View of the Dissertation

Explaining the India-U.S. Strategic Partnership: The Impact of Middle-Class Identity

PhD Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Political Science in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

Shivaji Kumar

M.A.

Graduate Program in Political Science

The Ohio State University

2012

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Theodore G. Hopf, Advisor

Dr. Richard K. Herrmann,

Dr. Irfan Nooruddin

Shivaji Kumar

2012

Dissertation Abstract

Social-Cognitive identity is at partnership‟s core. My dissertation explores an empirical puzzle of how and why did India and the United States form a strategic partnership in 2008. This bilateral relationship is puzzling because it appeared inconceivable to practitioners and theorists of international relations only a few years earlier. In this dissertation, I bracket the American side of the equation and instead focus on India. I then test the argument that domestic identities, composed of individual and social components, shape state foreign policies. I test this argument by employing a novel sequential, multimethod research design that combines discourse analysis and a traditional large-n survey in a single study. This research design consists of, first, using discourse analysis of India‟s select popular textual sources, and then employing the thematic categories generated from the discourse analysis to design and conduct a large-n survey. This survey was conducted with a sample size of 804 respondents in two

Indian cities using cluster sampling. The combination of these two data collection techniques produced the empirical findings. The social-cognitive identities of

India defined the content and nature of the India-U.S. strategic partnership; variations in those identities generated variations in the different aspects of this partnership. The substantive aspects of the partnership analyzed in the dissertation relate to the growth of economic relations, the conclusion of civil (and not

military) nuclear agreement, and the clear disagreement over climate change.

Given its theoretical framework and multimethod approach, my dissertation makes three contributions to the field of International Relations: it establishes strong correlations between disparate empirical phenomena in valid and reliable manner, it demonstrates novel ways to combine different research techniques to analyze new substantive problems, and it increases confidence to explain and predict state foreign and security policies.

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Dedication

To my family.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my committee members for their continued support and encouragement to bring this dissertation to a close. No three people have had a greater influence on my professional life. Ted Hopf, my advisor and committee chair, has been a constant source of encouragement to push the work forward when my own inspiration flagged. His understanding of what it takes to write a dissertation under different limitations is simply unmatched. I wish to thank

Professor Richard Herrmann for guiding the design of large-n survey and patiently helping interpret its results. With his direct and sharp questioning style,

Professor Irfan Nooruddin kept this project from wandering into many dead-ends.

Most importantly, I have benefited on numerous occasions from his friendly advice on how to successfully navigate the many unknowns of graduate school.

This dissertation would have not been possible without the generous support of several funding institutions and centers. At Ohio State, I am thankful for two field research grants from the Mershon Center for International Security, one grant from the Office of International Affairs under its Global Gateways

Initiative, and two graduate student grants from the Political Science Department.

I also received scholarships from the Lions Club and the Ohio State‟s Office of

Student Affairs. I remain grateful to the Ford Foundation three-year International

Fellowship for launching my graduate career in the United States. This dissertation would have not been possible without generous help from many different Indian libraries. In particular, I want to acknowledge the help of the chief librarian Mr. S.M. Kaushik of the Aaj Tak television in New Delhi for digging out year‟s old records of recording and making them available. The staff of the Nehru Memorial Library graciously assisted me in accessing journals and periodicals. Among others who helped me, Suzanne Hartwick played a critical role in giving this dissertation its final shape. Thank you, Suzanne.

My family deserves sincere gratitude. Those who suffered severe second- hand effects of writing a dissertation are my daughter Sapna and my wife Sheetal

Ghadse. Sheetal cheerfully subjected herself to many political science ideas, though the subject matter remained far removed from her interests. Among many in India, my mom and dad served as constant sources of determination and inspiration to bring the task at hand to a successful conclusion. To them, I dedicate this dissertation.

Vita

2005...... MA, Purdue University

2001 ...... M.Phil, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

1997...... St. Xaviers College, University of Bombay, Bombay, India

Field of Study

Political Science

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Table of Contents

Dissertation Abstract ...... ii Dedication ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v Table of Contents ...... viii List of Tables ...... x Chapter 1: Explaining the India-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Why Domestic Identities Matter? ...... 1 Chapter 2: Social Cognitive Identities and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework ...... 16 Chapter 3: Sequential, Multimethod Identity Research in Security Studies: The Promise of Combining Discourse Analysis and Survey Methods ...... 53 Addendum A: Table of select popular texts ...... 86 Chapter 4: Discursive Identities of India (2008) ...... 87 Chapter 5: The India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement: the Impact of Shifting Middle-Class Discourses ...... 123 Addendum B: Questions Measuring India‟s Middle-Class Support for India- U.S. Nuclear Cooperation ...... 160 Chapter 6: The India-U.S. Economic Relations: The Impact of Middle-class Identity ...... 161 Addendum C: Correlations of India‟s middle-class values and American middle-class values ...... 191 Addendum D: Correlations of India‟s middle-class values and foreign investment ...... 192 Chapter 7: India‟s Constraints in the U.S.-India Climate Change Agreement: The Impact of Shifting Middle-Class Consensus...... 193 Chapter 8: Conclusions ...... 233 References ...... 254 Primary Sources ...... 254 Memoirs ...... 254 Documents ...... 254 Secondary Sources ...... 255 Appendices ...... 269 Appendix A: Table of select popular texts ...... 269

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Appendix B: Questions Measuring India‟s Middle-Class Support for India-US Nuclear Cooperation ...... 270 Appendix C: Correlations of India‟s middle-class values and American middle- class values...... 271 Appendix D: Correlations of India‟s middle-class values and foreign investment ...... 272

List of Tables

Table 4.1: Table 4.1. Discursive Identities of India 2008 ...... 92 Table 5.1: Hardworking Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 132 Table 5.2: India‟s Pragmatic Middle-Class Traits ...... 136 Table 5.3: Correlations of Middle-Class Identification and Nuclear Preferences ...... 142 Table 5.4: India‟s Civil Nuclear Plants ...... 143 Table 5.5: Overambitious Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 145 Table 5.6: Correlation of Middle Class Identification and Military-Nuclear Cooperation ...... 147 Table 5.7: Disillusioned Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 151 Table 5.8: Question Measuring Disillusioned Middle-Class Traits ...... 153 Table 6.1. Overambitious Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 168 Table 6.2. Big Achievements ...... 170 Table 6.3. Hardworking Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 177 Table 6.4. Correlation of India‟s Middle Class Values of Hard Work and Belief in Adoption of American Values ...... 181 Table 6.5. Correlation of India‟s Middle Class Values of Hard Work and Support for Foreign Investment ...... 186 Table 6.6. "Trade in Goods with India" (in billions of dollars) ...... 189 Table 7.2. Middle-Class Discursive Components...... 204 Table 7.3. Overambitious Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 213 Table 7.4. Hardworking Middle-Class Discursive Components ...... 220 Table 7.5. How confident are you that India-U.S. relations should be driven by cooperation over issues of climate change? ...... 226

List of Figures

Figure 1: India-U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions ...... 198

Chapter 1: Explaining the India-U.S. Strategic Partnership:

Why Domestic Identities Matter?

“Our relationship with the United States has never been in such good shape as it is today. And it is the intention of my government ... whether it is a question of climate change or global economy, India and the United States must stand tall, stand shoulder to shoulder, and that‟s what is going to happen” —Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the G8 Summit, 2008

Introduction

How and why do major shifts in foreign policy occur in the absence of international structural pressures and the non-commitment of political elites? To address these general questions, this dissertation investigates the influences of mass-level, social-cognitive discourses on the India-U.S. strategic partnership.

The dissertation tells a story of how domestic middle-class identity, composed of individual cognitive and social discourses, made possible the India-U.S. strategic partnership and the effects of those identities on the dyadic foreign policies.1 This partnership is puzzling because it appeared inconceivable to practitioners2 and theorists of international relations only a few years before 2008.3 In this dissertation, I bracket the American side of the equation and instead focus on

1 Note that I will use in this dissertation uppercase (International Relations) to denote the discipline and lowercase to indicate the general phenomenon of (international relations). 2 Indifferent or actively negative American foreign policy attitudes toward India in the past are detailed in the introduction to the report prepared for the members of the Congress entitled “India-U.S. Relations,” produced by the Congressional Research Service. See Kronstadt CRS Report RL33529 (January 30, 2009). 3 For excellent summaries of recent theoretical positions that did not predict an India-U.S. partnership, see Carter (2006: 36-38; Hagerty (2009: 23-42); Levi and Ferguson (2006: 1-7). 1

India as a case study, testing the argument that domestic identities shape state foreign policies. I test this argument by employing a novel sequential, multimethod research design that combines discourse analysis and a traditional large-n survey in a single study.

In this introductory chapter, I will address the question of what strategic partnership is and how it is relevant for the India-U.S. relations. I will also investigate the question of why it matters to study strategic partnership through an investigation of mass-level, social-cognitive discourses in the India-U.S. context.

The chapter concludes with a brief preview of the dissertation.

I. What is Strategic Partnership and why is it Relevant for India-U.S. Relations?

Dominant international relations theories of neorealism, liberalism, and elite rational choice have produced mountains of literature on the causes and consequences of formal and informal alliances, but a deep chasm exists between the insufficient theoretical attention to mass-level influences and the empirical reality of growing public support for different strategic partnerships. Governing elites often cite public opinion to support or reject strategic partnerships with other states. For instance, Israel and Turkey repeatedly cited high level of public opinion as the main driver of their strategic partnership.4 NATO officials would miss no opportunity to invoke European citizens desire for partnership with

4 Inbar (2001: 48-65). 2

Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States.5 Similarly, both

American and Indian leaders evoked mass support for their new era in bilateral relations. Despite its widespread use in policy-making,6 the popular basis of strategic partnership has received relatively little attention from International

Relations scholars. At the same time, the number of strategic partnerships is steadily growing--for example, between Russia and China,7 Russia and Iran,8

Israel and Turkey,9 the United States and Russia,10 NATO and other potential members,11 and India and Israel,12 to name a few.

The term “strategic partnership” refers to a special kind of close alignment between two states, but one that falls short of a full-fledged alliance.13 To appropriate the terminology of alliance formation, I borrow from Tertais‟s characterization of strategic partnership as a classic case of a flexible agreement between two sovereign states concerning cooperation.14 Such cooperation occurs because of the convergence of state interests on select issues.15 Here, two distinctive features of strategic partnership are particularly relevant for this paper.

5 Weitz (2010: 99-120). 6 Several formal statements on the growing significance of strategic partnerships in the recent past have come largely from former officials such as Secretary of State Powell (2004: 22-34). Also see William Burns, “India’s Rise and the Promise of the U.S.-Indian Partnership,” Speech of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs to the Council on Foreign Relations, June 1, 2010) http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm (accessed September 10, 2011). 7 Portkyakov (2007: 1-15); Wilkins (2008). 8 Jalali (2001: 98-111). 9 Inbar (2001: 48-65). 10 Goldschmidt and Kuchins (2008). 11 Hunter (2008: 14-28). 12 Kumaraswamy (1998: 42-54). 13 For arguments that the concept of “strategic partnership” is closely associated with entente and the use of this old concept has been resurrected in a different form since the end of the Cold War, see Hagerty 2006: 15); Wilkins (2008). 14 Tertrais (2004: 135). 15 See Inbar (2001: 47-48); Wilkins (2008). 3

First, a strategic partnership involves a pledge to consult or cooperate on matters that are mutually beneficial to states. A strategic partnership is relatively informal; it is not expressed in formal treaties or other agreements of international legal standing as compared to a formal alliance.16 In other words, strategic partners retain greater flexibility than alliance partners in determining the appropriate degree of support for one another. To rephrase Tertais, the strategic partnership is far more loosely defined than the alliance, is a far less conspicuous form of association, and often involves no definite commitments on the part of the partners.17 Second, states in a strategic partnership enter into a political agreement to establish cooperation for the pursuit of their political goals.18 A strategic partnership serves largely as a mechanism of political agreement for cooperation; it may explicitly lack military character inherent in alliances. Thus, support for a strategic partner could extend to military cooperation, but it may also be confined to close diplomatic consultation or moral support. More specifically, whereas alliances tend to be focused on particular, well-defined military dangers, strategic partnerships tend to concentrate on preparing for a wide variety of possibilities, which might include military cooperation but also non-military cooperation such as economic ties and a common plan for preventing global warming. Given this understanding and India‟s preference to retain independence and autonomy in its foreign policy, I contend that the relationship between India and the United States is best characterized as a strategic partnership.

16 Hagerty (2006: 15, 17). 17 Tertrais (2004: 133; 135; 140). 18 Schweller (1994; 1999); Hagerty (2006: 15). 4

Given that a strategic partnership has both military and political objectives, a mass-level support in its favor or against plays a critical role. The increase in strategic partnerships in recent years and their disconnect with popular basis have three serious practical consequences for International Relations field.

First, the absence of mass-level, popular bases of state partnerships makes their implementation difficult, or even impossible. For example, the masses have little connection with the strategic cooperation between Pakistan and the United States, and often loudly protest against it at the slightest provocation.19 Second, state decisions about foreign policy are often political in nature, they involve use of political tools in the hands of elites to work out mutually-agreeable settlements in the domestic sphere. Given that politicians are interested in getting elected to political offices, we observe political elites to conform with their constituents‟ discourses. In the absence of such domestic mass-level political roots of strategic partnerships, they risk provoking popular resistance and mass uprisings, as witnessed in the contemporary Middle-East. Such social upheavles threaten the position of the governing elites as well as that of the continuation of the strategic partnership between states. For instance, a purely elite-driven strategic agreement between Egypt and Israel remained rock-solid as long as the elite consensus about its relevance was unquestioned under the position of the long-term governing elites remained intact.20 However, injection of mass-level element into the

Egyptian politics is severely straining that strategic agreement.

19 Cohen and Chollet (2007: 7-19); Schaffer (2002: 169-183). 20 Shafir (2006: 3; 22; 24-26). 5

Finally, the scholarly neglect of the strategic partnerships and their social bases seem to emanate from the relatively recent origins of this form of alignment and the difficulty of labeling it neatly within analytical categories of existing alliance literature. Only a handful of studies, such as Johnston (1995), Rosen

(1996), have focused on social basis of state military and political strategies, but they too examined influences of those domestic traits only in terms of state alliances and alignments, analytical categories that fitted well within the traditional security literature.21 The practice of Strategic partnership is of relatively recent origin and appears to be deeply rooted in mass-level, popular support for its continuation across time and elite generations.

My focus on the India-U.S. partnership is intentional. The turnaround in

India-U.S. relations in recent years has been dramatic. From only a lukewarm and spasmodic interaction until 1998, mostly in the context of India-Pakistan

Kashmeer conundrum,22 the transformation of India-U.S. relations in 2008 became breath-taking.23 This transformation entails re-envisioning of India as

America‟s “natural ally,” “natural partner,” or “strategic partner.”24 Such descriptions of the India-U.S. relations were justified because of India‟s growing status along several dimensions. It was the second-fastest growing economy;25 its military was rapidly modernizing and adapting to new modes of warfare (Tellis

21 Hagerty (2006); Tertrais (2004: 135-37). 22 Ganguly (2006: 45-57). 23 Hagerty (2006: 15; 2009); Pant (2010); Rice (2006); Schaffer (2009). 24 For attempts at outlining the content of these various terms from a practitioners perspective, see the speech of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns “India’s Rise and the Promise of US-Indian Partnership,” delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations (June 1, 2010) http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm (accessed September 9, 2011). 25 Cux (2007: 53-75); Zakaria (2008: 165). 6

2008: 21-42);26 it was competing with China for political and diplomatic influence in the South Asian region (Cohen 2001; Talbott 2004);27 its strategic importance in the Asian Pacific region was growing,28 and the United States was forging multidimensional ties with it (Cux 2007; Tellis 2008: 22-23; Zakaria

2008: 34).29

Theoretically, focusing on this significant bilateral relationship is important because India perceives itself as a rising power and seeks to bolster its position in international relations with the support of the United States. However, according to the neorealist balance-of-power theory, we should expect the U.S. to balance against the rise of India and take preventive measures. Such measures will prevent cooperation between India and other rising powers (e.g., China), the two weaker states in the triad, to form a balance against the U.S. According to this strategic balance-of-power, “the expectation is not that the balance once achieved will be maintained, but that a balance once disrupted will be restored in one way or another.”30 The further expectation is that this balance will be restored in the form of China and India joining together to oppose the U.S. in the contemporary period, replacing the long-maintained Soviet-American bipolar structure.

