Branding Islam: the Strategic Use of Official Religious Discourse

Branding Islam: The Strategic Use of Official Religious Discourse

by Annelle Rodriguez Sheline

B.A. in Conflict Studies, May 2008, New York University M.A. in Political Science, January 2015, The George Washington University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2018

Dissertation directed by

Nathan J. Brown Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Annelle Rodriguez Sheline has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of July 23, 2018. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Branding Islam: The Strategic Use of Official Religious Discourse

Annelle Rodriguez Sheline

Dissertation Research Committee:

Nathan Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Harris Mylonas, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

iii Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Daniel T. Rodriguez, without whom it would not have been possible.

iv Acknowledgments

Thanks are owed to many people that cheered me on during this long marathon; the following are only a few of them. In gratitude to my dissertation committee – Nathan

Brown, Marc Lynch, and Harris Mylonas – who offered such unerring guidance. Without

Harris’ influence, I might have ended up elsewhere, and most of the people I subsequently describe would not appear below. Marc, I hope to live up to your example of excellence, energy, and efficiency. Nathan, in the midst of serving as president of

MESA, a phone call that your son had been in jail, and in the thick of Friday crowds on

Bourbon Street, you paused everything upon learning that I would have to retake my minor comprehensive exam, and spread out your bag on the curb to sit me down and make sure I was alright. This gesture sums up my experience of you as my advisor and chair: generous, thoughtful, and ever-ready to help me overcome the next hurdle.

Many thanks to Henry Hale and Peter Mandaville, for encouragement throughout, and helping me to cross the finish-line of the defense.

To all the friends who proved that the dissertation marathon could be run – Fabi,

Dot, Barnett, Scott, Alanna, Madeleine – and all those still on the course – EB, Aparna,

Mara, Lilly, Jen, Julian, Rosalie – thanks for running alongside me. Especial thanks to

Jessie A., for making the whole process infinitely more fun; Daniel N., for starting me on the right foot; and Abboud K., for reminding me to enjoy the journey.

To all those who made dissertation fieldwork such a joy. In Jordan: Lauren and

Stephanie for hosting, Omar for phone skills, Soheer and Sohieb for assistance from

Amman to Irbid, Sajeda for translations and mosque visits, Anoud for iftars, and special thanks to adventure buddies Phil, Alex, Chris, and Michael. In Oman: Sultan and Samira

v for years of guidance, Mohammad for unflagging support, Sugey for opening her home,

Hannah for sharing contacts and long drives through the mountains, Heiderose for the paradise of Qantab, and Yvonne for coming all that way. In Morocco: Catherine for being an ideal work partner, Shamineh for unfailing hospitality, Tarik and Manu for kayaking,

Ethan for leadership, and Dante for baraka.

To the following bad-ass ladies of political science for their academic mentorship:

Lisel Hintz, Kristin Fabbe, Ann Wainscott, Callie Jones, and Sarah Feuer. To my

Undergraduate Scholars for reminding me why I keep chasing this elusive beast called

“academia.”

To those who got me through the final harrowing weeks by distracting me with delightful travels: Chantal Berman and Michelle Weitzel, Corinne Miller and Caroline

Topouzoglou, and the Fornshell family.

To Stephen Duncombe who first floated the idea that a PhD was a great way to go to grad school for “free,” and Robert LaTowsky who first inspired me.

To Sam, Bettina, and Elena: I never guessed I would start this program with just one brother and end it with two amazing sisters. To my parents, Drs. Barbara and

Jonathan Sheline, thank you for raising me with the confidence that I could pull this off.

In submitting this dissertation, I join the proud ranks of the “Doctors Sheline,” although I am the only one devoted to the “long hard boring of hard boards.”

To my grandmother Yvonne, the first female Dr. Sheline.

And most importantly, to Daniel. Although you maintain that I could have done this without you, your love and unwavering belief in my abilities are all that got me through the tough patches.

vi Abstract of Dissertation

Branding Islam: The Strategic Use of Official Religious Discourse

What explains variation in the resonance of religious messaging produced by the state, or official religious discourse? In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region), official religious discourse is often assumed to lack credibility, due to the authoritarian character of many Middle Eastern states. As a result, scholars interested in these societies’ religious views tend to focus on the activities and ideologies of Islamist groups, seeing them as a more accurate reflection of public religious sentiment. However, such perspectives overlook the ways in which state institutions shape the religious arena.

Islam has interacted with state structures since its earliest expression and throughout its history. In the contemporary Middle East, the state exerts control over institutions of religious education, oversees the training of would-be religious actors, and regulates religious spaces. I add to existing scholarship by proposing an explanation for variation in the credibility, or resonance, of official religious discourse.

My research combines two areas of scholarship to explain this observed variation, nation-building and framing theory. Scholars of nation-building have long studied the processes through which political elites inculcate a shared sense of identity; however, such work has less frequently focused on Islam as a key component of national identity.

Framing theory has typically been used to study social movements, specifically how articulating a call to action in a specific way can encourage bottom-up participation; I use framing theory to evaluate top-down dynamics, considering how different forms of state discourse can produce different levels of resonance.

vii Drawing on data collected during nine months of fieldwork in three Arab monarchies, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, I examine how political elites sought to disseminate a specific form of religious discourse using the nation-building toolkit, and the extent to which contemporary religious discourse corresponds to that established during the foundational period. Sermons, textbooks, and archival materials provide the content of official religious discourse, while interviews offer insights into the extent to which official Islam resonates with key populations, including religious bureaucrats, educators, students, and diplomats.

I assert that the form of official religious discourse established during the nation- building process has path dependent effects on subsequent efforts to use state control of religious discourse. I focus in particular on political elites’ choice to articulate official

Islam in either national or universal terms. I find that, despite the general assumption that religion transcends geographic boundaries, framing official Islam as grounded in locally specific heritage is more likely to evoke resonance than framing official Islam in universalistic terms. In addition, if a form of religious discourse is seen as subject to foreign influence, it is more likely to be rejected.

These findings have implications for political elites seeking to influence their populations’ religious identity, especially for the purpose of combatting extremism and building support for the regime. Foreign actors that wish to discourage intolerance should avoid contributing to the perception of foreign meddling. Influencing religious messaging requires a generational timescale, and is ill-suited to the short-term game of politics.

viii Table of Contents

Dedication...... iv Acknowledgments...... v Abstract of Dissertation...... vii Note on transliterations...... x Chapter 1: Defining Official Islam...... 1 Chapter 2: Creating Official Islam...... 56 Chapter 3: Teaching Official Islam...... 114 Chapter 4: Preaching Official Islam...... 161 Chapter 5: Exporting Official Islam...... 214 Chapter 6: Regretting Official Islam? ...... 247 References...... 278

ix Note on Transliterations

In general, transliterations follow the guidance of the International Journal of

Middle East Studies (IJMES). In keeping with the IJMES style guide, if a common spelling exists in English for an Arabic word, that spelling is given. This is particularly true for names of individuals, places, and other proper nouns. For example, Abdullah instead of ʿAbdullah.

If IJMES provides more than one spelling of a transliteration, sometimes the transliterated spelling of the word is provided before the more common English spelling is given in subsequent use of the word. I adopt an alternative spelling for certain words.

For example, in order to distinguish the name of the ruling Moroccan dynasty from the minority religious group in Syria, the Moroccan monarchs are referred to as Alaouites, while the minority are referred to as ʿAlawites, in keeping with the IJMES style guide.

Chapter 1: Defining Official Islam

I. Introduction

My dissertation examines whether political elites can shape religious discourse and what happens when they try. I analyze the state-led construction of discourses1 about heritage, national identity, and religious identity, establishing the processes through which they are produced, as well as how state-led discourses are viewed by those charged with disseminating them. Focusing on contexts where the production of religious discourse is a core state activity, the study evaluates how political elites promote an image of religious authority, and the extent to which state-produced religious discourse is either reproduced or challenged.

In contexts where the state’s duties include the promotion of religion, religious production is standardized. When bureaucratic structures reproduce cultural symbols, the products are simulacra of the originals on which they were based due to their homogenized and centralized mode of production by the state. The daily act of buying in to a national religious identity does not necessarily signal genuine belief, but rather a willingness to play along. Yet if state institutions fail to recreate the symbols of shared nationhood that citizens recognize, or failed to establish them in the first place through the process of inculcating a shared notion of membership in a national community, a latter-day claim to authentic cultural production is unlikely to attract adherents. The act of either reproducing or

1 I draw on the Foucauldian definition of discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak,” see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972) 49. Foucault later uses the phrase “regime of truth” to describe a corpus of knowledge; see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York, Pantheon Books, 1977) 30. By drawing on the Foucauldian conception I emphasize the discursive actions of the state as manifestations of power.

1 challenging official discourse is carried out more as a social act than a personal act, and both choices respond to the religious content produced by state institutions.2

The study focuses on two areas of analysis: the choices made by political elites when performing standardized religion, and the extent to which this performance is either challenged or reproduced. The method of analysis highlights the views of religious bureaucrats – individuals employed by religious institutions controlled by the state – focusing on their perceptions of official religious discourse. Religious bureaucrats are responsible for disseminating official religion to the broader population. Focusing on these individuals, the middlemen of the state’s discursive sales pitch, offers an in-depth look at how state employees interact with and view the discourses they are charged with promoting. By focusing on this population, my dissertation offers a clearer perspective on the mechanics of how political elites’ desired messages may be transformed in the process of transmission. In order to contextualize the perspectives of religious bureaucrats, the study evaluates how students, journalists, experts, and members of opposition groups view official religious discourse: these individuals are referred to collectively as “non- bureaucrats.”3

I do not claim to evaluate individuals’ private beliefs. Verifying an interviewee’s

2 My conceptualization of performance draws on that articulated by Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Random House, 1956), in which he emphasizes the conscious presentation of specific aspects of the self as a constant aspect of engagement in social life. My conception also draws on Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), although Butler focuses on the constitutive power of performance as related to gender, whereas I relate performance to the reification of state power, similar to that of Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetorics, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). For a useful discussion of different theories of performance, see, e.g., Edward Schieffelin, “Problematizing Performance” in Ritual, Performance, Media, Felicia Hughes-Freeland, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998). 3 In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish bureaucrats from non-bureaucrats, due to the extent of state penetration into, and control over, civil society. A respondent was designated a “non- bureaucrat” if they were not employed by the state at the time of interaction.

2 privately held convictions and preferences is less relevant to the object of analysis. Instead

I focus on which kinds of official religious discourses are repeated, and which are contested. Interviews with both bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats generate data regarding these individuals’ inclination to parrot or challenge official state discourse about religion, revealing the extent to which state institutions have presented these discourses in a manner compatible with individuals’ existing beliefs.

My dissertation draws on two fields within political science that have theorized the ways in which political elites seek to inculcate their desired discursive interpretations: scholarship on nation-building and frame analysis. By nation-building, I refer specifically to long-term state-led efforts to encourage the target population to adopt a collective identity and a sense of shared history.4 Frame analysis tends to highlight the short-term effects of strategically choosing language to influence public opinion. I derive insights from both areas of scholarship, applying them to the state-led construction of, and claims to, religious authority.

Scholars of nationalism have long analyzed the various means by which political peoples are constituted, however religious identity is less typically viewed from a nationalist perspective, and is more often noted for its capacity to transcend national boundaries than be limited by them. Yet in contexts where the state seeks to establish a monopoly over the legitimate expression of religious discourse, religion bears the marks of state influence and as a result, takes on a national character.

4 My definition of nation-building stresses the agentic capacity of state institutions wielded by political elites to inculcate a desired identity among the population of a specific territory, and relies primarily on the following works: Harris Mylonas, Politics of Nation building: Making Co- nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

3 Framing is loosely defined as “a political process by which actors, such as state elites, seek to impose their definition of a political reality.”5 Scholarship on framing explains how a given social actor uses a frame to encourage audiences to adopt a preferred viewpoint and act accordingly; however there has been relatively little study of the overlap between the processes of nation-building, which play out over the course of generations, and the processes of framing, which have more typically been analyzed for their short-term effects. Yet nation-building can be seen as the process of erecting the frames through which the population of a given nation-state understands its history and heritage, the shared points of cultural resonance that allow for a persistent sense of shared national identity. Culturally resonant frames are built through the nation-building process.

Much of the existing scholarship on framing is based on analysis of democratic contexts; in societies where voters can alter the contours of political power, elites have an interest in shaping their views. In non-democratic contexts election results are less significant, but the views of the public remain a core concern of leaders eager to avoid popular protest. Scholarship on framing highlights the credibility of the framer as a causal factor in the success of a given frame. When non-democratic political elites frame religious discourse, they contend with suspicion that their motives are driven by considerations other than faithfulness to religious tenets. I focus on how non-democratic political elites try to encourage both domestic and international audiences to buy in to their religious authority, itself a construct of the nation-building process, and what influences the extent to which

5 I rely here on the definition of framing offered by Cedric Jourde, “The International Relations of Small Neo-Authoritarian States: Islamism, Warlordism, and the Framing of Stability,” International Studies Quarterly (2007) 51, 481–503. The concept of framing was developed by sociologist Erving Goffman in Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and primarily theorized for its application to social movements.

4 these audiences are willing to reproduce these constructions.

A defining characteristic that helps to delimit my universe of cases is the focus on state-produced Islamic discourses. The religion of Islam has been subject to heightened scrutiny, critique, and pressure in recent decades. This scrutiny shapes the dynamics between claims of religious authority made by political elites, and the likelihood of these discourses’ reproduction or contestation, in ways specific to claims made about Islamic authority.

Relatedly, the universe of cases is limited to “officially-Islamic” contexts, or states where the constitution defines Islam as the official religion. Out of the 42 countries that have an official religion, 25 designate Islam. In officially-Islamic countries, the promotion of religion is viewed as a core state activity: the state produces religious curricula for public schools, trains and licenses clerics, and controls mosques. Although the extent to which religious institutions and actors can operate independently of state oversight varies within this universe of cases, given the shared characteristic of state oversight of religious institutions, differing institutional arrangements do not exhibit a significant causal effect within this universe of cases. The designation of officially-Islamic is a modern phenomenon that accompanied the spread of European models of bureaucratic-legal governance characterized by direct rule6 to polities where political elites had not previously had access to the administrative and coercive capacities of the modern state.

“Official religious discourse” refers to religious content produced by state actors and institutions. Official religious discourse is neither hegemonic nor uniform, but in the context of an officially-Islamic state, it exerts a perceivable influence upon religious

6 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 28.

5 expression. The research examines the ways in which official Islam can differ by country, and seeks to evaluate how various expressions of state Islam are viewed by inhabitants, specifically by the individuals charged with disseminating official religious discourse: clerics, religious scholars, and bureaucrats working for the government departments responsible for producing and enforcing official Islam.7

Islamic institutions of religious authority historically maintained a relationship with state structures. When previously independent religious institutions became integrated into the state, these institutions’ capacity to serve as a counter balance to the decisions of political elites was eroded. The incorporation of previously independent religious endowments into state institutions during the process of nation-building fundamentally altered both religion and state in the process. Nation-building, often initiated under the influence of European models or direct colonization, took on the features of European states, yet also incorporated aspects of Islamic law, most often in the realm of family law. Islam was integrated into the national identity of these new state- nations.8

Official Islam reflects the top-down homogenization that tends to characterize state-led discursive projects. Institutions of official Islam were made to serve the agendas of political elites, but simultaneously inspired the loyalty of inhabitants as a result of nation-building. In the contemporary context, the increase in literacy and the transmission of religious ideas through cassettes, satellite television, and eventually the internet and

7 My conception of official Islam draws on the methodology and perspective employed by Laurie Brand, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), as well as 8 Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).

6 social media have broken the grip of traditional sources of religious authority. Religious bureaucrats compete with alternative sources of religious authority that transcend state boundaries.

When evaluating the ways in which political elites compete to assert their religious authority, the concept of “branding” offers a useful heuristic. The association between branding, competition, and consumption reduces the potential inclination to buy in to state claims to promote “authentic” expressions of religious heritage, and serves as a reminder of the commodification of authenticity.9 Political elites in officially-Islamic contexts use the nation-builders’ toolkit, including public education, state control of religion, and the media, to produce a form of Islam disseminated across the state’s territory and in international messaging that competes with non-state forms of Islam. Despite claims to authenticity, locally distinct traditions are erased in the production of a standardized state form of Islam, as the process of creating a single unified national discourse inevitably homogenizes. Although certain aspects of official religious discourse are grounded in local tradition, referring to the discourse at large as a brand highlights its underlying purpose of attracting consumers while competing with alternative brands/interpretations.

I approach both national and religious identity with a constructivist lens. I begin by tracing the path-dependent processes that established the parameters of official religious discourse in different officially-Islamic contexts during the period of nation-building in the early and mid 20th century. Then I focus on the early 21st century, a context characterized by concerns about so-called religious extremism that have heightened the stakes for

9 See, e.g., Lisa Breglia, Monumental Ambivalence: The Politics of Heritage (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), and John and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity Inc. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

7 asserting religious authority. I examine how political elites have sought to export their brand of official religious discourse abroad, specifically for the purpose of establishing a reputation as a useful security partner in counter-extremism efforts. I highlight the relative ease with which political elites can export their preferred brand of Islam abroad, in contrast to the challenges inherent in domestic transmission that relies on religious bureaucrats, who can choose the extent to which they express religious and political views that reflect the official line.

I then shift from the international to the domestic and examine the content of official religious discourse and the ways in which it is disseminated, focusing on educational institutions as a primary means of establishing the content of the Islamic narrative preferred by political elites. Subsequently, I analyze the perspectives of individuals charged with disseminating official religious discourse: clerics, religious scholars, and bureaucrats responsible for producing and enforcing official Islam.

Analyzing statements made by these mid- and high-level regime officials, specifically their willingness to perform official religious discourse, offers a means of evaluating how such discourses are viewed. In contrast to analyses where state actions are treated unproblematically, I examine the ways in which top-down discursive projects are transformed in the process of transmission. Finally, I consider the unintended implications of the standardization of religious discourse by the state, specifically the potential undermining of the religious authority that political elites sought to cultivate in the first place.

Official Islam has been relatively overlooked in the academic literature due to its perceived lack of credibility; scholars have tended to focus on Islamist groups as expressing

8 popular views on religion,10 due in part to their electoral successes.11 However, independent or non-state forms of Islam exist within a national context shaped by centuries of interaction between religion and state. Islam has always interacted with state institutions, having been fused with the political and territorial realities of its earliest practitioners. Both the Qur’an and hadith call for adherents to “enjoin good and forbid evil,” and this task was seen as a core responsibility of pre-modern governing institutions.12 Furthermore, rulers have sought throughout history to use religion to bolster their influence and legitimacy, and Islamic leaders are no exception.

The dissertation asserts that contemporary expressions of Islam are more usefully understood through the prism of the modern state and the agendas of political elites than by seeking to establish a causal relationship between the behavior of contemporary actors and early religious texts. While these actors may themselves view their behaviors as based on foundational Islamic texts, their interpretations are indelibly shaped by the ways in which the organs of the modern nation-state have articulated Islam.

I focus this project on the historical period since the establishment of the modern

10 See, e.g., Hrair Dekmejian, “The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict & the Search for Islamic Alternatives," Middle East Journal 34, no. 1: 1-12; Nikki Keddie, “The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do Fundamentalisms’ Appear?” Comparative Studies of Society and History, 40, no. 4 (1998): 696– 723; Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (New York: Routledge, 2007); Oded Haklai, “Authoritarianism & Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Research & Theory Building in the 21st Century,” International Studies Review, 11 (2009): 27-45. 11 See, e.g., John Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, [1984] 1998); Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1996] 2004); Carrie Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Tarek Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 12 Several Qur’anic verses convey the notion of encouraging good and preventing evil, such as Sura 3:104 which states “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.”

9 nation-state, a period characterized by the centralization and standardization of governance.13 During the “foundational period” of early modern nation-building, state power expanded significantly, including the state’s capacity to influence the views of its population. By gaining the capacity to count, educate, conscript, and tax, state structures rendered their populations legible, simultaneously gaining the capacity to mobilize them as citizens of a nation. In the context of modernity, state institutions actively shape individuals’ identities into those of citizens; in the context of a modern officially-Islamic state, these institutions mold and influence individuals’ religious identities such that religious belief becomes an aspect of membership in the nation. The project of constructing national identity relies on mechanisms of public engagement wielded by the political elites at the helm of state institutions, specifically pertaining to practices such as education, commemoration, and celebration. In officially-Islamic contexts, state religious institutions are among the tools at the disposal of political elites to disseminate the desired national religious identity. Due to the parallels between the construction and dissemination of national identity and that of religious identity in officially-Islamic contexts, the research draws from the scholarly literature on nationalism, particularly pertaining to the elite-led construction of national identity.14 I examine the production of national Islam during the process of nation-building (Chapter 2), the domestic production of official religious

13 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 28; Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas, “Threats to Territorial Integrity, National Mass Schooling, and Linguistic Commonality” Comparative Political Studies, 49, no. 11 (2016): 1446-1479. 14 See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992 [1983]); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keith Darden and Anna Gryzmala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, Communist Collapse,” World Politics, 59, no. 1 (2006): 83-115; Keith Darden, Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties (Cambridge, Forthcoming).

10 discourse through educational institutions (Chapter 3), and religious institutions (Chapter

4), the dissemination of official religious discourse internationally (Chapter 5), and finally consider the unintended consequences of the homogenization of religion in an effort to monopolize the legitimate production of legitimate religious discourse (Chapter 6).

My dissertation has both theoretical and practical implications. On the level of theory building, I derive insights from scholarship on the mechanisms of top-down identity construction employed in the process of nation-building and apply them to the articulation of a national religious identity for the purpose of highlighting the ways in which modern forms of education and the transmission of knowledge have influenced religious ideas and identities. My intention here is to highlight the strategic use of religious identity by political elites, both in an effort to drum up domestic support and to elevate their international standing. This generates several practical implications, specifically in the context of concerns regarding religious extremism and violence, and the making of international security alliances on the basis of strategic claims. Interrogating the claims of specific discourses regarding the causal effects of heritage, national, and religious identity allows us to more effectively challenge the essentialized thinking that political elites often successfully manipulate for the purposes of power consolidation.

II. Argument

Having established the broad scope conditions of my research (nation-states that adopt Islam as an official state religion), the inquiry evaluates the willingness of specific individuals to reproduce official religious discourse. The argument centers on the likelihood that official discourse will be reproduced or challenged as reflecting the extent

11 to which the discourse resonates with a given individual’s existing ideas about religion.

If the individual is a religious bureaucrat, his or her willingness to reproduce the state’s religious language indicates his or her participation in the production of state power: these individuals are both more likely to repeat official religious discourse due to their dependence on state institutions for employment, and more potentially vulnerable to accusations of betraying the religion and the personal requirements of faith, due to their public position. The tension inherent in their incentives to maintain both roles simultaneously makes analysis of their discursive practices particularly useful for evaluating the pervasiveness of the state’s religious narrative in a given national context.

Because resonance adheres at the level of individual experience, I evaluate resonance using interviews, focusing on key members of the religious establishment. My dissertation is a work of theory building; future application of the theory could potentially seek to exhaustively test the argument through national level surveys, although the collection of massive amounts of data would lack the interpretivist edge provided by face to face interaction. Still, testing the theory with a much larger N would allow for the establishment of a “threshold of resonance” among the population more broadly, rather than focusing on influential figures within the religious establishment as particularly visible indicators of resonance.

While the concept of “resonance” is long established in sociological research,15 and most typically employed by political scientists to evaluate social movements, resonance in

15 For an early theorization of resonance see, e.g., Robert Benford and David Snow, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research, 1 (1988): 197-217. See also their review article on framing scholarship, Robert Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000): 611-639.

12 my usage refers to the extent to which a given discourse is experienced as corresponding to what an individual recognizes as familiar and generally accepted within a given social setting. Note that resonance does not necessarily correspond to an individual’s beliefs, but instead reflects what the individual recognizes as a prevalent narrative. I focus on how political elites seek to use ideas about national identity and religion established during the process of nation-building to frame official religious discourse in the contemporary context; when the contemporary frames resonate with those established during the process of nation-building, official religious discourse is more likely to be reproduced rather than challenged.

I analyze the extent to which both religious bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats are willing to reproduce the state’s preferred articulation of religion. I view this willingness as reflecting an individual’s experience of resonance, which I define as the match between an individual’s expressed views and the position established by official religious discourse.

The concept of resonance has been most thoroughly developed by social movement theorists in the context of evaluating the effectiveness of a given frame to inspire social action. In their influential article on framing, Benford and Snow identified “four sets of factors concerned with the conditions that affect framing efforts,” including “the cycle of protest in which the movement is embedded,” a signal that their theorization of frame resonance is deeply embedded in their focus on social movements.16 The concept of frame resonance offers a means of evaluating state-led discourses as well, although the specific dynamics at play when a frame is used by an authoritarian state have been under-theorized.

Theorists have sought to overcome conceiving of resonance as inherent to a given

16 Robert Benford and David Snow, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” (1988): 198.

13 frame or cultural object, and instead to think of it as an “emergent collective act” that reflects the importance of an individual’s evaluation of other people’s reactions to a given frame.17 McDonnell, Bail and Tavory emphasize the interactional aspect of resonance, and their analysis is relevant to thinking about the ways in which individuals look to each other for signals of how and when to act, and who and what to believe.18 In the context of performing or challenging official religious discourse, interviewees’ responses indicated the influence of others’ opinions. The dynamics might appear similar to the act of preference falsification,19 but instead of pretending to support an authoritarian regime, individuals are aware of the collective project of performing a state’s religious authority.20

Unlike in preference falsification, they are aware that others’ actions are performative.

Within political science, analysis of framing effects tends to focus on how different frames can influence voters’ opinions. Chong and Druckman acknowledge a fruitful area for future research with the observation that “A number of studies have examined the effectiveness of different kinds of appeals on particular subjects without drawing conclusions about the elements common to persuasive frames.”21 My dissertation identifies one element common to persuasive frames employed by non-democratic state institutions about religious discourse: the leverage of culturally resonant frames established through nation-building, or the process of establishing a shared set of ideas about the heritage and

17 Herbert Blumber, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969). 18 Terence McDonnell, Christopher Bail, and Iddo Tavory, “A Theory of Resonance,” Sociological Theory 35, no. 1 (March 2017): 1-14. 19 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 20 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetorics, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 21 Dennis Chong and James Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science, 10 (2007): 117.

14 identities common to a territorially-defined group.

To clarify, I do not wish to imply that religious discourse freezes, after which it can never be altered.22 However similar to the inculcation of a shared sense of what membership in a nation entails, an official religious discourse becomes sticky. Literacy, made possible through the mass education provided by the modern state, engenders shared forms of knowledge and shared understandings of identity. In some contexts, the state inculcates a shared sense of the nation; in contexts where a specific form of religious belief is spread using the same channels as those used to disseminate national identity, this understanding of religion functions similarly as national identity, and becomes similarly resistant to change.23 In officially Islamic contexts, sensitivity to perceived foreign manipulation of religion further complicates potential efforts to alter official religious discourse, as such efforts are viewed with suspicion.24

My dissertation operates on the understanding that an individual’s existing religious identity is constructed from a combination of factors, including state religious education, familial traditions, individual spiritual experiences, and many other possible influences.

This construction, which an individual may perceive as a deeply rooted component of their identity, is partly shaped by external influences and possibly subject to change. However, the notion of resonance posits that certain frames will be experienced by a given individual

22 For the classic example of a freezing hypothesis, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (Toronto: The Free Press, 1967). 23 For the full version of the relationship between national identity, mass literacy, and nationalist schooling, see Keith Darden, Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties (Cambridge, Forthcoming). 24 See, e.g., Michael Hechter, Alien Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Adria Lawrence, Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

15 as corresponding to the existing ideas that they know are dominant in society. Individuals are more likely to accept discourses that correspond to these commonly held frames, whereas discourses that do not correspond to that which is seen as “common knowledge” may be viewed as intended to manipulate and therefore are more likely be resisted. In other words, when religious messaging resonates with what an individual recognizes as a nationally shared religious identity, she or he is more likely to be willing to reproduce the messaging, but if it does not resonate, the individual will be more likely to challenge it.

The state can influence what is publically known, but cannot control all of it. In general, the process of establishing the parameters of what is accepted as historically true requires several generations of time and a hegemonic level of control that eludes most state structures. In addition, the successful imposition of top-down identities builds on existing identities.25 As a result, even if a state theoretically began the process of establishing its preferred version of religious discourse at the earliest possible opportunity, i.e., the attainment of the instruments of the modern state and specifically mass education, certain aspects of common knowledge would always elude control.

The research findings demonstrate that resonance correlates with how Islam is articulated as related to the nation itself. I posit that political elites can select different strategies when seeking to project an aura of religious authority. The research highlights two of these strategies: claims made on the basis of orthodoxy or correctness,26 and claims made on the basis of adherence to tradition. Claims to orthodoxy/correctness require that

25 Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 26 For a discussion of orthodoxy versus orthopraxy in Islamic contexts, see, e.g., Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 25.

16 the claimsmaker possess the authority to speak on behalf of the religion at large; in contrast, claims of tradition are grounded in local heritage, and build on the claimsmaker’s origin matching that of the tradition for which he speaks. The assertion of correctness is more typically established with reference to core religious texts, whereas perceived adherence to tradition can be established through the process of nation-building.

Claims to speak for correct Islam as opposed to traditional Islam can be construed as lying along a spectrum. In any given expression of official Islam, claims from both ends of the spectrum may be made; however, the majority of claims in a given context tend to fall on one end or the other. On one end of the spectrum, correct Islam is posited as having the authority to speak for a universal vision of true Islam, and to demarcate which forms of the religion are incorrect. In contrast, traditional Islam is articulated as specific to a given national context. By connecting religious expression to local heritage, history, and geography, authority is claimed on the basis of authenticity in a manner that echoes other invented traditions common to nation-building strategies.27

Regarding the articulation of official religious discourse in more universal/correct terms or in more national/traditional terms, respondents were asked to explain if and how religious identity in their country was distinct. In contexts characterized by more universalistic or orthodox religious discourse, respondents tended to reject the idea of articulating how religion in their country was distinct, whereas in contexts characterized by more nationalistic or traditional religious discourse, respondents tended to be more comfortable with the idea of articulating a form of distinct national Islam.

To evaluate whether or not a given interlocutor viewed official religious discourse

27 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition (1983).

17 as resonating with their existing religious identity and ideas, interviewees were asked to describe official Islam, to explain whether or not they felt that official Islam reflected their own views, and if not, to describe the inconsistencies between their views and those present in official religious discourse. If an individual articulated official religious discourse, and agreed that it matched their views, and used their own words to articulate how official religious discourse reflected their religious identity, I considered the individual to exhibit resonance. If the individual challenged official religious discourse, this demonstrated a lack of resonance. Resonance does not necessarily correspond to the individual’s private beliefs, but to their willingness to reproduce state discourse, as a result of their awareness of others’ views on state discourse.

By focusing on interviewees’ willingness to reproduce official religious discourse, the study accounts for potential reluctance to discuss topics as sensitive as religion, official discourse, and the authority of rulers. Religious bureaucrats might reproduce official discourses regardless of their own private views, especially individuals with a higher status in the religious bureaucracy. However, religious bureaucrats are also aware of the potential blow to their own credibility if they parrot discourses that do not correspond to the views of their co-nationals.28 Analysis of an interviewee’s willingness to either reproduce or challenge official discourse reflected that individual’s membership in a specific group: a lack of resonance was particularly evident if a high-ranking member of the religious bureaucracy challenged official religious discourse, as members of this group were usually likely to reproduce the state’s position. Relatedly, if a member of an Islamist opposition

28 Religious bureaucrats have been shown to challenge official discourse as a means of establishing their own credibility, see, e.g. Richard Nielsen, Deadly Clerics: Blocked Ambition and the Path to Jihad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

18 group reproduced official religious discourse, this was interpreted as a strong signal of resonance, as these individuals were typically more likely to reject or challenge official

Islam.

In addition to the study’s focus on controversial subjects, the responses interviewees were willing to express were influenced by my identity as a non-Muslim, a foreigner, and a female. Although my identity cannot be separated from the data collected, the manifestation of variation between the willingness of religious bureaucrats to reproduce state discourses in one national context as opposed to another indicates that my identity was not determinative of the discourses respondents articulated.

Although Chapter 5 focuses explicitly on those aspects of official discourse that the state exports abroad, the data in Chapters 3 and 4, where my interlocutors articulate and comment on educational and religious discourses, can also be seen as directed externally, due to my identity as a foreigner. The impossibility of separating the effect I had on the data I gathered reinforces my characterization of the production of official religious discourse that I observed as performative. For example, both bureaucrats and non- bureaucrats expressed eagerness to disassociate Islam from violence, and most interviews would not proceed until the interviewee felt assured that they had made this point clear.

Their behavior reflects that of internationally directed state discourse, where the first discursive task is often to disavow any link between Islam and violence. My interlocutors’ impulse to reproduce this on the interpersonal scale corresponds to state practice. I observed the performative aspect of externally directed official religious discourse at all levels of the study, from the construction of religious authority through nation-building, to the signaling of commitment to the international security agenda through educational

19 reform, to conversations with religious bureaucrats as well as non-bureaucrats about their views on official discourse, and most obviously in analysis of the export of religious discourse. Performance permeates official Islam, and in the context of concerns about a perceived link between Islam and violence, it shapes articulations of Islam produced for non-Muslims.

Frame analysis can sometimes suffer from tautological explanations, wherein the most resonant frames are successful because they are the most resonant. I avoid circuitous logic by evaluating contexts in which the resonance of official religious discourse varies. Studying contexts where religious discourse does not resonate and comparing these to contexts where such discourse does resonate allows for the analysis of the key causal factors at work. By employing a most similar systems approach, the research design reduces the possibility that this variation is the result of other possible causes.

The relationship I examine between certain national expressions of official Islam, and the likelihood that official Islam resonates with existing religious frames, is specific to the contemporary context of heightened anxieties and sensitivities about control over

Islamic discourse. Assumptions about the causal effect of religion breed anxieties about the need to alter Islamic discourse. Powerful non-Muslim political entities often treat Islam with suspicion on the basis of a perceived link between Islam and violence. Because

Muslim populations are aware of this (mis)perception, any efforts to influence or otherwise alter official Islam are subject to heightened domestic scrutiny.

Given this increased attention from both international and domestic audiences, as well as concerns about the possibility of instability or violence, political elites in officially-

20 Islamic contexts are incentivized to use state control of religious institutions to influence official religious discourse. Due to the difference between the views of the international and domestic audiences, political elites must play a two-level game: portray official religion as nonthreatening to powerful international actors, while also assuage domestic concerns that Islam is accused of contributing to violence, and that official religious discourse is subject to foreign manipulation.

In response to concerns from the international environment, a frame adopted by political elites in many officially-Islamic countries has been the articulation of so-called

“moderate” Islam. The utility and ubiquity of the term lies in its lack of a fixed meaning.

In the late 20th century, for example, the idea of moderate Islam sometimes referred to a willingness to engage with Israel29 or to participate in the democratic process.30 After 2001, the term became more commonly associated with the renunciation of violence. Although the meaning of the term is contextually dependent,31 political elites in many officially-

Islamic contexts make claims about promoting moderate Islam as a means of countering violent extremism, and signaling their contribution to the counter-terror international security agenda.

The concept of framing is useful for articulating the different content of messages directed domestically, as opposed to those that target an international audience. For example, the idea of “moderate Islam” is a frame that resonates with non-Muslim audiences that perceive a potential link between Islam and violence, such that the modifier of

29 Stacey Gutkowski, “We are the Very Model of a Moderate Muslim State: The Amman Message and Jordan’s Foreign Policy,” International Relations (2015): 1-21. 30 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 31 Murat Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics, a Country’s ‘Centre,’ and Democratization,” Democratization, 21, no. 2, (2014): 244–67.

21 “moderate” is necessary in order to render Islam non-threatening. Whereas for many

Muslim audiences, the idea of moderate Islam is unnecessary and insulting, as the concept conveys the assumption that Islam is in need of moderation or alteration, a premise that the majority of Muslims reject. Other resistance arises in response to perceived government meddling with religion, especially as a result of foreign, specifically European and

American, influence.

Variation exists in the extent to which political elites have been able to frame official religious discourse that satisfies both international and domestic audiences. When official religious discourse employs frames established as culturally resonant by the process of nation-building, the discourse resonates with the targeted population. Gathering relevant data has led me to conclude that one of the key aspects associated with higher resonance of official Islam is its articulation in nationally-specific terms. In contrast, evidence indicates that official religious discourse that makes claims on the basis of universality or correctness is less likely to resonate. I attribute this to the contextually specific dynamics between a constructed national Islamic identity, the agendas of political elites to appeal to both international and domestic audiences, and domestic resistance to perceived manipulation.

This finding that the promotion and articulation of moderate Islam in universalistic terms is less likely to resonate is somewhat surprising. Articulations of Islam, and religion in general, are often assumed to derive their potency from their perceived connection to metaphysical truths that transcend time and place. Yet I argue that because religious identity is partially a construct of the organs of the nation-state in officially-Islamic contexts, an individual’s experience of their religious identity is connected to their national

22 identity and mediated by official religious discourse. The nation-state has indelibly shaped religion and religious identities under these circumstances. Due to domestic anxieties about foreign manipulation, official religious discourse expressed as deeply grounded in local heritage is more likely to reassure domestic constituencies than broad claims of universality. If the nation-building process involved the articulation of a locally specific form of Islam, political elites will have an existing set of cultural resonant frames within which to situate their preferred official religious discourse.

In contrast, claims to speak on behalf of correct Islam must compete with those made by other powerful sources of transnational Islamic authority. For example, Saudi

Arabia uses its control of the two holiest cities of Islam, coupled with its considerable wealth, to actively export a form of Islam it asserts is the most correct expression of the religion. My argument regarding the ineffectiveness of universal forms of national Islam is predicated in part on the presence of Saudi Islam. Any form of official Islam that claims to represent the correct form of the religion competes with the powerful Saudi brand of religious discourse, which benefits from both material resources and first-mover advantage. The resonance of official religious discourse grounded in nationally specific language is also due in part to its ability to coexist with the near-hegemony of Saudi Islam.

The so-called Islamic State constitutes another example of a transnational source of religious authority. Although many Muslims reject the religious authenticity of the Islamic

State, or other groups that espouse violence in the name of Islam, the number of pious recruits signals that the group’s claims are religiously compelling to some.

The decision by political elites to articulate either a more universal/correct or a more traditional/national form of official Islam reflects the pressures and choices present

23 during the foundational period of nation-building; like many choices made during the foundational period, these choices exhibit path dependence. Because religious identity is a component of national identity in officially-Islamic contexts, scholarly expectations of national identity hold true for national religious identity. Similar to national identities, once approximately half the population achieves literacy as a result of state-led public education,32 the national religious identity becomes resistant to change. While political elites can use their control of the mouthpieces of official religion to try to influence religious messaging, the context of heightened scrutiny of Islamic discourse makes contemporary efforts to shift the content of religious discourse more difficult, as publics suspect foreign pressure.

Political elites control the mechanisms through which official Islam is disseminated, and can use them to alter its content, but the process, like that of nation- building, takes decades. If political elites try to alter the content of official religious discourse more rapidly, they are likely to experience resistance from the population, who may view the effort as an assault on their religious beliefs. While a national religious identity may be influenced by political elites in the first place, once that identity has been successfully disseminated through mass schooling and standardized religious messaging, it will be more likely to be experienced by individuals as connected to their own personal religious identities. Religious identity in a population is malleable and subject to change over time, yet if a population suspects that some aspect of their identity is targeted with manipulation, they are likely to resist, making top-down change more difficult. People

32 Keith Darden, Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties (Cambridge, forthcoming).

24 display particular sensitivity to perceived manipulation when they are aware of foreign pressure to alter their religion, a sensitivity that is heightened in the post 9/11 context.

Although political elites can try to shift the content of official religious discourse slowly, it is a long-term process ill-suited to the short-term demands of politics.

My analysis of the construction of religious identity in officially-Islamic contexts draws from scholarship on nationalism, where national identity is widely seen as constructed rather than primordial. With regard to Islamic religious identity, explanations for the behavior and views of devout individuals are frequently sought in historical religious texts (e.g. the Qur’an, hadith, 15th century fiqh manuals, etc.). Scholars would instead be better-served by looking to the processes and conditions present in the early and mid 20th centuries, when the “DNA” of national Islam was established. Constructivism has come to dominate scholarly views of national identity; adopting a fully constructivist approach to religious identity would permit a more nuanced understanding.

Furthermore, despite political elites controlling the construction and dissemination of official religious discourse, existing scholarly literature on the intersection between

Islam and politics has tended to focus on Islamist movements. The political success of

Islamist parties across different Muslim-majority contexts is often taken to indicate that their views reflect those held by the population more broadly. In contrast, the religious discourse produced by state institutions, “official Islam” is generally seen as less credible.

While the focus on Islamist groups has advanced scholarly understanding of these movements, the influence exerted by official Islam on religious discourse is also significant, such that scholars would do well to “bring the state back in” to enable more complete study of Islam and politics.

25 III. Scope Conditions, Methodology and Case Selection

The universe of cases where the argument outlined above is applicable are officially-Islamic states, or the 25 states whose constitution defines Islam as the official religion. In these contexts, the state is a key religious actor: it produces religious curricula for public schools, trains and authorizes clerics and other religious officials, and regulates religious spaces. I use the term “official religious discourse” to refer to verbal and textual content produced by state-affiliated religious actors and institutions. I use the word

“discourse” in part to emphasize the production of power inherent in a state-articulated form of religion. Describing national Islam as a “brand” emphasizes the intention of political elites to use official religious discourse to enhance their domestic credibility as well as their international reputation.

To develop and test my argument, I use case studies concerning the production of religious discourse. Like many concepts within social science, the effects of discourse are difficult to measure, and therefore meaningful comparison proves challenging. For this reason, comparative case studies offer a useful means of establishing analytic equivalence between different discourses for the purposes of achieving conceptual validity. When trying to evaluate the effects produced by a discourse, case studies permit me to explore the causal mechanisms at work.33 I use process tracing to establish the historical origins of a given official religious discourse. When making causal process observations, a case study is appropriate due to the depth of engagement with a single case.34

33 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 34 Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 2nd ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010); Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence.” Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (2006): 250-267.

26 Methodologically, process tracing allows me to explain why political elites selected specific elements to emphasize as a component of official religious discourse. Drawing on archival documents, textbooks, sermons, and government publications, I collect official religious discourse promoted as a component of nation-building in different national contexts. I compare this to data collected through interviews with members of the official religious establishment, including prayer leaders, preachers, state-trained female religious guides, teachers, and bureaucrats in religious and educational ministries. Their perspectives on official religious discourse offer insights into how individuals balance their own beliefs and convictions with the agenda of the state they serve. Interviews with Islamists, students, and experts offer perspective on the views of the government-affiliated interviewees. The evidence was gathered during nine months of fieldwork.

I evaluate three national contexts to determine how the official religious discourse was established during the foundational period, how it was reproduced in the contemporary period, and how it is presently viewed by the individuals responsible for disseminating it.

The country selection is based on a most-similar-systems design that compares two relatively similar units, and also includes analysis of an additional shadow case to demonstrates the argument’s ability to travel.

The two similar units are Morocco and Jordan. In Morocco, official religious discourse established during the process of nation-building emphasized a specifically

Moroccan form of Islam. In Jordan, official religious discourse emphasizes the universal religious authority of the Hashimite kings. I find that Moroccan official Islam has higher resonance and is generally seen as more credible than Jordanian official Islam. I consider the framing of Moroccan Islam in nationally specific terms to be a crucial component of

27 this resonance with representatives of official Islam, as well as segments of the general population.

Jordan and Morocco exhibit sufficient similarities as to allow for fruitful comparison, as both are monarchies and exhibit relatively similar levels of wealth,35 both experienced European colonization, and both the Jordanian and the Moroccan monarchies claim religious authority based on descent from the Prophet Muhammed. Existing studies have used the relative similarities between the two monarchies to conduct comparative analyses.36

The comparable criteria between Jordan and Morocco represent possible alternative explanations: a high level of per capita wealth could enhance the credibility of state- sponsored projects based on performance legitimacy, thus any argument pertaining to credibility requires that this possible explanation be mitigated. Jordan and Morocco’s relatively similar level of wealth means that the higher level of resonance observed in

Morocco is not likely due to the Moroccan government’s performance legitimacy, as the

Jordanian government enjoys no such credibility despite a comparable GPD per capita.

Morocco’s GDP per capita is in fact lower than Jordan’s, further demonstrating that

Moroccan religious officials do not buy in to official religious discourse as a result of higher satisfaction with government performance on the basis of wealth.

Relatedly, Jordan and Morocco both experienced European colonization. A

35 Although Jordan has a higher level of economic development measured by GDP per capital (According to the World Bank, in 2017 Morocco’s GDP/capita was ~$2,800, while Jordan’s was ~$4000), the presence of millions of refugees has strained the capacity of the Jordanian economy. 36 See, e.g., Dörthe Engelcke, “Processes of Family Law Reform: Legal and Societal Change and Continuity in Morocco and Jordan” (PhD diss., St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 2014); Sean Yom, From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

28 significantly different colonial experience could also alter the development of the national and religious identity, and so I sought cases with relatively similar colonial experiences.

The religious authority of the ruler is also significant with regard to potential universalistic framing of official Islam and must be controlled for, therefore the status of both the

Hashimite and ‘Alouite dynasties as descendants of the prophet Mohammad eliminates this possible alternative explanation.

Of the two monarchies, Jordanian official religious discourse falls on the universalistic end of the spectrum. The Hashimites claim the authority to speak on behalf of “true Islam,” and do not seek to promote a form of Islam grounded in a specifically

Jordanian identity. In contrast, the Moroccan monarchy constructed a religious discourse grounded in national heritage. Although these traditions were invented during the process of state- and nation-building, they are seen as authentic, and therefore achieve greater resonance, which I define as the match between individuals’ expressed views and the position established by official religious discourse. Because official religious identity is constructed and disseminated in the same manner as national identity, lessons from the construction of nationalism can help to explain the successful production of an official religion. I argue that in Jordan, the disconnect between national identity and religion contributes to the inability of the monarchy to convincingly assert its religious authority, whereas in Morocco, tying the official religious identity to the national identity contributes to the successful promotion of the monarchy’s religious authority.

To demonstrate that the argument can travel within the universe of cases, I selected a third monarchy: Oman, another context where the state encourages a discourse of religious toleration. Oman exhibits different characteristics, including a higher level of

29 wealth, an indirect form of colonization, and a ruling dynasty that does not claim religious authority. Evaluating the applicability of the argument in the Omani context demonstrates that it is not limited to the circumstances of Jordan and Morocco alone. While the dynamics of religious authority play out differently in republics than in monarchical contexts, I consider many of the points regarding the effects of official religious discourse to hold true in non-monarchical contexts, such as the Arab republics for example. Future research could evaluate the impact of a national versus universal framing of official Islam in non- monarchical contexts.

Because the study compares three different countries, no single country is analyzed with the level of detail that focusing on one country alone would permit; instead I derive insights from comparison. By observing similarities in the ways in which these three different monarchical systems produce religious discourse, the research systematically identifies areas of policy overlap. Variation in the level of observed resonance constitutes the study’s primary explanandum. Comparative analysis also allows for certain alternative explanations to be ruled out, as discussed in each chapter.

My findings have policy implications regarding the capacity of governments to manipulate religious discourse and identity. Despite claims by the governments of many officially Islamic states that the promotion of so-called “moderate Islam” will reduce the likelihood of religious extremism – such as by Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman of

Saudi Arabia – such initiatives require decades of sustained effort. Specifically regarding

Saudi Arabia’s claims, it is likely that the sudden change in religious discourse will be seen as motivated by foreign pressure and by the Saudi government’s need to attract foreign investment. I anticipate that the claims by Mohammed bin Salman to “return Saudi Arabia

30 to moderate Islam” will be rejected by Saudi society. If the House of Saud wished to alter the content of their official religious discourse, they would need to do so slowly and subtly, over a period of decades. States can shape their populations views, but it becomes more difficult after the foundational period. In the context of easy access to information as well as suspicion of foreign pressure, altering a religious discourse must be done in a way that carefully follows the contours of the existing conceptions of identity, heritage, and religious tradition.

IV. Building Block Concepts and Theoretical Contribution

The following section engages with some of the foundational works of scholarship on which my research builds. I first discuss political science’s relatively recent acknowledgment of the importance of religion. I think present some of the crucial scholarship on nation-building that shapes much of my approach to thinking about how officially-Islamic states engage with Islam. I outline some of the pitfalls scholars have identified when studying religion, especially Islam, focusing on the dangers of treating religion as a causal factor and on the historical biases that have shaped much discourse on

Islam. I then present contemporary scholarship on Islam and the state in the Middle East, specifically the works that most influenced my own approach. I finally engage briefly with key scholarship on framing and resonance, as these theories are crucial to my argument about how nation-building processes can explain variation in the resonance of official religious discourse.

31 Religion & Political Science

Religion and politics are co-constitutive forms of power. When posing the question,

“Do we need a political science of religion?” Kettell asserts that the discipline’s engagement with religion must focus on the “central core of political science (namely, the study of power).”37 The study uses processes related to the consolidation of power that have been analyzed by political science — including nation-building, the long-term effects of institutions, and strategies of power maintenance — to answer questions about religion.

To explain the forces shaping Islam requires an analysis of the relationship between religion, state capacity, national identity, and authoritarianism.

This is appropriate to the universe of cases where religion is in the purview of the state. For many Muslim citizens of these states, the fact that the state produces Islamic discourses for public consumption through religious and educational institutions is seen as both appropriate and desirable. This contrasts with assumptions common in Western

Europe and in the European diaspora about the inappropriateness and undesirability of contact between religion and the state. Due to the processes of colonial and post-colonial nation-building in many contexts in the MENA region, formerly independent religious institutions were incorporated into the state, which became responsible for the production of official religious discourse. Few citizens would argue for a total separation of religion and state, as this would be seen — and in cases where it was attempted, it often was seen

— as inauthentic and overly reminiscent of European secularism.38

37 Steven Kettell, “Do We Need a Political Science of Religion?” Political Studies Review 14, no. 2 (2016): 9. 38 Such cases include the imposition of secularization practices in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1920-1938), in Iran under Reza Shah (1925-1941) and Mohamed Reza Shah (1941- 1979), and in Tunisia under Habib Bourgiba (1956-1987). These societies continue to grapple with the effects of such policies.

32 In the contemporary context of enhanced state capacity characterized by direct rule, the modern state has a greater ability to shape religion than its premodern counterparts.

Therefore, although the use of religion by states to bolster their power is hardly new, it is fundamentally altered in the modern context. The core role of Islam in the national identities of officially-Islamic states reinforces the benefit of drawing upon the insights of scholars of nationalism. Comparativists have analyzed efforts by governments to impose identities and their related behavioral norms from the top down, through channels such as schools, religious organizations, and the media. These institutions are often associated with processes of nation-building, or cultivating a sense of shared national identity.39

Nation-building

The field of nationalism studies has dealt with narrative construction and deconstruction, the reification of categories that defy easy definition, and the processes through which identities are conjured, perpetuated, and institutionalized.40 I draw inspiration from this scholarship and use it heuristically to develop functional equivalence when studying the production of an official religious discourse. Within the universe of cases, or states that establish Islam as the official religion, religious identity is a component of national identity. However, because state institutions produce the official articulation of

39 Although some scholars of ethnic politics and nationalism maintain that identities are “primordial” this view has largely given way to the constructivist argument that national and ethnic identities are social constructions. Influential scholarship on government efforts to encourage identification with the government’s preferred national discourse include Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 80- 124; Kristin Fabbe, Disciples of the State: Religion and State Building in the Former Ottoman World (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming). 40 Kanchan Chandra, Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

33 both national identity and religious identity, regimes can use their control of state institutions to alter the articulations of both national and religious identities.41

Constructivist scholars of nationalism have offered different explanations for the mechanisms that can generate a shared sense of nationhood, including industrialization, the development of print capitalism, and colonial territorial boundaries.42 In contrast to this view of shared national identity as an unintended by-product, I draw on scholarship that highlights the ways that political elites encourage a sense of shared nationhood among a target population. Smith explains that a sense of shared identity is created through

“constrained, asymmetrical interactions between actual and would-be leaders of political communities and the potential constituents for whom they compete.”43 Hechter stresses the drive towards cultural homogenization brought about through the process of nation- building.44 Political elites are key to promoting a homogenized national identity, and in cases where it exists, a unified form of official religious discourse.

