sign in sign up
<<
Home , Natural resource

DEMAND MANAGEMENT, NATURAL RECONSTRUCTION AND TRADITIONAL VALUE SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY FROM YEMEN

Occasional Paper No. 14

Water Issues Study Group School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London

By

G. LichtenthŠler & A.R. Turton gl3&soas.ac.uk & [email protected]

INTRODUCTION:

Previous research has shown that under conditions of extreme , such as in the Middle East, reconstruction can take place (Allen & Karshenas, 1996). This may not always be the case however, as certain societies seem better able to cope with this process than others. This phenomenon has been linked to the adaptive capacity of a society (Turton, 1999) where it has been shown that all social entities are not equally endowed. A shortage of adaptive capacity has been redefined as a second- order scarcity (Ohlsson, 1998; 1999). What is currently being regarded by most researchers as a manifestation of resource scarcity is in fact probably the result of a second-order scarcity of social , which impacts in turn on the way that social entities deal with the first order scarcity of a natural resource such as water. In terms of this thinking, a shift in emphasis to second-order scarcities would be appropriate. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that in a society where resource capture is being actively pursued, natural resource reconstruction is unlikely to occur because it reduces the overall legitimacy of the political system (Turton, 1999). A study of these aspects in Yemen (LichtenthŠler, 1999) is therefore considered to be extremely fruitful because of four fundamental reasons. Firstly, parts of Yemen are extremely water scarce. Secondly, Yemen has a number of critical socio-political cleavage lines, which makes the water sector a politicised environment. Thirdly, all of the elements for resource capture to take place, are in evidence. Fourthly, there is a vibrant indigenous culture embracing a traditional value system, which seems to tentatively suggest that adaptive capacity is present in a form which may be capable of resisting this resource capture if correctly harnessed. This may be instructive to other water-scarce states facing similar problems.

DEFINITIONS:

For the purposes of this paper, the following definitions will apply: Adaptive capacity is the sum of social resources that are available within a society that can be mustered in order to effectively counter an increasing natural resource scarcity (Ohlsson, 1998; 1999). There are at least two distinct components to adaptive capacity (Turton, 1999: 25). The structural component comprises the sum of institutional capacity (including financial capacity) and intellectual capital which allows for the generation of alternative solutions such as water demand management strategies by technocratic elites. The social component is defined as the willingness and ability of the social entity to accept these technocratic solutions (such as water demand management strategies) as being both reasonable and legitimate.

Allocative efficiency is the second method available to increase the return to water, which is based on the notion of a rational choice as to which activity would bring the highest return to water (Allan, 1998: 3). Allocative efficiency is economically rational but can be politically stressful, so it tends to be avoided by politicians and can be understood as being the Òmore jobs per dropÓ option (Turton, 1999: 23). There are two distinct types of allocative efficiency in existence that need to be clarified however, as each represent a different level of political risk. Inter-sectoral allocative efficiency can be defined as allocating water away from one economic sector (usually ) because of an inherent low return to water, to another (usually ) because of an inherently higher return to water. This is politically very risky (Turton, 1999:17) as was discovered by President Jimmy Carter when he tried to introduce a new policy called Òrealistic water pricingÓ in the USA (Reisner, 1993: 323). Intra-sectoral allocative efficiency can be defined as allocating water within a given sector, usually at the level of a production unit (farm or factory), away from production that has a low return to water to production with a higher return to water. This is usually politically less risky.

Ecological marginalization is one of the end-products of resource capture, whereby those to whom access is denied become marginalized socially, politically and economically (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1996:7). This becomes significant within the context of a developing state where either the economy or the government usually lacks the capacity to provide for those people who are marginalized.

A first-order scarcity is a scarcity of a natural resource such as water or (Ohlsson, 1998; 1999).

Natural resource reconstruction exists when a social entity can effectively introduce water demand management, specifically by re-allocating water from one economic sector to another (Allan & Karshenas, 1996: 127-8). Thus, natural resource reconstruction needs principles of allocative efficiency to be applied in order to become a reality. For this to take place effectively, the second (social) component of adaptive capacity must be present (Turton, 1999: 29) and functioning however.

