America the beautiful: Made in Eleanor Smollett

This is a prepublication version ofan article published in Anthropology Today. The definitive published version can befound as: "America the Beaut!ful: Made in Bulgaria", In: ANTHROPOLOGY TODA Y, Vo!. 9, No.2, London, U. K., April, 1993.

For the past coupl e of years there has been an increasing infatuation with the USA among Bulgarians. The full context for understanding thi s phenomenon must include the characteristics of sociali st development in Bulgaria as it took shape during the preceding hal f centu ry, and the dismemberment of socialist institutions in Bulgaria and elsewhere during the past few years. Si nce it is clearly impossibl e even to outline these here, this article aspires onl y to provide a road map of Ameri canization and a few observati ons along the way. These are drawn from the experience of ten research trips to Bulgaria during a twenty year period, the most recent during Spring 1990 and Spring 1991.

A pithy characterization of the infatuation wi th Ameri ca was provided recently by Blagovest Sendov, President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, in a Washington Post interview (S January 1992). 'Right now', he said, 'the American is the ideal. Bulgarians believe that Americans never li e, they never steal, they never throw rubbish on the streets'.

In a way, thi s shouldn't surprise me. Six years ago, urban Bulgarian high school seniors -- the same youth who are the vocal young adults of the present -- were assuring me that unemployment couldn't possibly exist in ri ch countries like 'America' and Canada, except among the lazy, when even in a poor CO Wltry such as theirs all were employed. They also believed that all Americans loved Reagan. Any contrary information must originate, they were sure, from Bulgaria's propaganda apparatus. [n the pre-Gorbachev era, with little access to foreign media, the Radio Free Europe version of America was just about the only non-Bulgari an source that was avai lable. It waited in the wings as the image of prosperi ty and democracy to be contrasted with the frustrations experi enced by the Bulgarian youth of the 70s and 80s.

Nevertheless, the I 990s' in fatuation wi th Ameri ca did surprise me. Thi s was because, after ovember [989, when opposition Communists had deposed the long-term Communist leadership, all major Bulgarian politi cal forces had declared themselves to be setting out 'on the road to Europe', not the road to America. These politi cal fo rces included both the Socialist Party (formerl y the Communist party, reorganized under a partl y new leadership), and the several opposition coalitions. Bulgarian political discourse debated onl y how the road to Europe should be travelled. This road was to lead (either gradually, according to the Socialists, or through 'shock treatment' according to the oppositi on) to a market economy and, more immediately, to the June 1990 multi-party parliamentary election.

I wi ll sketch in some of the events of thi s election as backgroWld to other observati ons to foll ow. The 1990 election was contested by dozens of parties, most of them newly formed, and by several multi-party coali tions. Those who proved to have significant followings were the Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces, or UDF, a coalition of 16 parties ranging from monarchi sts to Social Democrats, united onl y in being anti-communist.

During the run-up to the [990 election, in the rhetori c of all sides, the notions 'the road to Europe', 'market economy' and 'multi-party elections' quickly became coterminous with 'democracy' and 'prosperi ty'. However, sorting out all the underl ying subtleties in what 'the road to Europe' meant is complicated. In the campaign di scourse, 'Europe' meant moving towards the EC and , by implication, towards the prosperity of I its members. But hanging in the background, li ke a gossamer curtain swirling about the campaign rhetoric, was the old Bulgarian (and pan-Balkan) anxiety to prove themselves to be 'tTue Europeans', prosperous and civili zed, and not backward 'eastern' descendants of the Ottoman Empire. I

The main opposition coalition, the UDF, played on all these elements by running a slick Western-sty le election campaign. Sophisticated UDF TV commercials appeared, showing fabulously stocked food markets in Greece, with the message The choice is yours. Vote for prosperity'. Only occasionall y did campaign speeches explain more candidly that the 'shock treatment' transformation to a capitalist economy would bring some hardships along the way to the promised prosperity. European and American campaign experts, and millions of dollars of European and American money, ran thi s campaign. Some of the American money came from U.S. government infornlation services, some from 'voluntary organizations' such as the U.S. Republican Party.

The UDF plastered the country with bright posters that all could see were printed on foreign-made papers with foreign-made inks. The World is With Us', said the posters. Translation: The Capitali st World will invest here and give us loans if, and onl y if, you vote for the UDF'. Speeches and widespread graffiti , as well as less cheery posters crowded with skulls, advocated defeating 'the Communist murderers', and vengeance against Communists.

