The Airmen Charged with Delivering Nuclear Weapons Were Often Kept in the Dark About the Revolutionary Weapons
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The airmen charged with delivering nuclear weapons were often kept in the dark about the revolutionary weapons. Early Atomic Air By Phillip S. Meilinger Photo from the collection of Harold Agnew heoretically, it had been known for decades that splitting the atom would release enormous power—far greater than any explosive ever invented. In the T1930s the theories of nuclear fission be- gan to take definite shape as scientists in Germany, the US, and elsewhere began experiments that revealed the secrets of the atom. In early 1939 it was apparent war was coming in Europe. It was also obvious to a group of scientists in America, some of whom had recently fled Germany, that the Nazis were working toward an atomic bomb. This was a frightening possibility, so these individuals, led by Albert Einstein, wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning him of the peril represented by German research. The US needed to beat the Nazis to the atomic bomb, and it would take immediate action and vast funds to do so. Top: 509th Composite Group aircraft on Tinian, before its bombing mission to Hi- roshima. Enola Gay is in the foreground. Above: Enola Gay crewmembers (l-r) Maj. In October 1939, one month after war Theodore Van Kirk, Col. Paul Tibbets Jr., and Maj. Thomas Ferebee. Despite their erupted in Europe, FDR directed the successful mission over Hiroshima, Tibbets’ crew was bypassed for the tests at Army to study the matter. Bikini Atoll. 74 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 For the next six years the Army man- aged the Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb. This was the most secretive weapon-development program of the war. The entire project was enormous, requir- ing not only covert laboratories, “heavy water” plants, and vast amounts of silver to produce the required electrical coils, but also mining operations to obtain the necessary uranium. On Dec. 2, 1942, a team of scientists led by Nobel Prize winner Enrico Fermi huddled in a secret lab beneath the stands of the abandoned football stadium at the University of Chicago and produced the world’s first self-sustaining nuclear reaction. A year later scientists at Los Alamos, N.M., under the leadership of J. Robert Oppenheimer, began building a weapon from Fermi’s achievement. On July 16, 1945, an atomic device Seated at the Potsdam Conference (l-r): British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, US was detonated at Trinity Site in the New President Harry Truman, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Truman learned of the Mexico desert. The blast was seen as far successful Trinity test while at this conference. away as Albuquerque and El Paso and entailed the now familiar ball of fire and bombs available to waste on empty space. mushroom” that quickly rose to a height mushroom cloud. One observer described It was also feared that since the actual of 45,000 feet—three miles higher than the blast as “unprecedented, magnificent, bomb had not yet been tested—Trinity the aircraft’s own altitude—and even beautiful, stupendous, and terrifying.” was a huge, static device detonated under from several miles away appeared to be laboratory conditions—the psychological “boiling upward like something terribly Ending the War and propaganda harm of announcing a alive.” It gave the unsettling appearance President Harry Truman was in Pots- demonstration only to have the bomb fail of a phenomenon about to engulf the dam, discussing the postwar settlement of to explode was too great a risk. airplane. In the city below, it destroyed Germany with Joseph Stalin and British This concern was not trivial; even the virtually everything within a one-mile Prime Minister Clement Attlee, when he head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Fleet radius of the blast. was told of the Trinity blast. According Adm. William D. Leahy (who considered A second bomb, a more advanced to Truman, there was never any question himself an ordnance expert), predicted plutonium design nicknamed “Fat Man,” in his mind that he would use the atomic failure. was dropped on Nagasaki on Aug. 9. bomb against Japan. The issues now dealt In addition, military planners and Japan surrendered five days later. with delivery and the appropriate target. scientists wanted an untouched target Debate still rages over whether the Because of its size and weight, the so they could more easily determine the atomic bombs were necessary to force bomb could only be carried in a B-29; effects of the atomic blast. Secretary of Japanese surrender, but it was not a seri- even so, the bombers had to be specially War Henry L. Stimson then crossed Kyoto ous question at the time. Truman had no modified and the crews specially trained off the target list because of its