Productive efficiency is one of the two methods available to increase the return to water, usually involving improvements to the efficiency of water delivery in systems (Allan, 1998: 3) or to other consumers. The important aspect in this regard is that it does not involve a change in the overall water-use paradigm by allocating water to alternative

2 economic sectors. This makes it a politically favoured but sometimes ineffective option as it fails to take advantage of the gearing ratios with respect to return to water that alternative economic sectors offer. This can be thought of as the Òmore crop per dropÓ option (IIMI, 1996) and is sometimes referred to as Òend user efficiencyÓ (Turton, 1999: 22).

Resource capture is the process by which powerful social groups shift resource distribution in their favour (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1996:6) over time. This is particularly relevant under conditions of extreme water scarcity where access to a critical natural resource like water gives considerable advantage to those who control the access and allocation of that resource. This serves to politicize water further by decreasing the level of legitimacy, introducing elements of mistrust which undermine the water demand management strategies being proposed by technocratic elites (Turton, 1999: 13).

Return to water refers to the value of the product being produced from a given quantity of water. This implies that there are at least three fundamental aspects concerning the notion of ÒvalueÓ, which need to be recognised. Firstly, the concept can be understood in terms of an economically rational approach, naturally favouring the production of goods with the highest economic yield. This may be economically rational, but socially or politically irrational, and consequently not implemented. Secondly, the concept can be understood in terms of a culturally rational approach, which would favour water allocation to an economically nonviable but culturally essential activity. Water as a status symbol can be seen in this regard. Thirdly, the concept can be understood in terms of a politically rational approach, which may be economically irrational but politically necessary and feasible. The concept of return to water is thus highly complex and effectively defies a simple definition, which is probably why other authors seem to have avoided the task.

A second-order scarcity is a scarcity of adaptive capacity (Ohlsson, 1998; 1999). This is manifest as the inability of a society to muster sufficient social resources to effectively counter the increasing natural resource scarcity. The operative word here is ÒeffectivelyÓ.

Sustainable development can be operationally defined as taking a long-term view on water-use patterns; not compromising the future in pursuit of the present; recognising the need to involve people; and emphasising the quality of and living systems in the definition of development (Morris, 1996: 230). therefore involves a switch in emphasis from supply-management (which attempts to meet rising demands by abstracting more water from a depleted resource base) to demand management (which attempts to reduce consumption by increasing efficiencies and developing alternatives) over time.

Water demand management (WDM) is a policy for the water sector that stresses making better use of existing supplies, rather than developing new ones (Winpenny; 1997: 297). WDM can be managed in many different ways (Westerlund, 1996: 155) so there is no given strategy that is universally applicable. This means that local factors such as culture need to be considered by technocratic elites when developing solutions.

3 THE PROBLEM IN THE SAÕDAH BASIN OF YEMEN:

There are distinct phases to the development of in the SaÕdah Basin of Yemen (LichtenthŠler, 1999). Until the mid-1970s groundwater irrigated agriculture was not possible in the SaÕdah basin. Most land was communally owned and managed. This meant that members of a tribal community shared the right to collect firewood, graze their flocks and collect fruit from trees. However, the communities were not permitted to use their grazing land agriculturally since the run-off collected from its surface area fed the fields of other communities downstream. Customary law stipulates that the right to the run-off is stronger than the right to the land. Population increase and development of infrastructure after the end of the civil war in 1969 put pressure on the limited agricultural land available. However, suggestions to develop grazing areas where blocked by those who owned the rights pertaining to run-off. A settlement negotiated by a religious scholar in 1976 became a mile-stone decision which opened the way for the expansion of agricultural development and consequently led to the of the SaÕdah . It stipulated that a community must give up half of the area of its grazing land to those owning rights to the run-off from it. However, if the owners of run-off preferred the run-off to receiving half of the land no development could take place. The scholar's arbitration was accepted unanimously by all the tribes (see LichtenthŠler 1999).

Consequently, many tribal communities privatised their . Each household received land according to the number of males, children or adults. In order to finance well drilling and equipment landowners sold parts of their uncultivated land to members of other tribes Ð something deemed shameful only a few years earlier. Thus started SaÕdah hydraulic mission was born, manifesting itself as a relentless quest for access to the only source of available water Ð the alluvial aquifer.

