The airmen charged with delivering nuclear weapons were often kept in the dark about the revolutionary weapons.

Early Atomic Air By Phillip S. Meilinger

Photo from the collection of Harold Agnew heoretically, it had been known for decades that splitting the atom would release enormous power—far greater than any explosive ever invented. In the 1930sT the theories of nuclear fission be- gan to take definite shape as scientists in Germany, the US, and elsewhere began experiments that revealed the secrets of the atom. In early 1939 it was apparent war was coming in Europe. It was also obvious to a group of scientists in America, some of whom had recently fled Germany, that the Nazis were working toward an atomic bomb. This was a frightening possibility, so these individuals, led by Albert Einstein, wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning him of the peril represented by German research. The US needed to beat the Nazis to the atomic bomb, and it would take immediate action and vast funds to do so. Top: 509th Composite Group aircraft on Tinian, before its bombing mission to Hi- roshima. Enola Gay is in the foreground. Above: Enola Gay crewmembers (l-r) Maj. In October 1939, one month after war Theodore Van Kirk, Col. Paul Tibbets Jr., and Maj. Thomas Ferebee. Despite their erupted in Europe, FDR directed the successful mission over Hiroshima, Tibbets’ crew was bypassed for the tests at Army to study the matter. Bikini Atoll. 74 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 For the next six years the Army man- aged the Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb. This was the most secretive weapon-development program of the war. The entire project was enormous, requir- ing not only covert laboratories, “heavy water” plants, and vast amounts of silver to produce the required electrical coils, but also mining operations to obtain the necessary uranium. On Dec. 2, 1942, a team of scientists led by Nobel Prize winner Enrico Fermi huddled in a secret lab beneath the stands of the abandoned football stadium at the University of Chicago and produced the world’s first self-sustaining nuclear reaction. A year later scientists at Los Alamos, N.M., under the leadership of J. Robert Oppenheimer, began building a weapon from Fermi’s achievement. On July 16, 1945, an atomic device Seated at the Potsdam Conference (l-r): British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, US was detonated at Trinity Site in the New President Harry Truman, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Truman learned of the Mexico desert. The blast was seen as far successful Trinity test while at this conference. away as Albuquerque and El Paso and entailed the now familiar ball of fire and bombs available to waste on empty space. mushroom” that quickly rose to a height mushroom cloud. One observer described It was also feared that since the actual of 45,000 feet—three miles higher than the blast as “unprecedented, magnificent, bomb had not yet been tested—Trinity the aircraft’s own altitude—and even beautiful, stupendous, and terrifying.” was a huge, static device detonated under from several miles away appeared to be laboratory conditions—the psychological “boiling upward like something terribly Ending the War and propaganda harm of announcing a alive.” It gave the unsettling appearance President Harry Truman was in Pots- demonstration only to have the bomb fail of a phenomenon about to engulf the dam, discussing the postwar settlement of to explode was too great a risk. airplane. In the city below, it destroyed Germany with Joseph Stalin and British This concern was not trivial; even the virtually everything within a one-mile Prime Minister Clement Attlee, when he head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Fleet radius of the blast. was told of the Trinity blast. According Adm. William D. Leahy (who considered A second bomb, a more advanced to Truman, there was never any question himself an ordnance expert), predicted plutonium design nicknamed “Fat Man,” in his mind that he would use the atomic failure. was dropped on Nagasaki on Aug. 9. bomb against Japan. The issues now dealt In addition, military planners and Japan surrendered five days later. with delivery and the appropriate target. scientists wanted an untouched target Debate still rages over whether the Because of its size and weight, the so they could more easily determine the atomic bombs were necessary to force bomb could only be carried in a B-29; effects of the atomic blast. Secretary of Japanese surrender, but it was not a seri- even so, the bombers had to be specially War Henry L. Stimson then crossed Kyoto ous question at the time. Truman had no modified and the crews specially trained off the target list because of its historical regrets over his decision—the invasion of to handle the new weapon. In the summer and cultural significance. The name then Japan scheduled for November could have of 1944, Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold coming out on top was Hiroshima—Ja- cost millions of lives, on both sides. He chose Lt. Col. Paul W. Tibbets Jr., a su- pan’s eighth largest city, a large seaport, was not willing to pay that price. Japanese perb pilot with a distinguished combat headquarters of the Second Army, and a leaders interviewed after the war agreed record, to head the unit that would deliver major war industry center. the bombs had been the final straw that the bomb. The 509th Composite Group In late July, President Truman warned had broken their will. The enormous was activated on Dec. 17, 1944, and after the Japanese they must surrender or face power of the atomic bombs had as much training in the US, Tibbets moved his unit terrible consequences. They ignored him. psychological effect as it did physical. to the island of Tinian in the Marianas. On Aug. 2, Tibbets received orders to Essentially, everyone believed atomic After undergoing normal theater orienta- drop the bomb. The Enola Gay took off weapons had fundamentally altered the tion, the 509th flew a number of combat from Tinian at 2:30 a.m., Aug. 6, 1945. conduct of war. There would have to missions against Japan, utilizing large The flight en route was uneventful, and be new strategies, new weapons, new conventional bombs, termed “pumpkins,” at 8:15 a.m. the bomb exploded above organizations, and new doctrines. that resembled the atomic bombs in size, Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,890 feet to When the war ended the Army Air shape, and weight. maximize the blast effect. Forces shrank dramatically in size, as The target question involved several The bomb, termed “Little Boy,” had did the entire military establishment. The factors. President Truman and his advi- a uranium core and detonated with AAF, which had consisted of 243 groups sors decided to hit an actual military the equivalent force