237-8.

23 markets sought overseas investment opportunities, which were more profitable than the domestic counterparts.62

The effect of the banking amalgamation saw British banks annual returns decline from 1870-

1913 from 17 per cent to -2 per cent.63 With domestic banks posting negative returns and domestic industries like iron and steel on the decline, foreign investments like railways posed an attractive opportunity. Similarly, British domestic and non-domestic securities between

1870 and 1913 grew by 347 per cent and yet when examined independently, domestic securities grew by 289 per cent while non-domestic grew by 446 per cent.64 The decline in manufacturing and the focus on overseas investments has been construed as a strategic macroeconomic failing of the British government in managing the economy, which yielded the comparative advantage in manufacturing it held until 1870.65 The significance of this is that Britain had undergone an economic shock with their macroeconomic position having suffered a fundamental negative shift. The doubling of trade deficits coupled with declining bank profits, whereby investors sought out greater returns from riskier overseas investments.

The focus on foreign investment continued, and by 1907 it was estimated that this figure was now around £2,900.5 million. Over the next six years, this figure rose by a billion pounds sterling, such that it was then estimated conservatively to have reached between £3,700-

£3,800 million just in public securities. These figures have been continually revised and are widely considered as understated.66 Albert H. Imlah reported that Britain’s overseas balance

62 Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism: the United Kingdom, 1850-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) p. 136; see F. Capie and G. Rodrik-Bali, ‘Concentration in British Banking 1880–1920’, Business History, 24 (1982), pp. 280–292. 63 Richard S. Grossman, ‘Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic: English banking concentration and efficiency, 1870-1914,’ European Review of Economic History 3:3 (1999), 323-349, at p. 344. 64 Edelstein, Overseas Investment, p. 48. 65 John R. Ferris, ‘“The Greatest Power on Earth”: Great Britain in the 1920s’, The International History Review 8:4 (1991), 726-50, at p. 727. 66 Imlah, ‘British Balance’, p. 232.

24 of credit in 1870 was £692.3 million, and by 1880 it had risen to £1,189.4 million.67 The

upward trend continued, more than tripling the 1870 amount by 1900 to £2,396.9 million and gaining a further 40.6 per cent by 1910 to reach a level of £3,371.3 million.68 Over the ten- year post-isolation period, Britain realised a significant increase due to several key factors:

Britain's vast imperial financial wealth and dominance; a speculative demand for investment; and the extent to which British overseas investment was exposed. These factors exerted immense pressure on foreign policy to maintain and avert any potential risk to economic instability, such as conflicts or war.

By 1913 this amount had risen again, but by an even larger year on year amount. Britain’s balance of credit in 1913 had almost reach £4 billion (at £3,989.6 million).69 During the

period 1900 to 1910, the average annual increase was £97.4 million, whereas between 1910-

1913 the increase was £206.1 million, an increase on the year-on-year average of 211 per

cent. The significant financial investment of both public and private securities, loans, interest,

and dividends reflected not only the enormity of Britain’s creditor nation status but similarly

how vital it was to assure fiscal stability through foreign policy. Forty per cent of this sum

was invested in railway investments with forty per cent of that solely in United States railway

enterprise.70 The export of capital was offsetting the declining export of steel; Britain’s

empire had gone from the ‘workshop of the world’ to becoming the world’s bank. With that

responsibility, Britain now assumed the risk that comes with being the world’s lender, such

that the fragile nature of foreign investment meant an increased need to protect against any

threats given their financial exposure.

67 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 3; see Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958), Table 4, pp. 70-75. 68 Platt, Finance, p. 232. 69 Platt, Finance, p. 232. 70 Imlah, ‘British Balance’, p. 233.

25 Up until 1890, Britain had had a comparative advantage in global steel production, but by

1914 Germany had more than doubled the productive output of Britain at 6.5 million tonnes

to Germany’s 14 million tonnes.71 Besides losing the comparative advantage in the

production of steel, Britain had lost its dominance in the U.S. steel market: by 1901 U.S. steel

possessed two-thirds of that affluent market.72 Britain’s supremacy in the steel sector had

been eclipsed: by 1900 it only accounted for 18 per cent of the market share, and by 1914

Britain was only producing at 1880 levels of around 4-5 million tonnes.73 The ascendency of

the United States and Germany as economic powerhouses represented more than the

competition. These two rising nations were also Britain’s two largest trading partners, and

there was an economic dependency. By 1914 Germany had become an integral trading

partner of Britain as they represented their second-largest trading partner.74 Germany had

increased its world trade by 30 per cent from 1900 to 1913 while Britain’s had declined 15

per cent, but despite jostling for world trade, a co-dependency had emerged between the two nations which had grown significantly since 1890.75

Between 1890 and 1913 German exports to Britain rose by £54 million to £80.4 million,

while Britain’s combined exports grew from £30.4 million to £60.4 million for the same

period.76 German exports had risen by 48 per cent, but Britain’s had doubled. There was a

a mutual economic dependency and one that favoured Germany in total, since Britain had a

negative trade balance of almost £20 million. However, two aspects of this trade arrangement

71 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 293. 72 Thomas K. McCraw and Forest Reinhardt, ‘Losing to Win: U.S. Steel's Pricing, Investment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938’, The Journal of Economic History 49:3 (1989), 593-619, at p. 593. 73 Kirby, The Decline, p. 3; Robert C. Allen, ‘International Competition in Iron and Steel, 1850-1913’, The Journal of Economic History 39:4 (1979), 911-937, at pp. 912-13. 74 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 175-176. 75 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 293. 76 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 293.

26 are evident. First, the combined total of trade meant both nations stood to lose should war

ensue. Second, Britain had increased their share of trade from 55 per cent of Germany’s trade

in 1890 to 75 per cent in 1913. Moreover, Britain’s share was only 35 per cent of the total

value of trade in 1890, but by 1913 that share had risen to 43 per cent; therefore, they had

more to lose by going to war in 1914.

The growth in Anglo-German trade over the twenty-three-year period demonstrated

Germany’s ascendency in global trade. In 1890, Britain still had a positive trade advantage of

£4.4 million, even in 1900 the trade surplus with Germany had grown to £7.3 million.77

However, between 1900 and 1905 this trade advantage eroded as Germany expanded exports

to Britain with what were deemed as ‘modern wares’. Germany had increased its exports by

73 per cent from £31.1 million to £53.8 million, thereby eclipsing British exports to

Germany, which only grew by 11.2 per cent from £38.4 million to £42.7 million.78 The result

was a trade deficit by 1905 of £11.1 million for Britain, which reflected the changing

dynamics of world trade that they now operated in, one that not only threatened their

dominance but undercut their financial growth and economic stability.

Britain was financing the vast majority of world trade, but the industry sectors that had

brought her to imperial dominance were in decline. Sugar and silk were no longer viable

commodities, wool and iron were perilously under siege, cotton faced increasing competition

just as steel had. Pax Britannica was now a classical dream, at least from a trade

perspective.79 Britain had not only forged the industrial revolution but had created an

intertwined commercial network, which had led to her providing the financial infrastructure

77 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 293. 78 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 293. 79 Harold James, ‘Cosmos, chaos: finance, power and conflict’, International Affairs 90:1 (2014), 37-57, at p. 42.

27 for commercial trade.80 Nonetheless, Britain still retained a unique financial might and

relative dominance in trade, insurance, and finance.

Despite Britain’s vast wealth, they were exposed financially as half of their savings were

invested overseas. Britain was competing in an international economy which meant that as

the competition intensified, the demand for resources like capital increased – there was a

natural correlation.81 Maintaining the empire already meant spending vast sums on the Royal

Navy and a continual commitment to naval estimates. As such, they were acutely aware of

the impact war could have on financial reserves as it would be capital intensive and impact

the flow of trade from the empire.

The relative weakening of Britain as the leader in world trade had seen them lose almost a

quarter of her trade between 1880 and 1913, from 23 per cent to 17 per cent, but Britain still

led their rivals Germany with 13 per cent, the U.S. with 11 per cent, and France with 8 per

cent.82 Britain remained the great imperial power, despite having declined in relative terms,

resulting from a market-driven move from the world’s manufacturer to the world’s financier.

Hence, the evolutionary shift from the world’s manufacturing leader a century before, to

becoming the world-leading lender and creditor nation by July 1914 meant they had assumed

additional financial risk.83 Britain had not only done this to remain competitive but also to generate wealth and retain Britain’s prestigious international standing.

80 James, ‘Cosmos’, p. 43. 81 David M. Rowe, ‘World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe’, International Organization 53:2 (1999), 195-231, at p. 199. 82 W. Woodruff, Impact of Western Man. A Study of Europe’s Role in the World Economy 1750-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 313. 83 J. M. Keynes, ‘The City of London and the Bank of England, August, 1914’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 29:1 (1914), 48-71, at pp. 49-50.

28 Britain’s Post-Isolationist Policy

Market conditions may well have forced Britain’s economic paradigm shift, but it also reflected their post-isolationist policy. Britain’s economic position had altered in relation to their major trading partners and this, in turn, had implications for foreign policy. Britain had intentionally afforded themselves an extended period of isolationism which enabled them the freedom to manoeuvre, thereby serving both their commercial interests as well as foreign diplomatic ones. It was George Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, who in February 1896, stated that Britain’s isolationism was ‘the isolation of those who do not wish to be entangled in any complications and will hold themselves free in every respect…it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we choose in any circumstances that may arise’.84 The debate as to the significance of whether Britain had a ‘policy of isolation’ before 1895 is not relevant here. The fact remains that until 1902 they were not bound by any formal tie to another nation. Hence the Treaty with Japan would represent a fundamental change due to external pressure and as a means to ensure commercial interests were protected. The agreement represented a new dawn in how foreign policy would be conducted but only in so much as it would continue to preserve Britain’s overseas economic concerns.

Britain’s imperial power and influence over trade and finance had been at the forefront of their economic policy since defeating Napoleon. The century-old strategic directive brought

with it an intricate network of dependencies that shaped the actions for all political parties

thereafter, especially those in positions of leadership, namely Prime Ministers and Foreign

Secretaries. None more so than Lord Lansdowne, who was faced with the first real challenge

of adopting a ‘post-isolationist’ policy brought on at the insistence of the United States. By

altering course in 1902, Britain would set upon a series of policy initiatives that would

84 Christopher Howard, ‘The Policy of Isolation’, The Historical Journal 10:1 (1967), 77-88, at p. 80.

29 transcend the next decade. It set out a new directive, one which embraced the long-standing

economic imperial policy with an emerging need to secure partner nation-states for the

benefit of trade in an increasingly competitive economic landscape.

The British had previously held the belief that isolationism, ‘the policy or doctrine that peace

and economic advancement can best be achieved by isolating one’s country from alliances

and commitments with other nations’, was a course Britain had pursued throughout the

nineteenth century until 1902.85 Ostensibly this definition represents a position whereby

Britain ‘lacked friends among the other powers’ and was viewed as a policy to avoid, as it represented a perception of weakness.86 The so-called belief in Britain’s period of ‘splendid-

isolation’ would lead one to assume that it was part of a master strategy and was planned with

deliberate intent – and it was. Britain had been able to orchestrate their empire and derived

unrivalled autonomy on multiple levels.

The phrase ‘splendid isolation’ is credited to then Liberal MP Goschen in 1864, when he

stated that it was an ‘utterly selfish and isolated policy’ that Britain should retain a position

when nations were seeking greater cooperation. Yet, some had pushed for a ‘non-

interventionist policy’ particularly towards Europe.87 The actual term ‘policy of isolation’ was believed to be first used by Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons in 1871. It was not until the 1890’s that the term was more widely adopted both in the press in Britain and

Germany.88 Britain’s policy of ‘splendid isolation’ by the 1890s was succumbing to a

85 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 709. For further definitions, see George C. Grosscrup III, ‘Isolationism and American foreign policy’, PhD, UMass Amherst 1972. 86 Howard, ‘The Policy’, p. 77. 87 Jonathan Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1866 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 240-1. 88 Howard, ‘The Policy’, p. 79.

30 changing economic landscape where they no longer held a monopoly in global trade or

certain markets. There was a growing need to change their policy to one that reflected

cooperation some forty years after Goschen had made that isolationist statement. Just as

Goschen advocated isolationism, Joseph Chamberlain, Britain’s Colonial Secretary, once a

leading supporter of isolationism, was vociferous by 1898 in stating Britain needed to

abandon isolationism or suffer the consequences of losing their Chinese interests.89

Chamberlain stressed that ‘An understanding is perhaps better than an alliance, which may

stereotype arrangements which cannot be regarded as permanent in view of the changing

circumstances from day to day’.90 The notion of flexibility and non-committal to a formal

alliance would be the basis of the ententes. However, this non-traditional agreement would present challenges. The question of ambiguity in 1914 would stem from the fact that the ententes were not traditional alliances and as such, while having served Britain’s post- isolationist needs, left doubt as to their military intent.

The 1890s saw Britain facing new challenges to their long-standing dominance. The Franco-

Russian alliance in 1894 aligned two European powers, thereby negating previous antagonisms.91 The emerging imperial aspirations of the United States, coupled with their

powerful navy and combined with Germany’s and Russia’s naval fleets posed potential

threats to the Royal Navy not seen since Napoleon. However, it was perhaps the declining

Ottoman and Chinese empires that posed the greatest opportunities and threats. China’s

imperial decline had resulted in a power vacuum that presented itself as a highly sought-after prize by Germany, Russia, and France.92 Britain faced a potential threat to their existing trade

89 G. W. Monger, ‘The End of Isolation: Britain, Germany and Japan, 1900-1902, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 13 (1963), 103-21, at p. 104; W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, new edn, (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 508. 90 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 42-3. 91 Monger, The End, pp. 103-121. 92 Monger, The End, p.103

31 in the region as the three European powers appropriated concessions and the likelihood of

partitioning China seemed imminent. Japan’s victory over China in 1895 had resulted in a

scramble for territory and imperial expansion.93 The subsequent Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and

the annexation of Manchuria by Russia saw the realism of partitioning come to fruition.

Britain’s economic trade in the region was now potentially under threat.

Nineteenth-century Britain was not only a bastion of industrialised manufacturing and trade, but they also revolutionised economic and political thinking. Laissez-faire economics had supported Britain’s free rein, at least until 1870 with the emergence of the United states and

Germany now set to follow suit and 1899 with the Open Door Policy initiative.94 Laissez-

faire economics under the banner of isolationism had served Britain’s imperial cause; it was

the ethos behind global free trade and established the pound sterling as the ‘good as gold’

global currency.95 Britain had prospered and established itself as the pinnacle of what could be achieved through industrial might and international exploitation, and the financial benefits from this freedom and dominance were about to end as they entered the new era of post-

isolationism.96

The 1899 Open Door policy was a mechanism to redress the territorial encroachments in

China by Britain, Japan, France, Germany, and Russia. This policy would stop China from

being subdivided into territories, and thereby, ensure the continuance of free trade.97 The

93 Elleman, International Competition, p. 1. 94 Ivan T. Berend, An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe: Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 15. 95 Berend, An Economic, p. 15. 96 Britain’s Post Isolationism reflects the post-1902 period up until the outbreak of war in 1914. Britain had been in a period of self-imposed ‘splendid isolation’ from the mid-1880s up until 1902, whereby they had no stipulated diplomatic alliances or ties to any other power. Post-Isolation represented a new period where Britain entered a series of agreements with specific powers, primarily Japan, France, and Russia to both alleviate points of friction that threatened existing trade, thereby reducing resources to combat impending threats. 97 Elleman, International Competition, p. 1.

32 initiative itself looked to assure free competition as opposed to zones of economic enterprise,

and thus ensured China’s sizeable domestic markets were open to exploitation by all trading

nations.98 The open door approach to economic trade enabled equality and removed any preferential trading status and thereby furthered economic competition among the imperial powers, something which Britain was already struggling with.99 For Britain this meant not

having privileged status, they would have to compete in the open market and thereby be

subject to market competition for resources, and then employ industry to create a competitive

advantage, which by now they were losing. After all, profitability would be tied directly to

those resources and the efficient productivity of those goods and services produced.100 By

reducing barriers, it opened up markets, but this extended to open navigation of seas and

required the cooperation of nations to avoid disputes, so ameliorating any potential friction

was necessitated.101 The U.S. led political initiative would be promoted more widely beyond

China when Germany leveraged it politically in 1906 in the First Moroccan Crisis.

The links between politics, trade, and the Open Door Policy would continue to present points of contention throughout Grey’s tenure. In 1911, German railway construction threatened to impact on British trade in Persia, where there needed to be equal opportunities that did not impinge on those interests.102 Even in May 1914, Grey was patently aware of the importance

of Britain’s trade position and that it was necessary ‘to keep the open door and to keep the

markets open’.103 Grey had always held that it was a preeminent objective of foreign

diplomacy to assure the country’s peace, thereby ensuring thriving trade.104 While Grey had

98 Elleman, International Competition, p. 1. 99 Elleman, International Competition, p. 1. 100 Elleman, International Competition, p. 1. 101 Elleman, International Competition, p. 1. 102 BD, X, I, No. 707, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 20 March 1911, p. 684. 103 Knaplund, Speeches, p. 227. 104 Knaplund, Speeches, p. 228.

33 minimal sway over financial practices, even so far as any direct contact to the financial

houses themselves, he did maintain communication about matters pertaining to the Empire.105

D.C.M. Platt would use the term ‘watchful insistence’ when referring to how British

commercial interests should be viewed and managed within foreign policy.106

The term ‘watchful insistence’ reflected the tone of British imperial interests, security and

trade. Sir Eyre Crowe noted in his renowned Memorandum of 1907, that: ‘the preservation of

national independence…[But] second only to the ideal of independence, nations have always

cherished the right of free intercourse and trade in the world’s markets’.107 There is some

similarity to Lord Malmesbury’s remarks regarding the importance of nations having an

ability to preserve their national commercial interests and the need for peace. Here Crowe

related security to peaceful trade in the world markets. There can be little doubt that these

assertions some six decades apart still encapsulated the overriding intent of British foreign

policy.

Grey’s approach to foreign policy was bipartisan and one that the Liberals continued as a

policy of Lord Lansdowne, the previous Conservative Foreign Secretary (1900-1905), and

which supported Britain’s post-isolationist free trade approach. Just so long as ‘British trade

was in the ascendant’, they had assumed a laissez-faire approach to commercial interests.108

Grey too looked to support and facilitate British trade by strategically advocating the need for

building a railway in Persia, just as Germany had undertaken in 1911.109 Beyond the

expansionist opportunities, Grey knew there was a need to secure and protect access to

105 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 23. 106 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 244. 107 BD, III, Eyre Crowe, ‘Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany’ 1 January 1907, pp. 402-06 (Appendix A). 108 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 29, 109 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 52.

34 existing trade and communications in the region, particularly as it related to India.110 Britain

was open to free trade, so long as they had control of the access to that market, and could

secure assurance that no other nation would circumvent or interrupt their trade routes. It was

here that protectionist Britain exerted their commercial and naval might in assuring their

interests. Even after their apparent perceptual shift from a protectionist nation, they

maintained their power under the cloak of free trade.

In a speech in 1913, Grey explicitly laid out four central duties of being a British Foreign

Secretary, the third of which was ‘aid in the promotion and encouragement of British

Commerce’.111 Grey recognised that peace and trade were intrinsically linked and that

without the former, the latter suffered. Two of the other three tenets of a Foreign Secretary’s

responsibility were also directly related to commerce. They acknowledged the need to

preserve external political stability in order to maintain both the Empire’s security and

Britain’s ability to communicate with the colonies.112 Grey suggested that a Foreign

Secretary should limit Britain’s imperial expansion: ‘He must prevent the empire from

assuming too heavy responsibilities, especially territorial responsibilities’.113 Grey was

perceptive in realising the inherent difficulties in managing so vast an empire and the need

for strategic resources to protect it, namely the navy. Furthermore, more territory meant a

greater opportunity for points of friction, something he was attempting to negate.

Grey, when addressing the House in March 1914, stated that ‘Your foreign policy must depend very largely on your naval strength’.114 Grey was cognisant that in the context of

110 Otte, ‘‘‘A Kind of’’’, p. 52. 111 Knaplund, Speeches, p. 14. 112 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 13. 113 Knaplund, Speeches, p. 13. 114 Knaplund, Speeches, p. 242.

35 European foreign policy, sea power was the major determining factor, but more so from a

strategically defensive position.115 Sea power had been and was fundamental to Britain’s imperial ascendency and the need to ensure naval supremacy and estimates was a constant source of Cabinet quarrelling. Grey’s position was clear. He held that there must be a common foreign policy that united all the Empire, which must be served by an unequalled

Royal Navy.116 This belief still drove, as it had done in the past, the need for increasing naval

estimates, particularly for the protection of overseas territories, but also to ensure existing commerce and trade. Grey’s objective was most assuredly to preserve peace using diplomacy, but more so, to secure access to those overseas markets that brought prosperity to

Great Britain and supported its economic vitality.

The Foreign Office under Grey continued with the liberal approach to commercial-free trade which was captured by Sir Eyre Crowe’s memorandum. Crowe had stated the importance of

‘freedom of commerce’, which correlated to ‘international friendship of other nations’, especially in light of British naval supremacy it would make ‘them feel less apprehensive’.117

The Foreign Office, and indeed Grey, not only recognised the importance of Britain’s commercial objectives but knew that by supporting openness to trade it would at least, in theory, provide fewer points of friction and outwardly mitigate the appearance of British protectionism and naval supremacy.

115 BD, VI, Extract from Minutes, p. 782. 116 BD, VI, BD, VI, Extract from Minutes, p. 781. 117 BD, III, Crowe, ‘Memorandum’, p. 403.

36 Summation

When Grey took the mantle of Foreign Secretary from Lansdowne, he assumed the

responsibility of safeguarding Britain’s bipartisan foreign policy direction. It was a policy

derived to ensure support and protection for Britain’s imperial interests as part of a

macroeconomic strategy. Grey was but one in a series of men who had orchestrated diplomatic affairs to ensure dominion interests. The position held certain pre-established

conditions and he was bound to operate within them, most notably Britain’s post-isolationist

policy. Under Grey’s predecessor, Britain had emerged from the so-called period of

‘splendid-isolation’ and entered a new phase in the global market-place. Britain was now

competing with two industrial powerhouses who had challenged their dominance in

manufacturing. For Britain, this meant they had to reassert their superiority in the credit

market. These pressures would dictate Britain’s policy directives in the first decade of the

new century, one that would bring unheralded challenges to Grey.

The Controversy: Grey’s Policy-Making

Grey’s Legitimacy: The Entente Cordiale and Algeciras 1905-06

It was Lord Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary in the Unionist government (1900-1905), who

brokered Britain’s post-isolationist policy-making. He first signed the Treaty with Japan in

1902, and then the Entente Cordiale in 1904, the agreement that would provide Grey with a

platform when he assumed the role of Foreign Secretary in 1905.118 Lansdowne further set

Britain’s and indeed Grey’s course by laying out the conditions and framework by which the

118 The Treaty of Japan was an Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in January 1902, primarily designed to assure neutrality to either party in the eventuality either were subject to a conflict. However, under Article II, should either party become engaged in a war involving two or more powers, then the other party was obliged to act in its support. The Treaty was established for a five-year term but was subsequently renewed in 1905 and 1911.

37 1906 Tripartite Treaty would be executed under Grey’s oversight.119 This continuity of

policy, one that the two parties were abiding by, was re-iterated by the departing Lord

Lansdowne in November 1905, who stated that ‘questions of foreign policy should be lifted

out of party politics’ and that ‘foreign policy in this country should be a continuous

policy’.120

Grey’s appointment coincided with rapid reforms within the Foreign Office which enabled

senior officials to be actively involved in formulating foreign policy.121 This period also saw

significant new appointments departmentally and within European Embassies.122 There was a

paradigm shift that followed, with new blood bringing a Germanic focus which set the tone

for foreign policy.123 Grey himself brought a new style of leadership to the Foreign Office; he

was open to critical discussions of ideas, especially those which were in contrast to his

own.124 Grey promoted free-thinking and encouraged ‘responsibility and initiative’. He not

only embraced the opportunity, but he set the tone for it and was seen as easy to work for.125

Grey assumed his Cabinet position despite some initial hesitancy, if not reluctance, and with

no prior Cabinet experience.126 Despite Grey’s initial disinclination, he acquiesced after

Richard Haldane, Britain’s Secretary of State for War, had persuaded him.127 Grey had not

119 G. L. Bernstein, ‘Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Imperialists’, Journal of British Studies 23:1 (1983), 105-124, at p. 118; The Tripartite Treaty of 1906 was an agreement that resolved differences between Great Britain and France concerning Ethiopia. It had been an impediment to securing the Anglo-French Entente and was excluded in order to facilitate its resolution. It brought about a second agreement that would bring the two powers closer together and included Italy as a signatory, thereby resolving another point of friction in North Africa. 120 K.M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 17. 121 Zara Steiner, ‘VII. Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 1906-1910’, The Historical Journal X:4, pp. 415- 39, at p. 415. 122 Steiner, ‘VII. Grey’, p. 415. 123 Zara Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office’, The Historical Journal 6:1, pp. 59-90, at p. 84. 124 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 190. 125 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 190; Robert G. Vansittart, The Mist Procession,(London: Hutchinson, 1958), p. 44. 126 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 62-63; Trevelyan, Grey of, Letter from Grey to Dorothy Grey, 5 Dec.1905, p. 100. 127 Willis, ‘The Foreign’, p. 103; Paul Knaplund, ‘The Memoirs of an Ex-Minister’, The Sewanee Review 34:1 (1926), 99-104, at p. 47; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 63.

38 been Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s preferred choice as Foreign Secretary,

for he had previously extended invitations to both Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) and Victor

Bruce (Lord Elgin), only for each of them to decline the post.128 Grey initially found the

workload fraught and combined with understanding the new regime and with the impending

January elections he was taxed.129 Grey’s reluctance could be construed as a lack of desire for

office given his penchant for country life. More likely it was due to the ‘Relugas Compact’,

which he, Herbert Asquith, and Haldane had planned, and which had failed to come to

fruition. They had plotted to depose the current Prime Minister, Henry Campbell-Bannerman

(1836-1908), due to his stance on South Africa and the Sudan, whereby Asquith would assume the leadership role.130

Immediately upon accepting the post, Grey was thrust into the foray of an international crisis,

the first of several. The Moroccan Crisis would serve to achieve several critical outcomes

besides establishing Grey’s legitimacy as Foreign Secretary. Grey was faced with his first

challenge as Foreign Secretary: whether to implement the Entente Cordiale or ‘let it languish

and die’.131 There was no alternate course; Grey had to support the French and the agreement

for several reasons. The agreement was only the second of Britain’s post-isolationist policy-

making – the first with a European Great Power. Failure to uphold its intent would unquestionably end the accord. It would simultaneously end any opportunity to broker further agreements with other nations, notably Russia. Had Grey not supported it, it would have meant that Britain was not willing to stand-up to Germany. By abandoning France, not only would Britain be willing to stand alone in Europe, they would have given free rein to

128 Wilson, The Policy p. 22; Richard Smith, ‘Sir Edward Grey: The Private Life of a Foreign Secretary’, The International History Review 38:2 (2016), 339-355, at p. 344. 129 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 70. 130 Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1968), p. 47; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 62. 131 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 141.

39 Germany. Grey knew this and also that honouring the agreement was maintaining the

continuity of Britain’s post-isolationist policy.132

The First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-06 would test Grey’s resolve and the Entente Cordiale.133

The crisis provided an opportunity for Grey to affirm the Anglo-French accord, whereby this

‘colonial arrangement’ would offer British diplomatic support to the French over Morocco.134

For Britain, the Anglo-French accord supported commercial trading by assuring there would

be no ‘imposition of custom duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.’135 Perhaps

more so, the ensuing crisis provided Grey with an opportunity to foster British integrity

concerning the agreement with Paul Cambon, France’s Ambassador to Britain, and develop

his reputation in the international diplomatic arena. The implied intent was to bind their

friendship and offer clarity as to their positions primarily over French Morocco and Britain’s

interests in Egypt. It clearly stated under Article 9, ‘The two Governments agree to afford to

one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the

present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco’.136 What this meant was an

acknowledgement of ‘commercial liberty’ under Article 4, ensuring free passage through the

Suez Canal as stated under Article 6, and similarly for the Straits of Gibraltar under Article

7.137

132 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 436. 133 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 69; Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 142. 134 K.A. Hamilton, ‘Great Britain and France, 1911-1914’, in British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 113-32, p. 113; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers London, 1911, vol. CIII, Cmd. 5969 Formally titled, the 'Declaration between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, Together with the Secret Articles Signed at the Same Time’. Article 9, online edn, The Entente Cordiale Between England and France – 8 April 1904, [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/entecord.asp, accessed 14 August 2018]. 135 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Article 4. 136 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Article 9. 137 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Articles 4, 6, 7.

40 Britain was ensuring access to a safe trade route not solely for Egypt, but also trade from the

Indian continent. Grey knew this was of fundamental importance as India was central to

British cotton, jute, hemp, tea, grains, spices, and hides from tanneries amongst a vast array

of exported goods. India had long been instrumental in Britain’s ascendency as the world

leader in trade, but the mercantilism of the East India Company had given way to British

capital investment in railroads, and electric telegraphs. Steamship passage through the Suez

Canal was vital to the ongoing profitability of this enterprise region and the goods it

exported.138

The Entente Cordiale was explicit in its intent to afford France and Britain assurances to

continue to exploit commercial activities and that they would not be prohibited in their

passage. The agreement was explicitly limited to diplomatic support and Germany would test

the strength of that bond at Algeciras. While the letter of the Anglo-French agreement was

explicit, there was also ‘the spirit’ of it. Grey told Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador to

France, that ‘if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising

out of the Agreement…public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favour of

France’.139

Britain’s post-isolationist agreement with France provided Germany with an opportunity to

test the strength of the limitations of the agreement and the Anglo-French resolve. Germany

had been in disagreement with France over Morocco, and while the French Foreign Minister

Theophilé Declassé was in office given his anti-German policy, they were unlikely to get any

138 T. Roy, ‘Trading Firms in Colonial India’, Business History Review 88 (2014), 9–42, at p. 16. 139 BD, III, Grey to Bertie, 10 January 1906, pp. 170-1; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 72-3; Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 149.

41 resolution.140 Declassé, who had been the principal French architect with Lansdowne on the

Anglo-French accord, was forced out by the Germans. They achieved this employing a veiled

threat of war. By early July the French had agreed to a conference over Morocco in

Algeciras.141 The switch of foreign ministers provided Germany with an opportunity to lay

their claim. More importantly, they had succeeded in applying pressure and the threat of war

successfully. Germany believed there was ‘an undercurrent in France, desirous of a friendly

understanding with Germany’.142

France wanted an express message of intent from Britain; what they got was a nuanced

diplomatic assurance. Grey interpreted the intent of the agreement and desired to reassure

France that Britain stood with them. The agreement was specific, and he made it clear that

Britain was bound to the agreement and that they would support France diplomatically in the

current crisis. He avoided extending this interpretation to mean military support and went

further to say that the intended conference should yield a favourable outcome to France.

France had looked for a clearer message that if Germany were to attack France, then Britain

would ally herself with France. Grey was deft in not giving this certainty, as he stated ‘…no

greater mistake than that a Minister should give such an assurance unless he were perfectly

certain that it would be fulfilled’.143 Grey remained of ‘firm will and cool judgement’ despite

the pressure exerted by Paul Cambon.144 He provided diplomatic assurances to France, while

not acquiescing to Germany through the ensuing conference.145

140 GDD, vol. III, Memorandum by Baron von Holstein, 2 May 1905 XX 358, The Chancellor, Count von Bülow, at Karlsruhe, to the German Foreign Office, 5 May 1905, XX368, p. 227. NB. Thereafter the acronym GDD will be used. 141 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 71; Röhl, Wilhelm II, p. 351. 142 GDD, vol. III, XX, 406, Flotow, Chargé D’Affaires in Paris to the Chancellor Prince von Bülow, 7 June 1905, pp. 228-9. 143 BD, III, Grey to Bertie, 10 January 1906, pp. 170-1; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 72-3. 144 Trevelyan, Grey of, pp. 138-139; Grey Twenty-Five, I, p. 73. 145 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, pp. 142-143; Mulligan, The Origins, pp. 57-58.

42 Having been thrust into the foray of international diplomacy, from the outset, Grey intended

to enforce Lansdowne’s policy and preserve European peace. Grey knew the importance of

maintaining Britain’s role in balancing the power of Europe, but also it established him as a

sagacious diplomat.146 Grey himself noted he could not recollect using the term ‘balance of

power’, and indeed, he had deliberately avoided using it.147 And yet, Grey was pivotal in

brokering the crisis, given Germany’s stance on Algeciras and her intent to drive a wedge

between France and Britain, thereby tearing apart the Entente. Grey sought to placate both

sides by indicating to the Germans the seriousness of the situation while offering sympathy to

the French.148 Grey conveyed to Metternich the subtle distinction between France’s

precautionary measures against an attack and that these were decidedly different from the

process of preparing armaments for war.149 Both Grey’s resolve and diplomatic skills would

be tested with the Germans trying to break the agreement and by the French looking for it to

be extended. Grey believed that eventually German aggression would result in confrontation.

Regardless of Grey’s belief that popular opinion supported France, a more direct reply to

Germany did not suit Britain’s cause. Grey would again choose not to rise to German baiting,

for at Agadir in 1911 where he again showed his imperturbable approach to international

diplomatic flashpoints by not responding rashly and sending a gunboat.

The First Moroccan Crisis was Grey’s initiation into diplomacy as Foreign Secretary and

helped to forge his reputation.150 Grey had walked a fine line preserving the intent of the

Entente Cordiale with diplomatic assurances to France. Prime Minister H. H. Asquith would

later refer to Grey as having ‘trodden, without losing his head or foothold, the narrow path

146 T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 241. 147 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 5; Taylor, The Struggle, p. 437. 148 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 85. 149 BD, III, Grey to Lascelles, 31 January 1906, p. 240; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 90-1. 150 Taylor, The Struggle p. 437.

43 between two abysses’.151 While Asquith’s remark was not specifically referring to the

Algeciras crisis, it clearly illustrated that Grey had walked a thin line, which he had done

since entering office. To some degree, this was due to the Entente itself being limited in

scope and partly because Britain was the fulcrum that balanced power amongst the main

states of Europe. For Grey avoiding dragging Britain to war was a primary concern. Despite

Britain’s GDP being twice that of Germany’s $244 billion over half of their $483 billion

GDP was based on the Empire. The British had far more to lose economically, and Grey

knew that Britain was not prepared for war. 152 Grey knew of his limitations, and this enabled

him to maintain clear policy convictions as Foreign Secretary while enforcing Britain’s

objectives.153

Extending the Spirit of the Entente Cordiale: The Tripartite Treaty 1906

Predominantly, Anglo-French differences had been settled in 1904 with the Entente Cordiale.