26 Also see, Ashley J. Tellis “India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States,” (2005) available here: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17079&prog=zgp&pro j=zsa (accessed 4/02/2009). 27 Also see, Alan K. Kronstandt’s assessment of India’s role as one of the main contenders to Chinese growing power after the new administration assumed office in a report to the Congress entitled “India-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Quarterly Service (January 30, 2009) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf (accessed 3/15/2009). 28 Muscan 2007: 70-8). 29 Also see Lisa Kurtis and James Carafano “U.S.-India Strategic Partnership on Laser-based Missile Defense,” Backgrounder (2009) available here: http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2250.cfm (accessed 4/02/2009). 30 Waltz (1979: 126). 7

According to neorealism, such balancing occurs because states consider power as a means and not an end in itself; they prefer to join the weaker of the two possible coalitions.31 Thus, there is generally a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The neorealist theoretical expectation is that the United States would prevent formation of an alliance between India and China by attracting the former toward its own side. From my perspective, however, while India‟s trade relations with China in 2008 were burgeoning, the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership was gaining real legs in nuclear, trade, and other issues of mutual cooperation. Clearly, neorealism cannot explain a vast array of everyday states‟ decisions and activities, which in addition to balancing, form a bulk of their international politics.32

Second, there is yet another realist strand that suggests not balancing, but bandwagoning behavior in the India-U.S. strategic partnership. Specifically, when faced with an adversary, states look for and ally with a stronger partner.33 The claim here is that India formed a strategic partnership with the United States to check the growing power of its neighbor China.34 Similarly, the United States uses India to check the growing Chinese power and thus prevent significant changes in the existing distribution of power in the Asian region.35 Empirically, however, since the India-U.S. strategic partnership was first proposed in 2005 and until the conclusion of the nuclear agreement in 2008, both China and India had

31 See Waltz (1979: 124, 126, 201, 202). 32 Basrur 2009: 8). Also see Schweller (2003: 313). 33 Schweller (1994: 93; 1997: 927-928). 34 Emott (2009); Hong 2007). 35 Haggerty (2009: 23-25); Rice (2000; 2006). 8

developed fairly extensive network of international relations.36 In particular, India was invited to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with observer status,37 both were cooperating in the group of emerging economies, and conducting separate meetings to increase their influence in the existing structure of international politics.38 This growing cooperation between China and India does not seem to explain India‟s bandwagoning behavior toward the United States in forming a strategic partnership.

Third, I selected the India-U.S. cooperation as a case-study because of the empirical puzzle of the lack of cooperation between two democratic states of

India and the United States on the one hand, and the theoretical expectations of the democratic peace propositions, on the other. The liberal theory does not offer convincing explanation of establishment and growth of this cooperative relationship. This theory posits that democratic political structures and liberal norms will generate peaceful relations among democratic states.39 What confounds the explanation of India-U.S. cooperation in the recent past from the liberal perspective is that both states in this dyad had been democracies for more than fifty years with only a brief period of non-democratic rule in India, yet the bilateral relations of the two countries could be characterized as anything but cooperative.40 On account of these inadequate explanations of the India-U.S.

36 Basrur (2009: 15-17). 37 See Kavalski (2007: 839-845); Norling and Swanstrong (2007: 429-444). 38 For an excellent discussion on latter two points, see Singha and Dorschner (2010: 86-87). 39 For initial explication of this liberal theory and its implications for international relations, see Doyle (1983; 1986). 40 Raja Mohan (2008); Pant 2009); Karnad (2008). For a view that India’s extreme reluctance to use democracy promotion to build relations with other states, see Mallavarapu (2010: 49-61). 9

partnership, I now turn to a discussion of my explanatory variable: the social- cognitive identity.

II. Why Social-Cognitive Identity Matters for the India-U.S. Partnership?

In positing identity as a cause of the India-U.S. relations in 2008, I am claiming in this dissertation that identity (social and individual) made one foreign policy outcome more likely than others, hence leading to differentiated outcomes in a strategic partnership.41 The recovery of India‟s domestic discourses and the subsequent statistical analysis of the large-n survey show a significantly high correlation between the social-cognitive identity and country‟s foreign policy choices. In my domestic constructivist framework, I treat domestic social- cognitive identity formation as independent variables that generate particular foreign policy outcomes.42 Here, my claim is twofold. First, the dominant identity discourse shapes foreign policy by predisposing decision-making elites toward one cooperative/conflictual outcome more than others. Second, citizens‟ individual cognitive capacity defines the level of their agreement/disagreement with the dominant discourses that, in turn, set important limits on the elite foreign policy decisions. From my perspective, partnership between India and the U.S. is

41 This dissertation implements a multilevel, multimethod research design to capture both social and cognitive components of citizens. For recommendations in International Relations field to promote such designs, see Abdelal et al. (2005; 2009); Hopf (2004); McDermott (2004: chaps 1- 3). For specific methodological choices I make in applying this research design, see chapter 3 of the dissertation. 42 For similar domestic constructivist frameworks, see Abdelal (2006); Hopf (2002; 2009). This framework is different from systemic constructivism of Wendt (1999). 10

a function of the dominant social cognitive identities in the specific Indian context. I evaluate this argument in three issue areas of the India-U.S. partnership rooted in the social cognitive identities: the politics of the signing of a civil (and not military) nuclear agreement, the growing economic relations, and the faltering cooperation over climate change.

Because each issue area is evaluated in the same year (2008), the theoretical puzzle remains the same in each chapter even though the empirical issue is different. In the case of civil nuclear agreement, I explore how and why the civil agreement in the nuclear field became possible with the U.S. when it was unthinkable only a few years ago for India to consider anything less than full military cooperation. However, in the absence of such cooperation, the other extreme position was to have no nuclear cooperation. Instead, significant in this process was the discursive influence of the middle class to change the political elites‟ decisions to accept a civilian nuclear agreement. The elite decisions were predisposed toward civil nuclear agreement by this middle-class identity to forgo the strategic considerations of full military nuclear cooperation or preferences of no nuclear cooperation.43

In the realm of economic cooperation, the India-U.S. relations were constituted in significant ways by the middle-class social cognitive identity. The discursive influences of this identity were expressed in desires to promote greater economic cooperation with the U.S., to welcome the American investment in

43 For an elite-driven constructivist view that liberal or conservative identities of American leaders played a significant role in relations between India and the US in the past, see Widmaier (2005: 431-55). 11

India, and to evaluate effects of such economic cooperation between the two states as particularly positive for the middle class. Such everyday middle-class desires generated discourses that constituted a domestic political environment in which elite preferences were shaped in favor of fast-tracking economic relations with the United States but with the emphasis on using indigenous middle-class talents. As a result, the Indian government put in place several fast-track institutional measures to foster greater economic cooperation with the U.S. but also emphasized utilizing domestic middle-class creativity and talent. My findings demonstrate that the domestic middle-class identity of India predisposed decision- making elites to seek greater economic cooperation with the U.S. in those areas the middle class most desired,44 setting aside the liberal arguments in favor of supporting free flow of goods and ideas among democracies or the strategic considerations of giving preferential treatment to alliance partners to strengthen the balance-of-power.45 I treat the climate change issue as the final empirical case study to argue that the central cause of a faltering cooperation in this issue area is the strong constitutive influence of a social cognitive identity discourse on the decision-making elites. My empirical findings show that the dominant middle- class identity discourse constitutes the U.S. as a selfish and greedy nation that robs others of their resources for its own consumption. As a consequence, India‟s middle class discursively shaped the India-U.S. cooperation over climate change to the extent that India would not commit to any binding standards until the latter

44 For similar arguments that everyday practices of masses impose limitations on the elite decision making in economic realm, see Seabrooke (2007: 796); Abdelal et al. (2010: chap 1). 45 See Raja Mohan (2006: 33-43). 12

did so. By constraining Indian elite decisions not to commit to any unilateral standards to deal with climate change, the constitutive effects of middle-class social cognitive identity were clearly observable on the climate policy of India with the U.S. Therefore, the Indian leaders are extremely reluctant to enter into a dependable cooperation with U.S. over the issue of climate change.

III. Preview of the Dissertation

Before I present a map of this dissertation, let me recapitulate this introductory chapter. Here, I briefly addressed questions of what “strategic partnership” stands for and why it matters in the contemporary international relations. I also raised the question of why this form of alliance is important to study the India-U.S. dyadic relationship. To address these questions, I argued in favor of recovering domestic social and cognitive elements of mass identities to explain the strategic partnership between India and the United States. There are more than a few alternatives to researching the strategic partnership, as I briefly discussed in this chapter and will engage more comprehensively in the last chapter, but I believe that establishing a credible and convincing correlation between mass-level, social identities and state behavior requires multiple analytical and methodological cuts.

In Chapter 2, I will develop a theoretical framework to account for the role of mass-level, social-cognitive identities in the formation of the India-U.S. strategic partnership. Specifically, I will lay out the role of social discourses and

individual cognition in generating mass-level identity content. I follow this with a comprehensive framework that enables integration of content and contestation within a society, which produce agreement/disagreement over the nature and relevance of particular identities. While I argue for a social-cognitive identity approach to explain the India-U.S. strategic partnership, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of limitations of this framework. In Chapter 3, I will discuss this dissertation‟s research design. That chapter will outline a sequential, multimethod research design to tap into both social and cognitive components of identities. In particular, I employ a multimethod design that uses discourse analysis as the first data collection method, followed by a large-n survey as the second research technique. After I present this sequential multimethod research design in that chapter, the empirical chapters of the dissertation will employ this design to analyze the India-U.S. partnership.

In Chapter 4, I will present social discourses recovered from select popular texts and their corroboration with the survey data. The use of this sequential, multi-method data collection produced three dominant clusters of social-cognitive identity that, according to the existing literature, constitute different segments of

India‟s middle-class. Based on my multi-method data, I categorized these segments as the overambitious, futuristically-oriented middle class; the pragmatic, present-oriented middle class; and the disillusioned, past-oriented middle class. I use this identity framework to analyze the India-U.S. strategic partnership as the dependent variable of the dissertation in the following chapters. Those chapters will analyze the conclusion of civil (and not military) nuclear agreement (Chapter

5), the growth of economic ties (Chapter 6), and a hesitant but nascent cooperation over the issue of climate change (Chapter 7) between India and the

U.S.

Finally, in Chapter 8, I evaluate my arguments against dominant

International Relations theories. Specifically, I discuss how my theoretical and empirical evidence add to or subtract from our understanding of the contemporary world politics. I do not focus on the entire range of IR theories. The discussion here is restricted to the three IR theories of elite-consensus, neorealism, and systemic constructivism. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the ways in which my multi-method approach would help explain the changing dynamics of the contemporary international relations--changes incomprehensible with the application of existing dominant IR theories or the use of single research methods.

Chapter 2: Social Cognitive Identities and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical

Framework

Introduction

In this chapter, I will describe a framework of social cognitive identity to analyze a substantive puzzle of International Relations:1 how and why India and the U.S. formed a partnership. This partnership is puzzling because its formation seemed inconceivable to practitioners2 and theoreticians of international relations only a few years ago.3 In the first section of this chapter, I will present some of the important concepts of identity as used in contemporary International Relations theories, and explicate their relevance for my dissertation. Specifically, I will discuss how ideational and social constructivist conceptions of the world shape our understanding of identities and their relevance for analyzing foreign policies of states. In this discussion, I will highlight the ways in which both social

1 In this dissertation, I will use uppercase International Relations to denote the field and lowercase international relations to indicate the phenomenon. 2 Indifferent or actively negative American foreign policy attitudes toward India in the past is detailed in the introduction to the report prepared for the members and committees of the Congress entitled “India-US Relations” produced by the Congressional Research Services. See Kranstadt CRS Report RL33529 (January 30, 2009). 3 The opposition to the partnership came from both realist and liberal perspectives. From the neorealist balance-of-power theory, India possessed little power to affect the existing distribution of capabilities in the system, and thus would have inconsequential influence on international outcomes. However, the liberal critics claimed that the formation of partnership with India was tantamount to de facto recognition of India’s nuclear status, and thereby rewarded the recalcitrant behavior of that country for nearly forty years toward the nuclear non- proliferation. For excellent summaries of these different theoretical positions toward the India- US partnership, see Carter (2006: 36-38; Hagerty (2009: 23-42); Levi and Ferguson (2006: 1-7). 16

psychological and systemic constructivist (the two theories most closely associated with identity research in International Relations) suffer from many limitations because their mutually-exclusive research programs. I suggest that these disparate bodies of literature possess many useful and productive concepts that can be harnessed creatively to address many of the puzzles of International

Relations. My claim here is that the use of a hybrid concept of identity, which combines both psychological and social components, will generate valid and robust explanations of many substantive problems in international relations. In this section, I argue for borrowing social content from systemic constructivism and combining it with cognitive elements from psychological theories to produce such a concept.

The second section describes a framework of social cognitive identity and its constituent components. Specifically, I will lay out the role of social discourses and individual cognition in generating identity content. This discussion will highlight a comprehensive framework of identity that enables integration of content and contestation within a society to produce agreement/disagreement over the nature and relevance of particular identities. This section also lays out the two important limitations of the social cognitive identity framework employed in this dissertation, and identifies the ways in which these limitations can undermine usefulness of my model. I conclude this section by deriving the main hypothesis of the research: the greater the influence of social cognitive identities in the domestic politics of states, the greater the influence of those identities on the state foreign policies.

The third section considers a set of alternative hypotheses drawn from the existing dominant International Relations theories about conflict/cooperation among states in international politics. These alternative hypotheses relate specifically to cooperation/conflict between India and the U.S. across the issue areas of civil nuclear agreement, economic ties, and climate policies. These issues form empirical chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 5 analyzes the India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement. Chapter 6 focuses on bilateral economic ties, and Chapter 7 deals with the India-U.S. cooperation over climate change.

I. Social Cognitive Identities and Existing Identity Theories in

International Relations

My dissertation employs identity as the primary explanatory variable to analyze state foreign policy outcomes. I conceptualize identity as constituted by actors and structures, which I understand as interactions among actors that constitute a social structure, and this structure in turn constitutes actors. In this perspective, the generated identity is primarily social or ideational rather than primarily material.4 Based on these assumptions, I define identity as sets of social relations that make people similar to or different from others.5 As actors, states attribute these sets of relations and their meanings as associated with domestic identities to themselves, while relating to significant or relevant others in

4 For an initial conceptualization of this social constructivist position in IR that rejects the total dominance of materialism, see Wendt (1987; 1992; 1999: 1). 5 This definition is fairly close to many other concepts of identity in IR. From constructivist perspective, Hopf (2002: 3-8) conceptualizes identity as rooted in similarity and differences from various others that provide order, prediction, and certainty to life. Wendt (1994; 1999) defines identity from symbolic interactionist approach in which one takes perspective of the other. 18

international relations. This identity is generated through social discourses and individual cognition. On account of its focus on individual cognition and societal discourses, I label this identity as “social cognitive.”6 This labeling reveals my intention to employ social and cognitive components in the constitution of an identity. Whereas the “social” is the staple of constructivism, “cognitive” is the core concept of psychology. Traditionally, these two components have rarely been self-consciously employed to generate a single identity measure in the field of

International Relations. From my perspective, a domestic identity composed of these two elements would more reliably explain foreign policy outcomes than would a domestic identity composed of just alone.7

The concept of social cognitive identity employed here draws upon both social discourses and individual cognition. This concept can truly be termed as

“social psychological,” as opposed to extant psychological theories which concentrate exclusively on the individual cognition. Highlighting such one-sided focus in the literature, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann observed that the field of social psychology suffered because of its inattention to the social structures within which individual psychological processes take place.8 Similarly, Richard

Nisbett and Lee Ross highlight the unfortunate focus of the social psychology on

6 For a forceful argument in favor of using this societal, domestic-level concept of identity, see Hopf (2002). For an initial coining and use of the term “social cognitive” in the International Relations literature, see Adler and Barnett (1998: 31), and for its later use in empirical research, see Hopf (2002). 7 From the psychological perspective, there is a nascent but growing trend to combine elements of constructivism with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to explain state behavior. See Houghton (2007: 24-45); Kaarbo (2003: 155-201). Also see others making such concerted moves to bring cognitive studies of foreign policy closer to constructivism, see Hudson 2005: 1-30); Hudson and Sampson (1999). From constructivist perspective, see Kowert and Legro (1996: 481-3), and Rouseau (2006), for appeals to integrate constructivism with psychology. 8 Berger and Luckmann ( 1966: 32). 19

“individual beliefs and theories” rather than “social milieu.”9 Given these shortcomings, Ross and Nisbett sought to put the concept of identity on more solid grounds. They put forward a conceptual tripod that focused on situation, individual subjectivity, and interaction between individual psyche and larger social collectivities.10

However, in my view, the forgoing discussion is somewhat misplaced in focusing on the absence of situational or contextual factors in psychological theories. The early cognitive psychological works contained a large component of situation (or social) context that orients individuals in different settings. However, this focus on social settings has been almost forgotten in the rapidly changing disciplinary fashions of the recent past. Consider one of the foundational texts on cognitive psychology in International Relations, but one sadly little read today in the field: Foreign Policy Decision-Making.11 Underscoring the significance of the situational factors in foreign policy, Snyder in the introduction to the book12 noted:

It is difficult to see how we can account for specific actions and for continuities of policies without trying to discover how their operating environments are perceived by those responsible for choices, how particular situations are structured, what values and norms are applied to certain kinds of problems what matters are selected for attention and how their past experience conditions present.