The Socialist Party, lacking money, lacking foreign aid, and lacking -- by this time -- much access to the mass media (which were already largely 'democratized' and in the control of young supporters of the opposition) ran a low key campaign. They relied on public gatherings, on TV time allotted by the election law, and on their own press. They admitted that, given the disintegration of the international socialist economy, they had nowhere to go but to the market, and no clear economic plan; but they would develop a plan, they said, that retained as much as possible of what working people had gained under socialism. They stated clearly that hard times were coming, and they promised no prosperity. They conceded the planning failures, inadequate democratization and corruption of the past -- but denied that these justified the discarding of socialist objectives.

Despite the difficult circumstances, the Socialist rallies had an upbeat mood, filled with laughter and a sense ofwann solidarity. The leaders' speeches had a tone of tenderness and quiet reflection, of empathy with their listeners; and the response was in kind. 'We have been through a lot in thi s period; we have learned some terrible things about our past; we must live through it in solidarity and retain our goals'. The speeches decried the vindictiveness of the opposition's campaign and its painting of all Communists with a criminal brush.

And, although the Socialists had also declared themselves to be 'on the road to Europe', they mocked the opposition's obsequiousness toward the West as Ihe locus of civilization. The fine honed po litical satire that is so well developed and appreciated in Bulgaria was evident in the speeches, and was met by delighted hilarity -as in one speech at a huge rally, given by Angel Wagenstein, a much beloved film and theatre director. The UDF', he said, 'has dispatched a blue express train' (blue was the UDF campaign colour), 'a blue train hurtling towards Europe, where backward Bulgaria will learn civilization; well, we ask of the UDF only to include one small red caboose on their blue train, and in it will ride Geo Milev and icola Vaptsarov, Pablo Picasso and Sean O'Casey .. . ' and there followed a long list of all the greatest Communist intellectuals of Bulgaria and the world.

I I was reminded by chance of the pan -Balk an nalure of this anxiety th is summer, when I read in the press a quole from a Bosnian Muslim. a professor of soc iology. 'We used to have a pcaccfullife', he said . 'We th ought we were Europeans. I had a big house. my children were in high school ... so I never expected th ese things could ever happen to us ... We afC not Kurd s. we arc Europeans, there must be SOffie justice' . (Toronto Globe & Mail, 27 July 1992.)

2 At rallies, the Sociali st slogans were simply: 'We are still here', 'We are many', 'We shall be victorious'. And they were victorious. The Sociali st Party won the election, won it with a clear parliamentary majority. But in an eerie echo of their pre-World War 2 election victories (i n the then monarchist Bulgaria), they won but were not allowed to govern 2 And it is here that we must return to America the Beautiful. Because it was towards the end of thi s 1990 campaign, when it became evident that the Sociali sts mi ght very well wi n the election, that the Ameri can presence became extremely noticeable. And it remained so from then into the present. As a Wash ington Post reporter later commented (5 January, 1992), The European Community is actual ly spending more in Bulgaria than the United States, but Ameri ca carries a bigger megaphone'.

By the latter part of the 1990 campaign, it had become obvious that 'Europe' was preoccupi ed with other pro blems and pl aces, and was not hastening to promise EC membership to Bulgaria. 'America', on the other hand, having been alarmed by Bulgaria's Spring 1990 moratorium on debt repayments, and perceiving the possibi lity ofa Sociali st victory, expressed increasing interest. Some groundwork had been laid the year before. Bulgarian-American Friendship Societies had been establi shed. Bulgarian sociologists had carried out opini on surveys, commissioned by (and on themes formu lated by) these societies, about Bulgarian images of American li fe, and had widely broadcast the positi ve results. Now, hundreds of American advisers took up residence in the downtown Sheraton Hotel in (the capital), giving advice on how to conduct a democratic election (and -- after the election -- remaining to give advice on how to make the country ungovernable by the democratically elected Socialist Party).

According to press reports, when asked a questi on by the American ambassador about the opposition campaign, the Social ist leader, Andrei Loukanov, had repli ed, 'You are the opposition' . On the fina l evenings of the campaign, opposition motorcades wound through Sofia, horns blaring and American flags waving from car windows along with the opposition blue. And at the final opposition campaign rally, the Ameri can ambassador spoke, fl anked by a large Ameri can fl ag on the podium.