historical regrets over his decision—the invasion of to handle the new weapon. In the summer and cultural significance. The name then Japan scheduled for November could have of 1944, Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold coming out on top was Hiroshima—Ja- cost millions of lives, on both sides. He chose Lt. Col. Paul W. Tibbets Jr., a su- pan’s eighth largest city, a large seaport, was not willing to pay that price. Japanese perb pilot with a distinguished combat headquarters of the Second Army, and a leaders interviewed after the war agreed record, to head the unit that would deliver major war industry center. the bombs had been the final straw that the bomb. The 509th Composite Group In late July, President Truman warned had broken their will. The enormous was activated on Dec. 17, 1944, and after the Japanese they must surrender or face power of the atomic bombs had as much training in the US, Tibbets moved his unit terrible consequences. They ignored him. psychological effect as it did physical. to the island of Tinian in the Marianas. On Aug. 2, Tibbets received orders to Essentially, everyone believed atomic After undergoing normal theater orienta- drop the bomb. The Enola Gay took off weapons had fundamentally altered the tion, the 509th flew a number of combat from Tinian at 2:30 a.m., Aug. 6, 1945. conduct of war. There would have to missions against Japan, utilizing large The flight en route was uneventful, and be new strategies, new weapons, new conventional bombs, termed “pumpkins,” at 8:15 a.m. the bomb exploded above organizations, and new doctrines. that resembled the atomic bombs in size, Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,890 feet to When the war ended the Army Air shape, and weight. maximize the blast effect. Forces shrank dramatically in size, as The target question involved several The bomb, termed “Little Boy,” had did the entire military establishment. The factors. President Truman and his advi- a uranium core and detonated with AAF, which had consisted of 243 groups sors decided to hit an actual military the equivalent force of 20,000 tons of in March 1945, quickly dropped by two- target, rather than attempt a demonstra- TNT—equal to thousands of B-29s thirds—it would eventually bottom out tion, such as exploding a bomb off the carrying conventional bombs. Tibbets at 48 groups—and many of those were coast of Tokyo. There were too few described the blast as a “giant purple no longer combat-ready. The 509th was AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 75 The Army and Navy would It detonated at 518 feet, but it missed its jointly conduct these atomic tests target by nearly half a mile, and to the because the main targets were to left—as Ferebee had predicted. Despite be surplus American ships and months of practice and two dry runs captured enemy vessels. The plan immediately before the actual drop, the called for one air burst over the bomb still missed its target, in perfect ships themselves—to be dropped weather, by more than five football fields. by a B-29 from the 509th—and two The Navy was much amused. Nevada underwater detonations arranged was still afloat—although five other by the Navy. (During the event, ships were sunk and others were heav- only one underwater detonation ily damaged. As an aircraft approached took place because the first was the barely scorched Nevada, one sailor so successful.) mused: “Well, it looks to me like the Vice Adm. William H. P. Blandy atom bomb is just about like the Army was the overall commander for Air Force [sic]—highly overrated.” Crossroads, with Maj. Gen. William E. Kepner, from the AAF, as his What Had Gone Wrong? deputy, and Brig. Gen. Roger M. People pointed fingers at the aircrew, Ramey leading the AAF contingent airplane, bombsight, and the bomb itself. of 2,200 people. Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the deputy The first test, termed Able, was chief of the air staff for research and scheduled for July 1. The 509th development, ordered tests of the aircraft had been practicing in New Mexico and bombsight immediately thereafter, but Lt. Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold (r) with for several months, dropping “pumpkin” they showed no malfunction. Crew error Col. Jacob Smart in China. Arnold picked Tibbets to head the 509th Com- dummy bombs in the desert. Accuracy was also ruled out, although as noted, posite Group. remained a concern. The horrible aero- some believed that was the culprit. The dynamic shape of the 10-foot-long, Strategic Air Command official history one of the few groups still in good shape, five-foot-diameter, and 10,000-pound blamed unpredictable winds. and it formed the core of the “atomic Fat Man bombs had been troublesome One report of the incident concluded air force.” since Nagasaki, but little had been done lamely that “some unusual force affected Besides demobilization and budget to correct it.