The impact of unequal access to and control over groundwater is accepted by a large majority of farmers on the grounds of two Quranic verses (LichtenthŠler, 1999). These are:

And we raise some of them Above others in ranks, So that they may command Works from others. But the mercy of thy Lord Is better that the (wealth) Which they amass (Al-Zukhruf,) Surat 43:32 (Translation by Yousuf Ali)

wa Allah faddala baÕdakum Ôala baÕdan fi risq With respect to sustenance Allah has favoured some over others (Al-Nahl) Surat 16:71 (Translation by LichtenthŠler)

4 After consultation with a number of scholars (LichtenthŠler, 1999), it was found that the established Islamic belief is that land owners have the right to utilise and abstract groundwater on their own property, as long as they do not the God-given resource. When the environmental consequences were repeatedly pointed out to these scholars, they usually replied that Òthe state of people is all ordered by GodÓ (translation by LichtenthŠler). Even when the details of the consequences of the 4-6 metre per year drop in groundwater levels were implicitly spelled out, these two Quranic verses were quoted in order to indicate that notions of equality in this life are not in accordance with prevailing normative systems.

The effect of this normative system is twofold when seen against the background of management. Firstly, it serves to explain why some people have the capacity to abstract and mobilise more water than others do. This explains the amazing absence of tension and conflict over groundwater resources where land rights are firmly established in terms of the turning-point 1976 arbitration. Secondly, it provides the basis for the legitimisation of resource capture, which is becoming evident as the water levels are dropping. The dynamics of this process are fuelled by the fact that as the water table falls, deeper wells need to be sunk and longer pipelines need to be inserted in them. This takes money, which for the poor, is mobilised by selling land. In addition to this, the deeper water requires more to lift to the surface, so larger engines and increased operating costs are placing further pressure on marginal farmers. The richer farmers are able to buy up land cheaply and thereby entrench their positions of power.

An additional aspect to this problem was introduced in 1983 when the government introduced a fruit import ban (LichtenthŠler, 1999). This acted as an economic stimulus to agriculture, prompting many farmers to invest in the production of cash crops. By this time, wealthy shaykhs and traders owned many of the farms. Interestingly enough, many of the traders derived a portion of their wealth from supplying irrigation equipment. Thus the three year period after the fruit import ban saw the greatest number of wells being sunk. From the late 1980s, existing wells have been deepened 2-4 times in order to chase the falling water table. New wells are also being sunk, but given the increased cost of these deeper structures, these can only be afforded by a few of the richer farmers. Thus the process of resource capture has begun to manifest itself in earnest.

The devaluation of the Yemeni Rial after the 1990 Gulf crisis forced many out of trade and into the only alternative left to them Ð agriculture. Following the unification in 1990, various crises (Gulf crisis, 1994 Civil War, the Hunaysh dispute and tensions along the Saudi-Yemeni border) have fostered a climate of uncertainty re-enforcing tribal notions of autonomy and -self-sufficiency. Cropping and water use patterns are, to a large extent determined by these perception and notions. What this means too is that penetration by the central government into this area has become increasingly tenuous.

The problem in SaÕdah is therefore best understood in terms of the following cleavage lines: (A) Government versus tribe. (B) Local tribe versus local tribe. (C) Local tribe versus tribes that have been displaced from elsewhere due to water scarcity. (D) Certain powerful individuals versus the tribe.

5 NOTIONS OF ÒVALUEÓ AND RETURNS TO WATER:

The SaÕdah basin provides some excellent examples of the different notions of ÒvalueÓ with regard to returns to water. The economic value alone does not explain the actions or responses of a Yemeni farmer with respect to water (LichtenthŠler, 1996). Great social importance continues to be attached to the cultivation of land and to the production of homegrown , whether economically viable or not. To a certain extent, some evidence exists that farmers have responded in an economically rational way by meeting the demands for certain cash crops however. These returns are combined with income from other activities and often subsidize those agricultural activities which are perceived to have a high social and socio-political value. Cereals are not only central but also absolutely essential to Yemeni cuisine. Importantly, the perceived social and cultural values of some home grown varieties Ð of which 25 are known for sorghum alone Ð and their distinct place and function within Yemeni daily life, explains the strong preference for local grains over foreign imports. Moreover, homegrown cereal foods, especially at lunch, are believed to enhance the daily and socially significant qat chewing experience in the afternoon. Qat is a mild stimulant chewed by the majority of Yemeni men in the company of friends and relatives. The production and consumption of homegrown cereals strengthens social values and notions of identity. These are more significant than economic and environmental rationality when it comes to making a decision about allocative efficiency and returns to water.