9 Ross and Nisbett (1995: 30). Also see, Hopf (2002: 1-2). 10 Ibid (1995: 8-17). 11 This book written by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954/2002) outlined many of the core concepts of psychology used in the field but later lost its relevance due to growing emphasis on structural determinants of International Relations. For a detailed commentary on the lack of a central focus of the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), see Carlsnaes (2002: 332-36); Houghton (2007: 25-30). 12 Snyder et al. (1954/2002: 5). 20

In this somewhat forgotten text by Snyder and his associates, situation (or context) provides a framework to actors of a pre-existing interpretive scheme.

Decision makers as actors turn to their operating situations or interpretive dispositions to get important clues not only about the choices they make, but also about the norms and values that influence their decisions. These norms and values acquire even more importance in the decision making process in the form of past experiences and thus shape individual choices.13 Noteworthy from my perspective is that the individual cognition of the policy makers in this book turns out to be product of the situational or social contexts, which were overlooked for decades by the successors of Snyder and associates (1954/2002) in the field of foreign policy analysis. Coming from the psychological perspective, Goldgeier and

Tetlock opine that cognitive science has potentially much to contribute to constructivism. They claim “at a foundational level, a cognitive psychological analysis of world politics is compatible with the constructivist program.”14 To bridge this assumed or real gap between social (situational) and individual cognition, this dissertation combines cognitive conceptions of identity with social and discursive components. In my view, such integration of individual cognition and social discourses generates robust and valid measures of domestic identities.

Two specific pay-offs are denied to my research in the absence of adding a social discursive dimension to the concept of psychological identity.15 First, the lack of conceptual development for connecting individual subjective identification

13 Ibid. 14 See Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001: 83). 15 For origin and development of this identity theory, See Tajfeld (1978), and Brown (2000: 745- 78). 21

with social discourses (e.g., history and culture) undercuts the processes of building collective identities.16 While Brewer and Weber17 highlighted the directionality of the processes of identification as they moved from individual to larger social collectivities, they could not demonstrate clear links between micro- level dynamics and the collective identities.18 Second, this concept of identity present by Brewer and Weber cannot tell us how weak individual subjective identities progress toward becoming strong19 identities without incorporating those cognitive elements with their discursive processes. To explicate this movement in individual subjective identity toward becoming an intersubjective collectivity, Huddy argues for the need to focus more on the processes of creating meaning of the internal group identity rather than group boundaries.20

Unfortunately, the psychologically-oriented studies have instead focused on the group boundaries in the field of International Relations.21 As a result, the field has tended to concentrate on the causes of differences among people, what sustains these differences, and the measures to deal with the consequences of those group distinctions (cites). From my perspective, what is missing from this psychological research is the explicit focus on the processes of identity generation at both social and individual levels, researched through a coherent framework of identity founded in social discourses, and individual cognitive identification.

16 For recent attempts at bridging the gap between foreign policy analysis and constructivism, see Houghton (2007),and Kaarbo (2003). 17 Brewer and Weber (1994: 265-88). 18 For a detailed discussion of such weak links between individual and group identity, see Brewer and Weber (1994). 19 Huddy (2001: 130). 20 Ibid. 21 See Abdelal et al. (2009, 2006); Hopf (2002); McDermott (2004). 22

Whereas the social psychological literature tends to overemphasize individual subjectivity, the systemic constructivism tends to overgeneralize the constitutive effects of external identities on state foreign policies. Although a part of the unique contribution of constructivism is to understand the significance of social identities (as norms or collective identities to explain outcomes),22 social constructivism focuses only on a top-down approach to explain those international outcomes. This has severely restricted systemic constructivist application to the issues and problems located at state and substate levels. Checkel quite convincingly argued that focusing on the systemic-level explanatory variables was a good strategy in the initial stages of the development of constructivism, but the continued lack of research at the domestic-level has stunted its ability to develop a productive research program.23

In this dissertation, I amend the constructivist research program and adopt a bottom-up approach to analyzing effects of social cognitive identities on the foreign policies of states. This domestic constructivist framework has two specific benefits for my dissertation. First, domestic-level constructivism enables recovery of many more forms of identities than permissible with the systemic constructivist conceptual tool kit. In the field of International Relations, however, these outcomes are generally attributed to the identities formed outside the states, which socialize domestic constituents as individual citizens or leaders. Following this systemic constructivist logic, domestic identities (both individual and social) have no effects on foreign policy outcomes. Wendt, as a typical systemic constructivist,

22 Finnemore (1996); Sikkink (1998); Wendt (1994: 384-96 and 1999). 23 Checkel (1998: 83-114; 1999: 324-50) 23

claims that, like Waltz, he was dealing with processes of construction at the international, and not at the foreign policy level.24 Following this logic, the social cognitive identity, to take an example, (the middle class) would not be relevant to explain foreign policy outcomes of India. This is because middle class identity did not exist at the systemic level to constitute a top-down Indian citizens‟ identity that, in turn, would make one foreign policy outcome more likely than another. As a correction to such a systemic view, Checkel forcefully argued that the domestic identities set important limits to the type of content and the degree of contestation of the international identities at the domestic-level. Consistent with this argument, my framework employs middle class as a social cognitive identity that produces large and observable impact on India‟s foreign policy toward the US. More specifically, a focus on the domestic identities helps determine the processes through which international identities “out there” are shaped by domestic identities and generate “outcomes here” at the foreign policy-level.25

From my perspective, systemic constructivism treats states as corporate entities, and makes a simplifying assumption that states, or their leaders, know what their population wants them to pursue as national interests.26 Despite an impressive list of state interests studied with this research perspective,27 it is not clear whether or how those interests are desired and approved by various domestic

24 Wendt (1994: 385; 1999: 11). 25 Checkel (1999: 84-5); Sikkink and Finnemore (2001: 393). 26 Klotz and Lynch (2007: 86). 27 This list is as varied as the pursuit of the non-use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999), the banning of the use and production of chemical weapons (Price 1995), or even the promotion of global human rights norms across state borders (Keg and Sikkink 1998; Robb et al. 1999). 24

identities.28 Consequently, systemic constructivism marks a definite advance in conceptualizing interests as non-material over other approaches, but it still does not clearly tell us on whose behalf objectives are being pursued as the national interest. Thus, it may be true that international identities determine the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons29 or respect for global human rights,30 but appropriateness and efficacy of these norms are contingent on their resonance with domestic identities.

The second advantage of my domestic constructivist approach is to generate valid and robust constructions of internal identities. These identities help specify clearly whether the system-level identities compete against or complement the pursuit of state foreign policy goals. More specifically, domestic identities help decide whether and the extent to which the international identities influence state foreign policies.31 Instead of generalizing identities operating at the international level to the rest of the states,32 the domestic-level constructivism employed in my dissertation has the potential for uncovering local variations and setting appropriate limits to the application of those systemic identities.33 Thus, a focus on construction of domestic identities will produce robust and valid measures of those systemic identities that, in turn, will help evaluate as clearly as possible their causal power. In particular, it will help reduce the indeterminacy generally associated with constructivist identity research, which shows that the

28 Checkel (1999: 85). 29 Tannenwald (1999) 30 Keg and Sikkink (1998); Ropp et al. (1999). 31 For similar arguments, see Abdelal (2005); Hopf 2002). 32 Wendt (1994 384-96; 1999: chaps 3-5). 33 Kowert and Legro (1996: 488-90). 25

same identity has dramatic effects in one state and fails to have any in another.34

As a result of this indeterminacy, the predictive power of constructivist identity studies is seriously undermined. Therefore, a social cognitive identity, consisting of social discourses and individual cognition, will produce valid and robust measures, which will reduce the indeterminacy associated with identity constructs, and will improve their predictive power.

In this section, I have presented the concept of identity in contemporary

International Relations theories and its relevance (or lack thereof) for my dissertation. In the following section, I will present a social cognitive framework of identity and the primary hypothesis of this dissertation.

II. A Framework of Social Cognitive Identities

Liberals and realists of different stripes eschew any talk of explanatory power of identity to address issues of conflict and/or cooperation in International

Relations, and they argue that identity at best plays an epiphenomenal role (as liberals assert) or at worst has no role at all (as realist think). From my perspective, both scholarly communities abandon a vast space of theoretical and substantive importance from which originate many novel and contemporary puzzles of international relations. The puzzle of the India-U.S. partnership is one such contemporary substantive problem that does not find adequate explanations in either liberal or realist scholarship. Prior to the formation of this relationship, neither India nor the U.S. considered it in their interest to form such a partnership

34 Checkel (2001: 563-4). 26

based on the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Nor did the two countries cooperate with each other because of their mutual respect for democratic principles and democratic institutions. On the contrary, I claim that the formation of partnership between the two states was the product of the social cognitive identities of India that shaped not just the nature but also the content of that bilateral relationship. The empirical chapters of this research will demonstrate that the substantive puzzle of the India-U.S. partnership is better explained by using citizens‟ social discourses about attitudes, feelings, and behaviors toward their status and significance in society.

From my perspective, identities are constituted by a combination of individual cognition and social discourses. As social discourses, they generate sets of social relations that constrain or enable the extent to which individual identities converge or diverge from their social discourses. Although such convergence of individual identity with social relations is product of individual cognition, the social discourses constrain or enable the extent of convergence or divergence of individual from the social identities. Thus, an individual‟s cognition tells a person to create and maintain personal proximity or distance from the social relations produced through discourses inside a state. To put it differently, an individual‟s cognition delimits the extent to which social discourses are agreed upon by individuals as members of social identities. These social cognitive components generate meanings of state identities in relationship with others. States as actors attribute a set of meanings associated with these domestic identities to themselves,

while relating to significant or relevant others in international relations.35 By positing identity as a cause, I am making an argument that state identity (social and individual) will have made one foreign policy outcome more likely than others, and hence will lead to differentiated outcomes in conflict or cooperation.

In this dissertation, I conceptualize social cognitive identity of states composed of a set of meanings states as actors attribute to themselves while relating to significant or relevant others in international relations.36 The concept of such social cognitive identity varies along two dimensions: contestation and content. Content describes the meaning of an identity. The content of such meanings is generated from the contestations among domestic groups and individuals over the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors while relating with others.

These different forms of identity content can be simplified and understood through employing a conceptual framework recently put forward by Abdelal and his associates.37 The meanings that states attribute to themselves constitute their social cognitive identity, which can be categorized under four basic, mutually- non-exclusive forms: constitutive norms (who we are), social purposes (what we want to achieve), social comparisons (who we are and what we are not), and cognitive models (what we see and know).38 Within the framework of Abdelal

35 Note that this understanding of identity in my dissertation is done from a multimethod approach that combines both Positivist large-n survey with Post-Positivist discourse analysis. For application of such understanding of identity in International Relations from a Post-Positivist perspective, see Doty (1993); Nueman (1994, 1999). 36 Constructivists in recent years have been quite self-conscious to ensure such variations in their identity-driven research. See Klotz and Lynch (2007: 65) for a forceful argument in favor of this research design. 37 Abdelal et al. and colleagues (2006; 2009). 38 Ibid (2006: 695-96; 2009). 28

and his associates, these forms of identity are the products of two varying dimensions: content and contestation. The content of these forms constitutes social cognitive identities that a state attributes to itself while interacting with others in international politics.39 Significant here is that this identity content is a product of the second dimension: contestation. Specifically, contestation includes the degree of within-group agreement about the constitutive norms of an identity; consensus over and congruence of social purposes ascribed to an identity; meaning attached to an outgroup; and coherence of shared cognitive models.40

According to this conceptual framework, by considering the level of contestation over each type of content within states, we can construct a valid concept of identity.41 From my perspective, we can best observe such content and contestation of identities in individual cognition42 and social discourses43 inside states.

Theories of discourse tend to differ on many themes, but converge on three basic points. First, discourses are intersubjective, which means that there exist some shared interpretations of attributes and traits of a social identity. With regard to an internal (societal) middle class identity within India, for instance, discourses generate interpretations of the shared attributes and traits of that social

39 For a useful caution to avoid the error of treating complementary identities from different levels as competing in the process of integrating them in the constructivist research, see Klotz and Lynch (2007: 65). 40 Abdelal et al. (2006: 701). 41I will expand on the significance of the robust and valid concept of identity for this research later. See Chapter 3. 42 I describe ways of tapping into individual cognition through a large-n survey. See Chapter 3. 43 For specific justifications to employ discourses as sources of domestic identities, see Appendix A. 29

identity. Specifically, these discourses help answer the questions: who are we; where do we stand in relation with the earlier middle classes inside the state; what do we want or aspire for in the contemporary period; and what is the relevant identity outside the state that offers mental proximity but spatial distance. To carry forward India‟s middle class example, discourses further help answer questions about the middleclass morality of openly celebrating ostentatious material consumption, while large swaths of the state remain mired in poverty.

Moreover, discourses help answer questions about the legitimate means through which this social cognitive identity influences India‟s domestic politics.

Second, discourses are background conditions used socially by societal groups more broadly or by political elites more narrowly.44 These social identities use their background conditions for discursively influencing the political and cultural environment. The discursively constituted influence means that the background social conditions provide the words, phrases, pictures, or even objects of consumption that become important markers of what constitutes a particular identity. Middle class, to return to my earlier example, as a social cognitive identity at the domestic-level of India uses the words and phrases “hard-work” or

“disillusionment” to signify the links between the achievement-oriented attitude of a segment of the society that sees opportunities opening up in the contemporary period on the one hand, and a sense of loss in the social segment because of the demolition of the Nehruvian, socialist lifestyle on the other. In a sense, discourses permit use of common sense understandings of the daily practices, specific

44 Milekhen (1999: 233). 30

language usage, and special imagery for making something possible, intelligible, imaginable, and desirable.45 In other words, discourses enable or constrain certain expectations, interpretations, and categories that constitute social cognitive identities, which shape and reshape policy preferences of political elites.

Third, the use of discourses as background conditions also allows individuals as agents to constitute discursive structures. Most individuals most of the time do not act as mere automatons of larger social discourses, nor do they act as agents radically free from their influences. I think Goldgeier and Tetlock had similar individuals in mind when they conceived of the possibility of integrating foreign policy analysis with constructivism. They argued that all causal inferences and policy lessons were the product of mental constructions of different sets of antecedent conditions.46 From my perspective, these antecedent conditions are precisely those background discourses that produce different conceptions of self versus other. These different conceptions in modern democracies construct citizens‟ identities by allowing citizens to adopt different interpretive dispositions.

The dominant way in which citizens adopt their interpretive dispositions is through the medium of everyday language. Everyday language allows individual citizens to express their opinions and sentiments as well as to interact with similar individuals or political leaders. Specifically, the cognitive capacities of individuals as citizens help them set their objectives in line with larger goals of

45 For a common sense-based understanding of discourses, see Hansen (2006: 76). 46 See Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001: 83). 31

the discursive structures.47 For example, the cognitive capacity of a certain individual, either as a member of a larger collectivity or as a political leader, constitutes that individual‟s sense of “I.” This sense of “I” enables that individual to organize thoughts coherently, behave consistently, and interact clearly with others in the society.48 Such cognition further helps individuals make sense of their surroundings by raising questions: what kind of situation am I in

(friendly/rival/inimical); who are my allies (who can cooperate with me); what do

I want to achieve (a nice home, respect from others in similar situations, alliance with other states, some military assistance), etc.