The agreement had brought France and Britain to an understanding regarding Morocco and

Egypt. However, the Ethiopian question had been excluded due to differing interests between

the two nations. Had they been included they would have complicated the already arduous

negotiations of the Entente.154 Nonetheless, the 1904 Anglo-French agreement would a

foundation by which discussions over Ethiopia could be pursued in the future and bring the

two nations even closer. The deliberate intent of excluding Ethiopia ensured one less point of

contention; it also enabled the two nations to include Italy into a Treaty as a third

151 Michael and Eleanor Brock, H.H. Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 112. 152 Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, ‘The Economics of World War 1: A Comparative Quantitative Analysis’, online edn,[http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/papers/ww1toronto2.pdf, accessed 16 December 2018]; Thomas Otte, ‘Postponing the Evil Day’: Sir Edward Grey and British Foreign Policy’, The International History Review 38:2 (2016), 250-263, at p. 260. 153 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 83; Taylor, The Struggle, p. 436. 154 Edward C. Keefer, ‘Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Tripartite Treaty 1906’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 13:4 (1981), 364-380, at p. 364

44 signatory.155 The signing of the Tripartite Treaty represented to France Britain’s good faith of the spirit of the Entente. The Tripartite Treaty bolstered the Anglo-French friendship and eliminated another colonial-imperial difference between the two powers.156

The issue for France dated back to the late nineteenth century, with a controlling interest in

the Imperial Railway Company of Ethiopia which Britain had subsequently invested in by the

turn of the century. British investors had purchased heavily discounted shares, debentures,

and bonds, such that they held a controlling interest by 1901, which threatened to undermine

French managerial control.157 From a British perspective control of the railway was

paramount, if France were to gain control they could dictate Ethiopian foreign commerce, whereby this would affect British Somali ports which relied on camel trade for operating revenues.158

Over the ensuing years, no resolution was found, but the signing of the Anglo-French accord

provided the necessary mechanism by which further conversations could take place. If not for

a change in the British government, the Treaty would well have been another Lansdowne

success. Discussions reopened shortly before Grey took office in December 1905, only now

Italy was demanding territorial access to its East African colonies which would sever

France’s access to Addis Ababa.159 With Grey having made clear Britain’s desire to further

the French friendship he was faced with the First Moroccan Crisis in Algeciras, and so the

Ethiopian question was put aside. Essentially, the Tripartite Treaty had already been drafted

all Grey needed to do was to ratify any final details.160

155 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 364. 156 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 365. 157 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 365. 158 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 366. 159 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 367. 160 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 367.

45 In February 1906, France suggested that they and Britain sign the Treaty, which was positively received by both Grey and Sir Charles Hardinge, recently appointed Permanent

Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, despite Italy not having signed.161 However, Grey’s enthusiasm was tempered by the fact that he wanted Italian support with the upcoming

Algeciras conference, and he felt it would work against the greater need at that time, so he argued against pushing forward. Italy continued to press for further concessions after the

Algeciras conference. Cambon believed there was collusion between Italy and Germany as they had wanted to be a party to the agreement.162 The new French Foreign Minister

Bourgeois (appointed after the Rouvier ministry had resigned in March 1906) and Grey forced Italy’s hand by agreeing to sign the Treaty having deleted all reference to Italy, at which point Italy acquiesced.163 Bourgeois had attempted to change the terms of the agreement by only focusing on railways. Grey was not in favour of this, and he rejected the proposal as it did not favour British interests and failed to resolve the Ethiopian settlement issue.164 France demanded that Britain allow Italy to have territorial access from their western sphere of Addis Ababa, which forced Grey to question French sincerity regarding the agreement and France’s intention of leveraging Britain to appease Italy’s desire for a corridor of access.

Essentially the Tripartite Treaty was about the relative scopes of economic influence each nation would have in the event Ethiopia should collapse and who would have control of the railway system.165 The British Government’s cost was marginal, those who lost were the ones who speculated and invested in the railway, as they lost their investment. France had declared

161 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 378. 162 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 378. 163 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 378. 164 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 378. 165 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 379.

46 the original company insolvent and created a new enterprise; thereby, all investment was

lost.166 Britain’s concession of allowing Italy access to a corridor meant relinquishing part of

their controlled sphere of territory. Nonetheless, Grey believed that in the long-term, this would yield favourable support for future Mediterranean issues, in which Italy could prove a factor.

Friends at Last: The Anglo-Russian Entente 1907

The long-standing intent to forge an Anglo-Russian Entente was finally realised two decades after being suggested by Lord Salisbury in 1888. It was during his second term as Prime

Minister (1886-1892) that Salisbury advocated for a commercial agreement that predominantly related to Persia.167 Grey, during his time as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs, recalled the acute diplomatic relations that had existed between

Britain and both France and Russia.168 Britain would not have had the resources to defend the

Mediterranean and India simultaneously, and both represented strategic importance to

trade.169 Britain had been on the brink of war on multiple occasions, particularly when the

Russians made inroads into Pamirs along the Indian frontier.170 It had always been a

preeminent objective of Grey’s as it put to rest any long-standing imperial challenges by

Russia in the Far East.171 Grey had sought to remove any impending threat to India, and he

166 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 379. 167 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 234. 168 Keith Wilson, ‘Grey and the Russian Threat to India, 1892-1915’, The International History Review, 38:2 (2016), 275-284, at p. 276. 169 Gordon Martel, Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy (London: Mansell Publishing, 1986), pp. 237-241; Wilson, ‘Grey’, pp. 275-276. 170 Wilson, ‘Grey’, p. 276. 171 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 87; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 152-3, 205; Trevelyan, Grey of, pp. 138-139, 141; T.G. Otte, ‘’Almost a law of nature’? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 14:2 (2003), 77-118, at p. 79; Wilson, The Policy, pp. 17, 19; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 205; Lowe and Dockrill, The Mirage, I, p. 17.

47 knew that in doing so, it would secure a ‘Triple Entente’ and both act as a deterrent to and safeguard against Germany.172

From the Russian perspective, they were incentivised by fear of an Anglo-German agreement and Germany’s penetration into Persia.173 The agreement secured Persian independence and thereby both sides had ensured the precept of the Open Door Policy.174 The agreement specifically signified an equal advantage for both nations as it related to trade and commerce in the region, and the agreement extended to other states of interest like Afghanistan,

Baluchistan (a region in Pakistan), and Tibet.175 Tibet was to be a neutral safeguard, while

Afghanistan was relinquished by Russia, thereby assuring the security of India’s northwest frontier.176

Britain had sought a settlement between the two powers since 1903. When Russia changed its position much as the French had done in 1904, an agreement was reached.177 During the

Algeciras Conference, Grey stated that it was imperative that Britain needed to support

France as Russia would never consider an agreement if they had not done so. The Anglo-

Russian Entente was a means to alleviate potential threats to Asia, especially crucial in securing India and protecting Japan from any retaliation for the War of 1904-05.178 While it

172 BD, III, No. 299, Memorandum by Grey, 20 February 1906, pp. 266-68. 173 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 442. 174 Parliamentary Papers, London, 1908, vol CXXV, Cmd. 3750, online edn, My 2009 [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Anglo-Russian_Entente, accessed 15 January 2019]; BD, IV, Grey to Spring Rice, 7 September 1907, p. 584. 175 BD, IV, Grey to, p. 584. 176 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 443; Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995), p. 287; R.A. Johnson, ‘Russians at the Gates of India’? Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900’, The Journal of Military History 67:3 (2003), 697-743, at p. 698. 177 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 442. 178 BD, III, No. 299, Memo by Sir Edward Grey, 20 February 1906, pp. 266-7; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 152, 159-164; Taylor, The Struggle, p. 425; B. J. Williams, ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907’, Historical Journal 9:3 (1966), 360-373, at p. 366; B. Williams, ‘Great Britain and Russia, 1905-1907’, in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 133-47, at pp. 137, 147; J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), p. 314; K. Wilson,

48 averted any possible conflict with Russia, it failed to derail their expansion into Persia.179 The

Anglo Russian agreement represented a means to ensure British imperial interests, not

balance the power in Europe, although in establishing the agreement it did tip the scales

decidedly toward the Triple Entente partners.180

Grey, unlike his predecessors Salisbury and Lansdowne was not considered a risk-taker.181

He had inherited two highly significant binding agreements. Lansdowne had driven Britain’s

post-isolationist strategic international partnerships and was the greater risk taker. He had orchestrated the French accord, the Japanese Treaty, and ostensibly brokered the Tripartite

Treaty and had begun conversations with the Russians during his term in office. The Entente

Cordiale provided Grey leverage to conclude what had been a primary foreign policy objective by establishing positive relations with Russia.182 Grey extended Britain’s post-

isolation policy and brokered the second entente in 1907.183 By Grey securing the agreement

with Russia, and much like the Anglo-French accord had achieved, it brought reconciliation between two Great European Powers.184 In doing so, Grey was conscious of the fact that

having agreements with both the French and Russians it would ‘check Germany’.185

Despite Lansdowne actively commencing the Anglo-Russian process, it was Grey who

concluded the Entente and left his mark on Britain’s post-isolation policy setting. It represented a ‘primary goal of British Foreign Policy’ and addressed a long-held belief that this was a necessary step – it would be his seminal moment in establishing his ‘own

‘British Power in the European Balance, 1906-1914’, in Retreat From Power: studies of British Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, ed. D. Dilks (London: Macmillan, 1981), 21-41, at p. 33. 179 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 236. 180 Wilson, The Policy, p. 75. 181 Lowe and Dockrill, The Mirage, I, p. 17. 182 Wilson, The Policy, pp. 2-3. 183 Lowe and Dockrill, The Mirage, I, p. 17. 184 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 441. 185 BD, III, No. 299, Memorandum by Grey, 20 Feb 1906, p. 267.

49 policy’.186 In 1901, Grey had sent a communique to Leopold Maxse, the then editor of the

National Review. In it, he emphasised the necessity for Britain to establish an accord with

Russia for the sake of business relations.187 Grey told the House in January 1902 that he favoured a Russian agreement to resolve the question of Persia, and indeed threats to Asian interests.188 It would also have implications for reducing any potential future friction,

something which Grey was keenly aware of, thereby enabling him to continue to focus on

Europe. Prior to assuming his Cabinet post in 1905, Grey had underlined the need to enhance

affairs with Russia as a central tenet of his foreign policy.189

From a financial perspective, Article V of the agreement dealt specifically with ensuring both

parties’ investment interests to ensure repayment of interest on loans that had been extended

by both nations.190 Both Britain and Russia had offered the Persian government loans as a

way to exclude any possible German investment in Persia.191 The agreement safeguarded

British commercial interests in Persia too, something Grey had seen as a marked success

when combined with protecting India.192 Britain was fortuitous in that the oil exploration of

William D’Arcy in 1901 yielded dividends in southern Persia in 1908, given they occupied

the south-eastern section.193 Southern Persia was also strategically important as it protected

India, Britain’s second most important trading partner after the United States.194 India

186 Wilson, The Policy, p. 74. 187 Wilson, The Policy, p. 109. 188 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 94; See also Hansard 1902, 101, pp. 609-10, online edn, July 2018 [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/sittings/1902/index.html, accessed 22 November 2018]. 189 Sweet, ‘Great Britain’, p. 216; Trevelyan, Grey of, pp.90-92; Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, pp. 132-135. 190 BD, IV, Chapter XXIX, No. 518, F/O 371/372, The Reception of the Anglo-Russian Convention, Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey, September 2, 1907, p. 578; Yale Law School, The Anglo-Russian Entente 1907, Article V, online edn, 2008 [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angrusen.asp, accessed 27 December 2018]. 191 Keith Wilson, ‘Creative Accounting: The Place of Loans to Persia in the Commencement of the Negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907’, Middle Eastern Studies 38:2 (2002), 35-82, at p. 43. 192 Rose Louise Greaves, ‘Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its Working in Persia, 1907-14’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 31:1 (1968), 69-91, at p. 82; Knaplund, Speeches, p.41 193 Geoffrey Jones, ‘Persian Oil 1900-1914’, in The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry, ed. Geoffrey Jones (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 128-159, at p. 128. 194 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 443;

50 represented Britain’s wealth and might, as their largest colony and the most economically

vital.195 As for the Persian Gulf where Britain also had commercial interests, it would be neutral, thereby stemming Russian advancement.196 By protecting India and the Gulf, Grey

had achieved his two principle aims, his ‘real raison d’être’ of the agreement.197

In forging the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907, Grey not only created continuity of policy, he

unequivocally tied Britain, France, and Russia and set forth a greater deterrent to German

ascendency and dominance on the continent. Grey firmly believed this eliminated any

potential friction with Russia, but more importantly, it checked German aggression.198 The

agreement spurred investor confidence in Russia and thereby created a stimulus for British

investment after 1907.199 Britain’s ferocious appetite for overseas investment opportunities

was met with equal fervour by the Russians who now considered British capital as a way to

exploit their natural resources.200 There was a natural synergy between the two European

powers beyond ancestral monarchy; there were commercial interests that served both nations

yearnings and aspirations.

The Anglo-Russian Entente also aided Russia’s position as a force in Europe and beyond,

especially after the devastating defeat to Japan in 1904-1905.201 As far as balancing the

power in Europe this could be construed as tipping the scale towards what would become the

wartime allies of France, Russia, and Britain. Rather than balancing it, it created an

195 James Foreman-Peck, ‘Foreign Investment and Imperial Exploitation: Balance of Payments Reconstruction for Nineteenth-Century Britain and India’, The Economic History Review, New Series, 42:3 (1989), pp. 354- 374, at p. 354. 196 Keith M Wilson, ‘Imperial Interests in the British Decision for War, 1914: The Defence of India in Central Asia’, Review of International Studies, 10:3 (1984), 189-203, at p.197; Knaplund, Speeches, p. 67 197 Wilson, ‘Imperial’, p. 197; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 165-6. 198 Charmley, Splendid Isolation?, pp. 339-40. 199 R. J. Barrett, Russia’s New Era: Being Notes, Impressions and Experiences- Personal, Political, Commercial and Financial-of an Extended Tour in the Empire of the Tsar (London: Financier and Bullionist Ltd, 1908), p. 41. 200 The Times, ‘Public Companies. The Russian Mining Corporation’, 15 February 1907, p. 15. 201 Williams, ‘Great Britain’, p. 134.

51 imbalance and led to a German perception of encirclement.202 For Russia, Britain’s alliance

with Japan meant any excursion would be met with significant consequences, something

Russia could ill afford given her military and economic vulnerabilities at that time.203 Grey

held the belief that the Ententes still meant Britain was not militarily bound to her new

partners and that they were still neutral. However, there was no ignoring that Germany had

rightly been concerned about any alignment as Prince von Bülow noted in a memorandum to

the German Foreign Office 31 August 1907, the same day the Anglo-Russian agreement was

signed. He wrote that ‘Otherwise Russia and Austria might group themselves in the East with

England, France and Italy against us…’ 204 Britain had fuelled Germany’s anxiety.205

The Anglo Russian agreement was not well received in Britain, and detractors felt Grey had

conceded too much land in Persia and had been too trusting and seceded to Russian

demands.206 There were also those detractors within the Liberal party who opposed the

Anglo-Russian rapprochement.207 The division was so divisive there was the potential for

Prime Minister Asquith’s Cabinet to dissolve. Had Grey not carved out an agreement with

Russia, the potential for reprisals to Japan would have lingered. The agreement stopped any

potential Russian incursion into China, whereby this would have impacted trade and required

naval resources.

The trade-off of Persian land seemed minor in comparison to achieving a strategic objective of British foreign policy, let alone securing India and all the appreciable value it brought to

imperial trade. Compromise or bargaining as Grey had undertaken is a common practice

202 Martel, The Month, p.13; Williamson, ‘German Perceptions’, p. 205; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 203. 203 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 441. 204 GDD, III, XX, 423, Memo Prince von Bülow to the German Foreign Office, 31 August 1907, pp. 255-256. 205 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 441; Otte, The Foreign Office, p. 309. 206 Murray, The Foreign Policy, p. 79. 207 M.B. Cooper, ‘British Policy in the Balkans, 1908-9’, The Historical Journal 7:2 (1964), 258-279, at p. 265.

52 between political elites, particularly when it comes to preserving international markets.208

Grey understood the bigger picture and the need for trade-off, particularly when it added

value to an overriding strategy. Nonetheless, Grey was not convinced that it was ever a

strategic objective of Russia to threaten India.209 After Russia’s failure to thwart Turkish

troop advances in Persia, Grey was of the firm opinion that they lacked the resources to pose

a credible threat to India.210 However, Grey had cemented an Anglo Russian agreement

which partitioned and preserved Persia and created a buffer to India.211

The Anglo-Russian Entente was not a move by Grey to secure the balance of power in

Europe, instead to ensure British imperial interests.212 The division of Persia gave control to

Russia in the north, a neutral central region, and Britain to the south, but this was for political

reasons, not commercial interests, at least not initially.213 This division ensured the Open

Door Policy for other nations who wished to conduct trade in the state.214 Grey is regarded as

the ‘principal author’ of the agreement which originated with Salisbury in 1888 and was broached again in 1904 between King Edward VII and Izvolsky.215 Grey may not have been

the architect, but it was a masterstroke in averting a confrontation between the two powers

and has been lauded as visionary.216 From this, we can conclude that Grey may not have

established Britain’s strategic policy setting, but he certainly advanced it.

208 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 113-17. 209 Williams, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 136-7. 210 Williams, ‘The Strategic’, p. 363. 211 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 154. 212 Wilson, The Policy, p. 75. 213 Platt, Finance, p. 235. 214 Platt, Finance, p. 235. 215 BD, IV, No. 183, F.O. Russia 1677, The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Spring-Rice, pp. 188-9. 216 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 205.

53 Reaffirming the Japanese Alliance 1911

Grey espoused the three central tenets of British foreign policy: the importance of friendly

relations with the United States, the value of the Anglo-French agreement, and the Treaty

with Japan.217 Britain had entered into the Treaty in 1902 with the intent of curtailing Russian advances in the Far East given their respective interests in China and Korea.218 Again, Grey

inherited the foundational work of his predecessor Lord Lansdowne, who had undertaken to

spearhead the agreement. Lansdowne was astutely aware of the significance of such an

accord, for Lord Selbourne, now First Lord of the Admiralty, had run aground on the naval

estimates and had been told to seek arrangements with those naval powers who posed a

threat.219 The British navy was faced with challengers from Germany, the United States,

France, and Russia. Coupled with this, was the fact that the Russians had deployed their fleet

to Asia. In doing so, it posed a threat to Britain’s fleet that supported her interests in China.220

Just as Britain faced limitations to naval estimates, Japan had limited finance to continue to

support naval funding, but what they did have was six first-class battleships.221 The 1902

Treaty specifically stated that if either nation was subject to war by two or more powers, then

the other was bound to wage war as an ally.222

The 1902 agreement provided no significant trade benefits for Japan, which was still in the

development phase of industrialisation; neither did the rewritten 1905 extension. The initial

agreement was due to last five years until 1907. By 1905, coming after the Russo-Japanese

217 Knaplund, Speeches, pp. 26-9; Mulligan, The Origins, p. 56. 218 BD, II, No’s. 122, 123, 124, The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, F.O. 563, January 18, 24, 30, 1902, pp. 111-4; BD, II, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 30 January 1902, Article I, p. 116; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 152. 219 Ian Nish, 'The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty', Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Discussion Paper Houghton Street No. IS/02/432, (London: London School of Economics, 2002), p. 4. 220 Nish, ‘The First’, p. 4. 221 Nish, The First’, p. 4. 222 BD, II, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 30 January 1902, Article 3, p. 117.

54 war of 1904, the revised Treaty was structured to avert Russian retaliation.223 Thwarting

reprisals in the Far East and India were of primary concern to Britain, but from a Japanese

perspective the end of the war had left Japan with a significant manpower shortage, plus they

were financially crippled.224 Britain and the United States had invested in Japan’s war efforts

with commercial loans. Britain despite the Treaty had remained neutral but had wielded

influence by buying two warships from Chile that were previously bound for Russia.225 The

Royal Navy interceded to buy two cruisers bound for Argentina, so Britain kept her hand in

play indirectly, but Britain’s most direct role was the Entente Cordiale.226

While the Anglo-French agreement was in no way directed at Asia, this accord negated any

French intent of support for Russia. The 1905 agreement with Japan, albeit a revised extension, again reiterated Japan’s position in Korea and allowed Britain to include India.

Primarily, the 1905 extension, much like the 1911 agreement, can be construed as three separate Treaties each with their specific purpose.227 Given Russia’s depleted fleet, which

had suffered extensively at Tsushima, there was the belief that Russia would naturally look to

move inward towards central Asia.228 The second alliance was just that, a new alliance, again

brokered by Lansdowne, at the same time as the peace talks for the Russo-Japanese war were

taking place in Portsmouth Maine. The continued inclusion of Korea along with India

increased the geographic scope of the agreement; it also restated their commercial and

industrial interests in China by ensuring China’s independence, and that the Treaty would last

until 1915.

223 David Steeds, ‘The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance and The Russo-Japanese War’, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Discussion Paper Houghton Street No. IS/02/432, (London: London School of Economics, 2002), p. 2. 224 Steeds, ‘The Second’, p. 3. 225 Steeds, ‘The Second’, p. 4. 226 Steeds, ‘The Second’, p. 5. 227 Steeds, ‘The Second’, p. 3. 228 Steeds, ‘The Second’, pp. 5-6.

55 By 1911, Britain had successfully negotiated the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907 and in 1910

had concluded the Japanese-British Exhibition, which provided Japan with an opportunity to

emphasise Japan’s modern civilised government and reiterate their alliance built on their

respective navies. However, there was a need to establish a third Treaty due to both Japan

and Britain having signed agreements with Russia in 1907. These agreements had negated the

1905 Treaty.229 Britain needed to ensure its Pacific territories were secure. Japan required

that it protected them from being isolated, given their concern as to the United States.230

Those treaties secured the territorial integrity of Korea, China, and India, besides removing

Russia as an enemy to both parties and any reprisal to Japan over 1904.231 From a trade

perspective, the international economy and trade were expanding exponentially, and the 1911

agreement included a new commercial treaty, which replaced the existing one that dated back

to 1894.232

The central issue was tariff reform, which had under the 1894 agreement been set very low

for British imports to Japan, creating a favourable market for British mercantile exporters.

Tariffs were a prominent issue within the global commodity markets and counter to Britain’s

view on free trade. Tariffs represented protectionism and akin to increased competition from

foreign traders who could undercut their pricing, which was especially true of the United

States and Germany, Britain’s two largest trade rivals. Britain’s imperial dominance was now

subject to increasing pressure, partly due to policy decision-making, partly due to emerging

nations, and partly because Japan needed to protect their domestic producers.233 The

229 Ayako Hotta-Lister, ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911’, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Discussion Paper Houghton Street No. IS/02/432, (London: London School of Economics, 2002), p. 4. 230 Hotta-Lister,‘The Anglo’, p. 3. 231 Hotta-Lister, ‘The Anglo’, p. 4. 232 Janet Hunter, ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Development of the International Economy’, Studies in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902 – 1923, Discussion Paper Houghton Street No. IS/03/443 (London: London school of Economics, 2003), p. 2. 233 Hunter, ‘The Anglo’, pp. 3-4.

56 complexities of the alliance did not stop there, as Britain had since 1900 invested £65 million

in Japan, approximately 20 per cent of the British government’s loans between 1900-1913.234

The 1905 Anglo-Japanese Treaty was all but nullified by 1911 as Britain had signed an

Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty in 1911 and coupled with the increasing hostilities between Japan and the United States it meant that placating all parties was paramount. Japan recognised Britain’s position was such that they would never ally in a war against the United

States. Since the 1905 Treaty had bound Britain to Japan this stipulation was changed for the third treaty of 1911, whereby Britain was not obligated to come to their aid when they had an existing agreement with another nation.235 Japan had pushed for a third Treaty due to its

annexation of Korea and out of fear of isolation.236 For Grey, the naval alliance was still of

paramount importance as it protected the Pacific waters, freeing up the British fleet.237 It is

significant that after the first Treaty in 1902, Japan had commenced in building more

battleships, which did little to placate the concerns of countries like the United States. Japan’s

undertaking to increase its fleet contributed to destabilising the Pacific region but had Britain

not had a Treaty then this anxiety would have most surely escalated and drawn the Royal

Navy’s resources into the region. Grey knew the value of the Royal Navy and that it

underpinned British foreign policy and Britain’s imperial trade, so the extension in 1911

would be imperative to naval resource allocation.238

234 Hunter, ‘The Anglo’, p. 4. 235 Hotta-Lister, ‘The Anglo’, p. 35. 236 Hotta-Lister, ‘The Anglo’, p. 44. 237 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 230; Jonathan Steinberg, ‘The German Background to Anglo-German relations, 1905- 1914’, in F. H. Hinsley, (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 193-215, at p. 197. 238 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 136.

57 The signing of the Treaty with Japan brought an end to ‘splendid isolation’ in 1902. It set the

foundation for Britain’s move to an agreement with France in 1904 and eventually provided a

natural springboard to the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. The principal reason for the

Treaty was due to the capping of naval estimates. The secondary aspect of both current and future trade cannot be ignored, as Japan sought its place in the global economy. The two driving factors work to support each other: without British trade in the region there would have been no need for a navy to protect it, whereby the Japanese navy would not have been needed, but it is imperative to reflect that Britain recognised the strategic importance. Grey knew this, and Britain invested in Japan accordingly.

Summation

Grey’s objective as Foreign Secretary was clear; to neutralise the four Great Powers through agreements, whereby it would secure peace, thereby stabilising Europe but even more to make sure British trade and commerce could thrive. He had successfully done this in the

Asia-Pacific Region with Japan, Russia, and the U.S. So, it follows that this was part of a master strategy that Grey wanted to remove all potential points of friction. However,

Britain’s post-isolationist policy of ententes presented a conundrum for Grey to navigate. The

ententes alleviated specific potential areas of tension, but they simultaneously exacerbated

anxieties with Germany. Britain was bound diplomatically to the two ententes, and yet, they

were not much more binding than commercial contracts, which allowed Britain

manoeuvrability in terms of freedom from military obligation, unlike the Japanese Treaty.

This presented Grey with a duality: on the one hand, they were not bound militarily, and on

58 the other, they had diplomatic obligations, which was something that Grey continually had to

balance even during the July Crisis.239

The ententes also presented a paradox for Germany. They perceived them as encircling, and

yet they were not alliances and had no stipulations regarding military support. The ententes

were intrinsically ambiguous but were Britain’s answer to addressing their strategic need to resolve the question over isolation. The ententes reflected the changing dynamic of global trade and emerging naval threats, but also the immense sway in international politics that the

U.S. now carried. Britain lacked resources to support the vast scope of its Empire, and without forging agreements to protect markets, Britain would have been exposed to numerous areas of possible conflict. However, having solidified their position through these four agreements, they had ostensibly narrowed their field of vision to Europe and could focus on their biggest potential threat, Germany. Grey was not the maker of his ‘own policy’, but he

did extend Lansdowne’s existing post-isolation policies. He can be credited with the Anglo-

Russian agreement, in so much as he concluded a vital understanding to protect Britain’s

jewel India, and thereby negated another point of friction.

239 Stephen J. Valone, ‘There Must Be Some Misunderstanding": Sir Edward Grey's Diplomacy of August 1 1914’, Journal of British Studies 27:4 (1988), 405-424, at p. 424.

59 Chapter Two: Grey’s Crises 1905-1913

In his autobiography, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, Grey acknowledged five crises as the

seminal events of his time as Foreign Secretary. The First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-6, the

Bosnian Crisis of 1908-9, the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, and the Balkan War of 1912-

13 were each pivotal and marked out the escalating tensions between Europe’s Great Powers.

The culminating fifth and final crisis, the July Crisis of 1914, was the most notable as it led to the ensuing First World War. These first four watershed events defined his term as Foreign

Secretary, as he was able to exert influence and forge his reputation in successfully resolving

these contentious confrontations. Furthermore, they provide a historical thread as to the

evolving tensions and threat posed by both Germany and Austro-Hungary, which continually

endangered European peace before the First World War.

The first four crises have been downplayed when assessing Grey, particularly when viewed

in relation to the July Crisis. The historical emphasis has been on his responsibility in the July

Crisis without necessarily considering how his role in the preceding crises resulted in

averting a major European conflict. By assessing his decisions and those made by other

nations during those events, it can furnish a broader perspective of what was so different

from the July Crisis that it resulted in a European war. Chapter two sets out four crises as

watershed events and seeks to identify their key factors, thereby providing salient information

about Grey, the unique nature of each of the crises, and hence allows us to identify any

patterns that can be discerned.

60 The First Watershed: The First Moroccan Crisis 1905-06

Grey had barely assumed his role as Foreign Secretary under Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s

December 1905 Liberal government before he was called to defend his predecessor’s Entente

Cordiale. Lord Lansdowne’s landmark agreement between the two Great European Powers

put to rest a long history of antagonism, as well as cemented their understanding about trade

and colonial territories. The agreement not only signalled a new Anglo-French accord but

was the foundation by which Britain would build its foreign relations over the next decade. It

was through this concord that Grey would be thrust into the foray of a Franco-German impasse which had festered and begun long before he took office. Arguably, the long-drawn-

out events of 1905 commenced with the imperious grandstanding of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s

landing in Tangier 31 March 1905. The Kaiser’s act represented a symbol of their colonial

aspiration for territorial annexation and sought to challenge the Entente under the guise of the

open door tenet.1 Morocco was viewed as strategically important for those powers who had

an interest in that region, notably France, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain, but now Germany sought to exude imperial might – but more so test the strength of the newly bound friendship between Britain and France.

The significance of this crisis for Grey lay in the fact that it saw two of Europe’s preeminent

Great Powers, France and Germany, pushed to the verge of a confrontation and that Britain was directly bound by the 1904 Entente to support France. Furthermore, it brought into question the emerging strength of Germany and their imperialistic ambitions, who were demanding international recognition to enhance their prestige.2 The First Moroccan Crisis

was the first great power confrontation Grey would face and has been historically viewed as a

1 Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 124; John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 351. 2 Steiner, Britain, p. 33.

61 causal incident and a precursor to the First World War.3 Germany’s primary intention was in

wanting an ‘open door’ to Morocco for commercial and financial opportunities.4 However,

for the Kaiser, there was a more duplicitous subplot. He sought to sever the Anglo-French

Entente, and thereby break the newly bound friendship between Britain and France in order

to establish a Franco-German liaison.

Morocco had been of minor commercial significance up until 1903, as the total foreign trade

had amounted to a paltry 109,495,888 French francs or approximately £4.3 million British

pounds.5 The comparative national interests of this small sum saw Britain with the lion’s

share at 41.6 per cent, while France and Algeria had a 31 per cent stake, with Germany and

Spain’s shares significantly less at 9 per cent and 8.4 per cent respectively, the remainder

distributed among other powers.6 From this alone, we can deduce that the First Moroccan

Crisis was not solely about commercial interests as they were negligible. It was perhaps

Morocco’s economic potential, for it was believed to have significant natural resources. That,

along with its strategic geographic importance, at least from a British perspective, meant the

controlling interests should not be German. With the Anglo-Entente nations vying for

commercial control and dominance in Morocco coupled with Germany’s Weltpolitik, these

three great European powers were heading for an affrontement.

3 Taylor, Mastery, p. 441. 4 GDD, III, XX. 301, The Chancellor, Count Von Bülow, to the Emperor, 4 April 1905, pp. 224-5; GDD, III, XXI. 45, Count Von Metternich, in London, to the Chancellor Prince Von Bülow, 3 January 1906, pp. 235-6; David E. Kaiser, ‘Germany and the Origins of the First World War’, The Journal of Modern History 55:3 (1983), 442-474, p. 452. See Heiner Raulff, Zwischen, Machtpolitik und Imperialismus. Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1904- 05 (Droste publishing house, Dusseldorf, 1976), pp. 123-5; Butterfield, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 14. 5 Eugene Newton Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 2. 6 Anderson, The First, p. 2.

62 The Kaiser was adroit by engaging the U.S. President to prevail upon the French over the

need to call a conference under the guise of the Open Door Policy.7 The Kaiser

communicated to the U.S. President that war with France was likely while suspecting Britain

would attack Germany.8 The Kaiser, through ongoing communications with the President,

had intimated that Germany pursued no gains in Morocco and that they only sought to ensure

their independent sovereign rights. Besides, Germany needed to consider its ‘national

dignity’.9 The U.S. stated they would not participate in the Conference without France, and that they would ensure justice and not tolerate any inequity by Germany.10

While the U.S. representatives played no active role, one cannot overlook their influence and

the role that President Roosevelt took in supporting German demands for a conference.11

Similarly, the U.S. observer White was given more influence than what was to be expected,

and the Germans recognised this. White’s influence was expressly conveyed by Prince von

Bülow who stated 14 November 1906 that Germany should be grateful for America’s

reserved approach, their neutral interest, and that Mr White had been most availing in

resolving impasses and keeping the process of agreement on track, and in doing so ensured

peace.12 It can be surmised that while the U.S. remained formally unaligned to any nation,

they acted as the arbitrator from the outset, thereby ensuring a peaceful outcome, by which

the Open Door Policy would be adopted. So, this in and of itself would suggest a more

influential and active role than that of a mere neutral observatory role. In that regard, this

7 Trevelyan, Grey of, pp. 142-3; GDD, III, XXI, 259, Baron Speck von Sturnberg, in Washington, to the German Foreign Office, 7 March 1906, p. 244; GDD, III, XX, 301, The Chancellor, Count von Bülow, to the Emperor, 4 April 1905, pp. 224-5; GDD, III, XX, 309, The Chancellor, Count von Bülow, to Baron Speck von Sternburg, 19 April 1906, p. 247. 8 Joseph Bucklin Bishop ed., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, online edn, (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 467-471, [https://archive.org/details/theodorerooseve01bishgoog/page/n504, accessed 11 March 2019]. 9 Bishop, Theodore, p. 468. 10 Bishop, Theodore, p. 468. 11 BDD, III, No. 236, F.O. 371/171, Sir M. Durand to Sir Edward Grey, 11 January 1906. 12 The Algeciras Conference, The American Journal of International Law, 1:1 (1907), 138-140 at p. 140.

63 U.S. influence served to support Grey’s agency during the Conference and also illustrates the importance of the U.S. in preserving peace in Europe at that time.

Algeciras provided a foundation for Grey to augment his tenure by not only fortifying

Campbell-Bannerman’s selection for choosing him as Foreign Secretary, but it expeditiously helped him to forge his reputation while alleviating his detractors.13 Trevelyan proclaimed that it was ‘the most important month in Grey’s long tenure’ except for July 1914.14

Trevelyan’s claim was supported by his belief that there was a real potential for war and that the Entente Cordiale could have collapsed.15 If Germany were to attack France, then it could have resulted in a case of casus foederis, whereby Britain would have been compelled to support France.16 Just as Lansdowne had irrefutably provided France reassurance of strong support, so too would Grey, who was adamant that the Anglo-French accord was crucial to thwarting German ambitions. Grey was far from ambivalent as to the German threat, which had now usurped that of Russia, which had been the dominant foci of nineteenth-century foreign policy. The Liberals and Grey’s position on foreign policy directly aligned with that of the Conservatives which they had outlined under Lord Lansdowne.17

The rise of German Weltpolitik paralleled the decline in Britain’s imperial supremacy which was under threat on multiple levels.18 Both the pressure of German geopolitical and economic aspirations coupled with the advent of the U.S. Open Door Policy had influenced

Britain, requiring a post-isolationist shift in foreign policy. Grey was aware of Germany’s naval threat, and this posed potential risks to British trade and national security. Germany

13 Taylor, The Struggle p. 437. 14 Trevelyan, Grey of, pp. 138-139. 15 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 138. 16 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 139; BD, III, Minute by Hardinge on Memorandum by Grey, 20 February 1906, p. 267 17 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 71 18 Steiner, Britain, p. 43.