When political elites articulate a national identity, they tend to incorporate elements of existing identities or traditions. Hobsbawm and Ranger refer to the imagined historical continuity of a given aspect of state-led identity production as an invented tradition.45 Other

41 For change in the content of official national identities, see, e.g., Nadav Shelef, Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel 1924-2005, (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Şener Aktürk, Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 42 For the influence of industrialization on national identity, see, e.g. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For the effect of print capitalism, see, e.g., Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso Publishers, 1983). For the role of colonial boundaries, see, e.g., Daniel Posner, “The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Cleavages: The Case of Linguistic Divisions in Zambia,” Comparative Politics 35, no. 2 (2003): 127-146. 43 Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 32. 44 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, (2000). 45 Hobsbawm and Ranger define an invented tradition as, “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with

34 scholars also point to the importance of drawing on existing narratives. Smith asserts that what he calls “stories of peoplehood” must “always partly maintain and partly modify existing senses of political identity.”46 A national narrative or an official religious discourse that resonates with what a populace already finds salient is more likely to be successful than one that invents a tradition that has no connection to existing narratives, heritages, or identities. To refer to a tradition as invented does not imply that the heritage is fabricated, only that in constructing a coherent identity, political elites chose to highlight certain elements and ignore others, in service of a coherent narrative about the nation in question.

These scholars draw on a forefather of nationalism studies, Ernest Renan, who acknowledged in 1882 that nationalism requires that a people not remember their history, but forget it, as national unity requires the sacrifice of historical accuracy.47

Political elites typically disseminate national narratives through institutions.

Chandra uses the term “institutions of cognition,” to refer to “those institutions associated with the modern state which influence the cognitive frameworks that individuals accept as commonsensical.”48 For example, a census is an institution of cognition that shapes a population’s available conceptual frameworks for categories like ethnicity, gender, and marital status. Brubaker emphasizes the constitutive role of institutions in defining nationhood, observing that, “State apparatuses ‘nationalize’ their citizens more so than

the past.” Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition (1992 [1983]), 1. 46 Rogers Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, (2003), 54. 47 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” Text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on 11 March 1882, in Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992 (translated by Ethan Rundell). 48 Kanchan Chandra, Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

35 national movements.”49 Brubaker’s insights are particularly apt in contexts where national identity is primarily the result of elite-driven processes.

Educational institutions are considered particularly effective for instilling a sense of national identity. Based on the premise that, “schooling provides the one clear channel for the deliberate and systematic inculcation of a set of values,” Darden and Gryzmala-

Busse identify a link between literacy, education with nationalist content, and national loyalty.50 Their findings speak to the crucial role played by educational institutions for inculcating a sense of national identification. Scholars of nation-building have placed particular focus on educational institutions and official statements by national leaders to determine the content of official national narratives. I submit that when an official religion is present, these same institutions of cognition contribute to the production of the official religious identity, although they are joined by religious institutions controlled by the state.

Similar to the official national narrative, the official religious discourse in the cases I consider is a top-down construction, which may diverge from the lived religious identity of the population, which likely varies a great deal.

Nationalism as the product of modernity has informed my evaluation of the promotion of Official Islam as a facet of national identity.51 Relatedly, the contemporary state wields far greater power than the pre-modern state, and possesses the ability and

49 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25. 50 Keith Darden and Anna Gryzmala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, Communist Collapse” (2006), 90; Keith Darden, Resisting Occupation: Mass Schooling and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties. Cambridge, Forthcoming. 51 See, e.g. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Harris Mylonas, Politics of Nation building: Making Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

36 inclination to intervene in the lives of the populace.52 Therefore while the interaction between religion and state is not new, the terms of engagement are radically different under contemporary conditions characterized by powerful state structures.

Religion and Islam as Objects of Analysis

When studying nationalism or religion, the impact of modernity is often invoked, but for different reasons. Most scholars agree that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, and examine how processes associated with modernity, including industrialization, mass schooling, and direct rule facilitate national identification. In contrast, religion is frequently understood as being in opposition to modernity, which is often assumed to imply secularization, or the removal of religion from public life. Modernization theory includes a secularization component, which assumes that as societies modernize, religion will play a less prominent role. Secularization is unpopular in the universe of cases I define, but the association between modernity and secularism is strong enough to require unpacking.

The secularization thesis has been blamed for the lack of attention paid to religion by political science, generating calls for the field to incorporate studies of religion.53 The

52 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (2000). 53 Daniel Philpott, “Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007): 505-525; Daniel Philpott, "Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?" Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 183-202; Anna Gryzmala- Busse, “Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously,” Annual Review of Political Science, 15 (2012): 421-442; Harris Mylonas, “Revisiting the Link: Politicizing Religion in Democratic Countries” Harvard International Review, 34, no. 4 (2013). For the argument that religion should influence theories of Comparative Politics, see, e.g. Anthony Gill, “Religion and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 117-138; Eva Bellin. “Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics,” World Politics 60, no. 2 (2008): 315-347. For International Relations, see, e.g. Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Theorizing Religious Resurgence,” International Politics, 44 (2007): 647-665; Steven Fish, Francesa Jensenius, Katherine Michel, “Islam and Large-Scale Political Violence: Is There a Connection?” Comparative Political Studies 43 (2010): 1327-1362; Jack Snyder, ed. Religion and International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, God's

37 inaccuracy of the secularization thesis is evidenced by the persistent salience of religion in political and economic systems that would be characterized as “modern” by standards of economic and educational development. In response to the failure of expectations for secularization to materialize, Peter Berger, a key proponent of secularization theory in the

1960’s, acknowledged in 1999 that “the world is as furiously religious as it ever was.”54

The secularization thesis managed to sidestep this evidence through a conceptual sleight of hand; because the concept of modernity originally carried an assumption of secularization, it was assumed that the study of religion would be limited to historians.55

Political science is late to the study of religion, and therefore only recently discovering the questions with which other fields have already grappled. For example, scholars have long recognized that even the word “religion” is itself problematic, as its protean character has called into question the accuracy of this single word to apply to disparate practices across the span of human history and geography. The fact that many languages lack a word that translates to the English concept of religion further complicates efforts to theorize about it.56

Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011). Note that many comparativists had considered the impact of religion prior to the more widespread call for an enhanced focus on religion, such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (Toronto: The Free Press, 1967). For a critique of political science’s newfound interest in religion, see, e.g., Elizabeth Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 54 Peter Berger, ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington DC: Eerdmans/Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 2. 55 For a discussion of the failure of the secularization thesis, see, e.g., Gill, “Religion and Comparative Politics” (2001); Toft, Philpott, and Shah, God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (2011). Note however that although modernity has not had the effect on religiosity that the thesis predicted, populations with higher levels of wealth and education do tend to identify as less religious according to multiple studies, including the World Values Survey, as well as the Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism conducted by WIN-Gallup International in 2012. 56 For a discussion of the specific debate regarding the word “religion,” see, e.g, Timothy

38 The focus on religion as an object of analysis has been met with some skepticism, in particular the presumption that religion needed to be “rediscovered” as having social effects, as well as efforts to treat “it” as having a causal effect capable of measurement. For example, Hurd argues that, “Religion is too unstable a category to be treated as an isolable entity, whether the objective is to attempt to separate religion from law and politics or design a political response to ‘it.’”57 However she also acknowledges that, despite what may be an inaccurate depiction of an entity called “religion,” in order to critique it scholars must name it, and so participate in its reification. Hurd’s careful treatment of religion informs my engagement with discourses of toleration and moderation. In order to critique the discourse, it must first be invoked, but in a manner which highlights the discourse’s performative nature rather than treats it uncritically.

International demand for moderate Islam is driven by fears of its opposite, and the belief that “immoderate” Islam is the result of a misinterpretation of the religion, which in turn requires a religious solution. However, to treat religion as having a single causal factor is to ignore the vast array of behaviors and beliefs associated with a given religious tradition over time. Hurd questions the political effects of treating religion as a causal factor when she asks, “What are the implications of construing religion as an isolable entity and causal powerhouse in international relations?”58 She questions the uncritical promotion of

Fitzgerald, Religious Studies as an Ideology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Andrew McKinnon, “Sociological Definitions, Language Games and the ‘Essence' of Religion,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 14, no. 1 (2002): 61–83. For a more general treatment of the problematic use of the word “religion,” especially in the Middle East, see Jocelyne Cesari, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 57 Elizabeth Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 6. 58 Elizabeth Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion, (2015) 2.

39 religious freedom, and finds troubling consequences in the treatment of religion as having an isolable causal effect.

Misinterpretations and suspicions have long characterized the attitude of European

Christian populations towards Muslims. Scholars like Edward Said and Talal Asad problematize the construction of the “East” as the polar opposite of the “West.” As Said famously dissected in Orientalism, the identity of the “West” was constructed in opposition to the “East,” which was imagined as irrational, despotic, feminine/homosexual, and backward. Whereas the West was the opposite: rational, democratic, masculine/heterosexual, and committed to positivistic progress and technological advancement. The inferiority of the “East” justified its domination by the “West.” Hurd reiterates Said’s argument when she asserts that:

More than any other single religious or political tradition, Islam represents the “non-secular” in European and American political discourse… A laïcest and Judeo- Christian secular West has been consolidated in part through opposition to representations of an anti-modern, anti-Christian, and theocratic Islamic Middle East.59

She focuses specifically on the imagined threat of “political Islam,” a term coined in the

1970s as a phenomenon construed as opposing liberal values. Her analysis raises the counterfactual that had Islamist opposition activists belonged to a different religion, they might have been perceived as resisting authoritarian oppression, a tradition lionized by liberal thinkers, rather than feared as extremists.

Regarding the promotion of moderate Islam, the dissertation draws on scholarship that criticizes the alleged universality of the value of toleration. Brown asks, “How might liberal tolerance discourse function not only to anoint Western superiority but also to

59 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7.

40 legitimate Western cultural and political imperialism?”60 Brown focuses on how discourses of toleration privilege the West, while I extend her analysis to consider how authoritarian rulers draw on the power of Western norms to bolster their own positions.

The argument’s theoretical foundation seeks to counter essentialized treatments of religion, keeping in mind Asad’s assertion that, “one’s conception of religion determines the kinds of questions one thinks are askable and worth asking.”61 Asad reminds scholars of the continual evolution of religion over time, and suggests that instead of thinking of

Islam or any religion as a constant, it should be conceived of as a discursive tradition. Other scholars have also stressed the instability of religion as an object of analysis. Casanova observes that, “Of all social phenomena none is perhaps as protean and consequently as unsusceptible to binary classification as religion.”62 In this passage Casanova refers to the binary division of public from private, a distinction subject to extensive theorization, however I find his point useful for a critique of the notion of “moderate” as opposed to

“extremist” religious interpretations. Given that all religious texts and traditions exhibit contradiction and nuance, to try to treat any given religion as having a single causal effect betrays a lack of historical and theological awareness, or a deliberate agenda.

Some scholars have examined efforts to encourage moderate Islam, although most tend to focus on a single country case. Among the non-Arab cases, Turkey63 and

60 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7. 61 Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University (1986), 16-17. 62 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 40. 63 See, e.g., Murat Somer, “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1271- 1289.

41 Indonesia64 have garnered attention. Among the states I study, Gutkowski offers insights into the promotion of moderate Islam in Jordan, and informs my view that the promotion of moderate Islam shares similarities with “nation-branding.”65

Official Islam refers to the elements of religious authority that are under the direct or indirect control of the state.66 The phrase “official religious discourse” draws inspiration from Brand’s treatment of “official stories,” where the analysis of state-produced discourse allows her to examine “how and when a national political leadership uses elements of the narrative to consolidate or legitimate its power.”67 While Brand focuses primarily on pedagogical texts and textbooks to glean the content of a given official national narrative, official religious discourse is the composite of a wide array of sources. I include discourses produced by the state, and focus on certain disparities between the discourse produced by the royal palace and used for international export, for example, and that which is produced for domestic consumption by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and spread through imams and mosques, or by the Ministry of Education and disseminated via teachers and textbooks.

Political elites have greater control over the discourse they export abroad than that which relies on bureaucrats to disperse at home.

64 See, e.g., Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance Without Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 65 Stacey Gutkowski, “We are the Very Model of a Moderate Muslim State: The Amman Message and Jordan’s Foreign Policy,” International Relations (2015): 1-21. 66 This definition is based on that used by Michael Robbins and Lawrence Rubin, “The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan,” Politics, Religion & Ideology, 4, no. 1 (2013): 61. Note that Robbins and Rubin refer to control by the “regime,” whereas I define official Islam as that which is controlled by the state. I do so in order to preserve the agentic distinction between actors employed by the state (such as religious bureaucrats) and political elites. This distinction allows for bureaucrats to express their own views on the official line they are charged with disseminating. 67 Laurie Brand, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 20.

42 Islam and the State in the Middle East

In the late 20th century, Islam became increasingly prominent in public life in the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a trend that generated sustained academic study.

Common explanations highlighted widespread frustration with ineffectual and corrupt political elites and their impotence against Israel and the US, especially regarding the

Palestinian cause, as well as the perceived threat of European and American culture to traditional values.68 These grievances were attributed to the failure of ruling elites, whose self-enrichment and immunity from political accountability generated additional disillusionment. Dissatisfaction with the status quo was seen as contributing to the appeal of alternatives, such as religiously based political systems. The unprecedented increase in literacy rates over the 20th century also represented a crucial factor in the enhanced salience of Islam, as the previously unlettered public gained direct access to religious texts, undermining the authority of the religious establishment.69

Since the so-called resurgence of Islam and the increased activities of Islamist movements in the 1970’s and 80’s, scholarship on the promotion of religion has tended to focus on Islamists as the agents of religious promotion. The following excerpt from

Akbarzadeh and Saeed reflects the tendency to view enhanced emphasis on religiosity as a reaction to Islamists:

Muslim states … have been the primary targets of the Islamic revolutionary zeal. This challenge and the altered political conditions have forced state leaders to

68 See, e.g., Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, eds., Islam and Political Legitimacy (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). See also “The World’s Muslims” Pew Forum (2013). 69 For the impact of rising literacy on religiosity in the region, see, e.g., Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (1994); Patrick Gaffney, The Prophet's Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1998); Saba Mahmood, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

43 re-evaluate their image and symbols of power. In recognition of its emotive and familiar message, Islam has been systematically incorporated in the (explicit or implicit) frame of reference of the state to offset the increasingly plausible challenge to the legitimacy of the political leadership.70

Scholars often analyze Islamist movements from the perspective of social movement theory, a bottom-up approach that emphasizes the ideologies and grievances of Islamist activists,71 and much work has also focused on Islamists’ political appeal.72 Another vein of scholarship has examined the inclusion moderation hypothesis, considering whether the involvement of Islamists in democratic processes encourages them to adopt more moderate stances.73 Following the rise of the Islamic state, the “ISIS-ification of Islamist politics” has drawn scholars’ attention.74

While the literature on Islamists offers many insights, one aspect of understanding

Islamist movements has often been overlooked: the role of the state. When the state is included in analysis, it is generally seen as reacting to Islamist pressure. While this may appear logical from a social movements perspective, I argue that for greater analytic

70 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, eds. Islam and Political Legitimacy (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 2. 71 See, e.g., Hrair Dekmejian, “The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict & the Search for Islamic Alternatives,” (1980): 1-12; Nikki Keddie, “The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why do ‘Fundamentalisms’ Appear?” (1998); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (2002); Oded Haklai, “Authoritarianism & Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Research & Theory Building in the 21st Century,” (2009). 72 See, e.g., John Esposito, Islam and Politics (1998); Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (2004); Carrie Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt (2002); Tarek Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt (2014). 73 See, e.g., Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (2006); Omar Ashour, The De-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2009); Nathan Brown, When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). 74 See, e.g., William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015); Thomas Juneau, “Containing the Islamic State” Middle East Policy, 22 (2015): 36–43; Daniel Byman, “Understanding the Islamic State - A Review Essay,” International Security 40, no. 4 (2016): 127-165.

44 purchase, the direction of causality could also be reversed. The role of the state in structuring the religious sphere, and the effects produced by reactions to that structure, have been often overlooked and represent a fruitful area of study.

Although much scholarship on political Islam in the MENA region focused on

Islamist groups, some scholars have pointed out that Islamists operate within an arena established by the state. Brown points out that the “process of Islamic inflation” was actually undertaken by social actors in response to state “incursion into the realm of the shariʿa rather than the other way around.”75 The popularity of Islamist groups is itself a reaction to the level of state penetration into the religious sphere, which then prompted additional state penetration in an effort to reduce Islamists’ influence. Even in the nominally secular Arab Republics, the state is a key religious actor, especially in the production of religious education and the regulation of religious spaces. In 2001, Vali Nasr called for the need to “bring the state back in” when examining the increasingly public role of Islam in many societies in the MENA region. He argues that states did not simply react to pressure from Islamist groups, but acted in service of their own interests:

The turn to Islam is not so much a defensive strategy as a facet of the state’s drive to establish hegemony over society and expand its power and control. Islamization is a proactive rather than a reactive process, in which state interests serve as a causal factor.76

Like other modern states, Nasr’s “Islamic Leviathan” seeks to establish hegemonic control over its citizens’ ideology. In Muslim states, Islam is a key component of identity and

75 Nathan Brown, Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 158. 76 Vali Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power. New York: Oxford University Press, (2001), 3-4.

45 history. Nasr emphasizes that this hegemonic imperative is common to all states, although it is higher in authoritarian contexts.

Although his focus is the changing role of religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ), Zaman also emphasizes how modernity has empowered the state: “The modern state, colonial as well as postcolonial, has everywhere shaped the ‘traditional’ institutions and practices, not infrequently altering them beyond recognition, if not shaping them out of existence.”77

Zaman articulates how part of the reshaping was the result of the state creating separate arenas for aspects of life that were previously conceived as indivisible, such as family, law, religion, and government. This restructuring of social structures, traditions, and institutions was often initially carried out by colonizers, and later continued by the newly independent states.

In his discussion of the impossibility of an Islamic state, Hallaq stresses the

European genealogy of the modern state. He traces the historical process of insidious increases in state control that necessitated the construction of nationalism as a means of reattaching symbolic and ideological attachments that were lost to the destructive power of state-building.78 The modern state cannot survive without nationalism. Hallaq uses the phrase “Islamic governance” to refer to the governing structures that predated the incursion of the European nation-state into Islamic contexts.

Like Hallaq, I consider the modern expression of Islam to be indelibly shaped by the nation-state. In this I build on the work of Cesari, who interrogates the effect that modernity and nation-building have had upon Islam, arguing that the contemporary

77 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 60. 78 Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 109.

46 expression of the faith has undergone a radical transformation. Cesari asserts that “the making of Islam into a modern religion, whereby norms, organizations, and actors have been defined as Islamic, has been closely related to the making of the modern state.”79 The adoption of European state forms and institutions by environments with very different historical backgrounds led to a hybrid state that claimed secular labels but incorporated religious institutions that were once independent, including mosques, religious schools, universities, and hospitals, which had previously maintained financial independence through the system of religious endowments known as ʾawqāf (sing. waqf). Cesari argues that “The making of Islam into a modern religion, whereby norms, organizations, and actors have been defined as Islamic, has been closely related to the making of the modern state.”80 In her argument, the “politicization” of Islam was the result of the process of nation-building, and the popularity of actors calling for a greater role for religion in society and politics derives from the existing integration of religion and the state. Cesari’s scholarship is particularly influential for my argument regarding the centrality of religion in the national narrative, such that national identity is associated with religious identity, and good citizenship with piety.

While many regional specialists have discussed the increasingly visible role of

Islam, Akbarzadeh and Saeed explain that states have “systematically incorporated” Islam into the state’s frame of reference for the purpose of bolstering legitimacy.81 The challenge to legitimacy has primarily come from Islamists, who as a result of political elites’

79 Cesari, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (2014), 7. See also Jocelyne Cesari, What is Political Islam? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2018). 80 Cesari 2014 (7). 81 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, eds. Islam and Political Legitimacy (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 2.

47 historical targeting of other opposition groups, often constitute the only surviving expression of organized political opposition. Rulers have sought to bolster their control over the religious arena in order to undermine the power of Islamist groups, while simultaneously painting such groups as radicals and terrorists. Islam has been made inseparable from the national identity in order to bolster rulers’ legitimacy.

Yet like any religion, Islam does not have a single essence or expression. In order to be made to serve a political purpose, it must be altered.82 The process of alteration is that which transforms the pluralism of pre-modern Islam into a standardized expression of official Islam produced by the state. The modern state, in promoting Islam, has altered it.

Premodern heterodoxy common to all religious traditions in the absence of unified educational and communication systems gave way to unified public education and centralized media under modern conditions. Once the state began to produce a core religious curriculum, it became invested in promoting the idea that a single interpretation— the official interpretation—was correct. In some national contexts, official religious discourse acknowledges the existence of different forms of Islam, but religious curricula generally articulate a generic form of Islam that glosses over sectarian divisions.83

Frames and Resonance

The concept of “frame analysis,” as first articulated by Goffman, refers to the study of the cognitive organization of social experience.84 Sociologists have tended to apply frame analysis to social movements, as a means of explaining the factors required

82 Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (1998). 83 Eleanor Doumato and Gregory Starrett, eds. Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 5. 84 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).

48 for social mobilization.85 Frame analysis uses the concept of “resonance” as a causal factor associated with frames that successfully inspire action. Benford and Snow, in their review of scholarship on framing, identify credibility and salience as two key features of resonance. Credibility is seen as the result of frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of the frame articulators. In their discussion, Benford and Snow define frame consistency as, “the congruency between a social movement organization’s articulated beliefs, claims, and actions.”86 For the purposes of my dissertation, the consistency of a given frame with previously expressed beliefs, claims, or actions can be understood as corresponding to discourses established through the nation-building process. When an actor posits a frame that aligns with existing expectations, it is more likely to be seen as exhibiting consistency.

The time scale of interest to Benford and Snow is brief. They wish to explain why the framing of a specific issue by a social movement organization can inspire social action, and why framing the same issue in a different way can fail to mobilize action, due to the frame’s resonance with the target population. The span of time between the framing and the action is relatively short, and subsequent scholars have tended to use framing to evaluate the short-term effects of exposure to media or how the structure of a survey question can influence the response. In contrast, I am interested in the credibility of frames put forward by state actors and institutions, specifically state actors that represent non- democratic and non-representative structures. The frames put forward by states can be

85 See, e.g., Robert Benford and David Snow, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research, 1 (1988): 197 – 217; Robert Benford and Scott Hunt, “Dramaturgy and Social Movements: The Social Construction and Communication of Power,” Sociological Inquiry 62, No. 1 (1992): 36–55. 86 Robert Benford and David Snow. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment” Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000): 620.

49 reinforced over a long period of time. Nation-building can be viewed as a sustained process of building a set of culturally resonant frames.

Benford and Snow acknowledge that relatively little scholarship has focused on evaluating frame resonance, and even less has tried to focus on state actors as the frame- makers. Arguably no state possesses the tools to fully reshape the religious beliefs of their inhabitants: religion, and belief in general, have consistently demonstrated resilience in the face of the often-ham-fisted efforts by states to assert control.87

Numerous additional scholarly works informed my thinking, guided my data collection, and shaped my analysis. In the following chapters I discuss works that relate specifically to the three countries I examine; Chapter 2 in particular builds on secondary scholarship, while Chapters 3 through 6 rely more heavily on my own data.

V. Plan of the Dissertation

My dissertation examines the effects of state control of religious institutions, and evaluates the factors that influence the resonance of official religious discourse. The discourses and religious identities established during the processes of nation-building constrain political elites’ abilities to use their control of official religious institutions to serve their agendas, depending on the arena in which the religious discourse is performed.

The study identifies three different arenas in which the state dispenses official religious

87 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) and James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998) offer insightful discussions of the fundamental inability of states to effectively regulate, manufacture, or reproduce complex social practices. While Scott focuses on euthenics, or the study of improving the condition of human beings by altering their environment, I find his arguments applicable to the regulation of religion.

50 discourse: at the international level, to students in public school, and through mosques and other religious spaces controlled by the state. These threes arenas are listed in order of the ability of political elites to control the religious discourse produced: when communicating with the non-domestic actors, political elites are relatively unconstrained to make claims about their own religious authority and about the form of Islam they promote domestically.

When issuing proclamations or addressing international assemblies or other political elites, the mechanisms of dispensing information are controlled by elites and thus reflect a clear image of the political elites’ desired “brand” of official Islam.

Educational practices lie somewhat more removed from elite control than discourse directed at the international audience. When producing content for schoolbooks, political elites maintain a fairly high level of control over the content itself, but do not (yet) surveil classrooms to ensure that teachers reproduce official religious discourse uncritically or precisely. The cases under consideration exhibit variation in the extent to which educational content is the subject of debate; however, the discussion reflects the content of the material rather than the right of the state to produce it, which is relatively uncontested.

Religious discourse disseminated in mosques lies even more removed from elite control, and here the authority of state institutions to dictate religious speech is sometimes contested. The arena of mosques and other religious institutions constitutes a space in which the state has historically exerted less control, although religious extremism has been used to justify the expansion of state surveillance here as well. Bureaucracies like the

Ministry of Religious Affairs, the department of religious edicts, as well as more security- oriented structures like the Ministry of the Interior, have asserted their prerogative to control speech and activities that occur within and near mosques. However, efforts to assert

51 the dominion of the state over religious spaces in the name of public safety have been met with pushback. Both the individuals responsible for spreading official discourse, i.e. religious bureaucrats, as well as the ostensible targets, resist the state’s effort to monopolize the production of legitimate religious discourse. The level of resistance reflects the extent to which a state can successfully couch the expansion of its control within a framework that resonates with existing ideas about identity and the appropriate role of the state, as well as the discourses it advances.

I organize the dissertation according to variation in the level of state control reflected by these arenas. I begin with the unprecedented expansion of state control over all aspects of life that accompanied the implementation of direct rule in the nation-building period. In order to investigate the path dependent effects of discourses established during the process of nation-building, the specific historical circumstances that influenced the creation of a nationally-specific form of official religious discourse are presented in

Chapter 2, “Nation-building and the Origins of Official Religious Discourse.” The construction of the official national narrative included a religious component based on the specific claims to religious authority by the ruler, as well as the history of the territory itself. In the nation-building era, political elites faced some resistance to the discourses they created, but subsumed previously independent institutions into state bodies, thereby reducing the capacity of independent actors to produce religious discourse that challenged the state-sponsored version. The chapter explains the origins of the content of the official religious discourse in the three contexts of Jordan, Morocco, and Oman.

Having established the causal factors influencing the content of the religio-national narrative and official religious discourse in each of the three contexts, subsequent chapters

52 describe the contemporary era as one in which the state’s discursive monopoly is challenged. In the educational arena, the state maintains a relative monopoly over the production of educational content but cannot necessarily ensure that curricula are dispensed as desired. Chapter 3 “Teaching Official Islam,” builds on the rich existing literature examining the strategic use of public education to disseminate the state’s preferred identities and discourses. Textbooks and government-affiliated media sources offer the primary means of establishing the content of official religious discourse for this chapter, while interviews with bureaucrats, educators and students exhibit the ways in which such narratives are accepted or contested. At the time of fieldwork, all three monarchies had experienced, or were in the process of undergoing, textbook reform for the stated purpose of curbing extremism. The controversies surrounding such reform emerged frequently in interviews and media coverage, and speak to the ways in which official discourse is reproduced or contested.

Chapter 4, “Preaching Official Islam” focuses on religious bureaucrats and explains their willingness to either reproduce or challenge official religious discourse as a function of resonance. In Jordan, official religious discourse emphasizes the concept of “true Islam” rather than promoting a religious identity grounded in claims about Jordanian national heritage. Although the Moroccan and Omani traditions were invented during the process of state- and nation-building, they achieve greater resonance, or a higher match between individuals’ expressed views and the position established by official religious discourse. In this chapter, the evidence falls into one of two categories. The first category includes the institutions that produce official religious discourse, such as the Ministry of Religious

Affairs/Endowments (hereafter Ministry of ʾAwqāf) and the office of the Grand Mufti. I

53 present texts, statements, and sermons released by these institutions to establish the content of the discourse. In the second category, I analyze the responses of religious bureaucrats for their willingness to perform or contest the official position.

In Chapter 5, the implications of international scrutiny of official religious discourse are examined: “Exporting Official Islam” presents the content of the brand of official Islam that political elites seek to export abroad. In the international arena, political elites can closely control the content of the religious message. In this respect, international branding is similar to the nation-building era discussed in Chapter 2, when the state maintained a greater degree of control over the means of production of religious discourse.

In the context of global anxiety about a potential link between Islam and violence, state- sponsored articulations of Islam compete to establish primacy as an antidote to extremism.

Such public relations campaigns on behalf of national religious institutions and discourses constitute a form of “branding” as different states assert that the efficacy of their “product” of national Islam is superior, effectively competing in a marketplace of different forms of

Islam.

The sixth and final chapter, “Regretting Official Islam?” considers the implications and unintended consequences of the production and export of official religious discourse.

In particular, the chapter reflects on the ways in which a state-imposed form of religious discourse may have the opposite of its intended effect. One outcome the discourse produces is not necessarily to establish the state’s preferred religious discourse as correct, but to instill the notion that a correct form exists. By asserting that state institutions possess a monopoly on religious legitimacy, even if that monopoly never actually existed, official religious discourse establishes a worldview of correct and incorrect forms of the religion.

54 Inadvertently, political elites may discredit their preferred discourse, as citizens – taught that a correct form of Islam exists – do not find it in official religious institutions and seek it elsewhere. After engaging with possible areas of future research, this chapter concludes the dissertation.

55 Chapter 2: Creating Official Islam

I. Introduction

What explains the origins of nationally specific forms of official religious discourse as established through the nation-building processes of the early modern era? Drawing on theories developed by scholars of nationalism, I argue that both colonizers and local political elites used state control of institutions of cognition to instill a particular national identity that included an explicit religious component in officially-Islamic contexts. In the context of the heightened capacity of the modern state, characterized by public education and literacy, mass media, and targeted efforts to inculcate a shared identity among the inhabitants of a given state’s territory, political elites gained the ability to disseminate their preferred form of religious discourse on an unprecedented scale. While such discourses were by no means uncontested, they established the parameters of the arena in which other forms of religious discourse were expressed. For this reason, I consider the transition from pre-modern forms of political authority to modern state structures to have had a significant impact on religious discourse in both its official and unofficial expressions.

When political elites used state institutions to produce official religious discourse, they established a national religious identity. The content of the national religious identity persists in a manner consistent with findings about the durability of national identity among literate populations.88 When political elites wish to shape religious discourse, they must do so using frames that are consistent with those established during the process of nation- building. The frames established during the period of nation-building constrain political elites’ efforts to shape official religious discourse to pursue their own agenda, such as to

88 Darden and Gryzmala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, Communist Collapse,” (2006).

56 address concerns about violent extremism or strengthen the religious authority of the head of state.

My objective in this chapter is to establish the historical origins of official religious discourse, specifically how political elites’ governing concerns and interests shaped official Islam in each of the three monarchies under consideration. Subsequent chapters focus on how institutions produce official religious discourse in the contemporary context and evaluates the extent to which interlocutors reproduce or contest them. This chapter draws on secondary scholarship as well as archival sources to identify the origins of contemporary discourses in the nation-building period, which set the parameters and patterns investigated in the subsequent empirical chapters. The domestic factors that have especial weight in defining these parameters include the religious authority claimed by the ruling elite, the legacy of colonization, and the strength of religious institutions prior to their incorporation into state structures.

Regarding Jordan, a combination of factors including the exalted but foreign status of the Hashimites, and the rulers’ failure to clearly define Jordanian identity resulted in a form of official religious discourse that lacked specific connections to the Jordanian people or heritage. Instead the Hashimites used their historical status as religious leaders to assert a universalistic form of Islam, and specifically emphasized pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic unity.

In the contemporary context, where Jordan’s political elites face both international and domestic scrutiny regarding official Islam, the Hashimites have found it difficult to find a frame that resonates with both domestic and international audiences. Due to Jordan’s long-standing reliance on foreign economic support, the Hashimites have been eager to

57 frame official Islam as “moderate” in order to assure key non-Muslim allies of Jordanian support for an international security agenda oriented around fighting terrorism. However, because the Hashimite regime did not engage in nation-building policies that articulated a form of specifically Jordanian Islam, contemporary efforts to shape religious discourse for the domestic population lack an existing set of frames with which to connect. As a result, efforts by Jordanian political elites to shape official religious discourse are often suspected of reflecting non-Muslim or otherwise foreign influence, and certainly are not seen as authentic to a Jordanian religious identity.

The example of Jordan demonstrates the importance of nation-building to the perception of religious authority. Because religious and national identity are mutually constitutive in officially-Islamic countries, the Hashimites’ longstanding and arguably

“authentic” religious authority could not overcome their status as foreigners in the era of nation-states, when typically, a minimum requirement of rule is membership in the nation one rules. Their status as outsiders might have been overcome with a concerted campaign of nation-building to cement the Hashimites as the legitimate representatives of the

Jordanian nation, but the apparent lack of interest in constructing a coherent Jordanian identity, religious or otherwise, resulted in the absence of a clear connection between

Jordan, the Hashimites, and Islam. As a result, claims made regarding official religious discourse in Jordan lack resonance. While the Hashimites assert their authority to speak on behalf of Islam at large, they cannot articulate a specifically Jordanian form of Islam.

Ironically, in a world order set up according to nation-state boundaries, the Hashimites’ inability to speak for Jordanian Islam renders their historically accurate claims to broader religious authority obsolete.

58 In contrast, Moroccan political elites have had greater success in promoting a form of official religious discourse that resonates at both the international and domestic level.

However, this is not due to Morocco possessing an inherently more “authentic” form of

Islamic authority, as political elites would assert, but instead reflects nation-building instigated by European colonizers and continued after independence.

Morocco’s ruling Alaouite dynasty claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad, but their religious authority was contested by other prominent Moroccan families who jockeyed for political pre-eminence prior to colonization. During the period of the French protectorate (1912-1956), French colonial narratives stressed the political and religious authority of the Moroccan Alaouite sultan as the “commander of the faithful” (ʾamīr al- muʾminīn). French colonial authorities likewise reified the concept of a uniquely Moroccan form of Islam by treating it as an object of study. The colonial production of something called “Moroccan Islam” served the agenda of the Alaouite monarchy following independence, as did the notion that the Moroccan sultan held unique religious authority, and the regime continued to promote these concepts through education, religious messaging, and public commemoration, even codifying the king’s religious status in the

Moroccan constitution in 1962.89

In the contemporary context of concerns about terrorist violence, the Alaouite regime has leveraged the long-established framework around Moroccan Islam, portraying it as offering an antidote to religious extremism. Although the notion of “moderation” as the alternative to “extremism” was not a frame established during the process of Moroccan nation-building, the Alaouite regime has managed to successfully graft the concept onto

89 Adria Lawrence, Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

59 the existing framework of Moroccan Islam, thereby enhancing its international appeal while simultaneously couching it in language that adheres to the religious framework that resonates at the domestic level.

Interestingly, the image of Moroccan Islam as a brand for international consumption has not been harmed by acts of violence committed by Moroccan citizens or by members of the Moroccan diaspora in Europe, as such events have been successfully portrayed as reflecting foreign influence. Although many of the specific aspects of

Moroccan Islam are recent constructions, Moroccan political elites have succeeded in aligning the existing framework of religious discourse with the regime’s contemporary political agenda of enhancing the king’s religious authority and being seen as an ally in combatting extremism.

Although the religious authority of the Moroccan king did not historically transcend his borders, the successful construction of authenticity has enhanced the Alaouites’ stature outside Morocco as well. The monarchy has used its religious authority to expand its religious soft power in northern and western Africa through targeted outreach. As a result of his enhanced reputation in the Maghreb more broadly, European states have bought in to the notion of Moroccan Islam, and have begun sending imams from their own Muslim communities to study “moderate” Islam in Morocco on the basis of its perceived authenticity. Morocco offers an example of how religious discourse can be constructed in the process of nation-building, and then leveraged to serve a new political purpose in a manner that preserves the appearance of religious authenticity, due to its grounding in culturally resonant frames.

60 If the case of Morocco demonstrates the potential for constructing religious authority through nation-building, the case of Oman demarcates its limits. Like Morocco, the Omani government initiated a process of nation-building that articulated a uniquely

Omani national and religious identity. Concerns about the potential for territorial and sectarian cleavages impelled Omani political elites to stress unity and tolerance as key components of Oman’s religious and national identity. Such official religious discourse would seem ideal for the purposes of exporting the Omani brand of Islam in a context where the promotion of toleration is a valuable commodity. Yet because Oman’s official

Islam is Ibāḍī, a minority branch of the faith, Omani religious authority cannot transcend its territorial boundaries. Instead Omani political elites focus on preventing the spread of sectarianism and anti-Ibāḍī sentiment among Sunni Omanis, fomented by pro-Sunni religious actors especially in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Although official religious discourse enjoys relatively high credibility among Omanis, it is a brand intended exclusively for domestic consumption.

The juxtaposition of Jordan and Morocco might seem to indicate that religious authority can be constructed out of any religious tradition, as long as the population is targeted with sustained nation-building policies over the course of generations, such that younger citizens perceive as locally authentic what their great-grandparents might have recognized as state-imposed. However, Oman demonstrates that the content of official religious discourse must meet certain characteristics in order to resonate. Drawing on the theoretical framework established by Benford and Snow, the inability of Omani political elites to export the Omani brand of Islam is explained as the result of the lack of perceived credibility of Ibāḍī Muslims to speak about Islam to non-Ibāḍīs.

61 In the next section, I present historical trends observed throughout the Arab Middle

East before transitioning to more detailed analysis of the effects of nation-building on religion in the three monarchies of Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. When presenting evidence from the three monarchies, I consider how state building was used to legitimate the monarchs’ rule, specifically by incorporating religious traditions into the national narrative.

I focus on the dynamics of monarchical legitimation in each context, which relied on local histories and traditions and resulted in a form of legitimacy built in part upon religious authority. In presenting the three cases, I do not assert that the same factors played a role in each context, but illustrate the ways that similar mechanisms in the process of nation- building have generated path-dependent outcomes in each. Earlier choices made by a monarchy in the process of legitimating its rule in the context of a modern nation-state have constrained the choices subsequently available.

II. Nationalizing Religious Institutions

When discussing the process of nation-building that results in an institution possessing the power and capacity of a modern state, I refer primarily to the centralization of authority in state institutions. Centralizing authority in the state often involved incorporating existing independent institutions into state institutions.90 In many contexts,

90 “The modern state, colonial as well as postcolonial, has everywhere shaped the ‘traditional’ institutions and practices, not infrequently altering them beyond recognition, if not shaping them out of existence. The use of the state's resources has been variously legitimated by ideologies of modernization, efficiency, utility, rationality, overcoming a static tradition, and so forth. The targets of such initiatives have been as varied as the initiatives themselves, including but not limited to the family, law, education, the economy, and religion. These arenas were not, of course, thought of as necessarily distinct or separate from each other in many a pre-modern society, though in the course of state-sponsored 'reform' they have typically come to be conceived as such,” Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 60.

62 the most developed existing institutions tended to be religious, or to have a religious affiliation. In pre-modern Europe, state structures and religious institutions were often combined. The process of separating religious from state institutions that occurred in some

Western European countries caused the process of modernization to be associated with this separation, or secularization. For this reason, secularization was a component of the modernization thesis, or the assumption that processes of economic and political development would be accompanied by the removal of religion from public life. It was believed that this would occur anywhere that other processes of modernization were underway, although in fact many European states structures still included religious institutions or had a state religion. The assumption that secularization would accompany modernization was based, for example, on France, and ignored the many instances in which religion remained an integral part of modern state institutions.

Early modern state-builders in the Middle East often took over existing religious institutions and incorporated them into state structures. These included mosques, schools, public water works, hospitals, and other public institutions. All such institutions and public services were traditionally funded by religious endowments (ʾawqāf, singular waqf), or financial resources left in trust by pious and wealthy individuals for the provision of public goods, including courts, universities, media, or to support descendants.

Political elites interested in expanding the power of the state typically justified the incorporation of formerly independent organizations into state-run entities using the claim of greater efficiency, a frequent justification for modernization. The nationalization of religious endowments was partly justified on the grounds that ʾawqāf were poorly managed examples of “backward” institutions in need of modern bureaucracies to be effectively

63 run.91 Religious endowment holdings were significant – ‘awqāf property sometimes accounted for a third of all agricultural land in a polity – such that once they were nationalized, rulers greatly expanded the state’s territory and resources.92

In order to manage the lands, mosques, schools, hospitals, and other services previously funded by religious endowments, modernizing states in the Middle East created new bureaucracies. Healthcare and hospitals were taken over by the Ministry of Health, while the Ministry of Education oversaw public education, provided training and certification for teachers, and wrote textbooks and curricula. Scholarship has highlighted the transformation of the shariʿa-based legal system into a hybrid of European and Islamic law.93 A ministry focused on religious affairs, typically designated the Ministry of

Religious Endowments (wizāra al-ʾawqāf) was established to provide for the construction and upkeep of mosques, the training of clerics, the collection of alms, and other religious duties previously carried out by the system of independent religious institutions and religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ, singular ʿālim).

Studies of the Middle East have often used the case of Egypt to illustrate the process of transforming ʾawqāf lands and institutions into instruments of the modern state. The

Egyptian case offers insights into other former Ottoman territories, all of which were subjected to the early nation-building processes undertaken by Ottoman rulers in their

91 Timur Kuran, “The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System,” Law & Society Review 35, no. 4 (2001): 841-898; Sami Zubeida, Beyond Islam (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011). 92 Lisa Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East.” Political Science Quarterly, 106, no. 1 (1991), 11. 93 See, e.g., Allan Christelow, Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Lamis El-Muhtaseb, Nathan Brown and Abdul- Wahab Kayyali, “Arguing About Family Law in Jordan: Disconnected Spheres?" International Journal of Middle East Studies, 48, no. 4 (November 2016): 721-741.

64 efforts to compete with European rivals. However, some reforms implemented by the

Ottomans were imitated elsewhere, as many political elites looked to the Ottomans for guidance in the process of building a modern state in a manner that emulated European structures but attempted to preserve certain elements, such as the centrality of religious institutions.

Under the broad objective of modernization pursued by Sultan Selim III, Egypt’s

Ottoman regent Muhammad Ali sought to transform the territory under his control. A general who helped to seize control from the Mamluks and ruled the territory from 1805 to

1848, one of Muhammad Ali’s initiatives involved the imposition of a tax on religious endowments. Over time, the independent hospitals, schools, and ʿulamāʾ were subsumed into the nascent Egyptian state. By cutting off independent funding for mosques, including the great mosque/university of Al Azhar, political elites were able to curtail the freedom and influence of the ʿulamāʾ. Starved of independent income, they lost the ability to critique state behavior for fear of losing their funding and positions.94 Note that some scholars have questioned the idealized independence of the pre-modern ʿulamāʾ, arguing that the dynamic of religious support for political power was widely recognized in the pre- modern context, and typically justified by the need to avoid fitna, or communal strife, that would result from rebellion against those in power.95

This process was not limited to Egypt; state institutions took over ʾawqāf all over the region. In commenting on the loss of their traditional independence as a result of state

94 For a nuanced take on the agency of Al-Azhar in its own cooptation, see, e.g. Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The ‘Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952- 94),” International Journal of Middle East Politics. 31, no. 3 (1999): 379-399. 95 See, e.g., Nazih Ayubi, “State Islam and Communal Plurality,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 524 (November 1992): 79-91.

65 takeover, the ʿulamāʾ resisted their loss in status in part by portraying themselves as the keepers of tradition.96 Stressing the importance of tradition impacted popular views about the value of authenticity, religious practice, and sources of political legitimacy, all relevant themes when evaluating the strategies selected by rulers in their efforts to consolidate power.

The authority of each of the three monarchies examined herein is based, to some extent, on an invented tradition of religious authority. Such claims can be potential sources of weakness, as religious doctrine does not always permit the flexibility required of a political leader. In addition to the constraints of religious edict, monarchical rule is problematic. Strict interpretations of Islam reject kingship based on the view that God is sovereign and earthly rulers are merely vice-regents of God. Over the centuries, the prevalence of monarchical rule in territories conquered by the Muslims, such as Persia, caused the notion of monarchy to be more widely accepted. By the early 20th century, dynastic rulers, including the Hashimites in Jordan and Iraq, the Alaouites in Morocco, and the Saudis in Saudi Arabia, dropped their respective titles of emir, sultan, and imam, in favor of “king.” By taking the more European title of king or “malik” the rulers may have intended to convey an intention to introduce a more European form of government.97 It is noteworthy that the monarchs of the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar retain the title of “emir,” while the king of Bahrain only recently adopted the moniker of king, having been known as emir until 2002. The title of emir in the Gulf is a legacy of treaty agreements with the

British, who helped to ensure the rule of powerful local families in securing the passage to

96 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 60. 97 “Malik” Encyclopedia of Islam 2nd edition.

66 India. In Oman, Ibāḍī resistance to rule by a king as an un-Islamic innovation caused the coastal rulers to adopt the title of “sultan,” the title they retain.

The institution of monarchy in Muslim contexts faces two sources of pressure: one from Leftists who often view kingship as outdated and antidemocratic, the other from

Islamic fundamentalists who reject kingship as the usurpation of God’s authority. The claim by the Hashimites and Alaouites to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad conveys a measure of authority, however because their populations are primarily Sunni rather than Shi’i, rule by a descendent of the Prophet is not required. Sharifi dynasties, or those that claim descent from the Prophet’s grandson Hassan, frequently took power in

Morocco, and for that reason rule by a descendent of Muhammad constitutes a long-held tradition that enhances the authority of the Alaouites. In contrast, the Hashimites have put less emphasis on their religious credentials, other than to assert their status as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

Ibāḍī rule does not require that the political ruler, or imam, be descended from the

Prophet (as in Shiʿa Islam), nor of the Qurayshi tribe (as is traditional in Sunni Islam), and so Omani leaders have faced little to no pressure to claim descent from the Prophet.

However political authority in Oman was traditionally the result of powerful families selecting one of their own members to serve as imam, a position that required the acquiescence of the ruling families and which could be lost.98 The ruling Al Bu Saʿid dynasty in Oman was not one of these historically powerful families and thus lacks the religious authority that strict adherence to pre-modern imamate tradition would demand.

98 Dale Eickelman, “From Theocracy to Monarchy: Authority and Legitimacy in Inner Oman, 1935-1957,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 17, no. 1 (February 1985): 4.

67 Although the religious legitimacy of each of the three monarchs is not immune from attack, each monarchy has successfully undermined potential alternative sources of religious authority. While Egyptian rulers have had to contend, for example, with the religious authority vested in the venerable institution of Al Azhar — whose sheikhs have often pursued agendas other that of the ruler99 — other historical religious institutions have been hobbled by their incorporation into state structures. Particularly in cases like Jordan, which were not political entities prior to the modern era and as a result did not possess a government bureaucracy centralized in Amman that predated the establishment of the polity, rulers have faced less resistance from religious authorities. However, in Morocco and Oman, both of which existed as political units prior to the advent of modern nation- building and where pre-modern state structures included a historical religious bureaucracy, modern rulers often worked to weaken or obliterate existing religious authorities.

Regarding the religious status of the three monarchs in question, King Mohammad

VI of Morocco enjoys the most religious authority. The longevity of the Alaouite monarchy in Morocco and the nation-building discourse that conflates the person of the king with the nation confers a high level of religious legitimacy on King Mohammad VI. In contrast, the fact that an imamate still ruled the interior of Oman until the mid 20th century contributes to the urgency with which Sultan Qaboos has undertaken efforts to bolster his standing, as rule by the Al Saʿid dynasty contravenes the Ibāḍī injunction of rule by an imam. The

Hashimites are respected as a historical ruling family, yet their loss of the Hijaz and transplanting in Jordan undermines their religious standing.

When constructing the official religious discourse, each set of political elites faced

99Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-94)” (1999).

68 certain constraints, either regarding the extent to which they could rely on local support for their right to rule (Jordan), the competing religious authority of existing institutions

(Morocco), or religious legitimacy as a ruler (Oman). Early state builders were constrained by existing circumstances, traditions, and identities, which influenced the choices made, choices which now constrain their descendants.

III. Alternative Explanations

The chapter focuses on three factors that together influence the capacity of political elites to establish official religious discourse—the religious legitimacy of the rulers, the colonization experience, and the pre-modern religious institutions—that impact the development of official religious discourse during the nation-building period in each of the three cases. Yet when considering the specific circumstances of each, alternative explanations arise that appear plausible. I present these here, and argue that while they may have also played a role, the three factors offer a more parsimonious and generalizable explanation.

For example, the lack of will and capacity by the Hashimite monarchy to articulate official religious discourse in national terms could be explained by the presence of a powerful neighbor bent on establishing religious hegemony. Jordan is linked to Saudi

Arabia economically, socially, and historically. Efforts by the Hashimites to articulate a religious discourse that undermined or directly challenged the Saudi religious narrative could plausibly be understood as too risky.

Yet the proximity of Saudi Arabia did not prevent the Omanis from articulating a distinct form of Islam. The Omani monarchy might have chosen to avoid an emphasis on

69 Ibāḍīsm and instead to articulate a form of Islam more closely aligned with its powerful neighbor. Such a strategy might have thwarted Saudi efforts to discredit Ibāḍīsm and undermine the power of the Omani monarchy. Yet Sultan Qaboos instead has actively resisted Saudi religious hegemony, an option that the Hashimites might have also chosen to emulate, given the historic antipathy between their family and that of Ibn Saud.

Based on this logic, the Hashimites’ articulation of a universalistic Islamic discourse is even more surprising. Faced with the House of Saud’s explicit claim to represent the most correct form of Islam, the Hashimites might have considered it more prudent to articulate a non-threatening form of local Islam, one that did not directly challenge the Saudis, but asserted its legitimacy within the limited confines of Jordan. Yet as I argue, the Hashimites could not do so because such a claim would have been inherently non-credible, on the basis of their lack of historical ties to the territory they found themselves in charge of. Another possible explanation for the lack of a specifically

Jordanian expression of Islam is the presence of Palestinians. Following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, compounded by Jordan’s loss of the West Bank in 1967, almost half the inhabitants of the kingdom had no connection to Jordanian territory, and many actively sought to maintain their connection to the land they had lost.

Yet the argument that the Hashimite political elite would have been incapable of incorporating the Palestinians into the existing Jordanian population ignores that the

Jordanian government did not actively target the Palestinians with nation-building. Other than the initial wave of refugees from 1948, many Palestinians do not have full citizenship in Jordan, and the government uses different levels of access and privileges to demarcate

70 their various legal statuses.100 Given the relative rapidity with which other states have successfully implemented assimilation policies targeting non-core groups with nation- building, the lack of such policies constitutes a decision by the Jordanian political elite.

The choice may have been motivated in part by the unique status of the Palestinians in the region, as emblematic of Arabist norms, the symbolic martyrs that so often assisted in redirecting public attention away from rulers’ failings.101 Rather than target them with nation-building, until 1989 the Hashimites tried to leverage Palestinians’ presence to serve their goal of territorial expansion.