Similarly, the cognitive capacities of political elites as representatives of people in democratic states enable their imaginations as the embodiment of certain traits and expectations of their constituents. That is, such imaginations of political leaders are contingent upon their cognitive ability to engage the social discourses. Specifically, these discourses enable or constrain the cognitive capacity of political leaders, which determine the extent to which their middle class politics will be successful. It is critical, therefore, whether President Obama would be successful in engaging in a middle class discourse about the traits of hard work and perseverance as a member of that class in the face of adversity in the U.S., or whether the Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee successfully portrayed

47 My dissertation implements a large-n survey to capture individual cognition, the content and categories of which were produced through discourse analysis of select popular texts read/watched/heard in the everyday dominant language of Indian citizens. I will describe design and conduct of this survey fully in Chapter 3. 48 For a discussion of this sense of “I” in the constructivist literature, see Hopf (1998; 2002). 32

values of that same class to build a broad political coalition in India.49 Such cognition of political leaders connects how the categories of discourse become categories in policies.50 For categories of discourse to become categories of policies means that political leaders receive cues from the discourses prevailing in the domestic settings, and either adopt or modify those discourses in ways to shape their policy options.51 This may relate to whether such domestic discursive cues generate particular identity relations that, for instance, produced the Sino-

Soviet split,52 or whether domestic discursive cues drove the political leaders to use different identity labels in the former Yugoslavia to settle what was known as

“the national question.”53 The domestic discourses also enabled President Clinton to rearticulate the war against Bosnia as an attack on the Western values of multiculturalism, and to thus justify his decision to intervene in the Balkan conflict.54 Thus, I employ an intersubjective and not a subjective concept of identity in this dissertation. Material power or rational decisions are meaningful to the extent that they are constructed through intersubjectively held discourses and debates. Such combining of social discourses and individual cognition produces a comprehensive framework of domestic identity. These discourses make certain foreign policy options of states more likely than others.

49 For a forceful criticism of the foreign policy literature that focuses only on political elites, see Larsen (1997: 1). Larsen argues that structural pressures at the domestic-level force political elites to make their decisions one way or another (2-5). 50 Milliken (1999: 233). 51 I treat elite decision making as an intervening variable as opposed to an independent variable in my research. For a similar treatment of elite decision making as intervening variables, see Abdelal (2005: Chap 1); Larsen (1997: 2-5). 52 Hopf (2009: 279-315) 53 Wilmer (2002). 54 Hansen (2006: 114). 33

In positing identity as a cause, I am arguing that state identity (social and individual) will have made one foreign policy outcome more likely than others, hence leading to differentiated outcomes in conflict or cooperation. In my domestic constructivist framework, I conceptualize state decisions and actions in terms of processes of domestic identity formation that generate particular foreign policy outcomes. Here, my claim is twofold. First, the dominant discourse of identity shapes foreign policy by predisposing decision making elites toward one cooperative or conflictual outcome more than others. Second, the individual cognitive capacity of citizens to comprehend the dominant discourses defines the level of agreement or disagreement within the discourses. This level sets important limits on the actions and decisions of elites about foreign policy cooperative or conflictual outcomes. From my perspective, partnership between

India and the US is a function of the dominant social cognitive identities in the specific Indian context. I evaluate this argument in three issue areas of the India-

US partnership that is rooted in the social cognitive identities: the politics of signing of civil (and not military) nuclear agreements; the growing economic relations; and the faltering cooperation over climate issues.

extreme position was to have no nuclear cooperation. Significant in this process was the discursive influence of the middle class as the social cognitive identity on the decision making elites. The elite decisions were predisposed toward civil nuclear agreement by this middle class identity to forgo the strategic considerations of full military nuclear cooperation or liberal preferences of no nuclear cooperation.55 The liberal preferences of no nuclear cooperation were based on the assumption that democratic structures and liberal norms produce pacific dispositions in international relations. Such pacific dispositions obviate the need to possess destructive weapons, including nuclear weapons. Therefore, the liberal preference was to work for a comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament rather than to conclude an exclusive nuclear agreement with the

U.S.56

In the realm of economic cooperation, the India-U.S relations were constituted in significant ways by the middle class social cognitive identity. The discursive influences of this identity were expressed in desires to promote greater economic cooperation with the U.S., to welcome American companies to invest in

India, and to evaluate effects of such economic cooperation between the two

55 For an elite-driven constructivist view that liberal or conservative identities of American leaders played a significant role in relations between India and the U.S. in the past, see Wesley Widmaier “The Democratic Peace is What States Make of it: A Constructivist Analysis of the US- Indian ‘Near-Miss’ in the 1971 South Asian Crisis,” European Journal of International Relations (11:3, 2005) pp. 431-55. 56 The rational choice research on elite preferences has taken three main stances: audience costs, transparency, and political effects of size of the winning coalition. Firon (1994) argues that elites will undertake foreign policy goals only when there is strong possibility of successful conclusion of their undertaking in popular eyes. Schultz (1998) claims that the level of support or opposition from other political actors to the state interests reveals a measure of transparency to other states about the formation of state interests. Finally, Bueno de Mosquita et al. (1999) argue that the size of the winning coalition constrains leaders’ ability to pursue state interests because of the distribution of public goods after an unsuccessful conclusion of agreements with other states. 35

states as particularly positive for the middle class. Such everyday middle class desires generated discourses that constituted the domestic political environment in which elite preferences were shaped in favor of certain economic policies. As a result, the Indian government put in place several fast-track institutional measures to foster greater economic cooperation with the U.S. in spite of readily manifest advantages of promoting relations with other countries like China. My preliminary findings suggest that the domestic social cognitive middle class identity of India predisposed decision making elites to seek greater economic cooperation with the U.S. in those areas the middle class most desired,57 setting aside the liberal arguments in favor of the free flow of goods and ideas among democracies or the strategic considerations of giving preferential treatment to alliance partners to strengthen the balance-of-power.58

I treat climate change issue as the final empirical case study to argue that the central cause of a faltering cooperation in this issue area is the strong constitutive influence of a social cognitive identity discourse that is suspicious of the American motivations to enter into an agreement with India. My preliminary findings suggest that the dominant social cognitive identity discourse of India frames the U.S. as selfish and greedy, and robs others of their resources for its own consumption. As a consequence, the middle class discursively shapes India-

U.S. cooperation over global warming to the extent that India may not commit to

57 For similar arguments that everyday practices of masses impose limitations on the elite decision making in economic realm, see Leonard Seabrooke “The Everyday Social Sources of Economic Crises: From ‘Great Frustrations to Great Revelations’ in Interwar Britain,” International Studies Quarterly (51, 2007) p. 796. 58 See C. Raja Mohan “India and Balance-of-Power,” Foreign Affairs (85:4, 2006) pp. 33-43. 36

any binding standards until the latter does so. By constraining Indian elite decisions not to commit to any unilateral standards to deal with global warming, the constitutive effects of middle class social cognitive identity are clearly observable on the climate policy of India with the U.S. Therefore, the Indian leaders are extremely reluctant to enter into a dependable cooperation with U.S. over the climate issue.

My focus on the India-U.S. cooperation is intentional. The turnaround in the India-U.S. cooperation in recent years has been dramatic. From only a lukewarm and spasmodic interaction until 1998, mostly in the context of India-

Pakistan Kashmeer conundrum,59 the transformation of India-U.S. relations has been breath-taking. This sea change entails reenvisioning of India as the “natural ally,” “natural partner,” or “strategic partner.”60 Focusing on this significant bilateral relationship is important because India perceives itself as a rising power and seeks to bolster its position in international relations with the support of an existing great power in the form of the U.S. However, according to the balance- of-power strategic theory, we should expect the U.S. to balance against the rise of

India and take preventive measures. Such measures will prevent cooperation between India and other rising powers (e.g., China), the two weaker states in the triad, to form a balance against the U.S. According to this strategic balance-of- power, “the expectation is not that the balance once achieved will be maintained,

59 Ganguly (2006: 45-57). 60 For attempts at outlining the content of these various terms from a practitioners perspective, see the speech of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns “India’s Rise and the Promise of US-Indian Partnership,” delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations (June 1, 2010) http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm (accessed September 9, 2011). 37

but that a balance once disrupted will be restored in one way or another.”61 This balance will be restored in the form of China and India joining together to oppose the U.S. in the contemporary period, replacing the long-maintained Soviet-

American bipolar structure. Such balancing occurs because states consider power as a means and not an end in itself; states prefer to join the weaker of the two possible coalitions.62 Thus, there is a strong tendency toward balance in the system.

Second, I selected the India-U.S. cooperation as a case-study because the liberal theory does not offer convincing explanations for the establishment and growth of this cooperative relationship. The liberal theory posits that democratic political structures and liberal norms will generate peaceful relations among democratic states. What confounds the explanation of India-U.S. cooperation in the recent past from liberal perspective is that both states in this dyad had been democracies for more than fifty years with only a brief period of non-democratic rule in India; yet the bilateral relations of the two countries could be characterized as anything but cooperative. Third, I selected different issues of foreign policy of

India toward the U.S. because of their substantive importance. The India-U.S. partnership involves a gamut of economic, environmental, and security issues, cooperation over which is difficult to explain with a single cause. I contend that the social cognitive identity as the independent variable of this research offers tremendous explanatory power to address these issues of dyadic relations extremely successfully. I thus derive my hypothesis: other things being equal,

61 Waltz (1979). 62 See Waltz (1979: 124, 126, 201, 202). 38

(H1) the greater the influence of social cognitive identities on the domestic politics, the greater the influence of those identities on foreign policies of their states.

The critics of the social cognitive identity framework employed here are likely to point to its two sets of problems. These two problems relate to: the level of analysis and the methodological incommensurability. I will deal with the issue of methodological incommensurability later, but will first discuss the level of analysis problem. Both the dominant social psychological and constructivist perspectives situate identity at two different levels: the former at the individual and the latter at the international. This separation is based on the assumption that the explanations offered at one level cannot be applied to another.63 However,

Peter Gourevitch rejected such a clear-cut, water-tight compartmentalization of international relations. He argued, “these distinctions no longer capture intellectual life in our field, as indeed they have for many years not captured reality.”64 Despite such growing realization, psychological theories continue to posit the individual as the source of all decisions and actions in International

Relations. In my view, however, this individual is a theoretical impossibility.

This is because individual identity is deeply rooted in a person‟s capacity to communicate decisions, ideas, and emotions to others. These critical human identity attributes cannot be meaningfully understood in the absence of everyday language shared by others in the society. Realizing this missing link, some

63 The argument against crossing levels of analysis is that the theories at one level of abstraction cannot tell us much about phenomena at another level. See Waltz (1979: 121) from neorealist perspective. For a constructivist view on not crossing the levels of analysis, see Wendt (1999: 11). 64 See Gourevitch (2002: 310). 39

scholars have successfully connected an individual‟s microfoundations of identity with her/his social constituents and the effects of those constituents on politics.65

In my dissertation, I recognize the central importance of the individual as the first level of analysis to build a society, but combine the individual with the surrounding social aspects of that person‟s life at the domestic (or unit) level.66

However, the social (or structural) element in International Relations theories mostly belongs to the third level of analysis, and is located at the level of international politics. From my perspective, the social components of identity

(unit-level) are also present inside the state, and their influences are observable in many tangible foreign policy outcomes. Commenting on the general lack of research on the domestic-level processes of identity formation in International

Relations, Checkel forcefully articulated that this missing link between international and domestic levels resulted in the absence of explanations as to why some states diverge from systemic identities. To take an example, such a missing link between the domestic and international dimensions of identity generated a puzzle as to why there was widespread support for nuclear non-proliferation at the international level, but little at India‟s domestic-level (cite). Given this disjuncture between different levels of identity analysis, I employ a combination of social, structural (unit-level) and individual (psychological) components of identity as part of the explanatory variable of this dissertation.

65 See Kalyvas (2006); Laitin (2002). 66 For a growing number of scholars advocating integration of individual with group or social levels of abstraction within states as part of the foreign policy analysis, see Garrison (2003: 155); Gourevitch (2002: 310); Houghton (2007:41); Kaarbo (2003: 156-62). 40

The second problem critics may point to relates to methodological incommensurability. Methodological incommensurability means that research techniques used in different traditions of knowledge generation (Positivism and

Post-Positivism) cannot be mixed with each other. Motivated by such considerations, the issue of not mixing techniques from different methodological traditions pervades discussions in the field of International Relations. My research recognizes in principle the problems associated with methodological incommensurability, but it harnesses the potential of methodological mixing to investigate substantive problems from a new perspective and to generate robust and valid findings.67 I use two different methodological techniques to generate knowledge about India‟s domestic social cognitive identities to explain foreign policy outcomes. I employ discourse analysis as one of the methods that traditionally belongs to the post-Positivist research methods, and the large-n survey that firmly locates itself in the Positivist tradition.68 I believe, however, that research should not be driven by metatheoretical considerations, but by substantive ones. I consider acceptance of the methodological incommensurability as a small price to pay for large substantive gains. My research is driven by the substantive problem of International Relations that requires methodological pragmatism.

67 See Abdelal (2009); McDermott (2004: 8, 17). 68 Whereas Positivists within constructivism treat identity defined through the processes of consensus/conflict over its content (Bukovansky 1995; Finnemore 1998), Post-Positivists see identities as impositions of dominant representations (Doty 1996). From my perspective, many constructivists already straddle this boundary across the Positivist and Post-Positivist divide in the conduct of their empirical research. See Abdelal (2005); Hopf (2002); Rousseau (2006). 41

To conclude, I have described a framework of social cognitive identity and its constituent components. Specifically, I have outlined the role of discourses in generating social identity content. I followed this with a discussion of a comprehensive identity framework that enables integration of content and contestation within a society to produce agreement or disagreement over the nature and relevance of particular identities. I concluded the section with a discussion of the limitations of the social cognitive identity framework employed in this dissertation. This paved the way for deriving the main hypothesis that will be tested in this research: (H1) the greater the influence of social cognitive identities in the domestic politics of states, the greater the influence of those identities on the state foreign policies. The empirical chapters of this dissertation will test this hypothesis in the case-study of India-US partnership. I now turn to the derivation of specific alternative hypotheses from the existing IR theories about cooperation and conflict among states.

III. Alternative Hypotheses of International Cooperation and Conflict

Although realist, liberal, and constructivist literature in International

Relations is disparate, we can easily distill a set of hypotheses on why states enter into cooperation with the U.S. Let us begin with realist perspectives. Systemic realism (or structural realism) self-consciously brackets state characteristics, and assumes that anarchy and distribution of capabilities determine the structure of international politics. Great powers, therefore, have a priori interests in

maintaining distribution of capabilities in the existing system.69 Any increase in the material capabilities of other powers threatens the position of the great powers in the existing system. To deduce from these neorealist assumptions, the greater the increase in the material capabilities of a state, the greater the likelihood of conflict between the two states (H2). An important, but unfortunate, aspect of this neorealist hypothesis is the auto-mechanical assumption that any increase in material capabilities of others is potentially threatening to the stability of the extant international system. States that increase their material capabilities, such as

India‟s acquisition of nuclear capabilities, destabilizes the U.S. position because such an increase upsets the nuclear regime created, maintained, and strengthened over half a century under the American leadership. However, this power-centric, balance-of-power theory was later modified by Steve Walt, who argued that threats, and not only power, determined state behavior.70 Threat, among other things, consisted of aggressive intentions.71 This inclusion of state intentions opened an important and welcome door to accept a significant role of identity in the neorealist theory. As a result, state identities, as products of their social discourses and individual cognition, as my dissertation attempts to do more explicitly, have received tremendous support.

Realist theories that emphasize domestic-level attributes and/or interactions in dyadic relations are identified under the rubric of neoclassical realism. The general thrust of this realist perspective is that the unit-level factors

69 Waltz (1979). 70 Walt (1987; 1993; 1996). 71 Walt 1987: 21, 263-64). 43

mediate between the impact of systemic events and the international outcomes.

