Armenia, a Player Between Two Teams? the Armenian Case in Between the EU Common Foreign Policy and the Russian Interests in the Common Neighbourhood

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the EU common foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood

Master's Thesis

BERNARDO

Supervisor: Mgr. Petra Kuchyňková, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science European Politics

Brno 2019

ARMENIA, A PLAYER BETWEEN TWO TEAMS? THE ARMENIAN CASE IN BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD

Bibliographic Record

Author: BERNARDO Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Degree Programme: European Politics

Supervisor: Mgr. Petra Kuchyňková, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2019 Number of Pages: 135 Keywords: Armenia, European Union, Russia, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Hedging Strategy, CEPA, EAEU

1 ARMENIA, A PLAYER BETWEEN TWO TEAMS? THE ARMENIAN CASE IN BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD

Abstract

This research examines the Armenian foreign policy behaviour between the Russian and the EU influence in light of the hedging strategy concept. It investigates how the Armenian decision-makers handle the state’s smallness relating with its neighbours. The case study maps the 2013-2018 time span, from the Armenian refusal of the Association Agreement with the EU to the signature of CEPA in autumn 2017, taking into account the internal changes within Armenia and the approaches from the EU and Russia. The research shows how Armenia highly eval- uates both the relations with the EU and Russia.

2 ARMENIA, A PLAYER BETWEEN TWO TEAMS? THE ARMENIAN CASE IN BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Master's Thesis concerning the topic of Armenia, a player between two teams? The Ar- menian case in between the European foreign policy and the Rus- sian interests in the common neighbourhood independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 10/05/2019

...... BERNARDO

ARMENIA, A PLAYER BETWEEN TWO TEAMS? THE ARMENIAN CASE IN BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD

Acknowledgements

First of all, I am extremely obliged to the Armenian ambassador, His Excellency Mr. Tigran Seiranian. I would also like to sincerely thank all the personnel of the Caucasus Institute for the kind assistance during my time at Institute. Professor Cheng-Chwee Kuik was also helpful pro- vinding many articles regarding his theoretical concepts employed in this thesis.

Secondly, I would like to take the opportunity to thank my supervisor assistant professor Mgr. Petra Kuchyňková, Ph.D. for her unlimited pa- tience and advice throughout the progression of my thesis. Her knowledge and advices on the International Relations, the Caucasus and EU-Russia dimensions are second-to-none. It was my great pleas- ure to have her supervising me during the time of my thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

Table of Contents

List of Images 7

List of Tables 8

List of Terms and Acronyms 9

Introduction 11-21

Chapter 1: A Theoretical Body for the International Relations 22-34

Chapter 2: The Armenian Smallness 35-50

Chapter 3: The Armenian Player 51-66

Chapter 4: The two teams: Russian and European Proposals 67-79

Chapter 5: The Armenian Hedging 80-113

Conclusion 114-115

Bibliography 116-132

Appendix A 133-135

LIST OF IMAGES 7

List of Images

1) Map of This the four borders of the Armenian republic in the Caucasus between the Caspian and the Black seas. (http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/country-map01/ georgia-armenia-azerbaijan-map.htm) 2) Map of the self-proclaimed and not recognised Nagorno Kara- bach Republic and the territory occupied by the Armenians (https://www.jpost.com/sites/default/files/BloggersImages/16 40%5C/image/2000px-AZ-qa-location-en_svg.png)

7 8 LIST OF TABLES

List of Tables

1) Hedging Strategy. Courtesy shaped on the table designed by Pro- fessor Kuik in his article “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China”, page 166 and in his other article “How do weaker states hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ alignment behaviour toward China”, page 3. 2) Bandwagon peculiarities (by the author)

8 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 9

List of Terms and Acronyms

AA/DCFTA - Association Agreement \ Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations CEPA - Comprehensive & Enhanced Partnership Agreement CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization EAEU – Eurasian Economic Union EaP – Eastern Partnership EEAS - European External Action Service ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy EU – European Union GSP+ - Generalised Scheme of Preferences NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PCA - Partnership & Cooperation Agreement SCR – South Caucasus Railways UN – United Nations USSR – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the course of actions in the international arena has changed, as many new small states popped up on the grid of the EU borders The EU had to reshuffle approaches to the yesterday’s “enemies” turning them to today’s friends and good neighbours while the Rus- sian Federation has to organise the international relations with the former satellites and Soviet republics. The post soviet space finds itself today between the parent state, Russia, and the new complex friend, the EU. Despite the rocky road to the normalization of the neighbourhood policies between the EU and former states, still today both the EU and its neighbours come through some significant choices to make. Then, there are two major powers and many smaller states trying to balance, to bandwagon or to hedge them within the Caucasus region and its regional issues. According to the main purpose of this thesis, the two “super powers” are identified in Russia and\or the Russian based international organizations and in the European Union and its external instruments. There- fore, the small states answering both the Russian and the European ambi- tions are the other side of the coin of this thesis. For instance, what was the reason or what were the reasons behind the Armenian rejection of deepening the EU-Armenian relationship in 2013? Why did Armenia resume the relationship with the EU signing the CEPA in 2017? It becomes necessary to analyse the leading reasons of Armenia in making such opposite choices and the particular interests Armenia has been facing since the beginning of its statehood. The Armenian case in point provides a factual example to describe the aims, the hopes and the purposes of

11 INTRODUCTION a small state and the interests, the intentions and the actions from the superpowers in order to keep the balance of situation as much close as they can to their interests. In the Armenian list of priorities security occupies the first place, it stands above all and nothing is worthy enough to sacrifice it. “Whenever Armenia has to chose between security and anything at all, it has to chose security”1, both Respondent number 1 and number 4 agree on this point. How does then Armenia relate to the other international issues? The recent historical developments reshuffle the traditional uniqueness of the Caucasus as a “unique Russian garden” and since the late 90’ the EU is trying to earn its spot in the region. For twenty years now, the EU has been developing from the ground floor many tools to address the multi-differentiated needs of its neighbours. The “one small step”2 in the way of the establishment of EU-Armenia relationship was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that came into force in 1999. The recent and communitarian steps by the European sides are the European Neighbourhood Policy (established in 2003/2004) and the Eastern Partnership (established in 2009). They compose the umbrella under which the EU and its members frame the relationship with the neighbours. In between these two major steps, in 2005 the EU and Armenia committed themselves into the Action Plan for Armenia. Armenia is also a member of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences European GSP+. Recent- ly the two most important cornerstones are the Association Agreement, re- jected by the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in 2013, and the Compre- hensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in 2017 by

1 Iskandaryan, A. 2013: “Armenian’s foreign policy: where values meet constraints” in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus Institute, Aleksanteri Institute. Page 14 2 “That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind”

12 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Sargsyan. The CEPA then frames the current updated patterns of the Arme- nia-EU relationship. To Armenian eyes, the European offer seems to be more “contingent on the implementation of reforms and commitments to democratic standards”3 but still the European side of the moon seems to be a good opportunity for business and for “Europeanisation” of the civil society as well. The Armenians grab these normative and economic aspects from the EU, as the Russian partnership does not appease this normative need neither it calls for a reform of democratic standards. On the contrary, Russia has been developing own approaches towards the Caucasian states by the privileged starting point due to the soviet legacy. The Russian army has also a strong presence in Armenia, Gyumri, the second largest city in Armenia, hosts around 3000 Russian soldiers at the 102nd Russian military base for the ‘Group of Russian Forces in Trans- caucasia”4. Armenia belonged to the Soviet Union and since its collapse Armenia is member of the Community of the Independent States (CIS), Col- lective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), both established in the early ‘90s soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. More recently Armenia has entered the Eurasian Economic Union established in the current shape on 29 May 2014. In such international arena, Armenia develops own “multi-vector” foreign policy to answer the challenges of a new, small and independent state in a post-Soviet space. The troublesome region defines the Armenian

3Iskandaryan, A. 2013: “Armenian’s foreign policy: where values meet constraints” in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends, 6-17. Mikko Palon- korpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus Institute, Aleksanteri Institute. P. 12 4 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7952433/Russia- to-beef-up-military-presence-in-former-Soviet-space.html

13 INTRODUCTION priorities between looking for the Russian security asset and the European economy and normative offer. The Armenian “valzer” seeks to differentiate external allies looking both at the EU and Russia. This Armenian “dance” requires to set up a theoretical lens throughout which scrutinise the Armenian attempt to keep its economic and military pragmatism going on. Armenia is a member of the European Neighbourhood policy and it participates at the Eastern Partnership programme, but during the EaP Vil- nius summit president Sargsyan announced the rejection of Association Agreement - Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (hereinafter the AA/DCFTA) with the EU. At the same time Armenia opted to enter the customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the EAEU. Subsequently, Armenia signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (as known as CEPA) with the EU in 2017. Couple of years after the rejection of the AA with the EU, Armenia stated to be willing to keep the EU-Armenian relationship going on. Eventually, the Armenian foreign policy runs on a razor’s edge “swinging on its pendulum”5 between the Russian military, security and economic organizations and the European normative power and the Europe- an market.

5 S. Vasilyan, 2016. “Swinging on a Pendulum”; Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1, 2017, 32–46. Taylor & Francis Group

14 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review draws a general recap of the schools of international relations that constitute the theoretical framework and a wide sum- mary of the literature about the connections between Armenia, the EU and Russia. It is then necessary to recapitulate what other authors already wrote and what would be the contribution of this thesis to the existing research. Regarding the theoretical aspect of the literature, the thesis reviews the books, articles and publications from the neorealist school and the neoclassical realist schools. These schools provide the theoretical explanations of the Armenian behaviour between the EU and Russia according to the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning elaborated mainly by Waltz, Rose and their modern heirs. The neorealist field covers a reasonably huge share of the international relations and many authors already wrote about and against it. This thesis muses works such as “Theory of the International Relations” by Kenneth Waltz, “War and Changes in World Politics” by Robert Gilpin, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” by Gideon Rose and “Neoclassical realist theory of international politics” by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell depict the neorealist international world. In addition to these neorealist schools of the international relations, the academic literature comprehends the strategic hedging concept provided by Professor Cheng-Chwee Kuik. Professor Kuik article describes it in many articles. The main articles in which Professor Kuik depicts it are “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising Chi- na” and “Light and Heavy Hedging between China and the United States”. He applies them to the ASEAN countries in his previous articles and many

15 LITERATURE REVIEW other employed in this thesis. Furthermore, Kei Koga reviewed this concept in his article “The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift”. Furthermore, the theoretical literature includes a tiny portion of the small states’ literature which includes the book “Small states and shelter theories: Iceland’s External Affairs” from Baldur Thorhallsson and Hiski Haukkala’s critique in the journal Scandinavian Political Studies from the Nordic Political Science Association. These works provide the specific theoretical framework about the nature of the small states that applies to the case study of this thesis. Marija Vaicekauskaitė joins the small states’ analysis with her articles “Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World” implementing the analysis of the small states’ choices and behaviours. Clearly, small states are hardly able to defend the security landscape independently6. Regarding the factual and analytical part, the literature reveals an ex- tensive coverage of the Armenian peculiar multi-vector foreign policy, the EU’s commitments with the neighbouring states and the Russian influential presence in the Caucasus. This cluster of literature includes both primary and secondary sources. Within the primary sources, there are the international treaties, the official statements by the ministries of the states and the agencies of the international associations and speeches from public authorities. Moreover, this research moves forward from the literature adding interviews to the primary source due to my research on the field in Yerevan.

6 Vaicekauskaitė Z, M. 2017. “Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World”. Journal on Baltic security. De Gruyter Open

16 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Still considering the analytical space of this research, the secondary literature regards the analyses and the comments coming from academic personalities, researches and think tank personnel. In accordance with these theoretical descriptions of small states’ behaviours in this current post Cold war time, Syuzanna Vasilyan comes to describe the “Swinging on a pendulum” as the Armenian behaviour between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union7. The publications published by the Caucasus Institute highly contributed to the development of this research regarding both the Armenian foreign policy and the progress of the Armenian civil society. Mainly the “Ar- menia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends” and the “Ar- menia’s Velvet Revolution” compose the major part of the research institutes’ contribute to this thesis. Markarov and Davtyan follow this path writing for “Demokratizatsi- ya” about the place the Armenian national interest in the search for com- plementarily8. The post Velvet revolution space draws a new challenge for Armenia in the Caucasus in the light of the post Soviet democratization process. Eventually, this research takes in consideration the predictions, evaluation and interpretations by European and Armenian think tanks. Kostanyan and Giragosian, alongside the team of CEPS think tank, provide many articles about the development of the EU-Armenia collaboration since the early negotiations to the CEPA. On the same path De Waal

7 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 8 Markarov A. and Davtyan v. 2018 “Post-Velvet Revolution: Armenia’s foreign policy challenges” in Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization.

17 LITERATURE REVIEW and Zoylan, members of the Carnegie Europe, describe the Armenian situation focusing on the whole Armenian frame of relations between the international actors. Richard Giragosian, who also chairs the Armenian think tank Regional Studies Center, provides publications about the political and economic reforms and the conflict resolution in the Caucasus region9 from the Armenian point of view.

9 https://www.regional-studies.org; Regional Studies Center

18 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research aims to analyse Armenian foreign policy in the period 2013-2018 using theoretical tools from the international schools of structural realism and neoclassical realism. Concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are connected with structural realism school of thought, while the neoclassical realism introduced the concept of strategic hedging. The thesis thus uses theoretical concepts that concern the foreign policy strategy of the small states in the international relations, the concepts of strategic hedging, balancing and bandwagoning. Specifically, this thesis focuses on Armenian foreign policy in relation to Russia and the EU, in light of the Armenian membership in the EAEU, but also highlighting the bilateral agreement (CEPA) between the EU and Armenia. It is also necessary to take into account the changes of the balance of power within Armenia itself, since the CEPA signature, especially the Armenian Velvet Revolution10 and parliamentary elections in De- cember 2018. All the events tend to show a hedging strategy by Armenia. The case in point of Armenia both defines a pragmatic approach from the EU for

10 www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43948181. “The former Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan tried to become prime minister of Armenia at as the prime minister role has been enhanced after the constitutional change in 2015. Armenia has changed from a presidential regime to a parliamentary one. Consequently, the Ar- menian people triggered this peaceful revolution to demonstrate against Sargsyan’s attempt to keep his power .The Revolution occurred with no casualties and with a general commitment from all the Armenian people.” See more at www.tert.am/en/news/2015/12/07/president-speech/1867588; hearmen- ite.com/2015/12/armenian-constitutional-reform-2015-a-digest-william- bairamian/

19 DESIGN OF THE THESIS its Eastern Partnership and the ENP and the structure for the small states to survive the interferences from bigger states. Consequently, the aim of the thesis is to answer the following main research questions: Does Armenian foreign policy in 2013-2018 correspond with the so- called hedging strategy? And which indicators of the hedging strategy could be identified in Armenian foreign policy, in what extent and form? Besides of these main research questions the thesis will try to deal also with following empirical addresses: 1) To find out the possible factors/problems, that might have led to the Armenian refusal of the AA/DCFTA in 2013, subsequent entering the EAEU and final signature of CEPA with the EU; 2) To evaluate the Armenian actions and multi-vector foreign policy framework in connection with Armenian membership in the EAEU (on one side) and CEPA (on the other side). These main questions call for a theoretical structure to scrutinise also the rules and the circumstances under which the Armenian policy-makers pick up the decisions to orientate the Armenian foreign policy. The swinging on the Armenia requires a theoretical approach to understand its multi- vector nature.

METHODOLOGY

Answering the question about whether the Armenian international behaviour corresponds to the hedging strategy requires to devise the theoretical framework. There are four main pillars: the neoclassical realism and the structural realism, the hedging concept by Professor Kuik Cheng-Chwee and the theories about the smallness of the states in the international arena.

20 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood This research isoltates the most influential works from the neorealist and neoclassical realist schools with which it builds the theoretical background. According to this theoricatl background, this thesis takes into account the hedging concept by Kuik and the analysis of the smallnees of the states in the international relations applying them to the Armenian reality. Furthermore, the analitycal part of the thesis requires a set of primary sources and a set of secondary sources to develope its analysis. The primary sources consulted during this research are: the international treaties between the states and the international organizations, the press releases of the ministries, the international organizations such as the OSCE or the EAEU, the speeches of the relevant features, official documents, official statements and interviews with Armenian personalities. There are four main respondents for the interviews of this research: Respondent number 1 is an Armenian diplomat, respondent number 2 is an Armenian PhD student in the U.S.A, Respondent number 3 was an Armeni- an journalist, Respondent number 4 is a president of a research institute. The interviews constitute an important bucket of reasonable opinions about the effective impacts of the primary sources’ documents. They provide the opinions on the current situation in Armenia, the Armenian relations with the EU and Russia and their respective influences. Furthermore, the interviews are useful gauges for understanding the perceptions among the Armenian society. The secondary literature acquires the data from think tanks, academic journals, books and publications from research institutes. Reading and comparing them allows to determine the judgments about the political environment in which Armenia, the EU and Russia frame their interests offers.

21 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Chapter 1: A theoretical body for the international relations

Chapter 1.1: The theoretical side of the coin

This chapter considers the theoretical framework conforming with the neorealism\structural realism and neoclassical realism. Organizing a pragmatic analysis of an international relations’ scenario requires a neutral theoretical background. This system defines the ways the actors behave in this international relations’ arena. Despite their differences, both schools of realism apply to the same scenario, highliting different facets of the same problem. At least, “a rose by any other name is still a rose”11. Therefore, these schools of international relations provide the required tools to understand and define the Armenian situation in the Caucausus. According to the aforementioned concepts, this part of the thesis will also introduce the meaning of bandwagoning, balancing and strategic hedging, which will be more explained in future chapters. They are the pivotal bricks upon which this thesis will ground the investigation of the Armenian foreign policy in these last five years.