64 was setting a course of attaining parity with Britain’s international mastery in finance, trade,

and beginning to negate their naval superiority. The Kaiser’s and indeed Germany’s zeal to

challenge the French was fortified by their industrial and growing military might and designs

on European hegemony. More significantly, the Kaiser yearned to destabilise the French

alignment with Britain, but also with their other entente partner, the Russians, as they were

perceived as weak.19 For Lansdowne, as the Moroccan crisis evolved and dragged on, it began to symbolise a turning point as to German antagonism toward Britain and cast a shadow of ill-will between all the powers.20

Grey had sought royal approval for Sir Arthur Nicolson who had served as Britain’s

Ambassador to Russia (1906-1910) and was now Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign

Affairs (1910-1916) would be the representative for Great Britain at the Conference. The fact

that Nicolson had discrete knowledge of Moorish affairs meant he was a more than a capable

understudy.21 Grey had explicitly conveyed in his communique to Nicolson that he needed to

endorse any French proposal put forth specifically relating to Articles II and IX of the

Entente and ‘encourage your Spanish colleague to adopt a similar attitude’.22 Grey had laid

out clear expectations as to what Nicolson needed to affirm to France, which Article II

clearly stated:

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of

altering the political status of Morocco.

19 William Mulligan, ‘From Case to Narrative: The Marquess of Lansdowne, Sir Edward Grey, and the Threat from Germany, 1900-1906’, The International History Review 30:2 (2008), 273-302, p. 286. 20 Mulligan, ‘From Case’, p. 286. 21 BD, III, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, 14 December 1905, No. 193, p. 151. 22 BD, III, Sir Edward, p. 151.

65 His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to

France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great

distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide

assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military

reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose,

provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of

treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting

trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901,

Britain reaffirmed their current position and would not yield to German demands, nor would they allow changes to occur that might otherwise impede British interests, which were above all else their primary concern. As to Article IX, Britain wished to reassert that they had no intention of offering anything more than diplomatic support per the agreement.

The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order

to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and

Morocco.23

However, France was pressing for more than mere political endorsements and alignments.

They wanted assurances that Britain would provide military action as a means to apply

pressure to Germany to back down and to also be able to hold the upper hand in negotiating.

23 Yale Law School, The Entente Cordiale Between England and France, April 8, 1904, Article 9, online edn, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/entecord.asp, accessed 14 October 2018].

66 Grey was reluctant just as Lansdowne had been to offer such guarantees beyond that

contained in the Entente.

In a private letter of 20 December 1905, Grey repeated yet again the need to enforce Article

IX, and that he would attempt to ascertain from the French what the German demands were

and if they were offering any concessions.24 Only then could they determine what the French

would ask of Britain and how this would impact on British interests. Even from the outset

well before the Conference, there was great consternation as to how this would play out.

Grey’s communique to Nicolson shortly after his appointment reiterated the necessity to

support France and that they should ‘Act in Concert’ with them.

On 10 January 1906, Cambon broached the issue of British military support with Grey in the

event that France were to be attacked by Germany. After having had a prolonged

conversation with Haldane on 13 January 1906, Grey authorised both the British and French

navies and militaries to commence discussions.25 Grey had not undertaken this approach

without due consideration of notifying Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman as to the need to

placate Cambon’s request.26 Since the Prime Minister would not be returning to London until

25 January and Parliament was not returning until 29 January 1906, Grey had limited options available to address the French concerns.27 On 31 January after having discussed the matter

with Metternich Grey again communicated to Bertie that preliminary military conversations

had taken place with the French.28 During the conversations, Grey had stressed to the Count

24 BDD, III, No. 199, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, 20 December 1905, p. 161. 25 K. M. Wilson, ‘The Making and Putative Implementation of British Foreign Policy of Gesture, December 1905 to August 1914: The Anglo-French Entente Revisited’, Canadian Journal of History 31:2 (1996), 228- 255, p. 229; BD, III, No. 215, F.O. 371/70, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 15 January 1906, p. 177. 26 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 76. 27 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 76. 28 BD, III, No. 219, F.O. 371/70, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 31 January 1906, pp. 180-2.

67 his position, much like his predecessor, that should there be ‘an attack upon France by

Germany, arising out of our Morocco Agreement’ then the British government could not

stand aside.29 Here again, we see Grey offering a conditional reiteration of Britain’s position,

which was determinate solely on the Moroccan agreement. Grey had similarly offered a

limited commitment to France to negate any potential misunderstanding of the scope of

British intent while stipulating under what conditions Britain would in all likelihood commit

to action if pressed to do so against Germany. Grey’s approach to maintaining peace was not

to inflate nor escalate tensions but to quell them through an inference to Germany and a

reassurance to France.

Cambon had won a small battle, but Britain would not commit further. They had no intention

of an alliance, something that the French desired. Grey had had discussions with Cambon

regarding the possibility of any ‘concessions or alterations’ to the existing French policy,

which could be considered by the French government to avoid war. Grey persuasively

reassured Cambon that Britain did not question French policy concerning their agreement in

Morocco, but did so, to cloak his desire to press the French to ponder concessions. Here

again, Grey showed his masterful means of persuasion by applying pressure to both sides.

Grey was categorical that the agreement with France bore a duality as there was both a

specific meaning in the ‘letter of the agreement’ as well as ‘spirit’ of it.30 While the

specificity of the agreement was limited in scope, the spirit was in the inferred meaning.

There was an intention to extend the good faith of future accords like that of the Tripartite

Treaty.31 The ‘spirit’ of the agreement was understood by both signatories; as Declassé had

also suggested this notion of ‘spirit’ would include the Tripartite Treaty.32 The ‘goodwill’

29 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp.78-81. 30 Knaplund, Speeches, p. 29. 31 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, p. 364. 32 Keefer, ‘Great Britain’, pp. 370-1.

68 between the two powers had facilitated commercial concessions over the Ethiopian Railway.

The ‘spirit’ of the agreement also extended to an ‘expectation’ but not an obligation of militaristic support in the event of a conflict whereby one party would come to the aid of the other if needed. In all, the Entente Cordiale was a signal of friendship, and while it addressed

colonial and commercial enterprise issues, it more importantly brought closure to past tensions.

Undoubtedly the accord marked the transition forward and represented a new chapter in

international politics between the two nations, but also, this paved the course for further

agreements.33 The Algeciras Conference provided the perfect stage to reinforce that ‘spirit’ of

the Entente while also keeping Germany in check.34 Grey’s approach to resolving the impending conflict was astute, as he was able to ensure Britain’s diplomatic commitment to

France without committing anything more than that, thereby curtailing France’s militaristic stance. Simultaneously, Grey was able to deter German aggression towards France by suggesting that Britain would come to France’s aid should military action be taken.35 What

should not be overlooked is the significance of Britain’s willingness to conduct military

discussions. For this represented a form of contingency planning as much as it did a means to

placate the French, while also serving to deter any German thoughts of undertaking action

towards France. Grey similarly made it abundantly clear to Bertie that he felt that Britain

should stand with France if they were drawn to war due to their commitments in the Entente

33 The Guardian, From the archive, 9 April 1904: The growth of the "entente cordiale", Originally published in the Manchester Guardian on 9 April 1904, online edn, April 2011, [https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/apr/11/archive-the-growth-of-the-entente-cordiale-1904, accessed 6 January 2019]. 34 Kennedy, The Rise, p. 282. 35 Mulligan, The Origins, pp. 57-8.

69 Cordiale, but even then, Grey emphasised that ‘If we give any promise of armed assistance it

must be conditional’.36

It should not be disregarded that Grey was reliant on Ambassadors for information and

communication and was not always able to directly correspond with principal decision-

makers. Grey was heavily reliant on information passed to him, whereby he would have to

process, analyse, and choose his responses based on what he could discern from that

information and thereby formulate his replies while not compromising Britain’s primary

interests. It is clear here that Grey was constantly restating Britain’s foreign policy position,

and in doing so, he was not allowing any doubt to enable leverage by one party over another.

In this regard, the repetition serves to remind both parties as to Britain’s position, and the

limits to which they would allow the other parties to undertake or be subject to action. What

is more salient is that Britain stood firm: there was no vacillation concerning the Entente with

France, despite the Kaiser’s desire.

The Conference brought an end to this ‘crisis’ in April 1906. It would have been entirely

avoidable had the Kaiser chosen to accept Britain and France’s conditional offer for a sphere

of influence in Morocco. He declined because they wanted the dispute to be resolved quietly.

The Kaiser had wanted to maintain ‘…the status quo and for the open door and for equal

treatment of all nations whose rights were established by treaties’.37 For Grey, it was a

notable success both in terms of the outcome and in that it reinforced his belief in the

Ambassadorial conference process.

36 BD, III, No. 215, F.O. 371/70, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 15 January 1906, pp.177-8. 37 Bishop, Theodore, pp. 470, 476; GDD, III, XXI, 309, The Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, to Baron Speck von Sternburg, 19 March 1906, p. 247.

70 The Second Watershed: The Bosnian Crisis 1908-09

Grey’s Russian agreement had not only cemented a division between the two nations, but it

also meant Britain was now the fulcrum by which European peace was balanced. On the one

hand, it had alleviated several issues with Russia, on the other, it had created a new set of

challenges in preserving peace between the two groups – the three Entente partners and the

Triple Alliance. To achieve this ‘balance of power’, Grey knew the importance of sustaining

the Austro-German alliance.38 The division of Europe into two distinct factions would result

in increasing the antagonism between Russia and Austria, which would become a significant

factor in 1914. Grey remained hopeful that the two cohorts could coexist despite opposing

differences.39 With that, one can argue Grey’s role in cementing the Triple Entente

exacerbated existing tensions between Russia and Austria. The newfound accord would also

position Grey at the epicentre of their irreconcilable differences.

The Bosnian Crisis began in the autumn of 1908 and provided Grey with the perfect stage to

show unwavering support for Russia. Much like the First Moroccan Crisis was to cement his

tenure and Britain’s alignment with France, so too the Bosnian Crisis would reinforce the

Anglo-Russian Entente. The Bosnian Crisis was unquestionably a prelude to the July Crisis,

as Austro-Hungary sought to exert their control in the Balkan region. The void left by the

demise of the Ottoman Empire, along with a declining Austro-Hungarian Hapsburg Empire,

resulted in instability in the region.

Essentially two key aspects brought this crisis to the forefront of European politics. First,

Austro-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which brought consternation as they

38 F. R. Bridge, ‘Sir Edward Grey and Austria-Hungary’, The International History Review 38:2 (2016), 264-74, at p. 266. 39 Bridge, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 266.

71 undertook to extend their flagging imperial sphere of influence. Austro-Hungary’s actions

created friction with Servia who wanted to increase their domain in the region and to create a

Greater Servia.40 Austro-Hungary was strategically proactive as it would quell any Pan-

Servian plans for regional expansion. Second, was that of Bulgarian independence. Turkey

was insulted, as in their view, the Austro-Hungarians had not only violated the Treaty of

London (1871) but had chosen not to discuss the annexation with Constantinople and merely

offered a derisory form of compensation in the form of Sandjak.41 The once-mighty Ottoman

Empire saw this arbitrary shift from occupation to annexation by Austro-Hungary as more

than just encroachment. They had failed to abide by the Treaties, and for Turkey, it was

egregious, and Grey agreed with Russia that they should extend their support to Turkey.42

The incumbent Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid, had been overthrown by the Young Turks,

who installed a constitutional government. The newly self-proclaimed Turkish régime was

still focused on seizing and establishing formal control in Constantinople, and who according

to Grey, were entitled to consideration when Austro-Hungary exercised their claim.43 The

ensuing Austro-Hungarian annexation on 7 October 1908 would in all essence destabilise the

region, which they had been charged with stabilising under Article XXV of the Treaty of

Berlin in 1878.44 The annexation presented an opportunity for Austro-Hungary to reassert the

once-powerful Hapsburg might and prove they were not merely a satellite of Germany. There

was the prospect of influencing their political power, cultural, and economic sway over the

highly nationalised Slavic region. More importantly, it was a counteractive move against the

40 O.H. Wedel, ‘Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Documents, 1908-1914’, The Journal of Modern History 3:1 (1931), 84-107, at p. 85. 41 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 175. 42 BD, V, No. 301, F.O. 34597/31738/08/44, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, 5 October 1908, p. 390. 43 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 176; BD, V, No. 301, Sir Edward Grey, p. 390. 44 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, ‘The Bosnian Annexation Crisis (I)’, The Slavonic and East European Review 9:26 (1930), 312-334, at p. 312.

72 newly emerging Balkan states, who posed a potential threat to the declining Hapsburg monarchy.

Austria had undertaken the annexation without the consent of the signatories of the Treaty.

Nonetheless, the Kaiser was quick to congratulate and affirm his commitment of support to the Austrian Emperor.45 The actual dispute lay in the conversations and understanding between Austro-Hungary and Russia. The Austro-Hungarians claimed they had informed the

Russians, namely the Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky, and reached an agreement over the annexation; but Izvolsky had bowed to the agreement under pressure from Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal the Foreign Minister of Austro-Hungary. The fact remains that Aehrenthal was endeavouring to restore Austro-Hungary’s status within the councils of

Europe.46 Official documents have illuminated the Aehrenthal-Izvolsky dispute, whereby there is clear evidence that Izvolsky had agreed to the annexation.47 Aehrenthal had a misplaced arrogant belief that Germany was highly dependent on Austro-Hungary, which gave him the credence to act in a manner that usurped consulting the Great Powers.48

Grey counselled the Turks that they should refrain from engaging in conflict. Grey assured

Turkey that Britain would not accept further violations of Turkish territory. Grey remained adamant in reminding Austro-Hungarians of their obligation to the Treaty of London, specifically as it related to Powers abiding by Treaty obligations and maintaining the terms, whereby they could only be changed when there is a ‘friendly agreement’ by the consenting parties.49 Grey reiterated the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, that explicitly stated a need to consult Turkey.50 Grey made it abundantly clear to Metternich that the Austro-Hungarian

45 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 191. 46 Wedel, ‘Austro-Hungarian’, p. 85. 47 Wedel, ‘Austro-Hungarian’, p. 86. 48 Wedel, ‘Austro-Hungarian’, p. 87. 49 BD, V, No. 302, F.O. 34596/31738/08/44, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 5 October 1908, p. 390. 50 BD, V, No. 302, Sir Edward Grey, p. 390.

73 actions, as well as those of Bulgaria, had jeopardised the assurance of international treaties, and that Britain did not acknowledge their actions.51 Metternich replied that he stood by

Austria’s actions, to which, Prince von Bülow, the German Chancellor, categorically agreed.52

Grey exuded a uniformity of purpose in how he broached this crisis, one that was consistent with how he had dealt with France and the First Moroccan Crisis and now with Russia and the Balkans. Again, Grey was fortuitous in that the crisis afforded this opportunity. He conveyed unambiguous diplomatic support and consistency in the application of policy as he had done previously.53 Grey knew that supporting Russian interests was divisive and that by standing by the newly formed Anglo-Russian accord it risked causing a split within his party or the Cabinet. But for Grey abandoning the Russians so soon after having brokered an agreement was not an option. For Grey, he needed to work ‘hand in hand’ with the Russians, but this was not the case as Izvolsky was negotiating behind his back with Aehrenthal to garner his success in securing Russian interests in the Straits.54

From the German perspective, the Austro-Hungarian designs lie in attaining political influence and expanding Austrian commercial interests, not unlike what the French had done in Morocco. Germany was in a predicament as they were friends with the Turks, but the

Austro-Hungarians were their main ally. Their decision was less arduous given Algeciras;

Germany stood by their ally.55 Aehrenthal’s single-minded pursuit to return Austro-Hungary to an elite status was driven by his desire to impress Germany and the rest of the Great

51 GDD, III, Telegram, Count von Metternich to the German Foreign Office, 9 October 1908, p. 306. 52 GDD, III, Telegram, Count von Metternich, p. 306. 53 Bridge, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 264. 54 Cooper, ‘British Policy’, p. 265. 55 BD, V, No. 316, F.O. 34675/31738/08/44A, Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey, 6 October 1908, p. 397.

74 Powers that Austria was not ‘a mere satellite of the Wilhelmstrasse’.56 Unequivocally,

Aehrenthal sought to elevate Austro-Hungary’s power, which placed Germany in a precarious position of alignment and also brought them into direct conflict with the other

Great Powers. Austro-Hungary had thrust Germany into a crisis, and while Germany made it abundantly clear they had not initiated this, but that they too, had been caught by surprise at the rapid undertaking of Austro-Hungary’s actions.57 In Austria, Germany had a reckless ally, one who could undertake an action without regard for implications to their alliance and which could forcibly bring about a conflict which Germany might otherwise not be prepared to make.

It should not be overlooked that France also had legitimate interests in the dispute, given their commercial interests in Constantinople; however, they were reeling over Algeciras and were not inclined to be drawn into this dispute.58 Nevertheless, they were vociferous in advocating for compensation for the aggrieved Turks and supporting Britain and Russia. The French noted that the Austrians had signed along with other Powers at the 1871 Conference in

London, that no nation could ‘free itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify its stipulations’ without the consent of the contracting parties.59 The divisions over the importance and validity of treaties were apparent. France, Russia, and Britain were upholding their integrity while Austria and Germany viewed treaties as a disposable commodity.

The notion of a conference was proposed by the infuriated Izvolsky who felt Aehrenthal duped him over the annexation.60 The Turkish Government was keen to support a conference

56 BD, V, No. 316, Sir F. Lascelles, p. 397. 57 BD, V, No. 323, F.O. 34757/31738/08/44A, Sir F Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey, 7 October 1908, p. 402. 58 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 173-4. 59 BD, V, No. 306, F.O. 34775/31738/08/44, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 5 October 1908, pp. 392-3. 60 BD, V, No. 297, F.O. 34527/31738/08/44A, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 5 October 1908, p. 388

75 since they felt entitled to compensation, something Grey felt could be remedied through

pecuniary remuneration.61 Grey had been reluctant for the conference to proceed until the

scope of the issues and questions to be discussed were broached.62 In delaying the conference

it would enable Turkey, and indeed Britain, both an opportunity to prepare and formulate

strategies. It would have afforded Turkey an advantage to identify opportunities for

compensation from both Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria. To Grey, this seemed most

reasonable since the Treaty of Berlin would most assuredly have to be amended, and without

a prior agreement, the success of any conference was unlikely.63 Austro-Hungary and

Bulgaria had ostensibly vitiated the Treaty of Berlin and what it stood for. However, Bulgaria was within Russia’s scope of influence. Thus, Grey needed to be cautious in supporting

Turkey against Bulgaria, which would place Britain in opposition to Russia.64

Russia was pressing for their interests, namely the access to the Mediterranean, something

which had been a long-standing issue and one Britain had opposed given their naval

superiority.65 Grey also knew that Russia could not be constrained. Nonetheless, he was not

about to be compelled by them to more than he was obligated to under the agreement.66

Throughout the crisis, Grey walked a diplomatic tightrope by preserving consensus between

the Turks and Russians, and further to that there was the ominous threat of Austria and

Russia becoming engaged in a conflict.67 The Russians suggested a middle ground where the

Straits issue would be based on specific stipulations, namely only three ships could pass

through at any one time.68 Grey was coy with Izvolsky suggesting that Turkey were not

61 BD, V, No. 317, F.O. 34727/31738/08/44, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, 6 October 1908, p. 397. 62 BD, V, No. 314, F.O. 34662/31738/08/44A, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 6 October 1908, p. 396; BD, V, No. 317, Sir Edward Grey, p. 397. 63 Sir Edward Grey, p. 397. 64 Cooper, ‘British Policy’, p. 265. 65 Cooper, ‘British Policy’, p. 259. 66 Otte, ‘Postponing’, p. 254. 67 Otte, ‘Postponing’, pp. 254-5 68 BD, V, No. 383, F.O. 36443/31738/08/44, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, 15 October 1908, pp. 448.

76 likely to want to discuss this matter at present and any changes regarding the Straits was purely a decision to be rendered by them. It served Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean too; he ‘hoped Russia would now postpone the question’.69 When meeting with the Turkish

Ambassador, Grey assured him that the decision was theirs and they were under no pressure to do so, and most certainly that there would be no ill will. Turkey was concerned that in doing so, their relationship with Russia would suffer. Grey was sagacious in how he suggested that Turkey should not propose that this was not a matter for discussion. Instead, he suggested that it should be tabled for a later date, so as not to offend the Russians and close the door to future conversations regarding the Straits.70 Further concessions for Russia could have brought problems for Grey and indeed the Government since there were those within the Liberal party who were opposed to further co-operation between the two Powers.71

The Bosnian Crisis of 1908 was unquestionably complex and required the nuanced diplomacy of Grey and his continued faith with the Concert of Europe, which underlined his approach to sustaining European peace between the Great Powers, especially in light of an

Austro-Russian conflict.72 Grey’s adeptness in the Bosnian Crisis saw him curtail any speculative commercial ventures that British capitalists were keen for. Had he pursued and sought commercial interests in the region, it would have jeopardised the Anglo-Russian venture.73 After all, Grey’s primary role was ‘watchful insistence’ not to garner new commercial opportunities, certainly not at the expense of maintaining accord with Russia.74

The Austro-Russian discordance of 1908-9 was such that in 1912 Grey stated that if a war did

69 BD, V, No. 383, F.O. 36443/31738/08/44, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, 15 October 1908, pp. 448. 70 BD, V, No. 383, Sir Edward Grey, pp. 448. 71 Otte, ‘Postponing’, p. 254. 72 Otte, ‘Postponing’, p. 254; BD, IX, 1, No. 745, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 25 September 1912, p. 714. 73 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 188. 74 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 188; Platt, Finance, Trade, pp. 23, 192-3, 217-18.

77 break out then, Britain was not likely to become engaged in it nor intervene on Russia’s side despite the implications to the European balance of power.75

Despite Grey’s fervent support for Russia and their agreement, he and the Cabinet were not about to urge the Turks for concessions as to the Straits, something Russia wanted.76 Grey was endeavouring to gain some counter concessions for Turkey, not demand more of them.

His persistence was recompensed when Austria agreed to compensate Turkey significantly.

Grey had been adroit in informing the Italian Foreign Minister that in the likelihood of a conflict between Austria and Turkey that British intervention was a possibility.77

Nevertheless, Grey was emphatic to Izvolsky that Britain would not offer support to Russia if war broke out between Austria and Servia.78

Grey’s final challenge from the Bosnian Crisis was that of Servian compensation, something which Austria was not prepared to offer; in fact, their intention was more inclined to undertake action against them.79 The outcome was that Servia would not receive any territorial compensation as Germany had applied pressure to Russia, which was not prepared to risk a war. Neither the Russians nor Grey liked this outcome, but the reality was that despite Grey’s unequivocal support in gaining compensation for Turkey, Servia was a step too far. The Austro-German partnership had won that battle in the Balkans, British policy and the Anglo-Russian Entente had proven ineffective as it would do in 1914. The lasting legacy of this precursor to July 1914 echoes clear divisions in a region that had minimal value for

Britain and if not for the Anglo-Russian agreement most probably would never have seen

Britain being drawn into the crisis.

75 Platt, Finance, Trade, p. 255. 76 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 189. 77 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 193. 78 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 194. 79 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 194.

78 The Bosnian Crisis would prove a pivotal juncture in Anglo-Austrian relations, one which the two nations did not recover from diplomatically and indeed was only eclipsed by the events of July 1914. Assertions by both sides marked this turning point, Grey was perturbed by

Austro-Hungary’s demand for railway concessions from Turkey, and conversely, the

Austrians were accusatory of Grey’s support for Russia in Macedonia.80 There were two significant issues concerning this situation. The first was Austro-Hungary’s disregard for their obligations to treaties. Germany chose to support its ally and in doing so, endorsed the violation and thereby supported Austro-Hungary’s actions. Secondly, the crisis previewed

Germany’s actions in 1914 with the violation of Belgium neutrality and abrogation of the

1839 Treaty of London. The fact that both powers disregarded the importance of abiding by a treaty was clear in 1908-9. Austro-Hungary was deliberate in their actions and did not recognise that they violated any part of the Treaty, and Germany was culpable by endorsing them as an ally. Despite the Great Powers demanding that they adhere to treaty obligations,

Austro-Hungary was reluctant to do so, since they held that the provisions of the Treaty

‘contained not one-word respecting sovereignty’.81

This Bosnian Crisis illustrated the extent to which there was instability in the region, regardless of treaties – the region presented opportunities for the acquisition of territory without necessarily investing large amounts of capital. The seeds for an Austro-Servian confrontation were if not sewn before this Crisis they most certainly were after it. The region’s new independent nation-states like Bulgaria had altered their political status from a principality to a Kingdom. With that, there was the prospect of establishing themselves as viable autonomous nation-states freed of Ottoman control – they were not inclined to want to

80 Bridge, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 266. 81 BD, V, No. 318, F.O. 34674/31738/08/44A, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, 6 October 1908, p. 398.

79 be under Austro-Hungarian rule. It also offered the ‘Great Powers’ an opportunity to exploit territorial opportunities and gain footholds in the region just as Austro-Hungary was carrying out. The Balkans were important as they represented ‘Prestige and influence’ and were

‘cardinal points’ for both Austro-Hungary and Russia.82

The Third Watershed: The Second Moroccan Crisis 1911

By 1911, the Second Moroccan Crisis at Agadir saw European tensions between France and

Germany escalate to a level where war seemed imminent. Rebellious instability in Fez saw two of the European Powers with special interests there, France and Spain, both considering intervention. The incumbent Sultan who had governed since the Act of Algeciras in 1906 was now in a dire situation and required French military support. By 21 May 1911 French troops occupied Fez and Germany felt that they had breached the terms of the Act and compensation was due. Both Powers actions posed a significant threat to peace and renewed the Moroccan question of 1905-6, something which would not only reverberate in the region but throughout

Europe. Grey was adamant and warned both nations that neither power should take any action.83 On 1 July 1911, the Germans sent a gunboat the SMS Panther to secure their

African interests against what they saw as French expansionism. The fact was they had fabricated these so-called interests, thereby imagining some potential threat which was non- existent.84 Again, German grandstanding was an act of antagonistic aggression and escalated tensions in a situation that they had a minimal vested interest in, and yet were provoking an

Entente partner as they had in 1905.

82 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 173. 83 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 219. 84 H. H. Asquith, The Genesis of the War (London: Cassell, 1923), p. 91.

80 The arrival of the Panther was, at least from the German perspective, a precautionary measure, and one that was conveyed to Metternich by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-

Hollweg on 4 July 1911.85 Perhaps, more importantly, was the fact that the German

Chancellor made it clear to Metternich that he could inform Grey of this should Britain be contemplating active measures.86 The decision to send the gunboat had already been made regardless of Britain’s position on the events and was both a reactionary move towards

France and a pre-emptive one in case Britain were to pursue active engagement. The Kaiser’s decision reflects two key points: one the lack of either understanding of Britain’s position vis-

à-vis war, or a complete distrust in what Grey had to say or what Britain would do. This reflected the symptomatic decline in relations between Britain and Germany, particularly concerning Grey, and was one which would have ramifications in 1914. Several days later

Germany also sent the cruiser SMS Berlin to support the Panther. The port of Agadir was not used for commercial trade but was a viable naval base and was a significant concern to the

British and posed a potential naval threat to the Atlantic as it was within 500 nautical miles of the straits of Gibraltar.87

Germany’s provocative incursion instigated a crisis that would leave the balance of peace precariously teetering on the verge of war. Again, Britain was resolute, diplomatically siding with France, and for Grey, this meant being bound by and having to defend the 1904 Entente for the second time. On 2 July Bertie sent a communique from Paris and notified Grey of

German intention. Upon receipt on the morning of 3 July Grey immediately spoke to the prime minister, whereby they agreed a Cabinet meeting was required to decide upon what

85 GDD, IV, XXIX, 166, The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, to Count von Metternich, 4 July 1911, pp. 7-8. 86 GDD, IV, XXIX, 166, The Chancellor, pp. 7-8. 87 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 219; Churchill, The World, I, p. 43.

81 course of action should be undertaken.88 After that, Grey informed Metternich of the gravity

of their actions and reassured the French Ambassador Cambon that they were taking the

matter seriously.89

Despite the immediate alarm, Grey’s objective was ‘to steer for peace, not war’.90 Grey

having met with the Cabinet on 5 July sent a message to Germany that any decisions about

Morocco needed to be transparent. Germany held that France’s actions had altered the status

of the Act of Algeciras. Germany was resolute that there needed to be a return to the status

quo, or there would need to be restitution.91 Grey reminded Metternich that just as Germany

had felt the Act of Algeciras had been broken, they too could not stand by as a ‘disinterested’

party. Britain too was bound by both the Anglo-French Entente and the Treaty.92 Grey’s

insinuation could not have been clearer: Britain had vested interests, and just as they had

done previously, they would uphold their obligations, a message they had stood strong on

now on three occasions. For all intent and purposes, Grey was arbitrating as a policing agent

to ensure all parties were held to account.

France too was accountable for their actions, as they too had been culpable.93 Grey urged the

French to withdraw from Fez, and after some debate, he was explicit that neither the French

nor British should send ships to Agadir or any other port for fear of escalating the crisis and

further provoking Germany towards war.94 There was no doubt that Germany’s intent,

88 BD, VII, No. 345, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 2 July 1911, pp. 326-8; No. 347, Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis, 3 July 1911, p. 328. 89 BD, VII, No. 351, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 3 July 1911, p. 330. 90 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 219. 91 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 219. 92 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 92, 94. 93 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, pp. 240-1; Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 219-21; Keith Wilson, ‘The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements’, The Historical Journal, 15:3 (1972), 513-532, at p. 514. 94 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 220; BD, VII, No. 351, F.O. 26236/25641/11/28, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 3 July 1911, p. 331.

82 certainly that of Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter the German Foreign Minister and that of the

German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, was to ‘drive a wedge’ between the two nations.95

Despite the Kaiser failing in 1905-6 to divide and conquer, they were again attempting to sever the ties that bind. For the Kaiser, Germany’s position was that should the Act of

Algeciras become annulled due to France’s action then an open door for trade would be something Germany would expect.96 Conspicuous in this crisis was the complete silence of the U.S. and their Open Door Policy, which had been evident in the First Moroccan Crisis.

The Kaiser, who was so vociferous in espousing the Open Door Policy in the First Moroccan

Crisis, thereby defending the rights of the Sultan, was mute on the rights of Bosnia-

Herzegovina. The importance of their ally outweighed the rights of the aggrieved nations in this instance.

Grey was adroit in conveying to Metternich that he recognised Germany’s interests in

Morocco and that France’s and Spain’s actions had precipitated Germany’s blatantly provocative response, but that Britain had chosen not to react overtly despite actually having vested commercial and strategic interests in Morocco.97 Grey pointed out that he understood

German national interest and that the press required Germany to act, but that their actions were excessive, exacerbating the situation and increasing the state by which the British Press had become ‘excited’.98 He placated Metternich by suggesting that if Britain had sent a ship that the German Press might similarly react in the same manner.99 Grey was deft in this approach as it indirectly asserted understanding as to why they had acted, and yet,

95 GDD, IV, The Agadir Incident 1911, p. 1. 96 GDD, IV, XXIX, 120, Memorandum by the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 23 May 1911, p. 5. 97 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 223; BD, VII, No. 351, Sir Edward Grey, p. 331. 98 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 223. 99 BD, VII, No. 356, F.O. 26235/25641/11/28, Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis, 4 July 1911, p. 334.

83 simultaneously acknowledged that their actions had precipitated trepidation on a national

scale which Britain could not ignore.

Grey had consulted the Cabinet and had attempted to diffuse Germany’s demands for fear of

the crisis escalating. Grey similarly pressed France to make concessions to the Germans, so

long as there were assurances that the Germans would not gain a foothold in the

Mediterranean for fear of impacting British trade routes.100 Grey was resolute that there

would be no German fort or no port in Morocco, thereby preserving British trade interests

which were a primary mandate of British foreign policy.101 Grey was explicit that there

should not be any concessions to Germany with regards to Morocco, but ultimately decisions

were unreservedly to be made by the French and that Britain stood to support them on points

where they felt the Germans had made excessive demands.102 Grey was emphatic that unlike

in 1905-6 France would not be left in any doubt as to British support, a notion shared by

others.103

Germany suggested that they would renounce their territorial interests in Morocco if France

were to provide compensation in the form of the Congo.104 However, the Germans were

unclear as to what they desired in the Congo. Germany’s demands were unreasonable as they

sought to rectify the boundary between Cameroon and the French Congo.105 The Germans

demands were excessive and were viewed as a way to leverage the situation. They were a

means of establishing some form of a non-military post on the Moroccan coast. Prolonged

100 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 223; BD, VII, No. 391, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 17 July 1911, p. 391; Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 241. 101 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 241. 102 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 241. 103 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 241; BD, VII, No. 407, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 21 July 1911, pp. 383-4. 104 BD, VII, No. 367, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, 10 July 1911, pp. 345-6. 105 BD, VII, No. 391, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 17 July 1911, p. 370.

84 silence ensued such that by 19 July Grey believed that negotiations had met with an impasse

and that he was going to propose a Conference of Powers under the Algeciras Act.106 Grey

was concerned by Metternich’s lengthy silence which had lasted over two weeks. Given the

uncertainty over Agadir, he suggested to Asquith on 21 July that he be empowered to

communicate to Germany that if negotiations with France stalled that Britain be allowed to

intervene.107 Grey was adamant and restated to Bertie that while Britain was bound by the

French agreement to provide diplomatic support, they were not inclined to war unless their

interests were at stake.108

What had been a period of speculative unrest and uncertainty was abruptly awakened by

David Lloyd George, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the notorious Mansion

House Speech. The speech was primarily directed to several London financiers including the

Governor and Directors of the Bank of England, along with the city’s merchant bankers.

Lloyd George’s address on 21 July provided the impetus to awaken the Germans from the

long-drawn-out silence. The speech not only had the endorsement from both the PM and

Grey, but had was a statement that had been prepared by the Cabinet, albeit not the whole

Cabinet.109 It sent a resolute message that Britain was not about to be dragged unknowingly

into a European war.110 Lloyd George delivered a cloaked warning to Germany by making it

patently clear that while he advocated for peace, he and the nation must protect national

honour and security of international trade.111 He went further to say that nations are ‘more

ready to discuss calmly and dispassionately their differences, that I feel assured nothing will

106 BD, VII, No. 397, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 19 July 1911, p. 376. 107 BD, VII, No. 399, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Asquith, 19 July 1911, pp. 377-8. 108 BD, VII, No. 405, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 20 July 1911, p. 382. 109 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols. (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1938), vol. I, p. 27. 110 Lloyd George, War, vol. I, pp. 26-7. 111 BD, VII, No. 412, Extract from Speech of Mr. Lloyd George on 21 July 1911, at the Mansion House, p. 391.

85 happen between now and next year’, thus suggesting, albeit implied, that France and

Germany needed to come to an understanding.112 Lloyd George was unequivocal: Germany

needed to be reminded of how seriously Britain took its obligations.113 Lloyd George’s

speech bookended a period of protracted silence. Grey had had a discussion with Metternich

on 4 July, and since then there had been no official reply from the German Government,

during which time tensions heightened.114 For Lloyd George this represented ‘intolerable

insolence’ and that they were ‘blindly ignorant of the sense in which we treated our

obligations under the Treaty’.115 Yet again, a theme of honouring Treaty obligations and

adhering to them was the cornerstone of these repetitive issues that had arisen during Grey’s

tenure and was something which British statesmen were not about to ignore.