The Alaouite regime promotes the notion that their religious authority is due to their historic status as the commanders of the faithful, and an outside observer might be willing to buy into the notion that historic authenticity accounts for their success. Yet at the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912, the figure of ʾamīr al-muʾminīn was no longer salient, and without French scholars it would likely have been lost to history. The

Alaouites’ success in establishing an exportable brand of official Islam lies less in their historic authority than in their good fortune at inheriting a symbol that the French colonizers revived for their own purposes.

In general, the patterns established during the nation-building period are reflected in path-dependent processes that are consistent with expectations of the establishment of a

“sticky” identity that follows nation-building processes. In the following sections I examine the historical development of official religious discourse in each monarchy, and

100 Jordanian citizenship was given to “any non-Jewish person possessing Palestinian nationality before 15 May 1948 and was a regular resident of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954” according to Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last amended 1987), 1 January 1954, art. 3, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html. 101 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

71 use interviews with high-ranking religious officials to convey how these individuals compare present religious discourse to the historic narrative.

V. Case Studies

Jordan

Official Islam in Jordan is produced through three primary institutions: The

Ministry of ʾAwqāf, the Islamic Chief Justice’s office (Qāḍī al-Quḍāh), and the

Department of Religious Edicts (Dāʾira al-Iftā’). The Ministry of ʾAwqāf, like its counterparts elsewhere, oversees mosques and other religious sites or endowments, trains and employs imams and preachers (ḵhuṭabāʾ, singular ḵhaṭīb), collects mandatory alms

(zakāh), and works with the Ministry of Education to generate the content of religious curricula. The Islamic Chief Justice, or the “Judge of Judges” is the highest shariʿa authority in Jordan, and deals primarily with personal status and family law. The Dāʾira al-

Iftā’ produces official non-binding religious edicts (fatāwā, sing. fatwā). I focus here on the activities of the Ministry of ʾAwqāf, given its impact on religious institutions. Later I focus on the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ but do not go into great detail regarding the activities of the

Qāḍī al-Quḍāh.102

The ministry’s full name translates to the “Ministry of Religious Endowments,

Islamic Affairs and Holy Sites.” The inclusion of “holy sites” is a reference to the Jordanian government’s legal control of the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, specifically the Al-Aqsa

Mosque and the Dome of the Rock (qubba al-ṣaḵra) on the Temple Mount (ḥirm al-šarīf)

102 For information on the Qāḍī al-Quḍāh, see, e.g. Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) and Lamis El- Muhtaseb, Nathan Brown and Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali, “Arguing About Family Law in Jordan: Disconnected Spheres?” (2016).

72 in Jerusalem.103 This reference alludes to when the Hashimites controlled the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and it indicates their continued sense of the Hashimite connection and claim to Jerusalem, which itself represents a component of their assumed religious authority to speak for all of Islam.

The Hashimites’ historic territory in the Hijaz region of present-day Saudi Arabia centered on the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Hashimite ruler served as the sharif of Mecca, or sharif of the Hijaz, guarding the holy cities and protecting pilgrims, until the takeover of the territory by Ibn Saud in 1924. Due to the Hashimites’ support against the

Ottomans during World War I, the British set up Hashimites on the thrones of Iraq and

Transjordan.

As descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and the historic rulers of the Hijaz, the

Hashimite family enjoyed centuries of pan-Islamic religious authority. However, the loss of their traditional territory and role harmed their status, and their reliance on British support in establishing control over other territory was met with some resistance by local elites eager to assert their own dominance after the removal of Ottoman control.104 In addition to questions about their status as outsiders, the Hashimites have faced shifting borders and populations, a challenge for any would-be nation-builder looking to establish a clear narrative about the identity of the nation and their own role at the head of it.

Of the three monarchies studied, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan possesses the most robust civil society. Jordan has numerous civil society organizations, many of which

103 Note that an Islamic wāqf for Jerusalem officially manages the sites, but in the absence of a Palestinian state, Israel grants Jordan the responsibility for providing funds to maintain the sites. 104 Andrew Shryock, Nationalism and The Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Society, Berkeley Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

73 emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s.105 Jordan also exhibits the strongest Islamist groups and parties. Although the Muslim Brotherhood once monopolized the field of religious activism, in recent decades it has had to compete with additional Islamist groups, including Salafis, Habashis (a Sufi movement opposed to Salafism), and Daʿwa wa tablīḡ

(“Proselytization and Transmission,” a movement dedicated to encouraging piety as well as conversion). The Jordanian state clearly regulates and surveils the activities of Islamist groups, but unlike in Oman, it tolerates their existence, and unlike in Morocco, permits them a certain degree of independence.

In the following section I examine the national narrative of Jordan, focusing in particular on the role of religion within it. Using process tracing, I demonstrate how choices and institutional structures implemented during the period of nation-building continue to have repercussions for contemporary rulers. I show how these earlier choices limit the options available to the Jordanian monarchy in projecting an official religious discourse that responds to international pressure to contain extremism, specifically as a result of the historical absence of a specifically Jordanian form of religious identity.

Constructing a National Narrative

Gellner famously defined nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”106 Typically the political and national units also correspond to a geographic territory. In Jordan, questions of the unity of the political and national unit are complicated by the origins of the Hashimites, as well as by

105 Sameer Jarrah, “Civil Society and Public Freedom in Jordan: The Path of Democratic Reform,” (The Saban Center for Middle East Policy Working Paper 3, The Brookings Institution, 2009). 106 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1983.

74 the periodic inclusion of new groups of people, often refugees forced out of neighboring states.

The geographic aspect is complicated by shifts in the territory, as well as shifts in the official discourse regarding who is a member of the nation. The territory that eventually became the Emirate of Transjordan had been divided in the Ottoman period, the northern portion belonging to the Ottoman vilayet of Syria, and the southern port of Aqaba belonging to the territory controlled by the Hashimites. For a period of time the area served as a no man’s land in order to provide a buffer for Israel. The loss of the West Bank to

Israel in 1967 cost the Jordanians half their kingdom. Although initially Jordan asserted its right to reclaim the territory, in 1988 King Hussein of Jordan reversed this stance.

Shifts in the official articulation of the Jordanian territory and identity have inspired study. Lynch identifies how shifts in Jordan’s identity influenced its perceived interests and led to King Hussein’s decision.107 Frisch cites security concerns as a primary reason for the Hashimites’ unwillingness to pin down a specific definition of the Jordanian nation, referring to Jordanian nationalism as “fuzzy.”108 I consider the Hashimites’ desire to potentially expand their territorial control to explain why King Abdullah I and his successors avoided defining the identity and territory of Jordan more concretely.

In the official national narrative of Jordan, the legitimacy of Hashimite rule derives from a source typical of post-colonial contexts: their role in overthrowing colonial overlords. However, the particulars of the historical circumstances of the Hashimites’ control of Jordan are somewhat unusual, because the Hashimites are not native to the

107 Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 108 John Frisch, “Fuzzy Nationalism: The Case of Jordan,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 8, no. 4 (2002): 86-103.

75 territory of Jordan. During the period when the centralization of state control was first implemented in the territory of what is now Jordan, the area was part of the Ottoman

Empire. In an effort to keep their empire, the Ottomans initiated processes of modern state- building which included exerting state administration over educational facilities and religious institutions. Physical control of territory was also a priority: the construction of the Hijaz Railroad in 1908 was intended to connect Damascus to Mecca, for the stated purpose of easing the journey of hajj pilgrims. Although it only reached as far as Medina before construction was halted by WWI, the railroad expanded Ottoman oversight of Arab territory, facilitating the movement of troops. As states can more easily control and extract resources from sedentary populations, the Ottomans encouraged nomadic pastoralists to settle. As many of the inhabitants of the territory of Jordan were nomadic, this threat to their liberty and way of life spawned increasing resentment against Ottoman control.

The Hashimites’ pedigree as the guardians of the two holy sites of Mecca and

Medina contributed to Hashimite leader Sharif Hussein bin Ali’s view of himself as the rightful “King of Arabs,” whose territory ought to extend “from Aleppo to Aden.”109 He saw an opportunity to realize this ambition with the help of the British, due to the conflict with the Ottoman Empire in WWI. Between July 1915 and March 1916, Sharif Hussein corresponded with Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in the Sultanate of Egypt, regarding Arab assistance in the British war effort against the

109 The late King Hussein’s website emphasizes the legitimacy of Sharif ʿAli bin Hussein’s claim to rule over the whole of the Arabian peninsula and most of the Levant, and emphasizes that his kingdom would protect minorities: “Sharif Hussein’s objective in undertaking the Great Arab Revolt was to establish a single independent and unified Arab state stretching from Aleppo (Syria) to Aden (Yemen), based on the ancient traditions and culture of the Arab people, the upholding of Islamic ideals and the full protection and inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities.” http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_arabrevolt.html [Accessed 19 February 2017].

76 Ottomans. In an early piece of correspondence, Sharif Hussein explains the terms that the

British must meet in order to earn his support:

England will acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37th degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn ʿUmar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.

Hussein himself would rule over this caliphate. With British support, he and his sons Faisal and Abdullah fomented the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, which eventually wrested a significant portion of territory from Ottoman control. Yet Sharif Hussein’s ambitions were curtailed by those of the European colonizers, established under the terms of the Sykes-

Picot Agreement, and his pan-Arab state was not achieved. Hussein had to content himself with the British placing his son Faisal on the throne of Iraq, Abdullah on the throne of

Transjordan, and supporting his continued rule of the Hijaz. After the House of Saud overthrew his son Ali as King of the Hijaz in 1925, King Hussein retired to Transjordan, where he died in 1931.

Following Jordanian support of British objectives in WWII, as well as the exhaustion of the British empire, Jordan became independent in 1946. Like his father,

Abdullah I also harbored aspirations for territorial expansion, and dreamed of ruling over what he termed “Greater Syria,” a territory that included Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and

Palestine. Following the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948-49, Jordan gained control of the

West Bank and East Jerusalem, adding a significant population of largely urbanized and educated West Bankers to the primarily rural and uneducated populace of East Bankers.

Jerusalem was swiftly incorporated into symbolic depictions of the Jordanian nation,

77 however when Israel took control of the city in 1967, political elites were forced to alter the role of Jerusalem in the national narrative.110

Scholars have focused on the ways that territorial and demographic shifts have undermined efforts to establish a solid Jordanian identity. In his discussion of Jordan’s

“fuzzy nationalism” Frisch emphasizes security concerns as the motivation for the lack of specificity in official discourse on the boundaries of the Jordanian nation. Barnett examines how Jordan was not alone in its territorial ambitions, demonstrating how various Arab leaders claimed to support the establishment of Palestine while angling to take control of the territory themselves.111 In my view, vagueness in defining Jordan was due to lingering territorial ambitions tied to the Hashimites’ historical prominence. Emir Abdullah’s founding narrative of legitimacy was largely based on the Hashimites’ role in the Great

Arab Revolt, which legitimated the Hashimites’ claims to Palestine and Greater Syria on the basis of their role as Arab liberators. When these territorial ambitions proved fruitless,

Abdullah I and his successors had to reframe the basis of their legitimacy, as they could no longer claim to speak for all Arabs. Because their claim to rule was based on their would- be status as the legitimate Arab-Muslim rulers of a vast Arab-Muslim nation, their initial narrative was not specifically about Jordan, which was to have been but one corner of a vast empire. Yet as it became clear that these territorial aspirations would not be fulfilled, it was less apparent why they should rule over the inhabitants of a territory to which they had few historical claims or ties.

The early Jordanian state did not take a particularly active role in regulating and policing behavior. Jordanian scholars Abu Rumman and Abu Hannieh note a shift as a

110 Michael Robbins and Lawrence Rubin, “The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan,” (2013). 111 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (1998).

78 result of the conflict with Leftists in the mid-20th century, when political elites sought to reach out to other forms of opposition.

The serious conflict between the state and the secular-leftist currents – from the early 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s – drove the regime to open channels for a religious discourse that would help confront and oppose the spread of the leftist and Arab Nationalist (and pan-Arabist) movements.112

Although the Hashimites have largely constructed a founding narrative on the basis of anti- colonial revolt, they have also sought to draw on their historical religious authority. The basis of the Hashimites’ authority in Jordan is that of first among equals, as evidenced by the annual ritualized bestowing of tribal allegiance in the ceremony of homage (bayʿah).

Staged in an air-conditioned Bedouin tent, the heads of each tribe reconfirm their loyalty to the king, a practice that affirms that primary loyalty is to the tribe, and only then to the monarch.113

At different times, the Hashimite identity may be more of a tribal identity, at other times it is a religious identity. Similarly, at times the Hashimite kings of Jordan have put greater emphasis on either their religious authority, or their role as anti-colonial liberators.

Sometimes the narratives of religious authority and anti-colonialism are combined. In the following speech by King Hussein from 1992, he highlights the Hashimites’ status as a tribe, their role as Mecca’s freedom fighters, and their connection to “free man and the poor”:

The Hashimite tribe shall as always remain the hub—and apex—of the Arab nation's battles in the context of history as well as in the present and the future. The Hashimite state shall continue to embody the Islamic-Arab message which emanated from Mecca... The Hashimite's blood is inextricably mingled with the

112 Mohammed Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, The Islamic Solution in Jordan (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013), 35. 113 Broadcast on state TV channel Al-Telfziyon al-Urdunni, watched by the author at 9pm, 25 May 2015.

79 blood of the free men and the poor—in defense of the nation's freedom, of justice and of the people's right to sustenance, security, faith and free speech.114

King Hussein often used his claim to anti-colonial and religious authority to advocate on behalf of Palestine, a theme that King Abdullah II often highlights as well. However, King

Abdullah’s primary theme is often the Hashimites’ right to speak on behalf of Islam, especially concerning religious extremism. In the following speech from 2016, King

Abdullah II explicitly states that Jordan was founded on the religious legitimacy of the

Hashimites, who therefore have the religious standing to declare that Islam is tolerant by nature:

Our country’s pride in its religion and Arab identity is a national constant. Jordan was founded on the religious legitimacy of the Hashimites, who advocate Islam in a way that presents to the world the true image of this religion as a faith of tolerance that rejects all forms of extremism and violence.115

King Abdullah often mentions the Palestinian cause, but typically does so in the context of how the conflict can exacerbate violent extremism. In general, Jordan’s long-standing efforts to trumpet the Palestinian cause have been sidelined by considerations of violent extremism. The relative recentness with which the Hashimites began to articulate a narrative of Islamic toleration also undermines their efforts.

The lack of a set national identity in Jordan has contributed to the lack of a specific religious identity, such that when state institutions try to promote a specific interpretation of Islam, they have no underlying narrative about Jordanian religious identity on which to

114 Remarks by His Majesty King Hussein, Address to the Nation, Amman, Jordan, 5 November 1992. Translated from Arabic. http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html [Accessed 8 August 2017]. 115 Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II on the Occasion of Jordan’s 70th Independence Day, Amman, Jordan, 24 May 2016. Translated from Arabic: https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/occasion-jordans-70th-independence-day [Accessed 8 August 2017].

80 build. As a result, religious authorities make claims about Islam as a whole, in keeping with the Hashimites’ view of themselves as spokesmen for Islam. The official religious discourse does not try to tie its arguments about Islam to a specifically Jordanian character.

Religious Authority of the Monarch

The Hashimite rulers sometimes emphasizes their role in securing Jordanian independence, at other times they highlight the dynasty’s religious authority. In the contemporary context of international anxiety about Islam, King Abdullah II has attempted to leverage his family’s religious pedigree as an asset. The director of the Ministry of

ʾAwqāf for in the restive southern town of Maʿān, expressed the view that the Hashimites’ religious authority was significant: “the Hashimites were sent by God, and by the Prophet.

On the global level they, and King Abdullah II, always expressed the true image of

Islam.”116 He opined that the Hashimites’ religious authority exceeds that of other rulers, even the kings of Saudi Arabia. Not surprisingly, other representatives of official Islam expressed similar views. The Secretary General of the Department of Religious Edicts

(Dāʾira al-Iftā’) felt that the king’s Hashimite status was important to Jordan’s religious leadership: “Jordan is considered a model. This is important that the king is Hashimite.”117

Jordan’s role as a religious leader is a belief expressed by representatives of official Islam in Jordan, but no individual outside of Jordan spoke of it as having the status of religious model or leader.

Even some individuals not tasked with promoting official Islam viewed the

Hashimites’ religious authority as significant. Many stressed their respect for King

116 Author interview with the Director of the Office of the Ministry of ʿAwqāf, Interview ID 53A (Maʿān, Jordan, 11am, 21 September 2015). 117 Author interview with Secretary General of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’, Interview ID 17A (Amman, Jordan, 9am, 12 August 2015).

81 Abdullah II and even more expressed esteem for King Hussein. The former mayor of the southern town of Maʿān, a city more frequently associated with unrest than loyalty, asserted his regard for the Hashimites in general and King Abdullah in particular. He described an occasion when King Abdullah spoke on the state broadcast channel, JRTV, to encourage national unity and avoid fitna (communal strife), and in his view, the people listened. He added that, “The silence of Jordanians is not fearful. If I am quiet it is not because of the police but because I respect the king.” He pointed out that while there is corruption in the government, “the Hashimites deserve a round of applause.”118 His comments were echoed by others who viewed the monarchy as distinct from government. This view demonstrates the utility of a strategy employed by many monarchs, to separate themselves from the pettiness of politics, and to project an image of neutrality and remove. Yet in most Arab monarchies, the centralization of power in the royal family belies the projection of neutrality.

Despite the view held by some loyalists that the Hashimites have a unique religious standing, other individuals do not consider the monarch to possess religious authority.

Instead Saudi Arabia is often mentioned as the lode star for Islamic guidance. In an interview, an individual affiliated with the University of Jordan stated that whatever religious authority the Hashimites once had, they had lost to Saudi Arabia, “It does not matter that the king is Hashimite. We would trust a fatwā from Saudi Arabia more than one from Jordan… We would trust a fatwā from Al Azhar before one from Jordan.”119 In general, Saudi Arabia was cited as a religious model. The Hashimites are generally seen as

118 Author interview with the former mayor of Maʿān, Interview ID 56A (Maʿān, Jordan, 3pm 21 September 2015). 119 Author interview with security expert at University of Jordan, Interview ID 29A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 24 August 2015).

82 having some measure of religious status, and many respondents had positive views of King

Abdullah’s efforts to promote the “true” image of Islam as peaceful and moderate; however, King Abdullah himself is not seen as a religious leader.

The Hashimites do try to exert their religious authority on the international stage, as the mouth of “moderate Islam,” which I discuss in Chapter 5. Yet within Jordan, no references are made to a specific form of Jordanian Islam. Tying Jordanian Islam to the

Hashimites would be problematic, given their foreign origins. Proclaiming a form of

Jordanian Islam unique to Jordan would exclude the Hashimites, simultaneously undermining their political authority. Without a doctrinal message characteristic of Jordan,

Jordanians sometimes look for religious guidance elsewhere, especially to Saudi Arabia.

The territory of Jordan did not correspond historically to a single polity. When the emirate of Transjordan was established, it lacked a major urban center and therefore also lacked an existing set of institutions on which aspiring state-builders could begin to construct the organs of a modern state. Migdal might argue that the lack of existing institutions likely eased the task of early state-builders, as they did not have to exert control over them.120 However this has also undermined the authority of Jordanian religious institutions, as no set of indigenous Jordanian religious institutions predated the establishment of the modern state, and so there was no pre-existing tradition of Jordanian

Islam.

Official religious discourse in Jordan has had to contend with a lack of premodern religious institutions, the absence of a coherent national or religious identity, and the somewhat shaky claims to political legitimacy by the Hashimite monarchy. Official Islam

120 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 1988.

83 in Jordan does not present a specifically Jordanian form of Islam, and instead articulates universalist assertions. This stance is based in part on the traditional status of the

Hashimites as the rulers of Mecca, and also reflects contemporary trends that prioritize central, universal Islamic practice and belief over more local forms.

The royal family in Jordan continues to claim to speak on behalf of Arabs and

Muslims, and declares Jordan to be a homeland for all Arabs. Given their traditional standing as the rulers of Mecca, the Hashimites’ lack of religious authority is surprising. I attribute their deficit of religious authority to their inability or unwillingness to articulate a specifically Jordanian form of Islam. As will be discussed in the cases of Oman and

Morocco, the credibility of official Islam appears tied to the ruler’s ability to tether it to national identity. This is the result of the transformation of Islam that occurred when the religion was incorporated into state institutions and national narratives.

The Hashimites’ failure to achieve their desired status as pan-Arab and pan-Islamic leaders is puzzling. Given their historic role as figures of religious authority, they appear to have the attributes necessary to assert their status as religious leaders. Their failure points to the importance of linking religious identity with national identity. Although Islam is universalistic, its incorporation into the institutions, discourses, and identities of the modern state have altered the ways in which it is practiced and understood. Without the incorporation of Islam into the state, the Hashimites might have continued to enjoy religious leadership. However, their inability or unwillingness to articulate a national form of Islam and instead to seek for pan-Arab and pan-Islamic status has left them with minimal religious authority, even in their adopted territory.

84 Morocco

Official Islam in Morocco is produced through multiple institutions, including the

Ministry of ʾAwqāf, the High Council of ʿUlamaʾ, and the Mohammedia League of

Scholars. King Mohammad VI has established multiple new religious institutions in recent years, in a pattern of increasing bureaucratization of religious affairs. For example, the

Mohammedia League of Religious Scholars was established in 2006, the ʿUlamaʾ Council for Europe in 2008, the Mohammed VI Foundation for African ʿUlamaʾ in 2015, and the

International Imam Training Center also in 2015. These institutions are framed as a response to the 2003 Casablanca bombings and to general concerns about extremism, however other benefits are associated with greater institutionalization of religion, including the expansion of state control and positive global public relations for the regime.121

The process of colonization and nation-building in Morocco, both under the French and after independence, did not result in the establishment of an office of the Grand Mufti.

Morocco is somewhat unusual in this regard, as many officially-Islamic states rely on a

Grand Mufti to serve as the final arbiter of the state’s position on questions about Islam.

Grand Muftis are often associated with post-Ottoman territories, however some contexts such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei did not experience Ottoman control, yet chose to establish either a Grand Mufti’s office, or a collaborative group of muftis. Although French colonizers maintained the office in post-Ottoman Tunisia, for example, the religious status of the king obviated the need for a Grand Mufti in Morocco. In accordance with his

121 See, e.g., Ann Wainscott, Bureaucratizing Islam: Morocco and the War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Muhammad El-Katiri,” The Institutionalization of Religious Affairs: Religious Reform in Morocco” The Journal of North African Studies, 13, no. 1 (2012): 53-69.

85 religious status, the king of Morocco periodically leads prayers, a practice typically reserved for an imam.

The Alaouite dynasty of Morocco claims religious legitimacy due to their alleged descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Like the Hashimites, the Alaouite dynasty is of the

Sharifian line, the descendants of Fatima and Ali’s son Hassan. Yet unlike the Hashimites of Jordan, who tend to prioritize their anti-colonial bona fides, the Alaouites explicitly emphasize their religious authority. Of the three monarchies, the Moroccan king most clearly claims to hold religious status as the commander of the faithful, (ʾamīr al- muʾminīn). Mohammed VI, the present king of Morocco, enjoys a status formalized by his father Hassan II in the 1962 constitution. Yet the Moroccan king’s current authority was not a foregone conclusion and the monarchy has worked hard to centralize religious and political control within itself, disempowering previously influential religious institutions and altering the landscape of Moroccan Islam in the process.

The production of official religious discourse in Morocco shares many similarities with Jordan and Oman, specifically regarding the incorporation of religious institutions into the state and the effects that have persisted as a result of path dependence. Below I present the official national narrative, and the role of the king’s religious authority within it. Then I consider how the process of Moroccan nation-building has transformed religious institutions, and how the path dependent nature of these processes has constrained the choices available to the current rulers.

Constructing a National Narrative

In contrast to both Jordan and Oman, Morocco has a long and well-documented history as a political entity and a center of Islamic learning. As a result, Moroccan nation

86 builders have more historical resources on which to draw, but also must also contend with greater possibility for alternative interpretations. In Jordan, what little nation-building did occur focused primarily on the post-colonial past, and in Oman, the scarcity of historical texts, enduring buildings, or traditional institutions allowed nation builders greater freedom to construct a narrative of their own choosing. Encouraging identification with the

Moroccan nation was not the challenge; instead nation-builders had to work to curate a national narrative that served the purposes of the political elite. They chose to emphasize the tradition of the ruler’s joint political and spiritual authority.

The national narrative acknowledges pre-Islamic habitation of the territory, but highlights the significance of the invasion by the Umayyad empire in 670 CE, which brought Arabic and Islam to the Berber inhabitants. Official histories prioritize the independence of the Moroccan people, and the rise and fall of various Muslim Berber dynasties over the following centuries. The Idrisid dynasty, established by the great grandson of Hasan ibn Ali in 788, is seen as the first Moroccan state. The Idrisids were also responsible for establishing the Sharifian tradition in Morocco, and although the ruling

Alaouite dynasty is not descended from Idris, it also draws on the Sharifian legitimacy that

Idris first claimed.122

Beginning with the Idrisid dynasty, Morocco has been almost continuously ruled by a sultan or king, although few rulers controlled the entire territory of what is now

Morocco. Various dynasties shifted their capital city between Fez, Marrakesh, Rabat, and

Meknes, although Fez remained the spiritual center. The status of Sharif was held by some ruling dynasties, but all would-be rulers competed for religious authority with the powerful

122 The Idrisid dynasty was Zaydi-Shiʿa. Given that Shiʿa Islam requires the imam to be a descendent of the Prophet, Idris’ legitimacy within the Shiʿa tradition was assured.

87 ʿulamaʾ of Fez, as well as the heads of powerful Sufi orders. The official national narrative which highlights the absolute political and religious authority of the king is an invented tradition.

Alaouite control of a large portion of Moroccan territory was established by

Mawlay al-Rashid, also of Sharifian heritage, who overthrew the existing Saʾdi dynasty in

1672. Alaouite power waxed and waned as they jockeyed for position with other prominent families and foreign invaders, and faced resistance to centralized control by Berber tribes, especially in the northern mountainous Rif region. When the Spanish and French established Protectorates in the northern and southern regions of Morocco in 1912, the

Alaouite monarchy was in decline.

The French colonizers showed a preference for the Berbers rather than the Arab inhabitants, and sought to encourage the education of a class of local Berber elites and landowners, a practice that ingratiated them to certain powerful Berber families while alienating many Arabic speaking inhabitants. Yet the colonizer’s most significant error occurred when French efforts to disempower Alaouite Sultan Muhammad V united the population behind the monarch. The decision by the French to exile the sultan and his family to Corsica in 1953 solidified his stature as the embodiment of the Moroccan nation.

Although some independence fighters, and specifically the ʾIstiqlāl (“Independence”) party, wished for an independent Moroccan state to be set up as a republic, the king’s symbolism as a national and religious figure proved too potent. In 1956 Sultan Muhammad

V successfully negotiated Morocco’s independence, and changed his title from sultan to king the following year.

88 One key element of the official narrative is that the Protectorate period did not significantly alter Morocco. This narrative served the interests of the European colonizers, who wished to minimize resistance, as well those of the post-independence rulers, who wished for the Alaouites to be seen as the continuation a long history of centralized monarchical control. Therefore, both European and Moroccan political elites benefitted if the public saw the nation as emerging from colonial control unchanged.123 The monarchy has made subsequent efforts to connect its current rule with the traditions of Moroccan sultans of old.

After Muhammad’s death in 1961, his son became King Hassan II. In 1962 Hassan

II established a constitution. One key element of the new governing document was the designation of the Moroccan monarch as the Commander of the Faithful (‘amir al- mu’minin). Because the title was that held by Muslim caliphs, it was a controversial choice.

The decision demonstrates the eagerness with which Hassan II sought to strengthen his religious authority, a status that his son, current ruler Mohammed VI, inherited after his father’s death in 1999.

A relatively powerful central state has existed in Morocco for significantly longer than in either Jordan or Oman. As a result, the relationship between religious and political authority has a long history of interaction, characterized by symbiosis and rivalry. Yet it is only with the advent of modern nation-building, and the subsequent disempowerment of alternative forms of religious and political authority, that the Moroccan state has been able to transform Moroccan Islam into its present form, a manifestation of religious authority tailored to preserving the rule of the Alaouite dynasty. In the following sections, I provide

123 Susan Gilson Miller, A History of Modern Morocco (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3.

89 examples of how political elites have used the process of nation-building to assert control over the religious sphere. I also consider how this strategy of state control of religion has influenced the practice of Moroccan Islam.

Religious Authority of the Monarch

The groundwork for the official national narrative, as well as official religious discourse, was the result of European influence, especially following colonization in 1912.

Although the French were anxious to preserve an aura of authenticity, they decided to move the capital city from Fez to Rabat, in part due to the rebellious population of Fez. Sultan

Yusef ben Hassan, the father of the future King Muhammad V, also decided to move to

Rabat, as rebellion against the French and Spanish occupation threatened his safety as well as the colonizers’.

While the French felt that moving the capital was necessary for the sake of stability, they did not implement other changes to religious institutions that typified colonial control elsewhere. For example, the position of Grand Mufti as an official producer of religious edicts was never established in Morocco. The presence of a Grand Mufti is often the result of Ottoman influence, and Morocco was not colonized by the Ottomans. But unlike the

British in Jerusalem, who felt it necessary to establish a second Grand Mufti in addition to the existing mufti appointed by the Ottomans, no foreign power tried to instate a Grand

Mufti in Morocco.

The French were disinterested in introducing foreign structures of religious authority, because their strategy to rule Morocco was based on maintaining the fiction that the Moroccan way of life was largely unaltered by French control. The violence and expense that had accompanied the centuries-long colonization of Algeria had alerted

90 French colonial authorities to the need for a different approach in the Moroccan protectorate. The different approach centered on a discourse about the absence of French interference, embodied by the continued rule of the Moroccan sultan. As a figure endowed with the religious authority of a Sharif, the sultan also embodied Moroccan Islam, which the French colonial authorities actively sought to study, document, and classify as a unique expression of the faith.124 In his discussion of the role of the French in creating something known as “Moroccan Islam,” Burke incorrectly argues that Morocco is one of the few states to express a form of national Islam (many states do so); however, he is correct in that the discourse about Moroccan Islam predates many other national Islamic discourses.

In addition to reifying Moroccan Islam through their close scrutiny of it, the French attributed the relative absence of Moroccan resistance to Moroccan Islam (later resistance to French control not withstanding). Louis Lyautey, the first Resident-General of the

Morocco Protectorate from 1912 to 1925, made the following statement in a speech made to visiting colleagues in 1923:

We have not experienced here a single repercussion of the events in the East, for the simple reason that here the question of the Khalifat does not arise… Attribute it to only one thing: The religious autonomy of Morocco under the safeguard of its own Commander of the Faithful.125

Despite the fact that at the time of French occupation the Alaouite king no longer carried the moniker, it was resurrected by the French for the purposes of minimizing resistance to colonial occupation, and seen as crucial to the relative ease of colonization. Wyrtzen

124 Edmund Burke, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014), 6. See also Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 125 Louis Hubert Lyautey, Paroles d’Action: Madagascar - Sud-Oranis - Oran - Maroc 1900- 1926 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1927), 392. Translated from the French by the author.

91 describes how Lyautey sought to “preserve” authentic aspects of Moroccan heritage:

Lyautey, himself a legitimist sympathizer, meticulously maintained the makhzan’s traditional forms and trappings of rule and expended considerable effort to reinvigorate and, in some cases, reinvent the pomp and protocol of the palace, including a creating new Moroccan national flag and a new national anthem.126

By the early 20th century, the Alaouite sultans had lost much of their clout and prestige, as demonstrated by Yusef’s decision to follow the French from Fez to Rabat for his own protection in 1912. Because the French strategy for control centered on the continued rule of the sultan, the French heightened the publicity and visibility of both his political and religious authority.127 Ultimately, the French strategy worked too well, as demonstrated by the popular outrage that accompanied the French attempt to exile Sultan Muhammad V in hopes of quelling popular nationalist uprisings. The powerful ʾIstiqlāl party, active in

Morocco’s independent movement, viewed the monarchy as too complicit with French control. Without the unintentional boost in popularity caused by Muhammad V’s exile as

France clumsily tried to sideline him, the monarchy in Morocco might not have survived the transition to independence. Yusef’s son King Muhammad V and his grandson Hassan

II successfully worked to secure the monarch’s exalted status as it had been constructed by the French. Historically, the Alaouite dynasty had competed for authority with other prominent families, as well as powerful marabouts (religious teachers). Nevertheless, after the French made the Alaouite king the symbol of the Moroccan nation, public education and mass media soon communicated nationalist content that stressed the centrality of the king’s political and religious authority to all his subjects.

126 Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity (2016) 23-24. 127 Edmund Burke, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam, (2014).

92 In order to protect the renewed power of the monarchy, King Hassan II not only transformed existing religious institutions, he established new ones. In her discussion of how the Arab republics took over religious institutions, Zeghal highlights that the

Moroccan approach differed. Instead of allowing a religious institution, such as Al Azhar, to continue to exist under state control, the Moroccan monarchy took on the role of the central religious institution.128 There was precedent for this, as the Sharifian lineage of various Moroccan ruling dynasties had contributed to the vesting of religious authority in the person of the sultan himself. The ability of King Hassan II to establish the monarchy as the central religious institution in its own rite is based in part on this historical precedent.

Although King Mohammad VI benefitted from his father’s efforts to both expand and formalize the religious authority of the Moroccan king, his approach differs from that of the Hashimites. A comparison with certain practices and traditions of the Jordanian monarchy offers a few key insights into the Moroccan monarchs’ style of rule. For example, in Morocco the person of the king is vested with spiritual authority, while in

Jordan the status of the “people of the house” (of the Prophet Muhammad), extends to all members of the Hashimite family. In places where the official portrait of King Abdullah II is hung, such as government offices, typically the late King Hussein is also depicted, and sometimes Crown Prince Hussein, King Abdullah’s eldest son, as well. In contrast, in

Morocco King Mohammad VI is depicted alone. There are likely multiple reasons for this, for example, King Hussein was highly revered, while King Hassan was often known for his iron fist. Another reason could be due to the sensitive issue of succession in Jordan:

King Hussein’s brother, Hassan, was crown prince from 1965 to 1999. Abdullah replaced

128 Malika Zeghal, Trans. George Holoch, Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008), 9.

93 Hassan as Crown Prince just days before King Hussein died, leading to some uncertainty; as a result, Abdullah may wish to securely establish the paternal line of succession that will pass the crown to his eldest son, Hussein.

Relatedly, the official speeches of King Hussein are included in the database of royal speeches. In contrast, the Moroccan website only includes those of King Mohammad

VI, despite the fact that both King Hussein and King Hassan died in 1999 and ostensibly a similar level of technology was available to both bureaucracies in the process of archiving the former kings’ speeches and statements. Similarly, Jordan’s National Day falls every year on May 25th, to commemorate this date in 1946 when British control ended and Jordan became independent. In contrast, the date of Throne Day in Morocco depends on the king in power. Throne Day was established in 1933 to acknowledge November 18th as the day when Muhammad V took the throne three years earlier, in 1927. During the reign of Hassan

II, the date of Throne Day was March 3rd, to commemorate the day Hassan ascended to the throne. Following his death, Throne Day moved to July 30th, the day his son Mohammed

VI took the throne. In general, the Hashimite form of rule is grounded in their status as a family, and depends in part on each king’s relation to his predecessors and successors. In contrast, Alaouite rule is grounded in the person of the king himself, whose authority emanates from his automatic status as the commander of the faithful.

Although Mohammed VI does not highlight his father’s rule, he has built upon the legacy of religious power Hassan II established. In the following Throne Day speech from

2013, Mohammed VI explicitly references his status, as well as the significance of Maliki

Islam to Morocco’s brand of tolerant Islam.

[In] my capacity as Commander of the Faithful and protector of the faith and of the community of believers, I have sought to safeguard the Islamic identity of the

94 Moroccan people. Indeed, ours is a typically Moroccan approach to the practice of Islam, which is based on the homogeneity of the Maliki rite, as well as on temperance and moderation.129

The notion that the Maliki Sunni rite is coterminous with Moroccan identity is misleading, as the founder of Morocco, Idris I, established Shiʿa Islam as the religion of his domain.

However, both Hassan II and Mohammed VI have demonstrated their skill at rewriting history in such a way that resonates with existing beliefs, and as a result, the new narrative is rarely questioned.

Given that Moroccan Islam, in its present form, was largely shaped by French colonial narratives adopted and reinforced by the Alaouite monarchy, the widespread acceptance of the king’s status as the commander of the faithful is somewhat puzzling. As future chapters will discuss, Morocco has also been relatively successful in exporting its brand of Islam abroad, and Mohammed VI is seen as a religious leader for many Muslims in West Africa. In contrast to the Hashimites, whose religious status is long-standing, certain specific components of Moroccan Islam are of relatively recent vintage or had fallen out of use and were resurrected during the French Protectorate. I argue that Morocco has been more successful in its promotion of Moroccan Islam due to the effort to ground the religious identity in the national identity, drawing on existing aspects of Moroccan heritage and leveraging them in service of a politically useful narrative of Moroccan religious toleration.

129 Speech by His Majesty King Mohammad VI delivered on the 14th Occasion of Throne Day, Rabat, Morocco, 30 July 2013. Translated from Arabic. http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal- activities/full-text-royal-speech-delivered-tuesday-occasion-throne-day. [Accessed 27 August 2017].

95 Oman

Official Islam in Oman is produced primarily by the Ministry of ʾAwqāf and the office of the Grand Mufti. These institutions are characterized by stability. Abdullah bin

Mohammed bin Abdullah Al Salmi was appointed Minister of ʾAwqāf in 1997. Grand

Mufti Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad Al-Khalili was appointed in 1975. Both individuals are seen as influential in the production of Omani Islam.

The Ministry of ʾAwqāf, known in English as the Ministry of Endowments and

Religious Affairs, was merged with the Ministry of Justice from 1982 to 1997, at which point they were again split. The name of the Ministry was changed from “Islamic affairs”

(al-shu’un al-Islamiyya) to “religious affairs” (al-shu’un al-dinia) to reflect the ministry’s oversight of other religions. In general, Omani claims of religious tolerance are upheld.

According to the State Department’s Religious Freedom report, individuals of other faiths report that they are able to gather for worship.130 The Omani government maintains an active partnership with the Anglican Church, specifically through the work of the Al

Amana Center.

However, while members of other faith communities experience relative religious freedom, the government remains highly sensitive to Muslim sectarianism. Article 31 of the Press and Publishing Law of 1984 prohibits the publication of any material that would

“incite crimes or hatred or spread indecency or sow discord among members of society.”131

The government is quick to suppress sectarian discord between Ibāḍīs and Sunnis.

130 2016 International Religious Freedom Report for Oman, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: United States Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269152.pdf [Accessed 4 December 2017]. 131 https://omaninfo.om/english/module.php?module=pagesshowpage&CatID=162&ID=547 [Accessed 3 March 2017].

96 Grand Mufti Sheikh Al Khalili was appointed to the office in 1975 at the age of 30, following the death of the previous Grand Mufti, Sheikh Ibrahim bin Said Al Abri. Al

Khalili is a member of a powerful religious family descended from several former ruling

Ibāḍī imams. Sultan Qaboos’ decision to appoint him reflects his efforts to encourage the families of former rivals to buy in to the success of the new government. The duties of the aging Grand Mufti are shared with his son-in-law, the Assistant Grand Mufti, Sheikh

Kahlan Al Kharusi, who sometimes acts as the representative of Mufti Khalili. The office of the Grand Mufti is part of the Ministry of ʾAwqāf, and Minister of ʾAwqāf is the superior of the Grand Mufti.

Like its counterparts elsewhere in the region, the Omani Ministry of Religious

Affairs builds and oversees mosques, trains clerics, and produces official sermons to be delivered during Friday mosque services. In addition, the Ministry holds annual conferences to expand access to information about Ibāḍī Islam.

The ruler of Oman, Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said, seized power from his father in a bloodless coup in 1970. The Al Bu Saʿid dynasty has held power in Oman since the middle of the 18th century. Historically the Al Said controlled the coastal territory known as Muscat, and Oman’s periodic overseas holdings in East Africa, but the interior territory of Oman was a separate polity ruled by an Ibāḍī imam. The treaty of Seeb of 1920 formalized the de facto separation of Oman and Muscat, however the discovery of oil in the interior contributed to eventual conflict between the two, culminating in the Dhofar

War of the 1950s. Sultan Said, Qaboos’ father, assisted by the Royal Air Force, overwhelmed the forces of Imam Ghalib, who had received Saudi support to re-establish the Ibāḍī imamate. Said took control of the interior, and in 1970 his son Qaboos altered the

97 name of his kingdom from the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat, to the Sultanate of Oman.

The Al Bu Saʿid dynasty does not claim religious status; within Ibāḍī tradition, prominent male members of the community select an imam, who is possessed of both religious knowledge and leadership qualities, to rule. The imam can be removed from power if he fails to engage in consultation (shura) with advisors and community leaders, or otherwise loses the support of his followers. In practice, imams tended to be from a few key families.132 Sensitive to Oman’s history of rule by an imam, Sultan Qaboos has avoided any sort of religious veneer for his rule, focusing instead on using petroleum revenues to burnish his performance legitimacy. Qaboos has carefully cultivated a national narrative centered on his own person as the key driver of Omani prosperity in the late 20th and early

21st centuries. Oil wealth, widely distributed, has transformed Oman from one of the poorest and least developed societies in 1970 to its current status as an upper middle- income state.

Of the three monarchies studied, Oman represents an example of a strong state and a relatively weak society. In contexts where the state has access to resources, the population is small, and existing institutions at the time of modern nation-building are few— conditions typified by the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council—we can expect that the beliefs and behaviors of the population are likely to be influenced by the discourse put forward by the state than in contexts less dominated by state power. I focus on the role of religion within the national narrative of Oman as articulated by state institutions, and begin with a brief background on Omani history to provide context for the national narrative.

132 J.E. Peterson, “Oman’s Odyssey: From Imamate to Sultanate,” In B.R. Pridham, ed. Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Developments (London: Croom Helm, 1987): 1-16.

98 Constructing a National Narrative

In contrast to Jordan, where territorial aspirations and shifting territorial and demographic boundaries undermined potential efforts to articulate a coherent national identity, the Omani monarchy is similar to the Moroccan in prioritizing both the articulation and dissemination of a robust national identity grounded in religious and economic factors. However, while the Moroccan narrative is based on the religious authority of the Moroccan king as the commander of the faithful, and is grounded in the relatively mainstream Maliki Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence, Oman’s form of official Islam is Ibāḍīsm. Ibāḍīsm is a sect of Islam which is neither Sunni nor Shiʿa, but characterized by strict adherence to the Qurʾan as well as tolerance toward non-Ibāḍīs.

Oman is the only country in the world where the political elites and the head of state are

Ibāḍī Muslims. While the Omani state enforces strict non-sectarianism, Ibāḍīsm is sometimes misunderstood abroad as being similar to Shi’ism. This is particularly inaccurate, as Ibāḍī Islam is closer to a strict form of Sunnism, while also maintaining some key distinctions on points of doctrine.

The territory of what is now the Sultanate of Oman was historically divided between the population that lived along the coast, and that in the interior. The current ruling dynasty, the Al Bu Saʿid, came to power in the coastal region after overthrowing the

Persian Yarubid dynasty in 1749. The sultans of the Al Bu Saʿid established a mercantile empire, trading along the sea routes of the Indian Ocean and conquering territory in South

Asia and East Africa. The interior portion of the country was historically the territory of

Ibāḍī tribes, periodically ruled by an Ibāḍī imam. The coastal and interior polities were separate, periodically warring or cooperating while maintaining distinct political, cultural,

99 and economic systems.

In 1798 Sultan Ibn Ahmed allied with the East India Company to repel the incursions of the Wahhabis from central Arabia. This was the beginning of a long partnership with the British, who sought the allegiance of the Arab political elites that controlled the route to India. In order to minimize conflict between the coast, known as

“Muscat” and the interior, known as “Oman,” the British helped to establish the Treaty of

Seeb in 1920. However, with the discovery of oil in the interior, Sultan Saʿid sought to take control of the territory, causing the tribes of the interior to unite around Imam Ghalib to defend their lands against the Sultan’s invasion. In a conflict known as the Jebel Akhdar

War (1954-1959), they attempted to establish the Imamate of Oman as a sovereign nation.

British assistance allowed Sultan Saʿid to defeat the Imam’s forces, annex the territory, and force Imam Ghalib into exile in Saudi Arabia. Even following the establishment of the

Sultan’s control over the interior, the territories were still known as “Muscat” and “Oman” until 1970, when the current ruler Sultan Qaboos renamed it the “Sultanate of Oman” after ousting his father in a coup.

When Qaboos took the throne, Omani forces were engaged in battle with secessionist rebels in the southern region of Dhofar.133 Although initially sparked by dissatisfaction with the rule of Sultan Saʿid among the impoverished Dhofaris, the conflict

133 Qaboos is the only Gulf leader to have fought a war to maintain control of his territory: “Oman is unique among the Gulf monarchies in that it is the only state to face internal military resistance, although it must be understood that the Dhofar war predated the coup of 1970 and in large part motivated the change in government. The Dhofar war played a critical role in defining both Sultan Qaboos and the nature of Omani development. By inclination, training, and most probably belief, Qaboos focused almost entirely on military affairs through most of the 1970s. The victory made him a national hero. Defense issues remained a principle focus of Qaboos, and it would appear that in this arena he met with little restraint from either the general population or the elite.” Calvin Allen and Lynn Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution 1970-1996 (London and Portland OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), xvii.

100 became a proxy for the Cold War when the Marxist People’s Democratic Republic of

Yemen, supported by the USSR, helped to arm the rebels, while the British and Iranian governments supplied military assistance to the Sultanate’s efforts to reassert control of the region. The first several years of Qaboos’ rule were largely devoted to winning the military conflict, and though Qaboos declared the rebellion officially ended in 1975, sporadic fighting continued.134 Sultan Qaboos eventually quelled the rebellion by combining brutal attacks with outreach to the local populace. He then focused on utilizing the sultanate’s petroleum reserves to set up a rentier state.

Due to the power of the state in the Omani context, the official narrative regarding the development of Oman is prevalent. Visitors to Oman note a frequently repeated anecdote that asserts, “When Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, there were only three schools and one hospital…”: variations of this anecdote exist, but the basic point is the same:135 Sultan Qaboos, in the narrative of the state and that adhered to by many members of the population, is responsible for the period of prosperity and stability known the

“Golden Renaissance.” He overcame the neglect and poverty overseen by his father Sultan

Saʿid, whom official discourse frames as the chief antagonist to Oman’s prosperity. His subjects revere him for overseeing nearly half a century of economic growth, marked by lavish social spending on literacy, health, and employment. Qaboos has accomplished this in the manner of all Gulf autocrats, funded by oil revenues and unobstructed by representative government, an active civil society, and few institutions that pre-dated his tenure. Like all nation-builders, Qaboos has actively cultivated national myths, legends,

134 For more on the Dhofar War, see, e.g., J.E. Peterson, “Oman: Three and a Half Decades of Change and Development,” Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (2004): 125-137; Marc Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 135 Oman: 1994 Muscat: Ministry of Information (166).

101 and invented traditions.

I highlight the aspect of the Omani national narrative that other scholars have critiqued, that which frames Sultan Qaboos as responsible for transforming Oman from an impoverished backwater to a modern rentier state. The official narrative uses Qaboos’ father Sultan Saʿid as the foil for Qaboos, portraying him as an ineffectual ruler unconcerned with his people’s needs. Although Sultan Saʿid did little to promote the wellbeing of his subjects, several scholars have pointed out that the official narrative is a strategy to strengthen Qaboos’ political legitimacy and popular support. Rabi (2006) argues that in fact Saʿid’s rule set the stage for Qaboos’ successful development of Omani society, specifically his efforts to begin to develop oil resources, stabilize an indebted economy, and establish positive relationships with tribal leaders. Rabi acknowledges that Saʿid actively prevented modernization due to his fear that change and development could threaten his rule, however he asserts that Qaboos’ portrayal of Saʿid as a completely incompetent ruler is inaccurate.136 As Eickelman wryly observes:

The major transformations in Omani society and polity have been incremental and cumulative, not readily reduced to the ahistorical ‘big bang’ theory advanced by government publicists in which all substantive change in Oman began in July 1970.”137

Valeri critiques the official narrative for focusing primarily on the person of Sultan Qaboos himself as instrumental in Oman’s current prosperity and stability, rather than attributing the change to the influx of oil revenues that occurred around the time when Qaboos took the throne.138 At the time he was deposed, Sultan Saʿid did not yet have access to the

136 Uzi Rabi, The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2006). 137 Dale Eickelman, “National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Oman,” International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies 6, no. 1 (1989), 10. 138 Marc Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State, 2009.

102 petroleum revenues that allowed his son to take credit for improving the lives of Omanis.

Although scholars have pointed out that the official narrative over-emphasizes Qaboos as instrumental in Oman’s development, interviews with Omanis demonstrate their conviction that without Qaboos, the sultanate may return to instability and poverty. Limbert notes that Qaboos has been so effective in portraying himself as the key to Oman’s transformation that the population lives in fear of his death.139 I highlight Sultan Qaboos’ apparent success in convincing the population of his role in order to provide context for the components of the narrative that focus on religion, as well as the prevalence of the narrative.

Ibāḍīs are the intellectual descendants of the Kharijites, a group of Muslims who split off from the early Muslim community due to their anger that Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, would agree to arbitration with the governor of Syria, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, viewing this as an unholy acceptance of an authority other than God’s, and a violation of Qurʾanic precepts. Violent extremist groups like the Islamic State have been compared to the Kharijites due to their advocacy of violence against other Muslims, and their extremely strict interpretation of Islamic scripture. The Kharijites as a group did not survive, and many of them were killed by Ali’s forces at the Battle of Nahrawan. A group of early Ibāḍīs settled in Oman and established it as a bastion of their sect.

Some Ibāḍī scholars have rejected the notion that the Kharijites were their forebears, while others acknowledge the connection.140 However Ibāḍīs’ view of themselves matters less than the fact that many Sunni and Shiʿa Muslims view them as

139 Mandana Limbert, In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 140 See, e.g., Ali Yahya Mu’ammar, Ibāḍīsm in History Vol. I: The Emergence of the Ibāḍī School (Muscat: The Ministry of ʾAwqāf and Religious Affairs, 2007).

103 Kharijites, or in some cases, as not truly Muslim at all: “Non-Ibāḍī authorities regard the

Ibāḍī school as a branch of the Kharijite movement, which broke away from the mainstream to form a moderate group under the leadership of Abdullah b. Ibād.”141 Ennami rejects the view that Ibāḍīs are Kharijites, asserting that Ibāḍīs consider themselves to be a continuation of the group that overthrew Uthman.142 This conflict, known as the First Fitna

(chaos), predated ‘Ali’s decision to agree to arbitration, which enraged the Kharijites.

Because Oman is the only state that establishes Ibāḍīsm as its official form of Islam, the discourse produced by the Omani Ministry of ʾawqāf and Religious Affairs has an essential monopoly on the subject of Ibāḍīsm. Since 1988 the Omani government has annually convened a conference on Islamic fiqh in order to raise awareness about Ibāḍīsm.143

One of Qaboos’ primary objectives has been to establish himself as the “natural” sovereign of the entire territory,144 a task he has accomplished through generous social spending and the production of unifying national myths. However, the population and territory of Oman exhibit many divisions. For example, the sectarian divide represents a possible source of conflict. Oman holds the largest population of Ibāḍī Muslims, though small communities of Ibāḍīs live in Algeria and Tunisia. According to the CIA Fact Book,

Ibāḍīs make up about 75 percent of the Omani population, although the Omani government does not collect information about the sectarian orientation of its citizens.