1.2 Neorealism and Neoclassial Realism

Albeit the theoretical schemes always restrain the real world, a spec- ulative blueprint is mandatory to analyse the international relations between international actors. This thesis agrees with the premise of William Wohl-

11 Rathbun, B. 2008: “A rose by another name: Neoclassical Realism as the logical and necessary extension of Structural Realism” in Security Studies; Taylor and Francis; Routledge. P.297

22 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood forth that, “realist thinking is now far more robust and rigorous than ever, making it much more accessible and useful to security scholars”12. Howev- er, theories have to investigate reality according to confirmations given from “certain theories in economics, sociology, anthropology and some other non political fields”13 and it may be possible for them to leave some specific detail out of the framework of the analysis. (Waltz, 125; 1979) . Distinctively, the neorealist school has been paved by Kenneth Waltz in his book “Theory of International Relations” (1979) focusing on the competition caused by the anarchical nature of the international environment. This competition is fuelled by the uncertainty and the fear of the other actors in the arena. The mistrust between the states comes from the incessant uncertainty of the others’ intentions; a state may use force every time it so wishes and the other states are force to live in fear of the consequences. Here the neorealism highlights the great switch between the old realist definition of super power and the current multi-factor definition. Waltz emphasizes the new dimension, pointing out that a superpower is so labelled once it satisfies the score on all the fields that compose this adjec- tive14. Furthermore, Waltz deepens the concept of balancing, reshaped according to neorealist guidelines. The balancing system between the actors of the international arena will always be restored once someone wants to reduce it into a unipolar system. Waltz always bears in mind the strong difference between the internal and external life of a state; this division of tasks

12 Wohlforth, W. 2010: “Realism and security studies” in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer. Abingdon; Routdledge, Taylor&Francis. 13 Waltz, K.1979: “Theory of International Politics”. New York, McGraw-Hill p. 125 14 Waltz, K.1979: “Theory of International Politics”. New York, McGraw-Hill p. 135

23 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS mirrors the peculiarity of the unique and separate realms. If the nations divide the tasks among its internal components to maximize the productivity, they will also use this method to interact with one another. The balance reflects the pivotal variation between the external and internal dimension of a state. This analysis from Waltz is particularly useful for studying the behaviour of the modern states in the community of the international relations. What is also useful from the theory of balancing defined by Waltz is the annotation about the ‘narrow margins’ of the weak states. The narrow margins do not allow weak states to take random shots within international arena. On the contrary, the weak states have to pay close attention to the ongoing events of the international community. Moreover, Waltz underlines the great stability offered by the bipolar system. Here the competiveness works well by nature given the result of marginal gains. In addition to Waltz’s analysis about balancing relationships between international actors, an important step was taken by Robert Gilpin in his book, “War and change in World Politics” (1981). He focuses on the shifting balance of power, his work no less realist than Waltz’s15. He clearly underlines that a state is not just motivated by power and security. A state has to deal with internal affairs, or ‘social affairs’, in defining the foreign policy. Gilpin underlines the need of a hegemonic stability and the incoming need to forge alliances16, given the structure of the international system. Hereto, the state ponders the domestic and international incentives to make

15 Wohlforth, W. 2010: “Realism and security studies” in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer. Abingdon; Routdledge, Taylor&Francis. P. 13 16Masala, C. 2010: “Realism and security studies” in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer. Abingdon; Routdledge, Tay- lor&Francis. P. 386

24 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood the best decision as the leading actor in the balancing policy17. “However, the tendency of a society to seek changes in the international system is dependent not only on decreased costs but also on domestic factors that influence the capacity and willingness of a society to pay these costs”18. Gideon Rose inserted the term ‘neoclassical realism’ into the academic debate, presentin it in his article “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”. The neoclassical realism mulls over the importance of the internal level and neoclassical realist writers affirm that policy-makers are rational just in their perception of the power coming from that reality19. The central foundations of Gideon’s theory states that political elites decide upon the foreign policy in accordance with their perception20 of nature of power. It is important to understand that occasionally these actors have binding restraints to the freedom of choice, as the development of internal affairs influence their actions. Therefore, the strength of the nation as a structure takes precedence in the analysis of a foreign policy. Society and resources add or diminish the effort to enact upon the dimension of the external service. Despite the differences between the internal and external dimensions, a state must balance the effort fot the foreign dimension. In addition to this internal divide within the structure of a state, the other facet of this reality is the pressure coming from the ‘systemic factors’ derived from the international community.

17 Gilpin, R. 1981: “War and Changes in World Politics”. Cambridge University Press. P. 55 18 Gilpin, R. 1981: “War and Changes in World Politics”. Cambridge University Press. P. 95 19 Fremouw, C. 2017: “Neoclassical Realism and the US Asia pivot”. Universitei Leiden. 20 Gideon, R. 1998: “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” in World Poli- tics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Oct., 1998), pp. 144-17. Cambridge University Press.

25 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Following Gideon, other authors such as Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell pushed forward the neoclassical realist approach in their book “Neo- classical Realist Theory of International Politics”. They try to surmount the differences between the existing theoretical backgrounds by attempting to update the neorealist theories focusing on the structure at the domestic level, the foreign policy level and the international level. Basically, the authors sought to merge the theories of anarchic constraints upon the states in the international arena posed by Waltz with the state’s inner affairs and complexity of Morgenthau and Carr. They place the neoclassical theories in the same vein of the realist tradition and according to them “the strategic choices of states— particularly the great powers— have an important effect on both international outcomes and the structure of the international system itself”21. These academ- ics want stress the conditions under which the decision-makers evaluate the reality and establish a foreign policy in the international arena. Among all the theories they explain in their book, the authors assert the domestic political milieu can influence the methods used by the states to counterbalance the international threats. Eventually, the neorealist and neoclassical realist schools underline the characteristics of the international reality and the tools for understanding the international behaviours of states, adopted in pursuit of their interests. It was determined that bandwagoning and balancing strategies form the core of a state’s foreign policy towards its fellow nations.

1.3 Bandwagoning, balancing and strategic hedging

21 Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E.. “Neoclassical realist theory of international politics” Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2016.

26 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Bandwagoning refers to the pure acceptance of superpower’s ruling role. The superpower guarantees the weaker state and it grants benefits, while the weaker party sacrifices its autonomy to cooperate with the other actors22 in the zone. Then, a “bandwagoning for profits”23 may lead to an overwhelming interference from a superpower in the business of a weaker one. Balancing hints at the opposite behaviour of bandwagoning. It keeps the world order balanced as it avoids the creation of a world hegemony by adopting a strategy which opposes the superpower. The weaker states openly counterbalance a superpower by adopting several balancing acts. The balancing states can both raise the military expenditure or align with another actor to strike back against the common threat. It questions both an internal and an external dimension of policy-making, as the weaker states seek survival in the ‘competitive realm’24. The strategic hedging is a new behaviour in the international relations’ arena. It names the position that lays between the previous methods. Some authors describe it as a rocky road between pure balancing and pure bandwagoning. It means keeping more windows open against future threats. The behaviour suggests maintaining neutrality with a high degree of flexibility between different partners. Kuik outperforms the neo-realist school by introducing this new fundamental concept: the hedging strategy. He moves the neo-realist school

22 Koga, K, 2017: “The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited: The Case of Japan's Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia's Power Shift” in International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 4, 1 December 2018, Pages 633–660. 23 Schweller Randall L.1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security; the MIT press. 24 Waltz, K.1979: “Theory of International Politics”. New York, McGraw-Hill; p. 127

27 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS towards a more specified analysis of decision-making process to understand the reasons why small states place themselves in a certain place among the ‘balance of power’. The hedging strategy draws a new academic attempt to identify the “substance and differences of small-state behaviour in the face of power asymmetries”25. The developments within international relations challenge the neorealist schools and Kuik updates these neorealist assumptions, by depicting this strategy as a suitable method for the weak or small states. He states that the leading reason, beyond which a state takes on the hedging strategy, regards the sphere of the internal affairs within the elites’ legitimization. The problem of legitimization reflects the shots taken by the elites to arrange the security and the cohesion issues in the international arena. The decision-makers of smaller states ponder the importance of these inner affairs while getting involved in the game of balance of power between super powers. This definition fulfils Waltz’s requirements in “Theory of Interna- tional Relations”, by the way Kuik gleans the concept of risk in the different ‘realms’26. According Waltz27, the hedging strategy consists of a race for a multi-polar and broad stockpile of international choices to offset the risks of being at a stake in a multi-polar world during such uncertain times. The modern times require new tools to depict the reality of the small states and strategic hedging is ì particularly useful in explaining the ‘offset

25 Kuik, C, C. 2008 “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P. 161 26 Waltz, K.1979: “Theory of International Politics”. New York, McGraw-Hill p. 123. 27 See Kuik, C, C, 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P. 163

28 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood risks’ scenario. The end of the Soviet Union opened a series of uncertain possible scenarios for the weak states in between bandwagon and balancing.

1.4 The deconstruction of the Hedging’s concept

Professor Kuik deconstructed the concept of hedging in five different components: indirect balancing, dominance denial, economic pragmatism, binding engagement and limited bandwagoning. He describes the ASEAN states’ strategy relating with China, the U.S.A and the regional actors in the South-East Asia. His model is useful to understand also other realities than ASEAN’s. It allows to understand how the international system gives the inputs to hedge between superpowers without aligning with them. Bearing in mind that its hedging concept equally proceeds from the pure counter balancing to the pure bandwagon and vice versa, it is necessary to make clear what its concepts describe.

Balancing Hedging Strategy Band- Strategy wagoning Pure form Strategy Pure form Risk-Contingency Return-Maximizing Options

Options

29 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Opposite and mutually exclusive

Indirect- Dominance- Economic- Binding- Limited- Balancing: Denial: Pragma- Engage- Band- Forging Balancing the tism: Forg- ment: wagoning: military political power ing eco- Binding Maximiz- alignment in the region nomic and en- ing the but not to minimize relation- gaging a political explicitly the political ship max- super benefits by targeting a risk. imizing power in selectively specific Political the profits order to giving power. hedge Economic maximize deference Military – Diversi- diplomat- &\or selec- hedge fication: ic bene- tively Diversify- fits forging ing the collabora- economic tion at the links to foreign reduce the policy economic level. dependency. Eco- nomic hedge Degree of power rejection Degree of power acceptance Table 1 - Hedging Strategy scheme: On the one hand, the more the Armenia goes left, the more it tries to reject the foreign influence and interference within its inner and foreign affairs. On the other hand, the more Armenia goes right, it means that Armenia practices a more willingness approach or more available approaches towards the two other actors. Courtesy shaped on the tables designed by Professor Kuik in his articles: Kuik (2008) page 166, and: Kuik (2915) page 3

It is equally important to remember three pivotal recalls: a small state should not absolutely support one superpower; it should provides preventing proposals against the superpower’s influence; it should use mutually counteracting acts to preserve a “firing-back” position. Abandoning any of these elements would imply a decisive shift from hedging to either balancing or bandwagoning strategies.

30 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Within the hedging plains, those who move between the pure form of the balancing strategy and the pure form of the bandwagoning are not always embedded in just one side. Actors try to adapt move “with different degrees of emphasis on risk-contingency measures. Heavy hedgers, for a range of internal and external reasons, are more concerned about the possible risks embedded in the uncertain great power relations and intentions”28. The distinctive factors “political hedge” and “military hedge” identify the impact of the hedging strategy in the political life of the small state that adopts such blueprint. The indirect balancing describes the policy of a state that seeks to cooperate with the stronger ally in the military or improving own military assets to answer ‘diffuse uncertainties’29. The state has to adopt a “risk contingency” measure30 and it has to implement the military cooperation, formal or informal, addressing a military or security threat. It constitutes the military aspect of the hedging strategy. When a state behaves according to the dominance denial concept it gets involved in “preventing and denying the emergence of a predominant

28 Kuik, C, C, and Roznam, G. 2015. “Introduction to 'Light or Heavy Hedging: Positio- ning between China and the United States” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America). Page 5 29 Kuik, C, C, 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P. 170. Kuik attributes the formal or informal arran- gement of the military factors amongst the allies to other factors than China and the direct or indirect balance comes from the plausible perception of the major threat for the states that adopt this behaviour. 30 Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2015): “Variation on a (Hedging) Theme: Comparing the ASEAN core states’ alignment behaviour” in Facing reality in East Asia: Tough decisions on competition and cooperation. Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 26, 2015. Wa- shington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America.

31 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS power”31. This is a political behaviour wherein the small\weak state attempts to deny a superpower’s dominance by involving other actors in the scenario or strengthening own resilience or using diplomatic mediations. The economic pragmatism is the most apolitical and less interested practice concept. It locates the state in a ‘neutral’ zone in the Kuik’s spectrum. Here the state should focus on the maximization of the profits with no political intentions and ties. The small state pushes this behaviour with no regards for the internal political preferences and relationship between the political relations. Due to its multinational nature, holding this pragmatic approach with the super powers requires to know how to work with the functioning bureaucratic system and normalized relations with the power or the powers in place. Establishing and maintaining contacts with a superpower means getting it involved in the local affairs, while institutionalising those relations binds the small state together with the superpower. Once these aspects are present at the same time, the result is the binding-engagement. It avoids the tendency to reshuffle normalised political and diplomatic activities between the small state and the superpower. Following the binding-engagement im- plies to establish or to deepen the diplomatic relations with the super power “by enmeshing it in regularized diplomatic activities32”. Eventually, the bandwagoning behaviour wherein the small state employees a series of actions to correspond the expectations proper of the super power. It splits itself in two ways: the limited bandwagoning and the pure bandwagoning. This two branches articulate in three different points:

31 ibid 32 ibid

32 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood PURE BANDWAGONING LIMITED BANDWAGONING Political and Military alignment Political partnership A non compulsory zero sum-up A compulsory zero sum-up scenario scenario Superior-subordinate hierarchy Hierarchy avoidance Table 2 – Bandwagon peculiarities (by the author)

On the pure bandwagoning hand, the political and military alignment requires a total accomplishment of super power’s expectations by the small state. Here the small state bandwagons to the super power pushing itself away from all the partners resulting in a zero sum-up game scenario. This leads the small state to accept the institutionalized chain of command where the hierarchy is accepted and it regulates the life between the big and the small state. On the other limited bandwagoning hand, the political partnership still considers a policy coordination on selected issue and the voluntary submission to the super power by the weak state. Then, the small state has still a free zone in which is able to bargain with the super power. This situation does not lead to a zero-sum relationship and it does not set up a hierarchical order among the partners. Eventually, Kuik provides the conceptual explanations of the ASEAN members’ choices. He firstly described them in an academic field and further he moved forwards in applying these theoretical concepts to South-East Asian theatre. He describes ASEAN countries’ foreign polices answering the inputs from an international system where China’s presence is strong.

33 A THEORETICAL BODY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The hedging strategy is an important behaviour and the pivotal state’s policy in this thesis’ decryption process to deconstruct, analyse, study and evaluate the Armenian manoeuvres between the two superpowers. The application of these deconstructed elements of the hedging strategy will be outlining and pointing out the political implications of the Ar- menian decisions in lieu of the Kuik’s model. Understanding the reasons and consequences of the decisions taken by the Armenian elites requires to contemplate the patterns of the Armenian foreign policy’s development during this particular time (2013-2018).

34 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Chapter 2: The Armenian Smallness

2.1 Armenian smallness: the theoretical side of the coin

Before moving forward in the main analytical part, there is a little pecualiar aspect of the Armenian situation to clarify: the weight of the Ar- menian state in the international relations. Whether a state, as Armenia does, applies the behaviours above- mentioned it clearly proves to be a small state within the international community. It is necessary to define which characteristic of the small states belong to Armenia. Comprehending the characteristics of the small state helps to understand against which threat the Amenis hedges, as “weaker states do not hedge against any single actor per se; rather, they seek to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations”33. Even though weak and small don’t have the same meaning as small refers to the smallness of the state while the weak refers to the weakness of the state in all its capacities to impact the statehood, in this case weak and small do cover the same meaning. This analysis considers the two meaning as equal, as it goes on in describing the same patterns of a state who has not massive size neither a bulk of powerful assets to stand its ground within the international anarchic arena. In the Armenian case these patterns combine together. The small state in the international relations’ environment is the one that “remains particularly vulnerable to external shocks as a result of their geographic positioning, inherent structural challenges, and deep integra-

33 Kuik, C, C. 2016: “Malaysia Between the United States and China: What do weaker states Hedge against?” in Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 8, Number 1—Pages 155–177. Policy Studies Organization. By Wiley Periodicals, Inc

35 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS tion into the global economy”34. Pursuant to Thorhallsson, a small state has to bear a limited influence in the global and regional business, structural weakness to process the decision-making process, financial issues and problems to promptly react to the international scenario. Furthermore, “small state is unable to defend its national interests by its own political or military means”35. It lies at the lowest level of the international relations and it always seeks to increase its importace maintaning its indipendecy despite the intentions of the bigger states. The internal and classical factors that compose the smallness of Ar- menia are: the amount of population36, the territorial extension37, the size of the economy38 and the mighty of the military39. Armenia places itself at almost all the mid-level or at the bottom of all the indicators’ table; it is definitely a small state by all these traditional criteria40. Armenia has just around 3 million people dwelling in a state of 29,743 km², that makes Ar- menia a tiny state of Europe. The geographical smallness of a state is not the only earliest characteristic defining the small size of a state at the international level. What makes a small state weak and permeable to international anarchic outputs are also the diplomatic inability, the economic weakness produced by the inactive public administration as well as it concerns the military factor. The

34 http://thecommonwealth.org/small-states 35 Vaicekauskaitė Z, M. 2017. “Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World”. Journal on Baltic security. De Gruyter Open. P. 8 36 http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ 37 http://world.bymap.org/LandArea.html 38 https://www.armstat.am/en/ https://ceoworld.biz/2018/12/28/gdp-rankings-of- the-worlds-largest-economies-2019/ 39 https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp 40 Thorhallsson, B, 2018: “Small states and shelter theories: Iceland’s External Affairs” in New International Relations, Routledge.

