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In the Supreme Court of Ohio Case No. ® ' / 1979 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Miami Valley Hospital, Plaintiff-Appellee, V. Lisa A. Purvis, et al, Defendants-Appellants. On Appeal From The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, Ohio Second Appellate District, Case No. CA 21740 MEMORANDUM OF LISA A. PURVIS, ET AL, IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION Stephen E. Klein (0014351) A. Mark Segreti, Jr. (0009106) Attorney at Law Attorney at Law 240 Bohanan Drive 1405 Streamside Drive Vandalia, OH 45377-2342 Dayton, OH 45459 (937) 890-5515 (937) 439-0386 fax: 890-6791 fax: 439-0386 klcinatlaw <<iol.com m^^rksce^eti ams^i._com Attorney for Miami Valley Hospital Attorney for Lisa A. Purvis and Darrell D. Purvis ^ LED OCT 2 E3 7007 CLERK OF COURT SUPREME COURT OF OHIO TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 Nature of the Case 2 Course of Proceedings 3 Statement of the Facts 4 ARGUMENT 4 Proposition of Law No. 1: Where a plaintiff files a second action against the same defendant(s) for claims that could have been litigated in its first action in which it obtained a judgment, res judicata bars the second action regardless of whether the same evidence would sustain both actions. (Grava v Parkman Twp. (1995) 73 Ohio St.3d 379, approved and followed; Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, clarified that fourth paragraph of syllabus is overruled.) 1. THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, SECTIONS 24-25 (1982), ADOPTED IN OHIO IN 1995, PRECLUDES A PLAINTIFF FROM SPLITTING ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND SUING THE SAME PARTIES A SECOND TIIvIE FOR ANY CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN LITIGATED IN THE FIRST ACTION, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE SAME EVIDENCE WOULD SUSTAIN BOTH ACTIONS. CONCLUSION 12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 12 APPENDIX 12 Judgment Entry of Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, September 14, 2007 Opinion of Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, September 14, 2007 THIS IS A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIAL GENERAL AND PUBLIC INTEREST This case is a matter of substantial general and public interest because it is so important to the administration of justice, the integrity ofjudgments, the principles of finality and repose, the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, and judicial economy, that the doctrine ofresjudicata be clearly applied throughout the state of Ohio. The Court of Appeals' opinion in this matter threatens the viability of the modem doctrine of res judicata by adding restrictions that were in the first Restatement of Judgments in 1942, and were abandoned by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in 1982, and by this Court in 1995. It is a matter of general and substantial public interest that such an important doctrine be clear in its application. In Grava, supra, this Court rejected the "identity of facts," "identity of evidence," and the same time of accrual, restrictions of the "primary right-primary duty" approach to the application of resjudicata (claim preclusion) in the first Restatement of Judgments (1942), as set forth in Norwood v. McDonald, supra. This Court specifically overruled the second paragraph of the syllabus in Norwood and Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, and modified the first paragraphs of those syllabi. This Court further specifically adopted the "transactional approach" to determining whether the same cause of action was involved in the first and second law suits, as espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, §§24-25 (1982). The essence of this change in the rule is the proscription against a plaintiff splitting its cause of action and suing the same defendant(s) more than once on a matter it could have brought in the first action. In other words, "We also declare that `[t]he doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action, or be forever barred from 1 asserting it.' Id." 73 Ohio St.3d at 382, quoting Natl Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62. In this case, the Second District Court of Appeals has reverted to the first Restatement view ofNorwood v. McDonald, requiring an identity of facts, or "the same evidence would sustain both," before the bar of resjudicala would preclude a second action. It is a matter of substantial general and public interest that the law be clear that res judicata is not so restricted in its application. It is important that this Court's " bright line" rule that the plaintiff must bring "all its claims against the defendant(s) or be forever barred", not be compromised by the old, restrictive approach requiring identity of the evidence. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the Case This appeal deals strictly with the application of the doctrine of res judreata where a plaintiff files two civil actions against the same defendants based on claims that could have been brought in one action. The restrictive ruling by the Court of Appeals provides legal support for returning this important doctrine of finality, integrity, and fair and expeditious administration ofjustice, to the limited role it served from 1943 to 1995. It is a case where the Court of Appeals itself acknowledges that the claims asserted in the second action against these defendants could have been joined in its first action. Ct.App. Op., at 6. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals rejected resjudicata because it perceived that the facts or evidence would be different and the same evidence would not sustain both actions, the approach rejected by this Court in 1995. It specifically rejected the notion that this Court had overtumed this restrictive approach. 2 Course of Proceedines On August 27, 2001, plaintiff, Miami Valley Hospital, sued the defendants, Lisa A. Purvis and her husband, Darrell D. Purvis, alleging they owed it for unpaid charges for "necessary medical services" as referenced in two statements with the service dates of June 7 and 13, 2001. A final judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $6, 392.12, on May 6, 2002. Subsequently, on October 1, 2004, plaintiff commenced a second action against these same defendants alleging they owed it $18,605 of unpaid charges for services rendered, as set forth in attached accounts listing service dates from October 28, 1998 to September 14, 2001. The Purvises filed an answer denying liability and asserting the affirmative defense of res judicata from the prior judgment. They then filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching an affidavit with a certified copy of the prior judgment and complaint. They also submitted the affidavit of Lisa A. Purvis describing her relationship with MVH for the series of treatments for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident in August, 1998. MVH argued that joinder of those claims was not required. It also argued that, based on Norwood v. McDonald, supra, res judicata did not apply because the claims "in the two cases involve different facts." The Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery County referred the motion to the magistrate who recommended that the motion be granted since the claims asserted arose from the same nucleus of operative facts or series of connected transactions, namely, charges for the series of treatments originating from the injuries incurred by Lisa Purvis in a motor vehicle accident in August, 1998. The magistrate stated the claims for $18,605 existed "prior to the judgment in Dayton Municipal Court and did arise out of the same series of connected transactions." The Court of Common Pleas overruled MVH's objections and adopted the magistrate's 3 recommendation and entered judgment in favor of the Purvises, dismissing the action as barred by res judicata. Plaintiff, MVH, appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. After briefing by the parties, the court of appeals reversed the trial court judgment. It acknowledged that the claims in the second action could have been joined in the first action, but held that since different facts were involved, and the same evidence would not sustain both actions, res judicata did not apply. Statement of the Facts The only facts before the trial court and the court of appeals were set forth in the affidavit of defendant, Lisa A. Purvis, in support of her motion for summary judgment. It states that she sustained multiple and severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident on August 22, 1998, and was treated at MVH. She stated that all of the services for which MVH alleged charges were not paid, arose from the injuries in the August, 1998 accident. She did not have health insurance and a county fund had paid MVH $70,000.00 toward the treatment. She had also paid MVH a proportional share of $4, 168.50, of her settlement with the young tortfeasor's insurance carrier. She stated that she and her husband had paid the first judgment. ARGUMENT Proposition of Law No. !: Where a plaintiff files a second action against the same defendant(s) for claims that could have been litigated in its first action in which it obtained a judgment, res judicata bars the second action regardless of whether the same evidence would sustain both actions. (Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995) 73 Ohio St.3d 379, approved and followed; Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, clarified that fourth paragraph of syllabus is overruled.) 1. THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, SECTIONS 24-25 (1982), ADOPTED IN OHIO IN 1995, PRECLUDES A PLAINTIFF FROM SPLITTING ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND SUING TIdE SAME PARTIES A SECOND TIME FOR ANY CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN 4 LITIGATED IN THE FIRST ACTION, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE SAME EVIDENCE WOULD SUSTAIN BOTH ACTIONS.
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