141 Amr Khalifah Ennami, Studies in Ibāḍīsm (al-Ibāḍīyah): Thesis submitted to the University of Cambridge for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Muscat: Ministry of ʾAwqāf and Religious Affairs, 1971), 31. 142 Ibid., 33. 143 Khalid Al-Azri. Social and Gender Inequality in Oman: The Power of Religious and Political Tradition (Muscat: The Omani Ministry of Higher Education, 2013), 107. 144 ‘Amr Khalifah Ennami, Studies in Ibāḍīsm (al-Ibāḍīyah), (1971), 252.

104 Sunnis are suspected to actually make up about half the population, however it serves the interests of the Ibāḍī political elites to maintain that Ibāḍīs constitute a significant majority. The region of Dhofar (Ẓufār) in southern Oman tends to have higher numbers of Sunnis. This region was historically part of the Ḥaḍramūt region, although today the border with Yemen splits a geographic area known for its distinct climate. The fact that Sultan Qaboos’ mother was Dhofari leant him increased credibility in the region, but the Dhofar War serves as a reminder that the area has not historically considered itself Omani. In addition, a community of Shiʿa Muslims originally from southern

Pakistan known as the Lawatiyya has lived in Oman for centuries, centered around

Muscat and in the Batinah region.145 The following sections focus on specific national myths used to legitimate the leadership of Qaboos over the imagined community of a unified Omani nation.

The Ibāḍī identity is primarily associated with the interior, the historic realm of the

Ibāḍī imam. In contrast, the coastal area of Muscat was known for its reliance on seafaring.

The image of a graceful dhow is a component of the national identity in most of the small monarchies that line the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, evoking the area’s history of seafaring. However, unlike the other small Persian Gulf states, the central role of seafaring in the traditional economy is used to highlight Omani toleration towards other cultures.

Oman’s heritage as a “seafaring nation” has received significant official promotion, both in formal education and in touristic material. In 1987, Wilkinson noted “The maritime image is promoted and Muscat society, which is becoming all Oman, turns its back on

145 See, e.g., Marc Valeri, “High Visibility, Low Profile: The Shiʿa in Oman Under Sultan Qaboos” International Journal of Middle East Studies 42, no. 2 (2010): 251-268.

105 the interior tradition.”146 The following text, taken from the 1994 edition of the annual publication of the Ministry of Information, provides a typical example of official discourse on Oman’s nature as a seafaring power:

From the seventh to the fifteenth centuries Oman’s maritime trade flourished. Omani ships regularly called at ports in Persia, India, and Southeast Asia…As they travelled and traded, the Omanis spread the message of Islam as well as the Arabic language and culture.147

In 1980 the Qaboos government sponsored the construction of the “Sohar,” a traditional dhow, named for the Omani town and alleged birthplace of the legendary sailor, Sindbad.

With much fanfare, the Sohar was sailed by the British explorer Tim Severin along the traditional sea route to China. Interviewees echoed the official narrative that Oman’s identity as a “seafaring nation” had a lasting effect upon the character of its people: according to one professor, “The first theme in Omani nationhood is its location and history as a maritime power.”148 I view the official emphasis on toleration to be a strategy to overcome the potential division of the territory. By framing toleration as the shared characteristic of both the Ibāḍī interior and the coastal merchants, the official narrative emphasizes that the two territories have shared values, even while acknowledging their distinct contributions to a (unified) Omani culture.

It is hardly unusual for the process of nation-building to emphasize the shared history and identity of formerly distinct territories. However due to the fact that both the interior region and the southern area of Dhofar engaged in armed rebellion against Muscat, efforts to convey unity are especially pronounced. All interviewees expressed a sense of

146 John Wilkinson, The Imamate Tradition of Oman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2. 147 Oman: 1994 (Muscat: Ministry of Information, 1995), 21. 148 Author information session with professor (Muscat, Oman, 3pm, 27 February 2014).

106 imagined community, from government employees to college students.149 When asked to explain the Omani stance on religious toleration, the Assistant Grand Mufti explained that

Oman’s status as a historical entity was significant. He contrasted Oman with polities that were the result of a colonizer’s pen stroke, stressing that Oman’s religious and mercantile heritage had created a unified identity on the basis of toleration.150 Processes of nation- building appear to have successfully cultivated a shared sense of nationhood that emphasizes a religious heritage of toleration; however, nation-building has indelibly shaped the ways in which religious heritage is understood, simplifying and codifying it in the typical manner of states. In the next sections I focus on the effect of nation-building on religious institutions.

Religious Authority of the Monarch

Omani ruling elites have had to deal carefully with the legacy of the Ibāḍī imamate; they generally chose to celebrate and historicize certain elements of the Imamate period, while ignoring other aspects, especially those that might threaten the legitimacy of rule by a sultan. For example, according to Ibāḍī doctrine, the imam or ruler of the Ibāḍī community is selected by prominent male members of the community based on his leadership qualities, including religious learning. During his tenure, the imam is supposed to enforce Islamic law (shariʿa), based on consultation (šūrā) with advisors. If the imam fails in his duties or is no longer qualified, the community can remove him. This emphasis on consultation informs the Ibāḍīs’ nickname, “The People of Consultation” which has

149 An Omani student shared the following: “It was always Oman, there is no specific time period for Oman… It was still Oman, though not united, with rulers in each part of the country. But it was understood that even though it was decentralized it was always Oman.” Author interview with student, Interview ID 4D (Muscat, Oman, 16 November 2007). 150 Author interview with Assistant Grand Mufti Sheikh Kahlan Al Kharusi, Interview ID20C. (Muscat, Oman, 11am, 18 November 2015).

107 caused some scholars to view Ibāḍīsm as a form of proto-democracy.151 The Qaboos government has embraced this view of Ibāḍīsm, sponsoring research into Oman’s traditional democracy, such as by the Fulbright commission in 2008.

While Ibāḍī doctrine supports this view in theory, scholars have expressed some skepticism. Wilkinson points out that in fact, the imams tended to come from specific families, representing dynastic succession rather than democratic rule.152 At the annual conference on Ibāḍīsm and Oman in 2016, Wilkinson noted that the Ibāḍīs of Oman lived under non-imamate rule for greater periods of time than under the rule of an imam.153

Similarly, when discussing the tradition of consultation, Valeri dismisses it as the “myth of traditional democracy.”154 Rule by an Ibāḍī imam did not necessarily conform to its idealized image as semi-democratic and deeply authentic to the Omani way of life.

Despite this, it was the idealized image of an Ibāḍī Islamic State that appears to have motivated the followers of Imam Ghalib in the Jabal Akhdar War of the 1950s. In the context of modernization that was beginning to occur in the territory by the mid 20th century, Imam Ghalib’s cause can be seen in nationalist terms, meaning it was motivated more by the modern desire for self-determination, although religious conviction likely also played a role. If the Imam’s forces had succeeded, they might have established a state similar to Saudi Arabia, wherein the promise of a government ruled according to Islamic precepts would likely have lost its veneer of justice and piety, due to the realities of politics.

However, their efforts for self-determination failed, and the idealized imamate remains

151 See, e.g., Hussein Ghobash, Trans. Mary Turton. Oman: The Islamic Democratic Tradition (New York: Routledge, 2006). 152 John Wilkinson, The Imamate Tradition of Oman, 1987. 153 “Religion and Policy in Oman,” 7th Annual Conference on Ibāḍīsm and Oman, Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford, May 23 to May 25, 2016. 154 Marc Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State, 2009, 44.

108 untarnished by lived experience. Although the image of the democratic Ibāḍī imamate appears to be largely a myth, its mythic quality has leant it sufficient potency to threaten

Sultan Qaboos. Fears that devout Ibāḍīs might seek to re-establish the imamate led to arrests in 1994 and 2005, although the intentions of the individuals involved remains unclear. Although convicted, the individuals were later pardoned by Sultan Qaboos.155

To counter this threat to his legitimacy, Qaboos has sought to incorporate certain aspects of Imamate rule into his own reign. For example, until poor health prevented him from doing so, he would make an annual trip around the territory to meet with his subjects, hear their complaints, and settle disputes. Although the tradition evokes images of the imam in consultation with his people, historical imams were more likely to have received petitioners inside their palace, and not once a year as a photo opportunity. While largely performative, interviewees expressed the view that the annual tour indicated the Sultan’s diligence in attending to the needs of his people.156

In the process of nation-building, the sultanate inherited Ibāḍī religious institutions, although the interior of Oman lacked major urban centers and architecture was usually constructed using short-lived mud brick. Yet a more enduring institution with which to contend was the network of prominent families that traditionally served as religious and political elites. Sultan Qaboos incorporated many of these individuals in his young government, which encouraged potential rivals to buy into the project of building up the capacity of the Omani state. The Grand Mufti of Oman, Ahmed bin Hamad al Khalili, was appointed in 1975 following the death of the previous Grand Mufti. Sheikh Khalili is from

155 Valeri, 2009, 185-8, 193-5; Mandana Limbert, In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town, (2010), 8. 156 Author interview with imam, Interview ID 17B (Nizwa, Oman, 6pm, 17 November 2015).

109 a prominent family that provided many of the Ibāḍī imams, including the final Ibāḍī imam to rule, Imam Muhammad b. Abdullah al-Khalili, whose death in 1954 contributed to the

Jebel Akhdar War.157 The institution of Grand Mufti itself was the result of Ottoman influence, although the Ottomans did not colonize Oman.

When Sultan Qaboos came to power and used petroleum revenues to undertake state building in a manner impossible under earlier conditions of resource scarcity, the

Ibāḍī imamate had not existed for 16 years, but remained a salient memory for the Ibāḍī tribes of the interior. In order to encourage a unified Omani identity and to reduce the likelihood of another rebellion, Qaboos strategically incorporated key individuals and concepts into his project of state- and nation-building. In the process, the understanding of

Ibāḍīsm and Omani heritage was altered to serve the needs of the rulers. Qaboos has emphasized the importance of maintaining Omani heritage, as reflected in the following statement from a speech given in 1993:

[I]t is necessary to maintain useful social traditions and a correct positive behaviour derived from a distinct cultural identity… Oman is a country with a deep-rooted history, a distinguished character, which has its own philosophy in social life, and therefore we should not allow senseless imitation to impede our progress or passively affect our immortal heritage.158

Qaboos’ alleged commitment to maintaining Omani heritage is ironic, considering the vast changes that he has implemented, many of which seek to consolidate control within his own person, as well as credit for lifting Omanis out of poverty. His stated commitment to

Oman’s heritage evokes the following observation by Anderson, who wryly points out that

“the monarchs of the Middle East can oversee vast changes in the name of preservation,

157 John Wilkinson, The Imamate Tradition of Oman, 1987, 8. 158 HM B.S. Qaboos, “Speech at Sultan Qaboos University, 1993.” The Royal Speeches of HIs Majesty, Sultan Qaboos bin Saʿid: 1970-2010 (Muscat: Oman Ministry of Information, 2010).

110 inventing traditions as they go along.”159 In the case of Oman, the primary invented tradition was that of Omani peacefulness and toleration, which Sultan Qaboos has particularly emphasized following 2001.

In contrast to Jordan and Morocco, the centralization of administrative control in state institutions began in Oman only towards the end of the 20th century. As a result, the

Qaboos government has enjoyed an almost complete monopoly over national and religious discourse, as the only institution that could have challenged its authority was the imamate, which was destroyed prior to Qaboos’ reign. Sultan Qaboos has used his control over institutions of cognition to inculcate a national identity that unifies the previously separate polities of Oman and Muscat. By emphasizing the religious tolerance of Ibāḍīsm and the cosmopolitan tolerance of coastal merchants, he seeks to diminish the possibility for territorial and sectarian division and to consolidate his own control.

V. Conclusion

For all three monarchies, I have presented evidence of similar patterns influenced by the characteristics of each case. In each, the construction of the official national narrative included a religious component based on the specific claims of religious authority of the monarch, as well as the history of the territory itself. Each monarchy invented traditions to bolster the ongoing control of the king against threats. The Hashimites are not originally native to Jordan; the Alaouites must maintain their claim to spiritual as well as political authority; the Al Bu Saʿid face a potential threat from the phantom imamate.

159 Lisa Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East.” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (1991): 13.

111 A comparison between the religious status claimed by the respective monarchies of

Jordan and Morocco is particularly revealing. The ruling families of both kingdoms claim the right to speak on behalf of “true” Islam based on their status as alleged descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet Morocco has been more successful in branding Moroccan

Islam as moderate: countries from France to Mali to Russia have sent Muslim clerics to

Morocco to be trained in moderate Moroccan Islam. In contrast, while Jordan has presented itself as “the very model of a moderate Muslim state,” few countries view Jordan as a religious leader. This is puzzling because the Hashimite dynasty of Jordan governed Mecca and Medina for centuries, and yet they have been unsuccessful in leveraging their unique religious legitimacy. In contrast, the status of the king of Morocco as the “commander of the faithful” was reinstated by the French during the Protectorate period, and formalized by King Hassan II in the 1962 constitution. Put simply, the Hashimites’ claim to Islamic authority is grounded in centuries of religious leadership, while the Alaouites’ claim is based on a moniker resurrected by the French for the purposes of minimizing resistance to colonial occupation.

The chapter argues that the Alaouites have been more successful in leveraging their religious legitimacy because they have connected their narrative to the Moroccan national identity. By building on French colonial discourse, the Alaouites constructed a narrative of religious identity integral to the Moroccan nation. In contrast, the Hashimites tried to rely on their traditional religious status but did not connect their articulation of religious identity to the Jordanian nation. The Hashimites originally saw their rightful domain as encompassing much of the Middle East, and later revised their ambitions to “Greater

Syria”; according to their ambitions, Jordan was supposed to be only a portion of their

112 larger kingdom. This, complicated by periodic influxes of Palestinian refugees determined to maintain their own national identity, undermined any efforts to construct a narrative tying the Hashimites to the territory and the people of Jordan.

In contrast, the Omani ruler successfully linked the official religious identity with the national identity, however due to Oman’s form of official Islam, Oman is unlikely to be seen as a religious leader, despite its success in preventing extremism. These findings are consistent with the chapter’s overarching argument, that in contexts where the state is a key actor in the religious sphere, efforts to encourage a specific religious identity and discourse will be more potent if linked to the national identity.

The chapter highlights how choices made during processes of nation-building exhibit path dependent effects. Having constructed a specific role for religion in the narrative of national identity and legitimacy of their rule, political elites are constrained in their ability to alter the narrative later. Religious identities linked to national identities will have greater resonance, and the ability to align official religious discourse with existing conceptions of national identity is specifically grounded in the religious authority claimed by the ruling monarchy, the legacy of colonization, and the strength of religious institutions prior to their incorporation into state structures.

The following chapter shifts from a historical perspective grounded largely in the secondary literature, to analysis of contemporary dynamics at play in the context of state- led shifts in religious discourse, and focusing on the educational realm.

113 Chapter 3: Teaching Official Islam

I. Introduction

My dissertation’s primary focus is on the production of official religious discourse by state institutions, as well as the extent to which individuals are likely to either reproduce the discourse or challenge the state’s preferred discourse. In the educational sphere, state discourses retain a measure of control over the content of textbooks.160 Although political elites cannot be certain that teachers are necessarily presenting the content uncritically, the bureaucratic structures of public education reinforce state power. Educational institutions are key players in the production and dissemination of religious discourse, and for this reason the subject of intense debate regarding government involvement in religion. In this chapter, the individuals in question are affiliated with the production of educational religious discourses, or engaged in activism around reforms to educational curricula, specifically pertaining to the discussion of religion, or are students: the targets of state-led religious pedagogy. The chapter explains variation in the resonance of educational discourses as reflecting correspondence to frames established during the nation-building process.

II. Religious Pedagogy in the MENA Region

Scholars have long recognized schooling as a means for states to indoctrinate citizens into a preferred way of thinking. Across much of the MENA region, educational institutions and curricula have received sustained attention as a key arena for state

160 My characterization of educational spaces as relatively more subject to state oversight follows Nathan Brown, Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 224-5.

114 penetration. Scholarly focus has coincided with the watchful eye of policy makers, international observers, activists, and journalists, such that shifts in curricula often prompt loud expressions of both support and resistance. Scholarship has demonstrated the role of schools in the process of nation-building, especially regarding the creation of a literate community that has been taught to conceive of itself as a nation. Brand, in her study of the role of textbooks in creating official national narratives, affirms that, “The most basic task of an official narrative is – through a combination of simple exposition and more complex construction – to establish the identity markers of a unified national community, and to do so in a way that presents them as natural or given.”161 Her analysis emphasizes the use of educational materials to create a “usable past,” one that can serve the nation-building agenda.

In their comprehensive edited volume analyzing curricula across the MENA region, Doumato and Starrett observe that, “Textbook producers aim primarily to articulate nations by crafting master narratives.”162 They find that in general, the forms of official religious discourse expressed in textbooks refrain from sectarianism and instead enforce a generic Islam primarily interested in adherents displaying obedience to the ruler. Starrett offers an apt description of the creation of a form of Islam useful to political elites: “But just as wild plants have to undergo systematic genetic alterations to make them useful as cultivated foods, so ‘Islam’ has to be altered to make it useful as a political instrument.163 His insights are useful for considering the ways in which

161 Laurie Brand, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (2014), 10. 162 Eleanor Doumato & Gregory Starrett, eds. Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East (2007), 13. 163 Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1998), 8.

115 religious discourse in the context of concerns about extremism is leveraged to serve this narrative, in addition to continuing to assert national unity and loyalty. Additional recent analyses of the use of educational institutions to advance political elites’ discursive projects have included discussions of how efforts to combat extremism have shaped pedagogical goals.164

Given the attention paid to pedagogical instruments like textbooks, educational content becomes an important indication of political elites’ commitment to a set of goals.

Yet the international focus on curricula tends to forget that the content of textbooks is rarely swallowed whole by students; instead of being understood for its presumed impact on young minds, curricula offer a means of listening to the state talk about itself, to observe the performance it enacts. The chapter adds to the robust scholarship on the religious education in the MENA region by focusing on the ways in which reforms to educational content have been seized upon by both proponents and critics as either cause for celebration or concern. Interviews with bureaucrats as well as non-bureaucrats demonstrate the extent to which education is recognized as a signal of the state’s agenda.

Yet both supporters and critics of reforms tend to also engage in the reification of these texts, such that alterations to curricula are seen as indicating a possible shift in the domestic balance of power. Educational reforms become the subject of sustained attention not so much for the effect that they are expected to produce in the minds of

164 See, e.g., Robert Hefner and Mohammad Qasim Zaman, Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Sarah Feuer, Regulating Islam: Religion and State in Contemporary Morocco and Tunisia (Cambridge University Press, 2018); Ann Wainscott, “Defending Islamic Education: War on Terror Discourse and Religious Education in 21st Century Morocco,” Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 4 (2015): 635-653.

116 young people, but as a symbol of the state’s priorities. Analysis of interviews with educational content producers and activists reflects the view that educational discourse is more usefully understood as a means of understanding a state agenda than for a hypothetical impact upon pupils.

III. Alternative Explanations

I argue that the higher resonance of official religious discourse in Morocco and

Oman is due to these regimes’ successful effort to build on the religious and national identity established during the foundational period, while the relatively lower resonance of official religious discourse in Jordan is related to the lack of successful nation- building, and specifically the Jordanian regime’s lack of investment in promoting a specifically Jordanian form of Islam. Instead the Hashimite regime has asserted that its historical religious authority grants it the legitimacy and responsibility to speak for all

Islam, rather than articulating a specifically Jordanian form of religious expression.

This chapter examines variation in how religious education is viewed by both the individuals responsible for promoting it, as well as students, journalists, and other individuals not on the state’s payroll. In keeping with the overall argument, the evidence supports the view that in general, Jordanian interviewees tend to express more suspicion regarding government involvement in religious affairs. In contrast, Moroccan and Omani respondents are more likely to express support for the government’s position and actions.

However, it is possible that the observed variation is due to factors other than the extent to which educational discourses are seen as resonant.

117 The observed variation is likely due in part to factors specific to the context in question. For example, the extent to which Islamist groups were seen as involved in the production of, or discourse surrounding, educational content differed in each monarchy.

In Jordan, some proponents of education reform saw the Brotherhood as preventing meaningful changes to the curriculum, which contributed to their dissatisfaction with the educational initiatives the Jordanian government was in the process of implementing at the time of data collection.165 In contrast, reforms to education in Oman elicited some grumbles from interviewees, but had produced no documented organized resistance at the time of data collection.

In Morocco, efforts to reform education were generally viewed as appropriate if they corrected “misinterpretations” of Islam. Despite the presence of an active Islamist party in Morocco, which at the time of fieldwork had control of the parliament, educational reforms were not seen as captured by this group. I attribute this to the relative weakness of Le Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) vis-à-vis the monarchy, in contrast to Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF). Ostensibly, the PJD had sufficient clout to mount a vocal resistance to state-led initiatives to alter educational content. If they had done so, they would have been acting like the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. However, although representatives of the IAF decried the state’s efforts to alter educational curricula and described such policies as reflecting Jordan’s submission to Western directives, the PJD did not express similar consternation.

165 For a discussion of the widespread suspicion of Brotherhood influence on education in Jordan, despite the brief tenure of a former Brotherhood member as Education Minister, see Nathan Brown, When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics (2012), 97.

118 This is partially due to the differing roles that the IAF and the PJD play in their respective contexts, however I also attribute it in part to the fact that the Moroccan regime has more successfully cultivated an official religious discourse that resonates with existing ideas about the Moroccan identity. As a result, when the Moroccan government launches initiatives to use educational materials to counteract the potential for violent extremism, they can do so within a discursive framework that is accepted on the basis of its consistency with Moroccan religious identity. In contrast, when the Jordanian government launches similar initiatives, its official religious discourse lacks resonance, and as a result, groups like the IAF portray such initiatives as reflecting the Jordanian government’s on-going campaign to curry favor with the West. Oman is somewhat different because the level of authoritarianism maintained by the Qaboos regime precludes almost any expression of resistance, let alone an organized Islamist opposition.

A factor that contributed significantly to how educational initiatives were viewed was the presence of a Christian minority. Approximately 4% of Jordan’s population is

Christian, down from about 20% in 1930, whereas native Christians constitute less than

1% of the Moroccan population, and did not historically exist in Oman, although some expatriate workers are Christian. Debate over educational reform in Jordan often touches on the matter of whether or not non-Muslims are depicted, and whether or not Christians are explicitly named. For Jordanian Christians, such questions are important both symbolically and practically, whereas because Morocco and Oman lack a significant

Christian minority, the debate has fewer implications for local citizens. As a result, discussion of educational initiatives was more contentious in Jordan than in Morocco and

Oman.

119 While variations in the reactions to state efforts to reform or otherwise influence educational curricula are due in part to locally specific dynamics, such as the strength of opposition parties or the presence of a Christian minority, the resonance of the state’s official religious discourse plays a causal role in how state actions are viewed. The chapter presents information from Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, focusing primarily on the educational initiatives and debates underway at the time of fieldwork in 2015 and 2016.

Similar to the other empirical chapters, I begin by discussing Jordan, then compare these outcomes to those found in the relatively similar context of Morocco, and finally consider how the dynamics play out in the somewhat different circumstances present in Oman.

IV. Case Studies

Jordan

The content of official religious discourse in Jordan is universalistic, meaning that it claims to speak for all of Islam, rather than limiting its claims to the territory and culture of the Jordanian people. Jordan’s official religious discourse de-emphasizes

Islamic pluralism in favor of the message of Islamic unity. Initiatives promoted by educational institutions largely tend to reinforce the notion of a single unified “true”

Islam that the Hashimites are uniquely qualified to speak for on the basis of their claims to historic religious authority.

Analysis of a textbook used to prepare for the tawjīhī (“Directive,” the exam taken by Jordanian public school students at the end of high school) documented the regime’s use of religious educational content to promote the image of the Hashimites as the defenders of “true” Islam.

120 Students were asked to “Select the dangers that the Islamic call has been exposed to/faced from its beginning to the present day” The textbook then listed the following options: “popular movements,” “the crusades,” “the Tatars,” “colonization in the 20th century,” and “fierce attacks designed to discredit Islam.” It then declared “The Muslims were the first people to defend their religion and the message of their nation and it was incumbent on them to hold the torch of the call” and “To show the features of true Islam”

(ʾibrāz maʿālim al-ʾislām al-ḥaqqi). The words “true Islam” were used repeatedly, sometimes al-ʾislām al-ḥaqqi and sometimes al-ʾislām al-ḥaqīq or al-ʾislām al-ṣaḥīḥ, both of which can be translated into English as “correct Islam” or “true Islam.”

The textbook repeatedly emphasized that King Abdullah II was the defender of

“true” Islam. The text described King Abdullah’s efforts to defend the image of Islam and to overcome its distortion by its “enemies” as well as its “delinquent sons.”166 The textbook also highlighted the efforts of King Hussein. In explaining the role played by these monarchs, the textbook repeatedly referenced the Hashimites’ “inherited legitimacy” and the responsibility passed down from the Prophet of peace.

The textbook then provided specific details of the Amman Message, including the names of the eight recognized doctrines of Islam agreed upon by the clerics that released the Amman Message, the rejection of religious edicts (fatāwā) issued by individuals without the required qualifications, and the rejection of new interpretations of Islam

(ijtihād). The text implored for the Muslim nation (ʾumma) to be at the top of all

Muslims’ priorities, and reiterated that the Amman Message was intended to facilitate

Muslim unity by rejecting the declaration of apostasy (takfīr) against any of the eight

166 General Secondary Education Certificate Examination Textbook. Tawjihi (“Guided”) 2014. Amman: Jordan Ministry of Education: 48-50. [Translation by author].

121 recognized sects. The textbook’s content appears intended to reinforce the spiritual authority of the Hashimites and the primacy of state religious institutions in releasing fatawa, while the reduction of disunity and violence between Muslims receives secondary consideration.

The textbook’s emphasis on the idea of a “true” Islam was also reflected in the words used by interviewees in Jordan. Religious bureaucrats would stress the importance of the Hashimites in promoting “true” Islam, while non-bureaucrats would stress the importance of adhering to “true” Islam, but would not necessarily consider the monarchy as upholding it. In contrast, the language of “true” Islam was far less common in

Morocco or Oman; I consider the pervasiveness of the concept of “true” Islam in Jordan to reflect its use in official religious discourse, even if in practice critics of the regime use the concept as a means of pointing out the ways in which the Hashimites do not represent

“true” Islam.

Analyzing the Discourse of Educational Officials & Experts

In keeping with expectations, official religious discourse was reproduced by religious bureaucrats as well as teachers and other individuals employed by the state in a capacity related to education bureaucracy. In contrast, those not employed by the state were less likely to reproduce official discourse, although at times they would use the language of the state as a means of critiquing it. Representatives of Christian organizations tended to deploy official religious discourse, especially regarding concepts like “religious toleration” in their effort to enlist support from the state in pursuing their interests, which include the reduction of Islamist influence.

122 According to senior officials, the Ministry of ʾAwqāf works in partnership with the Ministry of Education to produce educational religious discourse that reduces extremism. When interviewing the then-Minister of ʾAwqāf, he explained “We promote this idea [of moderation] with the Education Ministry when they [students] are small so they do not become extremist.”167 This point was reiterated by a former Minister of

ʾAwqāf, who assured the author that religious education provided the solution to reducing extremism.168 When asked what the government would do if it appeared that religious education was insufficient to counteract the problem, he repeated his assurances. In general, many Jordanian interviewees expressed the view that religious education was a key factor in the effort to combat extremism, but not all agreed on what the content of the education should be.

During the period of fieldwork in mid 2015, the Jordanian government was in the process of reforming educational curricula, specifically for the purpose of countering violent extremism. The reform process had begun in 2014 with changes to the curricula in first through third grade, continued in 2015 with changes to grades four through six, and would continue until all the curricula were updated.169 However, while the reforms had been the subject of both approbation and resistance, interviews with individuals that are familiar with the process expressed doubts that the changes were particularly meaningful. Therefore, despite media coverage and activism both for and against the

167 Author interview with Minister of Awqāf Hayel Dawud, Interview ID 68A (Amman, Jordan, 12:30pm, 26 October 2015). 168 Author interview with former Minister of ʾAwqāf, Abdul Salam al-ʾAbadi, Interview ID 21A (Amman, Jordan, 12pm, 16 August 2015). 169 Author interview with education expert, Interview ID 62A (Jordan Media Institute, Amman Jordan, 2pm, 1 October 2015).

123 reforms, it appeared that the curricular alterations were unlikely to substantially affect students’ learning outcomes.

In contrast to the willingness of religious bureaucrats to echo the official position that education, and specifically education reform offered a means of counteracting extremism, critics expressed frustration that the education reforms were insufficient.

When interviewing educational experts and individuals not employed by the government, they highlighted the ways in which the reforms did not address the themes they saw a contributing to intolerance and an increased likelihood of religious militancy. In our conversations, they stressed the prevalence of Islamic themes and messaging even in content otherwise not related to religion. In the social studies textbook for sixth grade, for example, a critic of the Ministry of Education explained that the texts provided to illustrate the civics lesson were often taken from the Qurʾan or hadith or otherwise from the era of the Prophet and his companions.170 Similarly, in the Arabic language textbook, text samples were also taken from the Qurʾan and hadith.171

The practice of using religious sources to provide sample texts is not unique to

Jordan, however some of the individuals interviewed saw this as evidence of the control exerted by the Muslim Brotherhood over the Jordanian education system at large. Other critics saw it as evidence that the Jordanian government was either oblivious to, or unconcerned by, the potential effect of framing social studies and language in reference to Islam. Interviews with both liberal Jordanians and Jordanian Christians demonstrated

170 Social Studies Textbook, Grade 6. 2014. Al-Terbia al-Watania wa al-Madania: Al- Juzʾ al- Awal (“National and Civic Education: Part 1”) Amman: Jordan Ministry of Education. [Translation by author]. 171 Author interview with former Secretary General of the Ministry of Education, Interview ID 61A (His home, Amman Jordan, 10am, 1 October 2015).

124 their concern that the monarchy was insufficiently concerned about the ways in which educational curricula could impact the views and behavior of Jordanian citizens.

In interviews with individuals who are familiar with the textbook reform process, many expressed frustration that the alterations were insufficient. One expert who had access to the new textbooks emphasized that one of the primary areas of concern about the old textbooks was that they framed all subjects in relation to Islam, “as if Islam were the only fact in the world.”172 In addition, the new textbooks still framed Islam as the only source of values like generosity, or honoring elders, or protecting the environment.

She and other critics of the reforms explained that they had hoped that messages of religious toleration would be framed in a manner that acknowledged the commonalities of different religious traditions, and that allowed students to see that the values encouraged by Islam were shared by members of other faiths. However, because the textbooks focused on Islam but did not mention any other religious tradition as also encouraging such values, they feared that this could contribute to students’ sense of

Islamic superiority and result in religious intolerance and possibly extremism.

The new textbooks include references to toleration. However, the expert echoed the views of others who had been disappointed to find that while the lessons talked about the values of citizenship and the importance of toleration, they still failed to make a concrete connection to non-Muslims, and specifically to Jordanian Christians. The concern expressed by this expert and others was that unless students were encouraged to be religiously tolerant and then told explicitly that toleration should be directed at their

172 Author interview with education expert, Interview ID 62A (Jordan Media Institute, Amman Jordan, 2pm, 1 October 2015).

125 Christian fellow citizens, students would view toleration as something intangible rather than a practice to be implemented in their daily interactions.

The new textbooks mention Christians, but they do so in a manner that fails to convey the idea that both Muslims and Christians are equal Jordanian citizens. For example, the expert drew my attention to the fact that the new textbooks state that

Jordanians are Muslims. According to her, the textbook says that, “The residents of my country are Muslims, and Muslims and Christians live in tolerance and love.” The new textbooks seemed intended to address the concerns leveled at the old textbooks, but to maintain the preeminence of Islam and of Jordan’s Islamic identity. Given the efforts of the Jordanian monarchy to assert itself as the primary religious authority not only for

Jordan but Muslims in general, it was not surprising that the regime had not insisted that the textbook reform include an emphasis on the equality of Muslims and Christians.

Instead, by instigating the reform, the regime gained a positive response by the Western press for its efforts to reduce extremist messaging.173 It could simultaneously avoid eliciting significant resistance from Islamist groups, while also staying on message about the Hashimites’ role as the purveyors of “true” Islam.

According to Christian critics, their concerns could have been assuaged by including Christian religious curricula for Christian students in public schools. However, according to a priest active in the ongoing debate about educational reform, this had been suggested by King Hussein in 1997, but was not implemented. He explained that instead,

Jordanian Christian students are taught that pilgrimage was to Mecca, that the holy book

173 See, e.g. Karin Laub, “Jordan Tries to Stem ISIS-style extremism in Schools, Mosques,” Associated Press, 8 August 2015.

126 was the Qurʾan, and that there was no mention of any other holy places or texts.174 When students were taught about the period before Islam, they learned that paganism prevailed, rather than acknowledging that Judaism and Christianity had come before Islam; in his view this contravened Islam itself, which recognized the prophets that preceded

Muhammad and honored the “People of the Book.” The priest voiced his frustration that this message obscured the legacy of monotheism that Judaism and Christianity left for

Islam. In his opinion, extremist movements like the so-called Islamic State were made possible by these kinds of messages in textbooks.

Other individuals involved in debates on textbook reform expressed similar levels of concern about the implications of educational curricula. A former Secretary General of the Ministry of Education explained that he saw Jordan’s education system as directly contributing to extremism, because the messages found in textbooks were not particularly different from those put out by the so-called Islamic State. He asserted that Saudi Arabia had more advanced textbooks than Jordan.175 The former official had established himself as a vocal critic of the educational reforms and had published several op-eds in hopes of gaining the attention of King Abdullah and prompting him to exert greater oversight over the reform process.176 According to this individual, the king had gone to the Ministry of

Education to ask them to implement more substantial reforms, but they had not complied.

The official anticipated that the regime feared that a more direct intervention could

174 Author interview with priest and education activist, Interview ID 38A (His church office, Amman, Jordan, 11:30am, 1 September 2015). 175 Author interview with former Secretary General for the Ministry of Education and for the Ministry of Youth, Interview ID 61A (His home, Amman, Jordan, 10am, 1 October 2015). 176 The interviewee expressed the desire for readers to have access to his op-eds criticizing the textbook reforms. They are available in Arabic at http://alghad.com/articles/880932 published online 7 July 2015 and http://www.alghad.com/articles/881596 published online 11 July 2015 [Accessed 12 January 2018].

127 potentially empower the Islamic State, because the Brotherhood could use the intervention to undermine the religious credibility of the monarchy. Yet in his view, the

Islamic State was already active in Jordanian society and was further empowered by the textbooks, and needed to be stopped by any means necessary.

The former Ministry of Education official shared views expressed by Christian activists who were familiar with the reform process. One often-repeated view was that

Jordanian education had been strong until the 1980s and 90s, when it became more influenced by religion. This was widely seen as due to the Muslim Brotherhood gaining control of parliament in 1989. Among critics there was a widespread perception that the

Brotherhood had been maintaining control over the Ministry of Education for several decades.

A Christian journalist and activist engaged in the textbook reform process voiced her frustration with the Ministry of Education for falsely claiming that it would respond to concerns about the lack of representations of Christians in the textbooks. She explained that she had attended an event organized by the Ministry to showcase the new textbooks, but was dismayed to find that the textbooks taught that the Qurʾan was the only holy book, and showed no pictures of churches, for example.177 The former official from the

Ministry of Education similarly pointed out that the cover of the social studies textbook depicted the iconic King Abdullah mosque in central Amman, but the image was cropped in a manner that obscured the large Christian church that sits next to the mosque.178

While such choices may not have necessarily been made with the intention of excluding

177 Author interview with Christian journalist and educational activist, Interview ID1A (Crumz Dabouq, Amman, Jordan 1:30pm, 1 July 2015). 178 Author interview with former Secretary General for the Ministry of Education and for the Ministry of Youth, Interview ID 61A (His home, Amman, Jordan, 10am, 1 October 2015).

128 Christians, they are interpreted as such. From the perspective of critics, Jordanian students continue to absorb the same kinds of educational messaging that first prompted cries for reform.

One commonality of interviews with critics of the reform process was that these individuals were likely articulate support for the regime of Bashar al Assad, for example, seeing him as the last bastion of secularism in the region. Such views highlight the polarization that characterizes discussions of Islamists and posits that the only alternative to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are military dictatorships like Al Assad’s. The lack of middle ground helps to explain why Islamists similarly voice frustration with members of their society that claim to stand for liberal values and democracy.

According to several interviewees, King Hussein had permitted the Muslim

Brotherhood to take control of the Ministry of Education beginning in the 1990s. In contrast to Morocco, where the Ministry of Education has been carefully controlled by the regime, Jordanian regime did permit a former member of the Brotherhood to become

Minister of Education in 1974, thereby allowing the Brotherhood a degree of control in what may have been an attempt to counterbalance Leftist influence.

Yet in time in became clear that the Brotherhood itself required a counterbalance to prevent it from threatening the status quo. In response, the regime has alternately empowered different Islamist groups.179 Salafi interviewees acknowledged enjoying a relatively high degree of freedom to express their views, as long as these did not include any anti-regime sentiments.180 At the time of field work, there was a widespread

179 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism (Albany: SUNY Press 2001). 180 Author interview with prominent Salafi leader, Interview ID30A (Offices of JO Publishing, Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 24 August 2015). Note: the interview was conducted through a male assistant over the phone due to the interviewee’s stated discomfort speaking with a woman.

129 perception that the regime was supporting the Habashis, a Sufi group formerly led by

Sheikh Abdullah al-Hararaiyy [d. 2008]. Several interviewees saw the regime’s decision to allow the Habashis to organize the Jerash Festival—an anticipated annual event at the eponymous Roman ruins—as evidence that the group was the regime’s current favorite means of counterbalancing the Brotherhood.

The effect of having a member of the Brotherhood control the Ministry of

Education was mentioned by several interviewees. As a result, any resistance to the goal of encouraging greater recognition of Christian Jordanians was seen as evidence of overweening control by Islamists, when in fact it may have been due to the regime’s reluctance to introduce changes that might threaten their religious credibility. However, the fact that Brotherhood control of the Ministry of Education was also brought up by individuals that had worked in government but were otherwise not active on behalf of a particular community indicates that Islamist control of the Ministry was a relatively widespread perception.

Pressure to reform Jordanian educational materials due to concerns that they contributed to intolerance and radicalization resulted in changes to textbooks beginning in 2014. According to the Jordan Media Institute, the reforms include such changes as depicting some images of adult women without veils; mentioning the fact that non-

Muslims exist in Jordan; mentioning the importance of tolerance. Prior to these reforms, according to critics of Jordan’s education system, public school textbooks presented a

According to the male assistant who conducted the interview, the interviewee had not always maintained a policy of not speaking with women, and had in the past given interviews with non- Muslim female journalists. The assistant brought this to my attention to point out that the interviewee most likely changed his stance to signal his commitment to ultra-conservative Islamic norms about gender segregation.

130 homogeneously Muslim portrait of Jordanian society. By presenting some adult women as unveiled, and acknowledging that not every Jordanian citizen is Muslim, the reformed textbooks permit a degree of pluralism into how Jordanian society is presented to school children.

Yet criticisms remain. According to critics, the reason the regime allowed the reform is that they recognized that the education system could be contributing to radicalization and intolerance. The high numbers of Jordanians leaving to fight for the

Islamic State, including high profile cases of the sons of prominent members of society,

[cite] may have propelled this transition. Alternatively, it is possible that the regime disliked the negative press generated by such high-profile occurrences, and so wanted to at least gesture at reform. Critics of Jordan’s education system continue to express concerns that the reform is insufficient. A priest and education activist notably articulated a critique of the notion of “tolerance” itself, saying that students should not be taught merely to tolerate each other, but to be instructed that each citizen of Jordan is equal, regardless of religion.181 This view presents an intellectual challenge to the region-wide efforts at encouraging “tolerance” and “moderation,” on the basis that such initiatives are based on the flawed premise of toleration, and should in fact be grounded in the notion of equality.

The views of some of the individuals interviewed about religious education clearly have an agenda: to reduce the prevalence of Islamic material in educational curricula. In order to develop a better sense of whether extremism was as prevalent as some individuals and other anecdotes would indicate, I traveled to the city of Maʿan in

181 Author interview with priest and education activist, Interview ID 38A (His church office, Amman, Jordan, 11:30am, 1 September 2015).

131 southern Jordan to conduct interviews. Maʿan had received media attention because the flag of the Islamic State had been flown there several months before I traveled there. In general, the city and surrounding area is often characterized as a hotbed of extremism, prompting the US embassy to forbid its employees from traveling there at the time of data collection, for example. Although historically southern Jordan represented a bastion of support for the monarchy, largely due to the regime’s efforts to cater to the desires of powerful tribes, the area had experienced high levels of unemployment and subsequent discontent.

While in Maʿan, I interviewed the head of the “All Jordan” Youth Commission about his experience with extremism among local youth. He acknowledged that many young people had gone to fight in Syria, and that some of them had not come back. He cited high levels of poverty and unemployment as contributing factors in young men leaving Maʿan to join the Islamic State. In his view, the reasons were typically less about religion than about a search for opportunity. However, he also acknowledged the role of religious discourse by explaining that young people tended to think that the strictest interpretations of Islam were correct. For this reason, they tended not to look to the

Dāʾira al-Iftā’ for religious guidance, for example, but instead to seek the opinions of conservative sheikhs online.182 As a result of receiving religious advice from some of these conservative sheikhs, some young people came to believe that it was their duty as

Muslims to join the Islamic State and fight in Syria.

Interestingly, most of the themes that emerged during interviews with individuals working with young people in Maʿan were not specific to the locality itself. This

182 Author interview with the director of the All Jordan Youth Commission, Interview ID 55A (His office, Maʿan, Jordan, 2:30pm, 21 September 2015).

132 contradicted the prevailing view of Maʿan held in Amman, which tended to characterize the city as uniquely prone to extremism, although generally for unspecified reasons.

Another factor in the rise of extremism identified by individuals in Maʿan but not limited there, was that efforts to contradict ultra-conservative or extremist interpretations of

Islam were relatively recent. A former mayor of Maʿan, who at the time of the interview was involved in the work of the All Jordan Youth Commission, explained that he supported the government’s efforts to encourage a “moderate” interpretation of Islam was itself fine, but because it had begun so recently, considered it unlikely to have much of an effect on the government’s concern regarding the recruitment of young Jordanians by

ISIS.

In explaining the government’s current strategy, he drew on a historical period that interviewees often brought up as a parallel to the War on Terror: The Cold War. He pointed out that the Jordanian government had used religious rhetoric to paint

Communists as “unbelievers” (kuffār). He recalled the influence of Jamal Abdel Nasser and the “Voice of the Arabs” radio broadcast that could be heard in nearly every home in

Jordan, and how the government was threatened by Nasser’s influence, and so taught people to view him and his Arab Socialist ideas as being against Islam.183 In the view of the former mayor and many Jordanian interviewees, the government was now implementing a similar approach to counteracting extremism, by painting these ideas as being un-Islamic. In his mind, the strategy would probably work in the end, but it would take time. This individual expressed strong support for the way that the Hashimite

183 Author interview with former mayor of Maʿan municipality, Interview ID 56A (Offices of the All Jordan Youth Commission, Maʿan, Jordan, 3pm, 21 September 2015).

133 monarchy was working to preserve Jordanian unity, either voicing his support for the regime or stressing his adherence to the party line.

However, he did not explain how the government would be able to portray extremist rhetoric as un-Islamic when many people viewed it as being in fact the most accurate, or “correct” interpretation of the faith. Because Nasser was opposed to a strong role for religion in politics, it was not difficult for the Jordanian political elite to characterize his views as un-Islamic, and eventually his influence waned. Whereas some

Jordanians, already disgusted with their government’s willingness to adhere to Western norms and directives and already primed to look to conservative sheikhs for the correct form of Islamic guidance, would not likely be swayed by declarations that their interpretations were “un-Islamic.” In general, the emphasis of Jordanian religious discourse on the notion of “true” or “correct” Islam would likely strengthen the appeal of more conservative or other claims to adhere to the most orthodox interpretation.

Analyzing Student Discourse

When evaluating views of religious educational content held by individuals not responsible for producing it nor otherwise engaged in activism around it, I conducted a focus group with college students. The group consisted of eight college students and one doctoral student. The discussion was not initially focused on religious education, but other relevant themes emerged. For example, the PhD student expressed the view that

Jordan does a good job of treating Christians as whole citizens.184 Her view would likely have been met with resistance if Jordanian Christians had been in attendance.

184 Author interview with doctoral student, Interview ID 45A (Focus group, Miami Center, Amman, Jordan, 4pm, 17 September 2015).

134 The students discussed the Amman Message, and specifically why it was not more famous. One student explained that only people who had taken the tawjihi since the

Message’s publication would likely know the Message.185 Another said that the Amman

Message was not really needed, as Jordanians already knew everything that it contained.186

When discussing the importance of religious education, the doctoral student explained that because of satellite television and the internet, people could ask for answers to their religious questions directly, however that sometimes this could lead to chaos. In her view, official religious edicts from the government could help to overcome the cacophony of different interpretations, such as designating the day when Ramadan would begin. She acknowledged that some people would disagree with the government, but that most would say that listening to the government was better than chaos.187 The students expressed different views, at times disagreeing with each other about what was permitted or not, such as whether smoking or music were forbidden by Islam. They agreed however that sometimes, if someone did something wrong, they did not need to be told this, they could feel it internally.

In general, the focus group with the students provided data that did not overly adhere to the government narrative. Their statements did not include any mention of

“true” or “correct” Islam. They acknowledged that the government was involved in

185 Author interview with college student, Interview ID 47A (Focus group, Miami Center, Amman, Jordan, 4pm, 17 September 2015). 186 Author interview with college student, Interview ID 50A (Focus group, Miami Center, Amman, Jordan, 4pm, 17 September 2015). 187 Author interview with doctoral student, Interview ID 45A (Focus group, Miami Center, Amman, Jordan, 4pm, 17 September 2015).

135 producing religious discourse, but explained that they tended to seek religious information from the Qurʾan, hadith, or from the internet.

Morocco

Similar to the official religious discourse of the Moroccan Ministry of Awqāf and other institutions of official Islam, the Ministry of Education also produces an image of

Moroccan Islam as tripartite, in that it is characterized by the Maliki madhhab, the

‘Ash’ari tradition with its partial emphasis on rationalism, and Sufism. By use these specific categories to describe Moroccan Islam, the regime implicitly recognizes that other forms of Islam exist. However, unlike Oman, the regime does not name these alternative forms, nor teach schoolchildren that alternative expressions of Islam are valid.

Instead, the tacit recognition of different schools of thought appears less motivated by the desire to mitigate potential sectarian tension, and more to enhance Morocco’s religious soft power. By positing the Moroccan form of Islam as implicitly pluralistic (by prioritizing one specific madhhab as well as Sufism), and at least partly based on reason

(by prioritizing ‘Ash’ari Islam), the regime posits itself as an alternative to Saudi

Arabia’s rejection of pluralism and reason and emphasis on a single correct form of Islam and on relying exclusively on religious texts. By implicitly framing Morocco’s approach to Islam as being in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s, the Moroccan regime quietly asserts itself as an alternative source of religious leadership, specifically for a form of Islam uniquely

136 appropriate for both European and African forms of Islam, while rhetorically ceding

“eastern” Islam to the Saudis.

At the time of fieldwork, Moroccan religious education was the subject of less debate than in Jordan, where controversial textbook reform was underway. In addition, because Morocco lacks a native Christian population, and because Moroccan Islamists have not been permitted to establish control over educational institutions, the two most vocal camps regarding Jordanian educational reforms were absent in the Moroccan context. As a result, religious education did not come up in interviews with the same frequency as occurred in Jordan.

Although it was mentioned less often, the Moroccan government had implemented certain changes to Moroccan religious education not long before the period of fieldwork. Certain changes were implemented relatively soon after Muhammad VI assumed power, such as the creation in 2004 of a separate directorate within the Ministry of Awqāf to oversee traditional, or religious, schools. After the restructuring, the Ministry contained five directorates: 1. Islamic affairs 2. Religious endowments 3. Mosques 4.

General affairs & administration 5. Traditional schools. As a result of the restructuring, in keeping with Wainscott and expectations about the Moroccan government’s efforts to increasingly bureaucratize Islam, the Ministry could exert greater control over traditional schools. Prior to the 2004 reform, graduates of traditional schools focused solely on religious studies, and graduated prepared to serve as imams, but lacked the education to enter a typical university or pursue a non-religious professional path. The creation of the new directorate corresponded with the overhaul of these schools to provide a more

137 general grounding in non-religious fields such as computer science that would permit students to enter a non-religious university setting if they chose.

According to the head of cultural activities in the Ministry’s Directorate of

Islamic Affairs, the rationale behind the reform of traditional schools was to allow students from such schools to more easily integrate into other areas of society. In his words, “they should not be separate like priests,”188 a statement that echoes frequent critiques of Christian clergy members’ practices of cloistering and abstaining from earthly life. The basis of the critique is that the separation of clergy and laypeople is not found within Islam, and that Islam (and arguably Judaism) are better than Christianity as a result. The concept of “wasatia,” sometimes translated as moderation, is invoked in a hadith where the Prophet Muhammad admonished his followers who declared they would abstain from marriage and meat and sleep, and Mohammed responded by saying that such actions meant that they were not his followers.189 The justification for the reform of religious schools was grounded in this strand of Islamic tradition.

However, the reform was likely also intended to ensure that graduates of religious schools could more easily integrate into the workforce and society at large, thereby mitigating the risks of radicalization as a result of both unemployment and isolation. The ministry’s director of Cultural Activities pointed out that the reform has been successful, because instead of being sent “straight to the mosque,” some graduates of traditional

188 Author interview with head of Cultural Activities, Directorate of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of ʾAwqāf, Interview ID 4C (Rabat, Morocco 10:15am, 22 July 2016). 189 “I will not marry women; someone among them said: I will not eat meat; and someone among them said: I will not lie down in bed. He (the Holy Prophet) praised Allah and glorified Him, and said: What has happened to these people that they say so and so, whereas I observe prayer and sleep too; I observe fast and suspend observing them; I marry women also? And he who turns away from my Sunnah, he has no relation with Me.” Sahih Muslim, Book 8, Hadith 3236.

138 schools successfully worked in the Ministry of Awqāf, whereas previously their education had poorly prepared them for such employment. Prior to the establishment of the fifth directorate of the Ministry of Awqāf, traditional schools operated with greater independence, further evidence of bureaucratization and centralization of control of religious institutions within the body of the state.

While the regime may have been primarily motivated by the desire to expand state penetration of religious and educational institutions, the Moroccan education system was in need of attention and resources regardless of more cynical interpretations of the underlying motivations. Illiteracy remained at approximately one-third, rural students were likely to drop out after elementary school, and the linguistic challenges of addressing the needs of both Amazigh and Arabic speaking populations persisted. In addition to the restructuring of the Ministry of Awqāf, King Mohammad VI implemented the following educational reforms: the National Literary and Non-formal Education

Strategy in 2004, the Accessibility and Infrastructure Reform in 2005, and the Education

Emergency Plan in 2009. In 2015 the Council of Education published the “Strategic

Vision for the Reform of the Moroccan School,” set to be implemented between 2015 and 2030. Government-sponsored descriptions of the “Strategic Vision” justify it on the grounds of improving educational access for students, helping to prepare young

Moroccans to compete in the 21st century economy, and as a means of counteracting radicalization.190 This initiative prompted financial support from the World Bank, the EU,

190 Morocco on the Move. “Reforming Education: How Morocco Plans on Empowering the Next Generation.” Published online 23 September 2015. http://moroccoonthemove.com/2015/09/23/reforming-education-morocco-plans-empowering- next-generation-anastasia-pestova/#sthash.CyGgxrmg.dpbs Accessed 9 January 2018.