36 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood smallness means of production of decisions define the structural smallness of the states41. Thorhallsson describes the need of safe political, economic and societal shelters for a small state in order to ‘survive and to thrive’. The more a state pushes for the safety of a shelter, the more a state recognises its weakness in such field and it shapes its smallness. However, a small state doesn’t not just push for accomplishing the survival aspect of the shelter’s theory, but it can also frame its activity “to pursue wider milieu goals, other than those related to their own immediate survival and prosperity”42. Thorhallsson moves forward describing the matter of the small states. The pivotal asset of the sovereign power to hold the border and the inner affairs highly shapes the reputation of a small state43, whether a state is able to control its own border and to decide the patterns of the internal and the external policies defines its size. Armenia relies on Russia to uphold its borders’ safety. The traditional patterns of smallness apply to all the small states but following the critiques towards the Thorhallsson’s book by Hiski Haukkala the smallness of the state doesn’t shape the same behavior for everyone. Generally, a theory is needed but everyone has its method to run the multi- vector policy for the shelter but “his is understandable in light of the stated

41 The Mаршрутка in the streets of Yerevan could be the tangible item that describes the Armenian smallness all across the world. 42 Haukkala, H. 2019. In Scandinavian Political Studies. Nordic Political Science Associ- ation. P.89 43 Thorhallsson, B, 2018: “Small states and shelter theories: Iceland’s External Affairs” in New International Relations, Routledge.

37 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS objective to develop a general theory but one is left with an impression that crucial differences and nuances are lost in the process”44. Haukkala indentifies also diplomatic, the military, the economic and the bureaucratic features. He further moves on from the traditional realist patterns to define the seize of a state. The author underlines the pivotal importance of the “risk of societal stagnation in terms of essential inability to generate enough fresh ideas indigenously”45. Here once again Kuik comes to describe the situation of small states in the international arena. He gathers many useful elements in describing the harshness and also the positive life of being a small state in the international world. Kuik’s small seize diverges from the previous technical description in the way it focuses on the pros and the cons of the smallness nature in the international arena instead of the smallness’ features. If a state has to be bandwagoning, counter balancing or hedging between two or more super-powers, the state doesn’t hold the ground from a healthy and powerful position. The main threat to small states comes from the military of the neighbours. In case of conflict between the superpowers46, the small state will be force to be uniquely on one side. Then, the small state is obliged to mind the decisions taken at a higher level and further do their moves. This top-down

44 Haukkala, H. 2019. "Small States and Shelter Theory. Iceland’s External Affairs. Edi- ted by Baldur Thorhallsson“. In Scandinavian Political Studies, 89-92. In Scan- dinavian Political Studies. Nordic Political Science Association. P. 91 45 Haukkala, H. 2019. "Small States and Shelter Theory. Iceland’s External Affairs. Edi- ted by Baldur Thorhallsson“. In Scandinavian Political Studies, 89-92. Nordic Poli- tical Science Association. P. 90 46 Kuik, C,C. 2015: “Introduction: Decomposing and Assessing South Korea’s Hedging Options” in TheAsanForum, Routledge.

38 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood uncertainty leads the small states to find an own path between the two super power and that’s why they arrange for themselves a path towards the hedging strategy. The engagement in international organizations helps to define the patterns upon which both actors build their relations blurring the issue of the scramble for the official label of leading power. Therefore, it helps to thin the impact of the decisions on the daily life for the weak states. Institutionalizing the relations with the super powers allows the small states to gain a certain degree of independecy along which engaging and binding the super powers in the local affairs. This could grant the inter- rupted space for communication between the small actors, institutions, security organization and economic cooperation clubs and the powerful states. Even for the predominant states could be unpleasant to mange with small states with no institutionalized relations. The outcomes of the decisions outside such engaged world could lead to solutions that are “less predictable, less productive, and less sustainable, multiplying risks and making returns- maximizing endeavours more difficult”47. Still focusing on the international placement of the weak states within the international or regional organization, sometime the membership in a broad set of international organizations save them from “becoming subser- vient or over dependent on their giant neighbours. They can also avoid an- tagonising any power or forgoing any economic gains, while mitigating the risks of entrapment and abandonment in the face of uncertainty”48. If a small state play cleverly, it can slightly move freely in the within the inter-

47 Kuik, C, C. 2015: “Introduction: Decomposing and Assessing South Korea’s Hedging Options” in TheAsanForum, Routledge. P.5 48 Kuik, C, C 2018: “Power transitions threaten: The ASEAN’s hedging role” in EAST A S I A F ORUM QU ARTERLY

39 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS national community. Moreover, being part of the international organizations allows the weak states to hinder not just against a peculiar super power or well-known threat, but on the contrary it allows them “to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations”49. Taking in consideration the different internal factors within every small state, the foreign inclination tends always to find a safe spot in the anarchic structure, as doesn’t admit them to be on their own. Regardless of some unique internal factors, the anarchical structure generally obliges the small states to “be exposed to a wide range of risks embedded in the uncertainty in inter-great power relations50”. In any case the small states should brace themselves to fire back at the unpleasant consequences coming from both the anarchical nature of the system and the manoeuvres from the powerful major states. On one hand, no matters for the position they want to hold, if super powers collaborate, the small states will lose all the cleavages and the bar- gaining tools. If super power agree with each other, they don’t need to involve small states in their politics to spoil the adversary. Small states don’t need to pick up a side with which align. On the other hand, in case the international scenario is uncertain and no clear balance is nearby, the small states will be suffering from both choosing or avoiding the international alignment. If they gather on one side, they may deplete the fondness for the other side as well as in case they don’t choose any side to be on they will completely arise suspicions and hostilities

49 Kuik, C, C 2016: “Malaysia Between the United States and China: What do Weaker States hedge Against?” in Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 8, Number 1—Pages 155–177. Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals. 50 Kuik, C, C 2016: “Malaysia Between the United States and China: What do Weaker States hedge Against?” in Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 8, Number 1—Pages 155–177. Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals. P. 172

40 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood in a high tension’s level game. “When two elephants fight, the grasses get trampled; and when the same two elephants make love, the grasses also get trampled!” In both scenarios, smaller states are powerless and have no control over what befalls them”51. Eventually, the smallness of the state in the international relations comes from objective tangible factors such us population and geographical extension at an internal level as well as the diplomatic and the military factors at the external service. Furthermore, a more abstract level the state defines its size according to the decisions it takes and the consequences coming from them. The motivations beyond these decisions come from the structure and from the moves made by the super powers that try to rule the waves of the anarchy. In this environment the small states are obliged to work for the best achievement while preparing for the worst outcome and eventually grabbing an average final score. Still steering toward a motto in the Armenian case, when the Cauca- sian Shepherd dogs watch the flock the sheep aren’t in their own but neither they change the way to follow. When the Caucasian Shepherd dogs are ab- sent, the sheep are in their own but they suffer from the absence of a certain path to cover and a leader to follow. In both cases, the Armenian flock has to follow or to look for a guide to go looking for new bigger grazing where the wind shakes the barley.

2.2 The Armenian smallness: the pragmatic side of the coin

In the course of time, smallness is not a bad thing per se, but the state has to play a harder game than super power since it suffers the authority of the super power. On the contrary, a big state or a super power has to

51 Ibit

41 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS control the mood of the small states. Then, it is always the ‘two side of the same coin’ problem. Looking at the traditional classifications made to categorize the seize of the states, Armenia has a little geographical extension wherein a small number of people live with a low-average GDP pro capita. Therefore, by a traditional sizable point of view Armenia is a tiny country and further the breakable geographical situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh makes Armenia weak in accordance with the factors in opposing the international threats. Multifactor nature of the international arena confirms the smallness of the Armenian state, due to the Armenian need to rely on someone else to make an impact on the international scenario and to put some effort in changing it. Like many other small regional states (such as Korea between the U.S.A and China likewise), Armenia confronts multiple sources of tangible threats, the multiple challenges of living under a constant rising and dangerous polarization of the relationship between its two closest countries and above all Armenia risks to confront between a two complete divergent sets of interests, values and international placements52. According to the respondent number 2, there is an objective Armeni- an dependence from Russia with regard to the labour and energetic markets. Furthermore, it is also massively important the armaments supply route from Russia to provide a sustainable arms consumption with relatively cheap prices and/or with Russian credits. The Armenian army barely reach the number of 50000 strength53 and it has to grant the safety of the Armenian borders, which are threatened by both Azerbaijan and Turkey, in addition to the deployment in the Nagorno

52 Kuik, C, C 2015: “Introduction: Decomposing and Assessing South Korea’s Hedging Options” in TheAsanForum, Routledge. 53 https://armeniagogo.com/armenian-military/

42 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Karabach region defending the precarious life of the Republic of Artsakh. It is particularly meaningful the declaration released by the Turkish president regarding the double nature of the same people, referring to the common Turkish historical heritage in Baku54. Azerbaijan and Turkey keep the borders with Armenia closed in name of the common Turkish heritage of the two states due to the events of the 1992 in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Azeri borders cover the two major segments of the Armenian borders and their closure worsen the Armenian landlocked smallness. The compelling Turkish threat on the Armenian borders highly underlines the Armenian dependence for Russian military and security needs and at the same time it obliges Armenia to keep good relations with Georgia going on. Georgia is the only precarious land connection to the outside world. The only other border that could allow Armenia to reach the sea in a friendly environment is Iran, but the latest international circumstances seem not too much in favour of a normal activity in the region there55.

54 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-will-not-open-armenia-border-amid- karabakh-occupation-erdogan-136892 55 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump- working-bring-irans-oil-exports-zero/

43 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS

1)This maps underlines the four borders of the Armenian republic and it helps to understand the place of Armenia in the Caucasus, a landlocked country within the Caspian and the Black seas. Turkey and Azerbaijan blocked their respective borders with Armenia getting the geographical position even more difficult for Armenia. The arrow indicates the Nagorno-Karabach, which is the triggering bone of contention in the whole South Cauca- sus. (http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/country-map01/georgia-armenia-azerbaijan- map.htm)

44 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood

2) This map briefly sums up the reasons of the bone of contention. The self-proclaimed and not recognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic is the heir of the Soviet autonomous Oblast. Armenia occupied it during the war but Azerbaijan never recognised the self-determination and the Armenian occupation. The brown territory includes also Azerbaijani territory occupied by the Armenians after the war, the red line marks the original territory of the autonomous oblast and nowadays Artsakh Republic and the yellow lines are the “missing” part of the Nagorno Karabach. (https://www.jpost.com/sites/default/files/BloggersImages/1640%5C/image/2000px-AZ- qa-location-en_svg.png)

45 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS

Still, the Armenian state can count on the international help coming from the Diaspora. The Armenian Diaspora counts more Armenians abroad than in the territories of the Armenian and the Artsakh Republics56. Being small but spread in all over the world allows Armenia to build nets and connections also without the official diplomacy such as the famous singer Aznavour did in his life57. Even before the collapse of the Soviet regime the Armenian Diaspora has been interesting itself in the Armenian business as well as in the formation of an Armenian dissident elite within the USSR itself58. Since the Soviet time the Armenian the Diaspora has therefore always felt an active part in the history and politics of the Armenian state. Still considering the multifactor definition of smallness in accordance with the features from Thorhallsson, the Armenian bureaucratic and administrative apparatus convey the impression to be blocked and the civil society seems to be weak. As a matter of fact, these are heavily targeted by the EU with the previous agreements and the CEPA to help Armenia improving the fair and neutral functioning of public administration and the Armenian state. Furthermore, the CEPA helps to fight preventing the corruption and the shadow economy inside the administrative apparatus. The international index of Freedom House confirms inability to generate new ideas to carry on the development of any massive international approach59. Europe helps Armenia to move forward, a small step for a government a great step for the whole Armenian state. Since the Armenian constitutional

56 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/armenia-population/ 57 http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/250057/ 58 Iskandatyan A, Makaelian H, Minasyan S. 2016: “Political elites in Armenia: A change of generations” in War, business and politics. Informal networks and formal institutions in Armenia. Caucasus Institute and Academy Swiss Caucasus Net. Yere- van. 59 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/armenia

46 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood reform in 201560 the Armenian political elite pushes for a further break- through to onward normalized parliamentary life. At the same time, the Ar- menian civil society answers the call for democracy gathering on the streets and empowering itself looking at the development coming from the Velvet Revolution. The Velvet Revolution demonstrates that even the small Armenia does not just struggle to achieve the pure survival among the clashes of the super big powers, but however they try to push forwards in following own peculiar targets, goals and aims. In spite of the theoretical hypothesis of survival matter, the small states differentiate their aims looking for something more tangible and proficient than the mere survival. A brief foreword about the Velvet Revolution before proceeding with the theoretical definition of the Armenian smallness. During the days of the Velvet Revolution, the Armenian people rally on the streets in a peaceful and bloodless intense protesting time bringing many compelling political and economic issues such as the corruption of the public administration and the low GDP rate 61 to a worldwide attention. At the end of the bloodless Velvet Revolution, Serzh Sargsyan stepped down and the Arme- nian political life kept developing the democratic reforms triggered couple of years before. The new waves of democratic, political and economic reforms coming from the constitutional reform in 2015 move forward throughout the Velvet Revolution towards a well functioning parliamentary system.

60 http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2886/ 61 https://armeniadiscovery.com/en/articles/velvet-revolution-symbols-and- memorable-moments

47 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS

The smallness of the Armenian state doesn’t come just from the academic categorization neither from the international researches and investigations, the other side of the coin, the other substantial valuable factor to know and evaluate is the Armenian perception of the Armenian size and international weight. This perception comes from the Armenian think tanks, institutes, people on the streets, official personal and at the same time by some objective and impartial factors. The Armenian infrastructures are tiny and poor62. Railways and main road can’t bear the comparison with the European standards. Actually, the national railway service is operated by a Russian com- pany63 that is committed in modernizing the Armenian railroads and trains but the terrain’s conditions are not easy to overcome. According to the official statement of the Joint-Stock Company “SCR” (South Caucasus Rail- ways), the Armenian republic agreed on “concession management is 30 years with the right of prolongation to 10 years after the first twenty years of work by a mutual consent of the parties”64 with the Russian company. This company takes care of the only railroad between Armenia and Georgia. Regarding the land connections, few Armenian roads can be as good as the European ones. The International E-road networks in present in Ar- menia just with the E117 and with short sections of the B class E001 and E691. Still, Armenia suffers the consequences of the two blocked borders in the infrastructures as well. The conditions of the streets are generally disas- trous and the Armenian priorities cover other issues65.

62 https://autotraveler.ru/en/spravka/road-network-in-europe.html#.XL7Hh3_VLIU 63 http://ukzhd.am/en_about_company.html 64 ibit 65 http://www.minenergy.am/en

48 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Regarding the official personal opinions, the respondent number 1 affirms that the Armenian decision-makers have been always directly tied to Russia as concrete result of historical developments. Since the beginning, Armenia is a member of the CSTO, the collective Russian security organization. This close historical relationship confirms the Armenian inability to grow alone as an important and independent state in the global reality and in the Caucasus. The multi-vector policy confirms the smallness, it forbids Armenia to take unilateral decisions, as the threats to the existence of the Armenian Republic are heavily present in the Armenian political discuss. The EAEU offer was not the most maximizing profit choice by a strict economic point of view, but Armenia has been forced by the regional circumstances to opt for this option. Being loyal to the Russian friendship satisfies the Armenian need of security, and helps Russia to keep the boots on the ground besides. On the contrary, the European offer wasn’t and the CEPA still does not fulfil the Armenian needs to have a trustworthy ally to rely on in case of strategic military need. This led Armenia to follow a structural hedging policy to keep itself still in the range of both the powerful neighbours. Essentially, the Armenian smallness at the international level meets the ‘political’ prerogatives in the way Armenia struggles “to avoid any straightforward or single- directional”66foreign policy’s attitude. However, even if Armenia suffers from such little size it struggles to survive the survival is not the primary and unique purpose of the state. Re- spondent number 1 has clearly underlined during our interview accomplishment of being the strongest democracy in the region and with an active

66 Kuik, C, C 2015: “Introduction: Decomposing and Assessing South Korea’s Hedging Options” in TheAsanForum, Routledge.

49 THE ARMENIAN SMALLNESS commitment in empowering the internal democratization process. The Vel- vet Revolution is to be considered a full internal process, no foreign power neither Russia nor the EU has interfered into the Armenian business in this occasion. The people went down on the streets due to corruption among the governmental office and institutions, the low rate of GDP’s growth67 and protesting against the attempt from Sargsyan to remain in charge. On April 21st 2018 Sargsyan resigned giving the floor to Nikol Pashyan. Eventually, Armenia tries to handle the seize issue with care swinging from a hard hedge position to a light hedge position in consideration of all the peculiarities in the Armenian case. However, the Armenian smallness and all the foreign interests in there does not prevent Armenia to try to set up a democratic working regime granting the fair and free elections in 201868. Overall, the Armenian elections in 2018 are a high point in confirming the willing of a small state to overcome the merely survival purpose. Armenia confirms in these last parliamentary elections the willingness to leave aside the post-soviet label and to keep strengthening the democratic patterns for the political life of the Armenian state.

67 https://armeniadiscovery.com/en/articles/velvet-revolution-symbols-and- memorable-moments 68 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/401984

50 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Chapter 3: The Armenian Player

3.1 The cornerstones of the Armenian foreign and internal policy during the period 2013-2018

Here this thesis will be contemplating the happenings that character- ise the Armenian political developments in the span of last five years. As a matter of fact, during this time lapse some interesting cornerstones for the definition of Armenian position between Russia and the EU. These recent developments also suggest an ongoing diversification of the Armenian interests, going beyond the simple survival issue, proceeding towards a closer relationship with the EU still being under the Russian umbrella. Since the refusal in 2013 to sign the Association Agreement with the EU from the former Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan to the recent signature of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in Autumn 2017 and the Velvet Revolution, the Armenian decisions in the international relations’ arena suit with the hedging’s description provided by Kuik. The rejection of the agreement with the EU in 2013 did not mean to completely close the Armenian doors to the European collaboration and benefits of the European market. Armenia tries to keep its multi-vector foreign policy in a balanced way of being complementary between the Russian military and the European normative and economic appeal. This flexible approach consists in “cooperating with all in a mutually determined propor- tional manner”69 in order to cover all the primary needs of a small state and far away on the route of particular interest.