Hours after the electi on results were known, and declared fa ir and legal by teams of internati onal observers, huge rallies of youth were organized. UDF leaders told them the election had been manipulated. They led chants of 'Strike, strike! We'll never work for the Reds'. A 'City of Truth' tent encampment to harass the government was set up near the parli ament in So fi a and continued for months. Student strikes were called. By the same Autumn, the leaders of these student strikes were studying on scholarships at American uni versities.

Before many months had passed, the elected Socialist government -- despite its parliamentary maj ority -­ turned over most key ministri es and the Presidency to the opposition. Faced with constant blockades and

2 Such :lll occasion is described ill fhe New Yo rk '-Jera ld Tribune. September 1932 , quoted jll Leo I-luberman's Mall 's Worldly Goods (New York and London. 1968. ori ginally published 1936):

BULGA RIA , MONARCHY, HAS COMMU NIST CAPITAL But Reds' Sweep of Sofia Couneillo be Shon·Livcd SOFIA. Bu lgnrin. Se pL 26 _. The sweeping victory Mllte Communists in yesterda y's municipal elections caused grellt surprise and much cmiJ.lrrassmcnl here . Out of th iny- fi vc scalS in Sofia's city council. the Commun ists wOTllwcn ty- two. aga in st ten for the allied governme ntal bloc and the Democrats and three fo r th e Za nkon· party. Si nce the parliamentary elections. in 193 1. th e Communists have morc than doubled the ir votes. while the govemmental bloc has lost 50 per ce nt of its followers. Sofia is the fi rst European capital, outsidc of Russ ia. to go Communist, and thc anollmly becomes cvcn more striking when it is remembered that Bu lgaria is a monarchy and that the reside"ce 0/ Ki"g Boris IS o"lya/ew min lites' walk /rom the city hall. For this. aud o/her rearons. a Communist c it y administration will "ot be tolerated. As soon as the elcction results were known. Premicr Nicolas MushanoIT announccd his intention to dissolve the city counc il before it assemb les. It ulso is probable that the Communist party will be declared illegal and forbidden throughout Bulgaria. The Communist viclory was due 10 the desperate economic situation. which led many persons in no wa y CO llllcclcd with Bolshevism 10 vote Communist out of protest.

3 di sruptions of production and transport, and even the lorching of the Sociali st Party's Central Committee building, they chose to give up power rather than all ow an escalation of disturbances that could lead to a civi l war. The avoidance of bloodshed had become the primary concern of the Socialist government under Andrei Loukanov. The opposition took advantage of this response to its destabilization campaign, and ultimately used it to go around the election results and take power.

In the succeeding year, 1990-199 1, the institutionalization of American influence proceeded with intensity. In fall-winter, the Open Society Fund established itself in Sofia. This organization is sponsored by the Soros Foundations. Led by George Soros of New York, thi s self-sty led pri vate 'charitable' organization is setting up Pri vatization Training Programmes, Business Administration Seminars and Educational Proj ects all over Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union] During 1991 , the pre-war American College in Sofia (a secondary school) was quickly re-established, with American staff for humanities and social sciences. Within a year, an American Uni versity was created in the town of Blagoevgrad. This was accomplished by the same Open Society Fund through an Initiative Committee chaired by Elka Konstantinova. Today, Elka Konstantinova is the Bulgarian Minister of Culture. In addition, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Open Society Fund, Dimiter Ludzhev, is Minister of Defence, and in 199 1 was made Deputy Prime Minister. In 1992, another member of the board of the Open Society Fund, Blaga Dimitrova, was elected Vice-President of Bulgaria·

In 1991 , Bulgarians could attend seminars on The American Way of Life' at the University of Sofia, advertised on posters all over Sofia, taught by a Fulbright exchange scholar. They could li sten to Voice of America broadcasts on loudspeakers in the central sq uare of Sofia and in a multitude of cafes and shops. That summer, young Bulgarians of my acquaintance assured us that we must find their television progranunes very dull, as American ones (which they had never seen) are so much more interesting. In America, the talents of young people are always developed, never wasted. And in America, even the busi ness men are 'more intelligent': 'Here in Bulgaria', they explained, 'business men buy cheap goods and se ll them at high prices to the population to make a big profit; in America, business men are more intelligent and would never do such things'.

So, in the end, it has been America and not Europe that has seduced and embraced a large and highly visible portion of the Bulgarian population -- the young, educated urban Bulgarians, the techni cal and professional workers, including those who now progranlme the mass media and claim the national vo ice. They are floundering between a socialist system they have rejected (but whose benefits they take for granted) and a capitalist system whose characteristics they grasp vaguely at best. But these young people who have literally wrapped themselves in the American flag, printed on their T-shirts, and who are convinced that 'the market' equals democracy and brings prosperi ty -- their voice speaks in fact for only part of the population.

