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MEMORANDUM DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code

T itle 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

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HIGHLIGHTS

North Vietnamese units seem to be preparing new attacks in the Dak To area. Communist forces are active in northwestern III Corps and seem bent on dominating this area.

I. The Military Situation in §outh Vietnam: Enemy forces launched two attacks in northwestern III Corps during the night of 28-29 November (Paras. 1-4). Intercepted enemy communications in the Dak To area indicate that the North Vietnamese may be planning another attack (Paras. 5-8). The enemy wishes to dominate the Binh Long — Phuoc Long Province area (Paras. 9~ll). The Weekly Review of Battle Statistics (Para. l2).

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III. Nilitary Developments in : Two more of North Vietnam s MIGs moved to on 29 November, but, despite these evacuations, 's air force continues to offer resistance to US strikes (Paras. l-3).

IV. Qther Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: A Libera— tion Front spokesman has again stated that a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would not necessarily affect the situation in the South (Paras. l-3).

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L, MILITARY SITUATIQN in SQUTH VIETNAM

l. A battalion—size force launched a heavy mor- tar barrage and ground assault on the Bo Duc district headquarters located 18 miles northeast of Loc Ninh and some 85 miles north of Saigon along the Cambodian border. The attack, during the night of 28-29 Novem- ber, was timed to coincide with mortar and heavy machine—gun fire on a nearby US Special Forces Camp at Bu Dop.

2. The ground attack, possibly by elements of the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment, penetrated but did not overrun the Bo Duc district compound. During the five- hour battle, approximately 200 South Vietnamese de- fenders and ten US advisers were forced to withdraw. They then called in air strikes on enemy troops in the southern half of the compound and by morning had regained control of the entire compound.

3. Early reports list l5 South Vietnamese killed as against 100 enemy killed.

4. In another action, South Vietnamese Army troops claim 36 Viet Cong were killed in a battle 84 miles southwest of Saigon late on 28 November. The troops were searching for enemy forces which had shelled the Soc Trang Airfield on 27 November. The Central Highlands

5. North Vietnamese forces may be planning a new attack in the Dak To area.

6. Although the headquarters of the North Viet- namese lst Division and probably some of its sub- ordinate units have pulled back across the Cambodian border, intercepted messages disclose that enemy forces are continuing to conduct reconnaissance patrols near US positions west of Dak To. Increasingly detailed enemy intelligence reports have been intercepted during the past three days. These include information on the number of troops, artillery, and supplies at various US positions.

29 November 1967 I-1

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7. The North Vietnamese appear to be particularly interested in the US artillery fire support base at Ben Het and a nearby hilltop supply base. These po- sitions are some 12 miles west of Dak To and about 7 miles east of the point where the Laotian, Cambodian, and South Vietnamese borders join.

8. The North Vietnamese may hope additional attacks west of Dak To will tie down and hold US battalions in the highlands for a longer time. This region, like the Demilitarized Zone area, is a battleground favorable to the Communists, because it is near sanctuaries across the border and has easy access to main supply routes. By maintaining forces active in these areas, the Communists may hope to relieve allied pressure on other North Viet- namese and Viet Cong units deployed near coastal population centers-

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9. The North Vietnamese are trying to establish a main force enclave in the Binh Long - Phuoc Long Province area along the Cambodian border north of Saigon. The heavy attacks in the Loc Ninh — Song Be area earlier this month and the recent attack on the Bo Duc District headquarters in northern Phuoc Long tend to confirm previous indications in captured documents that the Communists hope to dominate this region.

l0. Communications intelligence also suggests that the North Vietnamese have established a major "front" command group in this area, similar to the DMZ Front and the B-3 Front in the central highlands. The technical features of a new radio net, located by communications intelligence in the northern Binh Long - Cambodian border area in August, are similar to those exhibited by the B-3 Front when it first ap- peared in . Three of the radio stations on the net have been tentatively identified as the Viet Cong 5th and 9th divisions and the North Vietnamese 7th Division.

29 November l967

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fuQ 3.3(h)(2) ‘the recent step—up in enemy activity in northwestern III Corps area resulted from a directive from COSVN, the over-all Communist headquarters in South Vietnam. The directive allegedly indicated that the Commu- nists intend to dominate northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces with a view toward eventual negotiations. 3.3(h)(2) \the Communists hope to turn this area into a secure terminus for in- filtration and supply routes from and Laos.

Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

12. The week of 19-25 November compared with the week of 12-18 November:

I. Casualties

VC/NVA US 12-18 Nov 19-25 Nov 12-18 Nov 19-25 Nov

Killed 1,287 1,826 225 212 Wounded 1,251 1,241 Missing/ Captured

TOTALS 1,287 1,826 1,476 1,453

FREE WORLD 12-18 Nov 19-25 Nov 12-18 Nov 19-25 N66

Killed 269 216 10 8 Wounded 632 664 20 18 Missing/" Captured 74 25

TOTALS 975 905 30 26

29 November 1967

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II. Viet Cong Incidents

12-18 Nov 19-25 Nov Attacks 53 56 Battalion or Larger ...... 2 Small . 0 0 O Unit...... 51 Harassment . . 56 332 415 Terrorism 27 Sabotage 39 45 64 Propaganda 8 Antiaircraft 17 259 ll TOTALS 724 785

III. Weapons Captured

VC/NVA GVN I2-I6 Nov 19-25 Nov’ I2—18 Nov 19-25 Nov Individual 449 Not 233 178 Crew—Served 61 Reported 4 7

TOTALS 510 237 185 _

29 November 1967 I-4

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111. MIQITARYHDEVELQRMENQS IN NORTH YZETNAM

l. Intercepted communications on 29 November showed two North Vietnamese aircraft, possibly MIG~ 17s, flying from the Hanoi area to Meng—tzu Airfield in China. Prior to their departure, North Vietnam was estimated to have four MIG~2ls and eight MIG~ 15/l7s remaining in the country.

2. Despite the limited number of MIGs left, they continue to offer determined resistance to US aircraft. On 28 November returning US pilots reported six encounters, three of which involved the exchange of missile fire. No aircraft are known to have been lost by either side.

3. The aggressive behavior of Hanoi's fighters in recent weeks may have been prompted in part by re- peated attacks in the capital area. There is no evi- dence to indicate that the North Vietnamese are employ- ing any radically new tactics or weapons. The fighter pilots still flying combat missions are probably the most skilled and experienced the North Vietnamese have. Intercepted communications indicate that, despite numerous raids on North Vietnam's airfields, Communist ground controllers are directing MIGs in air engage- ments with increasing assurance and sophistication.

29 November 1967

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iv: OTHER l. There is nothing of significance to report

29 November 1967

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Y; COMMUNIST Pog;T;cA;_DEvELoPMENTs

l. Viet Cong spokesmen continue to stress that a US cessation of the bombings of North Viet- nam would not necessarily affect the situation in South Vietnam.

2. Dang Trinh Thi, head of the Liberation Front delegation to the recent Soviet anniversarv celebrations, took this line\ Dang 3.3(h)(2) outlined the standard Communist view that a peace- ful settlement of the war could best be brought about through acceptance of Hanoi's Four Points and the Front's new political program. When asked about the Front's reaction to a cessation of the bombings of the North, he replied that Hanoi would make its own decision on how to react to such a move. The Front, however, would continue to fight regardless of what North Vietnam might choose to do, even if it decides to negotiate with the US.

3. North Vietnamese officials, in an effort to show the independence of the Front, have also indicated that any action on their part following a bombing halt, including "talks" with the US, would not automatically include the war in the South. The US would have to deal directly with the Liberation Front on such matters.

29 November 1967 V—l

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YI._ OTHER MAJOR ASPECTQ

l. An intercepted message of 24 November from the North Vietnamese trade office in to Hanoi indicates that three carloads of unidentified cargo have been held up at the Sino—Mongolian border since 20 September waiting for through shipment. The Moscow office asked Hanoi to intervene with the Chinese authorities to secure the necessary transit permission.

2. Since last spring the North Vietnamese have been taking title to at least some categories of Soviet shipments at the Sino-Soviet or the Sino- Mongolian border, and the Vietnamese have been re-

3:xhX2)' sponsible for arranging the onward movement of these items to Vietnam. The reason for the present hold- up is not specified in the messaged ] 3;xhX2)

29 November 1967 VI-l

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