69 Syuzanna Vasilyan (2017) “Swinging on a Pendulum”, Problems of Post- Communism, 64:1, 32-46. Page 33

51 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER

In the way that agrees with the fears concerning the security’s fears and the economic needs, Armenia has signed the agreement to enter the EAEU on October 9th 2014 but it didn’t not completely shut down the EU- Armenian relationship. Despite the membership in the EAEU, Armenia never ceases to find some other more profitable economic partners with which start or deepen the business trade. The EAEU does not make the Ar- menian economy and the civil society as well a condition of absolute binding relationship with Russia70. Couple of years after the official Armenian accession to the EAEU, a new agreement with the EU comes to reshuffle the framework of the EU-Armenian relationship. The CEPA slowly increas- es the weight of European normative presence in the Armenian civil society. Additionally, the European states play a more important role for the Arme- nian economy and the EU member states as a whole makeup around the 30% of the Armenian export71. The Armenian Velvet Revolution does not directly regard the international positioning of Armenia, neither the civil society nor the politicians wish so. All my respondents agreed on this point. The Velvet Revolution comes from the Armenian people and has to deal with primarily the Arme- nian internal affairs. The widespread corruption and the low GDP growth were the main issues among those who went on the streets protesting against the former Armenian president. These weeks were nothing more than “the manifestation of our people’s will and had no geopolitical implications”72. Recapping the Armenian situation marks 4 main milestones in the history of the Armenian internal and foreign policy developments: the rejec-

70 http://asbarez.com/165311/armenia-prioritizes-foreign-economic-partners/ 71 https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/arm/#Destinations 72 http://primeminister.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2018/05/30/Prime-Minister- Nikol-Pashinyans-official-visit-to-Georgia/

52 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood tion of the Association Agreement in 2013 with the EU; the Armenian entrance in the EAEU in 2013 and its official start in 2015; the CEPA’s signature in 2017 and the still flourishing consequences of the Velvet Revolution. Here they compose the recent framework of the Armenian relations with Russia and with the European Union. The Armenian strategies beyond such unexpected ‘change of mind’73 reflect the genres identified by Kuik in his academic publications regarding the reasons, the manners and the aims of a hedging small, weak states between super powers. Before applying the hedging components to the Armenian foreign policy, a brief historical recap allows to clarify the reasons why Armenia chooses to follow such foreign policy behaviour between the EU´s and Rus- sian influences. The current decisions made by the Armenian policy-makers endure historical conflicts and quarrels, recent wars, ethnical tensions and international conjectures. In accordance with the assumptions of neorealism and neoclassical realism, it is necessary to analyse what goes on within the states and what goes on within the international arena, the system, that constrains the di- verse inputs under which the states produce internal and foreign policies. Because the perception of Europeanization, a consequence of tiding Arme- nia to the EU, at the state level may highly differ from the understanding that the civil society may recognise as well as the ‘acceptance’ of the Euro- pean values may create divergent expectations on the level of the major actors’ behaviours. During my time in Yerevan I took the possibilities to conduct many interviews and conversations with representative of the Armenian civil soci-

73 Syuzanna Vasilyan (2017) “Swinging on a Pendulum”, Problems of Post- Communism, 64:1, 32-46- Page 33.

53 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER ety. I met academic professors from the State University and the Brusov University, the team I co-worked with during my time at the Caucasus Insti- tute and people from the informa civil society. The Armenians seem to perceive and to welcome the improvement and the enforcement of the economic and normative ties between the two actors as a concrete sign of cultural revolution. If the EU pushes hard at the institutional level, the Armenians perceive this European involvement in the Armenian reality as a good opportunity to remove the Soviet and the post-Soviet label from the Armenian civil society. The Europeanization does not firstly regards the state’s apparatus but it involves more the common people at the values’ sphere. The Armenians can turn to be European without becoming Europeans, as the acceptance of the European values and the search for the improvement of the economic conditions do not come through the compulsory entrance in the European institutions. Being like the ‘Europeans’ is meant just the changing of values and the hopes for a better future at a domestic level. It does not take in any case in consideration changing or reshuffling the insti- tutions74.

3.1.2 The developments of Armenian cornerstones

Still recalling the theoretical frame of this thesis, before getting involved in the Armenian foreign policy within the chaotic arena of the international relations, it is essential to investigate the internal aspects of the Armenian small state. The Armenian reasons to answer such international developments come for particular post-Soviet scenario and this kind of uniqueness in the Caucasus makes Armenia the only state in the area fully

74Iskandaryan, A. 2013: “Armenian’s foreign policy: where values meet constraints” in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus Institute, Aleksanteri Institute.

54 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood sovereign in all its territory and even more75 as the result of the victory over the Azeri forces in the Nagorno Karabach conflict. It is therefore inevitable gazing at the developments of both Armeni- an historical developments of external and internal aspects to understand the reasons that mark such important cornerstones in framing the Armenian international relations with her two most friendly neighbours. At a first glance the most serious issue in the Armenian modern history is the Armenian genocide during the world war one76, as it still today affects the relations between those who recognise the Armenian genocide and Turkey77. However, the most crucial point for today’s political life for the Armenian republic comes from the result of the Nagorno-Karabach war78. At the end of the ’90, the collapse of the soviet rule triggered many ethnic and\or border conflicts, that still affect the political life of both the post-Soviet space and its neighbours. Here the conflict for the possession of the Nagorno-Karabakh places itself. At the end of the war in 1994 a Russian ceasefire was signed and since that time the OSCE group, the Minsk group,

75Iskandaryan, A. 2013: “Armenian’s foreign policy: where values meet constraints” in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus Institute, Aleksanteri Institute. Page 8. 76 https://www.britannica.com/event/Armenian-Genocide 77 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/24/pope-francis-denounces- armenian-genocide-during-visit-to-yerevan. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_95_- italya-temsilciler-meclisi-nin-1915-olaylari-hk.en.mfa. https://twitter.com/MevlutCavusoglu/status/1116275073231589383. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_115_-portekiz-parlamentosunun-1915-olaylarina- iliskin-aciklamasi-hk.en.mfa. 78 The office of the Armenian Prime Minister devotes to the Artsakh matter an entire main page within the foreign and the internal press release web pages.

55 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER tries to keep this situation stable and the ceasefire alive79. But still, some skirmishes take place and soldiers die from both sides. Then, the Nagorno- Karabach is a pivotal matter in the Armenian political life regarding the safety and the military issues. The war didn’t just involve the two competent states and the regional powers got interested in the developments of these happenings. “Following Armenia’s occupation of the Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan in 1993, the border between the two countries was closed” in a solidarity act with the Azerbaijan80. The Turkish endorsement to the Azeri cause81 is a huge threat that compels Armenia to take in consideration external aids in counterbal- ancing such Turkish behaviour. Even if the Zurich protocols82 didn’t mean to merge Turkish and Armenian relationship with the Armenian-Azeri conflict, the protocols raised many critiques from both sides due to the unre- solved historical controversies83. Despite some attempts to normalise the relationship between Turkey and Armenia84, nowadays Armenia finds itself with two closed borders and there are just four states that adjoin Armenia. Mainly Turkey doesn’t want to recognise the genocide as well as it tries to impose the genocide issue to all those with whom Turkey has established

79 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325 80 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-relations-with-southern-caucasus.en.mfa 81 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa 82 The Zurich Protocols were the attempt made by both Turkey and Armenia to start normalizing their relationship. Many international authorities attended this signature. The process didn’t go further and still Armenia has no diplomatic relationship with Turkey https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/tr 83 https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/17/diplomatic-history-turkey-armenia- protocols 84 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8299712.stm

56 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood relationship85. Supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia recalls this position and it forbids to develope normalized relations with Armenia obliging Ar- menia itself to cross Georgia to reach the Turkish hubs and the infrastructures to trade goods. Furthermore, the international community got involved in the conflict with the establishment of the OSCE Minsk group co-chaired by France, the U.S. and the Russian federation. The group tries to peacefully resolve this conflict gathering all the actors involved on a common basis for the negotiations promoting direct talks between the political representatives of both Armenia and Azerbaijan86. In addition to the OSCE group, the United Nation calls for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan but all the three members of the OSCE Minsk group voted against the UN resolution regarding the Nagorno Karabach87. The recommendations made at the UN levels seem to be unheard by all the actors involved in the conflict and by the OSCE group too. The road towards a definitive solution of the Nagorno Karabach conflict is still not in a close sight, due to the divergent interests of the parties involved and the zero-sum game regarding the survival of the Artsahk republic. Since the cease-fire on May 12, 1994 Armenia has been considering itself as the representative tool of the semi-independent republic of the Na- gorno Karabakh on one hand and Azerbaijan has been attempting to retake the secessionist region by force88. These antithetical positions don’t call for

85 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_96_-fransa-cbsk-nin-24-nisan-i-anma-gunu-ilan-etmesi- hk.en.mfa 86 https://www.osce.org/mg/70125 87 https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10693.doc.htm 88 Minasyan, S. 2013: “the Nagorno Karabach conflict in the foreign, domestic and military politics of Armenia” in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Develop-

57 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER a definitive overcoming solution of the present status quo. However, the OSCE group allows direct and indirect steps forward such as the ceasefire in 201689, the recent meeting between Pashinyan, the prime minister of Arme- nia and Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, alongside the respective foreign ministers, under the OSCE Minsk Group’s surveillance. The meeting has been favourable as, according to the OSCE’s declaration it “took place in a positive and constructive atmosphere and provided an opportunity for the two leaders to clarify their respective positions”90. In the future there should be certain initiatives aiming to agree on a peaceful solution of the conflict and the development of humanitarian aids. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the survival of the Artsakh are pivotal elements in the Armenian foreign and military policies while they play an important but still secondary role at a domestic dimension. Armeni- ans feel the Nagorno Karabakh as something that Armenia already owns91 and the stable presence of the Artsakh republic is something that seems to confirm this feeling. Furthermore, the current prime minister Ni- kol Pashinyan does not belong to those “Karabachi guys” as Sergey Mi- nasyan describes the Pashinyan’s predecessors and he rather devoted his political activity at the domestic level to the resolution of the corruption issue.

ments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus Institute, Aleksanteri Institute. 89 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35954969. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35964213. 90 https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/415643 91 Minasyan, S. 2013: “the Nagorno Karabach conflict in the foreign, domestic and military politics of Armenia” in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Develop- ments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus Institute, Aleksanteri Institute. Page 26

58 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Moreover, what has been developing the Armenian cornerstones of its foreign policy is also the indirect international scenario. Even in connection to the Nagorno Karabakh issue, the Turkish efforts to endorse ‘Azeri brothers’92 risk to cut Armenia off the international trades’ routes in all the plausible ways like avoiding to build pipelines across the Armenian territo- ry93. Furthermore, Turkey is openly hostile94 to the Armenian attempts to get the worldwide recognition of the Armenian genocide and it doesn’t try anymore to normalise the relations with Armenia after the Zurich protocols. Sometime also the Russian actions, that do not directly aim to touch the Armenian-Russian relationship, can force Yerevan to push for a change in the foreign policy’s priorities. Essentially, Armenia shapes its relations with Russia also during the Russian decisions regarding Azerbaijan and Georgia. In spite of the CSTO’s main purpose to defend its members, president Putin visited Baku in 2013 to check the improvement of weapons’ sup- ply95 to Azerbaijan, the direct enemy for Armenia in the region96. During the 2013 visit, Putin declared Azerbaijan to be a ‘strategic partner’ for Rus- sia trying to resume the relation from the demission of the Gabala radar sta-

92 http://asbarez.com/65154/azerbaijan-turkey-are-one-nation-two-states-say- foreign-ministers/ 93 https://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html 94 The Turkish foreign ministry press release is riddle with statements against the genocide recognition. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?ad9093da-8e71-4678- a1b6-05f297baadc4 95 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-azerbaijan-arms- idUSBRE95H0KM20130618 96 https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12804-vladimir- putin-visits-baku.html

59 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER tion in 2012. Basically, the two states didn’t agree on rent’s price and Rus- sia brought all the military equipment of the radar base back to Russia97. Even if the Russians aim to conduct their business with another actor in the region without ‘touching’ the relationship with Armenia, in autumn 2013, before the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, President Sar- ghsyan refused to go forward in the advancement of Armenian-EU relationship rejecting the Association Agreement with the EU. Armenia has the Georgian example in 2008. An exclusive decision to deepen too further the relationship with just one of the two partners may lead to precarious conditions with the other. This could result in unfair conditions and misunder- standing between the partners worsening for long time the relationship, in this case Armenia was scared of losing the Russian partnership. Georgia was handling the problem with the separatist republics of Abchazia and South Ossetia and in addition the non binding referendum on January 2008 clearly showed the Georgian intention to join NATO98. In June 200899 the Georgian president visited the NATO headquarter and in August Russia started the war. Nowadays, the separatist republics won’t ever rejoice Georgia and the Russian tanks are heavily present in the region. The breakout of the status quo in 2008 in South Caucasus opens a new window for the Armenia and due to the threat to remain trapped in the outcomes of the August war, Armenia starts to promote a more independent

97https://www.rbth.com/news/2013/01/23/russias_decision_to_close_down_gabala_ radar_station_is_final_-_lavrov_pa_22129.html 98 Nichol, K. 2008: “Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implicati- ons” in CRS report for the Congress. 99 https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/06-june/e0620a.html

60 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood and multi-vector policy towards the West and the EU100. On one hand, Ar- menia cannot allow itself to lose another border and for this reason Armenia didn’t completely endorse the Russian aspirations during the war. On the other hand, Armenia didn’t fully support the Georgian cause in order to not upset Russia considering the Armenian needs. After the turning point of 2008, Russia almost lost all the influential leverages in Georgia and Armenia since this war considers itself to be the only reliable ‘foothold’ for Russia in the Caucasus101. Armenia is well aware of the Russian longing for a strong presence in the region, as Georgia is clearly lost for Russia and notwithstanding the Russian business with Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani firstly look to Turkish help. The Baku–Tbilisi– Ceyhan102 pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum103 cross the Turkish land and Turkey is the gateway for Azerbaijan towards the EU market. Furthermore, there are historical and cultural linkages between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In sharing a “common enemy”, Azerbaijan and Turkey are two states but one nation104. The year 2008 didn’t not just mark a turning point for Armenia at the international level, it was also the beginning of the growing civil society’s involvement in the political life. The Velvet Revolution is not a unique

100 Markedonov, S. 2013: “Russia and Armenia in the South Caucasus security context: Basic trends and hidden contradictions” in in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus In- stitute, Aleksanteri Institute. Page 32 101 Syuzanna Vasilyan (2017) “Swinging on a Pendulum”, Problems of Post- Communism, 64:1, 32-46- Page 33. 102 https://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html 103 http://www.socar.az/socar/en/activities/transportation/baku-tbilisi-erzurum- gas-pipeline 104 https://www.repairfuture.net/index.php/en/identity-standpoint-of- turkey/turkey-azerbaijan-one-nation-two-states

61 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER

“Easter egg” in the Armenian recent history. Before this mass demonstration, Nikol Pashinyan together with the first President of the independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, leaded also a similar movement in 2008. Alongside the Pashinyan’s commitment within the civil society, Armenians organized many other mass events such as the Marshrutka’s strike in 2013 and the “Electric Yerevan” mass demonstration against the raise of the elec- tricity price in 2015105. The decade between the first harsh protests against Sargsyan has not been just a growing wave of internal criticism, the Nagorno-Karabach war has slightly coming back to the political discussion. The deadlock negotiations since 2011 and the full-escalated 4 days war in April 2016 increased the public critique against the national authorities. The Sargsyan’s government annihilated his weak popular and parliamentarian support back to the time of the Velvet Revolution occurred106. Despite Sargsyan’s efforts, the Parliament voted to appoint Nikol Pashinyan as the acting prime on May 8, 2018. The Armenian revolutionary phenomena has an inner complexity that surpasses the mere request for a democratic government with no corrupted people at its official levels. The Velvet revolution does not call for a particular slide of the population to go down the streets and clashing with another part or against the government. It rallies the whole Armenian people, males and females, all minorities, all ages and, above all, the Church and, above all, all the police forces and the army. The people meant to be “the people” against them, those who seated in the government, the ruling

105 http://panarmenian.net/photo/electricyerevan 106 Iskandaryan, A. “The Velvet Revolution in Armenia: How to lose power in two weeks” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. The Journal of post-soviet democratization. Vo- lume, 26, Number 4, Fall 2018. Demokratizatsiya. Page 469

62 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood elite. It was more a reminiscence of the revolutions in the Central-European states in the 1989 than a new wave of Eastern “coloured” revolts in the previous decades107. The final result of the revolt was not a change of power but a change in power. Nikol Pashinyan inherited the same power of his predecessor Serzh Sargsyan but Pashinyan committed to held the election within one year and he respected this time limit. Pashinyan’s party largely won the elections with around the 70% of votes in favour. The OSCE didn’t meet tremendous violations or threats to the fair execution of the elections. The result is free and fair even if still some problems remain regarding the procedures before the election or the gender un- balanced representation among the parties and at all the national and local life. OSCE suggests to include women for the second positions in all the electoral lists at all the levels of the political life108. To sum it up, given the complex international and regional environment where Armenia expands its foreign policy, the two closest reliable partners for Armenia are Russia and the Russian based international organizations and the EU alongside all the European services and policies for a good neighbourhood. Considering these efforts to be in-between these two major actors, Armenia is the case study as Armenia differs from all the other states that are in the EAEU. No other current member state of the EAEU has some serious aspirations for integration “with” the EU, and Armenia differs

107 Derluguian, G, Hovhannisyan, R: “The Armenian anomaly: Toward an interdisciplinary interpretation” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. The Journal of post-soviet democratization. Volume, 26, Number 4, Fall 2018. Demokratizatsiya 108 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic of Armenia, EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 9 December 2018, ODIHR Election Observa- tion Mission Final Report; Warsaw 7 March 2019.

