THE OFFICIAL CONCEPT OF THE NATION IN THE GDR: THEORY VERSUS PRAGMATISM BY JOANNA PATRICIA McKAY Department of Government London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis submitted for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY July 1995 UMI Number: U074613 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U074613 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 r OF POLITICAL $ AMD , m,csc^ X <b o 0Q 0 * Oo 0^ ABSTRACT This thesis is a study of the attempts by the leadership of the GDR to devise a concept of the nation which suited their objectives regarding the future of the state and of Germany as a whole, from 1949 until 1989. A simple analysis of official pronouncements on the subject over the years reveals serious inconsistencies and dramatic U-turns. This thesis considers various factors which may have shaped the official line, including the influence of Bonn and Moscow, public opinion and personal convictions. In particular it examines the input of experts from academic institutions in order to answer the question of whether or not the official line on the nation had a clear theoretical basis, or was purely determined by pragmatic considerations. In order to investigate what lay behind official policy, extensive use has been made of material from the SED's Central Party Archive, and interviews were conducted with leading theorists. In this way it was possible to gain a better understanding of the interaction between the political and theoretical aspects of the National Question in the former GDR. The findings reveal that the official concept of the nation was primarily determined by pragmatic, or even opportunistic considerations, and was viewed by the SED leadership as a means to legitimise the GDR in the absence of alternative methods. Initially the intention was to reinforce the claim that the GDR was a model for a future united socialist Germany, but later a concept was fashioned to support the idea that it was an independent sovereign state, and in no way linked to the Federal Republic. However, the regime was heavily reliant on the skills of theorists to provide credible (Marxist-Leninist) justifications for policy changes, and to modify policies in order to make them more acceptable and therefore more effective as a means to legitimise the state. CONTENTS A bstract i Contents ii Acknowledgements v CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 1) AIMS OF THE INVESTIGATION 7 2) TERMINOLOGY 9 a) Scholarship under Marxist-Leninist Regimes 1 2 b) East German Theorists 2 0 3) METHOD 2 8 a) Party Material 2 8 b) Theoretical Material 3 4 c) Structure 3 5 4) LITERATURE REVIEW 3 6 5) WIDER IMPLICATIONS 4 1 6) CONCLUSION 4 4 CHAPTER 2: THE UNITY OF THE NATION 4 6 1) FROM THE BIRTH OF THE STATE TO THE BUILDING OF THE WALL 4 6 2) THE GERMAN NATION IN THE SHADOW OF THE WALL 6 0 a) The Political Dimension 6 0 b) The Theoretical Dimension 6 9 3) CONCLUSION 7 3 ii CHAPTER 3: THE UNITY OF THE NATION IN DOUBT 7 6 1) TRADITIONALISTS VERSUS REALISTS WITHIN THE RULING ELITE 7 6 a) The Seventh Party Conference, 1967 7 6 c) The Theoretical Level 9 3 d) The Aftermath of the Seventh Party Conference 9 8 2) THE ’SOCIALIST STATE OF THE GERMAN NATION 10 4 a) The New Socialist Constitution of 1968 104 b) The Political Factors at Work 111 c) Theoretical Input 114 d) The 20th Anniversary of the GDR 115 3) THE CHALLENGE OF BRANDTS OSTPOLITIK 11 8 a) The SED's Initial Response to Brandt 118 b) Ulbricht's Rejection of the Unitary German Nation 126 c) Erfurt and Kassel 129 d) Explaining the Dramatic U-Turn 13 5 e) Theoretical Input 13 9 4) CONCLUSION 145 CHAPTER 4: THE ’SOCIALISTNATION’ IN THE GDR 148 1) THE INVENTION OF A 'SOCIALIST NATION' IN THE GDR 14 9 a) The Beginning of the End for Ulbricht 149 b) Ulbricht fights back 156 c) 'History' Settles the National Question 164 d) Theoretical Considerations 171 2) THE SOCIALIST NATION IN PRACTICE 17 5 a) The 'De-Germanisation' of the GDR 176 b) Public Opinion and Propaganda 180 c) Official Justifications for the New Line 193 d) Scholarly Activity and the Socialist Nation 204 e) The New Constitution of 1974 213 3) CONCLUSION 215 iii CHAPTER 5: THE SOCIALIST GERMAN NATION* - FROM CONSOLIDATION TO CRISIS 217 1) THE ’SOCIALIST GERMAN NATION’ IN THE GDR 21 8 a) Nationality: German; Citizenship: GDR 218 b) The New Party Programme of 1976 227 2) PROBLEM SOLVED? 23 2 a) The Political Implications of the Socialist German Nation 23 2 b) Academic Implications 23 6 c) The GDR: 'Heir to Everything Progressive in the History of the German People' 245 3) THE SUDDEN RETURN OF THE NATION TO THE POLITICAL AGENDA . 