The SaÕdah farmers have chosen to grow fruit trees, partly due to political and economic incentives, but also partly because of the notions of prestige attached to such production. Unlike the farmers in the Amran basin, who grow mainly seasonal vegetables and are thus able to respond quickly to changing market conditions (Handley, 1996), the SaÕdah farmers are locked into a long production cycle spanning a number of years from planting to first harvest (LichtenthŠler, 1999).

Alfalfa for livestock production is a major consumer of groundwater (LichtenthŠler, 1999), yet it persists for social reasons such as the status of owning livestock. There are also economic reasons for this preference of alfalfa. Demands in for Yemeni meat offer strong incentives, which are made more attractive because it generates hard Saudi currency. A large sheep will fetch more than 600 Saudi Rial (15 Ð 20 000 Yemeni Rial, US$ 160), whereas the same will only fetch 6 000 Ð 9 000 Yemeni Rial (US$ 65, 1995 figures) if sold locally. The choice of alfalfa is also linked to the preferred use of irrigation methods. This has been the preferred method for a number of reasons.

Firstly, in the mid-1980s groundwater appeared to be available in abundance and pumps were operated at low cost. Secondly, flood irrigation was applied in the citrus orchards to grow alfalfa between the maturing trees. With the loss of much natural grazing land due to the expansion of irrigated agriculture alfalfa had to be produced on the farms. Thirdly, farmers believed that flood irrigation and the alfalfa would reduce the salinization of the

6 . Consequently, the root system of the trees has developed in response to irrigation method, frequency and supply.

When some local traders introduced drip-irrigation, motivated in part by an attempt to sell a new technology rather than by any formally devised strategy of WDM, the trees soon went into water stress. The drip irrigation was thus abandoned. This is a pity, as the trees would probably have responded to the new technology, if it had been phased in over time. This would have allowed the roots to adapt, rather than to make the switch in one sudden event.

RESOURCE CAPTURE AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES:

From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the traders of SaÕdah were the principle importers of pumps and irrigation equipment (LichtenthŠler, 1999). Much of this was brought in across the Saudi-Yemeni border free of duty. In addition to this, the same families often own the drilling rigs that are needed to deepen existing wells as the water table falls, and drill new ones. Stated simplistically, the expansion and development of irrigated agriculture has directly benefited a number of trading families and has helped them to achieve a significant degree of economic power. Their market is essentially captive as all farmers are forced to deepen the wells as they chase the falling water table, and also face constant repairs to their pumps. The older Yanmar engines that were originally installed, are now underpowered due to the greater depths from which the water must be raised, so more powerful engines are being imported and sold. All traders own large farms that produce citrus and qat. Significantly, it was the traders who were the first to introduce measures to achieve productive efficiency, by experimenting with drip irrigation technology. The motives for this form of WDM were thus self-interest, rather than out of a sense of trying to conserve water as part of a sustainable development program.

One of the consequences of this resource capture is the introduction of feelings of mistrust into the community. This is particularly evident when a dispute arises needing some form of arbitration. Many shaykhs and traders are regarded with suspicion, as they are perceived to have vested interests and therefore being incapable of impartiality. Once formal WDM strategies are formulated by someone, they are unlikely to be implemented effectively as there will be such an element of structural scarcity in existence that the efforts may be perceived by the ecologically marginalized people to be only to the benefit of the rich and powerful. Resource capture thus serves to de-legitimise WDM strategies (Turton, 1999) and should be countered if possible.