63 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER also from Georgia, Moldova, and even Ukraine, which have already stepped on that path109. The way how Armenia tries to stay in-between these two major actors acquires a new meaning under the new Pashinyan’s government. He is currently shooting at the most urgent problem: jailing the previous corrupted elites. However, Pashinyan has to devise his governing party and now “the authorities have to build themselves while they govern, recruiting from a limited pool of human resources”110. The change is to occur in all the aspects of the Armenian political life but it doesn’t mean to boost automatical- ly the Armenian economy or the solution of the Nagorno Karabach conflict. According to Mr. Iskandaryan, it may be ‘just’ the beginning of the “post post-Soviet time”. Therefore, it is highly relevant to realise how Armenia now pushes its complementary multi-vector policy beyond the Armenian new political course. Its partners didn’t interfere with the internal developments coming from the revolutionary wave, the ‘irreversible democratic’111 happenings during the Velvet Revolution changed the Armenian internal scenario but the partnership with Russia and the EU comes from much far than just the late developments. It is necessary to understand what has already been constructed by all the three actors to understand the reasons why Armenia still keeps the EU and Russia as much close as it can to its side.

109 Syuzanna Vasilyan (2017) “Swinging on a Pendulum”, Problems of Post- Communism, 64:1, 32-46. 110 Iskandaryan, A: “ The Velvet Revolution: How to lose power in two weeks” in Ar- menia’s Velvet Revolution. The Journal of post-soviet democratization. Volume, 26, Number 4, Fall 2018. Demokratizatsiya. Page 481. 111 http://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2019/03/05/Conference/

64 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood 3.2 Armenia after the revolution. A new approach?

Despite the new hopes that the revolution initiated at the internal level, the Armenian relations with its two most important partners won’t see a differentiation from the complementarism of the multi-vector policy. Pashinyan visited both the EU institutions and some members state of the EU112 and at the same time he pledged a visit to Russia and to the EAEU’s headquarter113 following the Armenian tradition in the foreign policy. Fur- thermore, he visited Georgia and Iran in order to correspond the Armenian national interests of “softening the contradictions of the global and regional powers”114. The Armenian foreign policy survives the changes of the man in charge and the democratic transitions, as the concept reported by Markarov and Davtyan was elaborated by Cocharyan, who is now in jail for corruption and the facts of the revolts in 2008. During his visits to all the regional and international partners, Pash- inyan bears in mind the Armenian limits of the poor infrastructure in Arme- nia and the precarious linkage with Georgia, the only Armenia route to the sea and to the goods coming from Turkey. In spite of the absolute absence of Georgian-Russian relations after the 2008 war, Georgia allows the transit of the Armenian goods to the EAEU’s space. Also, Georgia is the crossing point for the European goods to reach Armenia.

112 http://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2019/02/01/Conference- Nikol-Pashinyan-Angela-Merkel/ 113 http://www.primeminister.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2019/01/25/Nikol- Pashinyan-Visit-to-Russia-Federation/ 114 Markarov, A; Davtyan, V: “Post-Velvet Revolution, Armenia’s foreign policy challenges” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. The Journal of post-soviet democratization. Volume, 26, Number 4, Fall 2018. Demokratizatsiya. Page 533

65 THE ARMENIAN PLAYER

Hence, the harsh conditions of the Armenian geographical, political and infrastructural position does not allow the elaboration of new patterns for a revolutionary change in the foreign policy of Armenia. At least until the Russians please the status quo in the Nagorno Karabach.

66 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Chapter 4: The two teams: Russian and European proposals

On the one hand, the Armenian “player” ponders the relationship with Russia and on the other hand it contemplates the proposals from the EU. This chapter describes the Russian and the European offers to Armenia and it analyses the Armenian responds to them accordin to the Armenian priorities. It means also to depict how Armenia has been trying to keep its relations with both its neighbours going on since the Armenian independency.

4.1 The Russian side

4.1.1 The Russian offer to Armenia

Hosting a Russian military base even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, makes Armenia a special place for the Russian interest in the South Caucasus. The Russians are there also due to international obligations and they frame their offer to Armenia in various branches. The Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) focuses mainly on the willing to keep the former Soviet space attached to the Russian sphere of influence and the preservation of the ties between the post-Soviet states and the Russian federation developed during the Soviet era. It aims to grant a space wherein goods, capitals and persons enjoy the free movements across the borders; to establish a coordination in the field of common taxes

67 THE TWO TEAMS: RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN PROPOSALS and external actions and to gather together these countries to agree on economic regulations for everyone115. In order to process its decision, the CIS has a charter that defines the role of the ministers and the leaders of the state’s members and the court of the Commonwealth; the executive branch with the Councils and the Com- mittee; the branches for the cooperation for economic, social, governmental areas. The Collective and Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO) is primarily an intergovernmental military organization that aims to “continue and strengthen close and comprehensive relations in the foreign policy, military, military-technical spheres, coordination and joint efforts in combating international terrorism and other security threat”116. In doing so, the CSTO encompasses from being a traditional military bloc to being a modern provider of national and transnational security for its member states fulfilling all the modern challenges in this world. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is mainly an economic organization for the international cooperation in the economic sector among the member states117. Theoretically, the main aims of the Union regard the improvement of the living standards; the competitiveness of the member states’ economies and a comprehensive growth of the Union itself. The Eurasian commission, the intergovernmental committee and the supreme Eurasian economic council aim to equip the member states with all the necessary tools to run their business, such as the common tariffs’ zone; the investigations and statistics, the database, the certifications and the literature of the Union produced by the Intergovernmental Council and the

115 http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm 116 http://mfa.gov.by/en/organizations/membership/list/cddd96a3f70190b1.html 117 http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about

68 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Commission about the common trades. The EAU offers a functioning domestic market to the states that join it with a significant volume of mutual trade in goods while also trying to tear down the obstacles to the common economic space. Eventually, the Russian federation offers to Armenia an economic Eurasian space but above all, it meets the Armenian security requirements through the direct and discounted access to the military supplies. In this case, Russia offers a more military and security partnership although the non-military organizations are on the table as well.

4.1.2 The Armenian-Russian relationship

Before talking about the recent relationship between two sovereign states, it is necessary to remember that Armenia was part of the USSR and not a satellite state. Since the mid 18th century, the Russian Empire has been present in the Armenian historical perspective. Many Armenians who currently live in Armenia are Russian citizens according to the Russian law, as they were born before the collapse of the Soviet Union or either they are part of the Armenian Diaspora. The Armenian-Russian relationship officially started on April 3, 1992118 and they wrap around the close friendship developed by both actors in almost three decades. According to the Armenian foreign ministry, Ar- menia and Russia signed more than 250 interstate treaties and friendship agreements. At the end of the Soviet Union, Armenia prioritized the establishment of official interstate relations with the Russian federation and “de-

118 https://www.mfa.am/en/search?q=Russia

69 THE TWO TEAMS: RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN PROPOSALS spite the negative legacy of the USSR and the Russian empire”119 in 1997 Armenia signed a friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty pav- ing the way to further evolutions. The three most important features of the Armenian-Russian relationship are: the Armenian membership in the CIS, December 21, 1991; the Armenian membership in the CSTO, April 20, 1994; January 1, 2015 and the Armenian accession in the EAEU, January 2, 2015. Moreover, alongside the crucial steps, Armenia agrees on the presence of Russian military at the Armenian-Turkish border and Russia has in Gyumri the 102nd Russian military base, but the Armenian presence in Rus- sia occupies a significant position, as Russia hosts the strongest community of the Armenian Diaspora120. In the imperilled Caucasus region, Russia perceives Armenia as a ‘reliable ally’121 in the common commitment to keep the Transcaucasia stable and to improve the Armenian security under the Nagorno-Karabach circumstances. From the perspective of the respondent number 4, none can substitute the Russian military presence in the role of granting force for the status quo in Nagorno Karabakh122. Armenia can only buy military security presence y and armaments from Russia due to the Rus- sian offer and the facilitations for CSTO’s member states. In addition, Mos- cow is also committed in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue

119 Markedonov, S. 2013: “Russia and Armenia in the South Caucasus security context: Basic trends and hidden contradictions” in in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus In- stitute, Aleksanteri Institute. Page 31 120 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/ru 121 Markedonov, S. 2013: “Russia and Armenia in the South Caucasus security context: Basic trends and hidden contradictions” in in Armenia’s foreign and domestic politics. Developments trends. Mikko Palonkorpi, Alexander Iskandaryan. Caucasus In- stitute, Aleksanteri Institute. Page 32 122 Respondent number 4

70 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood through its presence in the co-chaired Minsk Group from the OSCE. The Armenian foreign ministry warmly greets such international involvement123 to keep Azerbaijani violations of the ceasefire under the lens of the international community. Last but not least, the two partners add another valuable brick once Armenia entered the EAEU, the Eurasian Economic Union. The Armenian decision to join the EAEU surprised many European partners. Eyebrows were raised among those who took the accomplishment of the achievement of the full Europeanization process by Armenia124. Despite the ‘raising eyebrows’ and the European offer, entering the EAEU means the Armenian payment of the “toll” for the Russian friendship, to certain extent. Anyway, this enhanced step in the Armenian-Russian relations does not imply a zero- sum game for the EU. Armenia rather shows its loyalty to the concept of multi-vector complementarity. As also the respondent number 1 describes, the Armenian decision- makers find themselves always between two blocs and they would rather like to have a definitive decision in their hands. This was not the perfect case which could allow this strategy going on. The EAEU is not just perceived as the stringent economic Russian-based union, although the EAEU itself tries to demonstrate so. Its responsibilities cover the regional economic integration ‘raising the competitiveness of the member states between the national economies while empowering themselves to compete at a global level’125, but by the Armenian side it covers a broader meaning.

123 https://www.mfa.am/en/nagorno-karabakh-issue/ 124 Vasilyan, S. (2017) “Swinging on a Pendulum”, Problems of Post-Communism, In- stitute for European Studies, 64:1, 32-46. Bruxelles. Taylor and Francis group. Page 32 125 http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about

71 THE TWO TEAMS: RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN PROPOSALS

In addition Armenia and Russia share intergovernmental commis- sions and official meetings at the various ministerial levels. State representatives meet regularity and there were many official state visits between the two partners in both ways. This intense diplomatic activity paves the way to the exchanges between the two countries in all over the fields, the Armenian-Russian ties go fairly from the economic fields to the religious one through the educational and cultural space126. On April 15, 2015 following a Russian initiative the foreign ministers and the OSCE co-chaired Minsk group met together to discuss the Nagorno Karabach issue127. The intergovernmental Armenian-Russian ties involve also regional and international and nongovernmental actors. Regarding the educational space, there is a Russian-Armenian university in Yerevan. In the previous governments the presence of political features with cultural and education given in Armenia or former Soviet cen- tres was much bigger than soon after the independence128 and the current Parliament. At the time of Kocharyan and Sargsyan there was the ministry of Diaspora and this was the unique privileged channel to meet also the western educated Armenia. Western educated people were present just in this ministry, the other main governmental features were sharing a Soviet educational background. Before the Velvet revolution, analysts found out a semi-absolute absence of western educated people even in the Parliament and within the bu-

126 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/ru 127 https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2019/04/15/nk_meeting/9391 128 Academic Swiss Caucasian Net. AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association: “The political elite of post-independence Armenia: Characteristics and patterns of formation” – Yerevan: Edit Print, 240 150 p. Page 31

72 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood reaucrats129. The Armenian state has been held by CIS or private educated people who developed strong ties with the eastern reality. As a matter of numbers and quantitative data from the publication about the “Political elite of post-independence Armenia”, a good percentage of those previous members of Sargsyan government and Parliament studied in Yerevan or partially in Armenia and partially in Russia, mostly shared a studying time in Russia. Among the previous ruling party, more than the 90% of the members visited Russia and CIS countries while just the 3% visited the Western states such the European or the Northern American ones. These interviews and polls conducted by the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net130 demonstrate a close af- finity of the previous MPs to the Russian cultural space.

4.2 The European side

4.2.1 The European offer to Armenia

The geographical position in the middle of the Caucasus places Ar- menia at the Eastern borders of the EU. In accordance with the specific realities and geographical locations, the EU carries on the Eastern Partnership with which it provides specific services and actions in the area. The ENP is a joint initiative that equally demands its implementation by both partners, the EU and the neighbouring states131. The EU offers stable partnerships to those states that want to cooperate in political, socio-

129 Ibit 130 Academic Swiss Caucasian Net. AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association: “The political elite of post-independence Armenia: Characteristics and patterns of formation” – Yerevan: Edit Print, 131 https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy- enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en

73 THE TWO TEAMS: RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN PROPOSALS economic and security fields. According to the main principles of the ENP, the flexibility and the joint ownership, the EU tries to differentiate its approaches towards the neighbours sharing with them the responsibilities of the improvements of the relations. Through the ENP the EU opens its single market to the partners, helping them in the democratization process. The EU engagements do not cover just the economic side of the partnership, the ENP provides the access to the European market and financial aids just to those partners of the “more for more” idea132. The ENP has 4 principal demands to the partners that approach the EU. It calls for: a good and fair governance respecting the human rights accordingly to a democratic rule of law; the economic growth aimed to stabilise the country; security and migration and mobility. These principles frame a broad cooperation that may range from the medical and sanitary assistance to the public state management and taxation throughout the energy sector; the security and juridical cooperation; the agricultural developments and the educational issue. In accordance with these principles, the ENP allows to the European institutions to develop such approach “country-by-country” that helps in identifying the peculiar situation and the best ways to optimise the European patronage. The ENP produces Partnership & Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) or Association Agreements (AAs) between the EU and the partner countries as legal binding agreements to build the partnership between the two actors. Relating to these agreements the EU finances the projects at both the regional and local levels. This financial undertaking provides the European Neighbourhood Instruments to the partners and both the EU and the partners bilaterally discuss the needs and the tasks for these funds.

132 Ibit.

74 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood The Eastern Partnership is the European specific way to address the states that lie on the EU´s eastern borders. It is part of the ENP but it specifically targets a series of countries and here the EU frames its offer for Ar- menia. Every two years, the leaders of the European states and the six East- ern countries meet to discuss the accomplishments of the deliverables for 2020, the goals that the EU and the partners have within the 2014-2020 span. Generally, the EU demands: the empowerment of the civil society organizations granting free media and gender equality; the development of a stable market economy; the strengthening of free and fair institutions and a good governance; the energy security and safe supply; and the safe mobility for the people to move within this space. The ENP and the EaP are the major technical spaces with which these European demands elaborate the agreements for the Armenian-European dialogue. Eventually, the European offer to Armenia regards the two most interesting European goods: the access for the Armenian goods, capitals and persons to the European single market and the access for the Armenian state to the European normative aspect. It is necessary to remember that the relationship between Armenia and the EU comes from a longer perspective. The first agreement between the two partners was signed in the ‘90s.

4.2.2 The EU-Armenian relationship

The deputy Armenian foreign minister on April 11, 2019 visited Brussels attending the Eastern Partnership Senior Officials Meeting in occasion of the 10th anniversary of the EaP. Mr Adonts, the Armenian foreign minister, remembered the achievements and the goals of the Armenian-EU

75 THE TWO TEAMS: RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN PROPOSALS connection pointing out the enthusiastic Armenian point of view about CE- PA and its parliamentary stage133. The minister supported the Armenian trust in the EU´s presence in the region and the improvements from the OSCE Minsk group over the Nagorno Karabakh134. At the official level, the Armenian-EU relationship starts with the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1996 and its entry into force on 9.9.1999. This treaty provides the main framework upon which the two partners build up their mutual relations. According to the general principles of the treaties and the 102 articles, the once upon time European Community and the Armenian republic reserved to commit their efforts into the establishment of an official relationship between the two actors. The main points of this first treaty regard the establishment of the political relation between the two actors: the European commitment in support of the Armenian improvement of the democratisation process; the common committal in the consolidation of the Armenian democracy and its economic development; a basis for a comprehensive collaboration. Since the beginning of EU-Armenian relationship the PCA underlines that “the economic convergence achieved through this Agreement will lead to more intense political relations”135. This first agreement between the partners already indicates the importance of the economic and political\normative matters for both Armenia and the EU.

133 https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2019/04/11/EU/9373 134 https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/417281 135 PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT between the European Commu- nities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, Title II, Political dialogue, Article 5.

76 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Under the umbrella of the economic aspect, the EU and Armenia agreed on the regulation of trading goods, capitals and investments as well as the regulation of the labour market, the rights of the workers and the establishment and the operational life of the companies. The commitments are mutually valid, what the European states do recognise for the Armenian workers and companies in Europe that the Armenian republic pledges to respect for the European workers and companies in Armenia136. No doubt that the communitarian and Armenian commitments don’t grant nor they certify the free movements of capitals, goods and persons, they just establish the same fair competition for European and Armenian companies. The article 23 recapping the essential meaning states that “the Community and its Member States shall grant treatment no less favourable than that ac- corded to any third country for the establishment of Armenian companies as defined in Article 25(d)”137. The economic cooperation means to establish a scheme upon which they both define the understanding of industrial cooperation in mining and raw materials; cooperation in science and technologies improving the educational standards of Armenia; cooperation in the agricultural, energetic, environmental, transport and financial fields. The CPA in 1999 paved the way to the future enhancing bilateral actions projecting the European cooperation into the main priorities for the Armenian republic138. The Foreign ministry of the Armenian republic in its English web page states, regarding the importance of the European role in

136 PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT between the European Commu- nities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, Title Iv, Provisions affecting business and investments, from article 20 to article 40. 137 ibit 138 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu

77 THE TWO TEAMS: RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN PROPOSALS

Armenia, as following: “since Armenia’s independence, cooperation with the EU has been essential in carrying out reforms in the fields of economy, justice, building state institutions, securing democratic society, as well as institutions dealing with the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”139. The Armenian participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) marks a significant step for the Armenian-European relations. Arme- nia has ENP since 2004 and the Eastern Partnership since 2009 (EaP), since these are the main initiatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) for the Caucasus. Considering the upgrades of the ENP and the EaP, the Armenian-EU relations have been growing since the 2009. In light of the EaP, ministerial meetings and summits produce the circumstances where the Armenians ministers meet the European colleagues to talk about the rocky road to the fulfillment of the “20 deliverables for 2020”140. The European Commission started to negotiate with Armenia an As- sociation Agreement (AA) soon after the formulation of the EaP but it was never concluded141, in a great disappointment from the EU´s side, for the Armenian decision. Before the EaP summit in Vilnius in Autumn 2013, the Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan refused to proceed with the Association Agreement with the EU in favour of the entrance in the Russian based EAEU. However, this refusal didn’t mean to preclude any further improvement of the Armenian relations with the EU.