Grey had been completely aware of the speech, as Lloyd George had met with him that very

afternoon and ascertained that this length of silence was not the norm. He then read to Grey

what he intended to say in the speech.116 Not only did Grey think that it was appropriate but

that it was justified, and he welcomed it.117 Grey having agreed to the speech’s content

thought that it was most beneficial and he foresaw nothing in it that Germany could construe

as offensive.118 Lloyd George delivered an unwavering ‘rebuff’ of German gunboat

diplomacy and their tardy communication. Germany was riled by the speech and felt they

were making headway with France over concessions in the French Congo. However, they

were still blindly resistant to the fact that their actions of sending a gunboat had heightened

the crisis; they believed that France was at fault.119 Metternich in a meeting with Grey

112 BD, VII, No. 412, Extract, p. 392. 113 Lloyd George, War, I, p. 26. 114 Richard A. Cosgrove. ‘A Note on Lloyd George's Speech at the Mansion House, 21 July 1911’, The Historical Journal,12:4 (1969), 698-701, at p. 698. 115 Lloyd George, War, I, p. 26. 116 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 224. 117 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 224-5. 118 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 224. 119 GDD, IV, XXIX, 210, Kiderlin, in Berlin, to Count von Metternich, 24 July 911, pp. 14-5.

86 communicated that Germany believed the speech to be explicitly threatening and that this only served to increase their resolve towards taking whatever measures were deemed necessary.120 Grey was ‘thoroughly uncompromising’; for all intent and purposes, Germany had misread Britain’s resolve and failed to recognise that they would not sit idly by and allow

Germany to gain considerable concessions in Morocco.121

It was Lloyd George’s speech to which Grey would later give explicit acknowledgement; he attributed to it the preservation of peace, particularly as to how it was received in

Germany.122 Agadir was a culmination of a series of events that accentuated German apprehension and showed their continued desire to not only test but divide the Anglo-French agreement. Negotiations between France and Germany continued for several weeks, but it was clear that Germany did not feel a conference would serve any purpose, that all they wished for was the status quo ante to be resumed.123 Germany was not about to allow France off the hook, to them the Treaty of Algeciras needed to be upheld – so long as they gained compensation. Germany, for their part, felt Lloyd George’s speech had inflamed tensions and had taken umbrage, something that Grey completely disavowed and even went so far as to deny that there was any crisis.124

Grey was adamant that the speech was not directly aimed at Germany only that Britain should not be overlooked as a great nation, and that the speech was merely outlining possible contingencies. While Grey emphatically denied the direct implications of the speech, the inference was clear given the meeting he had with Lloyd George that very afternoon. The fact

120 GDD, IV, XXIX, 213, Count von Metternich to the German Foreign Office, 25 July 1911, pp. 15-6. 121 Lloyd George, War, I, 27. 122 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 226. 123 GDD, IV, XXIX, 213, Count von Metternich to the German Foreign Office, 25 July 1911, p. 15. 124 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 230.

87 remains Grey would downplay it much as he had done in negotiating in the two previous crises where he walked a fine line between both sides. No specific reference may have been given to Germany, but the interpretation was explicit. Grey in a communique to Sir Edward

Goschen, Britain’s Ambassador to Berlin, whereby he reiterated his meeting with Metternich and explained that Lloyd George’s speech was not intended to ‘embroil Germany’s negotiations with France’ - the fact was it had done just that.125 Britain had been rightly concerned that if the Franco-German discussions failed to achieve a peaceful outcome, then war was likely. The lingering effects of Lloyd George’s speech did little to quell the rising belief that the two parties would come to a resolution; the Germans were annoyed by what they saw as a threat.

By 4 November 1911 the crisis was resolved. The ensuing months between the Mansion

House Speech and the time of resolution saw the parties conduct secretive discussions. These deliberations centred on territories that bore no interest either directly or indirectly to the

British Empire. The outcome of the Second Moroccan Crisis would see Germany acquire part of the French Congo, which would be adjoined to German-held Cameroon as part of the settlement.126 For France, they would have a free hand in Morocco. Not until the settlement was reached did the Panther withdraw from Agadir.

Despite the secrecy of the negotiations, Grey was far from silent. Grey would meet with

Cambon and discuss French concessions, where Grey stressed the value and importance of

Morocco. He suggested to Cambon that they concede territory in the French Congo under the provision that the other Powers who had been signatories to the Act of Algeciras would

125 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 231. 126 GDD, IV, XXIX, 244, Count von Metternich, in London, To the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 25 September 1911, see notes p.17.

88 accept these terms.127 Grey stated that his efforts were to moderate German demands while influencing France to increase their offers.128 However, it begs the question as to what extent his diplomatic influence would be received by the Germans given the insinuations made by

Lloyd George. German demands had waivered throughout the crisis, and this left a degree of doubt as to not only what they wanted, but also as to whether any peaceful conclusion could be attained.

The Agadir crisis lasted approximately 168 days, from 21 May to 4 November 1911, but it cannot be overlooked that the actual causation of the crisis occurred when the gunboat arrived on the 1 July. Thus, the crisis really lasted just over four months (127 days). It eclipsed all other crises to date given the militaristic nature of sending in a gunboat. The crisis brought a cauldron of tension between three of the great European Powers and left

Germany feeling both ‘encircled’ and isolated. Encircled by the Triple Entente, and alone given Austro-Hungary’s and Italy’s conspicuous silences throughout the entire crisis. Not unlike the First Moroccan Crisis, Germany’s bravado was again on display. While the Kaiser had landed in Tangiers in 1905, the sending of a gunboat in 1911 followed by a cruiser to a closed port announced Germany’s authoritative militaristic intent. Not only did this illustrate their aggressive stance, but similarly their design to continue to provoke havoc between

France and Britain. Germany would argue that their actions were justifiable as they aligned with their foreign policy for Mittelafrika, as such they merely looking for opportunities for colonial expansion. The underlying pretext had been to press the two nations to test the

Entente, whereby relations would hopefully fracture. Germany failed in this endeavour and

127 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 2 128 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 233.

89 also suffered diplomatic humiliation as they had done at Algeciras. These two incidents

would leave them pondering their international standing over the next three years.

For Britain, the resulting consequence of 1911 would be a year of strengthening diplomatic

ties. The reaffirmation of the Japanese alliance, of which Grey was in no doubt, served

multiple purposes in ensuring peace in Asia and protecting Pacific waters, but it also freed up

the British fleet and theoretically would reduce naval estimates.129 Likewise, the success of

Agadir saw France and Britain draw closer as partners. France would safeguard the

Mediterranean, while Britain would focus on the North Sea and the English Channel.130

Britain’s navy had now secured significant support in policing against the ever-increasing

German naval threat. Germany’s increasing naval fleet had become a persistent cause for

concern to national security and trade.

The Fourth Watershed: The Balkan War 1912-13

Within a year of the Agadir Crisis, the German Fleet expanded and posed an even more significant threat to the British Empire. Germany, over the past four years, increased its number of battleships, thereby reducing the disparity between the two Powers. Britain’s advantage went from twenty-seven to just one battleship, thereby posing a threat to national defence and trade.131 The tension from Agadir had not significantly diminished, and with

Germany passing successive naval Bills this only exacerbated British apprehension. The abject failure of Agadir and the implied threat taken from Lloyd George’s speech had a resounding impact on the Germans. German naval construction by the end of 1911 was due

129 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 230; Steinberg, ‘The German Background’, p. 197. 130 Roy Jenkins, Asquith, (London: Harper Collins, 1964), pp. 242-5. 131 George Modelski and William R Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993 (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988), p. 76.

90 to decrease but instead amended with new constructive vigour and scheduled to commence in

June 1912.132

Unquestionably, the German Fleet was built around the premise of offensive action. The fact

that Germany’s navy was increasing posed an even greater risk to Britain than merely having

a navy of comparable size. Grey stated that the British Navy was not merely about national

prestige, but more a matter of life and death to the nation and Empire.133 Consequently, both

Britain and Germany were now in a shipbuilding race, which resulted in significant increases

to British naval estimates.134 Subsequently, to preclude the continued escalation and impact

on naval estimates, the British devised an unofficial mission to ascertain whether Germany

would be open to discussions to curtail their plans for continued naval construction.

Richard Haldane, Britain’s Secretary of State for War, led the mission in February 1912

intending to ascertain whether Germany was willing to discuss reductions to naval estimates.

In return, Britain would not interfere in German colonial expansion.135 Britain also proposed

a willingness to discuss German aspirations and any proposals that would alleviate the

likelihood of them becoming engaged in a conflict.136 The mission had been predicated on

the basis that the Kaiser would welcome the idea.137 Despite Grey’s dubious belief that the

Kaiser had originated the idea or that it would result in anything tangible, Grey proceeded to

endorse support for it. At which point he informed and assured Cambon that nothing would

result whereby Britain would be bound and unable to support France.138 The outcome of the

132 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 75. 133 Asquith, The Genesis, pp. 75, 78. 134 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 98. 135 Sir Edward Grey, Winston Churchill, & David Lloyd George, Memorandum. 29 January 1912, The Haldane Mission, online edn, February, 1912 [http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1914m/haldane.html.bak, accessed 10 June 2018]. 136 Grey, Churchill, & Lloyd George, Memorandum, Haldane Mission. 137 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 250. 138 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 251.

91 ‘Haldane Mission’ was a resounding failure, as Germany were reluctant to decrease their

naval expenditure programme as they saw this as essential to compete with the Royal Navy.

Perhaps the failure was as much due to whom Britain sent, as it was to Germany’s reluctance

to compromise. Both Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser felt that if Grey had undertaken to

visit them, then this would have precipitated negotiations and simultaneously been met with

‘great pleasure’.139 Germany had previously stated a willingness to compromise under

specific conditions and guarantees of a friendly policy towards them.140 German demands for

unconditional neutrality and their proposed postponement for new naval construction was

deemed unsatisfactory to Haldane and would be difficult for the Cabinet to accept.141 By

March, Grey with Cabinet approval proposed to Metternich that ‘England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and will pursue no aggressive policy towards her’.142

While this specifically extended Britain’s position toward Germany and was a measurable

proposal, it failed to meet with German expectations of a political agreement. Furthermore,

the Kaiser was incensed by Grey’s insinuation that any future change to British policy and or

personnel could impact this and that he had overlooked how the Kaiser saw his importance in accepting this offer.143 The Kaiser was indignant that Grey had dictated terms.144

In the Kaiser’s mind, he had been shunned by Grey for failing to come to Berlin to discuss

the British proposal in February, and now he had been presumptuous in thinking he could

dictate terms to the Kaiser. All this did was create a lack of trust between Berlin and Grey.

139 GDD, IV, XXXI, 97, Memorandum by the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, 29 January 1912, p. 72. 140 GDD, IV, XXXI, 105, The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg to the Count von Metternich, 4 February 1912, p. 73. 141 GDD, IV, XXXI, 120, The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg to the Count von Metternich, 12 February 1912, p. 75; Asquith, The Genesis, p. 100. 142 GDD, IV, XXXI, 178, Count von Metternich to the German Foreign Office, 4 March 1912, p. 83. 143 GDD, IV, XXXI, 178, Count von Metternich, p. 83. 144 GDD, IV, XXXI, 178, Count von Metternich, p. 83.

92 Berlin had lost faith in what Grey had to propose mainly due to not getting political parity

and respect on the same level as Britain. Rapprochement had all but faded, and antagonism

had raised distrust to a new level. Unquestionably, Germany was feeling pressure on all fronts, for Franco-Russian relations were now revived much like Russia’s resurgence, and the

Triple Alliance was abating.145 Thus, the Anglo-German discussions carried more

considerable significance than merely a reduction in naval estimates. Germany’s growing

apprehension of encirclement and isolation could be seen to be warranted.

Austro-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, disturbing the balance of power

in the region and challenged Turkish control. The Ottoman Empire had long been in decline–

what remained was fracturing, and the region had become politically unstable. Bulgaria along

with Greece, Servia, and Montenegro formed the Balkan League in 1912 which brought a

second subversion to Turkey’s status quo. 146 The consequence of which not only provided

another nail in the coffin of the waning Ottoman Empire but also saw the continued

ascendency of nationalistic fervour in the Balkan states. The crisis which began in the autumn of 1912 would last until the summer of 1913.

During the Conference in December 1912, Turkey was forcibly driven to an armistice resulting in the London Treaty 1913. They conceded to Servia’s and Greece’s demands, but

Bulgaria was pressing for further claims to Adrianople, which was yet to be conquered –

Turkey was unwilling to yield. To this juncture, Grey and Britain had steered clear with no vested interests in the matter.147 Grey was approached by the chief Bulgarian delegate

145 Otte, ‘Almost a law’, p. 106; Otte, ‘Postponing the Evil’, p. 252. 146 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 260; Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 123-5. 147 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 261.

93 Tontcheff, and during conversations, he stressed they still had designs on Adrianople.148

Bulgaria was attempting to apply pressure on the Great Powers to exert pressure on Turkey to

secede Adrianople without recommencing the war.149 Bulgaria was confident and willing to assume the risk of reigniting their quest for Adrianople despite Grey having elucidated the inherent consequences of reigniting the war. They did not heed Grey’s advice to simply make peace.150 As the Conference concluded, the Bulgarians proceeded to take Adrianople. After

that, they resumed their pre-war combative animosities with Greece, and the feud between

the two provided an opportunity for Romania to seek advantage. Russia had wanted Bulgaria

to gain Adrianople as they saw it as prestigious and that it would elevate their standing as

having forced Turkey to acquiesce.151 By March 1913 not only had Macedonia been claimed

but the western parts of Turkey. Bulgaria then began quarrelling with Servia and Greece

resulting in an intra-alliance fight for the plundered Ottoman spoils.152

None of the Great Powers was directly involved in the crisis, but both Grey and Germany

applied influence to restrain Austro-Hungary and Russia.153 Grey had in the previous year

stated a need for Britain to steer clear of the emerging Balkan League and their plans to

occupy Macedonia despite the pressure exerted by Russia.154 The Ambassadorial meeting

that was called was in-line with what had been a diplomatic axiom, that if any Balkan conflict

was likely then it followed that prevention of any Great Power being drawn into it would

mandate a need for such a gathering.155 Such that, the six Great Powers of Europe (Russia,

148 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 261. 149 BD, IX, pt. 2, No. 419, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, 30 December 1912, p. 318. 150 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 262. 151 BD, IX pt. 2, Minutes E. G., p. 313. 152 Hall, ‘Bulgaria’, p. 302. 153 BD, IX (II), Foreword to Volume IX (II), p. vii. 154 BD, IX, (II), Appendix II, Minute by Sir Edward Grey, 23 April 1912, p. 1008. 155 Hansard, War in Balkans: Statement by Sir Edward Grey, HC Deb 12 August 1913, vol 56 cc2281-352, online edn, [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1913/aug/12/war-in-balkans-statement-by-sir- edward, accessed 14 April 2019].

94 Germany, France, Britain, Austro-Hungary, and Italy) would convene to simplify the

machinery of foreign diplomacy, whereby constancy and expediency would alleviate

extended delays in resolving those issues which might arise.156 To which all Powers were in

concord as this would avert any immediate escalation by any Great Power, whereby Europe

would be dragged into war. Irony indeed given the events that follow in 1914. The

Ambassadorial meeting enabled the Great Powers to declare their respective diplomatic

demands through negotiations behind the scene without being directly contributory to the

regional events themselves.

The meeting commenced in December 1912 and lasted until August 1913, and was

comprised of the six Great Powers with Ambassadors Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky of

Germany, Albert Graf Mensdorff of Austria, Alexander von Benckendorff of Russia,

Guglielmo Imperiali of Italy, Paul Cambon of France, with Grey presiding.157 The overriding

aim was to localise the Balkan War, and so long as there was unanimity, then the Great

Powers would absolve themselves of any interference.158 Grey adopted an informal approach

to the proceedings, intending to make it a ‘committee of friends’.159 Their close association

would facilitate agreement over contentious issues, such as Austria’s willingness to allow

Servia to have Djakova in return for their ceasing hostilities and vacating the territories they held in Albania.160 Grey was quick to press Russia to accept these terms, thus enabling the issue to be closed and move forward to the next bone of contention. This method allowed the

six powers to advance amicably between issues, thus avoiding any major impasse. Grey

administered the five powers assuring that he served ‘as a useful and patient mediator

156 Hansard, War in Balkans: Statement by Sir Edward Grey. 157 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 265. 158 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 262. 159 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 265. 160 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 269.

95 between Russia and Austria’.161 Grey’s role cannot be overstated in assuring European peace

as he was able to navigate away from points of difference and steer toward conciliation,

thereby justifying the effectiveness not only of his leadership style in that role but more so

the effectiveness of the Conference.

Several key aspects can be surmised from the prolonged meeting. First, the meeting was held

in London; thus, Grey was in direct communication with all parties. It afforded Grey

immediate access to information along with direct access to those Ambassadors who posed

any issue. It enabled him to directly address anyone likely to circumvent the proceedings,

which would result in them being drawn into the actual war. Shortly after the Conference

commenced, Grey met with four of the Ambassadors, the French, Russian, German, and

Italian, each individually so they could speak frankly.162 The Ambassadors wanted secrecy as

did Grey, in this it can be assumed that there was a high-level respect for Grey not only to

keep the content of the conversations confident but that he was someone whom they trusted

would do so. During this particular week, 16 December 1912, Grey suggested that when a

unanimous accord was reached between all the parties that only then would a communique be

made.163 Grey’s democratic approach illustrates inclusiveness where all sides were given equal opportunity to express ideas and concerns, but more importantly, was the aspect of a collective agreement to decision-making.

Second, the Treaty of London (1913) and the subsequent Second Peace Conference in May

1913 availed the Great Powers considerable leverage, so long as their accord prevailed, enabling them to apply influence over the ensuing combatants. This was the case on 20 April

161 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 272. 162 BD, IX, Pt. 2, No. 387, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 16 December 1912, p. 290. 163 BD, IX, Pt. 2, No. 387, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 16 December 1912, p. 290.

96 1913, when the Balkan States finally acquiesced to the Powers’ desire for mediation.164 The

subsequent meeting on 20 May between the Balkan delegates and the representatives of the

Great Powers was met with an initial reluctance which lasted until 27 May. Grey provided

the delegates with the choice to sign the Treaty or leave – the Treaty was signed on the 30

May 1913.165 Grey was in a position to demand this of the Balkan delegates as he had been

empowered by the collective agreement of the other Great Powers, also as the convenor it

afforded him executive authority to make such a decision.

The Kaiser’s willingness to support the Concert of Europe in resolving this crisis was something he had been reluctant to do in the Bosnian Crisis and would be unwilling to undertake in 1914.166 Germany was not about to undertake to be a provocateur, unlike Agadir

in 1911, whereby their stance carried influence in affecting Austria’s policy during the

proceedings.167 Germany’s position from the outset of the Conference was to avoid war.168

However, by October 1913, the Kaiser in a conversation with Leopold Graf von Berchtold,

Austrian Foreign Minister stated that should Austria desire to attack Servia then ‘I shall stand

behind you, and am prepared to draw the sword whenever your moves make it necessary’.169

From this, it is evident as to the tenuous nature of the peace and the severity of Austro-

Hungary’s concern over Servia. The foreboding exultation of the Kaiser’s willingness to

desire war echoes the infamous ‘blank cheque’ of July 1914.

164 The Treaty of London, 1913, 5. SECOND MEETING OF THE LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, MAY, 1913, online edn, [https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos145.htm, accessed 22 May 2019]. 165 The Treaty of London, 1913, 5. SECOND MEETING. 166 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 265. 167 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 273. 168 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 275. 169 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, p. 44.

97 Summation

The first four crises illustrate the delicate balance of great European power politics preceding the July Crisis 1914, which Grey had to navigate. Grey preserved British imperial and commercial interests, national security, and maintaining peace in Europe successfully on two occasions by utilising Ambassadorial conferences under the guise of the Concert of Europe.

From the outset, Grey and Britain were drawn into what were conflicts that they had limited or no direct interest in. Grey sought to uphold Britain’s position on the binding nature of treaties, and belief in the Concert of Europe, something that would become their undoing in

1914. These crises represented issues over imperial territorial expansion and rising nationalism at a time when France, Germany, Austria, and Russia were vying to compete alongside Britain on a global level.

Throughout these crises, Grey would safeguard the ententes while negating contentious issues so that commercial interests could thrive; Grey never once overextended Britain’s position concerning the ententes. He never promised or committed Britain to any military support or action – in this regard, he was resolute. Military discussions with France in 1906 aside, Grey was resoundingly opposed to escalating the 1911 crisis despite Germany’s provocative undertaking to send a gunboat to Agadir. Twice Grey had to contend with

Germany’s designs for greater commercial and territorial claims in Morocco, and while these were directed at France, Grey saw the strategic importance of Britain’s role in affirming support for France. Interestingly the first and last crises were the two that were resolved using the Ambassadorial conference process.

The reasoning is quite logical as to why there were no Ambassadorial conferences in 1908-09 and 1911. In the case of the Bosnian Crisis, Austro-Hungary were provocateurs and, as a

98 Great Power and ally to Germany, for a conference to be held Germany would have been placed in a compromised position – not unlike their reasoning in 1914. In the second instance, the Second Moroccan Crisis saw two of the Great Powers and signatories of the

Concert in Germany and France having been at fault. There could not have been a conference of the six powers as it could have ostensibly meant the three entente partners would oppose the three allies. The fact remains that the only reason there was a conference in 1905-06 was that Germany demanded it and forced France to the table with the aid of the U.S.

For Grey, throughout these crises, he was highly collaborative in how he took advice. In

1905-06 he sought the support of Haldane for French military discussions; in July 1911 he had spoken to the prime minister and garnered Cabinet approval as to what action should be taken prior to Lloyd George giving his Mansion House speech. Even then he endorsed and supported Lloyd George’s intention when he did give the speech. These examples serve to illustrate that Grey’s democratic style was one of openness to input, a collaboration of ideas and not that of a leader who was power-hungry and who had to have complete control. It further eludes to his demeanour and approach to diplomacy in general – one of conciliation, agreeableness, and above all else someone who was always rational and who looked diffuse potential flashpoints and navigated a course that was the path of least resistance. The evidence states that he was aware he did not have sufficient agency in decision-making and that exogenous factors were a constant source that placed him in a reactionary position.

99 Chapter Three: Grey and the July Crisis 1914

Historians have used the July Crisis as the principal measure for judging Grey’s tenure in

office, and as such it has served as his political epitaph. If we are to assess Grey’s political

term solely on this one precipitous event, it is necessary to consider how constraints beyond his purview bound him. The Crisis came during the halcyon summer of 1914 which paralleled a period of tranquillity in European diplomacy. It was awoken from this deluded respite by the Archduke’s assassination.1 For Britain, the Austro-Servian dispute was initially

of no political interest, much like their commercial interests.2 As the Crisis unfolded, Grey

would be drawn into the diplomatic fray as a series of uncompromising decisions would

result in irreversible changes to Europe’s Great Powers and their dominions.

A series of landmark events denote pivotal points in the escalation of the Crisis, and while

each was causally connected, they were all made beyond Grey’s sphere of control. Gordon

Martel divided the July Crisis into three distinct phases: the making of the crisis, a period

from 28 June to 23 July; the July Crisis itself, spanning 24 July through to 31 July; and lastly,

the ‘days of decision’ covering 1-4 August.3 The first phase mirrors that of the Agadir Crisis,

which saw a protracted period of silence from 4 to 21 July 1911. In 1914, Europe waited with

bated breath as to how Austria would respond. The stillness was abruptly ended with

immediate consternation as the Austrian ultimatum was delivered to Servia. For Grey, it was

not until Austria’s ultimatum, marking the beginning of phase two and some three weeks

after the assassination, that he fully apprised the Cabinet of the severity of the events that

1 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 283; Churchill, The World, I, p. 199. 2 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 201. 3 Martel, The Month, p. vii.

100 were now unfolding. Throughout this period, Grey’s diplomacy had been hampered by

ongoing problems within the Cabinet.4 Given the acceleration at which matters deteriorated

after the ultimatum, it begs the question as to why, when the Cabinet knew the severity of

what was occurring, did they not make this a priority rather than focus on other matters.

It was the ultimatum that commenced the 13-day path to war, during which Grey toiled to

stave off the prospect of conflict. However, it was not until the ‘days of decision’ phase on 2

August that the Cabinet undertook any action, several days after mobilisation had begun by

four of the Great Powers. By leaving it so late, it left a short window of opportunity for Grey to convey any message that would have changed the events that were unfolding, let alone altered the course of those already undertaken. Furthermore, the Cabinet’s belated attempt to reprioritise their agenda meant it had limited Grey’s agency from a domestic perspective.5

However, if we only consider this from an endogenous viewpoint, we would be highly remiss

in not considering certain exogenous factors that Grey was confronted with during the crisis.

Two vital factors would restrict Grey’s agency. Grey was unaware of pertinent information

(the ‘blank cheque’) which would have strengthened his decision-making capability and urgency to act. Second, from the time that Austria refused to accept Servia’s compliance on

25 July, Grey had all but three days to stop Austria from declaring war on Servia. Both of

these were time-sensitive and worked against Grey. The issuance of the ultimatum on the

back of the ‘blank cheque’ should not be considered surprising in any way. The Kaiser had

indicated his willingness to ‘draw the sword’ some nine months previous during a discussion

with the Austrian Foreign Minister.6 The Kaiser’s steadfast mind had been made up shortly

4 Valone, ‘"There Must Be"’, p. 408. 5 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 159; K. M. Wilson, ‘The British Cabinet's Decision for War, 2 August 1914’, British Journal of International Studies 1 (1975), 148-59, at p. 149. 6 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, p. 44.

101 after the conclusion of the London Ambassadors Conference and the signing of the Treaty of

Bucharest in August that year.

Unbeknownst to Grey, he was attempting to defuse what was a premeditated willing to war

and what had become a series of expedited decisions made by external actors from 6 July.

For Grey and indeed Britain the exigent nature of the crisis was being driven by nation-states

and indeed principal actors who wielded power to make such decisions that would lead to

war. Given that Grey was ignorant of specific information he could not have known that the

two principal actors who were waging a campaign for war would not be receptive to

mediation. Furthermore, they were not receptive to act otherwise. As the situation intensified

and deteriorated, Grey’s agency was without leverage and he was armed with only limited

means to avert impending conflict.

The Fifth Watershed: The July Crisis 1914

The thirty-seven days that frame the July Crisis from the assassination up to Britain’s

declaration of war were not met with a precipitous series of retaliations by Austro-Hungary.

Servia for their part had been contrite and published an apology conveying sincere regret,

condemning the atrocity, and more importantly, they had expressed their disappointment as

to how this lone act would affect their desire for friendly relations with Austro-Hungary.7 At this time, there had been no reply or communication made by the Austrians to Servia.8

Austria’s lack of response was, as Grey put it, ‘neither extremist nor alarmist’.9 That is not to say he did not recognise its gravity.10 While the Foreign Office had initially been taken by

7 BD, XI, No. 35, Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey, 4 July 1914, p. 28. 8 BD, XI, No. 31, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, 6 July 1914, p. 23. 9 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 309. 10 Steiner, Britain and the Origins, p. 220.

102 surprise by the assassination, as was all of Europe, it was not until ten days later that Grey

began to have growing apprehension as to how Austria might be compelled to respond due to

popular demands for retribution.11 The long silence had initially invoked no real concern and

was one that Grey had hoped would be dealt with locally without involving Europe.12

Churchill would later remark that the ‘crisis’ was barely noticeable until 24 July.13 The real

distractions for Britain had been domestic political events, primarily the Irish question, Home

Rule, and potential civil war in Ulster.14 The fate of Ireland was the central focus of the

Cabinet up until the end of July. And while the ramifications of this extended far beyond their

right to self-govern, the Cabinet’s preoccupation meant they were blinkered and failed to

recognise the seriousness of the events unfolding in the Balkans to assume such pre-

eminence. The focus on domestic issues was nothing new, as foreign affairs had been given

barely any consideration since Grey took office.15 Controversial domestic issues had

dominated both political parties and the Cabinet to the extent that the emphasis was not on

the bipartisan agreed foreign policy.16

Some historians have suggested that Grey discounted the seriousness of the assassination and

the events that followed.17 Others have gone so far as to suggest he was slow to recognise the

severity of the developing crisis.18 These aspersions fail to acknowledge two central points.

First, that Grey was unaware of the specific decisions that both the Germans and Austro-

Hungarians had taken until the ultimatum. Second, that Grey was acutely aware of the

11 BD, XI, No. 39, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 8 July 1914, p. 30; Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 155. 12 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 309. 13 Churchill, The World, I, p. 193. 14 T. G. Otte, July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 138-9. 15 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, p. 27. 16 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, p. 27. 17 Albertini, The Origins, III, pp. 205-6. 18 Otte, July Crisis, p. 144.

103 potential for ‘European Complications’.19 Grey undertook to respond and make decisions based on what he knew at that time – he could not have predicted the severity of Austria’s response.

As of 6 July, some eight days after the assassination, the window of opportunity to

circumvent the looming potentiality of war would seemingly be closing not that Grey knew

this. Grey’s uneasiness had been warranted, for the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-

Hollweg had on 6 July telegrammed von Berchtold that:

Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the

dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not

within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that

His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations

of his alliance and of this ancient friendship.20

Bethmann-Hollweg noted that the Kaiser had stated that they needed to ‘abstain from any

direct action or advice, as we must labour with every means to prevent the Austro-Serbian

dispute developing into an international conflict’.21 The Kaiser’s remark was explicit; he did

not wish for a Great Power confrontation, but this was not included in the telegram. The

manner in which Austria received and interpreted the ‘blank cheque’ can only be surmised from the demands made of Servia and the actions that followed. Austria’s intention in the

19 Lichnovsky to Bethmann-Hollweg, 6 July 1914, DD, I No. 20, online edn, [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Nr._20._Der_Botschafter_in_London_an_den_Reichskanzler,_9._Juli_1914, accessed 16 April 2019]. 20 Telegram from the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, to the German Ambassador at Vienna. Tschirschky, ‘The Blank Check’, online edn, July 1914, [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_%27Blank_Check%27, accessed 17 April 2019]. 21 Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections on the World War (London: T. Butterworth, 1920), p. 119.

104 ultimatum was clear and was without German knowledge or approval.22 It leaves unresolved

questions. Given Bethmann-Hollweg’s statement that the Kaiser had no intention of allowing the impasse to escalate to an international conflict, why had this been omitted or not stressed in the telegram and at what point did the Kaiser decide that a European war was acceptable?

As to the former, this is seemingly unknown, as to the latter, it must have occurred after 6

July and before 1 August, when they declared war on Russia.

From the issuance of the ‘blank cheque’ to the delivery of the ultimatum it was a period of

Austro-German deception. The open-handed German offer of unconditional support was immediately followed by a decision made by the Austro-Hungarian ministerial council that

Servia should be given an ultimatum on 7 July.23 The timeliness of this indicates the influence the German offer had on Austria’s decision to send an ultimatum, one which was intentionally meant to be unacceptable. At this juncture and for the next three weeks, the two powers deliberately created a sense of illusory calm.24 The Kaiser’s offer to support Austria

had been clear, but the extrapolation of meaning and indeed interpretation as to how far the

Germans would go beyond Servia was not. If the Kaiser had meant only to support Austria regarding Servia, then it suggests he did not intend for the crisis to escalate into a European conflict as he said but failed to communicate. Alternatively, if it did imply a broader meaning, then it could be said the ‘blank cheque’ was akin to the Anglo-French Entente and the idea of the spirit of it. While the Anglo-French Entente was specific about its stipulations and had subsequently taken on a broader meaning, so too would the ‘blank cheque’. The infamous ‘blank cheque’ was Germany’s carte blanche to Austria.

22 Hollweg, Reflections, p. 119. 23 Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), p. 15. 24 Mombauer, The Origins, p. 15.

105 Lichnovsky, who Grey was reliant on for information, was unaware of the communique and

therefore could not inform Grey of it. Had Grey known how far Berlin had gone, he would

have had cause to not only act differently but would have had more time in which to attempt

to broker peace. Grey had pinned his hopes on Germany tightening the leash on Austria, not

letting them loose. Vienna had been untethered by Germany and was given the power to

pursue whatever course of action they deemed fit. Given this was unknown to Grey, he pursued a course to allay fears that the crisis would escalate. He began discussions with

Russia and Germany to garner reassurances that they would not fan the flames. Benckendorff

said to Grey he hoped that Germany might restrain Austria; however, Prince Lichnowsky,

German Ambassador to London, had intimated to Grey that there was some sentiment in

Germany to do otherwise.25 Grey, when meeting with Benckendorff on 8 July, stressed a

need for Russia to reaffirm that there was no ‘ill-will’ toward Germany.26 Russia saw no reason for Austria to undertake a demarché against Servia, and much like Grey,

Benckendorff too was trusting Germany would restrain Austria.27 Grey’s predicament was

that his agency lacked sufficient power and influence when compared to the two powerful

actors, the Emperor and the Kaiser, who were making the decisions that were dictating

events.

Maurice de Bunsen Britain’s Ambassador to Austria in a telegram, told Grey on 16 July that

he believed Germany were backing Austria and their demands to Servia.28 On 17 July de

Bunsen wrote unofficially to Nicolson, and reiterated remarks made by Count Lützow after

having visited Count von Berchtold. Lützow had stated that the situation was ‘grave’ and that

a note was being drawn up that would require Servia to ‘cave in’ and if they did not then

25 Mombauer, The Origins, p. 15; BD, XI, No. 32, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, 6 July 1914, p. 24. 26 BD, XI, No. 39, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 8 July 1914, p. 30. 27 BD, XI, No. 39, Sir Edward, p. 30. 28 Mombauer, The Origins, (161) 16 July, Bunsen to Grey, p. 258.

106 Austria would ‘compel’ them to by force.29 To this point, the German Ambassador to Vienna

Heinrich von Tschirschky had not exerted any pressure to restrain Vienna.30 von Tschirschky

had previously been chastised for meddling in Austrian affairs by the Kaiser and warned not

to do so again. von Tschirsky had on 30 June reported to Bethmann-Hollweg that he had

urged caution and not to take ‘too heavy steps’, for which the Kaiser rebuked him. The

Kaiser expressed to Bethmann-Hollweg: ‘who authorized him to act that way? that is very

stupid. none of his business, as it solely Austria’s matter what she plans to do in this case’.31

The Kaiser did not wish to interfere in the Ballhausplatz’s diplomacy with Servia. From this we can conclude that von Tschirschky was sufficiently reprimanded, but it was unlikely that he could have wielded any influence over the proceedings. The Kaiser had wished to remain ex parte, but his telegram of support (the ‘blank cheque’) had given Austria the capacity to act. The Ballhausplatz had coveted this support, and it was considered imperative for their plans for warlike reckoning with Servia.32 The ‘blank cheque’ had given Austria the

reassurance to protect them from Russia, and now they could humiliate Servia with punitive

mandates. These demands would serve to meet any diplomatic obligations, and should Servia

agree, then Austria would have achieved monumental success and increased their prestige in

the region, something they had sought since the Balkan War.33

Grey’s persistent optimism for peace had not precluded him from being acutely aware of the

impending peril. Grey had discussed with Churchill the potentiality of war as a result of the

29 BD, XI, No. 56, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Arthur Nicolson, 17 July 1914, p. 44. 30 BD, XI, No. 56, Sir M. de Bunsen, p. 45. 31 Mombauer, The Origins, 108, 30 June, Tschirsky to Bethmann Hollweg, p. 170; Prince Karl Lichnowsky, The Guilt of Germany (GP Putnam’s Son’s London, 1918), pp. 60-1. 32 Mombauer, The Origins, 134, 7 July, Minutes of the Joint Council of Ministers for Common Affairs, p. 210. 33 Mombauer, The Origins, 134, p. 212.