CULTURAL RESPONSES TO RESOURCE CAPTURE AND WDM:

Recent field trips to the area (LichtenthŠler, 1999) have revealed some interesting changes to cultural patterns of some of the tribes. First evidence has now been gathered that a tribal community has acted collectively in an attempt to safeguard their groundwater resources. This tentatively suggests that notions of sustainability are now starting to take root. In consultation with his tribe, this specific shaykh ruled that no individual member of his tribe was allowed to sell any part of their land to people from

7 outside the village. The community has learned a lesson from a neighbouring tribe which sold large portions of their tribal land to investors, traders and tribesmen from outside the SaÕdah basin. Income from other sources enables these new landowners to drill more than one well and to irrigate large citrus orchards. They also have the capacity to drill deeper wells and to invest in submersible pumps in order to chase the declining water table. The fact that farmers in this specific area represent many tribes and other interests makes co- operation difficult. Individuals are starting to learn lessons and to draw conclusions about the impact of the falling water levels, as the shaykh from this specific village has demonstrated. Significantly, a number of people from various parts of the SaÕdah basin have been heard to commend this particular shaykh for uniting his village in response to the attempts to exploit their water resources. This signals a new and significant change in the perception of water that has not been noted on previous field trips.

In several other cases, villages have closed ranks to prevent their own shaykh from buying land from them and thus capturing the resource-base of his own people. Many of the local shaykhs have come to command considerable social and political power, and individuals are often reluctant to deny their requests to buy land, but new evidence suggests that this may be changing. A number of villagers have resisted the wishes of their shaykh when it emerged that he was acting as a broker for a rich businessman who is resident in the capital . Some of the locals were heard to ask, Òwhy the ÔhaveÕsÕ come and siphon off the water from the Ôhave-notÕsÕ?Ó (translation by LichtenthŠler).

Regarding a person who would propose a WDM strategy, the Islamic principle is one of first proving that they do not pursue a hidden agenda (ma lahum maslaha fi) (LichtenthŠler, 1999). The existing main tribal leaders have de-legitimised themselves and cannot be considered for the role of WDM initiators, because they have become embroiled in a cross-cutting network of political interests at the local, regional and national level. Some represent the largest local users of groundwater with a patently visible vested interest in irrigated agriculture. They are also expanding their agro- businesses annually, as farm size and number of wells are becoming symbols of status, power and wealth. This, in the eyes of their own people, limits their mandate to call for WDM measures (WMP, 1994: 32 & Moench, 1997: 3a)

The Saada are the learned doctors of religion with the SaÕdah basin being a centre of Zaydi scholarship. While many Saada became marginalized during the 1962 revolution, their services as teachers, preachers, arbitrators and judges have increasingly become sought after (Haykal, 1995). Unlike the tribesmen, they usually own very little land and are therefore not perceived as acting out of self-interest when they are called upon to address a water-related issue. It was a Zaydi scholar who acted in the turning-point 1976 mediation vis-ˆ-vis and land rights. In the recent past a younger group of Zaydi scholars appear to have emerged. They are trying to reconcile Zaydi principles to the requirements of modern life. Significantly, they do not represent one specific tribal grouping and they have no vested interest in agriculture. They can thus be considered to have a high degree of impartiality and legitimacy.

8 In order to determine the impact of the Zaydi resurgence, a number of scholars were visited during a recent field trip (LichtenthŠler, 1999). All of the scholars who were contacted were asked about the religious principles impacting on groundwater abstraction as noted above. All reconfirmed the established Islamic belief that land owners have the right to utilise and abstract groundwater on their own property as long as they did not waste this God-given resource. However, one very significant change in the Islamic interpretation was noted. An eminent Zaydi scholar who serves a tribal community that is particularly hard-hit by the falling groundwater table, quoted the following verse from the Quran:

Say: ÒSee ye?- If your stream be Some morning lost (In the underground ), Who then can supply you With clear-flowing water?Ó Surat 67:30 (Al-Mulk)

Surat Al-Mulk (dominion), from which this verse is taken, emphasises the fact that Allah in his goodness and power has ordered and arranged the world. If life-sustaining water suddenly disappears one morning, who can bring it back? The Zaydi scholar understood this to mean that farming communities do in fact have a collective responsibility to make sure that SaÕdahÕs common groundwater resources must be used in such a way as to avoid that the Òstream be some morning lostÓ. His interpretation stressed manÕs responsibility for managing his environment in a sustainable way. He also challenged the widely shared notion that God will readily reverse the damage done by decades of over abstraction.