139 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu 140 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu 141 Vasilyan, S. (2017) “Swinging on a Pendulum”, Problems of Post-Communism, In- stitute for European Studies, 2017 Taylor & Francis Group,

78 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Notwithstanding the Armenian rejection in 2013, the EU and Arme- nia produced two pivotal documents under the umbrella of the EEAS and European Commission Directorate General for Development and Coopera- tion – Europeaid: Single Support Framework for EU support to Armenia (2014-2017) and the Single Support Framework for EU support to Armenia (2017-2020). Both the documents follow the EU´s path of the flexibility, “country- by-country” approach and suit with the Armenian need of complementarism in the multi-vector oriented foreign policy. Essentially, the year 2017 counts the signature of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Armenia and the EU in the margins of the 5th Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels. It replaces the 10 years old PCA in setting up the rules of the Armenian-European partnership but it still has to enter into force.

79 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING

Chapter 5: The Armenian Hedging

5.1 Application of Kuik’s hedging in the Armenian case

Afterward, this thesis about to apply the hedging strategy’s components to the Armenian scenario. To find out the indicators of strategic hedging in Armenian foreign policy and this process requires to work with the ‘spectrum’ designed by Kuik. In spite of the difference (Kuik’s case study regard the ASEAN countries answering one big super power Chinese presence in the South East Asia), the Armenian case study can “pay the toll” to Kuik’s analytical lens for this thesis.

5.1.1 The risk concept and its three genres

The risk notion by Kuik is fundamental in the application of the deconstructed hedging behaviour, he considers three genres that compose the notion of risk, because pondering the probable risks is what the states do in taking their decisions at the international levels. Kuik identifies three genres: security, political and economic. At the foreign policy level, the ruling elites have to handle with care these three risks. The risks steadily change according to elites’ intentions and ability to stay in power. The ruling elites have to uphold the legitimisation of the authority keeping the “preserve security and internal cohesion, to deliver economic growth, to uphold sover- eignty and to promote a rationalized ideal”142. In the Armenian case, the security risk coincides with the today semi-frozen conflict in the Nagorno-Karabach and the security of the Turk-

142 Kuik, C, C. 2008: 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs. Project MUSE. P. 162

80 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood ish and Azerbaijani borders. Armenia opts for Russia in a more decisive way than its neighbours in the region due mainly to this security reason. The Armenian elites both internally and externally “upheld utmost priority”143 preserving the Karabach’s Armenian survival. Hence according to Kuik’s definition, the security issue over the Nagorno-Karabach challenged the Armenian decision-makers at both internal level, considering the survival of the region, and external level, regarding the Azerbaijani-Turkish blockage of the Armenian borders. Armenia calls for Russia to be militarily present at the Turkish border to cover the need of the security risk. The Russian military presence144 close to the Turkish border and the Armenian membership in the CSTO could fall in the concept of military security’s risk. However, the Russian military has granted the security issue for a while keeping the conflict at a low level or at a frozen stake, despite the significant escalation during the April war in 2016145. At a first glance, pondering the military risk makes Armenia closer to the bandwagon position towards Russia than the balancing mode. In the military case, the CSTO is the only offer for Armenia as NATO means Turkey. The risk comes uni- laterally from an external dimension and there was no other offer ready to satisfy the Armenian military need. Regarding the economic risk, the Armenian decision makers move closer to the hedging behaviour in pondering this risk. Here Armenia has other option as well, than just the Russian market. In here, Armenia is both member of the EAEU and member of the European initiatives such as the ENP and the EaP. Joining the EAEU de-

143 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. P.32 144 jam-news.net/russian-military-base-in-armenia-security-or-threat/ 145 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35949991

81 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING creases the Armenian long-term economic revenues but it satisfies the short terms for the Armenian market. At the same time Armenia is able to manage to keep the western gate open146. CEPA highly involves Armenia at both an economic and normative aspect. Fairer rules to keep business and jobs developing in the path of a friendly development stand together with new educational opportunities and strengthened democratic human rights all along147. Therefore, despite the close and essential relationship with Russia, Armenia does not refuse to uphold significant and valid alternative to the Russian economic and cultural ties. The last but not the least genre is the political one. This is particularly interesting in light of the recent internal development within the Armeni- an political scenario taking in the account the flourishing post-Velvet Revo- lution happenings. At the decision making’s level Armenia turns on a change in power. The political scenario in Armenia has been reshuffled by the Velvet Revolution and the last parliamentary election in 2018. The former Armeni- an president Serzh Sargsyan tried to become prime minister of Armenia at the end of his second presidential term, as the prime minister role has been enhanced after the constitutional change in 2015. Armenia changed from a presidential regime to a parliamentary one. According to Sargsyan himself now “parliamentary system of governance has become a reality for our country. It means also development of the partisan system which is an important prerequisite for any democratic state”. Consequently, the Armenian people triggered this peaceful revolution to demonstrate against Sargsyan’s attempt to keep his power entering

146www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_armenia_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_the_ view_from_yerevan387 147 eng_cepa_factsheet_armenia_digital

82 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood by the back door. Since the 13th of April, the people went on the streets to protest and they obtained the resignation of Sargsyan and Nikol Pashinyan became prime minister as already described in the previous chapters. After this change in power a huge political responsibility lies on Pashinyan’s shoulder. As a matter of fact, he stated the willing to keep the relations with Russia going on and the new Armenian political authorities do not want to take any political risk from the revolution. They keep the complementary multi-vector “and-and”148 alive and functioning at the foreign policy level. The normalization and the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the improvement of the economic condition and people’s great expectations on this new political elite merge the risk genres into the Armenian complementary foreign policy. Therefore, categorising the Armenian manoeuvres according to deconstruction of the hedging strategy describes the degree of the Armenian bandwagon, balancing or hedging foreign policy.

5.1.2 The introduction to the deconstructed application

A decade ago, academic authors were undoubtedly right in writing that “the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict has forced Armenia into a narrow paradigm of state survival as a Russian military ally and economic satellite”149, but a decade after the things have undoubtedly changed. Further- more, few members of the Armenian decision-making elite posed questions

148 This definition “and-and” pops out many time during the unofficial moments during the interviews I got. This concept was especially underlined by respondent number 1 and number 4 149 Wilson, A and Popescu, N, 2009: "Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. European Council on For- eign Relations, London, UK. Routledge, Taylor&Francis. p. 322

83 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING about the doable strong presence of Russian troops at the Armenian border, since Armenia sorts out to help Nagorno Karabach paying by itself the bill150. The decision was something more than just a simple matter of time for soldiers. Nevertheless, considering the aforementioned point made by Wilson and Popescu ten years ago, the number of the Russian soldiers have slightly decreased in the meanwhile. Today the Russian soliders are 3000 instead of the 5000 of ten years ago151. Armenia has moved toward a more neutral position in the international arena and its foreign policy looks at the Europe- an Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership offers in a more pleasant and independent way. The perilous path of Armenian-EU relationship provides a good shoot for Armenia to counter balance the Russian economic offers and to move towards a more neutral ‘economic pragmatism’. By an international point of view then, even after the Velvet Revolu- tion and after the last parliamentary elections in December, 2018, Pashinyan doesn’t push for a revolution, he doesn’t want to realize a ‘U-turn’ foreign policy. Armenia won’t start to discuss any membership in the Russian-based international organization as well as it won’t close the Russian military base in Armenia. Undoubtedly, Armenia won’t join any western military alliance but Pashinyan clearly wants to move towards the EU and from the EU he awaits strong help aiding Armenia in developing internal democratic patterns as well as keeping Azerbaijan far away from escalating the conflict in Nagorno

150 https://www.armenianow.com/news/28963/russian_military_base_gyumri 151 Wilson, A and Popescu, N, 2009: "Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. European Council on For- eign Relations, London, UK. Routledge, Taylor&Francis. P. 322

84 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Karabach152, and also Turkey far away from interfering with the supporting Azerbaijan. More specifically, it is remarkably interesting the call made by the Armenian prime minister to NATO. Even if Armenia has no close future prospect in joining NATO, Mr. Pashinyan underlines the Armenian participation in two NATO missions and he stresses also the considerable importance of an international and peaceful solution to the Nagorno Karabach matter153. By an inner affairs’ point of view, Mr. Pashinyan tries to focus on the improvement of the democratic reforms relying on the European support, which Donald Tusk is utterly to confirm and provide154. Furthermore, fighting the corruption among the state employees and improving the economy are topics highly perceived by the Armenian public opinion155. The firm willing by the side of the Armenian prime minister to decisively solve the endemic and widespread corruption issue shall not interfere with the international relations. A prominent victim of the new willing is the former president Kocharyan156. Some respondents and people in Yerevan point at this fight for corruption as step away from the Russian influence. However, the arrest of Kocharyan falls in the anti-corruption wave initiated by Pash- inyan157. Despite Kocharyan is claiming a certain degree of revenge against

152 https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-in-brussels-we-expect-more-assistance 153 https://www.euronews.com/2018/07/12/watch-full-interview-with-armenia-s- prime-minister 154 http://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/07/12/Nikol- Pashinyan-Donald-Tusk/ 155 https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/02/armenia-and-the-velvet-revolution-the- merits-and-flaws-of-a-protest-based-civil-society/ 156 https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29877150.html 157 https://transparency.am/en/news/view/2596

85 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING him, the Court proceeds in the case against him158. The conviction of the once upon time ‘semi-monarch’ of Armenia may provoke some interferences from foreign power159, someone perceives this arrest as the reloca- tion’s sign of the Armenian chessboard160. The people on the streets suggest that Mr. Putin called asking for information about his old Armenian friend, Pashinyan never picks the phone up. The fight against corruption within all the aspects of the Armenian political life projects Armenia between the East and the West and to the global dimension161. Underlining the civil involvement in the Velvet Revo- lution and its civil society’s framework, the prime minister remarks the absolute Armenian nature of this democratic transition.

5.2 The deconstruction of the Armenian foreign behaviour

Bearing in mind the hedging strategy, the ‘middle earth’, between the balance strategies and the bandwagoning strategies by Professor Kuik, this research applies factors of the hedging strategy looking at reasons of the decisions and to study the consequences of the decisions taken by the Ar- menian decision-makers. The application of Kuik’s scheme defines whether Armenia wants to bandwagon with Russia\EU or whether it wants more to keep an hedging position responding to its national interests.

158 https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29877150.html 159 Derluguian, G, Hovhannisyan, R: “The Armenian anomaly: Toward an interdisciplinary interpretation” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. The Journal of post-soviet democratization. Volume, 26, Number 4, Fall 2018. Demokratizatsiya. Page 462. 160 Chess is considered to be the most popular sport among the population. They are actually proud of this incoming event in May 2019. https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2019/02/21/international-chess- conference/2075577 161 https://oc-media.org/armenias-u-turn-back-to-multi-vector-foreign-policy//

86 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood The clashing interests in the region, the internal and external dimensions of the Armenian reality, the European interests and expectations, the Russian presence and willing and the other regional actors can sometime misunderstand or misjudge what happens at the internal level of a state.

5.2.1 The Indirect Balancing

The indirect balancing is a cross contingency risk aiming to forge a military alliance minimizing the security risk for Armenia. The Armenian membership in the CSTO aims to fulfil this purpose, as it grants the Russian military assistance in case of any aggression. This condition satisfies the rule of the balancing, allying with another power or super power allows the weaker state to forge a defensive cooperation or upgrade the possibility of own military162. In the Armenian case the risk connected to the international relations is composed by direct threats to the Armenian security: the Nagorno Karabach conflict and the Turkish support to the Azerbaijani side of the war. The military risk for Armenia comes from the state of semi-frozen war, even the conflict sometime does escalate163, with Azerbaijan and the Turk- ish support to the Azerbaijan cause in Nagorno Karabach. Again, the indirect balancing from Kuik, who says in his articles that the indirect balancing doesn’t directly aim to balance a specific country, suits perfectly the Arme- nian situation but it does suit a different reality than the ASEAN countries’ one.

162 Kuik, C, C 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P.170 163 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325

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What makes the indirect balancing suiting well in the Armenian way to the Armenian reality is the geographical position of the Russian base. It is sufficient looking to Google Maps to realise that the Russian presence in Armenia aims to counter balance an uncertain situation with Turkey keeping the status quo going on patrolling the border with both Russian and Armeni- an patrols. Gyumri is around 13 km far away from the blocked Armeni- an\Turkish border. Hence, it is not clear whose benefit comes first because of the Russian base in Gyumri. Armenians use the Russian base to keep uncertain Turkish threat under secure control and the Russians use the Gyumri base to have a huge boot on the ground close to the NATO borders and to some extent close to the Middle East. Despite the smallness of the Russian base, the distance from the Iranian border and the poor condition of the Armenian infrastructure to supply it, the base is still a military presence in the South Caucasus. This small needle can be always an emergency base for any need. In addition to this situation peculiar regional Armenian situation, the indirect balancing acquires a peculiar Armenian aspect, as Armenia does not directly oppose the EU or the Russian Federation vis-à-vis. On the contrary, Armenia needs Russia and Europe not facing each other in the region, it tries to keep the ‘and-and’ situation doable. In one hand, the Russians hold the military base in Gyumri at the Turkish borders, the military risk pushes the Armenian decision makers to tighten the military alliance between Russia and Armenia. At least, being a member of the CSTO allows Armenia to count on the Russian military aid in any case and it allows Armenia to directly acquire Russian weaponry

88 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood enjoying a strong discount on real prices164. The Russian military offer also is highly evaluated in Armenia as the result of the long historical connections with Russia. Back in history a part of the Armenians was under the Russian Tsarist empire and during the Soviet era, the Armenian republic was directly part of the Soviet Union. It is natural for Armenians to trust the Russian military aid to counter-balance the aggressive aspirations from Azerbaijan and the Turkish support to them. It balances indirectly the lack of a military and security offer from the EU. On the other hand, the EU has no intention to establish a military presence in the region to challenge Russia and Russia does not want to have a replay of the situation occurred in Georgia in 2008. As we can see, the CEPA does not offer any military option165, since the EU can just deploy some peace-keeping, conflict prevention and peace-enforcement missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)166. Armenia is firstly in need of military assistance for its national security and the EU is not a security provider, it is a security customer though and the security provider is NATO. Armenia can’t buy what the EU is not able to sell. Here comes the direct issue of the indirect balancing behaviour from the Armenian side. Armenia participates at some missions and NATO initia- tives167 but NATO has no influence in the Nagorno Karabach’s solution. The U.S.A and France are the members of the Alliance sitting at the Co- Chaired OSCE Minsk group that is in charge to mediate the Nagorno

164 Markarov, A, Davtyan, A. 2018. “Post-Velvet Revolution Armenia’s Foreign Policy Challenges” in in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. The Journal of post-soviet democratization. Volume, 26, Number 4, Fall 2018. Demokratizatsiya. Page 539 165 eng_cepa_factsheet_armenia_digital 166 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en 167 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48893.htm

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Karabach issue. However, the Armenian presence in the CSTO and the Turkish membership in NATO are the main denying blocks to a further integration. Eventually, the idea developed by Kuik for the ASEAN countries does not completely suit with the Armenian case, as stated above. The Ar- menian enemies in the South Caucasus are not the EU or NATO, but still Armenia needs the military alliance with Russia to oppose the Turkish and the Azerbaijani threats. This need leads Armenia to accept the Russian presence in Armenia not to balance an Armenian enemy but to uphold a bar- gaining chip with an ally. The Armenian need of military supply creates the favourable situation for Russia to have a foot in the south Caucasus moni- toring the border with NATO. The contingency of the Turkish\Azeri danger then moves Armenia from a balancing strategy to a limited-bandwagon strategy with Russia and the EU. When Armenia balances against the indirect Turkish danger and the real Azerbaijani threat, it does limitedly follow or satisfy the Russian offers and request. On the contrary, it still indirectly limits this bandwagon keeping in high consideration the tasks and the presence of the Co-Chaired Minsk group and considering the tiny NATO collaboration always open to any new initiatives.