107 assassination just three days before the ultimatum.34 Their discussion was more than three

weeks after the event and without the knowledge of Germany’s ‘blank cheque’. Grey was relying on Germany restraining Austria and not on them exacerbating the crisis, something which Lichnowsky would later state Germany could have compelled them to not ‘perpetrate the unqualifiable folly of attacking Serbia’.35 Grey thought and believed any impending

response to the assassination would be localised, just one more in the continually disputed and antagonistic relations that had beset the region.

The protracted silence was broken with Austria’s demarché, which came on 23 July, some twenty-five days after the assassination. Twenty-four hours prior Grey had met with the

Austrian Ambassador to Britain Count Mensdorff, who had made it clear that an official communique as to the ultimatum would be forthcoming but that it would include a time stipulation.36 Grey attempted to reason and indicated to Mensdorff that this could affect

matters with Russia. Mensdorff pointed out that Austria felt Servia had not lived up to the

1909 promise to maintain positive relations with Austria.

The long-standing agitations between the two nations were now approaching a precipice. The

apprehension that now existed would come down to the Austrian demands and whether they

were reasonable.37 The extent of the Austrian demands would be critical in determining how

much influence could be applied in St Petersburg. Grey was quick to convey that if the four

Great Powers of Austria, Germany, France, and Russia were to come to war, the financial

implications would be immense, such that it would impede trade and could collapse the

34 M. Ekstein, ‘Some Notes on Sir Edward Grey's Policy in July 1914’, The Historical Journal XV:2 (1972), 321-24, at p. 321. 35 John C. G. Röhl, 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), p. 102. 36 BD, XI, No. 86, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 23 July 1914, p. 70. 37 BD, XI, No. 86, Sir Edward Grey, p. 70.

108 European financial sector.38 Interestingly, Mensdorff did not suggest that it would come

down to Servia, but to Russia. From Mensdorff’s remark, we can conclude that Austria had

made their decision regarding Servia and the likelihood of war; as to whether this meant war

with Russia was yet to be determined. Grey concluded that he hoped that Austria and Russia

would, in any case, agree to discuss the situation, where Mensdorff retorted that it was

unlikely given their current attitude.39 Grey would have surmised that there was now little

hope of curtailing Russia from intervening on Servia’s behalf and that a European war of

some type was now more likely than ever. It was just left to determine the scope of the

conflict and how many actors would participate.

Both Grey and Prime Minister Asquith felt that the Austrian demands had exceeded

expectations and elevated the tension. Grey remarked that it had ‘even gone further than we

feared in the way of peremptory severity’.40 The prime minister saw no way in which the demands could be accepted.41 What followed in the immediate succession of events was

perhaps the most alarming; Austria’s failure to acknowledge Servia’s reply, which was one of

acquiescence and submission. Grey remarked in his memoirs that it was ‘From that moment

things went from bad to worse’.42 Austria had delivered the ultimatum at 6 pm on 23 July,

Servia had forty-eight hours to reply. Now, Servia had replied and acquiesced. On the same

day, Russia began mobilising which ‘escalated the crisis and greatly increased the likelihood

of a general European war’.43 By 28 July Austria had declared war; it had taken just five days

from the issuance of the ultimatum for events to escalate and light the cauldron for a

European war.

38 BD, XI, No. 86, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 23 July 1914, p. 70. 39 BD, XI, No. 86, Sir Edward Grey, p. 70. 40 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 310-11. 41 BD, XI, No. 92, Mr Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey, 24 July 1914, p. 74. 42 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 311. 43 Clark, Sleepwalkers, p. 480.

109 Grey held four key convictions which he believed were critical in attempting to avert the inevitable path to war. First that the idea of a European war would be catastrophic for all involved. Initially, a war had not been Germany’s desire, and yet they steered a course toward war by not clarifying the communique to Vienna and also by refusing to intervene.

These two points are perhaps the most salient. For had they truly not wanted a European war, they would have made the stipulations clear, and by not doing so, they could have always interceded – they did neither. Second, that Germany could impose their will on Austria – for

Grey this determined the approach he should follow to resolve the dispute. The problem was that Grey did not know that Germany had already imposed their will on Austria. For that reason, they were now refusing to do so. If they had honestly not wished to impose their will, they would not have extended unqualified support in the first instance, unless they had wanted them to act rashly and provoke a war. Third, in the event where France was drawn into a war, Britain must come to their aid and support them. Interestingly, Grey noted that he knew the Cabinet, Parliament, and the country would initially be reluctant to do so. Fourth, that Britain must not offer any indication of support to France and Russia in the event, they could not fulfil it.44

It is this latter point to which historians and scholars have suggested was crucial. Grey could have sent a clear message of support to France and Russia, and thereby signalled to Germany

Britain’s intent and averted the inevitability of the war.45 In the case of Russia, Grey had hoped France would support his quest to restrain Russia; this too would be misplaced.46 Grey had made it clear to both Cambon and Lichnovsky that he had no ‘moderating influence’, and that he was quite ‘powerless’, in influencing Russia.47 There had been no immediate pressure

44 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 312-13. 45 Gordon Martel, Origins of the First World War, new edn, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2008), p. 84. 46 Otte, July Crisis, p. 148. 47 BD, XI, No. 98, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 24 July 1914, p. 77.

110 for Grey to declare support to France and Russia, and this was not something Grey or indeed

Britain were keen to do. Nor was it something he had done in the preceding crises.

Grey had proceeded to manage this crisis as he had done the previous four by not over- committing -- and why should he? Britain was under no obligation to do so based solely on the ententes. They were more bound by treaties in terms of upholding any sort of military action than from the ententes; they were, after all primarily trade and territorial agreements.

He was also of the opinion that given the resounding success in 1912-13 that the Concert still held enough power to resolve disputes. Germany, after all, had kept Austria in check before regarding Balkan affairs. Therein lies the issue: Germany was not willing to do so in this instance; in fact, they had done the opposite. Ambassadors were being disempowered as primary decisions were being made at the executive level.

Grey had always been cognisant of the broader implications of the dispute between Austria and Servia and always held out hope for a positive resolution. However, the ultimatum had changed the urgency of discussions as the gathering clouds of a conflict beckoned. There was an exigency to Grey’s diplomacy as he reiterated discussions he had had with Benckendorff to Lichnowsky on 25 July. If there was a possibility that Britain, Germany, France, and Italy could work together despite Austrian and Russian mobilisations, then war could still be averted.48 Grey’s proposal raises two serious issues. First, Grey’s reliance on Lichnowsky:

why had he not telegrammed Bethmann-Hollweg who would have been better placed to

provide a more informed response, especially at such a late date? It also shows us that Grey

was still trusting Lichnowsky, whereby Grey believed he would have some scope of

influence; in this, it was misplaced. Further to this conversation with Benckendorff, he again

48 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 317.

111 pressured Grey to commit to not standing aside, to which Grey retorted he had already said

otherwise to Lichnovsky under the condition that the dispute remained localised between

Austria and Servia.49

Even after the ultimatum, Grey still pinned his hope on German intervention – a false hope,

nonetheless. However, Bethmann-Hollweg’s had stated that any intervention on Germany’s

part would have excluded them from intermediating as they would have been a named co-

agitator had they been drawn into the conflict.50 What is clear is that Germany had expected

Austria to keep them apprised of the ultimatum, but Austria did not keep Berlin au courant.

Bethmann-Hollweg stated that while they had a general gist of the Austrian demands, it was,

in fact, several days post-Servia’s reply that the actual demands were laid bare to Germany’s

State Secretary von Jagow, which he deemed were too severe.51

The assertion that Berlin lacked the knowledge and was ignorant as to the essence of the ultimatum is categorically false. Count Berchtold discussed with von Tschirschky on 11 July the content of the ultimatum.52 Austria had also planned when to deliver the note including the importance of a short window for a reply. Furthermore, they had already made their mind up as to whether the reply would be ‘satisfactory’. Austria had done this because they

intended to mobilise after the response. A confidential letter to Bethmann-Hollweg from von

Tschirschky on 14 July explicitly noted that the content of the ultimatum would be disclosed to Berlin, and while this was not conclusive, it suggests they knew of the ultimatum, when it would be delivered, and what the consequences were likely to be. Grey would state that he

was angry with Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow for they had led him to understand that

49 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 318. 50 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 122. 51 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 122. 52 Mombauer, The Origins, (146), 11 July, Tschirschky to Auswärtiges Amt, pp. 233-4.

112 they had not known the terms of the ultimatum. For von Jagow ‘as a diplomatic document, it

left something to be desired’.53 What infuriated Grey more was that not only had they been

aware of the contents and had disavowed knowing, but that they had failed to moderate their

weaker ally and vetoed any possible peaceful resolution.54 Grey was exasperated at the

Germans failure at not proposing a conference to Austria. To Grey’s mind, this was worse

than their failure to intervene in the actual drafting of the ultimatum.55

Grey had initially been disinclined toward proposing a conference despite the success of the

Conference of Ambassadors in 1912-13. He saw it as a last resort and had hoped that it would be unnecessary. However, in the eventuality that it would become necessary, the same

personnel were in place for all the Great Powers, so in that he was confident.56 Grey’s reluctance was grounded in his belief that Germany would be hesitant. In principle, Germany had always believed mediation could be undertaken, but experience had taught them that any conference where the Triple Entente Powers were aligned against Germany would be unreasonable and biased – it would lack impartiality.57 In a frenzy of telegram exchanges on

29 July between the Kaiser and Tsar Nicholas, the German Emperor suggested that any

Russian mobilisation toward Austria would thereby render Germany’s attempts at mediation

to be fruitless.58 With that Nicholas clarified Russia’s mobilisation was pre-emptory and directed at Austria and that the Austro-Servian dispute should be taken to the Hague Court of

Arbitration.59 Bethmann-Hollweg notified their Ambassador in St Petersburg that they were

resolute and denounced any opportunity for a Hague Conference.60

53 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 321. 54 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 321. 55 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 321. 56 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 314. 57 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 314. 58 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 196. 59 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 196. 60 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 196.

113 There are some mitigating circumstances with this attempt to defuse the incendiary events

that were now unfolding. Germany’s reluctance can be seen to be more than merely the need

for a conference between Austria and Russia. The Kaiser had given Austria a guarantee to

support them in whatever they wanted to do to Servia. When Austria declared war on Servia

on 28 July, they had essentially passed the point of no return, at least from this being just a

localised Balkan conflict. Russia, for their part, had mobilised as a preventative measure unaware of Germany’s guarantee. The Tsar held that the Kaiser’s unwillingness was that they were not keen to express to Vienna that they had brokered a conference.61 If the Kaiser had

done so, it would have been construed as having gone against his word and that the ‘blank

cheque’ would have meant nothing. Furthermore, given Germany’s tenuous alliances, this

would have weakened their relationship with Austria.

What is evident throughout this exchange is that Grey was powerless. Decisions were being

made by the primary advocates for both sides, Germany and Russia. Germany had indicated

that they would agree to a conference if it were between Austria and Russia. So, why were

Germany reluctant to make the proposal to Austria? The answer is the Kaiser had clearly

stated not to intervene, ergo this was a false offer Grey would remark that despite his best

efforts to negotiate with Bethmann-Hollweg, he believed that ‘He was not the master of the situation’.62

Grey continued his pursuit of forcing Austria and Russia to the mediation table, whether at

the Hague or again in London, which did not go unrecognised by Bethmann-Hollweg. The

German Chancellor noted that Grey had attempted to apply pressure on both nations.63

61 Asquith, The Genesis, p. 196. 62 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 322-3. 63 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 127.

114 Bethmann-Hollweg further asserted that the issues lay with the French Ambassador Paul

Cambon, who wanted the meeting to address the Austro-Servia dispute, to which the

Russians concurred.64 Germany was fearful of a conference where the Triple Entente could exercise might over them.65 Grey instinctively knew this, so by taking Russia off the table, it would leave Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to negotiate and would even up the apparent inequity. Also, by having Austria who had declared war, and Russia who had mobilised, agree to arbitration it would provide temporary respite from any further escalations. Besides,

Germany’s disinclination to negotiate was down to them not wishing to intervene in Austria’s dispute, something they had repeatedly stated since early July.66 If this were the case, then why issue the ‘blank cheque’ in the first instance. Moreover, why suggest a conference between Austria and Russia. In both cases, these are contradictory to not wishing to be involved in Austria’s affairs.

Grey had placed a great deal of trust in Prince Lichnowsky; the problem with that was

Lichnowsky was without influence in Berlin. Bethmann-Hollweg met proposals put forth by

Grey with more than mere reluctance but with complete disregard.67 On 26 July Grey told

Lichnowsky of the plan for the four Great Powers to meet and for Austria, Servia, and Russia to suspend military operations until a conference was concluded.68 This was met with fervent enthusiasm by Lichnowsky. Unfortunately, this unbridled optimism represented his lack of understanding of Germany’s position toward having a conference, which was due to him not being fully apprised of events. Furthermore, Goschen reported that Germany saw this as a

‘court of arbitration’ and that it was impracticable.69 Again, Goschen reiterated that Germany

64 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 127. 65 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 127. 66 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 128. 67 Bethmann-Hollweg, Reflections, p. 153. 68 BD, XI, No. 146, Communication by German Ambassador, 26 July 1914, p. 103. 69 BD, XI, No. 185, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, 27 July 1914, p. 128.

115 required Austria and Russia to hold discussions and that the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei

Sazonov and Berchtold intended to ‘exchange views’ and that only these two parties could

determine the course of events. Grey was virtually powerless, armed only with a conference no one wanted and proposals no one was listening too, except Lichnowsky, who was similarly without influence himself. Grey would state in May 1915, upon reflection about the outbreak of the war, ‘that he himself had no power to decide policy, & was only the mouthpiece of England’.70

Grey had adopted a consistent message with Lichnowsky throughout the litany of

conversations which took place during the fateful month. He reiterated Britain was non-

committal and that they were steadfast in their intimate relationship with their entente

partners.71 Grey told Lichnowsky that military conversations had taken place just as they had

back in 1906. Grey was open and forthright, something that he had built his reputation on.72

Paul Cambon, France’s Ambassador to London, and Prince Lichnowsky both acknowledged

Grey was an honest man determined on peace in Europe.73 Grey’s message had never

deviated; he would not give assurances, nor commit Britain to any course, nor align them in

any way that would otherwise undermine their interests – nor did he have the power to do so

without Cabinet and Parliamentary approval. His openness and clarity were something that

was not being reciprocated by Berlin or Vienna. Therein lay the problem.

70 Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War–July 1914 to May 1915. A Prologue to the Triumph of Lloyd George (London: Knopf, 1971), p. 52. See Eleanor Acland’s War Diary, c.7 May 1915, Acland MSS. Sir Francis Acland had served under Grey as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1911-1915. 71 Prince Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss: Reminiscences (London: Constable & Co Ltd, 1928), pp. 370- 372. 72 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 372. 73 Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, p. 68.

116 Lichnowsky’s stance was what Grey espoused, but neither was in alignment with Berlin.

Lichnowsky in a lengthy communique to the Chancellor on 16 July set out his view on

Germany’s policy. von Jagow replied that while he recognised the merit of what Lichnowsky

had presented, it was not the path they were taking; they were aligned with Austria for better

or for worse, despite their crumbling Empire.74 Further to which he added, they had failed to

find an alternative alliance, and the relationship with Britain was unlikely, so despite

Austria’s declining prestige, they would be standing by them.75 The German Secretary for

State of Foreign Affairs was clear: ‘The maintenance of Austria and, moreover, of as strong

an Austria as possible, is essential for us both for internal and external reasons’.76 The justification for this support von Jagow noted was, in fact, Grey’s belief in maintaining the

balance of power, such that in order to have this balance it required two opposing groups, and

by not supporting Austria the balance would be ‘shattered’.77 Lichnowsky needed to

understand this dictum. Their policy illustrated the fact that not only did he not grasp the political tone in Berlin, but that von Jagow had had to spell it out and that he needed convincing of it. Grey was relying on someone who was not being kept abreast of Berlin’s intentions. Furthermore, he believed Germany would be willing to alter the course of events.

They were both categorically wrong.

Lichnowsky’s naivety continued, as he conveyed optimism on 22 July that Grey would work to persuade Servia to accept Austrian demands, so long as they were moderate.78 Lichnowsky

still had not realised that Austria had already made decisions on the back of the ‘blank

cheque’. Austria by now had designed the ultimatum that ensured non-compliance, which

74 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 379. 75 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 380. 76 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 380. 77 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 381. 78 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 383.

117 would mean conflict. von Jagow relayed Lichnowsky’s correspondence to the Kaiser on 23

July stressing that people expected that they would assert their influence. The Kaiser was

adamant that this was not their business and dismissed Grey’s desire for them to interfere in

the Austrian Emperor’s affairs.79 The Kaiser was as resolute in his support for Austria as

Grey was in attempts to garner German assistance to intervene, neither waivered. The Kaiser

had the power to affect the outcome; Grey did not.

With Berlin’s continued refusal to intervene and disinclination towards the Hague Court or

another Ambassadors’ conference, there was fast becoming little Grey could do. Lichnowsky

would recall in his memoirs that Grey believed the Austrian demands had been excessive; the

finite period for a reply was something meant that war would be inevitable and not just localised.80 Grey persistently depended on Lichnowsky to convey to Berlin the need for a quatre, to which the Kaiser remarked that ‘This is superfluous as Austria has already made matters plain to Russia and Grey has nothing else to propose’.81 Nevertheless, this demand

was something that Bethmann Hollweg had stated was the correct approach, but the Kaiser

was reluctant to undertake. For Lichnowsky Germany had a moral obligation to intervene,

since without their support the ultimatum would never have been so severe; again,

Lichnowsky pressed Berlin to seek an extension and urged them ‘not to refuse’ Grey’s

proposal.82 Grey was continuing down the path of attempting to pressure Germany into

telling Austria what to do, and the Kaiser was emphatic that he would not.

Germany’s resistance to intervening in Vienna was not something Grey had been aware of.

He noted a reluctance even from his friend Prince Lichnowsky in his efforts to intercede on

79 Lichnowsky, Heading for, pp. 384-5. 80 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 390; BD, XI, Minutes, 25 July 1914, p. 80. 81 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 390. 82 Lichnowsky, Heading for, p. 393.

118 his behalf too: ‘If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support’.83 Little did Grey know how Berlin viewed Lichnowsky, for he noted that he was subject to being ‘left in complete ignorance of most important things’.84 Lichnowsky’s powerlessness was apparent, even more so, that of Grey, for even when he conveyed that Lichnowsky should present the idea that Germany put forth their proposal this was essentially ignored.85

For Grey, the Austrian Ambassador Mensdorff had similarly been scant on providing details of Austria’s ‘démarche’ and the time limit imposed. The Ambassador enthusiastically defended the point that it was not an ultimatum and that the distinction while minor was a

‘“nuance” of one’.86 Mensdorff’s argumentative distinction suggests that he would instead rather argue the ‘nuances’ of semantics than the content. There also seems to be little concern evoked by the Ambassador as to the actual substance of the ultimatum, but rather on the fact that if Servia failed to comply, then military preparations would commence.87 The

Ambassadors remarks suggest that there was no expectation that Servia would comply, and that no matter what Grey would say could convince or sway him or indeed Austria to take another course to avoid confrontation. This was to be expected as Mensdorff was merely a messenger acting for Vienna.

By 26 July Austria, despite Servia’s conciliatory response to the ultimatum, broke off communication, and by 27 July Mensdorff informed Grey that Servia had not agreed to the terms, thereby Austria ‘were compelled to take more severe measures’.88 It mattered not that

83 Lichnowsky, The Guilt, p. 28. 84 Lichnowsky, The Guilt, p. 64. 85 Lichnowsky, The Guilt, p. 71. 86 BD, XI, No. 104, Communication by the Austrian Minister, 24 July 1914, pp. 83-4. 87 BD, XI, No. 104, Communication by the Austrian Minister, 24 July 1914, p. 84. 88 BD, XI, No. 188, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 27 July 1914, pp. 129-30.

119 Servia had been contrite and submissive to Austria’s demands; they had designs for war,

something that started long before the ultimatum of 1914.89 Austria had wanted to attack

Servia in August 1913 to stop the impending signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, which was

executed the following day, whereby Servia would gain significant territory in Macedonia.90

Austria’s subsequent actions in 1914 should not have come as any surprise. However, the

essential core difference was that in 1913 Austria lacked the requisite support of their ally

Germany, which by 1914 Austria had in the form of the ‘blank cheque’. Grey elucidated to

Mensdorff that their posture had now given cause for Russia’s involvement and escalated tensions. Austria’s intention had been set with the ultimatum; it was merely a means of appeasing the protocols of international diplomacy. The immediacy of their actions had closed all opportunity for conversations to occur between Austria and Servia.

Austria closed the door on Servia on 26 July, and indeed Europe’s fate was seemingly sealed by 29 July the day after Austria declared war on Servia. With Servia having been drawn into a conflict, it meant that a crescendo of nations were likely to follow; Russia, Germany, and probably France too. Where did that leave Britain? Grey suggested as a means to avoid what was now likely to be a European conflict that Servia could become a vassal state. Whether

Grey was suggesting Austria could be that superior state or if he intended for Russia to take

Servia under their Empire was not transparent.91 It was made abundantly clear by Mensdorff that Berchtold had stated that Austria ‘had no intention of territorial aggrandisement in

Servia’.92 The proposal had no merit as a solution as it would have taken considerable time to

negotiate the intricacies given its complexity, let alone gain agreement from Servia. Servia

89 Otte, July Crisis, p. 280. 90 Frank M. Anderson and Amos S. Hershey, Handbook for the diplomatic history of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870-1914, No. 152, The Projected Austrian Intervention in Serbia in 1913 (Washington D.C.: G.P.O, 1918), pp. 443-4. 91 BD, XI, No. 282, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 29 July 1914, p. 179. 92 BD, XI, No. 412, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 August 1914, p. 247.

120 had only become independent from Turkish control in 1878. It was highly unlikely Servia

would want to come under Russian control in 1914. Grey had only been employing a

delaying tactic to bring the Austrians to the negotiating table.

The refusal of a conference by both Austria and Germany meant any apparatus to quell the

raging fervour for conflict was dependent on Russia’s intentions. Despite Germany’s

continued reluctance to ‘intervene’ or promote the need for restraint to Austria, which had

been their modus operandi since issuing the ‘blank cheque’, they still sought to exert pressure

on both Britain and Russia. On 29 July Goschen informed Grey that the German Chancellor

was concerned as to Russia’s intentions to attack Austria, which could result in a European

conflagration.93 The telegram stated that he, the German Chancellor, was audaciously

requesting British neutrality and limited assurances primarily that Britain would not become

engaged in the current conflict.94 The Chancellor’s request was not only problematic for its expectation of Britain but more so because the Chancellor could only provide limited

assurances and no real guarantee as to its scope or details. Above all else, it was coming from someone whom Grey knew not to be the principal architect of decision-making in Germany.

Had Germany wanted peace as the Chancellor intimated, then he should surely have made

every attempt to orchestrate the Conference. Instead, he bartered with those countries he

hoped would remain neutral. Grey saw through his intentions and knew what the Chancellor

was requesting and that it could have an impact on Britain’s reputation; after all, it was a

question of honour to uphold Britain’s obligation to France. Grey declined the Chancellor’s

request for neutrality as it exposed France to the potential of German policy.95 Grey was

93 British White Papers, The American Journal of International Law, Diplomatic Correspondence, (1914), No. 85, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, 29 July 1914, p. 318. 94 British White Papers, No. 85, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, 29 July 1914, pp. 318-19. 95 British White Papers, No. 101, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 30 July 1914, p. 333.

121 forthright that the Chancellor’s request would dishonour Britain’s relations with France, and that Belgian neutrality was not for bargaining.96 Grey’s reply noted that any possible advantages to be gained from assuring neutrality were not worth the cost of ‘tying our hands now’.97 Furthermore, Grey stressed Britain’s need to remain unshackled to any commitments to preserve their ability to adapt and act as they saw fit given the current situation.98 By maintaining their current position, Britain could choose to remain neutral if they so wished.

Whereas, if they agreed to the Chancellor’s request, they would have lost their right not to be neutral. They would have instantly abandoned their entente partners and Belgium. By maintaining the current course, it still afforded them the best option to determine their destiny, whether that lay with France or not. For Grey, this was the best course, but it aligned with British foreign policy, one which they had stayed the course with for over a decade.

Even if Grey had wanted to accept the Chancellor’s offer to commit Britain to neutrality, it would have required Cabinet and Parliamentary approval.

On 30 July Grey spoke with Asquith and despite a Cabinet meeting later that afternoon the decision to reply was taken as time was pressing.99 Grey’s reply if not explicit certainly was implicit: that Britain could not stand aside if called upon given certain circumstances. Grey had already communicated this to Lichnowsky.100 The 30 July brought the likelihood of peace no closer despite Lichnowsky offering to Grey the possibility that maybe the ‘German

Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria’.101

96 British White Papers, No. 101, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 30 July 1914, p. 333. 97 British White Papers, No. 101, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 30 July 1914, p. 334. 98 British White Papers, No. 101, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 30 July 1914, p. 334. 99 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 329. 100 See British White Papers, No.’s 98 and 101, pp. 330-1, 334. 101 British White Papers, No. 103, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 30 July 1914, pp. 334-5.

122 Germany had not guaranteed anything more than hope, despite having influenced Austria at the outset. The fact was that it was conditional upon Austria taking Belgrade, and only if

Germany felt Austria were satisfied would they then make overtures to limit further advances. The Chancellor’s proposal did not suggest any assurance of a guarantee. The fact remains that Germany’s posture had allowed Austria to turn their military might against

Servia, and that only then would they consider exerting pressure to control their ally.

Germany had wittingly endorsed Austria’s quest for conflict, which fuelled Austria’s overriding intention for war with Servia. The ability to undertake this incursion had been all down to Germany issuing the ‘blank cheque’, without which Austria would never have felt empowered to go to war with Servia.

Russia for their part was concerned Austria would not halt their advance at Belgrade.102 No one trusted either Germany or Austria. The Kaiser and indeed Germany could not be seen to be rescinding their support – therein lay the issue. A weakened ally had been given unilateral support by a Kaiser who was unwilling to risk his reputation to avert a European conflict.

Had the Kaiser seen that he could have orchestrated European peace at any time, it would have given him international prestige. However, it would have been at the expense of having guaranteed Austrian support; only then might the war have been avoided. Grey and indeed

Sir George Buchanan, Britain’s Ambassador in St. Petersburg, were imploring the Russians not to engage in the crisis.103 It would be the last hope since Austria ceased all communication with Russia on 30 July.

102 British White Papers, No. 103, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 30 July 1914, p. 335. 103 British White Papers, No. 103, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 30 July 1914, p. 335.

123 It was not until 31 July that Grey would make any diplomatic contingency for war – just four

days from Britain’s declaration.104 Their contingency had always been the navy and

diplomacy. If they were to engage in a European war now, they would need an army, and

with only 248,000 regular army soldiers, they were outnumbered by four to one.105 Grey was

all too aware of this imbalance, but his focus was still on trying to ensure peace and

safeguard Belgian neutrality. Russia’s mobilisation had been forced by the rejection of any

type of a Conference coupled with Austria’s declaration of war against Servia. Germany was

now using Russia’s mobilisation as a justification for their mobilisation, and they were

prepared for war, far more so than Britain or Russia.106

Now with Austria, Germany, France, and Russia, all mobilising a European war was

imminent. On 1 August, Germany declared war against Russia.107 For Grey, Britain’s role

was still uncertain and largely dependent on Germany’s actions towards Belgium. From the

German perspective, they wanted to secure Britain’s neutrality; there was no quid pro quo,

least not what Grey desired, which was at a minimum a conference to stall any further

deterioration. Grey was continually resolute; he had not wavered once. His policy was

abundantly clear, succinct even: settle the Austro-Servian dispute, albeit with Germany’s

support – here Grey had failed. All attempts at a conference had been thwarted again by

Germany’s reluctance. He then reiterated to the Germans that Britain could not be counted on

to remain neutral if war did break out but offered no guarantees to either the French or

Russians in terms of military support – Britain’s decision had not been rendered.108

104 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 329. 105 Hew Strachan, Pre-war Military Planning (Great Britain), online edn, [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918- online.net/pdf/1914-1918-Online-pre-war_military_planning_great_britain-2018-02-07.pdf, accessed 6 May 2019]. 106 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 330. 107 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 524. 108 Taylor, The Struggle, p. 525.

124 Assertions have been made by notable historians such as Zara Steiner, and those who worked

with Grey, David Lloyd George, Eyre Crowe, and Lord Vansittart, that he should have defined his policy sooner, and thereby war would have been averted.109 Grey’s position

throughout the crisis and indeed his tenure never deviated. For Grey to have taken what some

have suggested as a more explicit stance would have needed Cabinet approval. Even with

several Great Powers mobilising, the Cabinet was against giving any assurances to any power including France, let alone Germany.110 Grey was still of the mind that mobilisation did not

necessarily equate to war. He saw it as a deterrent, but for Germany, Russia’s mobilisation

meant that war was now imminent. What followed was a succession of declarations, born of

Germany’s invasion of France on 2 August and then Belgium between the 3 and 4 August. It

would be the latter which finally forced the hand of Grey and Britain. Adhering to the 1839

Treaty of London, Britain would honour their commitment and go to war based on

Germany’s flagrant violation of the compact that they too had signed.

Interestingly, even after the Germans invaded France on 2 August, there remained those in

Cabinet who were staunchly opposed to war.111 Grey was certain that the divisions within the

Cabinet were such that any attempt to gain their pledge of support for France would be so

divisive that it would fracture the Cabinet.112 Grey was faced with some pro-French supporters, those who believed Germany was just a form of Prussian militarism, and the fact

Britain had severed diplomatic ties with Servia some years previous that there was no real reason to be drawn into this dispute.113 The seventy-five-year-old Treaty of London was to

109 Steiner, Britain and the Origins, pp. 220-230; Vansittart, The Mist, p. 124; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, p. 55. 110 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 331; Vansittart, The Mist, p. 124. 111 K. M. Wilson, The Cabinet Diary of J. A. Pease 24 July – 5 August 1914 (Leeds: Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society Ltd, 1983), p. 8. 112 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 334-5; Vansittart, The Mist, p. 124. 113 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 335-6.

125 Grey’s mind a binding obligation.114 Germany had on 26 July demanded of Belgium the right to pass freely under the guise that the French were set on invading Belgium.115 Asquith and even Lloyd George concurred that they had a contractual obligation to protect Belgian neutrality.116 Grey and Churchill were firm in their opinion that they should support France, but it would be the violation of the Treaty that would precipitate Britain’s decision to go to war.117

Lloyd George later suggested that Grey could have averted the War but for his personality, which escalated the situation and that his lack of swift action also contributed to the catastrophe.118 Lloyd George further stated that Grey made mistakes that resulted in the outcome.119 Lloyd George’s remarks in fact suggest two clear facts about himself. First, that he was quick to attribute individual accountability to others, and second, that he wished to distance himself from any accountability, thereby enhancing his own reputation.120 Lloyd

George’s aspersion that Grey’s personality was somehow a factor is a dubious criticism as it is vague, as he did not specify precisely what he meant by it. Are we to assume what Lloyd

George was asserting was some type of personality clash, whereby Grey’s demeanour worked to contribute to the crisis which escalated to war?

This contention of a personality clash may well have occurred back in 1912 at the time of the

Haldane Mission when Grey had somehow inadvertently shunned the Kaiser by not travelling to Germany. The subsequent communique in March 1912 had outraged the Kaiser, so at this

114 Wilson, The Cabinet Diary, p. 8. 115 Vansittart, The Mist, p. 126. 116 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, p. 44. 117 Churchill, World Crisis, vol. 1, p. 222. 118 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, p. 55. 119 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I. p. 59. 120 Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 304.

126 juncture, there was no willingness to trust Grey after that and he was met with a certain level of disdain and doubt from the German leader and Bethmann Hollweg. If we accept this as a justifiable explanation it would be reasonable then to concur with Lloyd George that Grey would then not have been able to negotiate and gain the necessary compliance to pursue an alternate course. Unfortunately, this argument lacks merit as it fails to account for Grey successfully chairing the Ambassadors Conference in London between December 1912 to

May 1913. Had he not the personality to undertake this responsibility and lacked sufficient agency, then surely it would have yielded a different outcome.

As to Grey taking swift action and making mistakes, he was given limited time in which to respond. There were just 37 days from the assassination to Britain’s declaration of war.

However, there were just 13 days from the time of the Austrian ultimatum to that critical decision. For Servia, they had but just three days in which to avert the catastrophe that would befall them. The July Crisis, unlike the previous ‘crises’, represented a heightened degree of urgency, but more importantly was the lack of time in which nation-states had to make decisions to react.

What Lloyd George failed to acknowledge was that Grey was not fully apprised of all the pertinent information, namely the German ‘blank cheque’. Furthermore, Grey could not have anticipated both the scope and purpose of Austria’s ultimatum nor their intention to disregard

Servia’s reply. Germany’s actions were the coup de grâce and signalled for all intent and purposes Austria’s design for war. Lloyd George’s claims suggest Grey had sufficient agency to act differently. If we are to concur with this notion that Grey made mistakes, it can only be in that he continued to pursue a conference and to garner German intercession, not knowing

127 that the Kaiser had given the Austrian’s a ‘blank cheque’ and that he was resolute that he would not tell them what to do.

To suggest Grey could have acted swiftly as Lloyd George has insinuated is to give Grey more agency than he had. According to Lansdowne, Grey lacked the power in terms of

Cabinet support to explicitly make any such statement.121 Lloyd George’s rebuke of Grey went so far as to state that Grey should have unequivocally told Germany Britain would declare war and in doing so with their ‘whole strength – the issue would have been different’.122 With three-quarters of the Cabinet opposed to any sort of European war, they

were hardly likely to give Grey the support that could provoke a war.123 Notably, Lloyd

George was one of those majority in the Cabinet who was opposed to intervention and

promoted the idea of neutrality. For him to have suggested that Grey should have declared

Britain’s willingness to engage with their whole strength is not only ludicrous but also

hypocritical when he had openly stated a desire to remain neutral.

Lloyd George had told to the Manchester Guardian’s C.P. Scott that ‘there could be no

question of our taking part in any war in the first instance’, and that no minister supported

such action.124 Thus, on the one hand, Lloyd George promoted the idea that Grey could and

should have committed Britain to a position that which was something Grey had managed to

avoid in his time as Foreign Secretary, but furthermore, it would not have guaranteed peace.

On the other hand, Lloyd George made it abundantly clear he and many of the Cabinet were

fundamentally opposed to any European involvement. The fact that Lloyd George stated that

121 Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 304; C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, bart., G.C.B., D.S.O., his life and diaries, 2 vols. (Cassell and Company, Ltd. London, 1927), I, p. 200. 122 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, p. 58. 123 Churchill, The World, I, p. 211. 124 Martel, The Month, p. 251; see Diary Entry for July 27, Trevor Wilson ed., The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928 (London: Collins, 1970), pp. 91-2.

128 Grey should have conveyed to Germany that Britain was prepared to go to war exalted

Grey’s power and influence over the events while degrading the Cabinet’s role. Lloyd

George had played fast and loose with the facts and in doing so, scurrilously given a false

impression of Grey.