139 and from USAID, however it remains to be seen whether the funding will result in improved educational outcomes.

In contrast to Jordan, where educational reforms were prompted by concerns about the potential for textbook material to contribute to radicalization, educational reforms in Morocco target a basket of problems associated with low income contexts, although countering violent extremism is also acknowledged as a possible benefit.

Because educational reform in Jordan focused on the specificities of textbook content, and certain populations were invested in the outcomes of this content, the entire atmosphere around educational reform was more polarized. Whereas in Morocco, very few would argue against improving rural students’ access to schools and supporting their future job prospects.

Regarding the content of educational curricula itself, the Moroccan government sought to inculcate norms of toleration on the basis of Moroccan heritage. Although the tripartite narrative was present, it received less emphasis than in content produced by the

Ministry of Awqāf, for example. Excerpts from a Moroccan first grade textbook of

Islamic education demonstrated that, at least among young children, messaging was relatively simplistic and avoided discussion of different schools of thought of Sunni thought. Published by “The House of Culture,” a Casablanca-based publishing house certified by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the textbook’s inner cover stated that its goal was: “to build a homeland that is proud of its Moroccan identity and rooted in the values of its nation.” The text went on to say that it was a: “Male and female student brochure… Useful in Islamic education for the first year of primary education according to the new educational curriculum.” In its message to students, the textbook stated that it

140 intended to: “Build your personality in an integrated and balanced construction. Your education is based on the Islamic faith, [which is] based on: love and mercy, and rejection of hatred and intolerance.”191 The textbook maintained a straightforward message of good behavior and avoided more sophisticated discussions, such as different schools of Islamic thought, likely because it was intended for young children.

Throughout the textbook, the themes of tolerance and kindness were reinforced as a core part of being Muslim. On page 9, students were shown an image of a young boy helping an elderly man to cross a street. They were instructed to complete the following sentence: “I am Muslim. I love all people and ____ with them.” Page 22 depicted cartoon drawings of children of many different cultural and religious backgrounds, including an

Asian-looking girl in a traditional Japanese-style outfit, an African-looking boy, a

European-looking boy, etc. The text below the image stated, “God honored me: He created me and made me happy and made me in the best form. God is my Lord to create me and create all things. God loves me to: obey him, worship him, love him.” Although the images themselves appear potentially intended to implicitly encourage toleration of the kinds of children pictured, the text reinforces the primacy of God. Although it does not specifically call for worship as practiced by Muslims, for a child unfamiliar with other religious traditions, it is unlikely that the student would imagine anything other than

Muslim expressions of worship. As a result, while the image initially appears cross- cultural, it would elicit similar critiques as those posited by critics of the new Jordanian textbooks, that simply depicting a non-Muslim person is insufficient. In order to ensure that students actually understand what is meant by toleration, they must be shown an

191 Islamic Education Textbook, Grade 1. Al-Mufid fi Al Terbia al-Islamiyya (“Useful in Islamic Education”) (Casablanca: Dar al-Thaqafa, 2015) (“The House of Culture”) Translation by author.

141 image of a non-Muslim person, and told that non-Muslim people are to be treated with tolerance. Without such explicit messages, students are unlikely to connect a theoretical encouragement of toleration to the specific individuals at whom said toleration should be directed.

Furthermore, the message of toleration was not unequivocal. In one passage the textbook specifically refers to Islam through reference to the Prophet Muhammad, and instructs students how to feel towards certain individuals: “I love my prophet. I respect him as my father. I hate those who insult my prophet.” This passage demonstrates the limits of toleration, in a message that undermines the overall stress on toleration. As pointed out by the Jordanian priest, toleration is likely a less effective message than equality.

Yet unlike in Jordan, Morocco’s major ethnic fault-lines were more linguistic than religious. The persistent marginalization of Amazigh communities indicated that messages of equality should perhaps be directed at Berber populations, and followed up with additional policy changes. However, following the Moroccan government’s decision to recognize Amazigh as one of the country’s official languages in a policy shift prompted by widespread protests in 2011, few additional initiatives sought to change conditions in these communities. Instead, the Moroccan government has implemented various country-wide initiatives to broadly improve economic and social development.

In soliciting international financial support for achieving developmental goals, the

Moroccan government often sought to encourage investment and aid on the basis of countering violent extremism. To a certain extent, this is likely due to a correct assessment of the priorities of powerful foreign actors like the US. In addition, the

142 Moroccan government presented itself as uniquely qualified to lead efforts to counteract

“eastern” or Saudi interpretations of Islam. This was also strategic, but simultaneously grounded in the view that Wahhabi and jihadi ideas had been given too much space take hold in Morocco. A Moroccan consultant unaffiliated with the government explained that part of why the Ministry of Awqāf had been able to successfully encourage people to buy into official religious discourse was because people themselves felt that their form of

Islam was under threat from outside. Although he acknowledged that people had many different sources of religious information and did not exclusively rely on the government’s spiel, he asserted that “there’s been a yearning to become reconciled with

Morocco’s spiritual heritage after decades of Wahhabi and jihad ideas being spread.”192

His statement reinforced my argument that because Moroccans were taught to identify with a particular form of Islam allegedly based in Moroccan heritage, government religious discourse that reinforced this form of Islam would be seen as both credible and desirable. Yet the interviewee was not overly sanguine about the government’s ability to maintain this buy-in, and put the government’s efforts in this record at about a five out of ten-point scale of effectiveness.

Although the Moroccan government had successfully inculcated a religious identity grounded in invented traditions, and had been lucky enough to select a discourse of toleration that played well on the international stage amidst concerns about intolerance and extremism, the fact that they received only a bare pass for their efforts spoke to a more general problem with government efforts to regulate religion. Not only in Morocco, and not limited to Islamic contexts, governments have generally struggled to keep up

192 Author interview with consultant, Interview ID24C (Café Carrion: Musée Mohammed VI d'Art Moderne et Contemporain, Rabat, Morocco, 6pm, 8 August 2016).

143 with the adaptations that characterize human society at large and religion in particular.

The fact that religion is seen as unchanging due to its foundational and supposedly timeless texts constitutes one of its key sources of influence, that it can appear unchanging and thereby convey a sense of connection to both past and future, while adapting to the needs and concerns of the present.

Analyzing the Discourse of Educational Officials & Experts

The inherent challenge of reconciling human spirituality with government bureaucracy was not lost on key members of Morocco’s religious elite, who expressed a level of awareness regarding the inherent challenges of their mission that far exceeded any concerns voiced by individuals in similar positions in Jordan or Oman. The head of the Muhammadia League of Religious Scholars, for example, articulated his doubts regarding the ability of bureaucrats to adequately address the underlying attraction of extremism, namely that young people sought excitement and purpose. As he put it, the state had to learn to “vehiculate dreams.”193 He felt that with the proper training, government clerics could effectively counteract the misinterpretations that jihadis spouted online, and with enough resources, armies of these clerics could overwhelm the relatively few individuals who up until this point had faced no massive online initiative to counteract them. However even while envisioning how the power of the state could be effectively harnessed to drown out extremists through sheer volume of content, Dr.

‘Abadi also acknowledged that the process of doing so would require the creation of more bureaucrats, individuals who would be unlikely to show the same passion for their mission as the jihadis.

193 Author interview with Dr. Ahmed ‘Abadi, Secretary General of the Muhammadia League of Religious Scholars, Interview ID 11C (His office, Rabat, Morocco 11am, 29 July 2016).

144 Despite his awareness that government clerics would, by definition, fail to summon the religious conviction of a fanatic, Dr. ‘Abadi explained that an additional part of his strategy pertained to religious education. He saw part of the current problem as being due to the fact that government clerics and religious educators tended to receive insufficient religious training. Such individuals saw themselves as experts yet were unable to address questions raised by young people who were trying to determine whether jihadi interpretations were in fact correct. In Dr. ‘Abadi’s view, most government clerics were useless, and most religious education in Morocco was insufficient to help “inoculate” Moroccan students against the threat of extremism.

However, he offered assurances that this was in the process of changing.

Dr. ‘Abadi’s frustration with Moroccan religious education was shared by other members of the bureaucratic religious elite. The Director of Islamic Affairs at the

Ministry of Awqāf sighed that the missing element was education, and specifically education pertaining to the spiritual ideas of Islam. Himself a Sufi, he bemoaned, “If you talk about angels, or if you see an angel, you are out.”194 Several top officials in the

Moroccan religious establishment viewed spiritualism as a means of counteracting the influence of more text-based and codified forms of the religion promoted by Salafis and specifically the Saudis. Relatedly, many of the religious officials appointed by the king were Sufi, or if not, their view of Islam exhibited the influence of Sufi beliefs and practices. Moroccan religious officials decried the rationalization of Islam, its rejection of spiritualism and focus on politics as a symptom of 20th century Salafism.

The topic of insufficient religious education came up frequently among

194 Author interview with Director of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 8C (His office, Ministry of ʾAwqāf, Rabat, Morocco 11:30am, 26 July 2016).

145 representatives of official Islam, in Jordan as well as Morocco. However, in Jordan comments tended to focus on the need for religious education in schools to promote the typical Jordanian refrain of “true” Islam, while in Morocco the desired strategy was to emphasize spirituality over orthodoxy. In addition, the Moroccan regime appears willing to permit and even encourage the comparative study of religions. This was introduced, for example, at the Dar al Hadith al Hassania, the institution established by King Hassan

II to centralize the training of imams under government control. According to the

Assistant Director of the Dar al Hadith, beginning in 2005, King Muhammad had instructed the institution to instruct imams-in-training about other religious traditions.195

Such training seems intended to encourage the imams to approach Islam from a more intellectual and comparative perspective.

Analyzing Student Discourse

When speaking with Moroccan students about the topic of religious education, some conveyed doubts about the approach. During a round table with nine mixed gender students, a male student from Rabat explained that in 2016 the government had removed certain verses from the religious curriculum, such as those that spoke about jihad. He saw this as unwise, because students would find the verses themselves. If students could have the verses explained to them in the classroom rather than by some sheikh online, they would be more likely to interpret them in a manner that would not radicalize them. He also criticized the decision to reduce the number of hours devoted to religious education on similar grounds, arguing that students would seek their own answers and might then

195 Author interview with the Assistant Director of the Dar al Hadith al Hassania, Interview ID7C (His office, Dar al Hadith al Hassania, Rabat, Morocco, 1:30pm, 25 July 2016).

146 come under the sway of extremists.196 The student recognized that different interpretations of Islam existed, and that the government could use a version that worked for its purposes as easily as the jihadis could. This awareness contrasts to the view expressed by many Jordanians, namely that there was one “correct” or “true” form of

Islam. I attribute the prevalence of this view in Jordan to its centrality in official religious discourse, and in indication that the Jordanian government had in fact influenced the population’s views, but in a way that undermined the government’s religious authority.

During the focus group, I asked the students whether they remembered being taught about Moroccan Islam as being Maliki, ‘Ash’ari, and Sufi. They said no, that the emphasis had been on Moroccan Islam as Maliki.197 This corresponded to the fact that the adoption of rhetoric pertaining to ‘Ash’ari Islam occurred in 2014, after the students were already in college and no longer taking religious education classes. The students explained that many of the religious lessons focused on citizenship at the same time as

Islam, almost equating the two, and that the equality of the genders was a component of the lessons on citizenship. In general, the students felt that they should have received more religious instruction, or that Moroccan students in general should receive more.

This view was due to their conviction that acts of violence were committed by individuals with insufficient understanding of Islam. However, the students also admitted that sometimes individuals who most fervently expressed religious beliefs were also those most likely to act in ways that contravened religion.198 They saw this as a uniquely

196 Author interview with male topography student, Interview ID12C (Language Café meeting, Café 7eme, Rabat, Morocco, 6:30pm, 3 August 2016). 197 Author interview with female student, Interview ID14C (Language Café meeting, Café 7eme, Rabat, Morocco, 6:30pm, 3 August 2016). 198 Author interview with female student, Interview ID17C (Language Café meeting, Café 7eme, Rabat, Morocco, 6:30pm, 3 August 2016).

147 Moroccan form of hypocrisy, although did not explain why they did not think this would occur outside of Morocco.

Oman

Unlike Jordan’s narrative that Islam itself embodies tolerance and moderation and therefore that any alternative expression of Islam is illegitimate and un-Islamic, Oman’s narrative of Islamic tolerance claims to be rooted in Omani tradition. The narrative of

Omani Islam is that tolerance is a core value of Ibāḍīsm, Oman’s official religious sect practiced by approximately half of Omani nationals. The tenets of Ibāḍīsm dictate that non-Ibāḍīs be treated as Muslims, although Ibāḍīs consider themselves to be the true

Muslims.

Like Morocco, Oman’s religious discourse of toleration is grounded in local religious heritage, and is a core component of the national identity promoted through textbooks, sermons, and other instruments of official Islam. However, in Morocco many representatives of official Islam acknowledged that at least part of the kingdom’s religious identity was strategic, specifically that it was based on the recognized need to protect “spiritual security” due to the possibility of radicalization and extremism. In contrast, most representatives of official Islam in Oman expressed the view that Omani toleration was deeply grounded in both the Ibāḍī tradition and in the Omani character.

They characterized these traits as more inherent than strategic.

I attribute the distinction between how Moroccan and Omani religious officials talk about efforts to encourage toleration to the ways that each regime has internationally portrayed its form of national Islam. The Omani regime has largely avoided the tactic of

148 trying to leverage its religious identity abroad, whereas Morocco has successfully marketed itself to non-Muslim foreign powers as a bastion of moderate Islam. The

Moroccan regime has been relatively successful in balancing the population’s identity with their external outreach in part by maintaining consistent messaging at home and abroad, an area where Jordan has struggled to maintain consistency. Moroccan religious officials recognize that the regime is selling its brand of Islam, which it justifies under the cover of promoting “spiritual security” both for Moroccans and for non-Moroccans.

Omani religious officials have not had to grapple with how to explain efforts to market

Omani Islam, because for the most part this has not occurred on a large scale. At the time of fieldwork in 2015, the Omani regime had recently launched its first attempt to cash in on the global demand for “moderate Islam” with the campaign “Tolerance,

Understanding, Coexistence: Oman’s Message of Islam” (al-tasamuh, al-tafahum, al- ta`ayyush: rislat al-Islam min `Uman). As discussed in Chapter 4, the campaign was sent to Omani embassies around the world throughout 2014.

By late 2015 the exhibition had returned to Oman, and was being shown in educational venues. I attended the launch of the exhibition at Ahmed bin Majid private school on 4 November 2015. The exhibit’s opening included statements by officials from the Ministry of Awqāf, and the showing of two films produced by the Ministry titled

“Islam in Oman” and “Religious Tolerance in Oman.” The opening included a Qurʾan reading by (notably) a female student at the school, an opening prayer, and the playing of the Omani national anthem.

The opening of the exhibition offered an opportunity to observe the production of official religious discourse by the Ministry of Awqāf in an educational environment. The

149 event was attended by the school children, as well as invited guests, both Omani and international. The exhibit provided an example of Omani religious discourse, specifically the way in which Ibāḍīsm is both acknowledged while also treated as hegemonic. The various exhibits discussed Ibāḍīsm but glossed over the political role of the imam and did not mention the Jabal Akhdar War, the conflict surrounding the end of the Ibāḍī imamate.

Representatives from the Ministry of Awqāf responded to the author’s questions in a manner that adhered exactly to the standard line. In general, the exhibit, complete with t- shirts labeled with the Twitter hash-tag #actfortolerance, conveyed the standardized narrative about Omani toleration as grounded in religious heritage.

In general, educational officials expressed a consistent line, whether in Muscat or outside the capital city. In ‘Ibri, a small city in the interior of Oman, a government teacher at a local school shared a PowerPoint presentation with me. The teacher said he had prepared the presentation for me so that I might better understand the role of the

Ministry of Awqāf and the Ministry of Education in promoting true Islam among

Omanis. I had asked if he could provide me with textbooks that I might analyze on my own, however instead he prepared the PowerPoint presentation. Below I include content from slides 5 through 7 in order to document the standard message about Omani Islam conveyed through educational content:

• Welcome to the Sultanate of Oman • Oman is a Muslim country • Oman a country of tolerance and closeness of religions, and between the Islamic schools of thought, and this is the secret of the stability and peace in Oman • Oman is interested in religious tolerance and closeness at the internal and external level • Freedom of worship for all Muslim schools of thought, even non-Muslims in their churches and places of worship • In Oman, all Muslims pray in the same mosque without distinction • Every year the Ministry of Awqāf and Religious Affairs organizes a seminar to

150 develop the sciences of jurisprudence by the participation of different jurists and ʿulama’ from all parts of the world, to show tolerance and closeness between the Islamic schools of thought • There are efforts at the external level to define Islam and to teach tolerance • And that it is a religion of mercy and tolerance and peace and equality • All views in the Sultanate of Oman — the political and religious and educational and societal — seek to consolidate this199

The teacher consented to be interviewed after he was satisfied that I had been given the standard line on Omani religious education. He largely reiterated the themes of the presentation during our conversation, emphasizing that the Ministry of Education seeks to cultivate mercy and respect for others beginning at a young age. He acknowledged that if this education were lacking, it possible that an individual might commit an act of violence. He emphasized that educational content focused on cultivating a sense of patriotism and an emphasis on Omani identity. This reinforced a theme regarding the emphasis on citizenship in Omani educational and religious content.

Based on the interviewee’s behavior, I asked if he minded that I was not wearing a hijab. He said he did not mind, because in Oman “we are used to people’s differences.

This is what distinguishes Oman.”200 Although he seemed somewhat uncomfortable to be alone with a female researcher with uncovered hair, he also appeared determined to help me understand Omani religious education. Interestingly, although he stated that Oman is unique because Omanis tolerate differences, he later explained that Omani Islam is not different than standard Islam, but only that misinterpretations existed elsewhere. He reiterated the common refrain that Omani peacefulness is due to its rejection of sectarian divisions.

199 Please see Appendix for the full PowerPoint presentation in the original Arabic text. [Translation by the author]. 200 Author interview with teacher, Interview ID17B (Noor Majan Institute, ‘Ibri, Oman, 6pm, 13 November 2015).

151 Analyzing the Discourse of Educational Officials & Experts

Religious education is not limited to schools. The Omani government takes seriously the importance of educating non-Muslims about Islam, while simultaneously using the opportunity to educate visitors that, at least in Oman, Islam is peaceful. Foreign visitors to Muscat, especially those on organized tours or cruises, frequently come to the

Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque.201 As discussed in Chapter 4, some Omanis do not consider the national mosque to be a spiritual space but instead to be a structure dedicated to advancing the agenda of the regime. This view is reinforced by the mosque’s Islamic

Information Center, a space located near the ritual washing (wuḍūʾ) areas for worshippers.

After visiting the impressive interior of the main mosque space, as well as the separate area for female worshippers, non-Muslim tourists are encouraged to come to the

Center to learn about Islam. They remove their shoes, walk past pamphlets explaining various aspects of Islam, and are invited to have dates and Arabic coffee. In the Center’s main visitor room male and female visitors are encouraged to mingle as they are in the rest of the mosque complex, although the visitor room is largely staffed by female volunteers. A separate adjacent room houses the offices of a male cleric who is available to answer questions as needed, but generally visitors interact with the female volunteers.

Visitors are given a short spiel regarding Islam in general, and Omani Islam in particular, and then are encouraged to ask any question they may have about the Sultan Qaboos

Mosque, Oman, Islam, or anything else.

201 The national mosque is listed as the number one attraction in the capital city on TripAdvisor.

152 When interviewing one of the Center’s senior volunteers, she explained that sometimes visitors were embarrassed or even frightened at the prospect of entering the

Information Center. She said that she did not blame them, because they had been fed so much misinformation about Islam. The volunteer asserted that Oman was a good place for non-Muslims to learn about Islam, because it had not been “infected” by politics.202

She credited Sultan Qaboos with establishing the Center as a safe space where people could feel comfortable asking any question, and a space that allowed for misperceptions to be corrected.

The senior volunteer reiterated a theme expressed by many Omani interviewees, which was that the stringent avoidance of any mention of sectarian division was one crucial factor in Omani peacefulness. This factor contributed to why Oman was such a good place to learn about Islam, in her view. Despite the law preventing any discussion of sectarianism, many interviewees brought up the issue, but only insofar as they used the matter to highlight the Sultan’s wisdom in forbidding any discussion of sectarian strife.

Interviews with government employees responsible for producing and disseminating educational content reinforced the view that Oman is immune from sectarianism. The former General Secretary for the Ministry of Education, himself a sheikh, explained that sectarianism in the rest of the region was the result of politics, and because such politicking was not permitted in Oman, the sultanate would be spared. He pointed out that the salience of religion, and specifically of sectarian divisions, was partly due to the US invasion of Iraq, which in his view had previously not experienced

202 Author interview with senior volunteer at the Islamic Information Center, Interview IDB1 (Islamic Information Center, Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque, Muscat, Oman, 11am, 29 October 2015).

153 sectarian tension. He also attributed the spread of information through the internet as a dangerous source of fanaticism, which needed to be countered through strong religious education.

The General Sectary gave the trajectory of religious education in Oman as beginning in the 1960s and 70s, when the state had only just begun to implement mass schooling. He explained that at that time, lessons on Islam were limited to only twice a week, following the Egyptian secularizing model of President Nasser. However, after the defeat of Nasserism, lessons on religion were given every day, a “strong dose” of religion, as he termed it.203 He explained that across the region, students were receiving more religious education, such that when events occurred like the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, and later the war in Bosnia, and then the Iraq War, they were seen through the lens of religion. In his view, these events whipped up religious feeling among people who only barely understood Islam. Yet he maintained that it was necessary to teach Islam based on the experience of cases like Algeria, where the population had been starved of religious education and overly secularized, so that people who were ill-equipped with religious knowledge became preachers, which led to radicalization and war.

In general, he felt that extremism was the result of insufficient religious education. He compared religious education to medical education, in that it required standardization. The fact that a government official would entertain offer the possibility of not offering religious education seemed significant. The former Secretary General expressed admiration for Nasser’s era when religion was less emphasized, and also voiced support for the policies of Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Assad regarding the

203 Author interview with former General Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Interview ID 14B (Costa Coffee Shati Qurum, Muscat, Oman, 4pm, 10 November 2015).

154 suppression of religion and sectarianism, in contrast to the “masses” that demanded religion. In explaining the Omani approach, he echoed the position of many, which was an emphasis on citizenship rather than religion.

The views expressed by the former General Secretary were more typical among government employees in the capital. However, when interviewing educators outside of

Muscat, they did not see lessons on Islam as strategic, but as basic to the project of education itself. In ‘Ibri, a small city in the Omani interior, an imam explained that the

Ministry of Education was involved in spreading morals and building a “learned generation.” He saw this as crucial to encouraging tolerance. He feared that if children were not raised with lessons of mercy and respect for others, they could go and kill someone.

He compared the efforts of the Omani government in the realm of religious education to its construction of buildings, that the government was “building the people of Oman” to both love their country and the world.204 Although he acknowledged that the

Omani government was actively involved in “building” the people of Oman, when asked to explain why extremism was not a problem in Oman, he voiced the standard line about religious heritage and commerce. He also echoed the view expressed by the Assistant

Grand Mufti, who attributed the strength of Omani identity to the fact that Oman was a polity, rather than a collection of tribes. Most of the contemporary states of the Arabian

Peninsula were historically ruled by tribal structures rather than state structures, whereas

Oman (and Yemen) were.

204 Author interview with imam, Interview ID16B (Noor Majan Institute, ‘Ibri, Oman, 9am, 13 November 2015).

155 When interviewing individuals that were not involved in disseminating the government’s official position, the matter of religious education came up organically. An

Omani journalist for Reuters expressed the view that the lack of sectarianism in Oman was partly due to the fact that young people are not taught about differences, but instead educated about commonalities.205 Her point was reinforced by a response from a college student, who when asked to talk about tolerance and Islam, scoffed “We [Omanis] solved this in 1960, or something. We know about Sunni and Shiʿa and Ibāḍī, we know that God is one, our book is one and our messenger is one. There is no need to be confused.”206 He seemed fed up with the author’s interest in the subject, but did acknowledge that this was an issue that other countries still dealt with.

The journalist did not address the fact that Omani young people have access to information about sectarian differences through the internet, where they would likely be exposed to less tolerant messaging. She iterated a point made by many, which was that parents should address sectarian differences at home, by teaching their children how to pray in the manner appropriate to their sect. At school, teachers tell students to pray in the way that they learned to at home, difference in the arm position during prayer being one of the most visible distinctions between Ibāḍīs and Sunnis.

Analyzing Student Discourse

When interviewing college students and recent graduates about religious education, they expressed different views regarding the amount and content of Islamic content. One student explained that in his opinion, 45 minutes for religious education

205 Author interview with Reuters journalist, Interview ID 6B (Starbucks Shati Qurum, Muscat, Oman, 3pm, 3 November 2015). 206 Author interview with male college student, Interview ID 7B (Al Rudha “The Lounge,” Muscat, Oman, 12:30pm, 4 November 2015).

156 each day was sufficient. However, he acknowledged that religious education was important, because young people relied on the internet for a lot of religious questions, and in order to use it effectively, young people needed to be able to distinguish who was a credible sheikh. Yet he considered 45 minutes a day to provide enough time to learn this.207 Another student said that she felt concerned that schoolchildren were receiving less religious education than they previously had, and she remembered experiencing this reduction after 9/11/01. She explained that some of the lessons from the Qurʾan had been removed even from the time when she was in school.208 She also acknowledged relying heavily on the internet for answers to questions, but also asking her parents and grandparents.

Interestingly, her description of religious content appeared consistent with what critics of Jordanian religious education had said they wanted: for moral values to be expressed in universal terms, rather than simply reflecting Islam. Yet the student found this to be disconcerting, that schoolchildren were not learning some of the Qur’anic stories that she herself had been taught and considered valuable. Instead children were taught that the values these stories reinforced were universal. Although the young woman voiced concerns regarding this shift to emphasize shared humanity rather than simply

Islam, her responses appeared to indicate that such shifts can be effective, because she acknowledged that reading religious texts, whether the Qurʾan or the Bible, could bring peace. When asked to explain, she reiterated that all religions were based on the same thing, that they were supposed to bring peace.

207 Author interview with male college student, Interview ID 7B (Al Rudha “The Lounge,” Muscat, Oman, 12:30pm, 4 November 2015). 208 Author interview with female recent college graduate, Interview ID 5B (Al Rudha “The Lounge,” Muscat, Oman, 2pm, 31 October 2015).

157 Other students expressed frustration with the notion of moderate Islam, because they saw it as sending the message that something was wrong with Islam. Two students who asked to be interviewed together, explained this was why they did not agree with the notion of “moderate Islam.” In conversation, it became clear that they saw promoting moderate Islam as something that other countries did, whereas the actions of the Omani government were intended to “preserve” Islam, rather than promote another form of it.209

This reinforced my view that the Omani government was successful in convincing citizens that official religious discourse lacked a political agenda, and was only intended to sustain existing religious heritage and identity.

V. Conclusion

The chapter has focused on the ways in which the governments of Jordan,

Morocco, and Oman have spread official religious discourse through educational institutions while also analyzing the views of the individuals involved in producing religious educational content, as well as students, journalists, and others that have experienced official religious education. This chapter considers the ways in which the

Ministry of Education used schools, textbooks, and teachers to promote its position on religious identity. At the same time, the chapter airs the concerns and critiques of certain individuals, while demonstrating how other individuals adhere to the official position.

Certain themes were shared across the different contexts. A broad consensus emerged that considered religious education to be crucial to the issue of countering violent extremism, yet many disagreed as to the most effective means of achieving this

209 Author interview with male and female recent college graduates, Interview ID 9B & 10B (Al Rudha “The Lounge,” Muscat, Oman, 2:30pm, 4 November 2015).

158 desired outcome. Many different interviewees saw extremism as resulting from insufficient or improper religious education. In Jordan, interviewees were more likely to express the view that extremism specifically resulted from an improper understanding of

Islam, a view in keeping with the government’s stance regarding the existence of one true form of “correct” Islam. In Morocco and Oman, interviewees were more likely to assert that their form of national Islam offered a form of “antidote” to extremism, and that extremist ideas came from outside their national borders.

In Jordan and Morocco, several interviewees explained that another source of extremism was that weak students pursued religious studies, while stronger students became doctors and engineers. This view was not expressed by interviewees in Oman.

Some Jordanian and Moroccan interviewees held that stronger religious education could overcome the dearth of qualified candidates to be imams, and would benefit the population in general. In Jordan specifically, several interviewees voiced concerns that the government sought to use religion strategically, but that it did not do enough to encourage an adequate understanding of Islam among the population.

Although several Jordanian interviewees stated that only weak students studied religion, they failed to acknowledge that many women study religion, in part because religious knowledge and piety are often seen as a desirable quality in a future daughter- in-law, on the basis that she will raise good Muslims. An interview with a female educator who had received her PhD in hadith contributed to this observation, although the interviewee did not herself mention the trend.210 The role of women in promoting religious education was not often acknowledged in interviews, although it had been

210 Author interview with female Arabic teacher, Interview ID 2A (Qasid Arabic Language School, Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 2 July 2015).

159 institutionalized by the Jordanian and Moroccan governments through the use of female preachers and mourchidates, respectively.

The data collected appears to reinforce the overarching argument regarding the relationship between nation-building and the resonance of official religious discourse.

One theme that emerged specifically regarding educational curricula was a discourse of citizenship, which was more present in the Omani context than in the other kingdoms.

Observed variation may also be the result of locally specific dynamics, such as the strength of opposition parties or the presence of a Christian minority. Yet regarding the level of acrimony regarding depictions of non-core groups, the observed variation can also be explained by nation-building. If the state had encouraged a form of Jordanian

Islam that was grounded in the local conditions, specifically the presence of a native

Christian population, tensions between Christian and Muslim Jordanians might have been eased. In Oman, for example, nation-building and strict policing have thus far prevented visible outbreak of friction between the Sunni and Ibāḍī communities.

The following chapter highlights the views of individuals responsible for producing and disseminating official Islam. Based primarily on interviews with representatives of the religious establishment and employees of government religious bureaucracies, I evaluate how these individuals interpret and interact with the discourses they are charged with spreading: often these individuals are responsible for disseminating such discourses to the broader population, however their own identities and ideas about

Islam may or may not resonate with the shift in narrative, complicating their ability to carry out their professional duties.

160 Chapter 4: Preaching Official Islam

I. Introduction

This chapter evaluates the ways in which the institutions and individuals associated with official Islam respond to the discourses that political elites entrust them with spreading to the population at large. The data are derived from interviews with imams, preachers, as well as religious bureaucrats employed by the Ministry of Religious

Affairs, and the offices that issue religious edicts, as well as participant observation in these institutions. State structures have been asserting the need for greater oversight of religious spaces in response to concerns about extremism.

In order to reduce the possibility of extremist (or anti-regime) rhetoric, the state has asserted its right to dictate the content of Friday sermons in multiple MENA countries. Surveillance of mosque spaces and surroundings has also increased, including measures such as the standardization of the call to prayer in some contexts.211 However, many mosques remain outside the control of the state: these may not have been necessarily intended as spaces for worshippers to avoid state oversight, and may instead reflect the pious belief in the rewards that await those who build mosques.212 Yet in practice these unregulated mosques have presented official religious institutions with a glaring reminder of their inability to monopolize religious space and discourse.

II. Official Islam as a Reproduction

The chapter focuses on the views of individuals employed by the religious

211 The UAE unified the call to prayer in 2004. Egypt announced the call to prayer would be unified in 2004 as well, and began to implement a single call in 2010, but many mosques resist compliance. 212 See, e.g., Mona Atia, Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).

161 establishment, specifically their willingness during interviews to either reproduce official religious discourse or to challenge it. Official Islam reflects the standardization and homogenization of all nationalized discourses, and for religious bureaucrats, the articulation of official Islam is an act of reproducing state speech as much as an expression of individual faith. I do not claim to evaluate individuals’ private beliefs regarding official Islam. However, I consider their willingness to reproduce official

Islamic discourse to reflect their experience of official discourse as resonant. Resonance does not imply that an individual necessarily believes the official discourse, but does imply that the discourse is familiar to him. This familiarity reflects the effects of nation- building, or the long-term construction of culturally resonant frames. Views of official religious discourse are not uniform across a given country, however certain trends characterize each monarchy’s state-produced narrative and thereby elicit a range of relatively comparable responses.

As established earlier, of the three monarchies, Jordanian official religious discourse falls on the universalistic end of the spectrum. The Hashimites claim the authority to speak on behalf of “true Islam,” and do not seek to promote a form of Islam grounded in a specifically Jordanian identity. In this chapter I refer to Jordanian official discourse as “Hashimite Islam,” which reflects the intent of language used by the

Jordanian religious establishment, if not the words themselves.

In contrast, in both Morocco and Oman, the ruling regimes construct a religious discourse grounded in the language of national heritage. Although these traditions bear the marks of European influence as well as the agendas of political elites in their efforts to signal compliance with the global combating terrorism agenda, they have resonance

162 because they reflect frames established during the process of nation-building.

The chapter’s primary methodology is discourse analysis: statements by representatives of official Islam are not themselves treated as evidence of fact but instead evaluated as both expressions of the regime’s stance on religious authority, and as evidence of an individual’s views on this stance. The research acknowledges the tension inherent in the position of religious officials, caught between their duties as employees and their convictions as individuals.

Respondents include senior religious officials, such as the Grand Mufti of Jordan and the Jordanian Minister of ʾAwqāf, the Assistant Grand Mufti of Oman, the Director of Islamic Affairs in the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and the head of the

Moroccan League of Scholars. For the most part, individuals in more senior roles tended to adhere most closely to the official narrative, with a few significant exceptions.

Interviews with these individuals helped to establish the content of official religious discourse itself, in combination with analysis of government produced documents such as sermons and textbooks. Whereas interviews with rank and file clerics and religious officials, both in and outside the capital cities, were less likely to reflect the official line.

These interviews offer insights into where the credibility of official discourse breaks down. Unless otherwise noted, the primary language used during the interviews was the following: primarily Arabic in Jordan; English or Arabic, or a combination of both in

Oman; French in Morocco.

163 III. Alternative Explanations

I attribute variation in religious bureaucrats’ willingness to reproduce or challenge official religious discourse to derive primarily from the extent to which they experience the discourse as resonating with their existing understandings. However possible alternative factors could account for the apparent willingness of some Jordanian bureaucrats to question state discourses, and the willingness of most Omani and

Moroccan bureaucrats to reproduce officially sanctioned speech.

One alternative explanation could be the level of repression exercised by state authorities. Of the three monarchs, King Abdullah II demonstrates the most tolerance for civil society activism, although Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are carefully managed. In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has permitted the PJD to set up a government, although he retains control over the real levers of power through the

“sovereign” ministries, including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious

Affairs. In Oman, Sultan Qaboos exercises complete control over the government, and political parties are banned. As a result, the compliance of Omani religious bureaucrats with the official position is not particularly surprising, as the regime brooks no dissent.

However, the juxtaposition of Morocco and Jordan is useful, given their relatively similar levels of repression. Although the Freedom House metric has many flaws, it can be useful for comparing countries’ scores to each other: according to Freedom House, in

2017 Jordan earned a score of 5 out of 7 (7 being least free, 1 being most), while

Morocco earned the somewhat freer ranking of 4.5 out of 7 (Oman earned 5.5 out of

7).213 Both Jordan and Morocco are categorized as “Partly Free.” Given their relative

213 “Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy,” Freedom in the World 2017. See the individual Freedom House Country Reports for rankings. Freedom House describes

164 similarity in levels of repression, the higher willingness of Moroccan religious bureaucrats to reproduce official religious discourse does not appear to be due solely to fear of reprisal.

Another alternative explanation for the observed lack of resonance among

Jordanian respondents is performance legitimacy. A government that fulfills the material needs of its people is less likely to be criticized than one that fails to do so. Again, the apparent resonance observed in Oman may reflect the relatively high quality of life enjoyed by many Omanis. However, the comparison of Jordan and Morocco reveals that wealth does not seem to be able to explain why Moroccans are more willing to articulate state discourse. According to the World Bank, in Jordan the GDP/capita in 2016 was

4087 USD. In Morocco, the GDP/capita was 2892 (current US$) in 2016. Moreover, the

Moroccan GDP/capita had declined from 3160 (current US$) in 2014 whereas in Jordan the GDP/capita had risen by approximately 20 USD since 2014.214 Not a significant increase, but preferable to the perceptible decline experienced by Moroccans in the same period. Although Jordanians enjoy a higher GDP/capita, this does not mean they are more willing to parrot the stance of the regime, while Moroccans are apparently more willing to do so.

it methodology as follows: “The analysts, who prepare the draft reports and scores, use a broad range of sources, including news articles, academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental organizations, and individual professional contacts. The analysts score countries based on the conditions and events within their borders during the coverage period.” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 [Accessed 23 May 2018]. 214 The World Bank, Data: Jordan “GDP per capita (current US$)” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=JO [Accessed 23 May 2018] The World Bank, Data: Morocco “GDP per capita (current US$)” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MA [Accessed 23 May 2018]

165 I attribute this to the fact that the Moroccan religious establishment couches its language in terms that Moroccans are familiar with, and which correspond to ideas about

Moroccanness and Islam that were established during the process of nation-building. In contrast, the Jordanian regime did not articulate a specifically Jordanian form of Islam, and instead promotes the religious authority of the Hashimites.

IV. Case Studies

Jordan

The office of Minister of ʾAwqāf is subject to the frequent cabinet shuffling that characterizes Jordanian parliamentary politics. During the period of fieldwork in 2015, the Prime Minister of Jordan was Abdullah Ensour, who controlled the Jordanian government from 2012 to 2016. Hayel Dawud was appointed as Minister of ʾAwqāf in

2013, and served until the election of a new parliament in 2016.

Across the three monarchies, I found that the longer an official had a given role, the more willing he was to express views that differed from the official discourse. As a result, I attributed Hayel Dawud’s strict adherence to official religious discourse to the relative brevity of his tenure as the Minister of Awqāf. During an interview with Minister

Dawud in October 2015, he expressed agreement with the government’s position, highlighting Jordan’s role in promoting “true Islam”: “The true idea of Islam… we promote this idea with the Education Ministry when they [Jordanians] are small, so they do not become extremist.”215 Not unexpectedly, his statements adhere closely to the official position established by the Jordanian regime. Unlike some high-ranking

215 Author interview with Minister of Religious Affairs Hayel Dawud, Interview ID 68A (Amman, Jordan, 12:30pm, 26 October 2015).

166 representatives of official Islam in Morocco and Oman, who expressed their own views and interpretations of the government’s message, Minister Dawud closely followed the established script. This appeared to reflect his somewhat tenuous position as a short-term officeholder subject to cabinet shuffling, rather than an individual appointed by the king for the purpose of long-term production of religious discourse, as in Morocco and Oman.

The contemporary extent of Jordanian state control over religious institutions is the result of increased expansion of state oversight. Wiktorowicz (2001) notes that while preachers were subject to supervision in the 1960s, by 1964 the Department of ʾAwqāf began to suggest topics for the sermon, and asked that preachers keep a written copy of the sermon. By the 1970s the Ministry produced entire sermons that preachers could read verbatim.216 In the early 21st century, the Ministry of ʾAwqāf began to use Facebook to distribute the text of its Friday sermon each week. At the time of writing, a link on the

Ministry’s Facebook page revealed a Google document with the title and text of the week’s sermon.217 The trend demonstrates increasing levels of ministerial control over preachers’ freedom of expression from the pulpit.

Yet preachers do not necessarily adhere entirely to the sermon’s text, even in religious space directly controlled by the regime. When I attended a Friday sermon at the

King Hussein National Mosque in July 2015, the preacher (ḵaṭīb) did not read the

Ministry’s pre-released sermon verbatim. The day I attended was the first Friday after the end of Ramadan, and the focus of his sermon was on maintaining a strong sense of piety throughout the year. In contrast, the subject that the Ministry had assigned focused on the

216 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism (2001), 57. 217 Facebook page for the Ministry of ʾʾAwqāf https://www.facebook.com/AwqāfJordan?fref=ts [Accessed 15 March 2017].

167 responsibility of parents towards their children.218 The fact that the preacher, a well- known figure in Jordan’s official religious establishment, would be permitted to veer so widely from the prescribed topic, is likely due to his avoidance of any subject that could cause concern to the regime. From the perspective of the regime, discussing consistent piety or parental duties are equally innocuous and therefore acceptable. It appears that even in the national mosque, a trusted religious official has some leeway to pursue his own line of religious discourse as long as it does not incite resistance to the king or express opposition to state policies.219 This demonstrates that the Ministry’s concern is not so much in dictating preachers’ exact speech, but merely in preventing speech that could potentially threaten the regime.

Like many post-Ottoman territories, Jordan has a Grand Mufti, who oversees an institution called the Department of Issuing Religious Edicts, or Dāʾira al-Iftā’.

According to the website of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’, the office was established in 1921.220

However this date refers to the appointment of Amin al-Husseini as Grand Mufti of

Jerusalem by the British High Commissioner for Mandate Palestine. The office of Grand

Mufti of Jordan was not established until 1941, five years before Jordan achieved independence from the British Mandate. Although a Fatwa Department was established in 1986, the Grand Mufti remained affiliated with the Ministry of ʾAwqāf until a law was passed in 2006 to establish a Public Fatwa Department independent from the ministry and

218 Google document posted by the Ministry of Awqāf: “Themes Proposed for the Friday Sermon on Date Friday, July 24, 2015,” https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3DojpDeasOQRUZHMFlwOW5wU1k/view [Accessed 17 March 2017]. 219 Author attended Friday sermon at the King Hussein National Mosque (Amman, Jordan, 1pm, 24 July 2015). 220 https://www.aliftaa.jo/ [Accessed 12 November 2017] Translated from Arabic by the author.

168 other government agencies.

The Dāʾira al-Iftā’ is the source of official religious edicts (fatawa) for the kingdom. Individuals outside the Dāʾira are prohibited from issuing fatawa. Although the office of Grand Mufti carries the rank of minister, and the Department is high in the hierarchy of official Islam, the office itself is outside of the main urban center of Amman.

When visiting the offices, assistants to the Grand Mufti expressed surprise at the presence of a researcher, despite my having set up an interview with the office in advance. During my interview with Grand Mufti Abdul Karim Saleem Khasawneh, the Secretary General of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’, Muhammad Ahmad A-Khalayleh, was also present in the Grand

Mufti’s office. About halfway through the interview, a previous Grand Mufti, Sa’id Al-

Hijjawi (Grand Mufti from 1992 to 2007), arrived and was invited to join the conversation.

Between 2010 and 2017, Abdul Karim Saleem Khasawneh served as the Grand

Mufti of Jordan. In January 2017 the former Secretary General of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’,

Muhammad Ahmad Al-Khalayleh, was appointed the new Grand Mufti, while Grand

Mufti Khasawneh was appointed the new chief Islamic justice, the top Shariʿa judge.

Prior to Mufti Khasawneh, Nuh Quda (senior) served as Grand Mufti from 2007 to 2010.

While periods of four to seven years may seem substantial for a government official, in other contexts, Grand Muftis often serve for decades. For example, Omani Grand Mufti

Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad Al-Khalili has held the office since 1975. The Grand Mufti of

Saudi Arabia, Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah Ash-Sheikh, has held the office since 1999. In the religious arena, the government of Jordan tends to avoid allowing individuals to hold long-term power, likely to prevent religious authority from accruing to them through their

169 role.

Despite his relatively brief tenure of five years, Grand Mufti Al-Khasawneh displayed a remarkable willingness to express criticism of the government. Al-

Khasawneh articulated a disconnect between the official position and true Islam. He pointed out the difficulty of reconciling timeless religious edicts with changing political agendas. In addition, he acknowledged that the Jordanian campaign to promote moderate

Islam as true Islam ignored some basic components of the religion and of heritage. He acknowledged that different interpretations of Islam exist, rather than adopting the official message regarding a single correct form of the religion. While he expressed these views to me, other individuals, including the Secretary General, quietly urged him not to.

I expect that the Grand Mufti would have questioned official religious discourse less if it were more closely tied to a Jordanian religious identity, as opposed to a notion of “true”

Islam, which is easily critiqued.

As part of its mission to issue religious edicts, the Iftā’ Department has built an online presence. During the period of fieldwork in the summer and fall of 2015, concerns about the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) were high, and the use of the internet by radicalized individuals to spread information and gain recruits was seen as in dire need of attention. The Iftā’ Department had appointed a mufti to issue electronic fatwas in response to questions posed by online users. The individual was trained in Islamic jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia. He argued that violence carried out in the name of Islam was based on incorrect interpretation (ijtihād) of Islam, but not the Qurʾan itself. This corresponds to a Salafi and a Wahhabi viewpoint, which advocates for the devout to rely

170 on the model of the ancestors (ʾaslāf), present at the time of the Prophet Muhammad.221

His view is consistent with his religious studies in Saudi Arabia, as well as with the notion of true Islam prioritized by the Jordanian regime.

Despite efforts to integrate the office into the online world of social media, the

Department of Iftā’ reported page views by 180,000 individuals for the month of June

2015, and 100,000 individual visits to their Facebook page. The Director of Electronic

Fatawa expressed optimism that the number was rising; after establishing an online presence in 2007, the site attracted few visitors. Even by 2012, monthly viewers only hit

32,000. Therefore, he viewed the increase to almost 200,000 monthly visits as evidence that the site was effective. He noted that 51 percent of viewers had IP addresses in Saudi

Arabia.

However, millions of individuals watch videos and visit sites hosted by nongovernmental groups, especially in Saudi Arabia. to find answers from alternative sources. It is difficult for the Department to compete with internet sheikhs, and especially more radical speakers, whose videos and pages can attract millions of views. Often the most popular sheikhs are those who ascribe to more conservative views. The mufti addressed the imbalance between Jordanian and Saudi religious authority, based in part on his time living in Saudi Arabia. In his opinion, Saudi Arabia has high religious authority due to its ideas, not only to the resources spent to spread them. He expressed the views that even if Saudi Arabian individuals and sheikhs stopped spreading Wahhabism as correct Islam, these views would continue to proliferate.

The mufti did not speak to this issue, but the Fatwa Department faces the

221 Author interview with Director of Electronic Fatawa, Mufti Jamil Abu Sara, Interview ID 19A (Amman, Jordan, 11:30am, 12 August 2015).

171 challenge of being staffed by only a few muftis to respond to religious questions submitted electronically, in contrast to the vast numbers of private individuals actively promoting their own religious agenda online. This imbalance speaks to a broader problem, namely, the difficulties that government institutions face when trying to respond in real time to internet content they consider undesirable. Bureaucracy is useful for maintaining practices, but often less adept at adopting new ones. Adapting official religious institutions to the social media age is necessary due to the volume of religious speech and information that proliferates online, but almost no government institutions have managed to successfully respond.222

The Jordanian government has tried to overcome this challenge in part by outsourcing the production of official religious discourse to NGOs. Jordanian civil society is relatively robust, although many organizations are not true NGOs because they receive government funding. For the production of official religious discourse, for example, the Jordanian government partners with organizations such as the Global Forum for Moderation (al-muntada al-3lamy lil-wasatia). Established in Jordan in 2001, the

Global Forum has branches throughout many Muslim-majority countries. The Global

Forum organizes events, conferences, and symposia to encourage the idea that “true”

Islam is grounded in moderation and toleration.

The discourse produced by the Forum is intentionally universalistic and largely non-sectarian, and does not articulate a relationship to any nation, instead expressing a universalistic vision of moderate Islam. The chairman and director of the Global Forum

222 On 11 November 2017 the website of the Grand Mufti’s office (https://www.aliftaa.jo/ ) was down, a sign that hardly bodes well for the Department’s efforts to keep up with online jihadi forums. By 12 November, the site was online again.

172 explained that the purpose of the Forum is to educate Muslims in “true” Islam, which is moderate and peaceful.223 However in addition to expressing this view, he also articulated opposition to government involvement in religion, specifically the instrumentalization of religion for political purposes. His view was shared by many in Jordan, although variation existed in the extent to which individuals found the government of Jordan to be guilty of using religion for political ends.

The effort to encourage “moderate Islam” often took the form of events and conferences to affirm dedication to upholding a moderate interpretation of the religion. In summer 2015, the Global Forum for Moderation hosted an annual conference dedicated to the “renewal of Islam” (tajdīd al-ʾislām). The event honored writers recognized for contributing to Islamic renewal. Speakers at the event clarified that the notion of Islamic renewal was not meant to convey the notion of new interpretation (ijtihād), a concept that is sometimes viewed negatively due to an association with unlawful innovation (bidʿa).

Instead they emphasized the government’s standard line about promoting a “true interpretation of Islam.”224 A few speakers mentioned the need for greater pluralism in religious thought, however the disconnect between promoting “true Islam,” which would correspond to a single interpretation, and encouraging pluralism was not addressed.

Holding conferences, seminars, and meetings among high-level individuals and representatives of official Islam is a frequent practice adopted by governments that claim to encourage “moderate Islam,” however in Jordan such efforts only rarely correspond to

223 Author interview with Director of the Global Forum for Moderation, Interview ID 6A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 30 July 2015). 224 Author attended the event “Annual Celebration to Honor the Renewal of Books in the Islamic World,” co-sponsored by the Global Forum for Moderation and the League of Book Renewal (rabita kitab al-tajdid), (24 August 2015, Landmark Hotel, Amman Jordan). Translated from Arabic by the author.

173 initiatives in at-risk communities, or through outreach to young people.

While the events and symposia held by organizations like the Global Forum for

Moderation are not necessarily aimed at the average Jordanian, the government also provides support for more direct interventions into the religious discourse directed at the general public, specifically through TV and radio. One radio show that several interlocutors highlighted as representing a key mouthpiece for moderate Islam is Radio

Yaqeen, run by Muhammad Nuh al-Quda.225 Muhammad Nuh Al-Quda, a former

Minister of Awqāf, as well as a former Minister of Youth, frequently appears on TV to offer his opinion as a religious scholar. His father, a prominent religious figure in Jordan, was the Grand Mufti of Jordan from 2007 to 2010. Muhammad Nuh launched Yaqeen

Radio in 2015 with the goal of encouraging true Islam. When asked to clarify what “true

Islam” meant, an employee of his radio station explained that it means moderation, not going to extremes but acting in a courteous manner, being positive, and giving to charity.

She explained that many individuals have questions about whether they need to engage in more extreme acts in order to be good Muslims, and Dr. Nuh’s goal is to reassure them that they are fulfilling their duties as Muslims by being good individuals. His radio station, as well as the foundation he established in memory of his father, have a reputation for providing needed aid for Jordanians in need. According the Dr. Nuh’s assistant, the radio station had attracted over 150,000 listeners since its launch seven months earlier.226

Muhammad Nuh Al-Quda represents an example of a religious figure who

225 Radio Yaqeen is available for free online: http://www.liveonlineradio.net/jordan/yaqeen- fm.htm [Accessed 13 November 2017]. 226 Author interview with female employee of Yaqeen Radio and assistant to Dr. Nuh, Interview ID 27A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 23 August 2015).

174 maintains a stance of relative independence from the state, despite his previous ministerial appointments. During his interview, Dr. Nuh criticized the instrumentalization of religion for political purposes, especially by Islamist groups. He attributed part of the appeal of his message of Islam is to his avoidance of politics. Instead he focuses on the religion of Mohammed, not that of political parties.227 His message is successful because he reassures people that their practice of Islam is sufficient, that they are not called to embrace more radical or conservative positions, but instead to focus on being good family members, neighbors, and citizens. Dr. Nuh did not address the fact that his promotion of moderate Islam is itself political, not least because it reinforces the discourse promoted by the government.