5.2.2 Dominance Denial

The dominance denial has been employed by Armenia since the beginning of its independent foreign policy fighting against the direct danger to its survival and for the Artsakh. This concept clearly suits with the pivotal concept of the Armenian foreign policy: multi-vector complementarism. It means that the Armenian foreign policy can’t suffer the dominance imposed by any of its international allies or partners. The line of the Armenian for-

90 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood eign policy has to lie on Armenian hands in order to be efficient in granting the best chance for the survival of the Armenian state. Just in this case, Ar- menia is fully able to play the balance of the interests between its partners keeping the Armenian partnership pleasing for them. According to the definition of foreign policy by the Armenia ministry for the Foreign Affairs, the EU and Russia play the major role in the radar of the Armenian interests. Still sticking to the Armenian ministry’s declaration, the Armenian National Security Strategy dates its formulation to a document approved on January 26th, 2007 at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office168. Despite the changes, the Armenian republic still have to redefine its National Security concept, as no news documents came out from the official channels in the meanwhile. The European and the Russian presences in Armenia have the same equal dignity in the eyes of Armenia and Armenia ought to freely pick up pondering between the offers coming from all its partner169s. The intentions of the Armenian official foreign policy is to keep building a special partnership and friendship towards Russia along with the integration into the Euro- pean family and the cooperation with its all instruments, institutions and organizations170. Especially after the Velvet Revolution Armenia wants follow its principle of orienting the Armenian complementarism toward a multi-vector search for different partners. Armenia tries to minimize the political risk of

168 REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, approved at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office on January 26, 2007 169 https://www.mfa.am/en/foreign-policy/ 170 https://www.mfa.am/en/foreign-policy/

91 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING total subservience171 both to Russia or to the EU, claiming the right to lead the business and the partnerships as an equal partner with everyone. After the signature and partial ratification of CEPA the renewed Armenian-EU relationship seems to lightly suggest to Russia to “don’t dictate us in a hegemonic way, or we will have no choice but to move closer to other powers”172. Armenia clearly want to establish regular relations with the EU without renouncing to the Russian military aid and the common market of the EAEU. According to respondent number 8, Russia realised that the Vel- vet Revolution was the answer, the indirect balance from the Armenian people, to the corrupted and Russian influenced Sargsyan’s regime. According to this complementary behaviour of denying a monopoli- sation of Armenian foreign policy’s space, the current prime Minister Pash- inyan equally reassures the EU’s chiefs and the Russian president confirm the political commitment in carrying on both the equal partnerships. Pash- inyan visited both the EU and Russia during his first year and half as acting and after the election in December 2018173 as elected prime minister, as the press release of the office of the Armenian prime minister demonstrates174. Armenia wants to talk to both the partners without triggering any discord among Armenia, Russia and the EU. The respondent number 4 says that in all the political hedging actions, Armenia has always to explain the

171 Kuik, C, C, and Roznam, G. 2015. “Introduction to 'Light or Heavy Hedging: Positio- ning between China and the United States” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America). Page 3 172 Kuik, C, C 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P.170 173 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic of Armenia, EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 9 December 2018, ODIHR Election Observa- tion Mission Final Report; Warsaw 7 March 2019. 174 http://www.primeminister.am/en/foreign-visits/

92 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood objective rational reasons of its choice to the other partner without diminish- ing the Armenian commitment in the other partnership. If Armenia talks to Georgia for a secure passage to reach the European market, despite its strong competitiveness, Armenia has to explain its reasons to the Russian ally. If Armenia prefers to enter the Russian custom Union, Armenia has to reassure the EU with no radical changes to the Armenian-European partnership. Furthermore, the Armenian political hedge tends also to the involvement of the international organizations to the Caucasus. The great re- gardful respect for the activities of the Minsk group’s175 decisions over the situation in Nagorno Karabach attempts to keep also the international community directly involved in the status-quo situation in the region, according with the principle provided by Kuik of “involving other powers in regional affairs”176. This Armenian approach to stick to the international organizations’ decisions for the region profs the attempts to minimize the political risks of subservience177. Basically, the Armenian political hedging balances between the security issue and the economic need obliges Armenia to mind more the responds to the Armenian decisions than the decisions themselves. Making it clear, the economic proposal from the Russian economic based EAEU does

175 https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/413813 176 Kuik, C, C 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P.170 177 Kuik, C, C and Roznam, G. 2015. “Introduction to 'Light or Heavy Hedging: Positio- ning between China and the United States” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America). Page 3

93 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING not just regard the tariffs’ law between the EU and the members of other custom unions. The eyebrows178 raised in Brussels were aware of the Russian aspirations beyond the Russian pro-forma regionalism. The EU is a bit sceptical about the Russian intentions and it fears that the membership in EAEU “helps Russia to impose its will on the speed, format, width, and depth of Eurasian integration; this entails limits for Armenia as an EEU member state”179. The same thoughts may arise in Moscow, as according to respondent number 4 sometime the Russians see the Armenians as too close to the EU. Especially, this suspect seems to grow after the Velvet Revolution.

5.2.3 Economic Pragmatism and diversification

The economic pragmatism is “the act of profit-maximizing itself does not carry any value of power acceptance or rejection”180 and carrying on such economic maximizing behaviour requires also the diversification among the sources of such profit-maximizing in the international relations. This is also Kuik’s most “neutral” point within his theory, as it lies on the exact middle point between the ‘risk contingency options’ and the ‘returns-

178 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. P.32 179 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. P.42 180Kuik, C, C 2008. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China” in Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Stra- tegic Affairs. Project MUSE. P. 167

94 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood maximizing options’181. It is also the point where the risk should regard just the economic nature of the international relationship. In the Armenian case, this economic risk and profit maximization absorbs a great time span. Therefore, the economic diversification harmonises the Armenian intention to deny a predominant political role to any of its partner. At the economic level, the political denial of an absolute dependence assumes the name of pragmatic differentiation of economic links. These links are meant to maximise the benefits for both the actors got involved, the Armenian membership in the EAEU and the signature of CEPA clearly show the Ar- menian will to keep the pendulum swinging on182. The risk here strikes the economic background of the hedging strategy in seeking for a complementarism between the East and the West. Here Armenia plays at the best of its skills the possibility to build a bridge between these two partners. In the economic field closely ties itself with the political field of interests and sometime it may happen that business turns to be a strong political instrument. By nature, the economic risk should just concern the independent maximization of the profits but profits may assume also other ways of being. In the South Caucasus, the Armenian pendulum seems to be the most skilful swinging pendulum between maximizing the economic profits and keeping the economic business just at an economic level among all the others.

181 Kuik, C, C, and Roznam, G. 2015. “Introduction to 'Light or Heavy Hedging: Positio- ning between China and the United States” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America). Page 3 182 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

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However, Syzuanna Vasylian argues in her article183 suggests the subordination to the security interest in the Armenian case but on the other side the respondent number four aims its attention to a broad complex behaviour than the hierarchy of interests. The entrance in the EAEU for Ar- menia doesn’t mean a subordination of economic business to the military security need, it just ratifies the importance of the Russian leaded market for Armenia and the historical ties with Russia. It draws a natural update of the Armenian-Russian search for more profitable economic relations. Accord- ing to him, “CEPA is almost the same document but the custom union fees are different, due to the different Armenian position once entered the EEU. All the other aspects are similar.”184 There is an old Latin motto that fully recaps this concept theorized by Kuik, “pecunia non olet”185. Through all the centuries of the human history, decision makers always tried to stick to the truth that business is business and political concerns should never try to affect it. The Armenian choices between the European and the Russian economic offers raise many eyebrows186 in Yerevan, Brussels and Moscow but business for Armenia still goes both ways. The pragmatic approach to the usage of this tool de- termines the success of the failure of the maximization the profits and benefits from the Armenian relations.

183 “ibit 184 Respondent N. 4 interview. 185 “Pecunia non olet” is a Latin saying. The phrase is ascribed to the Roman emperor Vespasian arguing with a person about taxes on urinal. He answered that money has no smell. Cash is always cash and it doesn’t matter its origin. 186 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. P.32

96 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Again, the economic relations between Armenia, the EU and Russia just apparently are based on a neutral economic pragmatic ground. In addition to such peculiar economic pragmatic background, the phenomenon of the Armenian Diaspora covers plays an important role. The working Dias- pora impacts the Armenian economic life facilitating the building of international ties for Armenia. The Diaspora’s net helps to invest in Armenia, con- tributes to the economic growth of the Armenian Republic and it bears the Armenian cause at a worldwide stage187. The Armenian Republic provides a service for the international cooperation through the Ministry of the La- bour and the Social issue to attract foreign investments. The cooperation covers especially those states where the Armenian Diaspora is present with a strong community188. Then, the main economic question to respond: does Armenia reach the maximization of the profit minimizing the economic risk while differen- tiating the economic partners? Hence, the economic pragmatism in the Armenian case does not just focus on establishing profitable economic ties with the economic partners, but it suggests projecting Armenia to receive other benefits than the economic ones. The decision makers have to establish a balancing behaviour between, on one hand, the urgent security and military needs that Russia can respond and, on the other hand, the benefits from the process of normative and economic relations with the EU.

187 https://www.imigrantarmenia.eu/investementclimate/ 188 http://employment.am/en/index.html

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5.2.4 Pragmatism in relation with Russia

In 2013 Armenia refused to deepen the economic ties with the EU rejecting the Association Agreement in favour of the entrance in the Rus- sian-based economic union and many were the reasons, but none comes primarily from an economic circumstance189. The Armenian decision- makers weight the security and military fate of Armenia on the balance of economic relations at the time they had to chose between the EAEU offer and the EU one. However, the Armenian foreign ministry states that Russia is Armenia’s key foreign trade partner190 and also the EU plays a pivotal role in the Armenian economic turnover191. Regarding the maximization of the profits coming from the economic partnership with Russia\EAEU, there is a peculiar flow of money from Russia to Armenia. The new Armenian Diaspora mainly dwells in Rus- sia192due to the lack of the job offer and the growing unemployment rate in Armenia193. The data of the exchanges at the official level between Russia and Armenia, unfortunately stuck at the last update in 16.12.2016, from the Ar- menian foreign ministry report that “in January-October period of 2016 the turnover reached USD 1 billion 76 million, which is higher by 13.4% in comparison with the corresponding period of 2015. Meanwhile, the export of Armenian products in the mentioned period grew by 52.8%, comprising USD 295 million, import by trade country increased by 8% and by 3.3% by

189 http://thearmenite.com/2014/12/armenia-chose-eurasian-economic-union/ 190 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/ru 191 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu 192 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/armenia-population/ 193 http://employment.am/en/38/free.html

98 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood country of origin”194. Furthermore, the Russian investments aim to contribute to the development of the Armenian economy at all its levels from the financial sector to the investments in the mines. Undoubtedly, the Russian economic partnership for Armenia is highly valuable and further, still sticking in the Russian partnership economic consequences, Armenian profit’s maximization means the Armenian chair in the EAEU. Therefore, the EAEU offers even a broader market than the Russian alone that covers around the 2% of the world’s trade195, despite the geographical detachment Union, Armenia is able to enjoy the share of the EAEU’s market. According to the respondent 1 the EAEU responds to the Armenian short-term economic needs while for respondent number 4 in a way Armenia is constrained by the geographical proximity and the already established relations with the post-Soviet space. Russian pipelines are closer than the EU and also the EU buys raw materials from Russia. Eventually, the economic maximized profit does not just regard the classic patterns of economic turnouts. The Armenian economic pragmatism at the Russian stage also lies on grating the Russian presence in Armenia to counter balance the Russian arms refuelling to Azerbaijan196. Economic loyalty is a pragmatic coin of exchange in the Armenian relations with Rus- sia and it allows to buy goods that go beyond the balance of trades between two countries.

194 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/ru 195 http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about-info 196 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-azerbaijan-arms/russia-starts- delivering-1-billion-arms-package-to-azerbaijan-idUSBRE95H0KM20130618 https://www.foxnews.com/world/azerbaijan-hikes-military-spending-to-3-7b-as- tensions-persist-with-neighboring-armenia https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms- trade-4-billion-amid-tension-with-armenia

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5.2.5 Pragmatism in relation with the EU

If the economic pragmatism within the Armenia-Russia relations goes also further covering the security issue for Armenia, the EU-Armenia relations mean stabilizing and improving economic, educational and normative benefits. Since the rejection of the Association Agreement in 2013, the EU has been developing a new way to perform the maximization of profits of the Armenian-European partnership. Regardless of the restricted Armeni- an flexibility197 after the entrance in the EAEU, the EU and Armenia signed the CEPA agreement in 2017 confirming the fair intents from both partners. Armenia grabs from the CEPA with the EU to counter balance the empty sector left by the Armenian membership in the EAEU: the normative\legal collaboration coming alongside also an enhanced political and economic collaboration. However, CEPA is not the unique aspect of the Armenian-European economic partnership and other agreements, documents, statements and European instruments compose such puzzle. Strictly sticking to the maximization of the economic profits from the ties with the EU, Armenian cooperation with the European states makes the EU responsible “for 23.6% of Armenia's total foreign trade. The EU is also the biggest export market for Armenia with a 26.7% share. In terms of the imports, the EU is the second biggest partner for Armenia with a 22% share”198, as the ministry of the Armenian foreign affairs states. One of the most interesting economic benefit coming from the Armenian presence in

197 Vasilyan. S. 2017. “Swinging on a Pendulum: Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and With the European Union” in Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 64, no. 1; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. P.42 198 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu

100 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood the European external projects regards its possibility to export 6400 goods in all the EU’s member states for a zero-duty rate. By the European point of the partnership, the European data shows us that the economic relationship with Armenia produces European exports in Armenia goods and services around 1 billion € and European imports from Armenia around €500 million 199. In 2013 the European imports from Armenia reached the value of €261 million while last year in 2018 they reach the value of €373 million. In 2018 the European imports from Arme- nia reached the value of €373 million while the exports to Armenia reached the value of €86 million. Overall, the volume of the economic exchanges has been a discontinuous process towards a growth of the volume of the total trade’s € millions. In 2018 total trade’s volume reached the highest peak since 2008, it amounts to €1236 million. Even in the case of economic pragmatism regarding the European offer Armenia gains benefits from the CEPA in other fields than economy: more business opportunities and fairer rules for economic competitions, direct accesses to European educational institutions and empowered democratic and civil society’s patterns and more environmental protection and greener energetic rules200. CEPA follows improving all the European values and norms. Eventually, the statistics from the European Commission – Direc- torate-General for Trade clearly underlines the massive impact of the Euro- pean presence in the Armenian economic life. Armenia import from Russia covers €1,065 million or 25.3 % of the toal share and the import from the EU covers €864 million or 23.1 % of the total share. Together Russia and

199 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/armenia/ 200 eng_cepa_factsheet_armenia_digital

101 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING the EU handle a good half of the Armenian imports. Regarding the Armeni- an exports to Russia covers €564 million or 27.6 % of the total share and the 28EU covers €373 million or the 26.7 % of the total share201.

5.2.6 Binding Engagement

Armenia always strives to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with the bigger partners maximizing the benefits produced by international multi-sector cooperative arrangements and institutions. The Armenian effort aspires to get its partners always present and involved in the regional quarrels in the Caucasus. In case of the relations with the EU, binding-engagement reflects both the engagement and the binding aspect of this behaviour. The Armeni- an binding engagement attempts do not just refer to the last agreement, the CEPA. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenia-EU relationship has developed a common engagement in a more and more binding result. The objective and clear hints of the EU engagement in the Armenian reality come from several joint commitments signed between the two partners: international treaties such as the CEPA, joint declarations and the common deliverables and objectives. We have tangible proofs looking at the Armenian presence in the ENP, in the EaP and in the fairly economic initiatives such as the EU GSP+. Both partners bilaterally bind each other together institutionalising the cooperation coming from the common engagement. Clearly, the binding-engagement is present in the Armenian foreign policy towards the EU and its external service’s tools, Armenia accepts in a positive way the EU offers.

201 European Union, Trade with Armenia; European Commission - Directorate-General for Trade. 19-03-2019.

102 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood The Armenian ministry of economic development and invest- ments202 and the ministry of the foreign affairs203 organize, implement and coordinate the European activities in the Armenian Republic. There are two the symbolic actions from both sides in showing the common binding willingness to proceed in the partnership. Firstly, on May 1, 2005 the Armenian Republic established an own Trade Representation to the European Union and a trade representative was appointed there204. Secondly, the EU has established a European delegation to Armenia whose current Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary is Mr. Dr. Piotr Antoni Świtalski205. The signature of CEPA on 24 November within the EaP strategies draws an even closer engagement of the partners in many topics. Juridical, economics, human rights and normative are the fields in which Armenia and EU engage them most and commit to deepen this engagement in light of the last CEPA. The Armenian expectations of European aids in further pushing the democratizing, anti corruption and human rights’ empowerment and the European commitment in deepening the relationship with Armenia and in the region reflect both the binding meaning given by Kuik. The EU and Armenia push ahead their common engagement for: a better environment for the investments for all the partners allowing the EU and Armenia to exchange goods and subsidies; an empowered civil society merging both European and Armenian civil platforms; common fight against terrorism; improving the anti-corruption norms and attitudes; improving the consumers’ protection and building a greener and wealthier en-

202 http://mineconomy.am/en/783 203 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu 204 http://mineconomy.am/en/783 205https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia_en/895/AbouttheEUDelegationtoAr menia

103 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING vironment206 By its nature, CEPA does not tie in an exclusive way Armenia to the EU warding off the plausible relations with other actors in the region. At the Armenian-Russian level, the binding-engagement bears out the Armenian needs of Russian security and military aids. The diplomatic ties both the bilateral and multilateral levels developed acknowledging the Russian massive impact accounted the historical and the political common heritage. In this engagement regards, the military aspect is still a pivotal element for the Armenian-Russian relationship. The symbolic value of the Russian military base in Gyumri satisfies the Armenian diplomatic effort to keep Russia in Armenia. Furthermore, in terms of Russian-Armenian relations the post-soviet legacy still persists and all the ties between Russia and Armenia share a common history that goes back to the early ‘20s of the last century. Due to the communist development of the region nowadays Arme- nian infrastructure and energy sector is handed by the Russian207. Within the infrastructural sector, the railways play an important role for the Russian engagement in the Armenian life. The company operating the Armenian railways is a Russian based organization208 established by a treaty between the Armenian republic and the Joint-Stock company signed in Yerevan on February 13th, 2008 and it started its operation on June 1st, 2008. The company transports both persons and goods within the Armenia and from Yerevan to Tbilisi. However, the main matter is the Russian project to develope the Ar- menian railways connection at the national level to project the Armenian crossroad to the regional reality. There are two main direction towards

206 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/896/armenia- and-eu_en 207 https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/armenia/armenia_economy.html 208 http://ukzhd.am/en_about_company.html

104 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood which the Joint-Stock company pushes ahead the Armenian communications with the international world. On one hand by the way of Georgia, the Russian company wants to connect Armenia with Turkey and Russia. On the other hand, Russia needs to cross Armenia to reach Iran and its market. Opening the railroad to Iran helps also the states beyond the Caucasus region. The whole project costs 3.2 USD billions, 6 years of works and it ex- tends the railroads for something around 305 km209. At the bilateral level of maximizing the diplomatic benefits binding Russia attached to the Armenian reality through the presence of Russian business in Armenian key sector. It is also helpful for Armenia to institu- tionalise the relations between the partners. Looking at the geographical map of the EAEU it is clear that Arme- nia is the only member of the Russian lead organization in the Caucasus and the Armenian crossroad is a pivotal factor in allowing the construction of an intestates economic net that helps the regional states and the neighbours of the Caucasus. Furthermore, Armenia and Russia respect the binding aspect of the Kuik’s theory due to the Armenian presence in CIS, CSTO and EAEU and in addition to more than “over 250 interstate, intergovernmental and inter- departmental treaties and agreements, including Treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance of August 29, 1997”210. The Armenian presidents, ministries and politicians visit many time their Russian col-

209 «South Caucasus Railway» CJSC The perspectives of Armenia’s and South Caucasus Railway Integration into the Eurasian Transport System. 12th session of the Group of Experts on Euro-Asian Transport Links Geneva, Switzerland. 3-4 February, 2015. 210 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/ru

105 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING leagues as well as the colleagues from all over the EAEU, CIS and CSTO in established and well know structures of communications.