The significance of Lloyd George’s statements regarding Grey set the foundation for others

to make similar judgements. Even Sir Eyre Crowe felt that Grey ought to have committed

sooner to act alongside the entente partners.125 Notably, Lansdowne would make a post-war appraisal which supports this belief, but that Grey was not in a position to do so.126 By the

1930’s Italian historian Luigi Albertini in wanting to apportion accountability also held that

Grey was one of those men who could have averted the catastrophe.127 Albertini’s remark

tied Grey directly to his actions based on his decision-making. It raises the question of what

specific actions Grey could have taken differently during the July Crisis based upon the

information he had at that time. Furthermore, Albertini presupposes that Grey was at the

epicentre of the crisis and had enough political power to influence the outcome. Albertini has

attributed with more power than he had and that he was on an equal footing with the Kaiser,

the Emperor, and the Tsar, clearly he was not.

Some eighty years later, William Mulligan stated that ‘Grey’s ambiguous messages’ had

brought consternation in Berlin.128 Both Albertini and Mulligan focused upon Grey’s

leadership decision-making, his lack of clarity in communication, as well as a clear definition

of Britain’s intent in July 1914, at least from an external viewpoint. Moreover, Mulligan

contended that the war was not born out of a ‘series of miscalculations’ but that it was the

125 Herbert Butterfield, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 13. 126 Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 304. 127 Albertini, The Origins, III, p. 385. 128 Mulligan, The Origins, p. 232.

129 result of uncompromised decisions, and perhaps more importantly, that there were a few men

who were inclined to want war.129 In that regard, he was correct as the Kaiser and the

Emperor had made ‘uncompromised decisions’ and that their intentions were highly

calculated. Mulligan further stressed that some decisions were not designed to provoke war,

and yet, Germany not only encouraged Austria, but they were unwilling to keep them in

check despite having the power to do so – that was an act of warmongering and must be

construed as provocational.

Lichnowsky noted that nothing was done on the part of Germany to preserve peace.130

Furthermore, Lichnowsky stated that their aim was war and that it was not a question of Grey

being able to prevent it, but instead why had Germany not prevented it.131 Unequivocally

German officials at the highest levels made decisions to wage war which Austria executed.

How was Grey supposed to intercede and attempt to defuse calculated actions? Grey could

not have been expected to make decisions and prevent a series of actions that were made by

those in the highest positions. For Grey, this was made more difficult when those parties who

were rendering the decisions were not forthcoming with all the relevant information or

transparent with their intent and designs for war.

Christopher Clark similarly echoed this idea of ‘ambiguous messages’ and that during the fever-pitched and frantic days in late July 1914, Grey had conveyed two contradictory statements as to Britain’s position.132 On 29 July Grey stated to Lichnowsky that Britain

would be compelled to be drawn into any action were France to enter a war with Germany.133

129 Mulligan, The Origins, p.225. 130 Röhl, 1914:Delusion, p. 52. 131 Röhl, 1914:Delusion, p. 52. 132 Christopher Clark, ‘Sir Edward Grey and the July Crisis’, The International History Review 38:2 (2016), 326-338, at p. 335. 133 Clark, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 335.

130 Clark then stated that two days later, on 31 July, Grey told Bertie that they were not likely to

engage in a conflict that was ‘remote from the country’s own interests’.134 Clark questioned

why Grey would have manoeuvred this way. Clark has charged that Grey’s contradictory

messages during this week were central to the breakdown of diplomatic solutions.

However, these two messages, albeit political stances, are not so opposed as Clark has

proposed. Britain’s popular press and opinion was against a war as Grey had previously conveyed to Lichnowsky. Grey also pointed out that there had been initial support for

Austria’s grievance, but their obstinacy concerning Servia’s concessions had swung the popular attitude.135 Grey also informed Buchanan of the fact that so long as the quarrel

remained localised between Austria and Servia, he had no intention of intervening.136

However, should the quarrel escalate and become protracted, whereby it became a matter

between Austria and Russia, this then would change the situation and jeopardise the peace of

Europe.137 Grey similarly communicated to Bertie and recounted a conversation he had had

with Lichnowsky on 29 July whereby he informed him that:

I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that

he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations in to any

sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to

preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany,

failed.138

134 Clark, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 335. 135 Lichnowsky, Heading to, p. 406. 136 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 318. 137 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 318. 138 British White Papers, No. 87, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, London, Foreign Office July 29, 1914, p. 320-1.

131 Grey was abundantly clear there was a line that should not be crossed and warned

Lichnowsky that in any eventuality that France should be attacked, then Britain would be obliged to support France. The message was a resounding declaration of Britain’s position and meant as a deterrent to Germany, although a pretence. As to Clark’s second statement,

Grey had been clear to France since 1905, there would be no assurance of anything more than diplomatic support and that was expressly consistent – there was no ambiguity. Nonetheless, in clarifying Britain’s purportedly unclear and ambiguous position, Grey was resolute in reiterating what he had always stated. Grey stood the course with France, and what had been agreed to by Cabinet, ‘that no pledge would be given, no hope even held out to France and

Russia, which it was doubtful this country would fulfil’.139 Grey had in no way manoeuvred the situation or falsely conveyed a contradictory position. He merely stated Britain’s consistent policy and that he was ultimately maintaining a single course to avoid war.

Britain did not wish to be drawn into or engaged in the ensuing regional conflict, which

Britain had no direct ties to and this he made clear. He simply stated to France what he had always said; there would be no unilateral military support. As for Germany, Austria’s reluctance to accept Servia’s concessions had changed public opinion. What some historians have suggested, and are thereby agreeing with Lloyd George, is that Grey should have directly gone against policy and extended Britain’s position by allying with France and guaranteeing military support if they were attacked. But this would not have necessarily guaranteed peace.

139 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, pp. 313, 339-40.

132 Summation

The reverberations of 28 June were barely audible in Britain, and yet the seismic consequences would leave an indelible impact on its economy and its people. The conflict that ensued from the July Crisis has been viewed as avoidable from a British perspective.140

John Keegan suggested that despite the rising tensions in July 1914, the resulting consequence could have been avoided and that war was not inevitable.141 Indeed, the assassination in and of itself was not a sign of a para bellum on Britain’s part. Nonetheless, the expectation of a ‘war’ was one that Grey foretold in 1908 when he stated, ‘I don't think there will be war at present, but it will be difficult to keep the peace of Europe for another five years’.142 From Grey’s prophetic assertion, two thoughts emerge. First, that maintaining peace over the next five years would be exacting. Second, that he could not have explicitly foreseen that the Great War would emanate from the Archduke’s assassination. However, since the Balkans were undergoing emergent change as one imperial dominance receded and the nascent state of countries like Servia threatened a declining Austria, increasing regional tensions meant war could not have been underestimated.

Grey did what he had always done, relied on honour and trust in the proven diplomatic process of the Concert of Europe. He similarly placed confidence in Ambassadorial relationships with the belief that Germany would wield power over Austria as they had done in 1912-13. The primary reason the Concert of Europe had worked in the past was due to

Britain's superior advantages economically and with the Royal Navy. These resources, coupled with a vastly superior navy, acted as a deterrent to other nations. These two key attributes served as both inherent deterrents in terms of resources and provided Grey with a

140 Ferguson, The Pity, p. 158. 141 John Keegan, The First World War (London: Hutchinson, 1998), p. 3. 142 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 176.

133 power base by which he could nullify any expectation of conflict. By 1914 this dominance

had diminished. Britain was no longer the prevailing economic powerhouse, and Germany’s

navy had now developed into a considerable force. There would be no assemblage, no repeat

of 1913.

The executive decision-makers, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Emperor Franz Joseph, through their

intermediaries, resisted such supplications from Grey for an Ambassadorial conference.

Germany was the power behind Austria, and the ‘blank cheque’ had given them the resolve

and strength to exact revenge. For Austria, they had a myopic focus on Servia and saw no

effects of their will or actions. Grey understood that Britain’s power was not without limits

and that he, too, had limited power and agency with which to manage the events that

threatened Britain’s primary aims and Europe.143 Since this Bosnian crisis was not initially a primary concern, there was little to be gained by interceding. As the situation intensified and

deteriorated, his agency was without leverage. Grey repeated the same position he had done

in the previous crises, diplomatic support for entente partners with no military obligation, but

since there was no vested interest in the region why become engaged, this held for 1914.

Only when there was a breach of Belgium’s neutrality did Grey and Britain advocate for war.

Grey’s unwavering position reflected his commitment to the overriding Imperial strategy

despite what became an insurmountable challenge. The die was cast when Germany

reassured Austria of their resolute unconstrained support with the ‘blank cheque’. What can

be conjectured is that had the ‘blank cheque’ not been offered then Austria may well have

taken a different posture with the ultimatum. It must be concluded that the precipitous cause

of events unfolding was down to the ‘blank cheque’.

143 Otte, ‘Postponing’, p. 260.

134 Chapter Four: The Confluence of Leadership Studies and History

‘In the billions of acts that comprise the leadership process, a pattern can be discerned that makes possible generalisations about leadership’ – James MacGregor Burns.1

Historians have typically resisted the notion of linking history and leadership.2 They have

been wary of exploring the connexion between the two disciplines given its tendency to

produce historical generalisations rather than focused explanations.3 One such argument that

supports this idea of avoiding historical generalisations is that by recognising patterns in one

period in the past, is that they may not hold true when applied to any future pattern.4 John

Lewis Gaddis stated that generalisations were frequently delineated by a specific event at the

time that the event occurs.5 Nonetheless, by not recognising the value of generalisations, it restricts our ability to recognise discernible patterns.

In particular, where there are specific variables which repeatedly occur over periods of time, for example, where Grey as a variable is common to all five crises, a pattern of his approach to decision-making may be discerned. Examining multiple crises is complex and requires investigating the particulars of each crisis to identify patterns across each of them from which generalisations can be made. In doing so, historical analysis enables and informs the study of leadership by identifying complexities which, as suggested by J. Thomas Wren is the sixth

1 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 427. 2 J. Thomas Wren, ‘Of history and leadership: the discipline of history and the understanding of leadership’, in Leadership Studies: The Dialogue of Disciplines, (eds.) Michael Harvey and Ronald E. Riggio, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 201), 66-81, at p. 66. 3 Wren, ‘Of history’, pp. 66; Erwin C. Hargrove, ‘History, Political Science and the Study of Leadership’, Polity 36:4 (2004), 579-93, at p. 579. 4 Wren, ‘Of history’, p. 66. 5 Gaddis, John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 63.

135 ‘C’ (Complexity) of historical analysis.6 The concept of complexity enables the undertaking of a historical enquiry into the interaction of interdependent variables over a period of time.7

For example, how Grey applies policy and the ententes in those five crises, despite the

independent nature of each event.

The causations of each of the first four crises encountered by Grey as Foreign Secretary could

be explained by understanding whether they constituted simple or complex causations.

Gaddis explained that simple causation is the result of one variable impacting upon another,

typically what is known or as he stated predictable.8 However, complex causation is the idea of what is not known or is unpredictable and that which occurs when the behaviour of others is not foreseen. 9 For example, specific events within the July Crisis. Thus, it is necessary and

indeed imperative that we examine these five crises for their patterns of predictability and

understand their unique causalities to see if Grey could have anticipated the consequences of

those events.

The Evolution of Leadership Studies

The evolution of twentieth-century leadership theories can be traced back to Thomas

Carlyle’s ‘Great Man Theory’ (1841), which was a catalyst in trait leadership studies.

Commencing with Carlyle’s foundational work, personality and trait theories were the

dominant discourse for leadership studies until the 1940s.10 It was during this period that the

study of leadership expanded beyond individual traits and evolved to consider the external

6 Wren, ‘Of history’, p. 80. 7 Gaddis, The Landscape, pp. 74-5. 8 Gaddis, The Landscape, p. 69, 72. 9 Gaddis, The Landscape, p. 69, 72. 10 Bernard M. Bass and Ralph Melvin Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications, new edn (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 37.

136 dynamic. The evolution of leadership theory began to consider those factors specific to any

situation and how they impacted on individual decision-making and how this shaped

outcomes. Stogdill suggested that one type of leader in any given situation might not

necessarily be the right choice for another situation.11

The context of incorporating the situation into leadership theory and how this affects decisions and actions provided a segue to linking a multitude of disciplines to the study of leadership.12 By including the situational context into leadership thinking it gave rise to the concept of contingency theories proposed by Fred E. Fiedler (1964), Hersey-Blanchard’s situational theory (1969), and Evans (1970) and House (1971) Path-Goal theory.13 These

theories concurred with Stogdill’s claim that no one style of leadership applied to all

situations, given that no two events or situations were the same. The central premise was that

the demands of a situation, which includes those factors inherent to a specific event, will

dictate the type of leader required.14 The focus was thus not on evaluating individual

elements or personal traits of the individual in isolation but assessing them within the scope

of a leader’s influence over a given situation.15

The History-Leadership Nexus

Typically, the application of leadership theory to the history of international politics has

focused on the areas of foreign policy and leadership traits, modelling personality, and

historical decision-making.16 In bridging studies of international diplomacy with leadership

11 R. M. Stogdill, ‘Personal factors associated with leadership: A survey of the literature’, Journal of Psychology 26 (1948), 35-71, at p. 65. 12 Bass and Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook, p. 38. 13 Bass and Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook, pp. 46-7, 488. 14 Bass and Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook, p. 38. 15 Albert S. King, ‘Evolution of Leadership Theory’, Vikalpa 15:2 (1990), 43-54, at p. 47. 16 See Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders’, International Studies Quarterly 24:1 (1980), pp. 7-46; W. J. Crow and R. C. Noel, ‘An

137 theories, this thesis intends to reconsider Grey’s culpability in the origins of the First World

War by devising a theoretical framework and applying a crisis decision-making model that

focuses on the five seminal events of his career from 1905 to 1914. The specific theoretical

lens used to frame the discussion utilises Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership

Theory and Charles Hermann’s Situational Cube. While the former provides a tool for

assessing Grey’s leadership style (autocratic versus democratic) and how he approached

crisis decision-making, the latter helps to determine the precise nature of the five crises and

how they affected Grey’s decision-making. 17 Besides Hermann, David Kinsella, Bruce

Russett, and Harvey Starr also situated specific historical events within the Cube using the set parameters of Decision Time, Awareness, and Threat level, as a means to determine whether those events constituted a crisis.18 These studies support the contention in this thesis,

whereby understanding those factors that influence decision-making during crisis events provides greater insight into how they affect the outcome.19

More precisely, Hersey and Blanchard’s task-relationship behavioural characteristics theory

(which has been modified and does not include follower maturity) has been coupled with

experiment in simulated historical decision making’, in A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, ed. M. G. Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 385-405; Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Circumstances under which leader personality will affect foreign policy: some propositions’, in In Search of Global Patterns, ed. J. N. Rouseau (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 326-333; M. G. Hermann, ‘Leader personality and foreign policy behavior’, in Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods, ed. J. N. Rouseau (New York: Sage-Halsted, 1974), pp. 201-34; D. G. Winter and A. J. Stewart, ‘Content analysis as a technique for assessing political leaders’, in Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, ed. M. G. Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 28-61. 17 Warren Phillips and Richard Rimkunas, ‘The concept of crisis in international politics’, Journal of Peace Research 15:3 (1978), 259-72, at p. 262; Charles F. Herman, ‘International Crisis as a Situational Variable’, in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, new edn (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 409-21. 18 David Kinsella, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, new edn, (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage, 2012), pp.136-7; C. Hermann, ‘Some consequences of crisis which limits the viability of organizations’, Administrative Science Quarterly 8 (1963), 61-82, at p. 64. 19 Robert L. Hamblin, ‘Leadership and Crises’, Sociometry 21:4 (1958), 322-335, at p. 324; King, ‘Evolution of’, p. 47; Juliet Kaarbo and M.G. Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: How Individual Differences Affect the Foreign Policy Making Process’, Leadership Quarterly 9:3 (1998), 243-263, at p. 248.

138 Hermann’s Situational Cube to form the theoretical lens (Figure 4.1 below).20 The theoretical

lens applied in this thesis is reinforced by the historical research that contextualises the

timeframes Grey had to evaluate, process, and make decisions during his five crises.

Furthermore, it considers what information was available to him to base decisions on and

those limitations, such as the binding nature of the entente’s imposed upon his agency.

Likewise, identifying the determinate factors that posed constraints upon Grey’s role as

Foreign Secretary requires these specific aspects to be articulated clearly in the theoretical

lens.

The diagram (Figure 4.1) shows the internal and external constraints that are either task or

relationship dependent. By adopting this approach, it means that specific issues will not be thoroughly examined in this thesis, for example, Irish Home Rule and the British naval policy. Other aspects will only be mentioned as a means to support arguments or to illustrate relevant points of fact for analysis as they relate to Grey’s leadership. For instance, Foreign

Office communiques and correspondence between Grey and foreign Ambassadors. The

diagram also shows where Charles Hermann’s Situational Cube intersects with Hersey and

Blanchard’s theory.

20 Hersey and Blanchard’s follower maturity correlates to the respective level(s) of those followers whereby a high level of follower maturity requires less guidance, conversely those with low levels of maturity require greater oversight and input.

139

Hersey and Internal External Blanchard Domestic International Situational Constraints Relations Theory Task Irish Home Rule Continuity of Foreign Policy

Dependency Naval Policy Grey’s Five Crises Crisis Theory King’s Edward VII and the George V Foreign Office Communiques Situational Cube Relationship Prime Minister Foreign Ambassadors Dependency Asquith The Cabinet Parliament

Grey’s Positional Power Base

Figure 4.1 The Theoretical Lens Applied to Grey’s Positional Power Base

The discourse on historical leadership has preponderantly focused on U.S. Presidents and

British Prime Ministers while ignoring other political ministers who served in a capacity to

influence national and international interests, particularly at significant times in history.21

Burns’ work on American presidents and transformative leadership is a notable exception

that bridges the two disciplines.22 His seminal work, Leadership (1978), stated that the

traditional concept of leadership was ‘dominated by images of presidents and prime ministers

speaking to the masses from on high’.23 Burns distinguished between his notion of what

21 See Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, new edn (New York: The Free Press, 1990); James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); R. C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981); Barbara Kellerman, The Political Presidency: Practice of leadership from Kennedy to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Erwin C. Hargrove and Michael Nelson, Presidents, Politics, and Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Erwin C. Hargrove, The President as Leader, Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998). 22 Wren, ‘Of history’, p. 66. 23 Burns, Leadership, p. 442.

140 leadership is - that of a dynamic relationship between the leader and the engagement of the

followers - as opposed to leadership based on power. Burns’ argued that those leaders who

are ‘power-wielders’ only focus on self-driven motives. Here there is a clear distinction

between the act of leading and the specific leadership position held. Leadership positions

inherently possess a power-wielding capacity, and by that, they are afforded a level of

responsibility with that position. Here there is a fundamental difference between positional

leadership and the act of leading. One may be in a position of leadership and actively leading

but not have the ultimate power to make decisions. A Foreign Secretary will have the agency

to conduct foreign policy but not have ultimate decision-making authority as they answer to

the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Parliament, and are elected by the people.

Historical research has predominantly studied American presidential leadership concerning

foreign policy, with a smaller degree of focus on British Prime Ministers. The scholarship on

British Prime Ministers’ and foreign policy-making has been scant, primarily focused on

biographical accounts and memoirs.24 However, since 1980 there has been an emerging trend towards the study of prime ministers and policy-making.25 The consensus of this research has

been that leadership style did not influence decision-making but that variations in political

structure did.26 The research suggested that foreign policy was shaped by the decision-

making process, which was influenced by leadership style within the context of British Prime

Ministers and German Chancellors.27 Kaarbo further determined that there were varying

24 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 244. 25 See Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research’, Political Psychology 18:3 (1997), 553-81; Juliet Kaarbo and Margaret C. Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: How Individual Differences Affect the Foreign Policymaking Process’, Leadership Quarterly 9:3 (1998), 243-63; Stephen Benedict Dyson, ‘Prime Minister and Core Executive in British Foreign Policy: Process, Outcome and Quality Of Decision’, PhD Thesis, Washington State University (2004); M. G. Hermann, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders’, International Studies Quarterly 24:1 (1980), 7-46. 26 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 244. 27 Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister’, p. 553.

141 degrees of latitude of freedom that prime ministers afforded their ministers.28 With that, it

can be deduced that there would be a more considerable latitude for decision-making when a

prime minister affords an increased degree of freedom to that minister.

In the case of a parliamentary system regardless of the power and latitude afforded by a

prime minister, the foreign minister is still answerable to Cabinet and Parliament. Prime ministerial power directly affects and influences the decision-making process, while the

effects on foreign policy were deemed to be indirectly affected.29 Kaarbo’s research supports the idea that the minister for foreign policy, or again the Cabinet or Parliament, have a more significant effect on foreign policy. In this context, the power wielder, the prime minister, has limited power up to the point where the political processes checks and balances can influence policy-making, and thereby affect the outcome of the policy initiatives that are proposed.

This would apply to any foreign minister, as they too would be subject to the Cabinet and

Parliament. Thus, a Foreign Secretary is empowered with agency to affect policy-making and respond to international events but is curtailed within the construct of the political system to which they answer.

Further research on British prime ministerial leadership by Kaarbo and Hermann (1998) examined the behavioural characteristics of British prime ministers within the context of leadership styles and foreign policy-making.30 In their research, they postulated the

importance of how responsive leaders were to given political constraints, their sphere of

influence over the environment, and their ability to control the factors affecting the event.31

Kaarbo and Hermann’s approach was counter to the notion of adaptive leadership, where the

28 Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister’, p. 568. 29 Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister’, p. 576. 30 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 245. 31 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 248.

142 leaders respond to the situation. The researchers were assessing previous research that had

shown that leaders who meet challenges head-on are not concerned by constraints but intently focused on acting swiftly and resolving the situation forcefully if required.32 Their pilot study

concluded that there was a correlation between personal characteristics which drove

individual leadership style and how leaders acted on foreign policy issues.33 Kaarbo and

Hermann’s findings contradicted previous research where leadership style was not a factor in

decision-making and that the political structure was the determinant factor as Jones and Rose

had asserted.34 Jones suggested that actual decision-making is a function of a political system, which suggests that the system limits the individual agency of decision-makers.35 In

the case of Grey, his ability to influence foreign policy is directed by a dominant strategy and

his agency is checked by the Cabinet and parliamentary system.

The Emergence of Situational Leadership

Stogdill’s research in the 1940s on individual traits and the situation was viewed as ground-

breaking by moving the discourse beyond solely looking at traits.36 However, Stogdill’s work

merely supports Machiavelli’s work in ‘The Prince’ some four hundred years earlier.

Machiavelli stressed the need to understand that structure can place limitations on leadership,

‘although there are some leaders among them who might have made changes, there were two

things that kept them steady, one the greatness of the church’, the other were the cardinals

who were ‘the origin of the tumults among them’.37 In this instance, leaders were bound by

32 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 248. 33 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 256. 34 See G. W. Jones, ‘The study of prime ministers: A framework for analysis’, West European Politics 14 (1991), 1-8; R. Rose, ‘Prime ministers in parliamentary democracies’, West European Politics 14 (2007), 9-24; Samuel R. Rohrer, ‘What Makes a Prime Minister Great?: A Leadership Trait Analysis of the effectiveness of British Prime Ministers from 1902 to 2004’, Research & Politics October-December (2014), 1-8, 35 Jones, ‘The study of’, pp. 1-8. 36 Bass and Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook, p. 38. 37 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci (Letchworth: Garden City Press, 1943), pp. 24, 46.

143 the power of the church, which limited their ability to affect change.38 This suggests

structural limitations that impede a leader’s agency. In terms of the cardinals and tumults, he was suggesting that the influence leaders brought could create confusion and discord. If a parliamentary democracy is substituted for the church, the limitations it imposes on Cabinet ministers are the same, just as a Cabinet can impede a Foreign Secretary. Furthermore, if the

Cabinet ministers are akin to the cardinals, then the tumult is the political split that existed with the Liberal Cabinet during Grey’s tenure.

The study of power has revealed that leaders who hold powerful positions conduct themselves differently in how they apply that power.39 Max Weber suggested that power was

a facet of leadership commensurate with the position that a leader holds, particularly within

bureaucracies.40 What this suggests is that the power of a Cabinet minister while limited by the bureaucracy of the political system can still exercise the power that that position holds –

although limited, but does not have the ultimate power to make decisions. Fiedler and

Chemers correlated a leader’s positional power with the task-relationship variables to

determine their level of effectiveness as it related to specific events.41 Fiedler emphasised that specific situations or events require leaders that were suited to a particular situation.42

Specifically, contingency theory proposes that just as crises themselves differ, no one style of

leadership fits all crises. Contingency theory also emphasises how a leader’s behaviour can

be affected by a given situation.43 Essentially, a leader’s positional power is dependent on

38 Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 5. 39 Ana Guinote, ‘How Power Affects People: Activating, Wanting, and Goal Seeking’, Annual Review of Psychology 68 (2017), 353-381, at p. 358. 40 Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press Incorporated, 1968), p. 263. 41 F.E. Fiedler, F. E. and M. M. Chemers, Leadership and Effective Management (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1974), p. 4. 42 King, ‘Evolution’, p. 47; F. E. Fiedler, ‘A contingency model of leadership effectiveness’, Advanced Experimental Social Psychology 1 (1964): 149-190, at p. 158. 43 Bass and Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook, pp. 46-7; G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, new edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010) pp. 162-3.

144 those resources which they can access, comprehend, employ, and maximise to their full

utility in order to be effective.44

It was from the emergence of contingency theory proposed by Fiedler that Hersey-

Blanchard’s (1969) situational theory evolved. Hersey-Blanchard’s theory extended existing

leadership theories by not solely evaluating individual elements or traits in isolation but by

assessing them within the scope of a leader’s influence over the situation.45 Situational

leadership’s development reflects the extension of leadership theories as a whole by

postulating that external factors affect a leader’s decision-making ability.46 Situational

leadership theory acknowledged that situational aspects could influence leadership power.

These situational aspects include the environmental context, the position the leader holds, the

level of power afforded that position, and the type of task that a leader is faced with.47

Specifically, these aspects will determine the agency a leader has in affecting an outcome.48

Here we can substitute ‘task’ with ‘crisis’ and the ‘environmental context’ with ‘external

factors’, namely international diplomacy.

Hersey-Blanchard’s focus on the leader’s adaptability to a crisis distinguishes it from

Fiedler’s earlier theory. Adaptability typically requires different leadership behaviours for a

diversity of tasks.49 For Hersey-Blanchard, when a leader faces a series of events, they must

be adaptable and draw upon different leadership characteristics to solve an impending

crisis.50 Leaders who endure and achieve success during a crisis must adapt their style to that

44 Fiedler, ‘The Contingency’, p. 59. 45 King, ‘Evolution’, p. 47. 46 King, ‘Evolution’, p. 47. 47 Bass and Stogdill, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook, pp. 228-9. 48 King, ‘Evolution’, p. 47. 49 Gary Yukl and Rubina Mahsud, ‘Why Flexible and Adaptive Leadership is Essential’, Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research 62:2 (2010), 81-93, at p. 82. 50 Stacy L. Muffet-Willett and Sharon D. Kruse, ‘Crisis leadership: Past research and future directions’, Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning 3:3 (2008), 248-258, at p. 255.

145 specific situation.51 Hersey and Blanchard argued that leaders must be flexible in their

approach in order to adapt to the evolving dynamics of the situation.52 It was a leader’s

adaptability that facilitated the best leadership style that was most likely to yield a successful

outcome.53 Here the two situational aspects, the individual and the power they hold, are both

adaptive. However, to be successful it would require the political system (including Cabinet

and Parliament) also to be adaptable, or it could limit the individual agency of the leader by

imposing a constraint on their effectiveness.

Similarly, a leader’s leadership style can influence the outcome of a situation. In 1939 Kurt

Lewin proposed that there were three types of leadership, authoritarian, democratic, or

laissez-faire styles.54 Crises have typically called for an autocratic leadership style, where

leaders make decisions with inherent limitations of the situation which constrain those

choices and the corresponding actions they take.55 These limitations extend to the retrieval and processing of information, including the possibility that in certain situations there may not be sufficient time to even access key data, let alone to process the pertinence of the information.56 Leaders cannot adapt to changing environments if their information flow is

distorted or delayed.57 Those leaders who are more autocratic as opposed to democratic will

engage less with those involved when ascertaining information and making decisions. More

51 Roger Gill, Theory and Practice of Leadership, new edn (London: Sage, 2011), p. 79. 52 P. Hersey and K. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing human resources, new edn (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 94. 53 Hersey and Blanchard, Management, p. 94. 54 Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph K. White, ‘Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,’’ Journal of Social Psychology X (1939), 271-299, at p. 298. 55 C. Conrad and M. S. Poole, Strategic organizational communication, new edn (USA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), p. 292. 56 Conrad and Poole, Strategic, p. 293. 57 Yukl and Mahsud, ‘Why Flexible’, p. 86.

146 democratic leaders will collaborate with interested parties who are vested in the process,

thereby informing the decision-making process.58

These two divergent leadership styles present polar opposite approaches in terms of how leadership decision-making is enacted. The autocratic leader is less dependent on information than the democratic leader, as they are inclined to make independent decisions since they do not encourage or rely on a participatory process. This suggests that the autocratic leader has both autonomy and a greater degree of power to influence decisions that are undertaken. In crises, an autocratic leader does not rely on group information to inform their decisions, which would suggest they have less information to make those decisions. Not being open to input from colleagues limits the number of suggestions that can inform decisions, and thereby limits effective decision-making and can affect the outcome.59

Hersey-Blanchard’s Situational Theory

To date, this research contends that Hersey and Blanchard’s theory has not been employed in assessing a historical figure during a crisis.60 The two fundamental characteristics of Hersey-

Blanchard’s leadership model are centred on leadership behaviour as it relates to tasks and

relationships. The leader who is task-orientated focuses on achieving desired outcomes,

whereas a leader who is relationship-focused fixates on building liaisons.61 In Hersey and

Blanchard’s situational leadership theory, the model of task-versus-relationship continuum suggests that for leadership to be effective, the leader must have ‘a rational understanding of

58 R. L. Heath and W.T. Coombs, Today’s public relations: an introduction (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 390. 59 Bernard M. Bass and Ruth Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications, new edn (New York: Free Press, 2009), p. 2349. 60 Mark A. Papworth, Derek Milne and George Boak, ‘An exploratory content analysis of situational leadership’, Journal of Management Development 28:7 (2009), 593-606, at p. 593. 61 Hersey and Blanchard, Management, pp. 82-3.

147 the situation and an appropriate response’.62 Here we can see the intersection of one of the

previous attributes of leadership, that of the context of the situation and how it requires a

leader to assess that situation in order to make decisions and affect an outcome. This then not

only extends our understanding of leadership attributes but also how they are employed in

making rational determinations of the situation. Only when they have understood the scope of

the situation and determined the type of response can the leader with power execute a

decision.

Situational theory posits the mutual dependency of the two leadership characteristics, task

and relationship, such that an effective leader requires a combination of both in some degree

to affect an outcome.63 The leader’s ability to apply these two behavioural characteristics and how leaders adapt them to any specific situation are what determines the level of effectiveness the leader has over a situation. Thus, the leader’s ability to determine to what degree they must focus and apply themselves to the task and or to make use of relationships

determines their effectiveness and the degree of success they are likely to achieve.

Hersey and Blanchard’s theoretical model had a third dimension focused on the level of

follower maturity. Follower maturity referred to their readiness level as it relates to their

ability and desire to undertake a specific task.64 This third factor is relative to how a leader

can employ those followers to perform tasks or provide information and the level of trust the

leader has in those followers. Typically, crisis leaders are authoritative and are focused on the

task as opposed to that of a democratic leader who is focused on relationships. Thus, this

62 Jim Allen McCleskey, ‘Situational, Transformational, and Transactional Leadership and Leadership Development’, Journal of Business Studies Quarterly 5:4 (2014), 117-130, at p. 118. 63 McCleskey, ‘Situational’, p. 118; Yukl, ‘Contingencies’, p. 288. 64 Papworth, Milne and Boak, ‘An Exploratory’, p. 594.

148 infers that a high level of follower maturity would be necessary for a democratic leader to

perform tasks and also participate in information sharing.

Conversely, an autocratic leader is less reliant on followers as they are more likely to make

decisions independently and to command followers to perform those tasks. This suggests that

follower maturity is unnecessary as there is no dependency on that relationship. Since crisis

situations require focusing on the task, it infers that there will be less emphasis on relationships. Thus, this would suggest there would be less concern for follower maturity.65

In this thesis, there is no dependency on follower maturity, because the focus of this assessment is on Grey and how he approached those five crises, not on his subordinate’s maturity, namely the Foreign Office staff or Ambassadors’ experience and knowledge.

Assessing these subordinates for their relative maturity does not inform this research as it relates to Grey’s decision-making in the specified crises.

Max Weber suggested that influence was a crucial factor in managing crises and that the individual with the highest degree of influence is more likely to take an active role than when there is a non-crisis situation.66 Here the concept of influence would imply having enough power to exert that influence. Leaders who have more influence can affect a positive outcome during a crisis.67 During crisis situations, there is a dependency on great leaders to enact a

solution to the issue that originated the crisis.68 A leader is responsible for deciding what

action should be taken within the inherent limitations of a crisis. When assessing the

constraints, a leader must determine informational exchanges, including both human and

65 J. Zurlinden and B. Bongard, ‘Situational Leadership: A Tool for OR Staff Development’, Aorn Journal 54:5 (1991), 967-988, at p. 969. 66 Hamblin, ‘Leadership’, p. 324. 67 Hamblin, ‘Leadership’, p. 322. 68 R. C. Tucker, ‘The theory of charismatic leadership’, Daedalus 97:3 (1968), 731-756, at p. 745.

149 systemic and make informed decisions.69 How a leader responds at the outset of a crisis and

the effectiveness of that initial response are imperative in the success or failure of resolving

the crisis.70 A leader’s ability to act or their failure to act at critical junctures during situations

is what determines the outcome.71 Leadership response is dictated by their communication in

conveying the choice and decisions made to address the crisis to those interested parties,

which is considered an integral element in the likelihood of success in managing the crisis.72

In extending and adapting the Hersey-Blanchard’s model for this thesis, it is imperative to

comprehend the essential leadership dynamic (task versus relationship) that has been

identified as a requisite for effective leadership during a time of crisis. Since an autocratic

task-orientated leader who is fixated on outcomes, their use of situational analysis is

fundamental for assessing crises. In doing so, the autocratic leader may draw on information

from relationships and apply their influence in ascertaining that information. With that, we

can conclude that there must be a dependency on relationships to some degree, so assessing

the degree of that relationship is necessary. This raises doubts about the extent to which that

leader is autocratic. It would suggest two critical questions of leadership decision-making

during crises. First, to what degree is the autocratic leader reliant on relationships to inform

his decisions but ultimately makes the decision(s) still autocratic? Second, is an autocratic

task-orientated leader the ideal crisis leader?

69 Conrad and Poole, Strategic, pp. 292-3. 70 Kate A. Mirandilla, Joylene Chia and Margaret Peters, ‘Decision making in the crisis cycle: The need for research and better understanding’, in ANZCA08 Conference, Power and Place, (Wellington, July 2008), online edn, [https://www.anzca.net/documents/2008-conf-papers/122-decision-making-in-the-crisis-cycle-the-need-for- research-and-better-understanding-1/file.html,accessed 28 July, 2018]. 71 R. C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981), pp. 15-30. 72 Heath and Coombs, Today’s, p. 390; R. R. Ulmer, M. W. Seeger and T. L. Sellnow, ‘Post-crisis communication and renewal: Expanding the parameters of post-crisis discourse’, Public Relations Review 33:2 (2007), 130-134, at p. 131; Mirandilla, Chia and Peters, ‘Decision’, p. 2.