This is evident if we examine the resu.lts of the most recent elections -- in 1991 and 1992. In October 1991 a new parliamentary election was held. This time, the UDF won power. But it won power with 34% of the votes (for all the 16 parties in the UDF coalition together) as against 33% for the Socialist Party alone. (The UOF requires the tacit support of an ethnic Turkish party in order to govern, the only party besides the Socialists and UDF to win seats in the parliament.) Then in January 1992 a Presidential election was held. Again, it was won by the UDF coalition candidate, but by onl y 53% against 46% for the Sociali st Party candidate.

J According 10 Open SocielY. Chronicle of rile Soros FO Ul/dO/iolls. 3.4 . April 1992. p.1, some of lhc Sores Founda tions' acti vit ies rccch'c major fundin g from the Unit ed Siales Infonn31ion Agency. ~ Elkn KonSlantinova, Dimitcr Ludzhcv and Blaga Dimilrova held the offi ces mCnlioncd ll llhc lime ofwriling. in April 1992.

4 The split in the electorate shown in these figures is along clear lines. It reflects a real division in the population -- in experience, and in thinking.

Support for the Sociali sts comes largely from older people, 40s and up, including a heavy rural component - - the cooperative farmers, as we ll as industrial workers (mostly outside the capital), and older artists and intellectuals wi th strong Communist roolS. These are people many of whom remember the pre-sociali st past, people who actively struggled for political change, who participated in the process of socialist development, and who ex perienced substantial benefits under the sociali st system. They were disgusted with the inadequacies and abuses of the Party leadership in power up to 1989, and anxious for it to be replaced. But they remai ned committed to sociali sm, and proud of its accomplishments in Bulgaria. They came out to rallies hundreds of thousands strong during the elections to say so. In Spring 199 1, I re-interviewed some of these people, cooperati ve farmers whom I had by then known for 20 years. 'Why should I want my land back, as the UDF offers?', they asked. 'What shall I do -- resume ploughing with a horse? We thought we had built something fine. We began in dire poverty, and for a long time now have been li ving so wel l. Now the UDF wi ll tear it all down 5

Supporters of the Sociali sts tend to compare their recent (up to 1989) standard of living with their pre­ socialist past, and to see the advances as having resulted from their own activities in work and politics -­ both within Bulgaria, and as part of an internati onal socialist system. These are not people who expect improvements to come from importing ei ther an Ameri can model or American aid .

Supporters of the UDF, by contrast, are mai nl y younger, 40 and under, largely urban, and educated in technical and professional occupations. They grew up assuming that socialist benefits such as sociall y provided hi gher education, health care, housing and guaranteed empl oy ment were normal, uni versal human ri ghts. They matured, however, in a period in the 70s and 80s, when they experi enced socialism as a system in decline, when corruption and lack of adequate democratization were apparent in their government, and when the failure of the system to find adequate means of decentralizing the economy was leading to occupational frustrations among the young. Most important, they matured in a period when few paths for politi cal action were open to them, paths of struggle for actively changing their situati on6

These younger people tended to compare themselves to young people of similar occupati ons in the West, not against their parents' and their grandparents' standard of li ving. And they judged what they had as inadequate by this external standard. It is they who have been reaching abroad, then, for models, models that they hope will allow them to import the universal prosperity they believe exists in the West. They search in many directions -- fl ocking to reli gion, exploring the occult (poltergeists are all the rage), starting dozens of little splinter parties or voting UDF, embarking on entrepreneurships of many varieties, and adm iring America. Even the Bulgarian language has expanded appropriately. One can now say beezinesmen (singular), beezinesmeni (plural), beezinesmenka (feminine).

One thought has come to me repeatedly during the past few years as I have watched this process. The UDF government and the young urban Bul garians who support it (and wave Ameri can flags) seem intent on tearing down existing institutions as quickly as possible. Granted, the disintegration of sociali sm internati onall y makes some of this unavoidable. Still, the assumption seems to be that if they strip away all traces of sociali sm -- the cooperative farms, the state enterpri ses, the social benefits -- then prosperity will come.