Within this literature, research on conflict and cooperation focuses on interests and capabilities of states involved in a dyad.72 To derive hypotheses from these neoclassical assumptions, it follows (H3) that the weaker of the two members in a dyad (India) would have interests in forming partnership with the U.S. (H4) that would increase India‟s capabilities. The state interests will intervene between systemic pressures of increasing state capabilities and international outcomes. The formation of India‟s ties with the U.S. will be influenced by different domestic pressures. These pressures not only influence the foreign policy outcomes of cooperating over military, economic, and climate change issues as never before, but also shape the specific nature of partnership between two states. The neoclassical realist emphasis on state interests as the touchstone of international cooperation and conflict rests on some shaky foundations. In the field of IR, the formation of interest similarity and its influence on cooperative or conflictual relations with others has waxed and waned over the years. From my perspective, such changes indicate that the positing of state interests as unchanging and invariant had been rooted in misplaced assumptions.73 With the discrediting of theories that presuppose incompatibility of interests as an exclusive cause of conflict,74 the field makes a general assumption that state interests are products

72 See Davidson (2006); Schweller (1998: Chap 1). 73 In his seminal work, Morgenthau (1948/1978) considered the pursuit of power defined as interest as one of the six main principles of international politics. According to him, states will neglect this pursuit of interests at their peril. 74 For an early formulation of this criticism, see Kratochwil (1982). For a more recent restatement of this position, see Wendt (1999). 44

not only of incompatibility of state interests, but also products of domestic societal actors.75

Liberal perspectives present another set of hypotheses about international conflict and cooperation. Cooperation between liberal states originates from the pacific union of democracies.76 The assumption behind such pacific union is that the respect for individual liberty and democratic institutions, the bedrock of internal democratic governance, functions as the bases of forming cooperative relations with other democratic states. From this liberal perspective, we can derive the hypothesis: given that India and the U.S. are both democracies, (H5) India will form cooperative relations with the U.S. and avoid conflictual ones. This liberal hypothesis is often considered something close to an empirical law in political science, but the application of this law to India-U.S. relations shows that their bilateral relations over the past 60 years could be characterized as anything but cooperative. Barring a brief interregnum in India 1975-77, both states possessed democratic regimes, and their citizens enjoyed fairly large measures of liberties, which would qualify this dyad as being liberal.

According to my theoretical framework, however, there are two things missing from this liberal perspective. First, this perspective overlooks the internal social processes of democratic regimes that bring together large and diverse populations of modern states. Such social bringing together of disparate citizenry occurs through discourses that manifest in “imagined community” or “community

75 Abdelal (2005); Hopf (1998, 2002); Minsk (2001). 76 For the initial explication of liberal peace in international relations, see Doyle (1983). For later empirical application of this thesis, interalia, see Chan (1992); Maoz and Russett (1993: 641). 45

of sentiments.” Such communities of imagination or sentiments engender among citizens of democratic states “we” feelings. This feeling of “weness” is expressed by citizens in their ordinary language use. This ordinary, everyday language connects disparate citizenry into something I might call “community of discourses.” In the case of liberal democratic states, these discourses constitute democratic identity of its citizenry.77 In the context of this dissertation, however, the discourses of overambition, pragmatism, and disillusionment constitute middle class identity, which, in turn, shapes elite decisions about state foreign policy. Second, the focus thus far in the liberal scholarship has been to search for law-like regularities, but a search for a little more contingent and middle-range explanations would be more useful. To take an example, just because India and the U.S. had been democratic until 2000, it would be fruitless to look for an explanation of the India-U.S. less than cooperative relations in the proposition of pacific union of democracies.78 However, a social cognitive identity approach will tap into the citizens‟ “we” feelings toward other democratic states to study the

India-U.S. relations, which are contingent upon the prevailing discourses as well as the direct popular approval of the functioning of the democratic institutions.

Surveys of population in the contemporary democracies point to such changes in the popular approval of their government policies, and such changes set important limits to the interests those governments can pursue in international politics.

Noteworthy is that within this liberal literature, the consensus is shifting to

77 For a similar argument, see Hayes (2009: 982). 78 The calls for cooperation between the greatest democracy and the largest one became a tiresome cliché in the India-U.S. relations. For such absence of democratic influences on the bilateral relations of the two countries, see Raja Mohan (2004: 60-63). 46

broaden the causes of cooperative relations among liberal democracies. From my perspective, broadening the focus to social discourses in the citizenry will help explain why some dyadic relations do not result in cooperation despite their domestic democratic principles and institutions.79 Capturing the discourses of middle class inside India, for instance, can explain why India-U.S. relations had not been cooperative until the recent partnership in 2008, and their subsequent decisive shift toward a strong bilateral partnership. The discursively constituted pragmatic middle class identity shaped elite predispositions toward greater cooperation between India and the U.S. in 2008. The old, disillusioned middle class, characterized by socialist, Nehruvian social and psychological attributes, did not generate discourses capable of constituting elite identity in the past and thus did not shape elites‟ decision making in the context of India‟s foreign policy.

Liberal institutionalism or neoliberalism is yet another variant of the liberal perspective that conceptualizes international institutions as producing positive outcomes for interstate relations. States mitigate their security dilemma under the conditions of anarchy through international institutions. These institutions generate variations in the effects of anarchy and distribution of power.80 All states have similar interests, the pursuit of which becomes possible through the international institutions that produce cooperation among states.81

79 Note that within this literature, there are suggestions to include a larger number of sources to form pacific union among states. See Russett and O’Neil (2003), who attribute cooperative relations among liberal states to democracy, interdependence, and international institutions, suggesting that conflict avoidance is a function of multiple factors rather than any one of these factors. 80 Keohane (1986); Oye (1986); Ritberger et al. (1997). 81 Kupchan (2001: 4). 47

Based on these neoliberal assumptions, it follows that (H6) India and the U.S. will cooperate with each other if they join the same international institutions. (H6A) the economic interaction will be higher if India and the U.S. cooperated in international institutions; (H6B) the greater the interaction between India and the

U.S. in international institutions, the higher the cooperation over the issues of climate change. (H6C) the greater is the interaction between India and the U.S. in international institutions, the greater is the probability of cooperation between the two states over nuclear issues. It is not theoretically clear whether the neoliberal perspective helps explain why there continue to be low levels of cooperation between India and the U.S. despite their common membership in many international institutions. Theoretically, it is important because different pay-off structures of mutual cooperation continue to exist that would bring potentially large benefits to both India and the U.S.

According to my perspective, however, international institutions are not driven exclusively by the similarity of state interests but by the individuals who participate on behalf of their nations. These national representatives bring to the institutions what their domestic discourses and individual cognitive capacities tell them to. What they bring from their domestic social cognitive identity discourses are the content of their interests and the nature of agreements. More specifically, the bringing of the content of interests means that the state representatives defend already discursively constituted state interests. The content of these interests is contingent upon the degree of consensus in domestic discourses over their legitimacy, appropriateness, or efficacy. It is not just opinion polls but also

discussions and debates in newspapers, and caricatures of leaders in television soap operas and daily shows, that constantly generate new articulations and interpretations of national interests.82 Thus, the preferences of the state representatives are defined by the domestic discourses for which the international institutions become venues for their defense. To put it in the neoliberal terminology, state representatives use international institutions to reveal their preferences by exchanging information about their state interests.

Systemic constructivism is yet another important perspective in

International Relations. Consistent with this perspective, cooperation between two states is the result of the prevailing international norms and identities.83 These identities and norms are not simply products of material considerations, but are also constituted by ideational (or non-material) factors. It follows (H7) that the greater the role of norms and identities in international politics, the greater their influence on state foreign policies. Noteworthy here is that the systemic constructivist analyses about the influence of international norms and identities on cooperation conceptualize state interests as varied as the pursuit of non-use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999; 2005), the banning of production and use of chemical weapons (Price 1995), or even the promotion of global human rights norms (Keg and Sikkink 1998; Robb et al. 1999). These studies have certainly opened up new lines of inquiry into the sources of state identities and their influence on the state interests, but they do not tell us whether or to what extent

82 For a focus on such elite attention to their domestic discourses while operating in international institutions, see Robert D. Putnam “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Two-Level Games,” International Organization (42:3, 1988) pp. 127-60. 83 Finnemore (1996); Sikkink (1998); Wendt (1994: 384-96), (1999). 49

those interests are desired by and resonate with the various domestic identities of states.84 As a result, the highlighting of the non-material interests of states marks a definite advance in the form of systemic constructivist perspective over other material approaches, but it still does not clearly tell us in whose name what is being pursued as the national interest. Thus, it is true that identities determine the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999) or the respect for global human rights (Keg and Sikkink 1998; Ropp et al. 1999), but their appropriateness and efficacy is contingent on the nature of domestic identities.

In my domestic social cognitive identity framework, the concept of identity will help measure efficacy and appropriateness of those systemic norms and identities from the domestic constructivist perspective.

To summarize, in this section, I derived a set of hypotheses from the dominant theories of International Relations about the conflict and cooperation among states in international politics. These hypotheses relate specifically to cooperation/conflict across the issue areas of civil nuclear agreement, economic ties, and climate policies of India and the U.S. In the following chapter, I turn to a discussion of the research design for this dissertation.

84 Checkel (1999: 85). 50

Conclusion

I have presented a framework of social cognitive identity and have argued for its use in explaining a substantive problem of International Relations: how and why India and the US formed a partnership. In the first section, I focused attention on the concept of identity in contemporary International Relations theories and their relevance for my dissertation. Specifically, I discussed the ways in which the ideational and social constructivist conceptions of the world shape our understanding of identities and their relevance for analyzing state foreign policies.

I claimed that both social psychological and systemic constructivism (the two theories most closely associated with identity research in IR) suffered from many limitations. I suggested, however, that these disparate bodies of literature possessed many useful and productive concepts that can be harnessed creatively to address many of the puzzles in International Relations. In my view, the use of a hybrid concept of identity that combines both psychological and social components will generate valid and robust explanations of the substantive problems of International Relations. In this section, I also made a case for borrowing social content from systemic constructivism, and for combining it with cognitive elements from psychological theories to produce such a robust and valid concept.

In the second section, I described a framework of social cognitive identity and its constituent components. Specifically, I laid out the role of social discourses and individual cognition in generating identity content. I followed this with a comprehensive framework that enables integration of content and

contestation within a society that produce agreement/disagreement over the nature and relevance of particular identities. The section also presented a discussion of the limitations of the social cognitive identity framework put forward in my dissertation. This paved the way for deriving the main hypothesis that will be tested in this research: the greater the influence of social cognitive identities in the domestic politics of states, the greater the influence of those identities on the state foreign policies. Empirical chapters of this dissertation will test this hypothesis in the case-study of India-U.S. partnership. In the third section, I derived a set of alternative hypotheses from the dominant theories of IR about the conflict/cooperation among states in international politics. These hypotheses relate specifically to the potential for cooperation/conflict across the issue areas of civil nuclear agreement, economic ties, and climate policies of India and the U.S.

The following chapter of the dissertation will discuss the research design of this project. That chapter will outline a mix-method, multimethod research design to tap into both social and cognitive components of identities. In particular, the research will employ a sequential multimethod design that uses discourse analysis as the first data collection method, followed by a large-n survey as the second research technique. Once I present this sequential multimethod research design in that chapter, the empirical chapters of the dissertation will employ this design to analyze the India-U.S. partnership.

Chapter 3: Sequential, Multimethod Identity Research in Security Studies: The

Promise of Combining Discourse Analysis and Survey Methods

Introduction

Given domestic constructivism‟s claim to offer deep insights into the state‟s foreign policies in terms of group and individual self-understandings, the critical question is how to investigate in a valid and reliable manner the influences of such social-cognitive identities. As a first cut, I employ a multimethod approach to understand the formation of domestic identities and to measure their influence on state foreign policy choices.1 For social psychologists, the use of experimental techniques produces valid and reliable measures of identity formations. These measures are considered sufficiently valid to assess their influence on state foreign policy decisions.2 Such experimental studies, however, often face skepticism about their generalizability of laboratory findings concerning the processes of identity formation to the wider society on the one

1 An excellent statement of such dissatisfaction with the exclusive dependence on the usefulness of single method research designs is found in the American Political Science Association report of the task force on Graduate Education (2004). The report stated, “the complex subject matter of politics must be studied using many methods if we are to obtain the greatly varying sorts of data forms, the wide range of descriptive and explanatory concepts, and to engage in many sorts of inferential testing that we need to achieve rigorous analyses.” See this report here: https://www.apsanet.org/content_4579.cfm (accessed July 20, 2011). 2 Huddy (2001); and Rose (2004). 53

hand, and the rejection of the expectation that the decision makers would follow these processes in their decision making on the other.3

To overcome such shortcomings of experimental methods, scholars instead opt for direct interviewing or surveying of select members of the domestic society and for measuring the influence of their opinions on the decisions of foreign policy makers.4 While these methods certainly give access to the thoughts of ordinary people in the natural settings and their influence on state foreign policy choices, they tend to treat their subjects (ordinary individuals or policy makers) as atomistic individuals, isolated from the influences of their larger social structures. Therefore, there is a growing consensus in the scholarly community that use of a single method leaves out important data about the people and identities under research.5 A multimethod research design promises to yield more accurate and reliable findings about our social world in general and foreign policy making in particular.6

Because of the growing use of multimethod research, the focus of my dissertation is to understand the processes of identity formation inside a state and their influence on the foreign policy making. Scholars point to the process of

3 Hopf (2002: 2); and Mintz and associates (2006: 757-76). 4 Brady (2007); and Tourangeau and associates (2004). 5 The 2008 APSA report is the most definitive statement on this disciplinary shift toward multimethod research. For recent empirical application of this research design, see Saunders (2012). 6 The term “multimethod” research is widely employed in political science, evident from the self- conscious use of its practitioners and the rapid growth of institutional structures to support this practice. For a cogent argument to employ “multimethod” as an umbrella term for those using a variety of qualitative techniques under this label, see, Collier and Elman (2008: chap 34). 54

development, growth, or decline of identity studies in different disciplines,7 but they are hobbled by the tendency to limit their methodological toolkit to analyze this complex concept from only certain vantage points. Such privileging of one methodological tradition over others imposes several handicaps on the processes of knowledge generation (Abdelal and colleagues 2009), some of which with more deleterious effects, manifest in isolation and mutual exclusion. Pointing to such lack of cross-method research, Levi argues that this has led to insufficient attention to, among other things, context and scope conditions.8

As a consequence of practicing such mutually exclusive methodological approaches, scholars have found it extremely difficult to understand identity formations and to evaluate their influence on thoughts, decisions, and actions of individuals, as well as on self-understandings, group cohesion, and group perception of larger social collectivities. To overcome such disciplinary complexity and to benefit from the growing acceptance of multimethod research in International Relations, this dissertation employs a sequential multimethod approach to study domestic identities and evaluate their influence on state foreign policies.

In this chapter I will examine in detail the reasons for applying a multimethod research design in my dissertation. The chapter confronts the question of why opting for a multimethod research design is appropriate for this research in the first section. The second section addresses the reasons for

7 Some of the disciplines that deal with identities relate to cultural studies, anthropology (Geeretz 1973), sociology (Berger and Luckman 1966; Giddens 1986, 1991), political science (Horowitz 1986/2002), and International Relations (Posen 1994; Simbonis 2002). 8 Levi (2007: 198). 55

choosing a sequential research design for the project. This is followed by two sections that explain specific research methods of discourse analysis and large-n survey, respectively. The third section discusses the text sampling strategies and the consequent type of discourse analysis. The fourth section lays out justifications for employing a large-n survey as the second data collection method and the ways in which it will enhance external validity of the research findings.

I. Defining Multimethod Approach?

In this section, I will describe the definition of the “multimethod” approach in my dissertation and explain why I make this methodological choice. I also describe the implications of adopting this definition for my research.9

It is safe to state that few empirical works in political science can exist without using both words and numbers. A research that employs large-n survey to study a rapid growth of consumers in emerging economies may refer to their historical trends of relatively low levels of economic backwardness to place that data in context; a research that uses critical discourse analysis to examine the development of Edward Said‟s thoughts may compare sales figures for his

9 Scholars have defined multimethod research in political science in different ways. Bennett and Braumoeller (2006) define multimethod research as combining game theory, econometric models, and case studies. Lieberman (2005) defines multimethod research as combining large-n analysis and small-n case studies in a nested analysis. Instead of following the standard qualitative/quantitative categorization, these studies include specific types of qualitative and quantitative research techniques in their definitions. In general, however, the primary categorization refers to qualitative and quantitative methods, with the understanding that each broad category contains specific multiple research techniques. In my dissertation, I employ multimethod design by using tools of discourse analysis and large-n survey that fall under the two separate labels of qualitative and quantitative methods, respectively. 56

different books. Therefore, multimethod research must mean more than a mere inclusion of words and numbers. I define it here as the research distinguished by the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis in a single project. This definition is distinctive in its emphasis on the variety of methods and not simply on the variety of data.10 More specifically, this definition excludes one type of data (qualitative or quantitative) used in research simply to set up the context, while the other type is employed to carry out the analysis. Presenting battle death data in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, to observe how participants in a focus group talk about the wisdom of the U.S. decision to field more troops in those countries as part of the military surge is not multimethod research. It is also not multimethod research if a study of political economy uses econometric data as evidence but begins by presenting a vignette about the personal traits of the heads of the IMF or the World Bank. This definition also excludes research in which one set of tools is employed for data analysis, even when other tools are used for deriving theoretical propositions for testing.