of 20,000 tons of in March 1945, quickly dropped by two- target, rather than attempt a demonstra- TNT—equal to thousands of B-29s thirds—it would eventually bottom out tion, such as exploding a bomb off the carrying conventional bombs. Tibbets at 48 groups—and many of those were coast of Tokyo. There were too few described the blast as a “giant purple no longer combat-ready. The 509th was AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 75 The Army and Navy would It detonated at 518 feet, but it missed its jointly conduct these atomic tests target by nearly half a mile, and to the because the main targets were to left—as Ferebee had predicted. Despite be surplus American ships and months of practice and two dry runs captured enemy vessels. The plan immediately before the actual drop, the called for one air burst over the bomb still missed its target, in perfect ships themselves—to be dropped weather, by more than five football fields. by a B-29 from the 509th—and two The Navy was much amused. Nevada underwater detonations arranged was still afloat—although five other by the Navy. (During the event, ships were sunk and others were heav- only one underwater detonation ily damaged. As an aircraft approached took place because the first was the barely scorched Nevada, one sailor so successful.) mused: “Well, it looks to me like the Vice Adm. William H. P. Blandy atom bomb is just about like the Army was the overall commander for Air Force [sic]—highly overrated.” Crossroads, with Maj. Gen. William E. Kepner, from the AAF, as his What Had Gone Wrong? deputy, and Brig. Gen. Roger M. People pointed fingers at the aircrew, Ramey leading the AAF contingent airplane, bombsight, and the bomb itself. of 2,200 people. Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the deputy The first test, termed Able, was chief of the air staff for research and scheduled for July 1. The 509th development, ordered tests of the aircraft had been practicing in New Mexico and bombsight immediately thereafter, but Lt. Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold (r) with for several months, dropping “pumpkin” they showed no malfunction. Crew error Col. Jacob Smart in China. Arnold picked Tibbets to head the 509th Com- dummy bombs in the desert. Accuracy was also ruled out, although as noted, posite Group. remained a concern. The horrible aero- some believed that was the culprit. The dynamic shape of the 10-foot-long, Strategic Air Command official history one of the few groups still in good shape, five-foot-diameter, and 10,000-pound blamed unpredictable winds. and it formed the core of the “atomic Fat Man bombs had been troublesome One report of the incident concluded air force.” since Nagasaki, but little had been done lamely that “some unusual force affected Besides demobilization and budget to correct it. Nonetheless, the crews felt the bomb, causing it to veer off in an un- cutbacks, the AAF faced the problem of confident as they prepared for the trip out predictable and erratic manner, giving a secrecy. The Manhattan Engineer District to the Marshall Islands. point of impact somewhere left and short run by Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves was Crews from the 509th dropped 27 of the theoretical one.” One theory was a very close-hold organization. For the practice bombs on the target to refine their that a bomb fin was damaged on leaving airmen, this was a major concern. Their skills. Even so, it appeared trouble was the aircraft and this caused the weapon institutional future seemed dependent on brewing when Kepner received a memo to veer off course. atomic weapons, but they had virtually no stating, “The scoring system, which The AAF blamed the poor aerody- insight into the bomb’s development or worked so well in the States, seems to namics of Fat Man and used this as an production. It made them a bit paranoid. be giving trouble at Bikini. Of the seven argument for greater transparency in the releases, it was possible to measure the atomic weapons program. If the AAF The Bikini Atomic Tests accuracy of only four, and those were were to be responsible for dropping the On Aug. 25, 1945, Sen. Brien O. estimated.” bombs in war, then it should have greater McMahon, chairman of the Senate’s According to the practice scores ob- insight into their construction. Divided Special Committee on Atomic Energy, tained, Tibbets’ crew was the best. None- authority over development and delivery suggested taking captured Japanese and theless, he was bypassed as mission pilot was a recipe for disaster. German ships out to sea and bombing because of what he later claimed was In the aftermath, the AAF continued to them with atomic weapons to prove internal Air Force politics. hammer away at Groves in an attempt to “just how effective the atomic bomb is.” On the day of the drop, Tibbets and gain more access to the atomic program. The Joint Chiefs agreed, and in January two of his bombardiers noted the winds By late 1946 an agreement was reached: 1946, Acting Secretary of War Kenneth and computed when and where to drop Groves would train more bomb command- C. Royall and Navy Secretary James V. the bomb. Their calculations were far ers—air officers who would assemble the Forrestal sent a memo to the President different from those of the assigned drop bombs—as well as weaponeers to actu- emphasizing such tests were necessary crew. Tibbets offered suggestions to the ally monitor the weapon in flight. This “to determine, among other things, the chosen crew but they ignored him: One was a major step forward. At the same consequences of this powerful aerial of Tibbets’ bombardiers, Maj. Thomas time, despite the embarrassment of the weapon with respect to the size, com- Ferebee, predicted the bomb would fall errant bomb, the test gave the services position, and employment of the armed 1,600 feet short and to the left of the target. and policy-makers an opportunity to forces and should particularly facilitate On the morning of July 1, 1946, a witness the power of the new weapon. an analysis of future naval design and B-29 arrived over USS Nevada—painted Many found this sobering. tactics.” bright red so as to be visible from 30,000 One naval officer at Bikini commented Truman approved tests to be carried feet—and dropped its bomb. The device that the Navy was much chastened by the out at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific; their was to explode 550 feet over the top of tests. It had expected to sail the target fleet code name was Crossroads. the battleship and sink it immediately. back to San Francisco to demonstrate the 76 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 The second of two Crossroads nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific in July 1946. Due to severe radioactive contamination, the Navy had to sink the fleet of ships used as targets in the two tests.