The thought that keeps coming to me is cargo. A mechanical analogy to cargo cul ts is meaningless of course. There is no cargo cult in Bulgaria. There is no charismatic leader. We are not seeing a revitalization

Sin 1992 . 1hc UOF go\,cmmcnl in fact began to dismantle th e cooperative faml s. 6 There were other imponnnt causes for Ih eir dissa tisfac tion . These will require dew.iled analys is in future publications. 5 movement (though some monarchi sts have appeared) or a millenari an religious movement. But still, in this secul ar, hi ghl y educated, industri al society, there are echoes that say 'cargo07 The wealth that is coveted exists somewhere else. in an external society. The structure of that external society and the manner in which the wealth is produced are poorl y understood. The young peopl e who covet what they imagine is the uni versal wealth of the West were not suffering from unemployment, poverty or absolute deprivati on under sociali sm (although, in the present situation, they are beginning to experience all of these). They were and are, however, experi encing relati ve depri va tion, as compared with their ex ternal model. It is thi s relati ve depri vation that moves them, as David Aberle made clear long ago in discussion of cargo cults. And as Eri c Hobsbawm pointed out in contrasting these movements with revolutions, the leadership of such movements has no cl ear programme or plan of implementati on for a new social system. The expected improvement to soci ety is based on faith. If we stri ~ away the old institutions, then the fo reign aid, the in vestment, the development, the cargo will come.

And if it doesn't come? If 'the market' doesn't bring prosperity? Perhaps the West was not emulated accurately enough -- perhaps not enough of the economy was privati zed, or the 'democrati c' elections were fl awed, or the communists inadequately suppressed.

Postscript -- August 1992

During the Spring and Summer of 1992, the UDF government launched a widespread purge of communists from the ci vil service and from academic institutions. Thousand s of people have been subj ected to loyalty investi gations in the guise of 'competence' checks. Many of those who have not been replaced have been required to sign loyalty oaths. In July, three past Prime Ministers in offi ce during the 1981 -199 1 period (including Andrei Loukanov) were arrested. Charges included 'corruption', 'mi smanagin g the economy', or 'misappropriating state fund s' (for internati onal solidarity !). The trial of former Communist Party leader, , on similar charges, continued.

1 For Illy non-a nthropologist readers:

The "C:lrgo Cult " was it widespread phenomenon -- it variety of millena rian movemen t _. in the Pac ific islllnds (particula rly Melanes ia) aller Worl d War r I. Th ese islands were inhabited largely by village dwe llers subsisti ng on horticu lture and fishing. people who had lillie experience with industria lly manufhct urcd goods. The American soldiers who fought the Japanese on th ese islands and/or occup ied them as bases were supplied with un limited cargos of fab ulous seem ing goods and equipmcnt. Even soldiers who were dark skinn ed like the islanders were Sl'C n rece iving and using these items. The loca l people had no undersltmdi ng of tile system and meth ods of manu fac tu re or of the sources ofthcse goods. They cons idered that the Americans must have morc powerful anccstor or other spirits looking afte r th em tJmn thcir own. In the JXlst -war years, a number of cult movemcnt s arose in the region. usually organi 7.cd arOllnd charismatic leaders. Panicipating islanders madc changes in Ihe loca l way of life so thai similar cargo would be delivered to themse lves. Followers ofthcse Illovemen ts sometimcs built docks or airstri ps. if none were len by the troops. in order to faci litate land ing of the expected cargo. Some proceeded to abandon much of the ir exist ing way of life - from soc ial and politica l instit utions, to ritua l. 10 methods of subsistence - clearing th e decks of al1 old instilut ions to make room fo r thc cargo to come . Then they wlI lted fo r it 10 arrivc.

When il didn't? Pcrhaps th e Americans were at fa ult . Though ge nerous to th cm during the war. Ih ey might have tumed slingy and interfered with the spirits who send cargo. Or perhaps they, thc islandcrs. were at fa ul!. M:lybc they had too lillIe fait h, or had failed to imitate Ame ri cans wc ll enough. or had fa iled to abandon their old ways thoroughly enough.

8 1 have discussed Bulgaria beca use it is what I know . To suggcst that Ihe phenomenon is probably much more widespread. here is II quotation fro m a Canadian reponer. Fred Weir. who describes political posters scen in Moscow du ri ng thc 1991·92 winter: 'My personal favorite is entitl ed "I mperialist Conspiracy " and shows the sky over Moscow billek with airplanes bcm ing U.S. Air Force Ill ll rkings. They arc dropping hams, cllccses, baby food. stylish wi nter clo th es, evcn te lev ision sets'. (Calladian Trib/l ne, 20 Ja nuary 1992). 6