25 9 a) The Challenge of Perestrieka and Glasnost 260 b) Kohl Throws Down the Gauntlet 264 c) Domestic Concerns 270 d) Theorists Hear the Call 282 4) CONCLUSION 283 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 284 1) THE FOUR PHASES OF THE OFFICIAL LINE 28 5 2) THE PARADOXES OF OFFICIAL NATIONALISM IN THE GDR 290 3) THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION IN WEST GERMANY 293 4) THE COLLAPSE OF THE GDR 297 5) OFFICIAL VERSUS UNOFFICIAL GDR-CONSCIOUSNESS 300 6) THE EAST GERMAN EXPERIENCE AND NATION -THEORY 307 BIBLIOGRAPHY 312 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors at the LSE, Professor Gordon Smith and Dr Michael Burleigh, and to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding this project, and also to the German Academic Exchange Service for additional support while I was undertaking research in Germany. I would also like to thank all the individuals who granted me interviews, in particular, Professor Alfred Kosing and Dr Juergen Hofmann, the archivists in the SED archive, especially the notorious Herr Lange, and everyone who assisted me in Berlin, in particular, Professor Siegfried Prokopp. Finally I would like to thank my father for providing me with a computer, Richard Wood for helping me overcome my technophobia, and my mother for her general concern for my welfare over the past four years. CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION Recent events in the former Eastern Bloc have shown that the key factor ensuring the stability of states and their systems is popular legitimacy. While an outside guardian, the threat of force from within and without, and even barbed wire and concrete can uphold a state artificially, they are no substitutes for legitimacy from below, and we now know what happens once these supports are withdrawn. Three factors can be identified as vital if a state is to enjoy the total allegiance of its population, and a deficiency in any one of them may well have disastrous consequences. The first is democracy, that is to say, the right of all citizens to give or withhold their assent to their state's system and regime and to participate in the decision-making process. The denial of that right suggests a belief on the part of the regime that it would not get the approval of the population, if they were given the opportunity to voice their opinions. The second factor is economic success, demonstrated by the fulfilment of what are perceived to be the minimum requirements for an acceptable standard of living, which will differ according to expectations. In the developed world, this will be based on material well-being, or more precisely, the ability of the state to satisfy demand for food, clothing, housing, transport and consumer durables - not just in terms of quantity, but of quality also. The third essential factor is what we might describe as identification of the state with a defined group and its interests, which may be a nation or a class, but (in theory) not both. Sometimes states do represent more than one group, but this can easily lead to discrimination, internal rivalry, even civil war, and may result in the division of the state as occurred in Czechoslovakia and could happen in Belgium or Canada. By appearing to represent a nation and to protect national interests 1 from outside competition and threats, a regime can draw on the powerful forces of national sentiment, even nationalism, to gain support and therefore legitimacy for itself and the state. Where the interests of the state and the nation are successfully fused together, causing national and state-consciousness to become inseparable, an extremely resilient entity, a true nation-state will become established. Alternatively, a genuine Marxist-Leninist regime should justify a socialist or communist state's right to exist on the basis of its social and economic system, that is to say, on the claim that the state represents the interests of the masses, since power is (theoretically) in the hands of the working class themselves. Clearly this claim is fundamentally incompatible with the claim to represent a group bound together by their nationality, regardless of class. Once a state has secured the loyalty of its citizens, or popular legitimacy, it is likely to be recognised as legitimate by the international community, which in turn will further encourage popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the state.