150 The scholarship would suggest that autocratic leadership is the pre-eminent choice of

leadership style during a crisis.73 The assertion here lies in the idea that a democratic

approach to building a consensus during a time of crisis delays decision-making.74 If

decision-making is protracted during a crisis, then the responsive action necessary is similarly

delayed. Employing a democratic approach which decentralises decision-making authority only serves to decrease response time. As the degree of threat escalates the immediacy at which decisions must be made increases, whereby authoritative leadership becomes ever more necessary.75 However, if we consider U.S. President John F. Kennedy handling of two crises and his two opposing leadership styles during his tenure, the 1961 Bay of Pigs and the

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the outcomes based on the style adopted offer alternative findings that contradict the scholarship.

The Bay of Pigs crisis saw Kennedy invoke a closed leadership style as opposed to the collaborative ‘groupthink’ approach during the Cuban Missile Crisis.76 With the Bay of Pigs,

Kennedy was more autocratic as compared to his Socratic questioning and the facilitating

democratic role with the Cuban Missile Crisis.77 Consequently, in the Bay of Pigs,

Kennedy’s approach yielded an adverse outcome, whereas, with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the

outcome was positive. A democratic approach to diplomatic crisis management thus has

73 Daniel Goleman, ‘Leadership That Gets Results’, Harvard Business Review, March-April (2000), 2-18, at p. 11; H. M. Busch, Leadership in Group Work (New York: New Association Press,1934), p. 137. 74 Goleman, ‘Leadership’, p. 11. 75 See S. T. Hannah, M. Uhl-Bien, B.J. Avolio, and F. L. Cavarretta, ‘A framework for examining leadership in extreme contexts’, The Leadership Quarterly 20:6 (2009), pp. 897–919; D. G. Isenberg, ‘Some effects of time pressure on vertical structure and decision-making accuracy in small groups’, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 27:1 (1981), 117–34; D. L. Gladstein and N. P. Reilly, ‘Group decision making under threat: the tycoon game’, The Academy of Management Journal 28:3 (1985), 613–27; M. Mulder, R. D. De Jong, L. Koppelaar and J. Verhage, ‘Power, situation, and leaders’ effectiveness: an organizational field study’, Journal of Applied Psychology 71:4 (1986), 566–70; M. Mulder, J. R. Ritsema van Eck and R. D De Jong, ‘An organization in crisis and non-crisis situations’, Human Relations 24:1 (1971), 19–41. 76 See Christopher P. Neck and Gregory Moorhead, Gregory, ‘Groupthink remodeled: The importance of leadership, time pressure, and methodical decision-making procedures’, Human Relations 48:5 (1995), 537-557. 77 Robert F. Grattan, ‘The Cuban missile crisis: strategy formulation in action’, Management Decision 42:1-2 (2004), 55-68, pp. 61-2.

151 plausibility. If nothing else, it provides compelling evidence that autocratic leadership does

not work in all situations.

Figure 4.2 outlines a five-stage process flow for autocratic task orientated leadership

decision-making. It illustrates the importance of the reliance on stages 2 and 3 to inform decision-making in stage 4 to determine what the response will be in stage 5. The autocratic style of leadership still requires some degree of information or intelligence gathering (stages

2 and 3). However, the impact of the style of leadership (autocratic versus democratic) is where the decision-making process (stage 4) deviates as the autocratic leader acts independently in making decisions.

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Satge 5 Task Leadership Situational Analysis Assessing Environment Decision-Making Response

• Authoratative • Information Gathering • Determining • Solution Identification • Assessment • Exacting Influence Constraints • Effectiveness

Relationship Dependence

Figure 4.2 Process Flow for a Task Orientated Autocratic Leader During a Crisis

In the case of a relationship orientated democratic leader, their style means that at stage 2

(Figure 4.3) there is collective participation via a cooperative approach to information gathering. Information is shared, discussed, and ideas postulated. It is at stage 4 that there the significant difference occurs, and perhaps this is the most pertinent deviation in styles. Here the democratic leader will not only have encouraged input but will possibly be subjected to it,

152 whereby ultimate decision-making and enacting a solution could be based on combined input or through a hierarchical process, For instance, a Cabinet or parliamentary system. It is here that a decision-maker is subject to the constraints of their level of authority.

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Satge 5 Relationship Leadership Situational Analysis Assessing Environment Decision-Making Response

• Democratic • Information Gathering • Determining • Solution Identification • Assessment • GroupThink Constraints • Subject to Levels of • Effectiveness • Collective Participation Authority - Cabinet/Parliament

Relationship Dependence

Figure 4.3 Process Flow for a Relationship Orientated Democratic Leader During a Crisis

Hermann’s Situational Cube

Charles Hermann (1938) evaluated organisational decision-making during crises by examining the level of authority of the person who was responsible for managing the crisis.78

To ground his research, Hermann adopted the sociological or political definition of a crisis, which was defined by a degree of panic. Hermann’s definition opposes the psychological definition of a crisis, where the term meant anxiety, stress, or a threat.79 Hermann’s definition was considered a decision-making approach.80 However, McCormick argued that there was no consensus on a universal definition of the term ‘crisis’ that could be used in all

78 Hermann, ‘Some consequences’, p. 72. 79 Hermann, ‘Some Consequences’, p. 63 80 James M. McCormick, ‘International Crises: A note on definition’, Western Political Quarterly 31:3 (1978), 352-358, at p. 353.

153 situations.81 Hermann’s definition was delineated by three criteria: the degree of threat, the

available time, and surprise.82

McCormick cited Charles Hermann’s definition of the perceived threat to an organisation’s value: the threat was a surprise to decision-makers and that it constrained the time available with which a formulated response could be made.83 McClelland endorsed McCormick’s definition by proposing his definition of a crisis event. McClelland asserted that it was where

the relationship between two nation-states undergoes a significant shift in the balance of that

relationship, such that the political actions between them change what constitutes a crisis.84

Oran Young agreed with McClelland by suggesting that a crisis occurs when there is a series

of ‘rapidly unfolding events’ that destabilise the existing balance between the political states,

whereby there is potential for violence.85

An alternate definition of a ‘crisis’ is the systemic approach, which has been widely adopted

by researchers. This approach focuses on the significant change that occurs between nations,

whereby the change in that relationship has resulted in a crisis.86 McCormick’s definition is

that there is an ‘interaction process between nations.’87 McCormick suggested that it is how

each nation-states decision-makers perceive that situation that defines whether it constitutes a

crisis or not.88 The decisions of one nation-state will invariably impact on another nation-

state causing the decision-maker to perceive a crisis. In the context of this research, the

81 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 352. 82 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 353. 83 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, pp. 352-3. 84 Charles A McClelland, ‘Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963’, in Quantitative International Politics, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968), 159-186, at p. 160. 85 Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 10. 86 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 353. 87 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 352. 88 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 352.

154 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was viewed differently by Austria than it was by

Britain. Similarly, Servia viewed the Austrian ultimatum as a crisis since it directly affected

them, a perspective which did not apply to France or Great Britain. How a crisis is perceived is relative to each nation-state. The actor responsible for decision-making and determining the degree of response will need to assess the level of urgency in making a response.

Hermann’s situational cube is a mechanism that allows for historical events to be situated within a three-dimensional construct, as a means to assess foreign policy decisions. Hermann defined an organisational crisis as having three key elements: 1) a threat to the organisation’s high-priority values, 2) a limited time to respond, and 3) an unexpected threat.89 Hermann

labels the three sides of his situational cube as Awareness, Decision Time, and Threat.90 The

level of expectation that an unforeseen event could occur has rarely been included in

traditional definitions of a crisis. In considering this dimension of the unforeseen, it suggests

that there are limits to contingency planning as there are endless potential policy choices or

exogenous factors to be considered. Thus, it is impossible to prepare for every contingency.91

However, the inability to predict every scenario does not preclude the ability to recognise the potentiality for a crisis.92 It has been suggested that only unpredictable events constitute a

crisis.93 The assertion of the unpredictability of events supports Hermann’s contention that a

crisis is something unexpected, where the awareness level is a surprise.

For Hermann, unpredictable events are denoted as a ‘surprise’ in his three-dimensional

situational cube. A surprise is defined as the extent of awareness that the leader or decision-

89 Hermann, ‘Some Consequences’, p. 64 90 Phillips and Rimkunas, ‘The concept’, p. 262; Herman, ‘International’, p. 409. 91 G. A. Morgan, ‘Planning in Foreign Affairs: The State of the Art’, Foreign Affairs 39 (1961), online edn, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1961-01-01/planning-foreign-affairs-state-art, accessed 11 February 2019]. 92 Hermann, ‘Some Consequences’, p. 65. 93 Hermann, ‘Some Consequences’, p. 65.

155 maker(s) has about that event.94 Hermann’s other two elements were the degree of threat

imposed by the event and the decision time to respond. He argued that these two elements,

along with the amount of surprise, were what governs a leader’s behaviour in determining

what course of action to take when a crisis is perceived.95 Within the situational cube, only

one point denotes a crisis: where there is a convergence of a high degree of threat, the

awareness level is a surprise, and a short decision time.96 The situational cube measures the

level of threat along the ‘x’ axis from low to high, the decision time along the ‘y’ axis from

short to extended, and the degree of awareness along the ‘z’ axis from surprise to

anticipated.97

Hermann developed the situational cube to analyse and illustrate at what point an event constituted a crisis. Developing the cube enabled Hermann to plot historical events, such as the Cuban Missiles Crisis, the Berlin Wall, the Berlin Blockade, and the Hungarian uprising amongst other historical events as perceived crises for analysis. In this regard, Hermann’s situation cube provides a unique model to evaluate the unfolding historical events that occurred during the July Crisis of 1914. More importantly, Hermann’s model allows for identification of constraints such as the element of surprise, the amount of time to respond, and the degree of threat, as these constitute situational constraints that impose limitations and pressure on a leader’s decision-making.

Applying a Theoretical Lens

In order to evaluate Grey’s ‘five crises’, it will be necessary to situate each of the crises within Hermann’s situational cube and then to examine each one using Hersey-Blanchard’s

94 Herman, ‘International’, p. 409. 95 Herman, ‘International’, p. 409. 96 Phillips and Rimkunas, ‘The concept’, p. 262. 97 Phillips and Rimkunas, ‘The concept’, p. 262; Herman, ‘International’, p. 409.

156 theory to assess Grey’s task versus relationship approach to leadership. In doing this, an

assessment can be made of Grey’s leadership style (autocratic versus democratic), the

institutional structure in which he operated, and the political contexts of each crisis. Both

theories can increase our understanding of Grey, his five crises, and specifically the July

Crisis. Each theory can be used to identify how Grey approached leadership and decision-

making for the five crises. Hersey-Blanchard’s approach can aid in identifying whether Grey

was an autocratic or democratic leader during the five crises.

The Hermann situational cube (Figure 4.4) was used to examine each of the ‘five crises’ to

determine a comparative assessment of each event and place them in historical context. This

will be undertaken in the same vein as Hermann evaluated fifteen historical events.98 The

thesis will also build on the recent work of Kinsella, Russett, and Starr who used Hermann’s

cube by mapping more recent historical events including 11 September 2001 attacks, the

Liberation of Kuwait 1991, and the North Vietnamese victory in 1975, amongst others.99

This hybrid framework extends the dichotomy of the task-relationship construct and builds on both Hermann’s original model and that of Kinsella, Russett, and Starr’s more recent adaptation of the situational cube.100

98 Herman, ‘International’, p. 409. 99 Kinsella, Russett and Starr, World, pp. 136-7. 100 Kinsella, Russett and Starr, World, pp. 136-7.

157

Figure 4.4 Hermann’s Three-Dimensional Situational Cube101

With the theoretical lens as an overlay looking at Grey’s leadership and communication style

with key figures in each of the preceding crises before July 1914, it will be possible to

identify any patterns of approach for managing crises that Grey may have employed.

Whether patterns exist or not, it will help to explain Grey’s degree of adaptability to the crises, especially the July Crisis, and may add insight into why he was unable to achieve peace in 1914.

Hargrove stated that when modelling history, a relationship needed to exist between the

‘constituent variables’ like those found in Hermann’s situational cube (Decision Time,

101 Phillips and Rimkunas, ‘The concept’, p. 262.

158 Awareness, and Threat).102 For Hargrove, when considering leadership, the individual’s skill,

the institutional structure, and political context were all likely to affect an outcome.103 Two of

Hargrove’s three factors, individual skill and institutional structure relate directly to Hersey-

Blanchard’s task-relationship behavioural assessment of leadership. Individual skill(s)

reflects the type of leader they are, whether they are autocratic or democratic, in so much that

each style has a specific approach to decision-making. Institutional structure relates to the

political system in which they operate. The third factor, the political context, is related to

Hermann’s situational cube, in so much as it goes to how an event is evaluated as to whether

it is a crisis. It could also be extended to consider international diplomacy and the legally

binding nature of ententes and treaties, both of which were instrumental factors for Grey and

can be construed as constraints.

A leader will be faced with complex tasks when making decisions when responding to

problems during crises.104 In order to assess Grey’s skill, the main focus will be on the

information he was provided with or had knowledge of, and the communication, particularly

between Grey and the Ambassadors. In terms of the institutional structure, it will be

necessary to assess Grey’s interaction and relationships within the Cabinet and those

pertinent foreign ministers and Ambassadors that he interacted with. Lastly, for the political

context, the consideration will be focused on the decisions being made by the other great

powers, notably, Austro-Hungary, Germany, France, and Russia, and how their approaches to

the events as they unfolded were based upon individual state interests.

102 Hargrove, ‘History’, p. 583. 103 Hargrove, ‘History’, p. 592. 104 Ole R. Holsti, ‘Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making’, American Behavioral Scientist 20:1 (1976), 11-32, at p. 15.

159 For institutional structure, the decision-making process can be impeded by constraints imposed by that structure. The political structure can exert pressure and force limitations on choice, as well as disempowering the decision-maker or delaying the response, particularly in a parliamentary system. Within this context, Grey not only answered to Asquith, but also the

Cabinet, Parliament, and the monarchy. For Hargrove’s political context it also relates to stage 3 assessing the environment and to what degree does the political context of that environment exert constraints over decisions to be made in stage 4 (Figures 4.2 and 4.3).

In the context of Hargrove’s three facets of leadership, Grey’s skills were limited based upon

experience at the outset in 1905 but were extensive by 1914. Grey operated within the

institutional structure of the British parliamentary system with checks and balances that

limited his decision-making capability. Furthermore, while there was a constitutional

monarchy, it was not beyond King George V to exert pressure on Grey, as was recorded at a

meeting of 2 August 1914, where the King told Grey to find a reason to go to war.105

Nonetheless, despite the foreboding sense that war was imminent, the Cabinet’s primary

focus in late July was still on Home Rule and the Irish question.106 All the variables, Grey,

the Cabinet, domestic constraints, and factors within the crisis all created a high degree of

complexity during July 1914.

Summation

This chapter served to outline the relationship between history and leadership. It posited that

of the three leadership styles: a) autocratic, b) democratic, and c) laissez-faire, that one style,

105 Anita Singh, ‘Revealed: how King George V demanded Britain enter the First World War’, The Telegraph, 26 July 2014, online edn, [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/10991582/Revealed-how-King- George-V-demanded-Britain-enter-the-First-World-War.html, accessed 4 August, 2018]. 106 John W. Young, ‘Lewis Harcourt's Journal of the 1914 War Crisis’, The International History Review 40:2 (2018), 436-455, at p. 439.

160 autocratic, was the suggested style for crisis situations. However, evidence has shown that a democratic style of leadership was successful in resolving a potentially catastrophic global crisis and that the autocratic approach, when used by the same leader, was not effective. How the leader employs information in determining a solution and enacting a response will vary for each crisis. It does not necessarily suggest that a democratic leader would have resolved the crisis (the Bay of Pigs), only that a democratic style of leadership has been proven to be successful (the Cuban Missile Crisis).

Two leadership theories can be combined into a proposed theoretical lens to examine the specific historical events outlined in this thesis. The argument adopts Charles Hermann’s definition of a crisis and what parameters may also co-exist from alternate definitions put forth by McClelland and Young. McClelland’s illustrates how the political exchange between individual nation-states can result in a crisis. In the context of this thesis, we will see this played out through each of the five crises. Young’s definition of ‘rapidly unfolding events’ resulting in destabilisation is exceptionally pertinent, as this is evident particularly with the

July Crisis in 1914.107

Perhaps the most critical variable or factor denoted by Charles Hermann and supported by

Ole Holsti is time. Despite this being a critical factor, Hermann left no definition as to what constitutes how much time or how little time equates to defining a crisis. This variable required clarification, particularly in light of the events of July 1914. Since Hermann did not specify the amount of time, we are left to deduce this from his cube. This was achieved by looking at which event was denoted as a crisis decision-making situation, the Cuban Missile

107 Young, The Intermediaries, p. 10.

161 Crisis, which we know from history to have been thirteen days.108 For this thesis, thirteen

days will be used as the determinant to evaluate the five crises.

108 Grattan, The Cuban Missile, p. 58; Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Pearson Education, 1999), p.1. This event is widely accepted to have started 16 October and ended 28 October 1962.

162 Chapter Five: Assessing Grey and the ‘Five Crises’

This chapter provides an analysis and discusses four specific themes: policy-making, leadership style, his first four crises, and the July Crisis. These themes shaped Grey’s role as

Foreign Secretary and in doing so, impacted his decision-making and agency throughout the period 1905-1914.

A Question of Continuity

Grey wished for peace; he worked persistently for it throughout his time in office leading up to 1914 and has been admired and indeed exonerated by others for his approach to preserving it. Some have argued that Grey was a persistent force for peace who fought continually to circumvent the breakdown of international diplomacy in 1914.1 Arthur Murray, Grey’s

Parliamentary Private Secretary, noted that Newton D. Baker U.S. Secretary for War had stated that ‘if any human agency could have prevented the World War, Sir Edward Grey would have prevented it’.2

Albertini, who had questioned Grey’s decision-making, noted that he had acted appropriately when Germany requested that Britain should remain neutral without guaranteeing Belgium’s neutrality.3 Annika Mombauer noted Grey’s importance in July 1914, but concluded that despite his sincerity ‘there were limits to what he could actually achieve’.4 Thomas Otte

1 T.G. Otte, ‘The Long Shadow of War: Sir Edward Grey and Liberal Foreign Policy before 1914’, Journal of Liberal History 87 (2015), 16-24, at pp. 16-24; A. Murray, ‘Lord Grey of Fallodon’, The Quarterly Review cxix, (1934), 1-19, at p. 9. 2 Murray, ‘Lord Grey’, p. 9. 3 Albertini, The Origins, pp. 385-90. 4 Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 320.

163 noted of Grey that ‘There was nothing half-hearted or meandering about his policy’.5 We are left then with opposing viewpoints that have fuelled an enduring debate, which has centred primarily on three key arguments. First, whether or not Grey surreptitiously dragged Britain to war by forging his ‘own policy’. Second, whether or not ‘his’ foreign policy failed to elucidate a clear stance of where Britain stood, which brought an imbalance to the Great

European Powers and produced the July Crisis of 1914.6 Lastly, whether or not Grey’s

specific style of leadership failed in thwarting the onset of war during the July Crisis.

As to the first point, Grey can hardly have dragged Britain to war through his ‘own policy’ as

two pre-existing mandates were driving Britain’s foreign policy. Their imperial economic

strategy, coupled with their post-isolationist policy, all of which he inherited. Grey was

astutely aware of Britain’s global economic position, and he knew as Foreign Secretary that

he needed to ensure European peace as this protected Britain’s trade and prosperity in what

was now a challenging global marketplace. The central argument of this thesis has been that

the main lines of British foreign policy were outlined some fifty-four years before Grey came

into office. Granville’s 1851 memorandum defined the next seven decades and mapped out a

strategy to protect Britain’s vast imperial wealth.

Britain’s overseas financial commitments were highly exposed investments. Thus, protecting

them remained a pre-eminent priority for foreign policy setting. Moreover, financial and

imperial interests were pre-eminent factors in Britain’s stance toward maintaining neutrality.

Grey was but one of a succession of foreign secretaries who adhered to the imperial strategy

that supported Britain’s commercial interests. Grey’s decision-making aligned with this

5 Otte, July Crisis, p. 520. 6 Trevelyan, Grey of, p. 125.

164 directive even throughout the July Crisis while he attempted to preserve neutrality while

steering a course for peace.

Grey’s policy-making simply followed that initiated by his predecessor Lord Lansdowne.

Grey completed Lansdowne’s outlined Tripartite Treaty and finally secured the Anglo-

Russian Entente. It was Lansdowne who forged Britain’s post-isolationist policy to ensure

imperial dominance within the changing dynamics of global trade and to protect against the

emerging economic threats of both the United States and Germany. The agreements that Grey

inherited sought to eliminate points of friction, whereby the partnerships would protect their

respective market interests. Yet, they also served in having broader implications by forging a

countering force to Germany and the Triple Alliance. Thus, the critique that Grey’s policy-

making took Britain to war overlooks that he, like his predecessors in the decades before he

took office, ensured the paramount nature of Britain’s commercial interests and trade within

its imperial dominion.

Concerning the second point, that Grey’s foreign policy stance was obscure and that it failed to elucidate Britain’s position which culminated in the July Crisis, this point is moot. The

July Crisis was indisputably instigated by antagonism in the Balkans, not as a consequence of

Grey’s policy-making. British policy-making and neutrality were irrelevant since the outbreak of war was the consequence of Austria’s actions orchestrated by German design,

something the Kaiser had endorsed nine months previous. If we were to accept this claim that

somehow Grey bears responsibility, then it should not be overlooked that a series of Prime

Ministers, Foreign Secretaries, Cabinets, and Parliaments, had similarly endorsed Britain’s

post-isolationist policy, including the ententes and neutrality. Britain’s ententes were deliberately established to preserve British neutrality and afford flexibility which is why they

165 had not signed any alliance. They had merely signed agreements that denoted specific considerations as to trade and territory – there was no binding commitment for military support. Grey espoused and reiterated the same message throughout his tenure, one that endured four previous crises. If anything contributed to the outset of the War, it must have been Germany’s deliberate deception and Austria’s antagonism and retribution.

Grey the Democratic Leader

As to the third argument that Grey’s leadership style was a factor during the July Crisis. In using the Hersey-Blanchard theory, the evidence unequivocally indicates that Grey was a democratic leader. Lewin’s concept of democratic leadership referred to this style as participative leadership, where the leader solicits input and imparts pertinent information as part of a decision-making process. Grey undertook this approach to leadership from the outset of his tenure as Foreign Secretary.7 No sooner had Grey taken office then he sought consultation with Haldane regarding the military discussions between France and Great

Britain. Here we see that Grey collaborated with the Secretary of State for War, whereby his input informed the decision-making process that facilitated the exchange between the two entente partners.8 This point serves to illustrate two key aspects of Grey’s approach to leadership. In that, he knew the limitations of his position, especially since he had just begun the role, and also that he had limited power within the political structure to authorise those talks.

In examining Grey’s leadership, certain key attributes became evident that increase our understanding as to how he approached leadership and managing the crises. The first was

7 Lewin, Lippitt, and White, ‘Patterns of Aggressive’, p. 298. 8 Heath and Coombs, Today’s, p. 390.

166 Grey’s traits. He was a man of honour and trust, and he expected the same in return. He

appreciated open and forthright discussions and was viewed as someone who was easy to

work for -- all of which constitutes a democratic style of leadership. Certainly, Grey was held

in high regard by Foreign Office staff and by both British and foreign Ambassadors. It has

been suggested he was not a risk taker, and yet by orchestrating the discussions between

France and Britain’s military in 1905-06, he showed a willingness to take a risk in stretching

foreign policy. Grey had taken a calculated risk and thereby perceived the ‘contingency of the

situation’, which is construed as an attribute of leadership during crisis events.9 Another

example of Grey’s perceptive understanding of the ‘the contingency of the situation’, when

he chose not to send a gunboat in response to Germany sending the Panther in 1911, as it

could have escalated the Crisis. And yet, it can be argued that it was one that escaped him in

July 1914.

To assess Grey solely based on July 1914, would be to overlook those critical incidences

when he was astutely aware of how his actions could have had significant ramifications. Had

Grey been able to sway the Cabinet in 1914 to openly commit to supporting France militarily during the Crisis, it would most certainly have increased the probability that the Liberal

Government would have collapsed given the fundamental division within it. This then illustrates Machiavelli’s point regarding the ‘tumult’ that exists between Cardinals within the church and which present limitations to leadership.10 In all three examples, we see Grey

having assessed the implications of his decision-making when deciding on what action to

take. Grey always considered the effect of his decisions and not just what he may have

9 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 352. 10 Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 24, 46.

167 wanted to do. Grey was conscious of the limitations of his role, but also, the effects his actions would have in the broader context.

His leadership power and agency are something he suggested that he did not have regarding foreign policy, which means he was both conscious of the limitations of his position, and that that constraints of the political bureaucracy that Weber discussed.11 Thus, Grey’s power was limited to his role, the position he held in overseeing the Foreign Office, directing existing foreign policy and making suggestions to Cabinet and Parliament. This thesis has attempted to argue that specific factors have constrained his power and agency, notably, imperial strategy and post-isolationist policy-initiated by Lansdowne that had a bipartisan agreement.

Grey's adaptability in the guise of situational leadership has also been examined by considering whether he could have adapted to the events of 1914 differently. The answer would be yes, perhaps he should have. If he failed in 1914, it must surely be that he failed to adapt to the events that unfolded and steered the same course for too long. By failing to adapt it was highly unlikely that there would be a successful outcome.12

As soon as Germany was resistant to a conference and were refusing overtures to intercede, then he should have gone to the Cabinet and demanded that they draft a clear message of their willingness to support France - something that Lloyd George suggested. However, where this argument fails is regarding the Cabinet's unwillingness to commit to war. Therein lies Grey’s conundrum – he was essentially checkmated by the institutional structure - the

Cabinet; again, Machiavelli’s argument. In this regard, he lacked sufficient support during the crucial stages of the Crisis, such that he pursued the only course he could have taken. The

11 Weber, Economy, p. 263. 12 Hersey and Blanchard, Management, p. 94.

168 finding that Grey lacked critical support confirms previous research that has shown political

structures can impede a leader’s agency.13

When we consider the political context, again we are drawn to Grey’s response to Cambon’s

request for military discussions in 1905-06. Grey’s continued support of France and the

entente had far-reaching implications in terms of how it antagonised Germany as evidenced

by two crises. It was also instrumental in facilitating Britain’s future Russian agreement.

Grey’s assertive action was one factor that worked towards effecting the successful outcome

of the First Moroccan Crisis. It also served multiple political purposes as it worked to solidify

the two nations and paved the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty.14 Grey had recognised the

need to extend relations between Britain, France, and Russia as it then provided him

‘resources’ that not only served as economic mechanisms but also as deterrents to Germany.

According to Fiedler, Grey’s approach to securing and extending the ententes was essential

for his positional power to be effective; it required access to ‘resources’.15 In that regard, the

political context of the Anglo-French Entente was something Grey was acutely cognisant of

and knew its resource value. Grey during that Crisis clarified the conditional limitation of

armed assistance in a communique to Bertie, thereby ensuring that there would be no

confusion as to how far he would commit Britain in supporting France. Grey was dependent

on his relationships with the Ambassadors to execute his decision-making, whereby what he

communicated was integral to the success in managing crises.16 This further exemplifies his

13 Kaarbo and Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles’, p. 244. 14 Mirandilla, Chia, and Peters, ‘Decision’, p. 2; Tucker, Politics as Leadership, pp. 15-30; Heath and Coombs, Today’s, p. 390; Ulmer, Seeger, and Sellnow, ‘Post-crisis communication’, p. 131. 15 Fiedler, ‘The Contingency’, p. 59. 16 Heath and Coombs, Today’s, p. 390; Ulmer, Seeger and Sellnow, ‘Post-crisis communication’, p. 131; Mirandilla, Chia and Peters, ‘Decision’, p. 2.

169 attentiveness to detail, whereby he ensured those people who needed to know were kept abreast of the limits of what Britain was committing to.

While the scholarship has suggested that an autocratic leadership style is a foremost choice during crises, there is case evidence that illustrates that this is not always the case.17 For

Grey, the First Moroccan Crisis began in April 1905 under Lansdowne; thus, the Crisis was already established by the time he took office that December. Britain was not a primary actor in the Crisis; they were drawn into it via the entente with France. It follows that they were already in a relationship and dependent upon others to inform and engage with to resolve it.

Thus, a democratic style was one that Grey had to employ as he was dependent on others to inform him, but it also suited his style of leadership. Being reliant on human information is integral when assessing constraints as Conrad and Poole noted.18 However, with that reliance, there comes the risk that the information being conveyed or received has been correctly interpreted and communicated. Grey had supported Lloyd Georges Mansion House address, and with that, he had agreed with its content. However, the German interpretation was such that they took umbrage and the cloaked message presented a potential risk, such that Grey had to placate Metternich.

Grey’s dependency on relationships for communication of information and decision-making shows the limitations of his agency. He was not a principle decision-maker nor one who could wield sufficient power to commit Britain militarily without Cabinet and Parliamentary approval. The First Moroccan Crisis was a prime example of a situational event and one that reflects the adaptive nature of the individual and the power they hold. To be successful, it

17 Goleman, ‘Leadership’, p. 11; Grattan, ‘The Cuban missile’, pp. 61-2. 18 Conrad and Poole, Strategic, pp. 292-3.

170 required the political system and both Grey and Haldane also to be adaptable. This notion

extends Hersey and Blanchard’s belief in the nature of the individual leader needing to be

adaptable as they were dependent on the system, namely the Cabinet to achieve a positive

outcome.19 Had they not been adaptable, it could have limited Grey’s agency by imposing a

constraint such that he would have been less effective. Still, also it would have changed his

relationship with Cambon, and the outcome could have been altered and less successful.20

The second crisis, much like the first, handed Grey an opportunity to affirm his resolve both

domestically and externally with Britain’s newly found entente partner, Russia. The new

accord was not met with broad acceptance by either the parliamentary radicals or members

within the Liberal party, meaning Grey had to be clear in the House of Commons that he

would stand by the agreement. Grey’s belief in the overriding benefits of the entente with

Russia meant during the Crisis; he would have to defend their cause as much as he had done

in 1905-6 with France.

Much like he had to placate the Cabinet and Parliament over the Anglo-Russian Entente,

Grey undertook the role of broker of peace during the second crisis. Grey had to support

Russia without antagonising Austria as he recognised the need to appease them as they were a means of ensuring stability in the Balkans. Grey was not only assuring Russia, and placating Austria, but attempting to assure the Turkish Government that Britain was indeed sympathetic to their claim. Grey's approach to mediation was dependent on his democratic leadership style, particularly in terms of his persuasiveness. Persuasion is seen as an essential tool when employing a strategy of bargaining.21 To this end, Grey fought relentlessly against

19 Hersey and Blanchard, Management, p. 94. 20 Hersey and Blanchard, Management, p. 94. 21 Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 94.

171 increases to Turkish customs dues, something which required consent from all the Great

Powers. Grey was appeasing the Turks to gain British support to limit German influence in the Middle East. Grey pointed out to Russia that Britain’s stance toward the Turks was not meant as a barrier as it had been previously.22 Grey was again balancing Britain’s current commercial interests by arbitrating between two of the Great Powers, one of which was now bound to them by an agreement. He had employed bargaining, a common practice between political entities and that is considered a skill. It is a means of controlling events, and that achieves some form of economic outcome, one which Grey had employed on numerous occasions to resolve disputes and to achieve the Russian agreement.23

Austria and Bulgaria’s actions had contravened an international treaty and as such Grey would not acknowledge their respective actions without the required consenting signatures of those vested powers. Grey again sought to employ the ambassadorial process to communicate this point to Metternich. The German Chancellor in concert with Ambassador Metternich retorted that they stood by Austria’s actions. This example not only shows Grey’s belief in the Concert of Europe and dependency on the ambassadorial process but significantly it shows the extent to which Germany was willing to support their ally, which should have been a warning for 1914. Furthermore, it also shows Grey’s dependency on the German

Ambassador for communication and negotiation to avert the crisis escalating. This dependency was a matter of course and something Grey would rely on again in 1914 with

Lichnowsky; however, Metternich was someone who carried more influence than that of his successor.

22 BD, V, No. 207, Sir Edward Grey to Sir Gerard Lowther, 11 August 1908, p. 266. 23 Dahl, On Democracy, pp. 113-17; see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics & Welfare (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 185, 324, 472.

172 Grey’s uniformity of purpose was to preserve the accord with the Russians and ensure the

Turks of compensation while defusing any Austro-Russian designs for war. Grey undertook

this at the expense of future British commercial interests which could have endangered the

peaceful resolution that was achieved. Grey’s astute awareness of compromise and trade-off was another example of Grey’s use of bargaining – in this instance, at Britain’s expense. This type of negotiating, according to Dahl, frequently occurs at a ministerial level as they have sufficient power to exercise such decision-making. It affords the minister an opportunity to exert influence and to participate in a bargaining process, whereby it facilitates achieving a specified outcome at some expense.24 By protecting existing trade by forgoing potential

commercial interests, it not only minimised the risk of war but was a low price to pay from

Britain’s perspective to ensure peace. Similarly, this was the case 1912-13, where again,

Britain had no real commercial interest, their only interest was to avoid war and maintain

peace.

The third crisis was again another Moroccan crisis. It again saw Germany attempt to drive a

wedge between Britain and France. It was déjà vu for Grey as he arbitrated both sides

requiring the French withdrawal from Fez while de-escalating the warmongering Germans.

The arrival of the gunboat Panther had escalated tensions, and it was the first time that any

form of the military was used to leverage negotiations. Yet again, Grey undertook a course of

decision-making that reflected Britain’s entente obligations to France. Coupled with Cabinet

support, he steered a course for peace by communicating to the Germans a need for complete

transparency in negotiations. For Grey to have the backing of the Cabinet supports Kaarbo’s

assertion that Foreign Ministers are dependent upon the political structure to exert power in

24 Dahl, On Democracy, p. 113.

173 order to affect an outcome.25 Grey used Germany’s reliance on their belief that France had violated the Act of Algeciras justifying their need to intervene. Given Britain were also a vested party to that Act and also bound by their entente obligations to support France, Britain had every right to become engaged in preserving peace. Grey conveyed to Metternich the same message he had previously in 1905-06 and adopted a mediation approach he used with

Austria and Russia in 1908-09.