negligible effects atomic weapons had when he wrote in April 1946: “Strategic were only 13 unassembled atomic bombs against it, but the radioactivity on the ships bombing is thus the first war instrument in the entire US arsenal. was so severe that the Navy abandoned the of history capable of stopping the heart In hindsight, it is apparent there was plan and sank the fleet—the contamination mechanism of a great industrialized a great deal of institutional jealousy and could not be removed despite countless enemy. It paralyzes his military power gamesmanship being played by the atomic attempts to do so. at the core.” gatekeepers. The bomb’s assembly and This was, as the naval observer noted, Airmen believed this, and because arming, as well as the modifications car- “a momentous decision, a momentous initial atomic bombs were so large and ried out on the B-29s used for delivery, admission.” The official committee tasked cumbersome, only large aircraft could were not as complex as pretended. More- to examine the results of Crossroads deliver them. Specially modified B-29s, over, secrecy was hardly airtight—the painted the significance of the atomic then the largest aircraft in the world, were Soviets infiltrated the Manhattan Project bomb in stark terms: “If used in numbers, the sole carriers of the bomb, and they early in the war and spies passed on atomic bombs not only can nullify any belonged to the AAF. This gave airmen invaluable secrets to Moscow. nation’s military efforts, but can demol- a sense of both euphoria and paranoia. As early as 1942 Groves knew the ish its social and economic structure Although they owned the aircraft, they Russians were attempting to infiltrate and prevent their re-establishment for did not own the bombs. The Manhattan the Manhattan Project, but did little to long periods of time.” The report went Engineer District controlled all aspects stop them. In fact, one historian labeled on to state there was no defense against of atomic bomb development, construc- the MED’s attempts at counterespionage the bomb; therefore the US could only tion, and assembly. In January 1947 the as “amateurish.” The heavy mantle of stockpile enough weapons so it could district was disbanded and its functions secrecy was successful largely in keeping overwhelm any potential enemy. absorbed by the Atomic Energy Com- information from the airmen charged with Atomic weapon development, which mission (AEC). delivering the bomb, not from the Soviets. took all but the most senior diplomats The cloak of secrecy draped over the Airmen would fight against this bu- and military officers by surprise, is rec- program by Groves and then the AEC reaucratic barricade for years. Not until ognized as a defining moment in history. was so total that airmen were kept almost the Korean War broke out, and there The detonation of a single bomb carried completely in the dark. Indeed, not just were fears of major conflict with the by one aircraft that destroyed a large airmen were in this state: When the AEC Soviet Union and China, did custody of portion of a major city while killing tens briefed President Truman in April 1947, atomic weapons finally transfer to the of thousands of people had a profound they told him the atomic stockpile was military—when atomic weapons were psychological effect on everyone. “very small.” Worse, no bombs were deployed to Guam just in case. Cities and people had been destroyed actually assembled and few personnel By the end of the decade, as a result of before—the Romans leveled Carthage were trained to do so. Truman, who had a decree by President Dwight Eisenhower, in antiquity and 50,000 Roman soldiers been President for two years by then and more than 90 percent of the nuclear stock- had been slaughtered in one afternoon should have known better, was nonethe- pile had been transferred to the military. at the Battle of Cannae—but the impact less visibly shocked. At that time, there There it would remain. n of such destruction occurring nearly instantaneously by such a relatively Phillip S. Meilinger is a retired Air Force pilot with 30 years of service and a doctor- small device shook the foundations of ate in military history from the University of Michigan. He is the author of eight military theory. books and more than 80 articles on military affairs. His latest book is Into the Sun: Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, the Commanding Novels of the US Air Force. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “How General of the AAF, noted this belief Bombers Defeated Japan,” appeared in December 2011. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 77