I define multimethod research as combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques in a single study.11 I opted for this design in my research for several substantive reasons. First, I employ a multimethod approach to generate new measurements of identity found in a society‟s social cognitive elements. The identities produced through discourse analysis in the first stage of the research generated characteristics associated with the middle class as the

10 Adcock and Collier (2001: 529-46). 11 For similar definitions, see Ahmed and Sil (2009:2); Mason (2006). 57

dominant category. However, middle class as an influential collective actor in foreign policy making was contrary to existing theories. To overcome such a disconnect, Levi suggested use of multimethod research design. According to

Levi, multimethod research can be used fruitfully when existing measurements of concepts do not line up with the theoretical predictions.12 Given such a promise, the multimethod approach can help generate new measurements of the concept

(the middle class, in this context) or new indices (overambitions, pragmatism, and disillusionment) of that concept. Such recovery of the middle class as the dominant domestic identity of India presents theoretical challenges to many of the existing predictions about its content and behavior, which highlight that the middle class is indifferent to politics13 or deeply mired into the consumerist culture.14 Thus, there exists a vast gap between the predictions of middle-class theories and the causal mechanisms linking their influence on politics.

Following Levi‟s insight about generating new theoretical predictions through a multimethod approach, I had to establish such missing connections between the causal mechanisms and politics through the measurement of middle- class and through the discovery of new indices of its attributes. Such new ideas about the concept measurement required moving away from the purely subjective conceptions of the middle-class and including an inter-subjective conception of that social group. Therefore, I opted for discourse analysis as the first data analysis technique followed by the survey of the same population for the

12 Levi (2007: 200). 13 Jefrelot (2008). 14 Varma (1998); Scrace and Scrace (2006). 58

measurement of the extent of personal/individual cognitive convergence with the larger inter-subjective structure of that class. As a consequence, I decided to field a large-n, face-to-face survey as the second data collection technique in my research (more on this survey later).

Second, the use of multimethod research design in my study helped to generate robust measurements of identity categories as the independent variable, than was possible using a single method. Whereas discourse analysis of the popular texts generated an internally valid concept of middle class identity at the social level, the survey captured individual cognitive attachments with that of collective identity. Such use of two different research techniques in a single research design significantly enhanced confidence in my findings.15 As a result, the research provided a design to ensure not just internal validity of each of the identity constructs, but also offered opportunities to test external validity of those two social and cognitive components of the concept. Such explicit attention to the improvement of internal and external aspects of validity offered an excellent opportunity to produce a significantly robust understanding of middle-class identity. Specifically, tapping into the individual cognition through a survey helped measure thoughts, decisions, and other cognitive processes of individuals and their degree of proximity to the larger collective middle class identity.

Specifically, the survey method helped to assess both the similarities/differences between the social identities recovered through discourse analysis (e.g., individual efforts of hard work, initiative, and technological proficiency) and also the

15 For a good discussion of the advantages of employing multimethod research design to overcome shortcomings of each other, see Lin (1998: 174-76). 59

cognition-based individual identity captured through traditional survey techniques.

Third, this dissertation employs a multimethod research design because it recognizes the importance of aggregating data from different levels to produce valid and reliable findings. Specifically, the collection and analysis of two distinct sets of primary data through more than one research tool in my dissertation helps to connect individual (cognitive) and group (discursive) levels of middle class identity that have hitherto remained unconnected.16 As a result, scholars have found the middle-class of India indifferent to the political processes of decision making17 despite the repeated invoking of the middle-class as the main motivators for many political decisions of elites. Given such a disconnect, Coppedge strongly suggests that known theoretical predictions or theories that make predictions at different levels of aggregations can merit the use of multimethod research tools to resolve contradictions, such as those found in the literature about the role and extent of middle-class influence on India‟s political decisions.18 For instance, I employ discourse analysis to recover middle-class identity components

(structural) and then use survey technique (individual) to assess validity of that discourse. Such an aggregation of data at different levels promises tremendous rewards of using a multimethod approach in my dissertation. Given such benefits of a multimethod research design, the following section outlines the type of

16 For a direct appeal to employ multimethod approach to aggregate different levels of data into a single research see (Abdelal and associates (2009); McDermott (2004: chap 2). For an argument against aggregating data at different levels, see Stoker (2003). 17 Jefrelot (2008); Scrace and Scrace (2006). 18 Coppedge (1999: 465-76). 60

multimethod research design this dissertation will employ. More specifically, it will delineate the specific features of a sequential multimethod research design for this project.

II. What Type of Multimethod Research Is Best?

In my dissertation, I employ a sequential, multilevel multimethod research design. In such a design, as Sidney Tarrow suggests, one method is first used to generate data,19 which is then employed to formulate the next research instrument.

In my research, I employed discourse analysis as the first method, followed by a large-n survey.20 There are three main advantages of such a sequential multimethod design for my research.

First, and to build on Tarrow‟s suggestion, the sequential research design allows for the use of one method to design the next stage of the research.

Discourse analysis in the first stage of my dissertation helped to generate in-depth knowledge of the processes of identity formation. These processes of identity formation take place at both individual and social levels. To recover the social character of identities, my dissertation used discourse analysis as a research tool.

This research tool generated clusters of identities that were shared by its

19 Tarrow (2004: 174, 177-78). 20 Note that this approach to multimethod design is contrary to most studies in International Relations or political science in general that first employ quantitative methods and then use case studies or other methods to generate fine-grained analysis. See Bennett and Braumoeller (2007) and Lieberman (2005). 61

members. In the hierarchy of those clusters, the top identity was the middle class.

The middle class as a social identity sets it apart from other segments of society.

At the next stage, the social character of the middle class identity is complemented by the individual awareness of that identity. To capture this individual awareness of the middle class, my dissertation employed a traditional survey method. Use of this survey is important because the cognitive awareness of a middle class collective identity is meaningful only when - and to the extent that - this awareness is shared among individual members of that social group.

These individuals recognize other members of the middle class by common characteristics widely shared among them. The use of individual cognition in the formation of identity required a research tool to tap into that element of the individual identity. Hence, the dissertation designed a large-n survey using features of the middle class recovered through discourse analysis.21

Second, use of a sequential multimethod research design in this dissertation offers a unique opportunity to profit from data triangulation. The term

“triangulation” in this research means highlighting the “multiple operationalization” by using more than one type of data.22 The use of data triangulation in a sequential manner helped ensure that the explained variance was the result of the underlying phenomenon or trait.23 This is best achieved when the

21 For an explicit appeal to employ such multimethod research designs that include discourse analysis and large-n surveys - among other methods - in a single study, see Elman and Bennett (2007: 188); Lin (1998: 174-75); and Munck (1998: 37). 22 For an initial formulation of the term, see Campbell and Fiske (1959: 82-105). 23 Fiske and Campbell (1959: 87). 62

weaknesses of one type of data could be overcome by the strengths of another.24

More specifically, triangulation in this research allows for the use of multiple measurements that are hypothesized to possess theoretically similar and relevant components. Following this logic, once a proposition is confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the confidence in its interpretation is significantly enhanced. Despite its obvious advantages for the study of the messy and complex phenomena of International Relations as evident in the study of democratic peace25 and identities,26 the field has been slow to use triangulation as an explicit and self-conscious data collection strategy. Given triangulation‟s obvious advantages, I self-consciously employ it as a data collection strategy within the research design of a single study.

Finally, sequential multimethod research affords a unique opportunity to generate far richer data for this dissertation than is possible with a qualitative or quantitative method alone. Some concepts in political science are too old, too important, and too complex to be measured validly and reliably with a single tool.27 Identity is one such old, important, and complex concept that forms a central focus of this research. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to a single indicator without losing some important part of its meaning. Moreover, the multidimensional nature of the concept makes it difficult to reduce it to any of its individual components. The concept of identity employed in this dissertation

24 Ahmed and Sil (2009: 2); Jick (1979: 602); and Tarrow (2004: 178). 25 Russett and O’Neal (2001: chaps 1-3). 26 Abdelal and associates (2009); and Klotz and Lynch (2007). 27 For an extended discussion of the importance of thickening of data in political science, see Coppedge (1999: 468). 63

would lose an important part of its meaning if it is reduced to a single indicator without recognizing its multidimensionality.28 The consideration of such a multidimensional nature of identity is explicitly recognized and operationalized in this dissertation, which requires a multiplicity of sources to produce rich data. The richness of the data is evident from the variety of sources sampled for the task at hand. In particular, the discourse analysis of the popular texts, produces clusters of themes associated with middle-class identity and contains its feelings, thoughts, and behavior. These middle-class components can be respectively labeled as evaluative, cognitive, and behavioral. There also appeared an enormous number of direct quotations, statements, and epithets that reveal vividly the aspirations, belief in hard work, and disillusionment of the middle-class.

More importantly, such a rich and thick concept of identity contains several insights into the social phenomena at different levels of analysis. Identity is located at several levels - individual (micro), group (meso), national-structural

(macro), or even international - that interacts with different levels in complex ways. A sequential multimethod dissertation that seeks to build a robust understanding of the identity can focus on these different levels. Specifically, the macro-level, middle-class identity can best be studied through discourse analysis and the micro-level, individual identity through a large-n survey. Only a multimethod research design that takes advantages of applying different research

28 The multidimensional or thick data employed in this research is different from that advocated by Coppedge. The thick data used here is more in the tradition of Geeretz (1973). For a discussion of this difference, see Collier and Elman (2008: 782-83). 64

tools in a sequence, as employed in this dissertation, promises to offer a thicker concept than generally used in the field of International Relations.

Such thick and rich data can thus help generate a robust understanding of the complex phenomena of International Relations or identity, as well as move from one level to another through rich and variegated data. Important to note here is that such rich data can be generated without inventing or importing new research tools from other disciplines. As this dissertation uses discourse analysis and large-n traditional survey methods, these research methods may be widely employed in the discipline of International Relations. Therefore, it is indeed possible to employ many of the existing data collection and analysis tools to produce rich data and reliable findings. Toward that goal, the following section will outline one of the two main methods of data collection in this sequential method research design. The first method of data collection will present specific reasons for applying discourse analysis in this research and its features relevant for producing valid and reliable foreign policy findings.

III. Methods of Data Collection 1: Discourse Analysis

“Without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves.” — Nelson Philips and Cynthia Hardy (2002: 2)

In this dissertation, I first use discourse analysis as one of the two methods of data collection. I employ discourse analysis to recover social cognition

embedded in domestic identities in the form of feelings, thoughts, and behavior expressed in everyday language.29 The form of discourse analysis employed here allows for what I call “language-in-use” or exploration of the ways in which social ideas and categories are created and given meaning.30 The observation of

“language-in-use” offers important opportunities to gather ideas, thoughts, or trends found widely diffused in a society.31 Given my strategy to recover collective understandings of identities inside India at the first stage of the data collection, the everyday usage of language allows for understanding as “it constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is thought of as the natural thing to do in a given situation.”32 What is thought of as a natural thing to do in a given situation in India in 2008 was to conceive of identities that functioned as alternatives to the seemingly reified ones such as religious, regional, or even racial.

Contrary to such reifications, my discourse analysis recovered feelings, emotions, and attitudes present in people‟s everyday language use. For example, when confronted with a new and hostile situation during the neoliberal policies,

India‟s socialist, Nehruvian middle-class considered it as its natural thought to construct a collective discourse of blaming the new policies for the diminishing lifestyle. As a collective sense of escaping from the loss, it generated a discourse

29 Scholars differ on the use of discourse analysis as a method. Whereas Laffey and Weldes (2002: 28) understand it as conceptual apparatus and empirical procedures of making reality possible, without any emphasis on its scientific nature, Milliken (1999: 226-7) associates it with scientific rigor and established rules of observation. 30 Fierke (2004: 37); and Hardy and associates (2004: 19). 31 For the use of such everyday language research designs, see Taylor (2001); and Wadak (1999). 32 Neuman (2008: 62). 66

about returning to the socialist past. The future-oriented middle-class, on the contrary, constructed a discourse that imagined a bold and bright future for itself and the country. Such a concept of a bold and bright future illustrates what

Neuman treats as something being possible to conceive of at all, in light of the larger social constraints and opportunities.33

Similar to any research intending to employ discourse analysis as a data collection method, I treat select sample of texts as sources of data linked with each other in specific ways. In the beginning, I treated each text as an independent entity to contextualize the meanings contained therein. Upon completion of such contextualization, I then intertextualized those meanings.34 Intertextualization here refers to relating the meanings found within one text to another. This is important because texts do not produce meaning individually; it is only through their interconnection with other texts that they are made meaningful.35 Such intertextualization produces large and overlapping categories based on the recovery of language in use.36 The intertextualization then opens the door for situating those intertextual meanings of the language in use into the larger societal

33 Noteworthy here is that using analysis of everyday language, Cillia and Wadak (1999: 158) recovered similar understandings of collective identity constructions inside Nordic states. 34 In adopting this definition of discourse analysis, I draw heavily on Philips and Hardy (2002: 3). I understand discourse analysis as an interrelated set of texts and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception that brings an object into existence. Also see, Hopf (2002: 24). 35 See Philips and Hardy (2002: 4). 36 Discourse analysis as a data collection technique starts out with generating large and overlapping categories as opposed to other techniques such as surveys that start with exclusivist themes. For an excellent analysis of such differences between discourse analysis and other data collection methods, see Taylor (2001: 39). Also see Fierke (2004: 37-38) for a discussion of differences between content analysis and discourse analysis. 67

categories of discourse.37 The generation of such larger social categories amounts to searching for texts in plurality, through which we arrive at central processes of category formation inside a world.38 To put it plainly, discourses are shared and social, originating from social groups and social structures. Thus, this dissertation treats discourse analysis as a data collection method that generates categories of social meanings through the processes of contextualization and intertextualization. It then employs those categories of discourse analysis to analyze the constitution of social reality.39

Because of the thickly inductive processes of generating discourse categories, I am often confronted with an important question of why I include a variety of sources of identity formation in the sample. In responding to this question, I declare here that the working assumption behind my sampling strategy is that discourses of identity form and operate among the citizens of large societies despite their geographic, economic, social, and/or political distances.

Here, I offer two sets of reasons for sampling different texts to build domestic collective identities of large and diverse states. First, popular books, films, TV shows, and newspapers describe background daily practices and ordinary modes of thoughts individuals rely upon for interpersonal and societal relationships. In doing so, they define and redefine not only boundaries of self and other, but also produce a template to which behavior is expected to conform in familiar

37 For an original statement of this research design in International Relations, see Hopf (2002: 24- 26). Also see Hansen (2006) for the implementation of a different discourse analysis-based research design in international Relations. 38 Fierke (2004: 37). 39 See Philips and Hardy (2002: 4). 68

situations.40 These elements of popular culture provide hints at what Hopf calls

“the private daily transcripts” of ordinary people, albeit partial ones.41 Second, these sources of identity generate bonds among social groups as “imagined communities” via print42 or electronic media.43 They also produce collective identities through popular cinema44 or through TV soap operas.45 These diverse sources of mass media encapsulate some of the most widely shared feelings, thoughts, and/or attachments citizens have toward each other and discursively construct historical narratives, live contemporary collective identities, and envision a common future.46 In other words, these different texts discursively constitute identities among citizens of large and diverse modern states despite their geographical distances, social status, economic classes, and/or political affiliations.