Grey’s attempt to mediate was to protect British interests as they did not want Germany to gain a position in the Mediterranean as this posed a threat to trade. Grey sought to stress to

Metternich that Germany had inflamed their cause with the Panther and attempted to placate him. Interestingly, Grey had sought Asquith’s permission to notify Metternich on 21 July given there had been a protracted silence. Again, we see another example of Kaarbo’s point that the political structure influences behaviour.26 Grey was both limited by and dependent on the political system and hierarchy to undertake certain decisions. Furthermore, it illustrates

Jones’s point that the political system limited Grey’s decision-making and agency by having to seek approval to convey a message.27

The prolonged silence was not broken by Grey’s intended communication to Metternich but by Lloyd George’s Mansion House speech which riled the Germans and could have undone the tenuous peace. The significance of Lloyd George’s speech should not be overlooked for it conveyed a clear intention of how Britain viewed their standing in the world and that they were willing to act if required to do so. Lloyd George had not proceeded without Grey’s knowledge, and by doing so, Grey benefitted from this intervention. However, we should not

25 Kaarbo, ‘Prime Ministers’, p. 576. 26 Kaarbo, ‘Prime Ministers’, p. 576. 27 Jones, ‘The study of’, pp. 1-8.

174 ignore the fact that Grey was the one that had gone to Asquith two days before seeking

approval to deliver a similar message. Again, this supports both Kaarbo and Jones and is

another example that shows the limited independent agency afforded Grey. He was

continuously compelled to adhere to political protocol, which shows not only the limits of his

position but that he needed to seek approval much like Lloyd George had done as to the

content of the message to be conveyed.

Interceding as Lloyd George did, not only did it break the silence but showed the importance

of the relationship of Cabinet ministers in supporting Grey. Had Lloyd George not had the

backing of Grey and Asquith he most likely would not have delivered that speech and the

outcome could have been vastly different. What this suggests is the positive value this

political process provides, as it enables checks and balances and ensures against autocratic

decision-making, whereby the democratic process would have been undermined. With Grey

having supported Lloyd George’s actions, it showed the dependency of relationships, a

primary facet of a democratic approach. Whether Lloyd George’s speech accelerated the

discussions between France and Germany is pure speculation. Grey felt that the continuation

of peace was due to the speech and its effect in Germany. While Grey undertook to reassure

Germany that the speech was not incendiary nor directed at them as they were claiming, he

was simultaneously upholding a united front with France – appeasing both sides. Just as Grey

had interceded on France’s behalf, notwithstanding British interests, Lloyd George had

interceded on Grey’s behalf, again showing the importance of relationships in decision-

making. 28 It is worth noting that much like the second crisis, there was no conference, as

Germany refused it much as they would do in 1914.

28 Hersey and Blanchard, Management, pp. 82-3.

175 The fourth crisis, the Balkan War, would see Grey draw upon the Concert of Europe and an

Ambassadorial conference held in London. By utilising a conference, it enabled Grey direct access to information and enabled him to address concerns of all the vested powers. The value of an Ambassadorial conference cannot be overstated, such that by requiring the six

Great Powers to undertake to participate reduced the likelihood of any nation becoming drawn into and thereby escalating the Balkan conflict. By doing so, each power was able to make their respective issues and demands known. Again, the democratic notion of relationships would ensure the localisation of the crisis.

Grey was able to exert authority, albeit democratically, during the Conference as the chair and in doing so, mediate between the other powers, particularly Russia and Austria, steering the proceedings through impasses and providing the points of conciliation. Grey, by facilitating collective participation of the Ambassadors, enabled disputes to be resolved amicably without them becoming laboured. When an impasse did occur with the Balkan delegates, Grey was quick to demand they sign the Treaty. He had gained the trust of the five

Ambassadors, and since they were all in agreement and European peace was all but assured, he could leverage his executive power and demand they comply. The strength of the relationship between all six powers during this crisis is a prime example of their collective participation and democratic leadership by Grey.

The laid-back democratic approach of the Ambassadors conference of 1912-13 was one that could have provided a template for resolving all future disputes. Grey thought that this had merit in 1914, particularly since the same six personnel were still in London – what they lacked this time was empowerment by the key decision-makers.29 The idea that a conference

29 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 314.

176 would work was perhaps Grey’s most misjudged moment; as the precipitous events of 1914 were not akin to those of 1912-13. The situation was decidedly different, and Grey failed to recognise that. The Balkan territorial disputes were not the same as the honour of a prestigious yet deteriorating Empire. Grey continued to assume there would be a willingness to partake in another conference, given its resounding success in 1912-13. But unlike then in

1914, Germany was making the decisions that were dictating events. Germany’s support had empowered Austria who were aggrieved, and they wanted retribution – not compensation.

Also, unlike 1912-13, there was the direct involvement of two Great Powers, Austria with

Germany’s support. With their vested interests in the Crisis, they worked in tandem to preclude the efforts of Grey to garner support for a conference.

Based on Hersey and Blanchard’s theory, Grey’s democratic style did not suit the July Crisis as his approach was inflexible in 1914. This would suggest two possibilities. One is that the alternative autocratic style may have been more suitable given its applicability to crises.

Alternatively, Grey failed to adapt the democratic style appropriately for the 1914 crisis, whereby this style still held merit, but his strategy of implementation was at fault. Since the former autocratic style was not an option for Grey as he lacked absolute decision-making power, this precludes it as an alternative approach. However, the autocratic style has some merit based on the assessment of all five crises. The fact is that the research will show that only one of Grey’s five crises met Hermann’s criteria that designated it a crisis, the July

Crisis, notably the one in which he failed to avert using a democratic style of leadership.

Thus, this would suggest that the autocratic style should have been if not adopted, then possibly considered. Based on the assessment, it will show that the preceding four events were not determined to be crises using Hermann’s model. What this suggests is that Grey’s

177 democratic leadership style was suitable for those events, given the successful outcomes when considering Hersey-Blanchard’s theory.

In the case of Grey adapting his democratic style, other factors may have affected his approach in 1914, whereby they hindered his decision-making and rendered his agency ineffective. This idea has the greater traction of the two possibilities. Grey was a highly successful Foreign Secretary; his strategy of approach may have been limited, but specific factors worked to limit his effectiveness in 1914. The question then is, did these other factors impede his agency, whereby they restricted his ability to adapt? Certainly, the Cabinet's split over being drawn into a war and their lack of focus on the Crisis until late July suggests that this limited his decision-making. Grey had wanted to show support for France sooner, but the

Cabinet was opposed to war and preoccupied with domestic events. This then supports

McCormick’s assertion that the threat of war came as a relative ‘surprise’ to the Cabinet as they had left it too late to formulate a response given the limited time to make decisions.30

Had the Cabinet chosen to prioritise their focus on the crisis at the time of the ultimatum it would have been less of a surprise. Also, they would have been afforded more time to formulate a response, whereby they would have had more flexibility in decision-making.

Having more time would have accommodated internal disputes where a consensus was required to support any directive undertaken. Since, a democratic approach already delays decision-making, so it follows, that with a divided Cabinet, more time would have been essential to orchestrate a plan.31 By having waited and having less time, Grey was operating

30 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, pp. 352-3. 31 Goleman, ‘Leadership’, p. 11.

178 under a significant time constraint after the ultimatum and had limited ability to adapt his

democratic style due to those constraints.32

Grey had approached the July Crisis from the inception with the belief that it was just another

Balkan dispute, one which would be localised. When matters began to become more

pressing, he implored the Ambassadors to be reasonable. He still believed that the

Ambassadors wanted European peace, but they were not making the decisions. Berlin had

made decisions that were driving events and while Grey implored Lichnowsky to have them

intervene, he was under the misapprehension that they were all wanting the same outcome.

Therein lies the fundamental difference. In 1913 European Peace was the overriding goal, but

by 1914 for Austria the primary objective with Servia was war.

Grey was single-minded in his belief that the Concert of Europe, Ambassadorial conferences,

and attaining Germany’s support to intervene were the correct means of resolving the Crisis –

it was his Achilles heel. He failed to adapt to the situation and change his strategy and

thereby failed to recognise that in 1914 this approach was not resonating. If we were to blame

Grey for his inaction and decision-making, then it would be attributed to his leadership style, which failed to thwart the outbreak of the First World War.

Unequivocally, being adaptable is a fundamental criterion of situational leadership during crises, which Grey failed to do based solely upon his continued efforts to focus on garnering

Germany to curtail Austria’s demands and intentions. Similarly, by having continued faith in the Concert of Europe and Ambassadors’ conferences, it illustrates the limited choices of actions he had at his disposal to leverage as a means of resolving the crisis. However,

32 Conrad and Poole, Strategic, p. 293; Yukl and Mahsud, ‘Why Flexible’, p. 86.

179 exonerating factors are evident. He had little time to react and was not afforded the full focus of the Cabinet during the thirteen days before declaring war. He had limited information and was not a party to the discrete agreement between two of the Great Powers, which significantly limited his agency.

The Long Road to War: The First Four Crises

In situating the first four crises within Hermann’s Situational Cube, it is clear that all four did not meet the stipulated criteria to constitute a ‘crisis’. The protracted nature of all four crises meant that the decision time to address the actual events was drawn-out regardless of the surprise or degree of threat. The prolonged window afforded time to negotiate and diffuse the impending conflict, and thus cannot be situated at point ‘A’ within the situational cube.

Grey’s first watershed moment, the First Moroccan Crisis, began with the Kaiser’s showboating of 31 March 1905, which resulted in the Algeciras Conference that ended 7

April 1906, by which time 373 days had elapsed. Therefore, there was a prolonged period of time for decision-making, which means that it cannot be situated as a crisis per se based on

Hermann’s definition. The second watershed, the Bosnian Crisis, also had a protracted period of time for decision-making and resolution. Commencing 6 October 1908 and concluding 26

February 1909, some 144 days had passed. Again, this situates it in Hermann’s cube as a non- crisis (Figure 5.4).

The third watershed, the Second Moroccan Crisis at Agadir, lasted approximately 168 days from 21 May to 4 November 1911. However, the actual escalation of the crisis occurred when the gunboat arrived on 1 July. With that, the crisis lasted just over four months (127 days). It eclipsed all other crises to date given the militaristic nature of sending a gunboat.

Despite the significance of the degree of threat, this crisis also did not fit Hermann’s definition. The fourth watershed, the Balkan War, saw unquestionably the most effective

180 management of the four watersheds. The Ambassadorial conference was held from December

1912 with two possible end dates that can be considered. Whether the date of 30 May 1913 when the Balkan states signed the Treaty of London or 12 August at the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest are used, there is little dispute that this was a lengthy negotiation. It was one that saw Grey herald it ‘as if we all put out our anchors to prevent ourselves from being swept away. The anchors held’ (Figure 5.4).33 It can be concluded that the London conference was between six and nine months.

The final watershed, the July Crisis, is typically seen to have commenced with the

Archduke’s assassination on 28 June 1914 and to have concluded when Britain declared war

4 August, therefore lasting 37 days. However, it could be contended that the actual crisis began with Austria’s ultimatum, which was delivered on 23 July; that would be just 13 days to war. Thus, this watershed event fits with the 13 days established as Hermann’s criteria.

Hence, this is the only one of Grey’s five watershed events that can be classified as a crisis based on the time delineation (Figures 5.4, 5.5).

33 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 277.

181

F  Administrative situation G + Fourth Crisis

+ First Crisis B C

+ Second Crisis

+ Third Crisis

E H DECISION TIME

Legend Extended Short + Fifth Crisis First Crisis – Morocco 1905-6  A D Crisis situation Second Crisis – Bosnian Crisis 1908-9 High THREAT Low Third Crisis – Morocco 1911 Fourth Crisis – Balkan War 1912-13 Fifth Crisis – July 1914

Figure 5.1 Situating Grey’s ‘five crises’ in Hermann’s Situational Cube

If we accept Hermann’s suggestion that there is a short decision period that denotes a crisis

from the emergence of the event to the point at which a response is formulated, it would be

reasonable to suggest that this is the most critical variable. The degree of threat is a perceived

variable and dictated by the type of threat that disrupts the existing state. The awareness of a

threat is determined by the extent that we know of it possibly occurring. In the case of an

international crisis, the surprise element is by definition something which is unanticipated

and or cannot necessarily be planned for. For Hermann, and indeed Grey, these events/crises

182 disrupted the stability of the international system.34 For Grey in 1914, the assassination was unquestionably a surprise but not one he was initially alarmed about from Britain’s perspective. The ensuing Crisis that evolved was not one he could have predicted. Indeed, three events: the assassination, the ‘blank cheque’, and the ultimatum constituted a series of complex causations that served to create a crescendo of unpredictability that Grey could not have foreseen.35 With that, this unpredictable event as, Hermann suggested, constituted a crisis.36

The fact remains that despite the Crisis commencing with the assassination, it was not until the Austrian ultimatum that his concern grew to a level of anxiety that would be considered a crisis given its severity, something Churchill recorded:

This note was clearly an ultimatum; but it was an ultimatum such as had never been

penned in modern times. As the reading proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible

that any State in the world could accept it, or that any acceptance, however abject,

would satisfy the aggressor.37

The Austrian note was without doubt devised to be excessive, for it was a formality rather than an honest attempt to seek demands. Austria intended to destabilise the region; the note was merely a precursor to their real aim. Hermann stated that instability arises, and a crisis

34 Charles F. Hermann, ‘Indicators of International Political Crises: Some Initial Steps Toward Prediction’, in Theory and Practice of Events Research, (eds.) Edward E. Azar and Joseph D. Ben Dak (New York: Gordon and Breach 1975), 233-43, at p. 234. 35 Gaddis, The Landscape, pp. 69, 72. 36 Hermann, ‘Some Consequences’, p. 65. 37 Churchill, The World, I, p. 205.

183 ensues, when one superpower is unable to deter another from acting in a way that disrupts the

balance.38 Servia had tried to satisfy their demands and deter them from inciting any conflict.

The July Crisis was as much about Austria provoking a crisis with Servia as it was about

Germany encouraging Austria. Now, Hermann does not address the fact that one superpower,

Germany, instigated another superpower to act in a manner that destabilises the system. Thus, his theory could be extended to consider causal connectivity in how one actor can induce another to act with provocation and intent to disrupt indirectly rather than directly the balance of an international system. This contention supports McCormick’s second definition of a crisis whereby the ‘interaction process between nations’ has escalated events and that their individual decisions reflect each nation’s self-interest, which superseded the balance of peace.39 Grey then had correctly targeted the instigator (Germany) for they were the destabilising influence on the system, not Austria. However, the fact he carried no influence or agency must be considered. One plausible explanation discussed earlier was that he lost credibility after 1912 when he failed to go to Berlin, and Haldane went instead. Further to that, the Kaiser had taken umbrage at Grey’s remarks whereby the Kaiser lost respect for him. Grey himself noted that he believed Berlin saw him as being ‘too prominent in continental affairs’.40

Germany had knowingly and deliberately engaged in an act that resulted in the disruption of the system that changed the pattern of relationships between multiple actors – akin to throwing petrol on a fire and watching it combust and spread.41 Germany’s act eventually

resulted in a rapid escalation, something that Young stated was essential in the deterioration

38 Hermann, ‘Indicators of International’, p. 234. 39 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 352. 40 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 314. 41 Hermann, ‘Indicators of International’, p. 234.

184 of an international system where there was the likelihood of violence occurring.42 It is this

rapid escalation that correlates to the importance of time, which was something Grey had

little of in 1914. Holsti’s examination of the July Crisis concluded that there was one causal

factor – the pressure of time. Any delay in acting would prove ‘catastrophic’ as it would

allow another nation to have a greater advantage.43 The German ‘blank cheque’ provided

both themselves and Austria a significant advantage as it delayed Grey’s response time as he

did not know of it. Further to that, Austria’s ultimatum, the subsequent response, and

declaration of war gave little time for intervention or manoeuvrability. These three events

also concur with Holsti’s finding. When considered with the previous analysis of the

Cabinet’s inherent delay in recognising the situation, coupled with their reluctance to commit

to a decision how to act, these factors significantly hampered Grey’s ability to be effective.

The time-driven escalation of events inversely correlates to the perception of urgency – as

time decreases that urgency increases, whereby each nation-state acts independently to avert

a perceived catastrophe. As the number of days (time) decreased in July 1914, the level of

urgency increased, which fits within Hermann’s cube moving from a low threat to a full-

blown crisis.44 Thus, we can conclude that there is some similarity between both Hermann

and Holsti’s analysis, whereby both acknowledge the importance of time during the July

Crisis. Had Grey known on 6 July of Germany’s intention to support Austria then Grey’s

window of opportunity to act would have doubled as the time to consider options, formulate a

strategy, escalate the matter to Cabinet, and make a decision how to act would have been 30

days. Holsti’s analysis suggested that the ‘perception of time pressure’ was not recognised at

42 Young, The Intermediaries, p. 10 43 Ole R. Holsti, ‘Theories of Crisis Decision-Making’, in Diplomacy: New approaches in history, theory, and policy, ed. P. G. Lauren (New York, NY, USA: The Free Press, 1979), 99-136, at p. 111-16. 44 Herman, ‘International’, p. 409; Holsti, ‘Theories’, p. 113.

185 all by Britain, France, and Russia until 21 July 1914.45 What Holsti suggested was that as

time decreased and pressure increased, leadership behaviour changed as to each nation’s

decision-making.46 For Grey, the pressure may have increased but his leadership behaviour

and approach to the crisis remained unchanged.

In situating the five watersheds within Hermann’s cube and having determined that the fifth

was the only crisis based on the specified determinant criterion of time, we are left to

consider the placement of the final four. In determining the first watershed, the First

Moroccan Crisis, and given it lasted over a year before it was finally resolved, we are left to

consider the degree of threat. Despite the Kaiser’s showboating there was a minimal concern

of it escalating. The Kaiser had sought to force France to a Conference and sought the

assistance of the United States; with that there was comparatively a minimal risk of war

resulting from his actions, as that was not his intention. However, it should not be

downplayed that this event saw three of the European Powers, Germany, France, and Britain

become embroiled in a non-European territorial dispute. The fact that resolution was achieved at a conference also diminishes the degree of threat. With that, this event can be placed comprising a low threat but substantive surprise.

With the second watershed, the Bosnian Crisis had a considerably shorter timeline of just

under five months, but there was again significant surprise with Austria’s annexation of

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, given Austria’s existing occupation, the annexation

should have been anticipated; it was not a case of ‘if’ but rather ‘when’. Servia had perceived

this as a threat, which meant Russia may possibly be drawn into any conflict. Given the

45 Holsti, ‘Theories’, p. 113. 46 Holsti, ‘Theories’, p. 113.

186 elevated risk and without a conference as a means to mediate a resolution, Grey was faced with quelling the Russian fervour, which would have escalated the Crisis since Germany similarly supported their ally. There was an elevated degree of threat, since now four of the

Great Powers were involved, which presented a significant risk and the threat of a European war was likely.

In the same vein, the third event, the Second Moroccan Crisis, also came as a significant surprise with the Kaiser having sent a gunboat to Agadir. The Kaiser had deliberately adopted a provocative high-risk strategy. The degree of threat was evident by sending a gunboat and was sufficient cause for a similar retaliation. However, Grey counselled France to not retaliate by responding in kind as this could have escalated the crisis. Grey adamantly stressed this was something that was not the right course of action, which reduced the tension and the likelihood of a European confrontation.

The fourth watershed, the Balkan War, was not a surprise given the events of 1908-9. The continual nationalistic fervour and jostling for territory and shifting boundaries was inevitably going to result in further conflict. The fact that it lasted the best part of nine months and that it did not directly involve any European Power was perhaps fortuitous. The only potential threat was that of Austria and Russia becoming involved. Russia having vested interests in Bulgaria and Austria having continued designs on expanding in the Balkan region, but they were kept in check by Grey and Germany respectively. The Ambassadors conference mitigated any real degree of threat. Thus, this event was as much an administrative challenge for the European Powers as it was for Grey who chaired the

Conference.

187 Historians have generally asserted that from 1912-1914 both the Austro-Hungarian and

German policymakers undertook a succession of diplomatic decisions that served to provoke

conflict.47 However, it can be argued that this could be extended back to the First Moroccan

Crisis of 1905-06, and this certainly pertained to the Bosnian Crisis 1908-09, and the Second

Moroccan Crisis of 1911. Whereby, specific patterns have emerged from the historiography

of the crises that bear a striking resemblance to the events of July 1914. What distinguishes their actions in the preceding situations is that they involved territorial disputes or acquisitions, whereas in 1914 the trigger had nothing to do with territory. Two of the so- called crises were in the Balkans, similarly the case in 1914. Breaches of agreements or a treaty, or a policy gave cause to three events. Under the auspice of the Open Door Policy in

1905, the 1908-09 dispute was a breach of the 1839 Treaty of London, that which would

draw Britain to war in 1914. Lastly, the 1911 dispute was seen as violating the Algeciras Act

of 1906. It cannot be ignored that the Kaiser’s antagonism exacerbated two crises through his

actions and that this was the case in 1914.

Grey’s Fateful Nadir: The July Crisis

In order to assess the causal events that led to war, those escalating events must be

independently situated along the time continuum in Hermann’s model. Besides Britain’s

ultimate decision to go to war on 4 August, four other crucial points need to be situated: the

assassination, the ‘blank cheque’, the Austrian ultimatum, and Servia’s reply (Figure 5.5).

These points mark the 1914 July Crisis, and they denote the path to war – a route that at the

time of the assassination was not inevitable. The covert support of the ‘blank cheque’ was

incendiary and was the touch paper that only needed to be lit; the ultimatum was the match.

47 Anievas, ‘1914 in World’, p. 722.

188 The ‘blank cheque’ was communicated on 6 July, and at that juncture, the window of opportunity to avoid war was just over four weeks. In the case of Servia, they were not to know that in three weeks, they would be at war with Austria. But what truly accelerated the cauldron of war was the Austrian ultimatum on 23 July leaving Servia just five days before war was declared. At the time of the ultimatum, there would be some justifiable belief that any war could still be avoided. Austria’s clear intention was to demand such rigorous concessions so that those demands could not be agreed to. In doing so, it gave Austria cause, and they would be able to declare war knowing they had fulfilled their diplomatic obligations. The fact that Servia overwhelmingly accepted Austria’s demands gave hope to a belief, albeit fleeting, that war would be averted. Austria’s decision to refuse Servia’s reply to the ultimatum on 25 July was the moment when the inevitability of a war of some kind was guaranteed, though it remained uncertain whether this war would remain local or expand to encompass the other Powers.

189

F

 Administrative situation G

B

C

DECISION TIME E H

Extended Short

x = 25 July b = 23 July N a = 28 June Legend Crisis situation  A D

High THREAT Low a = June 28 Archduke Ferdinand assassination. N = German ‘blank cheque’ – 6 July 1914. b = July 23 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. x = July 25 Servia’s Reply

Figure 5.2 Situating the July Crisis in Hermann’s Situational Cube

Figure 5.2 denotes the four critical time points that were pivotal events that accelerated the

July Crisis. In terms of assessing Grey’s reaction to each of the four key points, he was not

initially alarmed on 28 June. It has been suggested that the effectiveness of a leader’s initial

response at the outset of a crisis will determine the likelihood of success.48 Grey stated that

he had not seen any reason to be overly alarmist at that point.49 It would be remiss not to

48 Mirandilla, Chia and Peters, ‘Decision’, p. 2. 49 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 309.

190 acknowledge his attempts to limit the severity of Austria’s intended response. Since Britain had no vested interests in the region and was not tied by an entente obligation, there was little more he could have done to affect the outcome. The circumstances limited his direct influence and thereby its likelihood of success.

Further to Grey’s likelihood for success, it has also been suggested that during a crisis, the leader’s response at critical junctures will also affect the outcome.50 Since Grey did not know of the 6 July ‘blank cheque’, there is no reaction recorded – one can only surmise that his view of it would have signalled that the impending crisis had now escalated and the number of nation-states involved actors increased. However, when he found out about Austria’s demands of Servia and their subsequent dismissal of Servia’s contriteness, he knew the situation was grave. Upon hearing of the Austrian ultimatum, the efforts which Grey undertook to negotiate between the Germans, Austrians, and Russians to avoid further escalation have been documented. Grey had recognised several days before the ultimatum that there existed the possibility for war. He proposed the only course of actions available to him, one which had been successful in the past. He met with Mensdorff and reasoned but to no avail. Grey had limited time from the issuance of the ultimatum to the time Austria declared war on Servia in which to de-escalate the crisis. That five days became three after

Servia’s reply, thereby constraining his decision-making ability to respond, which impacted on the outcome.

If Grey had had any window of opportunity to resolve the Crisis successfully, it would have been prior to the precipitous ‘blank cheque’ (N) had he known of that pivotal event. It is reasonable to conjecture that he may then have taken a different approach. Not knowing of

50 Tucker, Politics as Leadership, pp. 15-30.

191 this provocative carte blanche limited him of pertinent information which was essential to his

decision-making in attempting to resolve the crisis. In crises, leaders cannot adapt to a

changing environment if their information flow is distorted or delayed.51

Knowing of this would not have changed the timeline; the degree of surprise may have been

heightened, but what would have changed most certainly would have been the degree of

threat, thus increasing the status from impending crisis to full-blown Crisis as of 6 July. Upon

Servia’s agreeing to the ultimatum and Austria’s non-acceptance, in Grey’s view while the

situation was grave, he still believed it was not a ‘really dangerous crisis’.52 As long as Grey

was still of the belief that the situation was salvageable, the Cabinet was reluctant to be

drawn into any confrontation. Even on Monday, 27 July three-quarters of the Cabinet were opposed to being drawn into the European quarrel unless under direct attack.53

It could be construed that the Crisis did not concern them, and to some degree, they would be

correct. Alternatively, the Cabinet misread the severity of it; for example, there was no reference to it in Lewis Harcourt’s journal until 26 July, some ten days before the war.54

What this suggests is that the Austrian refusal to accept Servia’s response was the catalyst

that hastened the Cabinet’s attention to the Crisis. However, it was not until 31 July that Grey

essentially surrendered the notion of peace and specifically took ‘a diplomatic step that

contemplated the contingency of war’.55 This correlates to the time when the Cabinet had

finally awoken to the realisation that the Crisis was now an impending war and that it

warranted primary focus over domestic concerns.

51 Conrad and Poole, Strategic, p. 293; Yukl and Mahsud, ‘Why Flexible’, p. 86. 52 Churchill, The World, I, p. 210. 53 Churchill, The World, I, p. 211. 54 Young, ‘Lewis Harcourt’, p. 437. 55 Grey, Twenty-Five, I, p. 329.

192 Summation

Grey’s policy was one of continuity; by definition, this means something unbroken in

continual existence over time. Thus, to assert Grey had his ‘own policy’ would suggest that

his policy was not one of continuity but rather divergent from that which came before – the

evidence states otherwise. Grey’s leadership style was democratic and reliant on the

participation of others. To be successful, he used a persuasive approach to acquire

information, and through cooperation, he was able to facilitate outcomes that served both

Britain’s political and economic needs. The evidence has shown that too much power has

been attributed to Grey’s role. Thereby, his decision making was limited by specified

constraints besides the system in which he operated.

Whether Grey could have orchestrated an alternate course during the July Crisis remains

debatable.56 Given the extent to which external constraints were a factor in 1914, there is no

doubt that they impeded Grey’s ability to affect the outcome.57 Furthermore, those nation-

states that precipitated the Crisis placed him in a reactionary position. McCormick’s

definition of a crisis stated that each nation’s decision-makers perception of a crisis

determines whether there is a crisis or not.58 In this crisis, the Cabinet were the British

decision-makers and they did not perceive a threat until Austria’s ultimatum to Servia. Both

Harcourt’s and Churchill’s accounts confirm that the Cabinet’s only recognised the threat at that time. And yet, they still do not make this a priority. Grey can hardly be held to account when those decision-makers responsible for determining the course of action were distracted with domestic issues which they prioritised as more pressing than the current Bosnian crisis.

In the case of Austria and Germany, both nation-states were initially in a reactive mode, as

56 Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey’, p. 320. 57 Neustadt, Presidential Power, pp.147-8. 58 McCormick, ‘International Crises’, p. 352.

193 such their subsequent actions were retaliatory and not responses to a perceived threat per se.

Furthermore, McClelland’s definition states that when the balance between two nation-states

is subject to a significant political change, it can result in a crisis.59 For Germany and Austria

and Austria and Servia, this was the case. Given the Austro-German alliance, Germany

recognised the need to support their ally with the ‘blank cheque’, especially in light of

previous Balkan crises. By giving them that support, it precipitated in the ultimatum, and

arguably the crisis commenced. In the case of Austro-Servia, the assassination was the

tipping point to an existing strained relationship without and the subsequent events that

followed resulted in the July Crisis.

Grey’s agency was limited not by ‘his policy’, not by the events preceding the July Crisis, but by three specific factors. First, not knowing of the ‘blank cheque’; second, a limited window

of opportunity to respond to Austria’s actions from 25 July; and lastly, the constraint of the

Cabinet since their attention was diverted away from this Crisis. If we were to accept that

Grey should be held accountable for failing to avert the War, then it would be because he

failed to adapt his leadership style. While he could have adapted his leadership style in all

likelihood without having all the relevant information, the outcome would most probably

have been the same. When this is considered alongside those exogenous constraints, Grey

was not in a position to influence the outcome of the July Crisis.

59 McClelland, ‘Access to Berlin’, p. 160.

194 Conclusion

In critically re-examining two key assumptions concerning Sir Edward Grey’s role as Foreign

Secretary and the parameters of his policy-making, this thesis has contested the commonly ascribed argument concerning his culpability in the origins of the First World War. As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, arguments asserting Grey’s accountability in taking

Britain to war has endowed him with an unsubstantiated level of individual political agency.

In short, these arguments have presupposed that Grey had shaped British foreign policy and was in a position to circumvent the established political structure to determine its course.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, British foreign policy-making had followed a strategy that formed a framework to support imperial economic commerce for the next seven decades. The

Victorian directive was assumed by a succession of Foreign Secretaries, including Grey, who efficaciously supported Britain’s security and commercial interests throughout the Empire.

However, by the turn of the twentieth century, Britain’s approach to foreign policy-making was compelled to undergo a paradigm shift to address emerging global economic pressures, which resulted in Britain enacting a series of agreements that ensured those imperial commercial interests. In his role as Foreign Secretary, Grey was required to follow the post- isolationist policies of Lansdowne, and in doing so, he was accountable for maintaining their continuity. To hold Grey individually accountable for British foreign policy-making is to ignore this continuity directive and view policy solely from when he took office in 1905.

Moreover, by accepting the argument that he forged his ‘own’ policy is to discard the work undertaken by his predecessors.

195 The second claim alleges that Grey should have communicated a clear message to Germany and by not doing so, he created ambiguity as to Britain’s position in 1914. This thesis dispels this notion and has argued that Grey consistently conveyed the same message in all five crises. By suggesting that Grey had the power to dictate Britain’s willingness to support

France militarily is, again, to afford him greater agency than he had. In his five crises, Grey did not have the power to convey a message of military support for France or that Britain would go to war without having Cabinet approval. Furthermore, by not prioritising the Crisis before the end of July, the Cabinet left minimal response time in which to avoid entering the war. Moreover, Grey faced a Cabinet that was divided, and this impeded his ability to act sooner during the July Crisis for fear it would cause the government to fall. These two factors undermined his ability to convey an explicit message that Britain may have been willing to go to war, thereby providing a possible deterrent. In his position as Foreign Secretary, Grey was not afforded autonomous or universal decision-making power that would have enabled him to circumvent the political structure by conveying a message beyond which he was empowered to do. This is a critical point that illustrates the distinction between Grey and those principal actors who were in positions to affect the course of events that led to the outbreak of the War.

Grey also applied a consistent approach in how he managed the crises. Grey acted as the peace broker – mediator, whereby he worked to preserve British economic stability.

However, this could suggest a degree of inflexibility, which could be argued was a causal factor in his failure to avert war in 1914. In situational leadership, adaptability to crises is a critical factor in the likelihood of a successful outcome, such as avoiding war. Indeed, it should not be overlooked that Grey applied the same leadership style throughout all five crises, of which four resulted in avoiding war. In examining his leadership during his tenure

196 as Foreign Secretary, and throughout the five crises, this thesis contends that Grey

demonstrated a democratic style of leadership. To assert that Grey had the power to shape his

‘own’ policy and convey a clear message is to imply that his leadership style was autocratic.

In extending the traditional research focus from Prime Ministers and Presidents, this thesis

has widened the lens used to examine individual agency during the historical crises of a

Foreign Secretary. By converging conventional methods of historical analysis with an applied

conceptual model, this thesis has adopted an innovative analytical tool for clarifying and

categorising the complexity of Grey’s leadership decision-making and his five crises. In doing so, this thesis has attempted to discern the contribution that the interdisciplinary study of history and leadership can provide to increase our understanding of Grey.1

Moreover, by examining all of Grey’s ‘five crises’ within the context of July 1914, specific

patterns were discerned. The obvious similarity was Britain not having any vested interest in

any of the Balkan crises/war. However, the most striking dissimilarity was the finding that

the July Crisis was the only ‘crisis’ that differed in terms of decision time. The deliberate

decision by Austria to expedite proceedings with the ultimatum’s time stipulation was

deleterious as it shortened Grey’s response time. This pre-eminent difference between the

‘five crises’ was detrimental to Grey as it hampered his ability to respond to the changing dynamic of July 1914. Holsti argued that Britain had not recognised the time-sensitivity until

21 July, which to some extent was true.2 In Britain’s defence, there was a period of protracted

silence just as there had been before the Mansion House speech. Over three weeks had passed

since the assassination before the ultimatum was presented to Servia. For Grey, he only learnt

1 Wren, ‘Of history’, pp. 66, 80. 2 Holsti, ‘Theories’, p. 113.

197 of the ultimatums time stipulation twenty-four hours prior.3 It is only then that time becomes

an issue and that the countdown to a conflict commenced. Britain and indeed Grey could be

forgiven for the indecision and inaction during those three weeks as they were waiting to see

what response Austria would take. How could any pre-emptive decision-making by Grey be undertaken without knowing all the pertinent facts, like those that were made in Berlin on 6

July or without knowing what Austria had planned. This was causally different from the preceding four ‘crises’.

From an external perspective, Grey was thwarted by Germany’s deceptive support for Austria and their unreceptive desire to intercede or embrace an Ambassadorial conference. The fact that Grey could not garner influence in this regard bodes further consideration. One possible explanation is that the sphere of his agency with Germany had diminished after he chose not to go to Berlin in 1912 and the subsequent suggestions he made to the Kaiser not only riled him but saw him lose favour and credibility with Berlin. This hypothesis supports

Christopher Clark’s theory that there was a lack of trust between the actors.4 Lastly, the tools of diplomacy Grey was armed with were ineffective against the independent nation-state actors who were able to wield power and make decisions he could not.

To characterise Grey’s reputation as one of those men accountable for the outbreak of the

First World War is to include him with those actors who had a willing to war, which is categorically false. The fact remains that there was an expectation that Grey could have somehow prevented the outbreak of the War. After all, he had successfully navigated four previous crises, whereby this had seen him achieve a heralded status in diplomatic leadership,

3 BD, XI, No. 86, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 23 July 1914, p. 70. 4 Clark, Sleepwalkers, pp. 189-203.

198 such that there was an expectation he would do so in 1914.5 This expectation is misplaced as to assert that great leaders can always enact solutions in crisis situations is give him far too much credibility and influence, for he was not in a position to prevent the events of 1914 despite his best efforts to do so.

By laying blame on individual actors is to ignore the fundamental causality of these events.

According to Grey, the inseparability of militarism and armaments made the inevitability of war a certainty.6 However, they were only symptoms of nineteenth-century industrialisation, which was an outgrowth of economic capitalism and competition between Britain and

Germany. The July Crisis will remain Grey’s fateful nadir, casting a perpetual shadow over his tenure as Britain’s longest continually serving Foreign Secretary.

5 Tucker, ‘The theory of’, p. 745. 6 Grey, Twenty-Five, II, pp. 53-4.

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