Mosques are a key mouthpiece for official Islam. As noted above, the Ministry of

ʾAwqāf uses Facebook to distribute a “suggested text” for the weekly Friday sermon. The

Ministry surveils mosque spaces in order to prevent radicalized individuals from spreading their views or recruiting mosque-goers to their cause. In addition, would-be preachers must be approved to give the Friday sermon, and the Ministry can revoke permission of any individual to preach or lead prayer.

In order to investigate the effect that Ministry oversight could have on the views of imams, I interviewed a few individuals who had their permission to lead prayers revoked. One imam who spoke with me was based at a mosque near the University of

Jordan in Amman. He and his family were still permitted to live in the house attached to the mosque, but he had temporarily lost permission to lead prayers and was required to pay a fine of 20 JD, due to his espousal of views that did not adhere to the official

227 Author interview with Dr. Mohammed Nuh al-Quda, Interview ID 28A (Amman, Jordan, 11:30am, 23 August 2015).

175 government position.228 He explained that speaking about politics was forbidden. He also said that while the government did not prevent religious practices, it did not encourage individuals to study Islam deeply. In his view, the government was controlling religion for the purpose of preventing extremism, a goal that he saw as legitimate.

Interestingly, when speaking about his own role in relation to the government, he distinguished himself from a representative of the Ministry of Awqāf. Despite having been trained and accredited by the Ministry, he expressed a clear distinction between individuals that were seen as independent and those that were seen as government- affiliated, and asserted that the views of someone independent like himself would be taken more seriously than the views of a government affiliate. Although the imam saw himself as independent from the regime, he also used language consistent with official religious discourse. For example, when explaining that the government closely regulated mosques following the rise of ISIS, he explained that this was positive because “Islam must be true Islam,”229 and that extremist interpretations were incorrect.

The Jordanian institutions and individuals described thus far are all based in the capital city of Amman. Like many capital cities, Amman differs greatly from the conditions found outside the city limits. Almost half (4 million) of the Jordanian population of 9.4 million live in Amman. Most other Jordanians live in other urban centers, including Irbid, Zarqa, Aqaba, and Salt. Interviews with imams in these secondary cities help to reveal the effects of distance from the main center of power.

228 The disciplinary actions he experienced are consistent with those described in the 2016 International Religious Freedom Report for Jordan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269142.pdf [Accessed 11 November 2017]. 229 Author interview with imam, his home, Interview ID 7A (Amman, Jordan, 3pm, 30 July 2015).

176 I traveled to the city of Irbid to attend mosque services and conduct interviews.

After listening to the sermon, the imam received me in a lavish home on the outskirts of

Irbid. The imam explained that the home was not his, but that a colleague of his had permitted him to use it for the purpose of our interview. The imam explained that he had been an employee of the Ministry of ʾAwqāf for the past 24 years. Similar to the imam barred from preaching in Amman, the imam was also opposed to Jordan’s treaty with

Israel, however he had managed to avoid censure by not overstepping such limits while preaching.

I learned of an imam in Salt who was seen as independent from the government, and therefore respected. During our interview, the imam articulated the view that religion and the state should be one, meaning that the state should adhere to Islam and be subordinate to Islam, and expressed frustration that often Islam was subordinate to the state, as representatives of official Islam used the religion to justify the actions of the state. The imam argued that the state only implements parts of Islam, those related to marriage and divorce and inheritance, but does not in fact adhere to the most important parts of the religion. His view that the state incompletely implements religion was a frequent theme in Jordan, where both religious officials, educators, and university students expressed the need for more thorough religious education.

The imam expressed confidence that technology could overcome the state’s use of religion to serve its agenda, because technology allowed people to circumnavigate the limits imposed by state religious institutions. At the same time, he explained that technology allowed anyone to issue a fatwa, joking that even his wife could issue a fatwa

177 on the internet.230 In articulating the need for better religious education in order to ensure that people were able to differentiate a sound hadith from a false or unsubstantiated one, his concerns echo those of many societies grappling with the overabundance of false information online, and the difficulty of verifying sources for accuracy.

The imam in Salt expressed more independent language than many of the other government registered imams with whom I spoke, although even his views demonstrated the influence of official religious discourse. He did not articulate views related to “true

Islam” although he did explain that Islam is itself moderate. When asked to explain the difference between “centrist Islam” (al-Islam al-wasati), a term based in the Qurʾan, and

“moderate Islam” (al-Islam al-muatadl), a term associated with English language discourse, he asserted that the two were identical. When asked for his view on state

Islam, he stated that ordinary people did not take it seriously, because it did not follow

Islam. For this reason, he did not expect that the government’s efforts to encourage moderate Islam would be successful. This view was markedly distinct from individuals working within the Ministry of Awqāf, who stated that because “true Islam” was itself moderate, government efforts to encourage it would be met with success.

Analyzing the Discourse of Religious Bureaucrats

As Antoun (2006) points out, “In Jordan, the state is closely associated with the religion of Islam and, being so, Islam in many of its manifestations is associated with the state.”231 As a result of the emphasis on “true” Islam, and on Jordan and the Hashimites

230 Author interview with imam, his home, Interview ID 41A (Salt, Jordan, 8pm, 5 September 2015). 231 Richard Antoun, “Fundamentalism, Bureaucratization, and the State's Co-Optation of Religion: A Jordanian Case Study,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 3 (2006): 385.

178 as responsible for promoting “true” Islam, interviewees largely rejected the notion of a form of “Jordanian Islam.” In contrast to the relative willingness of individuals in

Morocco and Oman to articulate a specifically national form of Islam, Jordanian individuals viewed a form of national Islam as anathema to Islam’s universalism, a position consistent with official religious discourse in Jordan.

In Jordan, official religious discourse has focused on the notion of “true” Islam

(typically phrased as al-islam al-haq or al-islam al-haqiqi). This corresponds to a view that attributes religiously motivated violence to misunderstanding the faith. This view asserts that individuals who commit acts of violence in the name of Islam are not true

Muslims. By emphasizing the notion of “true Islam,” the discourse inherently posits certain actors as responsible for producing this correct version of the faith; in Jordan, these actors are the Hashimites. By stressing the notion of true Islam and explicitly tying it to the religious leadership of the Hashimites, religious discourse seeks to discredit interpretations of Islam that arise from religious actors not under Hashimite control.

However, by analyzing the discourse of both elite and low-level members of the official religious establishment in Jordan, it became clear that the emphasis on true Islam actually undermined the religious authority of the Hashimites. By prioritizing the concept of a “true” or “correct” interpretation, official religious discourse put the Jordanian regime in the difficult position of needing to always adhere exactly to Islamic stricture.

However, as a small country that always relied on its relationships with more powerful allies, Jordan lacks the economic and political resources to adhere precisely to Islamic doctrine. In contrast, Saudi Arabia possesses the resources and power to more closely follow the doctrine it has established as religiously correct. In Jordan, this results in many

179 individuals following the guidance of Saudi doctrine, sheikhs, and religious edicts over

Jordanian religious authorities.

As reflected in policies specifically articulating national heritage and traditions, the absence of a clearly articulated Jordanian form of Islam resulted in the rejection of the notion of a national Islam in Jordan. Despite the presence of national institutions such as the Dāʾira al-Ifta, which issues religious edicts that apply only to Jordan, and the presence of the Ministry of ʾAwqāf and Ministry of Education that produce religious curricula solely for the education of Jordanian students, official religious discourse was largely described in universal terms. When Jordan was mentioned, it was to emphasize the country’s role in upholding true Islam.

The most common statement expressed was that violent extremism is alien to

Islam. This was often the first point respondents made. The Minister of Awqāf, the individual most publically responsible for promoting official religious discourse, began our interview by saying that violent extremism is not in fact part of Islam: “Islam is a religion of moderation and love and equality and cooperation between all people.

Whoever works with another idea of Islam is not Islam.”232 The Grand Mufti, another of the key individuals responsible for promoting the regime’s official stance on religion, explained the rules of war given by Caliph Abu Bakr that prevent combatants from killing women, children, and slaves, or even cutting down the trees of the enemy.233 The view that Islam is innocent of acts of violence allegedly committed in its name was stated

232 Author interview with Minister of ʾʾʾAwqāf Hayel Dawud, Interview ID 68A (Amman, Jordan, 12:30pm, 26 October 2015). His reference to burning most likely corresponds to the televised burning of military pilot Moath al-Khasasbeh by the so-called Islamic State in February 2015. 233 Author interview with Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Karim Saleem Khasawneh, Interview ID 16A (Amman, Jordan, 9am, 12 August 2015). He cites the hadith collection of Imam Malik, Al- Muwatta, Book 21: “Kitab al-Jihad,” Hadith 971.

180 by almost all Jordanian Muslim interviewees, not only those responsible for promoting the regime’s official position.

Another frequent point made by officials responsible for disseminating official

Islam was that acts of violence were carried out by foreigners, with the implication that

Jordanians would not adopt violence. The present Minister of Awqāf, a former Minister of Awqāf, and the Secretary General of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ all made this point, causing me to interpret it as a key component of official religious discourse.234

While attributing violence to foreigners, religious officials tended to emphasize that Jordan has a special status in the promotion of Islam. When speaking about the mission of his ministry, the Minister of ʾAwqāf reinforced the self-perception of the

Jordanian regime as speaking for “true” Islam. 235 His view of the ministry’s goal corresponds to the notion that only the state has the religious authority to define “true”

Islam. Although state efforts to monopolize religious discourse are strenuously contested, and state control is by no means hegemonic, the ruling regime has increasingly sought to expand state control over religious speech, institutions, and actors, in a manner reflected by the interview data I gathered.

Many religious officials expressed frustration at the perceived association between Islam and violence. They found it hypocritical that an individual’s religion would be seen as the cause for their violence, whereas acts of violence committed by

234 Author interview with Secretary General of Public Iftā’ Department Dr. Muhammad Ahmad A-Khalayleh, Interview ID 17A (Amman, Jordan, 9am, 12 August 2015). 235 Author interview with Minister of Religious Affairs Hayel Dawud, Interview ID 68A (Amman, Jordan, 12:30pm, 26 October 2015).

181 members of other religions were generally not attributed to these individuals’ faith.236

Officials in Jordanian religious institutions emphasized the freedom of preachers to express their own views. In an interview, a former Minister of Awqāf, Dr. ‘Abdul

Salam Al ‘Abadi explained that the sermon produced by the Ministry is merely intended as a model that preachers can follow if they wish, but they are not required to adhere to it word for word.237 However he also stressed that the Ministry draws on “correct” hadith, reinforcing the view that official Islam must curate the proper forms of the religion for distribution to the populace.

Yet even individuals that work with the government to produce or disseminate official religious discourse expressed doubts as to the long-term sustainability of the regime’s wish to monopolize religious discourse. Preventing preachers from commenting on issues that are of importance to society weakens the credibility of official religious authorities. The director of a state-sponsored organization charged with reproducing the government’s official religious stance expressed frustration with the fact that a preacher could lose his position for criticizing the government. The most concerning aspect of this, in his view, was that official religious institutions lost their strongest thinkers, those individuals that could potentially have wielded influence over their congregations.

Instead, the government prioritized individuals willing to mouth the official view and ignore the issues of greatest importance to the congregation. The government was primarily interested in hiring the individuals that were the least likely to inspire loyal

236 Author interview with Director of the Global Forum for Moderation, Interview ID 6A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 30 July 2015); Author interview with religious scholar at the College of Shariʿa, University of Jordan, Interview ID 43A (Amman, Jordan, 1pm, 17 September 2015). 237 Author interview with former Minister of Religious Affairs, Interview ID 21A (Amman, Jordan, 12pm, 16 August 2015).

182 adherents to their interpretation of religion. In his view, the government faced a dilemma: religion cannot be ignored, but it is too powerful to be effectively manipulated. Referring to Islam as the “essential engine” of society, the director stated that the government appears to be trying to weaken religion while simultaneously using it strategically. But he said that they would be unable to do so, that the strategic use of religion would backfire.238

By examining comments made during interviews by religious officials, I analyze how they view official Islam, Islam in general, and their role in aligning political agendas with religious imperatives. I am particularly interested in where such individuals question or disagree with the official position, which I interpret as indicating a fissure in the regime’s attempts to encourage identification with its official religious discourse.

However, this is coupled with a discourse that emphasizes that true Islam is self- evident and found in the Qurʾan, and that someone who had studied Islam properly would not be led astray by false interpretations. Of particular relevance for my argument is the stress on the idea of a single form of “true” Islam, and the rejection of multiple interpretations. Due to the notion of a single form of true Islam, it is difficult to account for the reality of different interpretations of Islam. In addition, government actions that are inconsistent with Islam are difficult to reconcile with their claim to stand for “true

Islam.” For this reason, Jordan represents an example of an unsuccessful attempt by the government to encourage its official religious discourse, due primarily to its failure to articulate a specifically Jordanian form of Islam, and instead to insist that it has the authority to speak for all of Islam.

238 Author interview with director of a state-sponsored religious organization, Interview ID 6A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 30 July 2015).

183 Morocco

In contrast to Jordan, the government of Morocco has engaged in a campaign to link Moroccan religious identity with national identity since the foundational period.

French colonization had the effect of reifying certain religious traditions and practices as specifically Moroccan, thereby cementing their importance to Moroccan national identity. French efforts to signal that Moroccan Islam remained unaltered by European influence were motivated by a desire to minimize resistance to colonial rule. The

Alaouite monarchy benefitted from the reification of Moroccan religious tradition, specifically those that emphasized the centrality of the figure of the commander of the faithful (al-ʾamīr al-muʾminīn), a status that carried only minimal significance at the time that the Moroccan Protectorate was established in 1912. The French enhanced its perceived importance, and after independence, King Hassan II cemented the religious status of the Moroccan monarch by codifying the position of the Commander of the

Faithful in the 1962 constitution.

In interviews with Moroccan religious bureaucrats, many expressed views that exhibited high resonance, or agreement, with the official religious discourse. Official discourse asserts that Moroccan Islam is grounded in Maliki Sunni Islam, the Ash’ari tradition of rationalism, and the influence of Sufi mysticism. The religious history of

Morocco was brought up in several interviews, specifically the lack of Ottoman influence as contributing to Morocco’s unique form of Islam. Notably, although Oman also largely escaped colonization by the Ottomans, this has not been adopted as key component of

Oman’s religious heritage in the way that it has in Morocco. The emphasis on Morocco’s escape from Ottoman control, and its lack of emphasis in Oman, demonstrates that

184 similar historical factors can be used to suit the regime’s narrative as needed, and should not be treated as inherently causal.

Official Islam in Morocco highlighted the need to encourage moderation in order to protect “spiritual security” in Morocco. This phrase was a frequent refrain among religious bureaucrats, expressed in Arabic language interviews as “al-ʾamn al-rūḥiyy” and in French language interviews as “sécurité spirituelle.” The efforts by the Moroccan government to discourage extremism included programs such as trainings for both

Moroccan and foreign imams, the education of female religious actors or mourchidates, anti-radicalization interventions in prisons, and efforts to reform education. Such efforts were broadly acknowledged and admired in statements by Moroccan religious bureaucrats. In general, representatives of official Islam expressed explicit agreement with and admiration for, the general strategy of the Moroccan king to counter violent extremism. They tended to view such efforts as expanding Moroccan prestige as a religious authority in the region and the world, and in counteracting the dangerous influence of “eastern Islam,” which referred to both Egyptian and Saudi Islam.

The lack of Ottoman influence upon Morocco is cited as significant by representatives of official Islam. The Secretary General of the League of Moroccan

‘ʿUlamaʾ (Rabita Muhammadia lil-ʿUlamaʾ) Dr. Ahmed ‘Abadi, attributed the unique independence of Moroccan Islam to its escape from Ottoman control. Specifically, he attributed intolerance associated with overly textual approaches to Islam to efforts by

Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566) to codify Islamic law and practice.239 Dr. ‘Abadi emphasized that because Morocco avoided the control of the

239 Author interview with Dr. Ahmed ‘Abadi, Secretary General of the Muhammadia League of Religious Scholars, Interview ID 11C (Rabat, Morocco 11am, 29 July 2016).

185 Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates as well as the Ottomans, it escaped the “codification syndrome” which allowed it to focus instead upon sciences and the expansion of knowledge.

While Islamic scholarship flourished in both Andalusia and Morocco – two regions that were one political entity during the period of Muslim Spain – subsequent efforts at codification have tried to essentialize Moroccan Islam, with the effect of preventing it from changing. The process began with French colonizers’ desire to study

Moroccan Islam as an isolable and authentic object of analysis. Building on the French narrative, the Alaouite monarchy benefits from what Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine

(2013) refer to as the “ritualization of political process in Morocco.” They describe the religious authority of the king as consecrated by spectacle: “Through the usage of culturally and historically resonant symbols, the regime ritualizes the public discourse.

This allows the monarchy to extend and reproduce legitimacy.”240 While Morocco avoided the codification of the Ottomans, the efforts of the regime to reify a unique and tolerant form of Moroccan Islam prevented the religion from adapting to the changing spiritual needs of the population. Although a discourse of authenticity and tradition has some appeal, Moroccan Islam’s early escape from codification has been replaced by an essentialized and static form of the religion enforced by religious bureaucracy, which in time may no longer resonate with the population.

State control and greater bureaucratization is a process of codification. Despite statements from religious officials about Morocco having escaped codification, and of

Moroccan Islam as representing practices “authentic” to the Moroccan identity, the

240 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, eds. Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics, and Society Under Muhammad VI (New York: Routledge, 2013), 27.

186 increase in state control over Moroccan Islam involves greater systematization of religion. Dr. ‘Abadi addressed this inherent tension when discussing how state control of religion operates in many contexts, but which he hopes to avoid in Morocco. He explained that religious bureaucrats often lack the training to engage with controversial and challenging topics, such as extremism. By emphasizing memorization and forbidding clerics from engaging in any form of discussion that could jeopardize the ruling status quo, religious institutions failed to prepare these individuals to respond to the real questions and concerns of their congregations. When clerics merely repeated sound bites, they lost the respect of the people who might otherwise have turned to them for religious guidance, and these individuals instead looked elsewhere, for example turning to the internet.241

The Ministry of ʾAwqāf was one of the earliest examples of the bureaucratization of religious institutions and functions, as it was established during the process of nation- building. Similar to its role in other officially-Islamic contexts, the ministry oversaw the construction and upkeep of mosques, trained and hired imams, collaborated with the

Ministry of Education in the production of religious curricula, assisted citizens with the process of making hajj to Mecca, and collected zakat, or required alms. Following the

2003 bombings, the Ministry expanded its control over the content of Friday sermons and established a program to train mourchidates, or female religious leaders, both efforts intended to promote the official religious discourse of Moroccan moderate Islam. The ministry’s full name translates to the “Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic

Affairs,” a moniker that does not convey the fact that the Ministry also oversees

241 Author interview with Dr. Ahmed ‘Abadi, Secretary General of the Muhammadia League of Religious Scholars, Interview ID 11C (Rabat, Morocco 11am, 29 July 2016).

187 institutions of other religions. In this capacity, it prevents the distribution of non-Islamic religious materials, as well as materials deemed inconsistent with the official Maliki-

Ash’ari interpretation of Islam.242

The position of Minister of ʾAwqāf has been held by Ahmed Toufiq since 2002.

A scholar and writer known for his Sufi affiliation, Toufiq’s appointment soon after King

Mohammad VI took power and his long-standing post as minister convey his important role in the king’s long-term efforts to promote a specifically Moroccan form of Islam. In

2014 King Muhammad articulated a new tripartite narrative of Moroccan Islam, grounding it in the Maliki branch of Sunni jurisprudence, the Ash’ari rationalist tradition, and Sufi mysticism. Although this three-part narrative about Moroccan Islam was relatively recent, it built on the long-standing influence of both Sufism and Maliki Islam in Morocco.

Sufism was seen as a core part of Moroccan Islam, a characteristic that reinforced its perceived distinction from Salafi Islam, and more specifically Saudi Islam, that the

Moroccan regime was eager to emphasize. Although some scholars question the assumed binary of Sufi and Salafi Islam,243 official discourse in Morocco reinforced the view that these perspectives existed in opposition to each other. Moreover, official religious discourse in Morocco posited Sufism as an antidote to violent extremism, a view that was not exclusive to the Moroccan context.

242 Morocco 2014 International Religious Freedom Report. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, 2014. 243 See, e.g., Mu’min Sirry. "Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī and the Salafi Approach to Sufism,” Die Welt des Islams 51, no. 1 (2011): 75-108; Itzchak Weismann, "Modernity from Within: Islamic Fundamentalism and Sufism,” Der Islam 86, no. 1 (2011): 142-170.

188 The stereotype of Sufi Islam as apolitical was used to explain why it could reduce

Salafi Islam, and even extremism, which were sometimes seen as overly political.

However, the binary broke down when considering that Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) historically played significant political roles, including in the Moroccan independence movement, whereas many devout and conservative Muslims that identified as Salafi eschewed politics and other earthly affairs.

The political/ apolitical binary was further complicated by the figure of

Abdesslam Yassine, the founder of the illegal Islamist opposition movement “Justice and

Spirituality” (al-ʿadl wal-ʾiḥsān more commonly spelled in English as “Al Adl wal

Ihsan”), himself a former member of Boutchichiyya, a prominent Sufi brotherhood.

Although Al Adl wal Ihsan did not explicitly engage in political action, Yassine famously sent a letter to King Hassan II calling for him to step down. In general, the view of

Sufism as apolitical was inconsistent with the behavior of many of these groups.

Efforts by governments, including that in Morocco, to encourage Sufism based on the belief in their political quietism evoke the strategy that many Arab governments adopted in the mid 20th century, when Islamists in general were seen as politically quietist and therefore a preferable alternative to Leftists. The empowerment of these movements and the challenge they subsequently posed to regimes across the region hinted at possible parallels to current efforts to foster Sufi Islam. If Sufi religious groups received government funding and encouragement they were being implicitly politicized, and were that much more likely to pursue political goals using their newfound strength and resources.

189 The second component of Moroccan Islam in the government’s tripartite narrative is Maliki Islam. One of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, Maliki Islam has traditionally been prevalent in North Africa and was historically associated with the mosque of Kairouan in Tunisia and with Muslim Spain. Despite the long-standing presence of Maliki Islam in the Maghreb, it is not as hegemonic as the regime’s discourse implies. For example, the founder of Morocco, Mawlay Idris, was Shiʿa. Although

Morocco’s national narrative and national religious identity both highlight Maliki Islam as an authentic component of Morocco’s heritage, this discourse ignores the religion of the national founder.

In dialogue, Maliki Islam was described by religious officials as “tolerant” and

“open,” although in scholarly discourse, Maliki Islam has been referred to as “rigid” and

“literal minded.”244 To understand why the regime chose to promote Maliki Islam, its characteristics as a school of Sunni jurisprudence (madhhab) are less important than its perception as an authentic component of Moroccan heritage. As explained by the

Director of Islamic Affairs at the Ministry of Awqāf, Maliki Islam is useful because it allows the regime to define the parameters of what is acceptable. He acknowledged that the Ministry stresses the significance of Maliki Islam as paramount in Morocco because confusion about the correct interpretation of Islam could allow greater freedom for the introduction of extremist ideas.245 Anything that does not conform to what the Ministry defines as Maliki Islam can be denounced as anti-Moroccan.

244 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014 [1988]). 245 Author interview with Director of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 8C (Rabat, Morocco 11:30am, 26 July 2016).

190 The third component of official Islam in Morocco is the Ash’ari tradition of

Islamic rationalism. Prior to 2014 the Ash’ari tradition had not been a significant component of official religious discourse. The Ash’ari tradition emphasizes the importance of textual adherence as well as the use of reason for Qur’anic interpretation.

The emphasis on the Ash’ari tradition represents a point of contrast with the heavily text- centric Wahhabi Islam spearheaded by Saudi Arabia. King Muhammad’s decision to highlight the Ash’ari tradition serves as a signal of his independence from Saudi hegemony, as well as distinguishes the Moroccan approach from Salafists, who assert their opposition to Ash’ari Islam.

The Ministry of ʾAwqāf is actively engaged in encouraging the concept of toleration. The Division of Cultural Activities is tasked with promoting tolerance in mosques and in television programming. According to an employee of the division, the minister disseminates topics and sometimes full texts for the Friday sermon (ḵuṭba).246

Morocco’s special heritage is invoked when promoting the notion of religious tolerance, such as the long-standing presence of both Jews and Christians in Morocco. Although the contemporary Moroccan population is one of the most homogenously Muslim in the region at 98 percent, official religious discourse highlights the historical presence of

Jewish communities, a few of which retain several thousand members between

Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakesh, and Fez. In addition to the emphasis on interreligious harmony as a traditional component of Moroccan heritage, the Ministry of ʾAwqāf conveys messages of tolerance through state radio and television.247 Ministry officials

246 Author interview with employee of the division of Cultural Activities, Directorate of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 5C (Rabat, Morocco, 11am, 22 July 2016). 247 According to the employee of the Ministry, messages of toleration are promoted on the radio station http://www.idaatmohammedassadiss.ma/ and the television station “AssadissaTV”

191 used the English language acronym to clarify that the activities of their ministry are categorized as “PVE,” or “preventing violent extremism.” In contrast, “CVE” or countering violent extremism, is seen as the purview of the Ministry of the Interior and other government institutions directly concerned with security.

The training of imams began to receive greater scrutiny following the 2003

Casablanca bombings. The reform of religious schools in 2004 was implemented in part due to concerns that the bombings were carried out by individuals radicalized by preachers. Imams must be accredited and receive permission to lead prayers, and are employees of the Ministry of Awqāf. Imams either graduated from religious schools and went directly to a mosque, or were trained by the Royal Imam Training Institute.

According to the head of the Cultural Activities division, when traditional schools were reformed in 2004, graduates of these schools were also “rehabilitated.” He explained that these imams needed to be made fully aware of this tolerant aspect of Islam, a topic that had previously received less emphasis in the traditional schools prior to 2004. In addition, following 2003 and subsequent acts of violence, Moroccans had more questions for imams, specifically pertaining to holy war, or jihad. In order to respond to such questions in the manner preferred by the regime, imams were retrained.248

In addition to providing these imams with talking points about moderation being a component of Moroccan heritage, a program was launched to reform the recitation of

Qurʾan, (tajwīd). The ministry began to enforce the “Warsh ‘an Naafi’” style of Qurʾanic

http://www.assadissatv.ma/index.php?lang=ar where programming is produced in both Classical Arabic and French. The name of the TV channel “Assadissa” means “the sixth” and is a reference to King Mohammad VI, known as “Muhammad Assadis” or “Muhammad the Sixth.” 248 Author interview with head of Cultural Activities, Directorate of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 4C (Rabat, Morocco 10:15am, 22 July 2016).

192 recitation. Warsh ‘an Naafi’ and Hafs ‘an ‘Asim are the two major styles of Qurʾanic recitation, although historically there were seven recognized styles.249 The styles differ in their intonation and sometimes meaning, according to symbols used to indicate pauses. In addition, certain diacritical grammatical symbols (taškīl) differ between the two styles, which can shift the meaning of a word or phrase, for example from passive to active voice. The Hafs ‘an ‘Asim style is the most prevalent style, due to path dependence following its adoption by the Ottomans. Although the Warsh ‘an Naafi’ style is named after a famed Egyptian imam and reciter of Qurʾan in early Muslim history, Egypt uses the more prevalent Hafs ‘an ‘Asim style, which was reflected in the influential Qurʾan of

Cairo published in 1924. The Moroccan government’s preference for the Warsh ‘an

Naafi’ style is due in part to its historic association with Muslim Spain, as well as much of North Africa. In addition to this style of recitation, the Moroccan government’s enforcement of Warsh ‘an Naafi’ influences Qurʾan printing, because although the words of the holy text do not change, the diacritical marks and symbols can. 2004 witnessed the publication of a “Moroccan Qurʾan” in the Warsh ‘an Naafi’ style.250 The Moroccan government’s requirement of this style of Qurʾanic recitation reinforces the discourse of

Moroccan Islam as both distinct and authentic to its heritage. The effort to enforce the

Warsh ‘an Naafi’ style of recitation constitutes another component of increasing state control over religion.

Imams can graduate from traditional religious schools, or from the Muhammad VI

Imam Training Institute. The institute has received media attention for training foreign

249 Cyril Glasse, The New Encyclopedia of Islam. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2002), 269. 250 Ann Wainscott, How an Islamic Solution Became an Islamist Problem: Education, Authoritarianism, and the Politics of Opposition in Morocco (Dissertation: University of Florida. 2013), 96.

193 imams in Moroccan moderate Islam, welcoming students from several West African countries as well as France. However, the Institute also trains Moroccan imams in a curriculum that heavily focuses on moderation and tolerance. The Institute received a new facility in 2016 and was expanded in 2017 to accommodate demand, primarily from foreign governments that wished to send their imams to Morocco for training.

An additional initiative of Muhammad VI has focused on training female religious leaders, or mourchidates, to teach Qurʾan and to focus specifically on issues related to women. The official position of the government is that women are influential in the home, in the raising of children, in influencing their sons and spouses in their views of Islam. According to the Director of Islamic Affairs, many women welcome the opportunity to convey a message of tolerance. He explained a hypothetical scenario in which a would-be terrorist goes to his mother, or daughter, or girlfriend, and because she has been trained by the mourchidates, she is able to dissuade him from his intention to commit violence, thereby protecting both his safety and that of the broader society.251

The mourchidates also work in NGOs and hospitals to disseminate the government’s official religious discourse.

While Muhammad VI has actively expanded government control over the religious sphere, his efforts build on those of his father and grandfather, Hassan II and

Muhammad V. Hassan II in particular sought to consolidate state control over religious institutions and undermine the authority of existing centers of religious authority. At the time of Morocco’s independence in 1956, religious authority was largely centered in the city of Fez, specifically around the venerable mosque/university of Al-Qarawiyyin. Al-

251 Author interview with Director of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 8C (Rabat, Morocco 11:30am, 26 July 2016).

194 Qarawiyyin was established in 859 AD by Fatima al-Fihri. According to UNESCO, it is the oldest continually operating educational institution in the world. The ‘ʿUlamaʾ of Fez, largely educated at Al Qarawiyyin, were traditionally among the most highly regarded in the region.

As the capital of the first Moroccan state under Idris I, Fez was seen as the symbolic seat of authority. Although Marrakesh, Meknes, and Rabat also served as capital cities at various points due to shifts in power, Fez housed the religious seat of authority of Al Qarawiyyin, as well as the tomb of Idris I, the founder of the Moroccan nation, and his son Idris II, revered as a powerful saint. Historically, when subjects would offer the oath of loyalty (bay’a) to a new monarch, obtaining the loyalty of the inhabitants of Fez was seen as the necessary first step to broader legitimacy,252 as the city’s symbolism contributed to the esprit frondeur (rebellious spirit) of the Fasi population.253 Fez was one of several capital cities, although it finally lost this status for good in 1912, when the French moved the administrative capital to Rabat, and was followed by the court of Sultan Yusef, who lacked support among the independently minded inhabitants. In addition to the spiritual leadership long offered by the ‘ʿUlamaʾ of

Al Qarawiyyin, the leaders of the powerful Istiqlal party were also graduates of the university/mosque, further signaling a divide between the administrative capital in Rabat, and the spiritual capital of Fez.

252 Rahma Bourqia, “The Cultural Legacy of Power in Morocco,” In Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, eds. In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 246. 253 Muhammad el Mansour, “The Sanctuary (Hurm) in Precolonial Morocco”. In Rahma Bourqia & Susan Gilson Miller (eds). In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 61.

195 Hassan II assumed the throne in 1961, only five years after Moroccan independence. In order to mitigate the possible threat to his power and religious authority posed by Al-Qarawiyyin, Hassan II cut funding to the esteemed institution in the 1960s and removed the certification of doctorate previously given by the university to scholars of Islamic learning. He established the Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania in 1965 to provide higher education in state-sanctioned official Islam, effectively replacing Al-Qarawiyin with this state institution. He also required that for an ‘alim to be recognized as such, he would have to be approved by the Ministry of Awqāf, forcing graduates of Al-

Qarawiyyin to submit to centralized religious training and certification.

According to the Assistant Director of the Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania, the institution was intended as an “extension” (imtidād) of the religious education offered by

Al-Qarawiyyin, which had been weakened by French colonization. However, according to Wainscott, “The regime’s neglect of Qarawiyyin University is too blatant to be coincidental.”254 When asked about the defunding of Qarawiyyin, the Assistant Director of Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania agreed that the institution had been established to facilitate the renewal of Islamic sciences.255 While he did not fully acknowledge that the Moroccan government’s policy to defund Al Qarawiyyin had effectively hobbled the institution, his admission of the need for renewal signals the official position.

King Hassan II successfully undermined the ability of the Qarawiyyin ‘ʿUlamaʾ to challenge his authority and cultivated a new body of religious scholars steeped in the state’s preferred narrative. This view contrasts with that of Robbins & Rubin (2017) who

254 Ann Marie Wainscott, How an Islamic Solution Became an Islamist Problem: Education, Authoritarianism, and the Politics of Opposition in Morocco (2013), 179. 255 Author interview with the Assistant Director of Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania, Interview ID 7C (Rabat, Morocco 1:30pm, 25 July 2016).

196 attribute Morocco’s success in spreading its narrative of official Islam to the existence of

Al-Qarawiyyin as an existing source of religious authority.256 Evidence indicates however that King Hassan II actively undermined Al-Qarawiyyin, not building on it but instead hollowing it out while establishing institutions of higher Islamic education that produced clerics loyal to him and his preferred interpretation of Islam, which highlighted his status as the “commander of the faithful.” However, standardizing the training of clerics was insufficient, because it would take years to produce a religious bureaucracy fully staffed with individuals trained in his preferred form of official Islam. In 1980

Hassan II established the High Council of ‘ʿUlamaʾ for the purpose of “institutionalizing the profession,”257 a body also located in Rabat.

In addition to training a new cadre of clerics to spread his religious narrative,

Hassan II sought to mitigate what he saw as foreign threats to his religious authority.

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and Imam Khomeini’s subsequent calls for devout Muslims to similarly overthrow their rulers, Hassan, like many rulers in the region, saw Islamists as newly threatening. In 1984 many inland towns experienced demonstrations and rioting in response to economic struggles, however Hassan II saw these as evidence of Iranian agents working with Islamists to foment rebellion. In response, he exerted further control over religious actors and spaces, adopting a discourse of promoting “an Islam of tolerance and co-existence” in the Sunni tradition.258 As a result, the promotion of toleration and co-existence as a means of combatting Iranian influence became a core goal of the Ministry of Awqāf, in a discursive turn that

256 Michael Robbins and Lawrence Rubin, “The Ascendance of Official Islams.” Democracy and Security (2017): 1-29. 257 Stephen Hughes, Morocco Under King Hassan (Cornell: Ithaca University Press, 2001), 291. 258 Stephen Hughes, Morocco Under King Hassan, (2001), 290.

197 reinforces the utility of the concept of “toleration” as capable of molding into almost any regime agenda.

In Casablanca in January 1994, for example, the Ministry of ʾAwqāf held a conference on the theme of tolerance in Islam, focusing on the Moroccan context but also including more general Islamic discourses of toleration. The proceedings were published in a book, “The Concept of Tolerance in the Construction of Islamic Civilization”

(mfhum al-tasamuh fi al-bna’ al-hidari al-islami). The book presents research specific to

Morocco, such as on the ecumenical nature of Moroccan diplomacy throughout history, when non-Muslim states received the same treatment of Muslim states. It also discusses the notion of tolerance as inherent within Islam, regarding the position of religious minorities, and the importance of religious toleration as key to the spread of Islam. The book is housed in the Ministry of ʾAwqāf in Rabat and is available only in Arabic, but it was presented by employees of the Ministry as evidence that Morocco’s promotion of tolerance is long-standing and specifically predates the foreign pressure that followed

9/11/01.

Having inherited an exalted status from his father, King Mohammad VI has engaged in what may appear to be a reversal of some of his father’s consolidation tactics.

For example, Muhammad VI funded the renovation of Qarawiyyin and reopened its famed library in 2017. In addition, he chose to establish a new religious institution in Fez, the “Muhammad VI Foundation for African Ulema.” In a speech announcing the new foundation, Muhammad VI stated, “I have decided that the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulema will be based in Fez, given this city's religious status, and also in view of the fact that it is one of Morocco’s main seats of learning and our country’s spiritual

198 capital.”259 Both acts seem to indicate that Muhammad does not take his father’s attitude of centralizing control in his capital city.

However, Muhammad VI is only able to adopt this policy due to his father’s successful efforts to limit the ability of Fez to serve as a bastion of opposition. The newly renovated manifestation of Al-Qarawiyyin mosque/university is as a museum, a place to observe authentic and ancient practices of religious learning, while those who wish to obtain state accreditation and employment as an imam or Friday preacher are required to do so through the state institutions in Rabat. By portraying Fez and Al-Qarawiyyin as heritage sites rather than a current source of religious authority, the regime reinforces the centrality of Rabat as the locus of political and religious power. In addition, Fez has been successfully converted into a living museum, whose message reinforces the official position that Moroccan Islam is authentic and grounded in tradition. The success of

Hassan II’s efforts to move the seat of official religious accreditation away from the once powerful capital of Fez to the relatively minor city of Rabat are demonstrated in

Muhammad VI’s decision to renovate these now toothless institutions.

In general, the Moroccan monarchy has been successful in centralizing religious authority within the person of the king, exerting state control over formerly independent religious institutions, and promoting a discourse of Moroccan Islam as traditionally and authentically espousing religious toleration. The regime’s greatest success, however, may

259 Speech by His Majesty King Mohammad VI delivered at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Higher Council of the Muhammad VI Foundation for African Ulama, Fez, Morocco, 14 June 2016. Translated from Arabic. http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-speeches/full-text-hm-kings- speech-inauguration-ceremony-higher-council-mohammed-vi-foundation. [Accessed 8 August 2017].

199 lie in enrolling clerics and other representatives of official Islam in the project of promoting its preferred religious discourse.

Reproducing Moroccan Islam

The Moroccan monarchy has successfully enrolled representatives of official

Islam in its official discourse of Moroccan moderate Islam. Interviews with clerics and other representatives reveal that these officials feel that their task of encouraging moderate Islam is important for both Moroccan prestige and safety. When discussing efforts to encourage moderation, the phrase most frequently used was the need to protect

Morocco’s “spiritual security.”

In contrast to many statements by religious officials in Jordan that stressed the necessity of adhering to “true” Islam, religious officials in Morocco tended not to use this phrase. While the notion of true Islam does appear in Moroccan discourse, it was mentioned with far greater frequency in interviews with Jordanian officials. In general, religious officials in Morocco explicitly discussed the importance of encouraging a form of Islam that could undermine extremism, rather than stressing the need to prioritize

“true” Islam. Jordanian religious officials periodically expressed reservations or even subtle criticisms of the regime’s efforts to encourage moderation, seeing this as a capitulation to US pressure for example. In contrast, Moroccan religious officials expressed support for the regime’s official narrative, describing it as necessary as well as repeating the standard line that it reflected Moroccan heritage.

Jordanian and Moroccan representatives of official Islam differed in their expressed views on state control of mosques. In Jordan, representatives of official Islam expressed some frustration over strict state control of mosques. In Morocco, the official

200 discourse highlighted the importance of “preserving spiritual security.”260 In this context, preserving spiritual security referred to preserving the peace and tranquility of sacred spaces and preventing them from being adulterated by temporal and political concerns.

The official discourse skillfully used existing Islamic values regarding the preservation of mosque sanctity in support of the regime’s agenda of preventing political speech and agitation in mosques and other religious spaces. In contrast, Jordanian officials pointed out that by suppressing discussion of politics, state control of mosques pushed individuals to seek religious engagement with temporal matters online, for example, rather than in the mosque, often exposing them to more radical views than would be aired in public.

One explanation for why Morocco has been more successful in encouraging the adoption of moderate Islam is that policies have focused on outreach to communities, such as the mourchidates initiative, as well as outreach to prisons and slums. When explaining why Morocco has succeeded in encouraging a discourse of moderate Islam, the head of the Mohammadia League of Scholars emphasized the importance of tangible benefits for individuals: “Give deliverables… let it touch their children, their souls, let them see and hear and experience… Let them feel pride in what you’re doing.”261 By stressing an outcome-based approach rather than one primarily focused on making statements, the Moroccan government has demonstrated to the population that espousing moderate Islam can provide tangible benefits.

In addition to this materialist explanation, evidence indicated that building on the existing parameters of religious identity established during nation-building enhanced the

260 Author interview with head of Cultural Activities, Directorate of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 4C (Rabat, Morocco 10:15am, 22 July 2016). 261 Author interview with Dr. Ahmed ‘Abadi, Secretary General of the Mohammadia League of Religious Scholars, Interview ID 11C (Rabat, Morocco 11am, 29 July 2016).

201 credibility of discourses of moderation. The significance of Morocco’s religious identity was frequently highlighted by representatives of official Islam. For example, the

Assistant Director of the Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania stressed how a religious national identity contributes to independence from outside influences: “It is not possible to affect us with ideas from Iran or Saudi Arabia, because all Moroccans feel that they have a

Moroccan school of religious understanding, and so can’t be influenced by others.”262

Countering the effect of Saudi Arabia constitutes a core objective of Moroccan official Islam. In addition to enforcing the Warsh ‘an ‘Naafi style of Qurʾanic recitation, for example, the Moroccan government does not automatically follow Saudi Arabia’s declarations pertaining to the religious calendar. In 2017 Saudi Arabia announced that the new moon marking the end of Ramadan and the beginning of Eid al-Fitr had been spotted on Sunday, June 25th. However, the governments of Morocco, Iran, Oman, South Africa and Brunei announced that Eid in these countries would instead begin on Monday, June

26th.263

Morocco’s independence from Saudi religious authority was evident in other ways. The Director of Islamic Affairs at the Ministry of ʾAwqāf noted that fewer

Moroccans were traveling to Saudi Arabia for religious instruction. In his view, this contributed to the spread of more moderate views in mosques and in mass media.264 The efforts to establish Morocco as independent from Saudi religious influence is a

262 Author interview with the Assistant Director of Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania, Interview ID 7C (Rabat, Morocco 1:30pm, 25 July 2016). 263 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/eid-al-fitr-saudi-arabia-declares-sunday-day- 170622071041784.html [Accessed 7 November 2017]. 264 Author interview with Director of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 8C (Rabat, Morocco 11:30am, 26 July 2016).

202 component of Mohammed VI’s campaign to consolidate the state, with himself at its head, as Morocco’s premiere religious authority.

In general, Moroccan representatives of official Islam expressed more willingness to use religion strategically to preserve peace and stability. This contrasted with representatives of official Islam in Jordan, who instead stressed the importance of adhering to “true” Islam, regardless of the potential consequences. The views of both groups of individuals exhibited the influence of the religious discourse they were charged with promoting, but in Jordan the promotion of true Islam actually served to undermine the regime’s position, due to individuals’ discomfort with policies that obviously contravened true Islam, whereas in Morocco, the government’s willingness to openly use religion for strategic purposes was embraced as a necessary means of preserving stability while also enhancing Morocco’s status as a source of religious authority.

Oman

Oman and Morocco are similar in that both governments have actively used nation-building tools to construct a religious identity closely tied to the national identity, whereas in Jordan the government has tried to assert more universal claims about Islam, without linking them specifically to Jordan. The process of nation-building in Oman began later than in Jordan or Morocco, as prior to the rule of Sultan Qaboos, the Omani state lacked the necessary resources and capacity. Following the development of Oman’s petroleum wealth in the late 20th century, the Omani government has implemented policies of direct rule, including mass education with nationalist content, to inculcate a specifically Omani national and religious identity.

203 The process of nation-building in Oman sought to overcome the long-standing divide between the interior territory, formerly ruled by an Ibāḍī imamate, and the coastal mercantile sultanate. This division had erupted in the Jabal Akhdar War of the 1950s, fought by Sultan Qaboos’ father, Said. Sultan Qaboos came to power in the midst of the

Dhofar War, where the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen supported the residents of Dhofar in trying to establish their independence. The recent memory of civil war likely contributed to Sultan Qaboos’ strenuous nation-building efforts, as well as his efforts to disseminate oil wealth in an effort to appease restive regions. The Omani national narrative blends the alleged toleration of the Ibāḍī sect of Islam with the cosmopolitan open-mindedness of coastal merchants, resulting in an identity grounded in tolerance and peacefulness.

Interviews with Omani religious bureaucrats demonstrate the entrenchment of this view. The diplomacy and tolerance of Omani social norms have been noted by other scholars, and while they do reflect Omani culture, the regime has sought to further encourage these behaviors and identities. In general, interviewees expressed gratitude for the sultan’s fostering of economic and social development, and his efforts to maintain peace and stability in Oman.

Because Oman is the only country in the world whose official religion is Ibāḍī

Islam, the sect is relatively unknown and often misunderstood as being similar to Shiʿa

Islam. Yet it more closely resembles a highly strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. Ibāḍīsm is associated with the Kharijites, who during the reign of Caliph Ali rejected his willingness to engage in arbitration with his rival, Muawiyyah, and eventually assassinated him. Although Ibāḍīsm rejects the association with the Kharijites, they are

204 their intellectual heirs. The link to the Kharijites is especially problematic in the contemporary era, when groups like the so-called Islamic State are likened to “modern khawarij,” while Oman has tried to publicize religious toleration as a key component of

Ibāḍīsm.

Some specific differences between Ibāḍī Islam and Sunni Islam include the position of the hands during prayer: Sunnis pray with their hands folded, Ibāḍīs with arms at their sides, similar to Shiʿa Muslims. Certain key theological disputes also differentiate the Ibāḍīs. For example, Ibāḍīs disagree with the Sunni belief that a devout Muslim can see God in Heaven, maintaining that God does not have a physical form. Ibāḍīs also dispute the Sunni belief that the Qurʾan existed at the beginning of time, arguing instead that God created the Qurʾan. Although such differences are explained in books intended for religious scholars, some of which were authored by Grand Mufti Sheikh Khalili himself, to discuss such sectarian differences in public is prohibited by law.

The Omani government convenes an annual conference to promote greater understanding of Ibāḍīsm; in 2016 the conference was held at Oxford University, and I was invited to present. American, British, Omani, and Turkish scholars joined Omani religious bureaucrats for a three-day conference devoted to “Religion and Policy in

Oman.” At the conference, the Ministry of ʾAwqāf presented its activities, including a presentation on “The Role of Ministry of Endowments (MERA) ʾAwqāf in Promoting

Tolerance” and “Policy and Objectives of Iftā’ in Oman.” The conference proceedings are published each year by German publisher Georg Olms Verlag in the series “Studies on Ibāḍīsm and Oman.”

205 In addition to this conference, the Ministry of ʾAwqāf has implemented additional means of promoting the idea of Omani/Ibāḍī Islam as uniquely tolerant. In 2004 the ministry began to publish a quarterly Islamic magazine titled “Tolerance” (Tasamuh). In

2013 the ministry changed the name of the magazine to “Understanding” (Tafahom).

Originally published only in Arabic, beginning in 2013 the magazine became available online and in English, and introduced a section for contributions from young writers, as well as book reviews. According to the magazine’s website, its intended purpose is the following:

1. Strengthening the Islam that is based on understanding, right to difference and diversity of views. 2. Rehabilitating diligence as a vital issue in the Islamic though [sic] to renew in order to adapt to changing times. 3. Addressing faults and deficiencies in Islamic thought and opening the way for Islamic perceptions that are issued by impeccable oneness and seek to embody well-informed vision away from intolerance.265

The magazine is published in physical form in Arabic. The ministry employee responsible for overseeing the magazine’s publication explained that the magazine is not intended to cause other Muslims to adopt Omani Islam, but that it could perhaps serve as a guide. His view was typical of religious bureaucrats, who emphasized that Oman did not wish to assert its religious dominance, but that given the ways in which many Muslim societies were struggling with issues of sectarianism and violence, the Omani emphasis on religious toleration could offer a potential alternative.

In 2014 the Ministry of ʾAwqāf initiated its first internationally targeted effort to promote Omani Islam with a campaign entitled “Tolerance, Understanding, Coexistence:

Oman’s Message of Islam” (al-tasamuh, al-tafahum, al-ta`ayyush: rislat al-Islam min

265 https://tafahom.om/en/ [Accessed 28 December 2017].

206 `Uman). The campaign included a traveling exhibition shown at Omani embassies in 70 cities and 26 countries around the world.

In addition to the Ministry of Awqāf, a key religious institution is the office of the

Grand Mufti. The Grand Mufti was instrumental in assisting the state to assert control over independent religious practice during the period of nation-building, which began in

Oman after oil wealth began to fund the expansion of state capacity in the early 1970s.

Ibāḍī Islam dictates that Muslims do not gather for Friday’s congregational prayer unless the imam is in power. However, Sultan Qaboos constructed an eponymous mosque in every major town and city in the sultanate, and Sheikh Ibrahim, Grand Mufti from 1970 to 1975, sought to encourage the population to gather for Friday prayer. The reason given was to combat Communism, which in southern Oman was seen as contributing to the

Dhofar Rebellion;266 however the effect was that of undermining Ibāḍī tradition and encouraging state control over religious spaces, as people gathered in the new state-built mosques.

Unlike in Jordan, the Grand Mufti of Oman sometimes expresses opinions that contradict those of the Ministry, or even the ruler himself. The Grand Mufti is subject to the oversight of the Sultan and would risk losing his position if his office was overly critical of the Sultan’s decisions, yet Grand Mufti Khalili has been in power since 1975 and has periodically voiced disagreement with government policies. For example, when the decision was made to allow for greater mixing of genders at Oman’s flagship institution for higher education, Sultan Qaboos University, Grand Mufti Khalili criticized

266 Abdullah Suleimi, fatwa researcher in the Omani Office of Iftā’, “Policy and Objectives of the Iftā’ in Oman,” Religion and Politics in Oman conference, May 24, 2016, Oxford, UK.

207 the change as contravening Islamic practice. Similarly, the Grand Mufti critiqued the policy change that legalized alcohol in the sultanate. In general, however the Grand Mufti tends to adhere to the official religious discourse.

Regarding the promotion of Ibāḍīsm, the Omani Office of Iftā’ is the premier institution. The Ministry of ʾAwqāf acknowledges sectarian distinctions when training students to become clerics,267 but de-emphasizes religious divisions in public discourse.

In contrast, the stated purpose of Office of Iftā’ is to preserve Ibāḍī heritage. According to an employee of the office, preservation can take an activist form: when Omani citizens are exposed to forms of religious discourse that may contradict Ibāḍī teaching, the Office

Iftā’ can issue religious edicts that help to preserve harmony in Omani society.268 Under the auspices of Office of Iftā’, preserving Ibāḍīsm becomes synonymous with preserving the political status quo, in a manner similar to the Moroccan government’s so-called preservation of Maliki Islam as means of asserting government control over religious discourse.

Reproducing Omani Islam

Evidence of nation-building was visible in the responses given during interviews with members of Oman’s religious establishment. As noted by Valeri (2008), Sultan

Qaboos has successfully equated the nation-state with himself, taking credit for Oman’s economic development and stability. Expressions of gratitude for his leadership and wishes for his long life and health were uniform. Although in a system characterized by the centralization of power in one individual it is difficult to gauge the sincerity of such

267 James Broucek, “Generic Islam? Official Religious Discourse in the Sultanate of Oman,” Religion and Politics in Oman conference, May 24, 2016, Oxford, UK. 268 Abdullah Suleimi, fatwa researcher in the Omani Office of Iftā’, “Policy and Objectives of the Iftā’ in Oman,” Religion and Politics in Oman conference, May 24, 2016, Oxford, UK.