The Islamic principle of maslaha Ôamma could be given greater emphasis as it clearly recognises that the interests and welfare of the wider community have priority over and above individual rights and benefits, even if these are lawful (al-maslaha al-Ôamma muqadimma Ôala al-maslaha al-khassa). The Sharia has to be applied wherever the general interests lie (haythuma kanat al-maslaha fathma sharÕ Allah). Based on the notion of Òno harmÓ it appears as if the concept of maslaha Ôamma could be explored to help regulate groundwater abstraction and well drilling (LichtenthŠler, 1999).

In the mid-1970s all the tribes of the area recognised that it was in their overall interest to re-negotiate established rights to land and water when they accepted unilaterally the solution mediated by a religious scholar mentioned above. As many farmers are becoming increasingly aware that regulation and groundwater management will indeed serve the long-term interests (maslaha 'amma) of their respective communities a large majority might again look to respected men of religion to arbitrate a new approach to groundwater management. That this can be done effectively through religious sermons has been shown in another Middle Eastern country (IDRC 1998). Relevant knowledge about water issues is shared and discussed with Muslim preachers, who then incorporate the information into their religious sermons. Islamic scholars should be encouraged to

9 explore ways in which the Islamic principle of maslaha 'amma (public interest) can be applied in an attempt to restrict groundwater mining.

POSSIBLE ROLE OF POETRY AS A COMMUNICATION MEDIUM:

Significant evidence has been uncovered suggesting poetry to be a vibrant medium of communication within traditional Yemeni culture (LichtenthŠler, 1999). There is a long history of the use of poetry for mediation during periods of conflict and for purposes of persuasion. A detailed study carried out in Khawlan al-Tiyal, a tribal area south-east of SanaÕa (Caton, 1990) supports the findings of various field trips. Within the context of contemporary society, tribal poetry has been employed for a variety of functions such as the criticism of party politics, the activities of elites and newly emerging power centres (Dresch, 1995a: 5; 1995b: 417 & Caton, 1990: 48).

An appraisal of local poetry from the SaÕdah area (LichtenthŠler, 1999) suggests that this literary genre could be harnessed to increase community awareness in order to bring about changes in the perception of groundwater use vis-ˆ-vis the notions of sustainable development. Tribal poetry (al-shaÕir al-shaÕbi) has played an important role in the peaceful resolution of some long-standing tribal conflicts. An example of such a feud was that which existed between the tribes of Bani ÔAuwir (Khawlan b. ÔAmir) and Harf Sufyan (Bakiil) during the 1980s. This went on for a number of years and claimed 20 , including those of two women. Poetry played a pivotal role in ultimately settling this blood feud, and the poetic words (Zamil) are alive in the memories of both tribespeople and city dwellers today.

In order to determine whether poetry is a potential medium for communicating the need for WDM in achieving natural resource reconstruction via sustainable development practices, one of the foremost poets from SaÕdah was visited during a recent field trip (LichtenthŠler, 1999). Hamud is a Sayyid - those claiming descend of the Prophet - and comes from the Khawlan area to the west of the SaÕdah basin. Recently, Hamud has written poetry for cultural and political occasions. His work has been commissioned by the Government for important political events such as the anniversary of the September Revolution. Other poetry of his relates to the tribal and social context of his native SaÕdah . In a discussion with the poet, a number of local men from various backgrounds were present. After noting the problems caused by excessive groundwater abstraction, all of the men present confirmed the role that poetry could play in changing this with some enthusiasm. Hamud immediately undertook the task of composing a poem addressing issues of equity, sustainable abstraction of groundwater, co-operation over shared resources, irrigation efficiency (intra-sectoral allocative efficiency) and water savings. The outcome of this will be followed up during the next field trip. Significantly, SaÕdahÕs Cultural Centre (al-markaz al-thakaafi) has also expressed interest in HamudÕs composition on the themes of environmental resource use and agricultural issues. They could provide valuable support in disseminating the poetry via the media and through the production of audiotapes. This poetry could also form part of cultural events that are held at the Centre, some of which have been televised in the past.