Given the vast variety of the sampled texts, I was self-conscious to prepare a codebook to guide my data collection.47 More specifically, this codebook served two important functions in my dissertation. First, it helped establish internal validity of the patterns of meaning found in the texts. A consistently found meaning across texts was the middle class, defined by the aspiration to make the future better, hard work, and yearning for the past. These characteristics point to a different concept of this social-cognitive identity, which forms an alternative

40 Hopf (2002: 35); and Billigg (1995: 10-13). 41 Hopf (2002: 35). 42 Anderson (1991: 39) 43 Barnett and Telhami (2002: 10-14) 44 Madhava Prasad (1998) 45 Zunen (2004: chaps 2-3). 46 Malhotra and Alagh (2001); and Sillia and Wadak (1999: 158). 47 See appendix A for a complete statement of the text sampling strategy. 69

understanding of that social segment. The existing concept of middle class tends to focus exclusively on the consumerist culture and the immoral pursuit of material wealth.48 The constituent characteristics recovered through discourse analysis in this research, however, point to a new content of social cognitive identity. In securing internal validity of this alternate understanding of India‟s middle-class constituent components, discourse analysis as a data collection method was specifically useful. Neumann observes that discourse analysis is particularly helpful to uncover new categories and metaphors that generate meaning of material objects, social practices, or even collective goals inside a country.49 Consistent with Neuman‟s observation, my use of data analysis produced categories of an overambitious, future-oriented, pragmatic, present- oriented, disillusioned, and past-oriented middle-class. These categories of India‟s middle-class are products of the varying content and contestation over meaning of material objects in possession of these class categories, social practices associated with their respective roles, and the country‟s collective goals.50

Issues of Replication

The use of a variety of sampled texts often raises doubts about replication of discourse analysis and I am self-conscious to allay such doubts about my research. Kuen and Rohlfing (2009: 20) forcefully articulated such doubts when

48 Jefrelot (2008); Scrace and Scrace (2006); and Verma (1998). 49 Doty (1993: 302); Hopf (2002: 2-3); and Neuman (1999: chaps 2, 3, 4; 2008: 62). 50 also see Abdelal (2001); Abdelal et al. (2009); and Hopf (2002). 70

they argued that the lack of clearly laid out rules for identifying, interpreting, and coding observations pose a severe challenge for the replication of discourse analysis. Usually, there are no formalized, standardized, and explicit rules made available to others for interpreting findings of this data collection method.51 I sympathize with the sentiment underpinning such skepticism, but I think the general lesson we need to learn from this doubt about discourse analysis is that political science or International Relations as disciplines would greatly benefit if scholars followed transparent and replicable research practices.52 Such research practices can certainly help overcome many, if not all, of the doubts about a research by ensuring transparency and openness.

As all scholars need to reveal to the community their strategies of data access and collection, so do discourse analysts need to describe and justify their strategies to the larger scholarly community. It is all too familiar to those who conduct field research that they have to keep track of how they enter their field site, how they track their informants and introducers, or how people react to their presence. Such accounts of the field research often shape the nature and extent of the data collection and data interpretation strategies. Given this conviction, as a discourse analyst, I took care to describe my choices of each type of popular text

51 Such similar criticisms are often levelled against the somewhat less socially-oriented technique of process-tracing in the positivist mold that can as easily be applied to discourse analysis; see Collier, Brady, and Syright (2004) for a strong defence of the use of process-tracing in political science. Also see Checkel (2005A, 2005B; 2006) for the use and defence of this technique in International Relations constructivist research. See King and Powell (2008) for critical view of this method in political science. 52 One general counsel always offered to graduate students in their methods training relates to leaving a clear and replicable record of sources and methods of data interpretation. See George and Bennett (2005: 22-25); King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 51). 71

in the sample. Although my sampling strategy was guided by the assumption that everyday life is found at diverse locations and at different times, I included texts in the sample by following transparent popular rating systems. For instance, I included the newspaper, the Times of India, in the select sample by following the results of a transparent and publically verifiable rating system. Based on its circulation, the Times of India was rated as the top English daily newspaper in

2008. This data is generated through a periodically conducted nationwide survey known as the National Reader Survey, the methodology and results of which are publically available.53 The justifications for selecting other popular texts also follow similarly transparent and public criteria for selection. I selected soap operas and Bollywood Hindi movies on account of their high popular ratings. The two soap operas received top television ratings54 and so did the two Bollywood movies.55 The data about the popularity of these sources is available in the public domain, which clearly shows that the sources selected for discourse analysis received top popular ratings. As a consequence, the text selection criteria for my discourse analysis are clearly identifiable. Given this open and publically verifiable nature of my selection criteria, I made choices to include popular texts in the discourse analysis, and my data collection strategies are easily replicable.

53 Data about the ranking of print and electronic news sources is collected as part of the National Readership Survey of India. The data for the years 2005 and 2007 is available here: http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/06/09/0906magazine-survey.html (accessed March 16, 2009). 54 For the data on the popularity of these television shows, see: http://www.indiantelevision.com/tvr/telemeter/indexteltam.php4 (accessed February 15, 2009). 55 The data about popular rankings of Hindi movies is available on the box office website: http://www.boxofficeindia.com/ (accessed March 15, 2009). 72

Furthermore, as ethnographers keep field notes, interviewers generate transcripts, or document analyzers reference long passages and the contexts that surround them to classify and interpret their subject matter, so do discourse analysts need to describe and explain decisions about their data classification and interpretation.56 Motivated by such considerations, I wrote a codebook to describe and justify my criteria for classifying texts in certain ways. This codebook contains many explicitly described guidelines to interpret and code texts at the data collection and interpretation stages.57 These categories of discourse analysis are not only interpretable by others but are also replicable. Finally, scholars of discourse analysis work with the assumption that complete knowledge is impossible and indeed uncertain, as do others. The willingness to remain open to the possibility of divergent discourses is important to demonstrate the tentative nature of knowledge generation. As all scholars must demonstrate the ability to deal with alternative hypotheses as convincingly as possible, so must discourse analysts allow divergent discourses to surface. One must also work out a strategy to address those discourses in the most plausible way. I took special care to ensure that there emerged divergences in my discourses of the middle-class that pointed to the uncertain state of the findings.58

56 See Milekend (1999: 226-9) for emphasizing scientific rigor in discourse analysis. For good suggestions to ensure replication of such a rigor in the interpretivist research, see Lin (1998: 169- 71). 57 For an instructive exchange over the use and non-use of formalized, standardized, and explicit rules in discourse analysis, see the News Letter of Qualitative and Multimethod Research (Spring 2004). 58 Lin (1998: 169) 73

In the following section, I will describe specific justifications for conducting a large-n survey that uses content of the discourse analysis in my sequential multimethod research design. Specifically, I will describe reasons for opting for a survey as the second research technique in the dissertation and then offer some methodological justifications for employing it. I will conclude the section by focusing on the specific rationale for selecting survey sites, the characteristics of the respondent population, the recruitment strategy, and a brief discussion of who was responsible for implementing the survey in the field.

IV. Data Collection Method 2: Survey

The second step in data collection on domestic identities involves fielding a large-scale, close-ended survey to access cognitive micro foundations of Indian citizens‟ identities. This survey serves two specific functions for my research.

First, and substantively, it adds a subjective dimension to the identity formations recovered through discourse analysis in the previous stage of research. The discourse analysis certainly shows how social identities constrain and shape micro foundations of individual decisions,59 but it does not explain how individuals shape those social norms and ideas.60 These social identities composed of norms and ideas are powerfully defined and shaped by individual subjective preferences and decision making processes.61 To bring in individual subjective dimension

59 Katzenstein et al. (1996); and Wendt (1999) 60 For an emphasis on measuring both individual and situational factors to evaluate citizens’ personal decision in International Relations, see Herrmann and associates (2009: 725); and McDermott (2004: 8). 61 Huddy (2001: 131); McDermott (2004: 13). 74

associated with those individual preferences along with social identities, I designed and fielded a large-n survey.62

Second, fielding a large-n survey as the second step in sequential multimethod research helps to assess variations in those identity formations.

Specifically, this survey helps to measure the similarities/differences between the social identities recovered through discourse analysis (e.g., individual efforts of hard work, initiative, and technological proficiency) and the subjective individual identity captured through traditional survey technique.63 The survey carries items to tap into these middle-class traits as well as their effects on the respondents‟ attitudes toward the United States.64 By measuring such variations in the individual subjective values and attitudes toward the role and conception of the middle-class, the dissertation clearly explicates the significance of those values to the individuals, based on their attributes of age and region.65 For instance, this survey allows for the measurement of variations in the values of the middle class across two regions of India. These two regions are North (Delhi) and West

(Mumbai) and allow for the assessment of their values of the middle class in a comparative manner on the one hand, and help measure their proximity or

62 For a direct call to tap into subjective dimensions of individual identity through survey and other such data collection techniques to complement macro-level data collection methods, see Abdelal and colleagues 2006: 699-700; 2009: 13-15); McDermott (2004: 13, 17). For using survey as the data collection technique to study individual subjective components of identity, see Herrmann et al. (2009: 721-54). 63 For a strong plea to use multimethod research design in psychological and subjective studies, see Young and Schafer (1998: 63-96). 64 Use of such discursive categories recovered through discourse analysis and their testing with large-n surveys promises to measure the degree of individual identification with those larger social categories. see Abdelal and associates (2006: 702-3; 2009). 65 For an excellent discussion of the desire to find meanings attached by respondents as individuals to their survey responses, see Schuman (2008: chaps 2-3). 75

distance from the macro-level discourses of that class, on the other.66 Given these advantages, I decided to field a large-n, face-to-face survey as the second data collection technique in my research. In the following parts of this section, I will delineate some of the methodological reasons for opting for a survey as a second research technique in my sequential multimethod research design.

Methodological Advantages of Survey

Methodologically, fielding a survey offers some distinct advantages to the researcher, unavailable with the use of discourse analysis in particular and other research techniques in general. One advantage is to ask direct questions about subjective preferences and decision making frames of the respondents. My survey taps into the elements of such individual preferences and decision making frames by offering an opportunity to quiz respondents directly about the extent to which the subjective preferences and decisions influence their attitudes toward their own identity (independent variable) and its correlation with the outcome variable of the study (foreign policy). Direct surveying of individual opinion in a project that begins with discursive clusters of identities is important for at least two sets of reasons.

First, the survey carries foreign policy-related items that range from the entry of foreign firms into the country, to climate policy, to important security issues of nuclear agreement. Although such diverse foreign policy issues have

66 Comparisons of the same phenomena or trends across place and time are one of the unique qualities of the survey technique. For an extended discussion of this point, see Brady (2006: 47). 76

been researched in the past using the survey method, this form of research tends to be misleading simply because of the assumed positive correlation between mass opinion and elite foreign policy preferences.67 Most of the research is restricted to interviewing political elites, news makers and news managers, or gleaning elite opinions from newspapers, journals, and other sources that are often passed off as proxies for public opinion. These proxies for public opinion - newspapers, for example - serve as important sources of public opinion, but these news sources are generally edited and managed by the intellectual elite. These intellectual elites already possess well-developed and well-articulated particular political orientations that color their thinking, writing, and editing in significant ways. Therefore, every newspaper has some specific identifiable ideological stance, which it keeps presenting, reinforcing, or weakening in its pages to the readers, either in the form of editorial pieces or news items.68

Second, interviewing the political elites about the foreign policy in which they play a strong role in formulating and implementing is tantamount to doing the same job twice over with no analytic gains and the consequent lack of falsifiability. Specifically, to obtain falsifiable results, the outcome variable

(foreign policy) must be kept analytically separate from other independent and

67 Scholars have found a wide gap between mass opinion and elite foreign policy preferences that ranges from 20 to 50 percent; this gap sometimes persists over two to three decades on specific issues. For a detailed discussion of such problems in foreign policy research, see Page and Barabas (2000: 339-64). 68 For excellent discussions of such biases in data collection processes, see Lustick (1996); and Thies (2002: 355-7). 77

intervening variables (e.g., identity and elite preferences, respectively)69 to ensure falsifiability. The lack of falsifiability stems from attempts to infer state foreign policy outcomes exclusively from elite preferences, rather than from variables other than the elite strategies for achieving those outcomes, such as domestic collective identities.70 This problem is further exacerbated by the widespread elite tendency to exaggerate their own achievements and to undermine those of their opponents. Such exaggeration significantly threatens falsifiability of the research findings, particularly when the elites in question are the only actors with insider information on the one hand, and there is no way to ascertain veracity of their statements on the other. These statements, whether intended to reinforce or to undermine their positions, originate from the very people who had a direct and indirect hand in fashioning the policies they defend.71

To overcome such limitations of relying exclusively on elite interviewing to inferring foreign policy outcomes, my dissertation fields a large-n survey to solicit direct and unalloyed measures of citizens‟ opinions about India‟s foreign policy toward the U.S.72 Consistent with this methodological choice, the research uses the survey to ascertain Indian citizens‟ opinions on foreign policy as a data

69 For a clear statement of this problem in political science research designs, see Abdelal (2005: 41-42). For the implementation of this suggestion in their research, see Herrmann and associates (2009: 725-26), who separate clearly components of identity (independent variable) from their behavioral measurements (dependent variables). 70 To appropriate Powell’s (1994: 318-22) original insight that states - as units - have preferences over strategies and not preferences over outcomes, elites similarly have preferences over strategies and not preferences over outcomes in my research. If not separated clearly for analytical purposes, elite strategies and policy outcomes tend to conflate, thereby running the risk of introducing non-falsifiability in the research. For an original statement of this problem in neorealist theory, see Powell (1994: 313-44). 71 For a good discussion of the problems related with elite interviewing, see Berry (2002: 679-80). 72 For an excellent discussion of the obstacles in deciding whose opinion should matter (elite or masses) for empirically studying foreign policy, see Herrmann (2002: 126-7). 78

collection tool and then measures the influence of these opinions on the foreign policy making elites. The advantage of such a strategy is to avoid tautology in the causal relationship between the independent variable (identity) and the dependent variable (foreign policy outcomes) by posing elite preferences as the intervening variable and investigating their formation as a distinct research phase.

Survey Nuts and Bolts

I hired TNS (India) as the data collection agency to field my survey. The survey was conducted in the two cities of New Delhi (north) and Mumbai (West) regions of India. TNS deployed two separate teams to carry out the survey. Each team consisted of five surveyors in addition to a supervisor and a manager.

Moreover, each city had its own quality control cell for back-checking the surveyors‟ work. The survey was fielded between July 4 and July 29, 2011.

Response Categories

This survey used a combination of Gutman (dichotomous) and Lickert

(graded) response categories. To start with, the survey employed the Guttman scale to establish the existence (or otherwise) of the relationship between the purported variables. For instance, I used “yes” and “no” response categories when constructing items that link middle class identity of individuals and its affect on foreign policy. One major advantage of employing “yes” and “no” response

categories for my research was to tap into respondents‟ subjective and cognitive dimensions. For example, I use the question, “If India became a middle class nation, do you think it will be easier to have cooperative relations with America?”

Restricting response categories to “yes” or “no” for this question allows respondents to clearly express whether they thought the relationship between independent variable (middle class identity) and foreign policy (dependent variable) existed. This direct and categorical establishment of the existence of the relationship is important for my research because it allows for substantiation of the evidence I gathered from the discourse analysis. Such direct and concrete affirmation or denial through this survey makes my findings robust.

In addition, to measure strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the survey employs a graded or Likert scale. Use of the Likert scale allows measurement of the higher or lower intensity of attitudes and feelings of the respondents. For instance, I ask the question, “In recent years, India‟s exports with the U.S. have steadily been growing. Some say that it is good for the middle class of the country and others say it is bad. What would you say?” The response categories I use for this question are “very good,”

“good,” “bad,” and “very bad.” Such response categories with varying strength allow the respondent to express cognitive and evaluative assessment of the relationship. Given the complementary role of this research survey, I see one major advantage of employing the Likert scale. After I have established the existence (or otherwise) of the relationship between main variables through the use of the Guttman scale, I can measure the strength of the individual‟s

identification with the relations between the two states.73 Measuring this strength is important because it will complement the collective levels of identification recovered from the discourse analysis. Surely, the discourse analysis generates fairly strong identity clusters, but it is limited in generating only intuitive and general orientations at the collective level. Leveraging the strength of individual feelings, in addition to the collective orientations toward the foreign policy goals in this survey, will make the use of the Likert scale very productive for the purpose of the research.

Characteristics of the Target Population

Based on the results of the discourse analysis as the first data collection technique, my survey - the second research method - focused on the middle class as the target population. The participant‟s eligibility was determined using three main criteria. First, all residents of the localities characterized as A and B socioeconomic demographics used in the Indian Readership Survey (IRS) were eligible to participate.74 The latest IRS75 was conducted in 2007, the results of which were used to identify A and B socioeconomic localities.76 Second, contrary to the original plan of four cities, the lack of funds forced me to conduct the survey in

73 For a very accessible discussion of the uses of the Gutman and Lickert scales in surveys, see Bradburn and colleagues (2004: 126-29). 74 The socioeconomic classes (SEC) segment population for retail and media studies according to income and education levels of the household heads. A and B socioeconomic demographics constitute the top two groups of Indian population. 75 Indian Reader Survey is Conducted by an independent organization. 76 See the results of this survey here: http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/06/09/0906magazine-survey.html (accessed March 16, 2009). 81

only two metropolitan cities, Delhi and Mumbai. These two cities were selected for their largest urban population and the existence of several A and B socioeconomic localities.77 Third, adults above twenty years of age were eligible to participate in the research. The oral script of the consent form explicitly informed potential participants of the twenty years as the minimum age of participation in the research.