208 expressions, these differed from the views of other Gulf citizens towards their equally powerful leaders. Sultan Qaboos enjoys unparalleled legitimacy and support, as it was under his rule that Oman transformed from a country that lacked paved roads, schools, and hospitals, to a middle-income economy whose GDP per capita is on par with

Portugal. Adulation for Qaboos is similar to sentiments expressed by Emiratis for the late

Sheikh Zayed, Emir of Abu Dhabi and a key founder of the United Arab Emirates. In few other contexts have leaders come to power with so little, and with the help of oil wealth, transformed their societies so totally.

Interestingly, views of religious bureaucrats did not vary by location: interviews with employees at the Ministry of ʾAwqāf in Muscat expressed nearly identical views as imams and religious educators in small towns in the interior, such as Ibri and Bahla.

When asked about Islam in Oman, all religious officials stated that Oman is uniquely tolerant of different religions, and that divisions within Islam do not matter in Oman.

However most acknowledged that Oman was vulnerable to the prevalence of sectarianism outside its borders. An imam in Nizwa, the former capital of the imamate, explained that young people are exposed to more media and may start to believe incorrect ideas. An imam in Ibri explained that Omanis had been peaceful even before embracing

Islam, but that Islam had reinforced this tendency. He cited a frequently quoted hadith, in which a follower of the Prophet Muhammad is beaten for proselytizing. Mohammad responded that if the man had been in Oman, they would not have beaten him.269 This hadith is seen as evidence that the Omanis were already known to be a peaceful people.

269 Author interview with imam and preacher, Interview ID 16B (Noor Majan Institute, Ibri, Oman, 9am, 13 November 2015).

209 Representatives of official Islam tended to espouse official religious discourse regardless of their location. Even in Nizwa, the capital of the former imamate, individuals adhered to the official position. An Ibāḍī imam who ran a bookshop near Nizwa Fort, the bastion of the former imam, affirmed that in Oman, Ibāḍī and Sunni and Shiʿa individuals would all pray together in the same mosque.270 He acknowledged that Saudi Islam has had some effect in fomenting sectarianism in Oman, but that the Omani government has actively worked to prevent this. He attributed Oman’s ability to resist Saudi influence to

Oman’s religious heritage and the leadership of Sultan Qaboos, a view expressed by many. In general, respondents did not go into greater detail than this, which might have required acknowledgement that attributing Omani peacefulness to the sultan’s policies was distinct from attributing Omani peacefulness to religious heritage.

While many individuals gave the standardized responses, some provided variations on the overarching narrative of Omani toleration. An imam in Ibri explained that one reason the Omani people peacefully accepted Islam was because many were

Christian, and explained that Jesus had foretold a prophet named Ahmed would come after him.271 An imam in Bahla asserted that the lack of politicization of religion in Oman was due to the absence of political parties, specifically Islamist political parties that elsewhere in the region had used religion to serve their own agendas.272 He also reiterated a key component of official discourse: that Ibāḍī Muslims constitute a majority of Omani citizens. The government does not collect information about sectarian affiliation in the

270 Author interview with imam, Interview ID 18B (His bookstore near Nizwa Fort, Nizwa, Oman, 10am, 17 November 2015). 271 Author interview with imam and preacher, Interview ID 16B (Noor Majan Institute, Ibri, Oman, 9am, 13 November 2015). 272 Author interview with teacher, Interview ID 12B (His home, Bahla, Oman, 1:30pm, 7 November 2015).

210 census, so the ratio of Ibāḍī to Sunni Omanis is unknown, however it is suspected that

Ibāḍīs no longer constitute the majority. If the Omani government were to acknowledge this demographic shift, the regime could lose power, or might at least be required to appoint Sunni Muslims to positions of religious authority. However up to this point, most key political figures, and especially religious figures, are Ibāḍī and the government’s narrative of moderation and toleration relies on the construction of Ibāḍī Islam as such.

The position that Ibāḍīs are the “overwhelming majority” was echoed at all levels of power, up to the Assistant Grand Mufti, Sheikh Kahlan al Kharusi.273

The Assistant Grand Mufti often serves as his father-in-law’s representative.

Sheikh Kahlan al Kharusi received me for an interview with great formality, and presented me with several English translations of books written by the Grand Mufti about

Ibāḍīsm. When I asked for his explanation for Oman’s apparently unique form of religious tolerance, he stressed the fact that Oman was a coherent political entity at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. When Muhammad sent letters to the rulers of adjacent polities to invite them to enter Islam, he included Egypt, Persia, Yemen, and Oman. The

Assistant Grand Mufti explained that for this reason, Islam in Oman has always been governed by state institutions, and reflected the concerns of the state.

When explaining why Oman has been able to encourage a form of Islam that promotes toleration, Sheikh Kahlan asserted that the government’s success in this regard is the result of building on the existing heritage and traditions that Omanis already identified with and practiced. He acknowledged that in contexts that lack an established heritage of toleration, it would be difficult to establish one now, because such initiatives

273 Author interview with Assistant Grand Mufti, Sheikh Kahlan al Kharusi, Interview ID 20B (Office of the Grand Mufti, Ministry of ʾAwqāf, Muscat Oman, 11am, 18 November 2015).

211 would lack credibility. However, he shared the cautious optimism expressed by many

Omanis that the Sultanate could potentially serve as a useful model for religious toleration, even for countries that lacked a similar heritage.

Of the three monarchies, Omani representatives of official Islam adhered most closely to official religious discourse, as did Omani individuals in general. I attribute this in part to the level of authoritarianism present in Oman, but also to the pervasiveness of state control. Oil wealth and Oman’s relatively small population allowed Sultan Qaboos to uniformly disseminate his preferred religious and national narrative during the crucial period of achieving literacy. Omanis express agreement with the official position partly as a result of the Sultan’s high level of legitimacy, an asset that his eventual successor will struggle to retain.

V. Conclusion

The chapter articulates how representatives of official Islam view the discourse they are charged with promoting, and seeks to explain why certain official discourses have higher credibility, or resonance, among these individuals than others. Specifically, the three monarchies in question differ in the content of the narrative they promote. In

Jordan, official religious discourse highlights the notion of “true Islam”: the discourse presents Jordan, and specifically the Hashimite monarchs, as representing true Islam. The ruling monarchy faced both challenges and disincentives in articulating a specifically

Jordanian identity, and as a result never explicitly generated a narrative about Jordanian religious identity. In contrast, both Morocco and Oman focus on a form of national Islam as “authentic” to their respective nations, and build on this existing tradition to strengthen

212 the prominence of a discourse of toleration and moderation. Although these discourses are now framed as based on the religious heritage of their populations, they reflect invented traditions highlighted by state institutions during the foundational period.

By evaluating the views of representatives of official Islam in the three monarchies, the chapter presents evidence of the extent to which official religious discourse is viewed as credible by this key population. If such individuals express views that contradict the official position or otherwise critique the government’s religious policies, it is highly unlikely that the average citizen would consider official Islam to be credible, or to seek guidance from official religious institutions.

At the domestic level, state-led productions of religious discourse compete with the interpretations put forward by non-state actors such as Islamist groups, as well as the religious establishments of other states. In the following chapter I focus on the international level, where states seek to brand official Islam for export abroad in the interest of soliciting international support for political elites’ continued control in the face of concerns about extremism and enhancing religious soft power. In the international sphere, political elites retain a relatively high degree of control over the religious messaging produced. While different brands of national Islam compete in the global marketplace, the authenticity of the content of the brand is rarely challenged by competitors, allowing states to put forward religious discourses that might be less likely to resonate at home. Yet domestic constituencies are not unaware of international messaging, although sometimes they react to it in ways that political elites may not expect.

213 Chapter 5: Exporting Official Islam

I. Introduction

This chapter shifts from a domestic focus to an international one, specifically regarding the ways in which the governments of officially-Islamic states respond to international anxiety about Islam and violence. State-sponsored articulations of Islam are frequently presented as offering an antidote to extremism. In the context of global demand for a solution to extremism, such public relations campaigns on behalf of national religious institutions and discourses constitute a form of “branding” as different states assert that the efficacy of their “product” of national Islam is superior, effectively competing in a marketplace of different forms of Islam. Similar to the nation-building period, political elites experience relatively little resistance to their assertions regarding the nature of official Islam they assert.

Jordan, Morocco, and Oman join other officially-Islamic regimes in projecting an image of their official Islam to states like the US that have signaled an interest in moderate Islam. Regimes tend to fall to one end or the other of a spectrum of how they frame their form of national Islam: some claim to speak for all of Islam, as in Jordan, while some articulate a form of Islam specific to local culture and practices, as in

Morocco and Oman. This chapter focuses on why political elites seek to project their form of national Islam abroad. I argue that this is done primarily for the purpose of ensuring regime stability by enhancing a given regime’s soft power in an international context characterized by demand for support of a counterterror agenda. In my argument, regimes seek to earn religious authority in the eyes of powerful non-Muslim actors like the US and the EU, as well as in the eyes of Muslim actors. Some focus more on non-

214 Muslim audiences, others more on Muslim audiences, but in my view, the evidence that both audiences appear to matter indicates the strategic nature of the branding project.

Specifically regarding the three monarchies under consideration, Jordan has focused more on burnishing its reputation for moderation with non-Muslim audiences, making explicit overtures to non-Muslim international organizations like the UN as well as to Christian organizations like the Papacy. I view this as the result of Jordan’s long- standing dependency on foreign support, specifically from non-Muslim actors like the

UK and US. Yet it is also due to the Hashimites’ claim to speak for all of Islam on the basis of their historical spiritual authority. Among Muslim audiences their claim rings somewhat hollow, as few Muslims outside Jordan, and only some within Jordan, consider the Hashimites to have the authority to speak for Islam at large. However powerful non-

Muslim allies have indicated their willingness to strengthen their alliances with Jordan, and so from the regime’s perspective, the accuracy of their claim matters less than the willingness of powerful allies to continue to send military and economic support.

Morocco has focused less on claiming to speak for all of Islam, and instead pursues religious leadership at the regional level; King Mohammed VI promotes himself as a religious leader for North and West Africa, as well as for North Africans living in

Europe. These efforts followed the protests of 2011, although 2003 is generally framed as the key turning point when the Moroccan regime reevaluated its efforts to counteract violent extremism, most state-led projects in this regard followed the Arab Spring, when the Moroccan regime adopted many new initiatives intended to bolster support for the king. The efforts appear to be successful: initiatives to train imams in Morocco’s brand of

Islam have been met with international approval, as states from Northwest Africa as well

215 as Europe have sent imams to learn that moderate Islam is the result of a uniquely

Moroccan heritage and interpretation. As a result, the Moroccan regime has earned recognition from the US and EU for its promotion of moderate Islam.

In contrast, Oman has invested minimally in its international branding effort.

Omani officials were reluctant to speak for Islam at large, or to encourage others to follow an Omani religious model. Following the emergence of the so-called Islamic State and heightened anxiety about the prospect of Islamic extremism, the Omani regime attempted some international messaging. However, the campaign achieved neither the scale nor the publicity of efforts like Jordan’s Amman Message, Morocco’s Marrakesh

Declaration, Saudi Arabia’s claim to “return to moderate” Islam, or other highly visible branding efforts. The apparent reluctance of the Omani regime to advertise is likely due to the knowledge that neither Sunni nor Shiʿa publics are likely to view Ibāḍī Islam as a model to be emulated. Because the Ibāḍī “brand” is unlikely to gain much traction among

Muslim audiences, overtures to non-Muslim partners are also unlikely to succeed, who seek a solution to acts of extremism largely committed by Sunnis.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by considering alternative explanations for Arab regimes’ efforts to export their brand of national Islam. Then I examine how the regimes of Jordan, Morocco, and Oman have attempted to portray their official religious discourse as the most effective means of reducing religious extremism. That the three regimes employ different strategies in promoting their form of Islam, and have somewhat different aims, emphasizes the parallel to “branding” as each regime seeks to corner a specific aspect of the market. When regimes try to sell their official religious discourse,

216 they both seek to project their own religious soft power, and to gain the benefits that accrue to those that adhere to international norms.

II. Branding Official Religious Discourse

The concept of nation-branding has been primarily studied from the perspective of communication scholarship, and is typically construed as a strategy to encourage tourism, enhance soft power, and invite investment in a globalized world.274 Scholars have fretted over the inherently undemocratic aspects of nation-branding, as a

“monologic, hierarchical, reductive form of communication.”275 Firms dedicated to nation-branding have offered their services to political elites eager to draw attention, investment, and tourists. For example, Sunil John, the Indian-born founder and CEO of a global communications agency, suggested that Egypt had the potential to develop a stronger nation brand. He recommended leveraging Egypt’s reputation as a cultural hub as a well as vacation destination, and specifically using Al Azhar to “dominate the global conversation on moderate Islam.” 276 His comment on Al Azhar speaks to the on-going competition for developing a reputation for promoting moderate Islam.

When articulating a brand of national Islam, the purpose is typically less motivated by a desire to attract tourists or investors, and more oriented towards the soft

274 Zala Volcic and Mark Andrejevic, “Nation Branding in the Era of Commercial Nationalism,” International Journal of Communication, 5 (2008): 598-618; Nadia Kaneva, “Nation Branding: Towards an Agenda for Critical Research,” International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 117–141. 275 Suec Jansen, “Redesigning a Nation: Welcome to E-stonia, 2001–2018,” In N. Kaneva (Ed.), Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the ‘New’ Europe (London: Routledge, 2011). 276 Travel and Tourism News Worldwide “Mideast PR Chief Urges Stronger Nation brand for Egypt (17 October 2017) http://www.ttnworldwide.com/Article/268951/Mideast-PR-chief-urges- stronger-%E2%80%98nation-brand%E2%80%99-for-Egypt [Accessed 18 October 2017].

217 power benefits that can accrue, although material pay-offs in the form of security support from American or European allies may result. Branding a national religious tradition tends to rely on leveraging or inventing traditions: stressing the aspects of heritage commonly associated with religious toleration, or playing up the influence of long- established religious institutions like Al Azhar. One strategy that countries from Pakistan to Morocco to Turkey have adopted have been to highlight a heritage of Sufi Islam has been used in different contexts to signal moderation, often a tacit challenge to Salafi interpretations of Islam that reject Sufi practices.277 However, the transformation of heritage into a commodity is not only non-democratic, as critics of nation-branding would point out, it homogenizes heritage, projecting across the territory of the state what may have been tied to specific locations and groups of people but not others. The production of official religion homogenizes existing religious traditions; the export of official religion commodifies it as a brand.

III. Alternative Explanations

Comparing how the Jordanian, Moroccan, and Omani regimes construct their campaigns to promote their brand of moderate Islam offers insights into regimes’ agendas for doing so. My argument that international branding is primarily intended to enhance a regime’s soft power through their religious authority is informed by observing the three regimes’ choices. For example, the fact that Oman has avoided drawing attention to its apparently successful strategy to discourage sectarianism seems to demonstrate that

277 Yousaf, Salman and Huaibin Li, “Branding Pakistan as a ‘Sufi' Country: The Role of Religion in Developing a Nation’s Brand,” Journal of Place Management and Development 7, no. 1 (2014): 90-104.

218 international branding cannot be solely directed at non-Muslim publics. Relatedly, while the Jordanian regime may have preferred to focus exclusively on fostering a reputation for moderation with its non-Muslim allies, this technique seems to undermine its credibility at home. The articulation of religious authority both at home and abroad requires a delicate two-level game, as publics are very sensitive to any effort to alter

Islam, especially if such efforts are seen as the result of Western pressure.

While I view international branding efforts to be the result of a desire to enhance regime stability by accruing soft power, alternative explanations exist. One would posit that trying to establish a unified motive for international branding of official religious discourse is futile, as regimes likely pursue very different agendas by doing so. The finer points of regime agendas clearly differ, yet the upsurge in the promotion of “moderate”

Islam after 2001 and especially after 2011 seems to indicate a shift in the shared global environment, namely an increase in demand for solutions to extremism. While regimes strengthen their soft power in order to pursue different specific goals, they share the desire to retain control, and establishing a reputation as a proponent of moderate Islam became a means of earning both international respect and support.

An additional alternative explanation would take a less cynical view, attributing what I refer to as “branding” to the valid concerns of pious individuals horrified at the slander of their faith. Anxiety about non-Muslims’ misperceptions regarding Islam colored many of my interactions, especially with less elite individuals. And yet most of the international branding efforts are targeted at the elite level: speeches by leaders about the peacefulness of Islam tend to occur at the UN, the EU Parliament, at seminars for high-ranking religious officials, at embassies. Such messaging appears to clearly target

219 decision makers. If regimes wished to win over non-Muslim publics, they have the tools to do so, using satellite television and internet. However almost no such initiatives have been undertaken.

Relatedly, another alternative explanation could argue that such branding is only intended to bolster a regime’s domestic standing, as a citizenry will hold greater respect for a leader that has earned international approbation. It is likely that this is indeed a partial component of regimes’ motivation when projecting their religious authority abroad, as domestic publics generally represent a more immediate source of support or challenge than international actors. Yet a similar logic to the previous explanation applies: if the citizenry were the primary audience for international branding, we would expect to observe more concerted efforts to publicize regimes’ international success.

However, regimes appear to be somewhat reluctant to share their discourse on the international stage, sometimes only presenting it in European languages like English or

French, for example, and not offering Arabic translations. This again conveys the dynamic of a two-level game that requires different strategies for domestic and international discourses. The strategy of targeting the international audience may undermine the regime’s credibility among the domestic audience.

220 IV. Case Studies

Jordan

International Branding of Official Religious Discourse

Jordan has initiated several different projects to encourage its reputation as holding religious soft power.278 Jordan’s efforts in this regard are consistent with the strategy of “nation-branding.”279 In the evidence of Jordan’s promotion of moderate

Islam I provide below, I argue that Jordan’s main goal is to gain international support for the continued rule of the Hashimites.

When projecting its official religious discourse for an international audience,

Jordan has enjoyed a first mover advantage. From its inception as an independent state,

Jordan has relied heavily on the UK and later the US for security support. As a close ally of the US in the War on Terror, Jordan was attuned to the US security agenda, and quickly took steps to fill the role of “moderate Muslim partner” sought by the US policy community.280 Of the three Arab monarchies I highlight, the Jordanian regime has pursued the longest and most coherent public relations campaign, with a slick online presence and strategies to leverage its message that demonstrate acute awareness of the preferences of its intended audience. Jordan’s initiatives demonstrate sensitivity to the prevailing global security agenda, and reflect efforts to frame the Jordanian position in a way that serves the regime’s goal of power maintenance. However, Jordan’s efforts to

278 For an overview of scholarly treatments of Jordan’s religious outreach, see, e.g., Turan Kayaoglu, “Explaining Interfaith Dialogue in the Muslim World,” Politics and Religion, 8 (2015): 236-262. 279 Stacey Gutkowski. 2015. “We are the Very Model of a Moderate Muslim State: The Amman Message and Jordan’s Foreign Policy.” International Relations: 1-21. 280 Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz and Peter Sickle. Building Moderate Muslim Networks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).

221 promote moderate Islam appeared to become less of a priority after 2011, as changing dynamics in the region and domestically caused the regime to focus more on a security- centric approach to combatting extremism.

The most widely recognized of Jordan’s initiatives to expand its reputation for religious soft power is the Amman Message. The Amman Message remains the most prominent plank in Jordan’s moderate Islam platform, and represents the gist of Jordan’s externally directed official religious discourse. In 2004, King Abdullah gathered influential religious scholars from around the world to agree on the parameters of acceptable Islam. He sent the following questions to 24 senior religious scholars: “1.

Who is a Muslim? 2. Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate? (takfir) 3. Who has the right to undertake issuing fatwas? (legal rulings)” The subsequent document, the

Amman Message, has been signed by many religious leaders, as well as professors, dignitaries, and bureaucrats from all over the world. It was released in response to acts of violence carried out in the name of Islam, specifically by Muslims against other

Muslims.281 The Amman Message received praise from both Muslim and non-Muslim leaders as an “unprecedented” effort to overcome doctrinal divisions. In interview with

281 The following is taken from the English language website of the Amman Message: “Based on the fatwas provided by these great scholars (who included the Shaykh Al- Azhar, Ayatollah Sistani and Sheikh Qaradawi), in July 2005 CE, H.M. King Abdullah II convened an international Islamic conference of 200 of the world’s leading Islamic scholars (ʿUlamaʾ) from 50 countries. In Amman, the scholars unanimously issued a ruling on three fundamental issues (which became known as the ‘Three Points of the Amman Message’): 1. They specifically recognized the validity of all eight mathahib (legal schools) of Sunni, Shiʿa and Ibāḍī Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology ('Ash’arism); of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a precise definition of who is a Muslim. 2. Based upon this definition they forbade takfir (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims. 3. Based upon the Mathahib they set forth the subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing of fatwas, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam.” http://ammanmessage.com/ Accessed October 25, 2017.

222 Ehud Yaari, host of Israel’s Channel 2, in March 2005, King Abdullah II stated the following:

The reason for the Amman Message was to identify throughout the Islamic world and also to the West this is what Islam means... All those that take the lives of innocent people that live on destruction and hatred, they have nothing to do with it… So, what we're trying to say is get the moderate majority of Muslims to stand up and say this is what's right and this is what's wrong.282

King Abdullah’s statements correspond to the position of the Jordanian regime, which is that terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. This position was echoed by Grand Mufti

Sheikh Abdul Karim Salim Khasawneh in an interview, who stated that extremism is the result of oppression rather than religion, and that the Jordanian regime has successfully reduced violence by gathering people together with the Amman Message. The Grand

Mufti did not explain how, if acts of violence had no relationship to Islam, the Amman

Message should have any effect on violence.283 This reinforces the contradictory position of moderate Islam more broadly, which tries to exonerate Islam for acts of violence, but also portrays that solution to violence as coming from a reinterpretation of Islam.

The Amman Message ostensibly seeks to promote Islamic pluralism. By recognizing many different branches of Islam as legitimate, it seeks to undermine the position of Muslim actors who declare apostasy (takfir) in order to justify attacks on these individuals as non-Muslims. However, a few groups who consider themselves to be

Muslim but who are often considered non-Muslim by mainstream sects were not recognized by the Amman Message, such as the Alawi and Ahmadi sects.284

282 Website of King Abdullah, accessed October 18, 2016. http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/interviews/view/id/312.html 283 Author interview with Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Karim Salim Khasawneh, Interview ID 16A (Amman, Jordan, 9am, August 12, 2015). 284 The Alawi sect is based primarily in Syria. Historically viewed as non-Muslim, political expedience has sometimes caused influential clerics to declare that they are Shiʿa, such as in 1936

223 By encouraging toleration of most Muslim sects, the Amman Message promotes the notion of a generic, homogeneous Islam, in which Muslims all agree on basic points like the Five Pillars and the Qurʾan, and ignore the differences in jurisprudence or practice or belief that are the basis of their division. While such differences do not necessarily lead to violence, their minimization speaks to the hubris of the Amman

Message. The idea that scholars’ and bureaucrats’ signatures on a page could achieve a meaningful resolution of doctrinal differences demonstrates that the main purpose of the

Amman Message was to elevate the religious status of King Abdullah and Jordan.

While the Amman Message appears intended to reduce violence and promote pluralism, its pluralism is circumscribed to the forms of Islam it names as valid. In addition to the branches of Islam that are not recognized, any form of Muslim worship that does not correspond to one of those named is implicitly not Islamic. The underlying effect of the Amman Message corresponds to the broader state project of standardizing

Islam. State power over religion is reinforced through the process of codification. By validating only those manifestations of Islam that the signatories consider legitimate, it renders invisible and illegitimate forms of Islam that do not fit any of the named categories. Although the Amman Message claims to make Jordan the voice of pluralistic

Islam, the effect is one of homogenization and the reinforcement of state power.

by the Sunni Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, in 1972 by Ayatollah Hasan Mahdi al- Shirazi, and again in 1973 by Shiʿa cleric Musa al-Sadr. The Ahmadi community is primarily based in India. While the community shares similarities with mainstream Sunni Islam, they are seen as non-Muslim due to their veneration of their founder Mirza Gulam Ahmad. Both communities are subject to persecution for their beliefs, in part due to their historic association with European colonizers. Neither the Alawi nor the Ahmadi sect nor community were named as Muslim by the Amman Message.

224 The Amman Message was one of the earliest efforts by an Arab regime to claim the mantle of “moderate Muslim nation.” Jordan has subsequently created or modified a portfolio of additional institutes and declarations to heighten the profile of its official religious discourse. For example, the website of the Amman Message links to additional projects carried out by the Royal Court, including the “Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for

Islamic Thought,”285 the “Great Tafsir Project,” (renamed in 2017 to reflect the Arabic al-tafsīr al-ʿaẓīma)286 the initiative known as “A Common Word Between Us and

You,”287 and the “Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies.”288 These initiatives all serve the common goal of portraying Jordan as speaking for authentic Islam to an international non-Muslim audience.

The various initiatives to promote moderation and/or highlight the Hashimites’ role as spokesmen for Islam are managed primarily by Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, a cousin of King Abdullah and his official religious advisor. While Prince Ghazi has launched many initiatives to enhance Jordan’s reputation as a promoter of moderate

Islam, several of them have been neglected after their initial launch. For example, the

Common Word Initiative, which Prince Ghazi described as “intended to promote peace, harmony, brotherhood and love between Muslims and Christians”289 was widely cited and praised after its release in 2008 but has subsequently received very little attention.290

285 “Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought” https://www.aalalbayt.org/ 286 “Great Tafsir Project” http://www.greattafsirs.com/ 287 “A Common Word Between Us and You,” https://www.acommonword.com/ 288 “Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies.” http://www.riifs.org/index.php/en/ 289 Tamara Sonn, “Questions for HRH Prince Ghazi of Jordan” Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2012. Accessed November 2, 2016. http://worldinterfaithharmonyweek.com/wp- content/uploads/2012/06/Ghazi-for-Oxford-Islamic-Studies-Online.pdf 290 The website for “A Common Word” (http://www.acommonword.com/) was out of date as of October 16, 2016: the list of new signatories appeared as code, and the list of original signatories did not exist. However, it had been updated by December 15, 2017.

225 Similarly, Prince Ghazi lobbied for the UN to adopt World Interfaith Harmony week, which was declared in UN Resolution A/RES/65/5, adopted in October 2010. Like the Common Word Initiative, early support has since faded away. It appears that such initiatives are largely intended to earn attention but lack the institutional backing or funding to contribute to a sustained shift in religious discourse. A former employee of

Prince Ghazi’s “Aal al-Bayt Institute” acknowledged that the Prince is fully committed to the promotion of moderate Islam, as he understands it from a Sufi perspective. In her view, Prince Ghazi’s efforts reflect his deeply held beliefs, rather than cynical strategizing.291 It appears that these efforts are not wanting in sincerity, but instead suffer neglect as a result of the conflict between Prince Ghazi’s approach, and the security centric attitude championed by the General Intelligence Department.292

Implications of International Branding

The content of the Amman Message differs from what the state teaches domestically. In schools and sermons, Jordanians are taught that there is one true form of

Islam. They are not taught that different forms of Islam are valid. The content of religious instruction that deals with the Amman Message focuses on Jordan’s role as a religious leader and the great responsibility this role conveys. The takeaway for the Jordanian student is that Jordan has high religious status in the Muslim world, and that he or she should feel proud to be ruled over by a leader like King Abdullah II. Another indication that the Amman Message is primarily intended for international consumption is its

291 Author interview with former employee of Prince Ghazi, Interview ID 67A (Evanston, IL, USA, 6:30pm, 8 April 2016). 292 Abu Rumman, Mohammed and Abu Hanieh, Hassan, The Islamic Solution in Jordan (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013), 69-73.

226 website, which initially existed only in English, although the site was offered in Arabic beginning in 2016.

The disconnect between the Jordanian regime’s international and domestic policies is noted by its citizens. When asked about the Amman Message, a Jordanian scholar of Islamist movements explained that the Amman Message was intended as a signal to the West, and that it had no effect on Jordanian society.293 A common sentiment was that the government is more interested in promoting the Amman Message abroad than at home.294 An employee of a human rights NGO in Amman observed that the

Amman Message had been released a decade earlier, yet few people knew about it. He expressed skepticism that the government had made an effort to publicize it, given that other religious messages are widely disseminated through state television and other government media.295 The view that the Amman Message was not intended for domestic audiences was reinforced by members of the opposition. When asked about the Amman

Message, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Zarqa said, “This is for the West.”296

A majority of interviewees who were not part of the official religious establishment shared this perspective. Similarly, when asked about the Amman Message, a Salafi

293 Author interview with Jordanian scholar of Islamist movements, Interview ID 59A (Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 29 September 2015). 294 Interviewees 40A 45A, 52A, 57A, 59A, 63A, 64A expressed the view that the Amman Message was primarily intended for the West, as part of a public relations campaign to promote the view that Jordan promoted moderate Islam. The individuals were not government employees, and at least two were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. 295 Author interview with Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Interview ID 29A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 24 August 2015). 296 Author interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Interview ID 62 (Zarqa, Jordan, 2pm, 3 October 2015).

227 preacher asserted that “moderate Islam” is secular Islam, which he and his followers reject, instead advocating for “true” Islam.297

The Amman Message and related initiatives to promote “moderation” are religious products primarily intended for export rather than domestic consumption. To summarize Jordan’s promotion of its official religious discourse, I characterize it as primarily focused on the symbolic projection of religious soft power, rather than ensuring a shift in the behavior or mentality of Jordanians. I attribute Jordan’s efforts to brand itself as a bastion of moderate Islam, while pursuing minimal efforts to ensure that religious tolerance is taught to its domestic population, to the Jordanian regime’s reliance on external financial and military support. The regime knows that powerful Western states look for alliances with regional partners that claim to espouse moderation, but are in fact agnostic about the effectiveness of efforts to encourage moderation. From the perspective of both Jordan and actors like the US, countering terrorism is primarily a security venture, and claims to promote moderation are intended to soften the material reality of violence.

Morocco

International Branding of Official Religious Discourse

The Moroccan regime began to project its official religious discourse several years after similar initiatives began elsewhere, such that countries like Jordan, the UAE, and Indonesia had already established their regimes as speaking for moderate Islam on the international stage. In spite of beginning to project its brand of moderation somewhat

297 Author interview with Jordanian Salafi leader Abu Sayyaf, Interview ID 30A (Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 24 August 2015).

228 later than the competition, Morocco managed to successfully establish a discourse of toleration based on claims regarding local tradition. In addition to the Moroccan monarchy’s efforts to influence the population’s understanding of Morocco’s religious heritage through religious and educational institutions as covered in Chapter 4 and 5, the regime also began to signal to the international audience that Morocco could prove a useful ally in the international fight against extremism, and developed a reputation as a proponent of moderate Islam in the United States and the European Union.

Yet the targeting of the international non-Muslim audience has required a specific framing by the Moroccan regime. According to official religious discourse, the

Casablanca bombings of 2003 constituted the catalyst for enhancing government engagement with religious discourse. While certain initiatives began after 2003, 2011 appears to represent another important shift, especially in establishing Morocco as a regional locus of religious authority. According to one US embassy official, King

Mohammad VI saw the fall of Qaddafi as an opportunity to assert Morocco’s role as the religious authority of the Maghreb.298 While the Libyan dictator had asserted his sacred authority on the basis of his Green Book, the Moroccan Alaouite king could draw on his historical status as “the commander of the faithful” (al-ʾamīr al-muʾminīn). Beginning in

2013, King Mohammed VI began traveling to different African countries during

Ramadan, to pray and lead prayer. Muslim communities in several northwest African states including Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Niger acknowledge the Moroccan monarch’s claim to religious authority.

298 Author interview with senior US Embassy Official, Interview ID 22C (Rabat, Morocco, 10:15am, 4 August 2016).

229 In 2014 the king established the Mohammed VI Institute for Training Imams and

Guides. The Institute is specifically intended to train non-Moroccan imams, as local imams already receive training through the auspices of the Dar al Hadith al Hassania. The

Institute is a centerpiece of Morocco’s strategy to enhance its profile as a key ally in challenging violent extremism.299 Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Tunisia, and France have sent imams to the Institute for training,300 and additional countries such as Russia are rumored to have plans to send imams. According to US embassy officials, the Imam

Training Institute is a frequent stop for visiting delegations and diplomats, and was appears to have been established to showcase Moroccan Islam to visitors as much as to train international imams.

In 2005 the Moroccan government launched an initiative to train women to engage with religious matters in their communities. The “mourchidates” have a specifically international appeal, however, according to Director of Islamic Affairs at the

Ministry of Awqāf, who noted the amount of international attention that the female religious leaders received.301 US embassy officials also spoke positively about the training of female religious leaders, which was seen as particularly useful in the effort to counter violent extremism.

In early 2016 Morocco undertook a strategy deployed by many officially-Islamic states; similar to the concept behind Jordan’s Amman Message, the Moroccan regime invited respected Muslim scholars from all over the world to establish a position on

299 Author interview with US Embassy Official, Interview ID 2C (Rabat, Morocco, 12:30pm, 7 June 2016). 300 Ruth Grosrichard, “Au Maroc, former des imams africains et francais pour lutter contre le terrorisme.” Le Monde, 20 January 2016. 301 Author interview with Director of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Awqāf, Interview ID 8C (Rabat, Morocco 11:30am, 26 July 2016).

230 Islamic doctrine, and issue the position in a statement. The statement, or “The Marrakesh

Declaration” was issued by over 300 Sunni and Shia ʿulamāʾ' in response to acts of violence committed by the Islamic State against religious minorities, including Druze and

Yazidi Christians, in Iraq and Syria. The Marrakesh Declaration was based on the constitution of Medina, drafted by the Prophet Muhammad in 622 CE, which protected the rights of Christians and Jews in Medina, the first Muslim community.

The process of issuing the Marrakesh Declaration was similar to that used by

Jordan when convening scholars for the purpose of issuing the Amman Message in 2004.

At the time, concerns were high regarding Muslim-on-Muslim attacks justified by takfir, or the declaration of apostasy. Some interpretations of Islam permit the killing of apostates as non-Muslims. Takfir became especially problematic following the invasion of Iraq by the United States, and the conflict’s devolution along sectarian lines. The

Amman Message was issued in part as an effort to reduce sectarian violence and delegitimize such killing, while also serving to bolster the Hashimites’ declared status as a source of religious authority. The Marrakesh Declaration appears intended to serve a similar purpose; it earned almost immediate international attention, including from the

US administration. In a speech addressing the Islamic Society of Baltimore in February

2016, President Obama acknowledged the Declaration.302 Like other similar declarations, however, the declaration has received relatively little attention since its issue.

302 According to a press briefing, President Obama referred to the Marrakesh Declaration by saying, “There are… Muslims who just met in Morocco to protect religious minorities, including Christians and Jews.” White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 3 February 2016. [Accessed 2 December 2016]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2016/02/03/remarks-president-islamic-society-baltimore

231 The regime sought to highlight the historic presence of religious minorities in

Morocco, especially the once-large population of Moroccan Jews. The government renovated and protected certain Jewish sites in the historic districts of Fez and Marrakesh, although many homes formerly owned by Moroccan Jews were taken over by Moroccan

Muslims.303 The government tended to ignore acts of violence carried out against

Moroccan Jews, especially following the establishment of the state of Israel. Instead greater focus was placed on the protection of Moroccan Jews by King Muhammad V against Vichy France during WWII, an act acknowledged by the Institute for World

Jewish Studies, which honored Muhammad V with its inaugural Reverend Martin Luther

King Jr. – Rabbi Abraham Heschel Award in 2015.304 In 2016 King Mohammad VI attended the rededication of Casablanca’s Ettedgui Synagogue and adjacent museum dedicated to the history of Moroccan Jews,305 however this may have been motivated in part by criticism from the museum’s director that Moroccan Jews were excluded from planning the 1200th anniversary celebrations for the city of Fez in 2008.306 Although the once thriving community of Maghrebi Jews diminished significantly in mid 20th century and by the early 21st century was only about 2500 individuals, the Moroccan government appears determined to highlight the historic presence of Jews, in support of the narrative of tolerant Moroccan Islam.

303 Author visit to Ibn Danan synagogue in historic Jewish quarter, Fez, 18 July 2016. 304 Anne Cohen, “Honoring the Moroccan King Who Saved the Jews,” Forward, 22 December 2015. [Accessed 17 August 2017]. https://forward.com/news/breaking-news/327772/honoring- the-moroccan-king-who-saved-the-jews/ 305 “Moroccan King Attends Rededication of Casablanca Jewish Sites,” Times of Israel, 16 December 2016. [Accessed 10 February 2018]. https://www.timesofisrael.com/moroccan-king- attends-rededication-of-casablanca-jewish-sites/ 306 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, eds. 2013. Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics, and Society Under Muhammad VI. New York: Routledge (51).

232 One purpose of Morocco’s reputation as a bastion of moderate Islam is to signal its appropriateness as a key ally in the combatting violent extremism. US embassy officials emphasized the centrality of this strategy to Moroccan foreign policy. A component of the Moroccan branding strategy was the establishment of the Global

Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF). Launched in 2011 in partnership with 29 other countries, and co-chaired by the Netherlands, the Forum is intended to signal Morocco’s commitment to countering terrorism and violent extremism.307 Morocco’s efforts to cement its standing as a key ally to the US and Europe also include its willingness to prevent migrants from crossing to Spain at Gibraltar, a policy that has earned the gratitude of many EU policy-makers.308 In the US, the Moroccan American Policy Center serves as a lobbying group to help advance Morocco’s image and interests in the eyes of

US policymakers.

Yet despite Morocco’s efforts to embody a picture of commitment to religious toleration and counter-terror, other policies indicated that the branding campaign was largely strategic. For example, although the Marrakesh Declaration made much of the

Islamic injunction to protect religious minorities, policies towards Christians in Morocco remained restrictive.309 Moroccan Shia were treated as a potential fifth column for Iran, and were denied permission to establish mosques. In a holdover from French colonial policy, Moroccan mosques were only accessible to Muslims, other than the Hassan II

307 Author interview with US Embassy Official, Interview ID 23C (Rabat, Morocco, 11am, 4 August 2016). 308 Author interview with senior US Embassy Official, Interview ID 22C (Rabat, Morocco, 10:15am, 4 August 2016). 309 Morocco 2016 International Religious Freedom Report. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269150.pdf [Accessed 20 February 2018].

233 National Mosque in Casablanca, which derived income from $30 entrance fees for non-

Muslim visitors.

The sensitivity of the Moroccan regime to its international perception is also visible in its efforts to be seen as complying with environmental conservation efforts, such as hosting COP22 in Marrakesh, and pursuing renewable energy policies. Activist groups accused the government of merely pursuing the appearance of environmental protection, without taking action to address the concerns of communities impacted by environmental damage and climate change, and staged a sit-in to protest COP22 while ignoring the pollution caused by the largest silver mine in Africa.

In general, Morocco demonstrated an interest in being seen as adhering to certain norms that powerful foreign powers, specifically the US and the EU, have signaled as being important. Such norms include adhering to a counter-extremism security agenda, supporting the rights of women and religious minorities, and encouraging environmental conservation. Yet efforts to heighten the government’s reputation as a key ally with shared social goals sometimes were revealed as merely a veneer for the Moroccan regime’s persistent authoritarianism and lack of meaningful protections for citizens’ rights or the environment.

Implications of International Branding

The Moroccan regime’s strategy of paying lip service to European and American agendas is not lost on the Moroccan people. During a focus group, university students expressed opposition to the government adopting policies merely for the sake of gaining greater access to development money and other sources of funding.310 Expanded support

310 Author interview with university student, Interview ID 12C (Rabat, Morocco, 6:30pm, 3 August 2016).

234 for women’s rights, for example through the adoption of a new pro-women family law in

2004, is an area where Morocco has gained international acclaim,311 yet this is seen as an example of the Moroccan government ignoring Islam to cater to European norms.

While citizens expressed disillusion with the regime’s willingness to cater to

American and European norms, the regime was sometimes disappointed that its efforts in this regard did not earn greater appreciation. For example, the Moroccan government expressed umbrage that despite its partnership with the US and EU in various counter terror capacities, the US State Department criticized its human rights violations in its

2016 Human Rights Report.312 According to a legal consultant for the Moroccan government, officials felt that the report focused only on the negative aspects of

Morocco’s human rights record, rather than on the efforts made to cater to the American security agenda.313 If the Moroccan regime continued to feel underappreciated for its cooperation in upholding and implementing international norms, it may feel little incentive to continue.

The motivation for adherence to certain international norms may also relate to

Morocco’s flouting another norm: the occupation of Western Sahara. The Moroccan government’s charm offensive in Africa appears to have potentially achieved an objective, as the kingdom was re-admitted into the African Union in 2017 after leaving the organization when it recognized the independence of Western Sahara in 1984.

311 Dörthe Engelcke, Processes of Family Law Reform: Legal and Societal Change and Continuity in Morocco and Jordan (Unpublished Dissertation. St Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 2014). 312 2016 Human Rights Report on Morocco, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265724.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2018]. 313 Author interview with legal consultant, Interview ID 3C (Café Mazzini, Rabat, Morocco, 9:30pm, 28 June 2016).

235 Morocco asserted its sovereignty over Western Sahara using the mass demonstration of the “Green March,” where thousands of Moroccan citizens physically walked into the disputed territory to wrest control from Spain in 1975.

The branding of Moroccan Islam for foreign powers is part of a broader strategy to enhance the kingdom’s soft power and regional authority. Of the three kingdoms on which my research focuses, Morocco has pursued the most comprehensive branding strategy, catering to international norms regarding environmental conservation, women’s rights, and minority rights, in addition to religious toleration. The Moroccan strategy on the religious front is relatively subtle, in that official religious discourse implicitly posits

Morocco in opposition to Saudi Islam, by asserting the tripartite narrative that Moroccan

Islam is Maliki Sunni, ‘Ash'ari, and Sufi. The position of the Commander of the Faithful constitutes an implicit challenge to the status claimed by the Saudi king as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places” (Khādim al-Ḥaramayn aš-Šarīfayn). Although the Moroccan king’s status in this regard is seen by his supporters as offering an alternative to the Saudi model of Islam, the House of Saud retains sufficient religious authority and exerts significant influence over global Islamic discourse, that the Moroccan king’s claim to religious authority had never posed a real challenge. However, the October 2017 declaration by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman that he would return Saudi Arabia to “moderate Islam,” may have signaled a shift in Saudi priorities, and potentially signaled a new source of competition for the Moroccan brand of Islam.

236 Oman

International Branding of Official Religious Discourse

Similar to Morocco and in contrast to Jordan, Oman has not sought to present itself as speaking for all of Islam. Oman has done little to promote its official religious discourse internationally. However as powerful international actors like the US have continued to seek partners to combat terrorism and violent extremism, the Omani regime has begun more international outreach. The choices made by the Omani regime in this regard are motivated by the same factors that prompt the actions of the Jordanian and

Moroccan regimes: the desire to expand religious soft power abroad.

Although the Omani regime has undertaken some initiatives to spread “Oman’s

Message of Islam” as the campaign is known, it has made far fewer efforts internationally than Jordan or Morocco. The reasons Oman has not made a concerted effort to export its brand of Islam are due to two factors: Omani Islam is Ibāḍī, despite the officially non- sectarian stance of the government; and the Omani regime is more concerned about the possibility of domestic rebellion than about foreign support.

Because Oman’s official form of Islam is Ibāḍīsm, its ability to project its religious soft power is constrained. Ibāḍīsm is neither Sunni nor Shia, and some Muslims do not consider Ibāḍīs to be true Muslims. I attribute this attitude, in part, to the influence of Salafi Sunni conceptions of orthodoxy which regard as non-Muslim any form of worship that does not conform to its own practices. This attitude persists despite initiatives like the Amman Message, which recognizes Ibāḍīsm as a form of Islam. Non-

Ibāḍī Muslims are unlikely to accept the religious leadership of a small and little-known sect; therefore, the regime’s outreach efforts tend to be conducted in English for non-

237 Muslim audiences. The Omani regime may be trying to expand its religious soft power among those who are not already biased against it, namely, non-Muslims.

Oman has targeted its own population with its official religious discourse and, until recently, largely ignored the international arena, in part due to concerns of internal rebellion and unrest. By the late 20th century the Omani regime had suppressed rebellions by both Islamists and Leftists. Because the regime was aware of the potential political threat posed by Islamist actors, it began to reframe its official religious discourse to disempower Islamists decades before other regimes perceived Islamists as a threat.

Although the Omani regime sought to assert the Islamic legitimacy of the Sultan following challenges to his rule, a series of events in the early 21st century impressed upon the Omani regime that projecting its narratives of moderation could be beneficial.

The 9/11 attacks shifted the attitude of the US, while the regional instability that followed the US occupation of Iraq inflamed sectarian tensions. In contrast, the stability and lack of violent extremism and sectarian conflict in Oman began to gain attention, from which the Omani regime sought to benefit.

The international promotion of Omani official Islam occurred through initiatives such as an annual academic conference that focuses on Ibāḍīsm, the English language version of a long-form literary magazine called “Tafahum,” (“Understanding”) and an exhibition titled “Oman’s Message of Islam” that was sent to embassies around the world beginning in 2014. The regime uses similar tactics and language abroad and at home, because the regime is as interested in reducing bias against Ibāḍīs among Sunni Omanis as in reducing the same bias outside Oman.

238 Each year the Omani Ministry of Religious Affairs holds an international academic conference about Ibāḍī Islam. To highlight the narratives produced by the

Omani regime for an international audience, below I provide details of the 2016 conference, which was held at St. Antony’s College at Oxford University with the theme,

“Religion and Policy in Oman.” The conference included presentations by representatives from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as well as prominent scholars on Oman and

Ibāḍīsm. In his presentation, Abdulrahman al-Salimi314 named the functions of the

Ministry of Religious Affairs and included “the promotion of unity and moderation.” His use of the English word “moderation” for an international audience is notable, because this word is absent from Ministry parlance within Oman, in either English or Arabic.

The Omani presenters upheld official religious discourse, even when not behind the podium. A key aspect of how the Omani regime presents its official religious discourse abroad, and at home, is that tolerance is deeply rooted in Ibāḍī tradition. While making a comment at the annual conference, an official with the Ministry of Religious

Affairs stressed that tolerance has “deep roots,” as demonstrated by Ibāḍīs’ tolerance for non-Ibāḍīs, and that this heritage is now reinforced through modern institutions.315 The ministry has reinforced the invented tradition of Omani tolerance by sponsoring the publication of a book compiling 19th and 20th century British travelers’ descriptions of

Oman, specifically those that noted the tolerance and kindness of the Omani people.316

314 A scholar as well as a prominent Ministry official, al-Salimi is a relative of the Minister of Religious Affairs, Sheikh Abdallah Bin Mohammed Bin Abdullah Al Salmi has been minister of religious affairs since 1997. I include his name, and those of other conference presenters, because the conference program is publically available: http://Ibāḍī-studies.org/prog.htm 315 Conference notes, “Religion and Policy in Oman,” May 23, 2016, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, UK. 316 Hilal Al-Hajri, British Travel-Writing on Oman: Orientalism Reappraised (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2006).

239 The book’s author, Hilal al-Hajri, attended the conference, and gave a presentation entitled “His Majesty Sultan Qaboos as a Paradigm of Peace.” The Omani narrative seeks to present tolerance as a long-standing Omani tradition while simultaneously crediting

Sultan Qaboos for his role in encoding it at home and spreading it abroad.

The conference allowed for the narrative of Omani tolerance to be questioned.

Several historians pointed out that while the Ibāḍī tradition did permit Ibāḍīs to associate with non-Ibāḍīs, this was done less in the spirit of religious tolerance and more as a result of Ibāḍī dominance in their strongholds, but weakness elsewhere. An American historian cautioned against retroactively projecting contemporary values, such as religious tolerance, onto earlier contexts that held different values. A prominent English scholar of

Omani history asked, “At which point does tolerance become political correctness?” In response, an official from the Ministry of Religious Affairs argued that nation building in the Middle East had required the incorporation of theology, which in the Omani case meant the incorporation of Ibāḍīsm. He went on to say that theology had only become problematic when nation-states began to foment sectarianism, which he argued began in

Iran and was continued by Saudi Arabia.

The annual conference on Ibāḍīsm appears intended to raise awareness and reduce bias against Ibāḍīs. Yet with the rise of the so-called Islamic State, the Omani regime may have sensed an opportunity for greater international outreach to promote Oman’s brand of Islam. In 2014 Oman launched an initiative called “Islam in Oman,” later renamed “Tolerance, Coexistence, Understanding: Oman’s Message of Islam.” The initiative includes a website that features films discussing religious tolerance in Oman, pages on “International Resonance” with praise for Omani Islam, information about

240 Ibāḍīsm, and the initiative’s traveling exhibit, which has traveled to 70 cities in 26 countries.317 The initiative includes the twitter hash tag, “#actfortolerance.” This exhibit, while in keeping with Oman’s more academic approach, constitutes a more publically oriented chapter in the advertising of Oman’s brand of Islam.

In November 2015, the exhibit was sent to the Ahmed bin Majed Private School in Seeb, near the capital of Muscat. The exhibit was opened with a presentation by the

Ministry of Religious Affairs. I note the presentation at the school because the content directed at Omani school children was the same as that used in the traveling international exhibition. The opening presentation was conducted primarily in English, other than poetry and Qurʾan reading in Arabic. The students in attendance receive instruction in

English and like many educated and upper-class Omanis living in the capital city, converse comfortably in English. The exhibition was emblematic of the Ministry’s efforts to promote the official religious discourse, both in Oman and abroad.

The presentation included a showing of the film “Tolerance,” commissioned in

2014 by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and produced by MGS Filmproduktion and

Arabia Felix Synform GMbH in Munich, Germany. The exhibit itself emphasized messages of tolerance within Islam, and noted the official narrative of Oman, without emphasizing sectarian differences. In 2014 the Grand Mufti of Oman, Sheikh Ahmed al-

Khalili, publish an essay which beseeched all Muslims to embrace tolerance.318

While Sultan Qaboos launched the official narrative of Omani tolerance, he has delegated its promotion to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Oman’s official religious

317 http://www.islam-in-oman.com/en.html Accessed November 3, 2016. 318 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 “Oman.” Accessed November 7, 2016. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257517.htm

241 discourse abroad is often represented by Assistant Grand Mufti Sheikh Kahlan al-

Kharusi. The son-in-law of the venerable Grand Mufti, who has held the position since

1975, Sheikh Kahlan travels on behalf of Omani Islam. In my interview with Sheikh

Kahlan, he asserted that Oman was not marketing its own model of Islam, but instead embodying the true spirit of the religion.319 The Assistant Grand Mufti emphasized that

Oman’s unique history and Ibāḍī tradition contributed to its culture of tolerance and non- violence.

Other officials with the Ministry of Religious Affairs expressed greater caution about the possibility for Oman to export its brand of Islam abroad. The ministry official responsible for the publication of the Arabic language magazine “Tasamuh”

(“Tolerance”), explained that Oman does not want to play the role of speaking for

Islam.320Although officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and other government offices held the view that Oman could serve as a model, they tended to express this position cautiously, as a result of Oman’s Ibāḍī official religious identity.

Implications of International Branding

The primary message of Oman’s official religious discourse is the importance of religious tolerance even in the face of religious differences, which the regime tries to mitigate. The explicit recognition of Islamic pluralism is somewhat unusual: Jordan stresses that “Islam is one”, but does not acknowledge or explicitly call for the acceptance of alternative religious interpretations; Morocco implicitly acknowledges that different forms of Islam exist, but engages solely with the forms of Islam propounded by

319 Interview 19, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Office of the Grand Mufti, 18 November 2015. 320 Author interview with employee of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Interview ID 21B, (Muscat, Oman, 12pm, 1 December 2015).

242 the regime. Omani officials would likely argue that this acknowledgment of Islamic pluralism, in addition to Oman’s long-standing heritage of toleration, explains the lack of violent extremism exhibited by Omanis. However, a key factor in Omani stability and peacefulness is the level of authoritarianism maintained by the regime. Sultan Qaboos, while venerated as the father of the modern country, exerts complete control. When trying to explain Omani stability, the rule of Sultan Qaboos is more significant than traditions of toleration.