10 The recent field work (LichtenthŠler, 1999) also confirmed that each tribal area has its own acknowledged poet who composes on behalf of their respective tribe and in response to specific issues. Tentative conclusions can thus be drawn that there is ample scope for the investigation of the potential use of poetry as a culturally accepted way of communicating information regarding groundwater abstraction in Yemen. Issues such as allocative efficiency, the dangers of resource capture and the benefits of sustainable development could be incorporated into a culturally acceptable WDM strategy. This aspect will receive ongoing research attention by the authors and progress will be published where relevant.

CONCLUSION:

At least seven conclusions can be drawn at this stage of the research project.

Firstly, the SaÕdah basin is an example of a social entity that is facing a first-order scarcity of a fundamental natural resource - water. The only water available is that which is found in alluvial found under the basin. These aquifers are being over- abstracted to such a degree that their levels are dropping at an alarming rate. It is safe to conclude that current abstraction levels are unsustainable, and in the absence of any other alternatives, the area will face a crippling water shortage in the next decade or two.

Secondly it can be seen that there is strong evidence that resource capture is in existence. So far this has been socially accepted in terms of traditional religious perceptions. If this is allowed to continue, it is likely to undermine subsequent efforts at introducing WDM strategies. This is because in a society where resource capture is being actively pursued, natural resource reconstruction is unlikely to occur, because it reduces the overall legitimacy of the process by politicising the issue. This is due to three fundamental factors. (A) Resource capture is basically greed driven and greed can never be satisfied. It therefore becomes self-perpetuating. (B) Resource capture results in ecological marginalization, which mitigates against efforts at natural resource reconstruction by alienating the very people who are most affected by the resource being reconstructed. In other words, the beneficiaries are likely to be those who already have sufficient water, rather than those who have been dispossessed. (C) Resource capture, if left unattended, ultimately results in structural differentials within society. This would introduce yet another cleavage line into an already deeply divided social entity. Therefore it can be said that effective WDM needs a system of legitimate government with a prevailing normative basis, rooted in the notion of some form of equity, if it is to have a realistic chance of success.

Thirdly, there is evidence of ecological marginalization. This has been driven to a certain extent by the rapidly changing normative basis of society resulting from the 1976 turning-point arbitration on land and water rights. The rapidly falling levels of the water table force many poorer farmers to sell parts of their land in an attempt to afford the increased cost of well deepening, re-equipping and higher operating costs.

11 Fourthly, there is strong evidence of the existence of adaptive capacity. This is found in the form of traditional value systems. It is encouraging to note that evidence exists of changing interpretations of religious principles, away from those justifying resource capture by a few powerful individuals, to those that are founded on notions of community and sustainability. It can thus be said that a second-order scarcity of social resources is not yet evident. This should be monitored closely in order to determine whether it is sufficient to change the prevailing patterns of groundwater abstraction and resource capture.

Fifthly, this case study provides excellent evidence of the complex relationship that ÒvalueÓ has as an aspect of the concept of return to water. Economic rationality differs fundamentally from cultural rationality and political rationality. The latter is included because political rationality within a localised context relates to elements of prestige and power. Therefore, having a large citrus orchard is a visible symbol of wealth and consequently a manifestation of power - which in turn is a political expression. This has mitigated against substantial efforts at achieving allocative or productive efficiency. Where allocative efficiency is being found to exist, it is at the level of the production unit and is thus intra-sectoral in . However, the lack of alternative industrial development must be taken into consideration, so inter-sectoral allocative efficiency is possibly not evident simply because there is no industrial sector. In short, the limitation of possible alternatives is a major stumbling block towards achieving effective natural resource reconstruction through WDM strategies.