5.2.7 Limited-Bandwagon

The bandwagon processes are quite elaborated in the Armenian case, sometime the ‘pure’ and the ‘limited’ bandwagon lessen their effects or consequences merging in some areas. Undoubtedly, the Armenian bandwagon attitudes towards Russia establishes an interesting case to study within the Armenian foreign policy, as Armenia can’t afford to commit itself to a zero-sum game. Armenia has to deal with the international reality that affects the regional environment trying to keep the more international actors as it can. In the military hand, Armenia involving the political bandwagoning behaviour with Russia leads to a pro-Russian alignment regarding the military aspect with no illusion about the Armenian dependency by the Russian military. Once again, Armenia is a member of the CSTO and the Armenia military equipment comes from Russian factories211 and Armenia length- ened the time of their presence at the 102 Russian base in Gyumri212 following a procedure that has been already adopted years before by the Armenian government213. Borders’ safety invokes some restrictive burdens to carry. Regardless of some claims and doubts from the inner Armenian political front, Armenia was not able and it is still not able to refuse neither constrain the Russian presence at the Turkish border. The Russian military police is

211 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armenia/army.htm 212 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7952433/Russia- to-beef-up-military-presence-in-former-Soviet-space.html 213 https://www.armenianow.com/news/28963/russian_military_base_gyumri

106 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood present at the Armenian border with Turkey conducting an operation of surveillance and borders’ protection with the Armenian army214. Despite the Turkish membership in the Alliance, Armenia has established some relations with NATO215. However, Armenia by no chance can apply to enter NATO neither NATO has ever mentioned a future enlargement regarding Armenia nor the Armenian Foreign Ministry talks about such topic216. In addition, Armenia opted for the CSTO and the Turkish membership in the NATO stimulates the Armenian rejection of NATO’s membership. NATO’s collaboration is useful for Armenia in order to avoid the zero sum up game with Russia. Armenian peacekeepers are present in Kosovo and in Afghanistan alongside the NATO’s mission and there are no rejections at the political levels for Armenia to establish normalised relations and keeping them going on217. The bandwagon behaviour shapes the form of the political alignment via military agreement. Despite the strong links created by the military cooperation, Armenia avoids the zero-sum game and the hierarchical master- satellite order with Russia. Despite Armenia huge acquirement of Russian weapons218, it receives from the collaboration with the NATO countries useful experiences in the defence and security reforms219. The political limited bandwagon with Russia keeps going on according to the last statements from the current prime minister of Armenia there

214 https://armenpress.am/eng/news/847527/russian-border-patrol-servicemen- detain-trespasser-crossing-from-turkey-to-armenia.html 215 http://www.natoinfo.am/en/armenia-nato-relations/ 216 https://www.mfa.am/en/international-organisations/3 217 http://www.natoinfo.am/en/news/308/ 218 https://massispost.com/2018/03/armenia-continues-acquire-new-weapons- russia/ 219 http://www.natoinfo.am/en/armenia-nato-relations/

107 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING won’t any ‘U-turn’ in the Armenian foreign policy. During the visit in the U.S last September, the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan delivered a message to the UN and he clearly underlines this point. He decleared that “Despite the radical transformations in the internal political life, our foreign policy agenda does not have U-turns. The continuity of Armenia’s foreign policy depicts Armenia as a predictable and reliable partner.” 220. The strong ‘pure’ bandwagon with Russia concerning military, political and economic fields does not quash the Armenian relations’ late developments with the EU. The zero-sum game and the hierarchical superior- subordinate scheme don’t occur in the Armenian-Russian relations. If they occurred in this case, there would have never been an independent choice from Armenia to take back the Armenia-EU relationship after the rejection of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 and the entrance in the EAEU. Especially after the Georgian war in 2008 and the Ukrainian issue in 2014 the strong polarization between the EU and the Russia doesn’t allow to drive both directions with no consequences. However, it is fundamental for Armenia to keep the multi-vector complementarism going on. On the Armenia-EU hand, a definitive and pure Armenian estrange- ment from the EU has never occurred on the contrary the EU has been working to reach the CEPA and to move further in deepening the cooperation. Armenia looks to the EU even with the burden of Russian presence and the urgent need of Russian asset to keep the Minsk group working on a far away peaceful solution for the Nagorno Karabach issue with no territorial transfers221. Armenia has to ponder cautiously the steps towards the EU but, after all, the signature of the CEPA and the Velvet Revolution could be per-

220 http://www.primeminister.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2018/09/24/Nikol- Pashinyan-working-visit-New-York/ 221 https://www.mfa.am/en/foreign-policy/

108 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood ceived as signs of slightly unchaining foreign policy. Then, Armenia is clearly fighting to keep own autonomy and independency avoiding the hierarchy-setting up and the new bid from the EU is highly useful in pursuing this goal. Recently, the EU through its most important personalities posi- tively judge the last Armenian democratic developments and endorse the full support in boosting the democratic reforms. Donald Tusk states that Armenia “can rely on EU’s backing on the way to democratic reforms”222. Definitely, the Armenian bandwagon behaviour regarding the EU is a limited bandwagon. There is no military bandwagon neither the game is a zero-sum neither the two actors establish a hierarchical order under which they shape own relationship. Eventually, the two major powers use both hard and soft powers’ tools to keep Armenia as close as they can to their neighbourhood policies. However, Armenia ponders the security issue as the pivotal topic for the near future of Armenian foreign policy. An ambivalence of views about being a close Russian ally and the Russian presence that grants the Armeni- an security223, the civil society is divided by irreconcilable points of views about this specific issue. As a result, Armenia manages to work (to more or less extent) with almost all the types of behaviour identified by Kuik in order to keep as more as it can its international placement close to Russia without blemish the relationship with the other major power in the area: the EU.

5.3 The judgment of the Armenian hedging

222 http://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/07/12/Nikol- Pashinyan-Donald-Tusk/ 223 https://eurasianet.org/armenians-hold-mixed-views-of-russian-base-opinion-poll

109 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING

The Armenians find themselves between two major spheresof influence, as it has been described above: the Russian influence and the Europe- an influence meet each other in different fields in Armenia. Also, the Arme- nians find themselves running their business and trying to achieve some other goals than the mere survival such as fostering the economic growth, looking for the worldwide placement of Armenia, deepening the international connections and committing them into the search for a regional solution to the troubles in the South Caucasus224. The stable and long-term peace for the region comes through the international agreement on the solution of the Nagorno Karabach\Artsakh Republic status quo. Even though the merging of conflicting and mutually counteracting nature of the factors beforehand analysed, Armenia tries to be an equal and independent partner in keeping the relations with the EU and Russia. In placing the Armenian decisions into the deconstructed hedging behaviours by Kuik, many elements close to the umbrella of the indirect balancing blend together with the limited-bandwagoning’s elements or strike them back at another level or in another field of the Armenian foreign policy. This conflicting and blended nature of both internal and external intentions, willingness, decisions and outcomes helps Armenia to keep its complementarism safe and sound among the interests of major super powers in the region. The complementarism of the Armenian multi-vector foreign policy is at the same time the main threat and the main road for Armenia. Since the beginning of its foreign political activities, the hedging behaviour between fully bandwagoning with Russia as well as directly or indirectly counterbal- ancing the Russian presence is the main feature of the Armenian foreign

224 https://www.mfa.am/en/foreign-policy/

110 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood political life. As Pashinyan is doing, Armenia keeps close the Russian influence but at the same time Armenia fosters the connections and the ties with Georgia225. The Russian influence can’t avoid Armenia getting closer, especially after the Velvet Revolution, to Georgia. It is vital for the Armenian trade, despite the inadequate infrastructure, Georgia connects Armenia to both the EU and Russia. What Armenia does, this is mainly in the interest of the Armenian people and the Armenian state even if it means to choose an ‘or-or’ situation. Especially after the positive conclusion of the Velvet Revolution, this perception is growing within the population after the anti corruption resolu- tions adopted by Pashinyan at the risk of compromising the relationship with Moscow. The Armenian political elite has always to ponder between the internal and the external dimensions and similarly it has to ponder between Rus- sia and the EU on one hand and Iran and the U.S.A on the other hand. How- ever, this thesis does not cover the American-Iranian dimension of the Ar- menian foreign policy as the most significant developments of the European approaches to the Caucasus on one side and the Russian intentions on the other happen in this European-Russian dimension of the Armenian foreign policy. The clever hedging by tiny Armenia leads the small Caucasian state to be member of a broad set of regional and international organizations. At a more detailed glance, the Armenian membership in EAEU, CIS and CSTO, the Russian based international organizations, tries to allot the Russian presence in the military field while the Armenian presence in the ENP and in the

225 http://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2019/01/15/Nikol- Pashinyan-meeting-Mamuka-Bakhtadze/

111 THE ARMENIAN HEDGING

EaP grants an incoming flux of economic exchanges between Armenia and the European member states. At the same time, Armenia needs both Russia and also the EU. It requires Russia as a military supplier; as the destination for the Armenian labour force and as the agricultural main importer, and it calls for the Europe- an market to import industrial goods and services. The opportunity in Pashinynan’s hands to foster the blooming of the Armenian democratic and stable regime could be the decisive step to attract many more foreign investments in Armenia than the ones already present in Yerevan. Derluguian and Hovhannisyan, introducing the Autumn 2018 publication of “Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization”, share this optimistic point of view also with the people at all the levels of the Armenian society. This notion is tangible among the people in Yerevan and the outcomes of the last parliamentary elections in December 2018 shows the popular endorsement to Pashinyan. He won the elections with 884,864 votes on the 1,256,141 total, it means more or less the 70% of the voters electing Pashinyan. OSCE looks at these elections with some restraints but generally the elections respected the democratic standards226. The military cooperation between Russia and Armenia fulfils the ‘heavy hedgers’ purpose to develope a clear and efficient net of military to face the urgent threat. At the same level, the internal political development with the recent international development of the EU-Armenian relationship fulfils the political ‘heavy hedgers’ behaviour in standing in international institutions and upholding an efficient diplomatic service.

226 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA EAR- LY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 9 December 2018 ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw 7 March 2019.

112 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Despite the fallen of trade exchanges occurred soon after the Arme- nian rejection on 2013227 that are anyway slowly recovering according to the Armenian ministry of foreign affairs228, in light of the new arrangements within the CEPA agreement for further improvement of economic relations, trade, investment and fair competition Armenia is trying to provide a “bridge between the member states of the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union229”.

227 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php?title=File:Trade_in_goods_with_the_EU- 28,_2007,_2012_and_2017_(million_EUR)_ENPE18.png 228 https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu 229 http://eu.mfa.am/en/invest/

113 CONCLUSION

Conclusion

6 Conclusion

This research tried to analyse the hedging strategy present in the Armenian foreign policy in light of the Armenian smallness and the different offers that it recives from Russia and the EU. The Armenian foreign policy acquires the mane of ‘complementarism’ or ‘multi-vector policy’. Through the theoretical lens this thesis showed the importance of the international milieu of the Caucasus in which Armenia lives and struggle for its aims. In reaching its purposes the Armenian foreign policy corresponds to the concepts of the hedging strategy. Cleverly, Armenia is able to merge almost all the indicators provided by professor Kuik to keep good relations with the EU and Russia influenc- ing the balance of Caucasus. In the description of the hedging behaviour between the pure balancing and the pure bandwagon, Armenia finds a com- plementar way handling with both the EU and Russia. In addition to the classical patterns defined by Kuik, the Armenian Diaspora performs an important leverage for the Armenian state bulding the informal connections by the Armenian communities living abroad. The Diaspora also provides manpower for the labour markets of the partners of Armenia and an influential presence in the political life of these countries. Both the European and Russian presences represent the two most important economic, political and diplomatic partners for Armenia. As the data, the treaties and the Armenian presence in many international, intergovernmental and transnational organization have shown, Armenia benefits from the military term to the normative aspect by the partnership it has with the EU and Russia.

114 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood The evolving situation in Armenia leaves many interesting starting points for further researches analysing the future settlements in the Cauca- sus as the post-Velvet Revolution Armenia is still developing. The OSCE statement on March 29th, 2019 over the official meeting between the Armenian Prime Minister and the Azerbaijani President and the meeting on Aprile 15th, 209 in Moscow between the Armenian and Azerbaijan foreign ministers may initiate a new path of events in the region. Furthermore, the EaP deliverables 2020 are close to the end and the CEPA is going to work at its 100% power soon. The GSP+ regime is valid until 2023 and it drawing a productive space in the balance of trades between the EU and Armenia. Their outcomes could draw a new background for the parternship providing new interesting outcomes to analyse and de- codify. Definitly, Armenia appears to be a friendly neutral ground where both the European and Russian interests meet and they are welcomed by Armenia to stay helping Armenia improving its conditions. The developments from the Armenian presence in the EAEU and the CEPA are still ongoing in these years. The Pashinyan’s time will be pivotal defining all these Armenian situations. He has a great responsibility concerning the Rus- sian and European relations, the Nagorno Karabach conflict and the democratization of the Armenian state in light of the complementarism of the Ar- menian foreign policy.

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126 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood (https://www.tert.am/en/news/2015/12/07/president- speech/1867588)

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132 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood Appendix: The Interviews

A few words on the interviews I collected.

I use four main respondents in my thesis and two different sets of questions. These four are the most qualified to be the official sources of this thesis. During my time in Armenia I had the possibility to meet and talk to many other professors and academic personel. They also contributed via unofficial interviews drawing the social, political and civil society’s environment within I conducted my research on the field.

Respondent Number 1 is an Armenian Diplomat Respondent Number 2 is an Armenian PhD Student in the USA Respondent Number 3 is an Armenian journalist Respondent Number 4 is an Armenian Research Institute in behalf of its President.

Due to the working places and official roles that some respondents cover, I decided to put here just the questions I asked. There reader examines the questions but I have to respect the willingness the respondents show me answering my questions. They rather prefer to don’t have the transcripts written here.

Anyway, I am available to anyone who wants to discuss the answers and the feedbacks I have.

1. What were the main motivations that led Armenia to refuse the signature of the AA/DCFTA in 2013? 2. What has changed in Armenian political scenario from the Armenia- AA/DCFTA and the new CEPA Agreement? 3. Then, what are the reasons why Armenia signed the CEPA last No- vember? 4. Could also we look at the Velvet Revolution as a direct consequence of the CEPA's signature? 5. Did the Armenian perception of the EU change due to these last developments?

133 APPENDIX

6. Did the entrance in the EAEU reshuffle the Armenian political will towards the EU? 7. Could the Armenian membership in the EAEU a bother for these new EU-Armenian relations? 8. Eventually, could we define Armenia as the place where both Euro- pean and Russian interests meet peacefully?

1) On one hand, what were the Armenian motivations to refuse the signature of the AA/DCFTA in 2013? On the other hand, what were the reasons to sign the CEPA in 2017? As Sargsyan was the president in both cases. 1.2. What has changed in Armenian political scenario from the Armenian refusal to sign AA/DCFTA and the signature of the new CEPA Agreement? 2) According to the European statistics after the CEPA’s signature230, does the improvement of the trade’s rate between the EU and Arme- nia counter balance the Russian trade and presence in Armenia? Does Armenia look at the EU as just an economic partner or something more like a normative power or international actor to grant security to Armenia? 3) Does the Armenian membership in the Russian leaded international organizations reflect a hierarchical structure of Russian-Armenian relationship? Does the Armenian smallness (by geographical and military point of views as well as the lack of raw materials and energy resources) obliges to bandwagon an absolute pro Russian strategy to avoid political, economic and security risks coming from the Turkish and Azeri presences at the borders? 4) Does Armenia bind together with Russia in choosing the internal and foreign political affairs? In case of a positive answer, why didn’t Russia intervene during the Velvet Revolution? 5) On the contrary, following the last recent developments in this span 2013-today, could we define the Armenian foreign policy a multi- vector policy the Armenian hedging in diversifying the rates of exchange with the EU in order to be less Russian-dependent?

230 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/armenia/

134 Armenia, a player between two teams? The Armenian case in between the European foreign policy and the Russian interests in the common neighbourhood 6) Does Armenia strive to engage in the regional affairs also some other powers/actors, besides of Russia? What was the situation before and after the Velvet Revolution? By which factors, if they exist, could we identify a major role\presence of the EU in the Armenian political life and civil society? 7) Could we identify the CEPA and the Pashinyan’s travels to Brux- elles as an attempt to reduce the importance of the Russian presence in the Armenian life redefining its role just as a military collaboration? Could the Armenian democratic regime and the territorial integrity get the EU more involved in the Caucasus?

135