The narrative of a tradition of Omani tolerance is problematic for Oman’s efforts to promote its brand of Islam. The thrust of the Omani religious narrative is that Ibāḍī heritage combined with a seafaring mercantile economy served to generate the Omani culture of toleration. Yet this narrative becomes problematic when prepared for export, as ostensibly a country that lacks Ibāḍīsm or a trade-based economy will be missing the crucial elements of Omani toleration. This and anti-Ibāḍī bias contribute to Oman’s reticence in trying to promote it religious narrative abroad. Religious officials did not explain how, if Oman’s peacefulness was deeply rooted in its long religious and cultural heritage, these principles could be exported elsewhere, as by implication this would require other societies to also experience Oman’s long history of Ibāḍī Islam and cosmopolitanism.

Toleration and religious freedom become important in the content of the nation- state, because in this context of shared national identity, it allows different groups to interact in the public sphere. However, these values were less relevant prior to the takeover of the nation-state as the hegemonic form of political organization. Although the roots of religious tolerance do exist in the Ibāḍī tradition and can be highlighted when

243 constructing an invented tradition, the utility of such narratives only works within the domestic context. As soon as Oman seeks to project its religious soft power abroad, it becomes clear that religious tolerance in Oman is in fact the result of contemporary policies to criminalize sectarianism and forcibly foster ecumenical harmony. The disconnect between the message that Oman could serve as a model for other Muslim societies and yet the Omani model was based on such a long-standing tradition, reinforces my position that the Omani regime has invented a national tradition of peacefulness, and in the present context when tolerance is a hot commodity, the regime hopes to quietly enhance its religious soft power by cashing in on this narrative.

Despite the logical flaw in successfully branding Omani Islam for international export, the lack of extremism in Oman has gained international attention. In July 2008

Jihadica.com, a self-described “clearinghouse for materials related to militant, transnational Sunni Islamism, commonly known as Jihadism,” noted online chatter from

Jihadis asking why there were no Jihadis from Oman, nor even criticism of the regime, despite its conformity with so-called “Bush-Blairi” Islam. They concluded that it was the result of Ibāḍīsm, or alternatively, Sufism.321 The Saudis also seem to have taken note: during Ramadan of 2015, popular Saudi TV cleric Ahmed al-Shugairi aired a segment on his show Al-Khuwatir which examined Islamic sectarianism. He highlighted Oman as an example of true Islam, comparing Omanis to the original Muslim community that existed prior to the Sunni/Shia split due to their “innocence” of sectarian divisions.322

321 http://www.jihadica.com/oman-the-land-of-no-jihad/ The author of the post and manager of the website, Will McCants, also seemed nonplussed at the dearth of Jihadis in Oman, saying that it “does need explanation.” 322 Ahmed al-Shugairi, “Reflections” (al-ḵūāṭir) television series, Season 11, Episode 5 “We Disagree and Maintain Friendliness,” 22 June 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7lXQDL-cyGk [Accessed 11 January 2018].

244 The Omani regime is cautious in promoting its official religious discourse due to bias against Ibāḍī Islam, however it has begun to attract international attention because domestic policies initially implemented to mitigate the potential for domestic divisions resonate with international security agenda to promote religious tolerance. Yet the Omani regime remains circumspect, and continues to pursue a primarily academic approach to raising awareness and understanding of Ibāḍīsm, while sidestepping the question of how an invented tradition allegedly rooted in Omani tradition can be usefully applied to contexts that lack its historic experience.

The unspoken takeaway from the position that the Omani regime could serve as a model elsewhere is that Omani tolerance is the result of contemporary policies that suppress sectarianism and while acknowledging pluralism, yet to say so out-loud risks undermining the Omani national identity, which relies on a narrative of historical continuity. Instead, Oman has focused its efforts on building a reputation as impartial, serving as a go-between for Iran and the rest of the GCC, and playing a similar role for

Qatar, following the Saudi and UAE-led embargo launched in 2017.

V. Conclusion

In all three monarchies, the promotion of the state’s preferred narrative of

“moderate” Islam is directed at both domestic and international audiences. In all three, domestic policies include state regulation of religious discourse in mosques and religious media, training of religious leaders, and regulation of religious and civic education. The

Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education generally take primary responsibility for implementing these policies. Initiatives directed externally include

245 international conferences of Muslim religious leaders, the promotion of interfaith dialogue, and partnerships with other governments or international institutions. The ruling monarch or members of the royal family generally spearhead such international efforts. Interaction between second level, or domestic, policies and third level, or international, initiatives occurs, however it moves particularly from the third level to second. For example, in all three states, educational curricula draw on international initiatives more frequently than international declarations make reference to domestic policies.

In this respect, the promotion of a country’s official religious discourse displays similarities with branding, or competing in a marketplace with other actors that try to speak on behalf of Islam, all trying to demonstrate that their “product” is authentic and superior. Yet when doing so, regimes must maintain sensitivity to the possibility of appearing to give in to pressure from the US and EU, to the detriment of upholding

Islamic norms. In national contexts where norms that most closely align with values like toleration, moderation, etc. are seen as indigenous, regimes that encourage these values will experience the least domestic pushback. However, in contexts where these values have not been encouraged, regimes are likely to experience greater resistance from domestic constituencies sensitive to perceived foreign pressure.

246 Chapter 6: Regretting Official Islam?

I. Introduction

Modern states possess a greater capacity than pre-modern states to render their populations legible and therefore subject to state power. Making an aspect of human life legible to state power often involves processes of centralizing production and control, which contribute to greater standardization. Gellner emphasizes the modern industrialized state’s need for interchangeable workers that are all capable of carrying out the same task in a standardized means of production. A standardized work force required a standardized education, which required a standardized language, which contributed to feelings of nationalism as well as cultural homogenization within a given nation.323 Scholars have demonstrated how greater oversight of the population enables the achievement of state strengthening objectives such as taxation and conscription, as well as how modern nation-building contributes to the standardization of language, education, and institutions.324 However there has been less focus on how centralized and standardized state control of religious institutions influences religious practices.

The primary argument of this chapter is that the production of religious discourse by a modern state contributes to the homogenization and standardization of religious practice. Note that because practice is observable while belief is not, I focus on practice rather than belief.

323 Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism (1983). 324 See, e.g., Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870- 1914 (1976); Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (1988); Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power” (1993); James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998).

247 Pre-modern religious expression was characterized by a lack of centralization, and the prevalence of localized and sometimes esoteric practices. In contrast, modern religious practice, especially when the state controls religious education, religious training, and many religious spaces, is often characterized by centralization, standardization, and homogenization. Pre-modern local practices are often framed as backward or even heretical, and may disappear when faced with centralized state religious orthodoxy. The transition from pre-modern local diversity to modern centralized standardization has been noted by scholars, however the effect specifically upon religious practice has received less attention.

The chapter emphasizes how regime efforts to monopolize religious discourse have had both intended and unintended consequences. The production of a single homogenized form of official Islam is likely seen as desirable by political elites, who in

Weberian terms, wish to establish a monopoly over the production of legitimate religious discourse. Yet unintended consequences include a lack of nuance or pluralism in the interpretation of religion, as well as an enhanced possibility for religious intolerance exhibited both by state institutions and by citizens. Expressions of intolerance are especially noteworthy when a state has attempted to portray its national religion as

“moderate” or “tolerant.”

II. Official Islam as Homogenized Islam

Specific periods of Islamic history exhibit tension between an approach that relies strictly on the literal words of the holy texts, and one that allows for greater freedom of interpretation to understand their true intention. A similar push for literalism is visible in

248 Christianity, spanning from pre-modern sects such as the Puritans to more contemporary expressions, like Evangelicals’ tendency to stress a literal interpretation of the Bible. The tendency to emphasize a literal interpretation of religious texts exists independently of state actions.

However, I assert that the incorporation of religious institutions into the state that occurred in officially-Islamic states has strengthened existing tendencies toward a literal interpretation of Islamic religious texts. As a result, the incorporation of religious institutions into state structures has contributed to the homogenization of Islam.

One means of establishing state control over religious practice was through public educational institutions that teach religion as a subject in school. State-builders, both colonizers and local elites, typically approved of religious education, seeing it as a means of promoting political quietism by using religion to encourage allegiance to the rulers.

Numerous studies of textbooks have found that regimes pursue this goal using specific religious discourses in educational curricula. Research comparing textbooks across the

MENA region have noted the similarities across countries, as curricula emphasize that to be a good citizen, one must be a good Muslim. Such studies have also noted the creation of a “generic” Islam that ignores sectarian distinctions in favor of prioritizing religious and national unity, specifically a national unit governed by the regime in power.325 One effect of the modern state’s control of religious institutions has been to project a unified religious discourse, using state-controlled mosques and schools, with the effect of homogenizing religious practice.

325 See, e.g., Patrick Gaffney. 1994. The Prophet's Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt. Los Angeles: University of California Press; Eleanor Doumato and Gregory Starrett, eds. 2007. Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

249 The state-led production of a form of simplified Islam that is reducible to lessons in a schoolbook has had major implications for the level of nuance with which the typical citizen is taught to approach official Islam. Individual citizens interested in more complex engagement with religious texts and their own faith must pursue it independently, as state interest in students’ mastery of religious studies is limited to their internalization of the virtues of obedience and loyalty to the ruler. The result, in some circumstances, is resentment of official Islam and the not-unfounded view that political elites wish to curtail sophisticated engagement with the founding texts of the faith.

In addition to the discouragement of sophisticated religious study, the projection of a simplified form of Islam found in schoolbooks generates a lack of pluralism. While the state’s official religious discourse is by no means unchallenged, the projection of a single message of official Islam conveys the notion that a single version of Islam is correct. This contrasts with the diversity of religious discourses that existed under a pre- modern system characterized by a lack of centralized religious discourse, where local practices, customs, and beliefs competed with religious orthodoxy. As Kepel explains, prior to the 1970s, “Islam was everywhere dominated by national or local traditions rooted in the piety of the common people”326 As populations became better able to read and interpret the Quran themselves, local traditions could more easily be distinguished from the written tenets of the faith. Scholars have documented how local practices such as visits to shrines and worship of saints have been frowned upon by increasingly literate

326 Kepel, Gilles. 2002. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (69).

250 populations who eschew local forms of worship for expressions of piety grounded in the practices condoned by holy texts.327

The effect was similar to that of the invention of the printing press in Europe: an increase in literacy and access to the Bible enabled engagement with Christian texts unmediated by the Catholic clergy. As more individuals read the Bible themselves, some were less willing to accept the authority of the state-sponsored Church, and agitated for the right to practice Christianity as they wished rather than as dictated by state religious institutions. The Protestant Reformation328 and the European Wars of Religion were two outcomes of the decline in the authority of state religious institutions, and the upheaval they caused led to the European view that peace and stability were unlikely without the separation of religion and state.

Some have argued that a similar “Reformation” is taking place in Islam.329

However the context of modernity alters the situation to the extent that relying on the

Protestant Reformation to understand present circumstances is unlikely to enhance an understanding of current events. In Europe, the tumult triggered by increased literacy and religious salience occurred prior to the advent of the modern industrialized state. The subsequent evolution of Protestantism, especially its most intolerant and puritanical forms, initially lacked official sanction by Catholic state authorities. Even in cases where

327 For changes in Jordanian visits to shrines, see, e.g., Norig Neveu, “Les politiques des lieux saints et la topographie sacrée dans le sud de la Jordanie, XIXe – XXe siècles,” L'atelier du Centre de recherches historiques, 79 (2014). For decline in attendance of saint festivals (mawlids) in Egypt, see, e.g. Samuli Schielke, “Hegemonic Encounters: Criticism of Saints-Day Festivals and the Formation of Modern Islam in Late 19th and Early 20th-Century Egypt.” Die Welt des Islams, 47, ¾ (2007): 319-355. 328 For a concise discussion of the role of literacy and the printing press in the Reformation, see, e.g., Euan Cameron, The European Reformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 329 See, e.g., Reza Aslan, No God But God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam (New York: Random House, 2005).

251 radical Protestants did control the levers of political power, such as certain Lutheran areas of northern Germany and the Puritanical American colonies like Massachusetts, the power of the state had not yet achieved its modern incarnation and therefore lacked the power associated with modern state capacity.

In the Middle East, populations began to achieve mass literacy as a result of state education in the mid 20th century, a period in which the processes of modern state building were already well underway in most contexts. Newly literate populations who began to question the authority of the religious power structure also inhabited systems where religion and government were intertwined. The effects of path dependence in an empowered modern state that had already incorporated religious institutions into itself is likely to prevent the separation that predictors of an Islamic Reformation might foresee.

At the very least, political elites that wish to retain control over religious discourse and official religious institutions have the power of modern militaries, the mass media, and public education systems at their disposal, presaging an even more tumultuous power struggle than that which transformed the political structures and demography of Europe during the Protestant Reformation and the Wars of Religion.

The transition to modernity has fundamentally altered Islam: “At the core of

Islam’s politicization lie the structural changes unleashed by the transition from premodern empire to modern nation-state.”330 The symbiosis between religious and state institutions has contributed to a form of the religion that is more simple, more rigid, and less representative of pluralism than the form of Islam that characterized pre-modernity.

One outcome of standardized religious practice can be a decline in tolerance, on the part

330 Jocelyne Cesari, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (2014), 20.

252 of the state as well as individual citizens, for forms of religion that are seen as contrary to the standard practice of Islam. Unless toleration is protected and promoted by law, and unless the state uses its control of educational and religious institutions to produce a discourse of toleration, intolerance is embedded in the notion of an official religion.

In discussing the homogenization of Islam, readers may protest that despite any illusions a regime may harbor about its religious authority, all contemporary Middle

Eastern regimes’ official religious discourses are challenged by society, often most vocally by Islamist opposition groups. In focusing on the state’s production of religious discourse and the consequences this can have, I do not intend to minimize the ways in which state discourse is actively contested. Yet the origins, actions, and ideologies of

Islamist groups have received sustained study, while state produced religious discourses have often been discounted as lacking legitimacy. I assert that the effects of state produced religious discourse may be more difficult to observe, drawing on insights from studies of nationalism that have highlighted how political elites have an interest in disguising their own preferred narratives as “authentic” to the heritage and identity of a given nation. Similarly, in my discussion of the influence of state discourse on religious practice, I consider many of these effects to be difficult to observe, except over long periods of time, and especially in the transition from pre-modern to modern state structures.

III. Unintended Consequences of Homogenized Islam

I consider the strength of Islamist opposition groups to be, in many ways, an unintended outcome of state produced religious discourse. As noted in Chapter 2, and

253 informed by extensive scholarship, many Middle Eastern regimes saw an increased emphasis on religion as a means of counteracting the power of Leftist groups. Hibbard asserts that “illiberal interpretations of religious traditions were used to counter leftist politics and legitimize hierarchical patterns of social order.”331 States sought to diminish the salience of class. Masoud asserts that the popularity of Islamist groups is due to the fact that state authorities had suppressed other forms of political opposition, especially

Leftists, but permitted Islamists to operate based on the belief that they would be politically quietist.332 Regimes’ greater emphasis on religion had the unintended consequence of opening up the regime to Islamists’ criticisms that the regime was insufficiently committed to Islam, that the regime’s use of religion is instrumental and intended for strategic effect.

Another unintended consequence of state produced homogenized Islam is the way in which it contributes to the popularity of strict interpretations of Islam. A well-known example of a strict textualist interpretation of Islam was promoted by Muhammad ibn

‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792). Wahhabism was adopted by the tribes of the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula, including the Saudi family. In partnership with the ʿulamāʾ of the

Najd, the House of Saud conquered much of the Peninsula and eventually established the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Having exiled the traditional rulers of the Hijaz, the

House of Saud controlled the two holiest sites in Islam, Mecca and Medina. Their interpretation of Islam was deeply conservative, and differed from the practice of Islam elsewhere, which often included traditions like visits to local shrines. Saudi Arabia’s

331 Scott Hibbard, Religious Politics and Secular States: Egypt, India, and the US (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), xii. 332 Tarek Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt (2014).

254 interpretation of Islam has been spread abroad using Saudi oil wealth, which has funded the opening of religious schools, the training of clerics, and the spread of Saudi Islam through satellite television. The ubiquity of Saudi religious products outside the kingdom speaks to the religious soft power of the Saudis, and contributes to the view that Saudi

Arabia is responsible for acts of violence committed in the name of Islam. Yet such a view overlooks how state standardization of Islam has also contributed to homogenization and a lack of tolerance for alternative expressions of the religion.

IV. Case Studies

Jordan

The existence of a central authority for issuing religious edicts was largely unknown in Islam until colonization by the British. Prior to this period, a member of the

ʿulamāʾ could become a mufti, or a “fatwa giver” with proper religious training. Fatawa are nonbinding religious edicts that are often specific to a particular set of circumstances in which the pious individual found him or herself unsure of proper Islamic practice. The notion of a central authority to issue such edicts contradicted the specific nature of various fatawa. As colonizers, the British found the lack of a central religious authority to be potentially destabilizing. The Church of England was modeled on the Catholic church, both of which relied on clearly established hierarchical structures of religious authority.

As a result, the British appear to have considered it useful to set up a parallel form of religious authority in their colonial territories, regardless of the religious traditions of the inhabitants, which may have lacked any such hierarchy.

Like many of its counterparts elsewhere in the region, Jordan’s Dāʾira al-Iftā’ was

255 established during the colonial period. Unwilling to be seen as interfering in the touchy topic of religious affairs, but also anxious to avoid the emergence of unregulated and potentially incendiary religious edicts, the British designated a deputy to issue official fatawa when the Emirate of Transjordan was established in 1921. That same year the

British established the Grand Mufti of Palestine as well as the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, appointing both an Ashkenazi and a Sephardic Chief Rabbi.

The website of Jordan’s Dāʾira al-Iftā’ affirms that it was founded in 1921, although does not mention the role of the British. The website also states that the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ has relied since its inception on the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.333 The Hanafi madhab of Sunni Islam was that adhered to by the Ottoman

Empire, and as a result most former Ottoman territories continue to officially embrace

Hanafi interpretations. Prior to Ottoman control, the Shafi madhab was more prevalent in

Jordan.

The Dāʾira al-Iftā’ was a branch of the Ministry of Awqāf until 2006, when a ruling by King Abdullah II rendered the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ independent from the ministry, and elevated the rank of the Grand Mufti to a status equivalent to a minister. In an interview, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Karim Saleem Khasawneh resisted the notion of an

“official” Islam, stressing that there is only one Islam, a sentiment expressed uniformly in interviews by representatives of official Islam in Jordan. He acknowledged that the actions and interests of the Jordanian government did not always comply with Islam. He gave the example of interest, or usury (riba), explaining that it is forbidden in Islam:

333 Dāʾira al-Iftā’ website “Definition of the Department of General Ifta” [Accessed 16 March 2017] http://aliftaa.jo/ShowContent.aspx?Id=39#.WMreLBLyvdQ

256 “However if the state allows it, we do not say that the banks must close.”334 A more junior mufti admitted that the king has asked for specific fatawa to support actions taken by the government.335

The unwillingness of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ to issue a fatwa that contravenes the position of the monarchy was reinforced by religious actors outside the Grand Mufti’s office. When asked about the religious credibility of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’, an imam at a mosque in Amman explained that its rulings were generally seen as legitimate; however, if the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ released a fatwa that was clearly in response to pressure from the regime, people would not view it as adhering to the tenets of Islam, but to be motivated by politics. He gave the example of a fatwa released by the Grand Mufti that acknowledged the right of Jews to be in Israel. He saw the fatwa as supporting Jordan’s

1995 peace treaty with Israel. His statement contradicted scholarship on the use of fatawa to support the peace treaty with Israel. Jordanian scholars Abu Rumman and Abu Hanieh note that the Jordanian government did not rely on religious justifications for the peace treaty.336 Robbins and Rubin use the example of the lack of reliance on religious justification for peace with Israel to argue that the regime has used religious institutions only selectively to legitimate its decisions. As a result, they argue that Jordanian state religious authorities have greater credibility than similar institutions elsewhere, such as in

Egypt.337 Yet despite the lack of an official fatwa from the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ in support of

334 Author interview with the Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Karim Saleem Khasawneh, Interview ID 16A (Dāʾira al-Iftā’, Amman, Jordan, 9am, 12 August 2015). 335 Author interview with the Mufti in charge of cyber operations, Interview ID 19A (Dāʾira al- Iftā’, Amman, Jordan, 12pm, 12 August 2015). 336 Mohammed Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, The Islamic Solution in Jordan (2013), 36. 337 Robbins, Michael and Lawrence Rubin, “The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan,” (2013), 74.

257 the 1995 peace treaty, the imam felt that the Grand Mufti’s office had lent support to peace with the Israelis. It possible that he viewed a fatwa that encourage peacefulness toward People of the Book (i.e. Jews and Christians) as politically motivated, although such tenets are found in the Quran.338

The imam did acknowledge that if the affront to Islam was too great, the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ would not offer a fatwa in support of the government’s position, but would be silent. For example, as he explained “the gays did not get a fatwa.” He explained that the

American ambassador to Jordan had made an appearance at an LGBT event and expressed official American support for equal rights for the LGBT population. The imam said that he did not know if the king had wanted a fatwa to support the Americans’ stance on gay rights, but he expressed satisfaction that the Grand Mufti did not embrace such a travesty.339

Officials at the office of the Grand Mufti acknowledged the difficulty inherent in the need to interpret Islam correctly while constrained by political pressures. When asked about his office’s official position, the General Secretary of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ stated that

“if you are between right and wrong, you shouldn't be in the middle.”340 His statement speaks to the importance of maintaining credibility as a source of religious authority, and

338 On 24 March 2014, the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ issued fatwa #2889 regarding treatment of Jews and Christians. The fatwa affirmed Quranic verse 60:8 “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.” 339 Author interview with imam, Interview ID 7A (Amman, Jordan, 3pm, 30 August 2015). Note that this imam had been barred from giving the Friday sermon due to statements he had made that contravened the government’s desired religious discourse, although he did not reveal the content of these statements. For coverage of the incident in English, see Aaron Majid, “US Ambassador’s Visit to LGBT Event Sparks Outrage in Jordan” Al Monitor, 16 June 2015. 340 Author interview with the General Secretary of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’, Interview ID 17A (Dāʾira al-Iftā’, Amman, Jordan, 9am, 12 August 2015).

258 reinforces the point made by the imam, that if the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ found itself unable to support a position taken by the monarchy, it would keep silent. Jordanian scholars Abu

Rumman and Abu Hanieh note the absence of indigenous Jordanian religious institutions that could provide religious leadership:

Jordan still lacks the kind of religious leadership that is consistent with the state’s official line, that can play an effective role, domestically and externally, and that can carry and effectively promote a defined religiously intellectual and doctrinal message characteristic of Jordan.341

They note the specific lack of a message characteristic of Jordan, which reflects the founding tension between the existing ruling institution in Jordan, the Hashimite monarchy, which lacks a solid foundation of legitimacy on the basis of national grounds, given their origins elsewhere.

As stated by its minister, the Ministry of Religious Endowments’ mission is to produce “true” Islam; yet in practice, this often corresponds to producing a simplified version of Islam. As theorists of modernity and state control have demonstrated, efforts by states to replicate complex organic processes, from forestry to urban planning, result in artificial and simplified simulations whose lack of diversity and complexity often prove inflexible and unable to adapt to meet changing circumstances.342 State efforts to mass produce religious instruction, to educate school children and even imams in the simplified and strategic form of Islam desired by the regime, appears to have a similar effect: a homogenized Islam too rigid to adapt to the questions and needs of adherents.

Simplified state Islam has resulted in a focus on otherwise arcane aspects of religious practice, emphasizing a strict adherence to religious rules regulating certain

341 Mohammed Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, The Islamic Solution in Jordan (2013), 73. 342 James C. Scott Seeing Like a State (1998).

259 aspects of life, but not stressing Islamic injunctions regarding care for the poor or needy.

In the words of one professor, “people are less religious than they appear,” due to their concentration on enacting the form of proper religious practice, but not necessarily adhering to broader injunctions about the behavior of a devout Muslim.

The state’s interest in producing its own preferred religious discourse is not primarily motivated by serving the population’s spiritual needs, but keeping the ruler in power. An imam in Amman, Jordan expressed the following, “I don’t want to say that the government prevents religion, but it also does not encourage people in official [religious] learning.”343 His view was corroborated by others who felt that the government was not interested in encouraging thorough study of the many complexities and nuances of the religious texts and traditions, emphasizing instead the simple aspects that encourage obedience and good manners.

The lack of sustained religious study is exacerbated by the lack of prestige associated with post-secondary study of religion, which is typically pursued by students unable to gain admission to more desirable fields such as medicine or engineering. To pursue a secondary degree in religious studies is typically to resign oneself to a low salary, as well as surveillance from the state. Women often make up a significant portion of individuals that pursue secondary religious education. Pious families may encourage their daughters to pursue religious studies, as potential in-laws may look favorably on a daughter-in-law who will properly educate their children in Islam. Yet most families would prefer that their daughters marry a son-in-law who is able to provide a better life than that afforded by an appointment as an imam. Robbins and Rubin note that the

343 Author interview with imam, Interview ID 7A, (Amman, Jordan, 3pm, 30 August 2015).

260 Jordanian government raised the salaries of imams by 30 percent, following a raise of 20 percent, in 2005.344 Imam salaries have risen again, but still remain too low to attract highly competitive candidates or to increase the status of the position significantly.

The lack of sufficiently rigorous religious instruction for Jordanian imams was cited as a reason to bring in imams trained at Al Azhar University in 2015. But the proposed plan was shot down by Jordanian clerics who feared competition from foreign imams, and argued that the Jordanian government should invest more in educating and training Jordanian imams.

Yet even if official religious education becomes more rigorous, nuanced, or conveys higher status, certain inconsistencies cannot be overcome with more sophisticated religious knowledge. The contradictions do not only emerge from within the complex religious tradition of Islam itself, but in trying to align politics and religion.

A university student noted the contradictions inherent in trying to match the precepts of shariʿa with the international system of Western behavioral norms that Jordan claims to ascribe to as a result of receiving financial assistance from the World Bank and

International Monetary Fund:

The Quran says a man has the right to beat his wife, which contradicts Jordanian law. You obviously have these contradictions, they are in Islam and how we deal with them is not very clear to people. It’s not clear to the government obviously. And people are confused. But it’s because not only the government, but also schools are not able to synthesize a clear approach on how to interpret the Quran and Sunna, and how to reconstruct Shariʿa.345

She explained that religious discourse has shifted as a result of Jordan’s transition toward neoliberal capitalism, using as an example that clerics who once condemned usury now

344 Michael Robbins and Lawrence Rubin, “The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan” (2013), 70. 345 Author interview with University of Jordan student, Interview ID 31A (Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 25 August 2015).

261 say that it is acceptable. Even if the Jordanian state chose to prioritize sophisticated religious instruction rather than a watered-down form of Islam intended to bolster political stability, reconciling Islamic precepts with the demands of a globalized capitalist system is unlikely.

Still, if Jordan possessed powerful religious institutions with great authority, they could more convincingly articulate how Jordanians ought to reconcile contradictions, or else to prioritize the spirit of religious piety and focus less on inconsistences. Yet Jordan lacked a historic network of influential religious institutions due in part to the absence of a large urban center within the territory. The religious institutions subsequently created during the colonial mandate period lacked the authority enjoyed by religious institutions that predated the modern state, such as Al-Azhar or Al-Qarawiyyin. Jordan’s state-built religious institutions have made few efforts to advance a religious discourse that speaks specifically to the Jordanian experience or identity. The changing boundaries of

Jordanian territory and population contribute to the difficulty in defining religious discourse that resonates with the population, however the ruling regime’s outsider status also complicates efforts to articulate an “authentic” Jordanian religious identity.

The influence of Saudi Arabia in Jordan was frequently noted, primarily expressed by individuals not involved in the production of religious discourse. Some acknowledged that Saudi influence is likely due, in part, to the vast financial resources that the House of Saud has sent to the Hashimite kingdom.346 Others saw the influence of

Saudi Islam as natural, noting that Islam originated in the territory of Saudi Arabia, as

346 Author interview with the director of a youth organization, Interview ID 52A (Amman, Jordan, 10:30am, 22 September 2015).

262 well as the fact Jordan and Saudi Arabia are geographically and culturally so close.347

Many acknowledged that a fatwa from Saudi Arabia would be seen as more authentic than one from a Jordanian source, or even Al-Azhar.348

Yet many viewed the pull of Saudi Islam as problematic. When commenting on the authority of the Dāʾira al-Iftā’ a journalist expressed doubt that Jordanians saw the

Grand Mufti as a meaningful source of religious guidance. In his experience, Jordanians watch Islamic TV shows, many of which are broadcast from Saudi Arabia. He noted that the prominent Saudi cleric Muhammad al-‘Arifi is particularly popular. As a result, in his view, the Jordanian interpretation of Islam is changing from Shafism to Wahhabism, even though “they don’t recognize that they are becoming Wahhabi.”349 Many saw Saudi influence as due to the refusal of Jordanian authorities to address controversial issues.

Seeking guidance on these questions, many see Saudi Arabia as the foremost authority on

Islam. The lack of a specifically Jordanian form of Islam may contribute to the sway of

Saudi interpretations.

Of the three monarchies I study, the influence of Saudi Arabia is most visible in

Jordan, although bureaucrats denied Saudi influence upon the religious practice of

Jordanians.350 However it was recognized by others, including members of the Muslim

347 Author interview with the CEO of a pro-state organization for youth, Interview ID 64A (Amman, Jordan, 11:30am, 21 October 2015). 348 Author interview with employee at the National Library, Interview ID 67A (Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 10 August 2015); Author interview with Director of the Center of Strategic Studies, Interview ID 29A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 24 August 2015) 349 Author interview with journalist, Interview ID 9A (Amman, Jordan, 11am, 2 August 2015). 350 Author interview with imam, Interview ID 34A (Irbid, Jordan, 2pm, 28 August 2015); Author interview with former mayor of Maʿān, Interview ID 56A (Maʿān, Jordan, 3pm, 21 September 2015). Note however that the head of a government affiliated youth outreach institution in Maʿān, acknowledged that the proximity of Saudi Arabia influenced the religiosity of Maʿān residents, especially young people: Author interview with head of Jordan Youth Commission, Maʿān, Jordan, Interview ID 55A (Maʿān, Jordan, 2:30pm, 21 September 2015).

263 Brotherhood. A Brotherhood member in Zarqa complained that it is Saudi Arabia that has made people focus on the minutiae of Islamic practice while ignoring social justice and systemic violence. “During the Gulf War, they [the Saudis] talked about the proper way to kill a spider, and about the importance of brushing your teeth with a miswak”351 In his view, the Jordanian government permits the spread of Saudi Islam because they see it as less threatening than the more activist strain of Islamism advanced by the Brotherhood.

Saudi Arabia contributed to the rising influence of Salafism in Jordan. A Salafi preacher acknowledged in a phone interview that Saudi Arabia has been supporting

Salafism in Jordan for about 40 years. He also noted that more Jordanians are adopting interpretations of Islam that align with the Saudi Wahhabi viewpoint, which is similar to

Salafism, and acknowledged the tacit support of the Jordanian regime for Salafi interpretations.352 However he and others also noted that the regime is fickle in its favor, sometimes supporting the Salafis and sometimes denouncing them. Others noted similar behavior towards the Muslim Brotherhood, indicating that the regime seeks to regulate

Islamic activism in a manner that prevents it from posing a real threat.

Morocco

The strategies undertaken by the Moroccan regime to establish control over religious institutions, spaces, and actors, has both intended and unintended consequences for religious practice. Moroccan Islam was initially reified by the French in an effort to portray colonial control as having a negligible effect on Moroccan traditional practices.

351 Author interview with Muslim Brotherhood member, Interview ID 62A (Zarqa, Jordan, 12pm, 3 October 2015). Note: a miswak is a twig of the arak tree used by the Prophet Mohamed to clean his teeth. 352 Telephone interview with Salafi cleric Abu Sayaf, conducted by male colleague using author’s questions, Interview ID 30A (Amman, Jordan, 2pm, 24 August 2015).

264 This form of official religious discourse, which was later adopted by the Alaouite monarchy and its state religious institutions after independence, draws on the tradition of maraboutism and Sufi mysticism as two elements that distinguish Islam of the Maghreb.

The earlier emphasis on the mystical tradition in Moroccan Islam includes two additional factors in contemporary official discourse. According to the Ministry of

Religious Affairs, Moroccan Islam is the product of three comingled influences: the

Maliki school of Sunni jurisprudence (fiqh); Sufism; and the Ashʿari tradition of Islamic rationalism. According to a member of a peace-building NGO, the regime began to promote these three elements as characteristic of Moroccan Islam after 9/11: “Since 2001 there has been a deliberate effort to promote or talk about the Moroccan Islam… as a concept with its three major components: Malikite school of fiqh, the Ashʿari doctrine, and the Sufism school of Ibn Junayd.”353 Other interviewees saw these aspects of

Moroccan Islam as timeless. A researcher at the Mohammedia League of Religious

Scholars explained that Morocco as “always” been Maliki and Ashʿari.354 This view arguably serves the interests of the regime in cultivating national identification with

Moroccan Islam, which overlooks periods of history when other forms of Islam, including Shi’ism, were adhered to. In this regard, the tripartite narrative of Moroccan

Islam as grounded in Maliki, Sufi, and Ashʿari practice is an invented tradition, with a grounding in reality but a convenient blindness to historical evidence that contradicts the official discourse.

353 Author interview with NGO consultant, Interview ID 21C (Rabat, Morocco, 6pm, 8 August 2016). 354 Author interview with researcher at the Mohammedia League of Religious Scholars, Interview ID 10C (Rabat, Morocco, 11am, 27 July 2016).

265 Of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, the Maliki madhab is that adhered to throughout most of North Africa, although Egypt is more typically associated with the

Hanafi school, and the horn of Africa with the Shafi’i school. The fourth school, Hanbali, is the most stringently text-based, and is followed in much of the Arabian Peninsula. The four schools of Sunni jurisprudence have historically acknowledged mutual legitimacy, and reflect various jurisprudential interpretations that were developed over the course of centuries. Sunni Islam once included other schools of thought as well, but these four were codified by the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt, which adhered to the Hanafi interpretation.

The Maliki school relies somewhat more on the example of the Rashidun, the first four caliphs that followed the Prophet Mohamed, and has traditionally been noted for its stringency.

However according to official religious discourse in Morocco, the Maliki school is characterized by moderation. The director of Islamic Affairs at the Ministry of ʾAwqāf explained that the Maliki school is very “tolerant” and “open,” as a result of its evolution in North Africa and Andalusia, and specifically due to the scholars of Fez. He went on to assert that:

The Maliki school is much more practical than the rest, so it was easily accepted and practiced for centuries. The idea of having one school is so important here in Morocco because so many of the differentiations among scholars, which bring about fanaticism and exclusiveness, don't exist here.355

I lack the expertise to comment on the practicality of the Maliki school in contrast to other traditions of jurisprudence, however his statement reflects the overall stance of official religious discourse, the moderating effect of Morocco’s location between North

355 Author interview with the Director of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of ʾAwqāf, Interview ID 7C (Rabat, Morocco, 11:30am, 26 July 2016).

266 Africa and Andalusia, and the influence of cultural diversity on Moroccan Islam. This narrative serves Morocco’s campaign for leadership as a flagship of a tolerant brand of

Islam.

In contrast to the official discourse, Maliki Islam has historically been seen as somewhat strict. The Great Mosque of Qayrawan (Kairouan) in present-day Tunisia was the intellectual hub of Maliki Islam, (incidentally the mosque of Qarawiyyin in Fez is named for Qayrawan, the city of origin of its founder, Fatima al-Fihri).356 In choosing to emphasize the Maliki character of Moroccan Islam, the regime emphasizes the Sunni character of Moroccan Islam, and stakes out a space for a form of Sunnism that is distinct from that promoted by Saudi Arabia.

Regarding the need to stress Morocco’s Sunni character, there have been panics about the possibility of Shi’a influence. The founding dynasty of the Moroccan polity, the

Idrisids, were Zaydi Shi’a. Although today almost no Moroccans identify as Shi’a, many engage in the veneration of saints, which is more typical of Shi’a Islam. A member of the

US embassy staff in Rabat jokingly referred to typical Maghrebi Islam as “Shiite light,” for the tendency of adherents to make pilgrimages to shrines and tombs.357 Given the contemporary influence of Salafism, which rejects worship of saints and shrines as idolatrous, such practices are often frowned upon. The formalization of a single form of correct Islam as a result of state-produced religious discourses has tended to undermine premodern forms of religious expression, which often included a veneration of local

356 Akel Kahera, Latif Abdulmalik, and Craig Anz, Design Criteria for Mosques and Islamic Centers: Art, Architecture, and Worship (Oxford: Architectural Press, 2009). The authors note that Fatima al-Fihri represents a rich tradition of wealthy women establishing mosques (81). 357 Author interview with US embassy staff member, Interview ID 20C (Rabat, Morocco, 11am, 4 August 2016).

267 saints and sites. In many Arab countries, such practices have been increasingly portrayed as backward and heretical; however, in the case of Morocco, by identifying Moroccan

Islam with Sufism, in which such practices are common, as well as Maliki Islam, the regime legitimates such practices as both Moroccan and Sunni, while also undermining the Saudis’ assertion to have a monopoly over legitimate Islam.

The Sufi legacy in Morocco is celebrated as an authentic part of Moroccan heritage, however it is sometimes at odds with Islamic practice elsewhere in the Arabic speaking world. Religious television programming, especially outside Morocco, tends not to depict Sufi worship or practice. However, in Morocco and elsewhere, Sufism has been held up as a potential remedy for intolerant expressions of Islam, especially due to the belief that Sufis tend to reject political involvement. This characterization ignores the historical political engagement by Sufi tariqas (brotherhoods), especially in the

Moroccan context, where Sufis mobilized for or against various rulers, and fought the

French colonizers. At present Morocco’s most powerful opposition group, Adl wa Ihsan

(“Justice and Spirituality”) was founded by Abdesslam Yassine, a former leader of an influential Sufi brotherhood. The contemporary tendency to romanticize Sufism as a form of nonpolitical Islam obscures the powerful political role Sufis have played throughout history, and continue to play.

In promoting the image of Moroccan Islam as influenced by Sufism, the official discourse emphasizes that the form of Sufism is that of Ibn Junayd, known as “sober”

Sufism. Sober Sufism tends to prioritize intellectual engagement with spirituality, in contrast to the “intoxicated” or “ecstatic” expressions of Sufism that are practiced through rituals of meditation, music, chanting, and movement. Sober Sufism, with its

268 emphasis on staying within the confines of Islamic law, remains a form of mysticism that is somewhat more in keeping with non-Sufi practices. Although ecstatic expressions of

Sufism were traditionally also common in Morocco, the regime’s emphasis on this less controversial form may be an attempt to mitigate potential charges of heresy by Salafis.

The third component of the official discourse about Moroccan Islam is the influence of the ‘Ashʿari creed. ‘Ashʿari Islam is named for Imam Abu Al-Hasan al-

‘Ashʿari (d. 936 CE), who sought to find a middle path between the strict textualist approach of Ibn Hanbal, and the rationalist approach of the Mu’tazilis, who were influenced by neo-Platonic rationalist trends in Christian theology.358 The disagreement between the two viewpoints centers on the attributes of God, with the textualists arguing for a literal interpretation of Quranic verses that refer to God undertaking behaviors such as speaking, and the rationalists asserting that God would not actually speak in the manner of humans, and that believing God would do so would be to anthropomorphize

God. Ashʿari Islam became the official interpretation promoted by the Seljuk Turko-

Persian empire, and was adopted in Morocco by the Almohad Berber caliphate.359

When speaking with interviewees about how the doctrine influences Islam in

Morocco, they confirmed the importance of the creed in Moroccan Islam, but very few could explain the exact meaning of Ashʿari; this is understandable, as even a brief explanation requires detailed knowledge that most non-specialists would not likely possess. However, this demonstrates the prevalence of the official religious discourse in

358 Yasir Qadhi, “Salafī-Ashʻarī Polemics of the 3rd & 4th Islamic Centuries Authors.” The Muslim World. 106, no. 3 (2016): 433-447. 359 The Almohads claimed to be the legitimate rulers of all Muslims, led by alleged mahdi Ibn Tumart (d. ~1128 CE). Ibn Tumart studied under Ashʿari teachers in Baghdad, and was influenced by the Sufi mysticism of Al-Ghazali. See, e.g. Allen James Fromherz, The Almohads: The Rise of an Islamic Empire (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 149-150.

269 characterizing Moroccan Islam, combined with a vagueness about the specific points of difference between Moroccan Islam and other forms. By not emphasizing the specific elements of Moroccan Islam, but simply encouraging identification with it as an authentic expression of Moroccan identity, the regime seeks to promote its own religious authority, and to undermine proselytization by non-Moroccan religious elites, without denouncing other interpretations of Islam as incorrect.

The regime’s emphasis on these three elements of Moroccan Islam were layered over an existing effort to encourage greater Islamic education and Arabic language instruction which began in the 1970s. As occurred elsewhere, the regime saw religious education as a means of counteracting the influence of the Leftists, what Wainscott describes as “an Islamic solution that became an Islamic problem.”360 The so-called

Islamic problem is an unintended consequence of state control of the religious sphere. By seeking to encourage Islamic education, the regime contributed to the salience of arguments made by Islamist opposition groups. This pattern is prevalent across the region and has been thoroughly studied.

In my view, another unintentional consequence of state efforts to monopolize religious discourse is a reduction in religious pluralism. Although Morocco claims to represent a “moderate” form of Islam, campaigns by Shi’a and Christian Moroccans to be treated as equal citizens have been unsuccessful. Similarly, expressions of Islam that align with the subversive stance of Adl wa Ihsan, or any form that challenges the rule of the king, are not tolerated. By rejecting pluralist expressions of Islam, the regime contributes to a religious worldview of intolerance. Although the official religious

360 Ann Wainscott, Bureaucratizing Islam: Morocco and the War on Terror (2017).

270 discourse may not condone violence, it does promote intolerance of alternative interpretations of faith.

Oman

Of the three monarchies, modern nation-building has had the least amount of time to influence religious practice in Oman. As a result, some local practices and superstitions remain prevalent in Oman, even visible in the capital city. Ceremonies by shamans to rid a person of a spirit (jinn) occur even in the capital city of Muscat.361 The belief in zombies (“mu-ghayeb”) and haunted locations remains prevalent, especially in rural areas.362 However such beliefs are likely to decline as more of the Omani population is raised in the national education system, which features standardized religious content that does not incorporate these beliefs.

One aspect of Ibāḍī practice that the regime has emphasized in religious education is the tradition of religious tolerance, both as a component of Ibāḍī doctrine, as well as an aspect of the Omani character both before and after the advent of Islam. Ibāḍīs are known for their tolerance of non-Ibāḍīs. This is based on an aspect of Ibāḍī doctrine known as

“dissociation” (bara’a). A devout Ibāḍī should dissociate from non-Ibāḍīs, yet Hoffman

(2004) notes that dissociation “is usually an internal attitude of withholding ‘friendship’

(wilāya), rather than outright hostility.”363 The doctrine of dissociation historically allowed Ibāḍīs to live peacefully alongside non-Ibāḍīs, and to afford them the rights

361 Author observation of exorcism ritual (Muscat, Oman, October 2007). 362 See, e.g., Samir Al-Adawi, Rustam Burjorjee, Ihsan Al-Issa, “Mu-Ghayeb: A Culture-specific Response to Bereavement in Oman,” International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 43 (1997): 144- 151. Specific towns, such as Bahla and Rustaq, are known as centers of spiritual activity. 363 Valerie Hoffman, “The Articulation of Ibāḍī Identity in Modern Oman and Zanzibar,” The Muslim World 94, no. 2 (2004): 201-216.

271 given to Muslims, such as marriage within the community or a Muslim burial, as opposed to non-Muslims who should not be tolerated. This is in contrast to both Sunni and Shi’a doctrine, which have no such doctrine of dissociation, and therefore can treat those outside their sect as targets for persecution or conversion.

According to official discourse, religious toleration was also prevalent among the

Omani people prior to the establishment of Islam. For evidence, the regime references the allegedly peaceful acceptance of Islam by Omani tribes during the lifetime of Prophet

Mohamed. This distinguishes Oman from much of the Middle East, which became

Muslim as the result of the Arab conquests. Oman’s acceptance of Islam is corroborated by a hadith in which the Prophet Mohamed is believed to have said, “God’s mercy be on the people of Al Ghubaira [people of Oman], for you believed me and had not seen me.”

In addition, Caliph Abu Bakr reportedly said, “People of Oman, you have entered Islam voluntarily although the Prophet has not come to your land on foot or on horse. You have not opposed him as other Arabs opposed him, and you have not called for separation or dispersion. May God unite you in benevolence.”364 These are taken as truthful descriptions of Oman’s entrance into Islam by the majority of Omanis.365

Scholars have suggested that brothers ‘Abd and Jayfar, the leaders of the Julanda tribe who chose to accept Islam, probably did so due to the strategic benefit of allying with the increasingly powerful Muslim tribes, which would soon dominate the Arabian

Peninsula and could serve as allies against the Persians.366 Regardless of the incentive,

364 Taken from the website of the Omani Ministry of Tourism, accessed 2 March 2017, http://www.omantourism.gov.om/wps/portal/mot/tourism/oman.home/sultanate history. Note that the hadith is not found in the generally accepted hadith compiled by Sahih Muslim and Sahih Bukhari. 365 Author information session with professor, (Muscat, Oman, 8pm, 28 February 2014). 366 J.E. Peterson, “Oman’s Odyssey: From Imamate to Sultanate.” In B.R. Pridham, ed. Oman:

272 the story of Oman’s peaceful conversion represents a historical anecdote that the ruling regime draws upon when constructing a constitutive story taught to the newly educated

Omani population.

In another hadith, one of the Prophet’s companions was sent to spread the word of

Islam but instead was beaten. When he reported this to Mohamed, the Prophet is believed to have said, “Had you gone to the people of Oman, they would not have insulted or beaten you.”367 This is seen as evidence that the Omani people were already a peaceful people prior to the advent of Islam. Although this history is useful for the purposes of promoting a unified national identity grounded in religious toleration, there are many other elements of history that the regime might have chosen to emphasize. I argue that this aspect of Omani history was singled out for emphasis due to its support of the regime’s narrative about Omani peacefulness, while other elements, such as the centuries of conflict between the imamate and the sultanate, receive little to no attention.

Although the Omani state has been largely effective in its efforts to monopolize the legitimate production of religious discourse, the effect has generally not contributed to the influence of Saudi Arabia, as observed in Oman. This is due to a degree of rivalry sometimes bordering on animosity with Saudi Arabia. Oman has consistently resisted

Saudi efforts to use the Gulf Cooperation Council to serve its own interests. Oman maintains relations with Saudi Arabia’s nemesis, Iran, and serves as a channel of communication between Iran and the rest of the world.

Economic, Social and Strategic Developments (London: Croom Helm, 1987): 1-16. 367 From the collection of hadith compiled by Sahih Muslim, Book 31: Fada’il al-Sahaba, Chapter 57.

273 The antipathy between Saudi Arabia and Oman is the result of efforts by Saudi

Arabia to destabilize or delegitimize its neighbour, a tactic it has also pursued in Yemen.

For example, after Sultan Sa’id defeated the forces of Imam Ghalib in the Jabal Akhdar

War, Saudi Arabia granted the would-be Imam a safe haven, from which he continued to advocate for his right to rule the Ibāḍī imamate. In the 1950s Saudi Arabia also asserted its sovereignty over the Buraimi oasis, which was also claimed by the Emirate of Abu

Dhabi, leading to the Saudi occupation of an Omani village in 1952 and their expulsion by Omani forces in 1955. In 1987 the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Bin Baz issued a fatwa declaring Ibāḍīs to be infidels, meaning that they should repent or be killed.

In general, Oman has stood up to efforts by the Saudis to exert influence over

Omani affairs. Oman demonstrates its symbolic independence from Saudi religious leadership by designating its own astronomers to look for the crescent moon to signal the start and end of Ramadan. A third-grade teacher in the city of Ibri expressed frustration with Saudi efforts to spread their interpretation of Islam: “The Saudis try to spread their madhab, Wahhabism, in a way that will make all people the same.”368 However he assured me that the Saudi project would be unsuccessful in Oman.

Although many interviewees expressed the view that Oman was “immune” from the sectarianism and intolerance that characterized Wahhabi Islam, some acknowledged that the younger generation is more exposed to Saudi views, and is more susceptible to them. When asked about the impact of Saudi interpretations of Islam, an imam in Ibri said that,

“Unfortunately, yes they have entered into the thinking of some young people in Oman.

368 Author interview with teacher, Interview ID 16B (Ibri, Oman, 6pm, 13 November 2015).

274 If you don’t stop these ideas, they will be very dangerous for this region, their ideas are terrorist… They say, ‘Only I am right, others are not.’” It remains to be seen whether the population will continue to identify with the Omani national narrative of a tradition of religious toleration.

During my fieldwork, conversations with US embassy officials about regime promotion of moderate Islam revealed that they do not consider Islam itself to be the key causal factor motivating acts of violence; however, one interviewee asked “What alternative do we have?”369 Despite American officials’ awareness that promoting moderate Islam is unlikely to accomplish its desired outcome of reducing acts of violent extremism, partnering with moderate Muslims remains a sufficiently significant US objective for Arab regimes to continue to espouse their commitment to it. The US government may hope that even if the promotion of moderate Islam does not eradicate violent extremism, it may help to mitigate it, or at the very least it will not contribute to it. Yet this assumption may be misplaced, and the unintended consequences of promoting moderation may in fact be to discredit moderation itself.

V. Conclusion

The chapter examines how the centralization and standardization of religious discourse by state institutions has contributed to a standardized and literalist interpretation of Islam. In addition, state religious education often presents a simplified, codified interpretation. In circumstances where regimes face international pressure to promote a religious narrative that counteracts religious extremism, some regimes find that

369 Author interview with senior US Embassy Official, Interview ID 22C (Rabat, Morocco, 10:15am, 4 August 2016).

275 their existing form of religious discourse is already suited to this purpose, while other official religious discourses are less appropriate.

State control of religious discourse is not hegemonic: the state competes for influence with religious content made available by non-state religious actors through multiple other channels, including satellite television and the internet. However, state control is fairly pervasive, and can influence religious beliefs and practices in ways that are not always immediately apparent. In this way, state-sponsored religious discourse is similar to nationalist discourses—which in many contexts are disseminated by the state— and the ways in which certain national values shape the conscious-horizons of the citizens raised in a given society.

As a result of state control of religious discourse, beliefs about religion take on a national cast. Citizens of a given officially-Islamic state are likely to view certain aspects of the religion as “given,” due to standardized religious education, sermons, and other official texts. This effect is achieved through the same mechanisms that allow states to construct a shared national identity: schools, museums, the census, official media, and other institutions of cognition that affect citizens’ worldviews in similar ways. The result is not uniformity of belief, but similarities among the religious views of fellow citizens, for example the presence of certain discourses in one national context but not another, which become apparent through discourse analysis.

In this exploration of how specific interpretations of official Islam interact with unofficial religious identities, I conceive of religion as contextually specific and of religious identity as constructed. I seek to avoid the essentialization that often characterizes much public commentary on religion in general and Islam in particular. On the theological

276 level, Islam and the other universal religions adhere to no geographic boundary, yet in practice religious expression differs by time and place. In nations where the promotion of religion is viewed as a core state activity, official religion differs by national context. In the period since modern states acquired the institutional capacity to shape their population’s views and identities, the project of nation-building has established specific themes in a given national expression of religion, specifically Islam.

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