Sixthly, there is no hard evidence at this stage of any form of sustainable development. What evidence does exist is found in two tentative forms only. (A) There is evidence of a newly emerging religious interpretation, which if continued, may result in the long-term change in perception of groundwater abstraction. (B) There is evidence that some tribes and/or tribespeople are starting to learn from the mistakes of others. This is manifest in a new normative order that either prohibits the further sale of land, or results in tribespeople resisting efforts by their traditional leaders to capture the resource base. Natural resource reconstruction is certainly not evident in any form. The first sign of this would be a stabilisation in the level of the groundwater table, which is not yet apparent.

Finally, there is a need to urgently get WDM strategies in place if a medium-term disaster is to be avoided. Given the cultural significance of poetry, this could become an effective means of communicating WDM strategies and principles in a way that is culturally acceptable. Given the resurgence of Zaydi scholarship, new Quranic interpretations could provide the normative basis of these WDM strategies. Progress in this regard will be followed up during the next field trip to the region and additional papers will be published where relevant and appropriate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Allan, J.A. & Karshenas, M. 1996. Managing Environmental Capital: The Case of Water in Israel, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, 1947 to 1995, in Allan, J.A. & Court,

12 J.H. (eds.) Water, Peace and the Middle East: Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin. I.B. Taurus Publishers: London.

Allan, J.A. 1998. Productive Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency: Why Better Water Management may not Solve the Problem. In Agricultural Water Management, No. 1425; 1-5. Elsevier Sciences

Caton, S.C. 1990. Peaks of Yemen I Summon: Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe. Berkeley: University of California Press

DHV 1994. Water management plan: SaÔdah plain. YEM/87/015. Dresch, P. 1995(a). The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis. In al-Suwaidi (ed.) The Yemeni War 1994: Causes and Consequences. London: Saqi Books

Dresch, P. 1995(b). Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen. In IJMES No. 27; 405-431.

Handley, C. 1996. Water Use Patterns in the Amran Valley, Yemen. World Bank Report.

Haykal, B. 1995. A Zaydi revival? In Yemen Update, No. 36. Bulletin of the American Institute of Yemeni Studies.

Homer-Dixon, T. & Percival, V. 1996. Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Briefing Book. Population and Sustainable Development Project, American Association for the Advancement of Science & University of Toronto.

IDRC. 1998. (International Development Research Centre) Conference report on: Water resources management in the Islamic World. December 1-3, 1998, Amman, Jordan.

IIMI. 1996. Mission Statement of the International Irrigation Management Institute. Colombo: IIMI

LichtenthŠler, G. 1996. Tribes and Trends: Changing Perceptions of the Value of Water in Yemen. Perceptions of the Value of Water and Water Environments. Proceedings of the European Seminar on Water Geography, 6-10 September 1996, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

LichtenthŠler, G. 1999. Environment, Society and Economy in the SaÕdah Basin of Yemen: The Role of Water. Draft copy of a PhD Dissertation. Geography Department. School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

Moench, M. 1997. Local Water Management: Options and Opportunities in Yemen. Summary report to the World Bank of the Decentralised Management Study.

13 Morris, J. 1996. Water Policy: Economic Theory and Political reality, in Howsam, P. & Carter, R.C. (eds.) Water Policy: Allocation and Management in Practice. London: E & FN Spon

Ohlsson, L. 1998. Water and Social Resource Scarcity Ð An Issue Paper Commissioned by FAO/AGLW. Presented as a discussion paper for the 2nd FAO E-mail Conference on Managing Water Scarcity. WATSCAR 2.

Ohlsson, L. 1999. Environment, Scarcity and Conflict: A Study of Malthusian Concerns. Department of Peace and Development Research, Gšteborg University.

Reisner, M. 1993. Cadillac Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water. Revised Edition. New York: Penguin

Turton, A.R. 1999. Water Scarcity and Social Adaptive Capacity: Towards an Understanding of the Social Dynamics of Water Demand Management in Developing Countries. MEWREW Occasional Paper No. 9. Water Issues Study Group, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

Westerlund, H. 1996. To Meter or not to Meter; That is the Question, in Howsam, P. & Carter, R.C. (eds.) Water Policy: Allocation and Management in Practice. London: E & FN Spon

Winpenny, J.T. 1997. Demand Management for Efficient and Equitable Use, in Kay, M., Franks, T. & Smith, L. (eds.) Water: Economics, Management and Demand. London: E & FN Spon

14