Rationale for Deriving the Respondent Sample

The rationale for deriving the number of research participants was twofold. First, the total number of participants (804) from two cities in India

(Delhi and Mumbai) was based on the minimum number of responses necessary to derive statistically significant conclusions from the study. The number of 400 or more participants from each of the two cities would make the research findings statistically significant. Any number below 400 may not yield useful data for the completion of the research. Second, the total number of participants (804) was also partly determined by the funds available for the research. Given the funding available for the study, it was impossible to increase the number of participants beyond 804.

77 For a similar use of locality-based cluster sampling, see Laitin (1998: 380). 82

Respondent Recruitment

TNS (India) as the polling agency recruited respondents for this research.

The potential participants were identified using two criteria. First, the participants were identified by using a criterion of locality cluster. These particular localities, classified as A and B socio-economic demographics, are generally known to have residence clusters in certain parts of the cities. Second, access to this population was based on a randomized sample of houses. In particular, randomization of the sample was ensured using a “right hand” rule. After every successful interview, the surveyor skipped two houses on right hand of the row. In the case where buildings have same number (e.g., 15) for multiple apartments, the surveyor used the already assigned letters for identifying them and then used those letters to skip apartments (e.g., A, B, C, D, etc). For example, after a successful administration of the survey at apartment number 15-A, the surveyor knocked on the door of apartment number 15-D. If the participant at the apartment 15-D was unwilling or incapable of participating, the surveyor then knocked on the door of the next dwelling that came after 15-D until he/she found a person who answered. After the successful completion of a questionnaire, the surveyor then returned to the original right-hand rule (skip two houses after a successful knock in case of houses) or letters (skip two letters in the case of apartments) in a large building.78

Third, adults above twenty years of age were recruited for the research. The oral script of the consent form explicitly informed potential recruits of the twenty year minimum age requirement.

78 I adapted this sampling technique for my purpose from Laitin (1998: 380-81) with significant modifications. 83

Thus, in this section, I presented substantive and methodological advantages of employing a large-n survey in this sequential multimethod project as the second data collection technique. In addition to the substantive benefit of adding microfoundations of identity to the concepts of collective identities, the section also presented methodological advantages of a large-scale, face-to-face quizzing of respondents through a survey technique. This survey not only promises to yield direct and unalloyed measures of citizens‟ responses to specific questions/issues relevant to foreign policy, but it also offers a way to avoid tautological reasoning in the research. Such tautology generally creeps into the research when the same elites are interviewed for data collection as well as to analyze the foreign policy issues in which they often play a significant part. Such doubling of elite roles in data collection and analysis makes it difficult to separate the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. I concluded the section with a discussion about some of the basic considerations in designing and conducting the survey.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I presented in detail the reasons for applying a multimethod research design in my dissertation. The chapter directly confronts the question of why opting for a multimethod research design is appropriate for this research in the first section. The second section addressed the reasons for choosing a sequential research design for the project. This was followed by two

sections that delineated specific research methods of discourse analysis and large- n survey, respectively. The third section discussed the text sampling strategies and the consequent nature of discourse analysis. The fourth section described the justifications for employing a large-n survey as the second data collection method and the ways in which it enhances the external validity of research findings. This section also described what I call the “nuts-and-bolts” of the large-n survey design.

The following chapter presents middle-class discourses as the dominant identity clusters of India in 2008. These clusters highlight three different conceptions of the self-understandings of the country. These three self- understandings relate to the overambitious, future-oriented, pragmatic, present- oriented, and disillusioned, past-oriented middle-class categories. In other words, this chapter will lay out the context in which the middle class as the dominant collective identity of India shaped individual citizens‟ attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts about their own role inside the country, as well as the pursuit of collective state interests through a strategic partnership with the United States.

Addendum A: Table of select popular texts

News sources

Title Language Period covered Aaj Tak (Until Today, a Hindi February, May, August, Hindi television news and November 2008 channel) Dainik Bhaskar (The Daily Hindi March, June, Bhaskar) September, and December 2008 The Times of India English January, April, July, and October 2008

Hindi soap operas

Title Language Period covered Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Hindi 2008 Bahu Thi (Kyunki hereafter) (Because Mother-in-Law was Daughter-in-Law too). Kahani Ghar-Ghar Ki Hindi 2008 (Kahani hereafter) (The Story of Every Household).

Hindi popular films

Title Language Period covered Gajini Hindi 2008 Rab ne Bana di Jodi (God- Hindi 2008 made Couple)

Chapter 4: Discursive Identities of India (2008)

“Alchemy of Miracles” —The Times of India (January 6, 2008) “… what everyone needs to do is to train your mind in a systematic way to a different perception of everyone and everything. Every individual can create miracles … miracles are thought-creations.” On a different note, “When going gets tough, take a moment, visualize your miracle, it will happen.” —The Times of India (January 6, 2008).

Introduction

In view of my domestic constructivist framework described in Chapter 2 and then firmed up with a sequential, multimethod research design in Chapter 3, I conduct in this chapter discourse analysis of my select sample texts.1 The dominant social-cognitive components recovered through this discourse analysis produced middle-class as the most widely available and the most strongly influential everyday identity in the popular texts. Here, I will sketch out in broad strokes different components of middle-class identity recovered from India‟s select popular texts. These texts use everyday language to express people‟s shared traits of being overambitious, pragmatic, and disillusioned. Based on these traits, I categorize these components of the middle-class into three main constitutive clusters. More broadly, these constitutive components relate to an overambitious attitude toward improving the future; pragmatism that one needed to improve life in the present, and the disillusionment that the best time for positively changing

1 For the use of such everyday language research designs, see Taylor (2001); Wadak (1999). 87

life had already passed. This content is generated through contestations at individual as well as social levels. Traits of making the future better defines the overambitious middle-class and the traits of achievement-orientation, initiative- taking, and technological proficiency produce a hardworking, pragmatic identity.

The focus of this pragmatic identity is primarily on improving the present conditions. The content of middle-class dissatisfaction with the present generates desire to return to the past, and thus represents a clear contestation in that identity.

Given that I treat identity as composed of social discourses and individual cognition expressed in everyday language use, the chapter claims that India‟s middle-class social-cognitive components help understand how certain interpretations of thoughts and decisions of that country‟s political elites are rendered imaginable, intelligible, and possible.2 It argues that policy preferences are inherently social because policy makers address opposition parties as well as the wider social sphere in a bid to institutionalize their understandings of policy options.3 In this vein, middle-class discourses of improving the future, valuing of working hard in the present, and desire for returning to the old ways of past middle-class lifestyle shape elite policy preferences. These discourses make available to political elites common knowledge about the nature of social values and the degree of convergence of individual preferences with the Indian middle- class lifestyle or constitutes political elites‟ identities and their interpretations of the context and action.”4 Such middle-class identity discourse -- one enmeshed in

2 Hopf (2002). 3 Hansen (2006: 1). 4 Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998: 681). 88

the celebration of the materialist middle-class identity, but deeply rooted in its social valuation -- generates a context within which the members of that class interpret their interests and actions. This discourse also generates what Abdelal and colleagues treat as “social purposes,”5 which policy makers institutionalize and advance as their policy options.6 In other words, this chapter employs middle- class discursive identity as the independent variable that shapes preferences of political elites as the intervening variable, which in turn, influences the foreign policy goals as the dependent variable.

The recovery of middle-class everyday discourses is founded in the claim that foreign policy choices that produce cooperation or conflict with other states follow domestic discourses about the content and contestation over meanings of national/state identity. Specifically, the discursive contexts within which political elites are embedded define their best courses of action; those discursive contexts vary; and therefore, variations in policies frequently result from changing discursive contexts. The discursive contexts of which the political elites form an important part affect the political positions they take on specific issues. To appropriate an old adage about elite behavior for my purpose, where political elites live determines where they stand on various issues.

My research adopts a standard social science method; that is, it holds independent variable (social-cognitive identity), intervening variable (elite preferences), and dependent variable (foreign outcomes) separate from each other.

These variables are kept separate because their measures require independent

5 Abdelal et al. (2006: 895). 6 Abdelal (2005 chap 1). 89

measurements for a falsifiable research design. Specifically, the discursive identity functions as the independent variable of the research, constructed by discourse analysis of the select popular texts as well as results of a large-n survey of individual cognitive preferences. It is only when the independent variable is constructed, do I move forward to apply it to the intervening variable (elite preferences). In this chapter, my endeavor is to demonstrate the ways in which discursive identity (independent variable) shaped the preferences of the political elites (intervening variable) of India in the year 2008, postponing the assessment of the effects of this model on the foreign policy outcomes until the following empirical chapters.7

I. Overambitious Middle-Class Discourse

In the year 2008, one of the dominant constitutive middle-class discourse in India was a heightened awareness of making the future better. This growing awareness of making the future better was widely observable in the everyday language of that class. “I work 14 hours a day, and I am excited that I will get a promotion in six months,” said Rakesh who worked at a call center (Aaj Tak May

7 I am aware of the debate in the IR discipline whether the political elites are true believers or instrumental rational actors in representing identities and values of larger social discourses. My approach here is similar to suggested by Krasner, Keohane, and Katzenstein (1998: 680) and implemented by Abdelal (2005: 43) that there is a point of complementarity between constructivist and rationalist approaches to politics about knowledge—sharing of information by actors in specific social contexts. 90

14, 2008).8 The palpable excitement of this call center worker was evident in his everyday language use. He knew what he had to do to advance his career “work

14 hours a day …” to get a promotion. Rakesh had no regrets about working extra hours (14 hours a day) to get to his desired goal. On the contrary, using his everyday language, he expressed a high level of excitement in performing his job when he connected his work and prospects for promotion through the words “I am excited …” in the same sentence like many other middle-class Indians.9

Significantly, such an excitement about the readiness to work and expect a better future also clearly showed that the Indian middle-class drew a line between its present condition and the future prospects. For this middle-class, working in the present was inextricably connected with the certainty of making the future better.10 Like Rakesh, such rewards of hard work took the forms of better work conditions and the prospects of career improvement. Such excitement about the career promotion becomes even more significant when Rakesh linked directly the effort he put into the work “I work 14 hours a day” and the rewards he would receive “I will get a promotion in six months.”11

8For an excellent account of the processes by which commercial television constructs viewers’ identity, see McMillin (2002: 123-36). 9 For an assessment of economic conditions of India in the year 2008, see Mukherjit (2008: 315- 31). 10 See Fernandes (2004: 15) and (2006: xviiii) for defining this social group as “new middle class” as opposed to earlier term “old middle-class.” I would adopt this nomenclature of Fernandes with a substantive difference. Whereas Fernandes defines the new middle class in terms of its modern consumption, the recovery of DA from my popular texts points to aspirations for making the future better and hard work in the present as the constitutive features of this class. 11 For journalistic accounts of such excitement in the middle-class about making the future better, see Luce (2007: chap 8); Meredith (2007). 91

Table 4.1. Discursive Identities of India 2008 Identities Constituent components Over Ambitious High aspirations, acute sense of future, moving from rural to urban areas, multiple skills Pragmatic Initiative-driven, achievement oriented, hard working, technically proficient

Disillusioned Longing for the past, stable life, sense of justice and fairness, feeling of being architects in building modern civilization

This discourse of future time horizon, characteristic of this overambitious middle-class shaped party platforms and elite preferences.12 The BJP13 promoted this sense of time horizon that directly engaged middle-class: “This is the moment to look ahead, to a new, resurgent India,” claimed the party manifesto for the coming elections in the year 2009.14 Such overwhelmingly positive orientation toward future, stemmed directly from the overambitious middle-class, which significantly shaped the BJP platform of considering this moment to turn India‟s attention to its future, thus, “this is the moment to look ahead.” This looking ahead in BJP‟s platform involved making India one of the few powerful states in the world.15 The strategy to secure such an overambitious goal was to turn the country into a developed state within a generation. This platform of looking ahead into the future also influenced BJP‟s leaders. Recalling a major speech he

12 For a similar research strategy for assessing party platforms and elite preferences through domestic discourses in the three Baltics states, see Abdelal (2005). 13 The acronym BJP stands for Bhartiya Janata Party. This political party ruled India between 1998 and 2004 and since then has been the main opposition party in the national parliament. 14 See the BJP election manifesto here: http://www.bjp.org/content/view/765/428/ (accessed 9/17/2010). 15 For good discussions of this distinctively BJP’s political vision, see Chaulia (2002); Corbridge and Harris (2000). 92

delivered soon after his party‟s victory in 1998, the former Deputy Prime Minister

Advani (2008: 541) wrote in his memoirs:

The BJP must now become new BJP. Only the new BJP can shoulder responsibilities of the new era that is opening up for India and for our own party. The BJP will not be guided by the issues of yesterday but by the agenda for future. The BJP will be fully alive to the changing world scenario and enable India to face challenges of the 21st century (emphasis added).

With this charting of the new beginning for the party and with that for the country, the political elites of the BJP meant that the middle-class discourse of bringing change in the existing ways of doing things shaped their worldviews. By asserting that “The BJP will not be guided by the issues of yesterday but by the agenda for future …” this major Indian political party‟s leaders were discursively influenced by the middle-class identity content of looking forward to a better future.16

As if Advani had been participating in her life experiences, one extremely talented young woman from a rural part of central India, who was highly proficient in math, quite adept at playing many adventure sports, and majored in finance, eventually opted for a career in acting--“I can safely say that acting was a long-term plan for me. I was academically inclined. Math used to be my favorite subject and I thought I would become the CEO of a top-notch company someday.

I wanted to go into finance but then acting happened.”17 Drawing upon her experiences, expressed in ordinary language use, this young woman from a rural

16 Snyder (1991). 17 The Times of India (July 16, 2008). 93

part of the country relished her success. Her agenda for future, as the political elites tended to understand, included two things. First, without worrying that she came from a rural part of India, where education in general is difficult to obtain, she evinced a strong tendency for excelling. Without giving even a hint of her background, this rural young woman imbibed the spirit of resilience and adaptability to her future agenda, “I can safely say that acting was a long-term plan for me. I was academically inclined. Math used to be my favorite subject and

I thought I would become the CEO of a top-notch company someday.” This overambitious goal to make the future better, better than her rural life, became the life objective long before she became successful in the chosen profession. Such an excitement about making her future better also meant that she had dreamed up a plan to become the CEO of a top-notch company in spite of her origin. Second, a drive to make the future better entailed honing a variety of talents and skills: “I wanted to go into finance but then acting happened,” meaning that this young woman did not rely on a single talent or skill to achieve her goals.

This is because one characteristic feature of India‟s middle-class was to accept the new and unplanned changes even if the best plan did not come through.

This feature of the middle-class discursive identity of this young woman from rural parts of India comes through when she draws a contrast between her first preference of a career in finance and the second choice of acting. Instead of regretting about her failure to achieve the first goal for making the future better, pursuing a career in finance, she accepted her long-term goal of acting. Focusing on the everyday language use of this young woman helps recover the main

constitutive feature of her character: overambition and overzealous pursuit of goals. “I wanted to go into finance but then acting happened” showed that she had cultivated a personality that knew how to turn failure into success. Notice the use of “but” as a contrasting conjunction in her language that should have expressed dismay and disenchantment (negative feelings) for settling for the second-best option, which, instead, helped express contentment and moderation even in the face of change in her future plans.

This excitement about making the future better evident in the middle-class discursive identity found echoes in the memoirs of the former Finance and

Foreign Minister Jasvant Singh (2007). Recalling fondly what his grandfather used to pose as a question in his days of growing-up in the rural desert state of

Rajasthan, “If an animal does not move, how will it graze?”18 Hidden behind this question, Jasvant Singh highlighted the counsel that made him move from a rural village to a career in the army and then to Delhi as a fulltime politician. This success came because his identity was rooted in that counsel which translated in his personal life as, “keep building, keep moving, and keep growing “(2007: 3).

This spirit to keep building and moving to the next level clearly marked life of that young woman from a rural region who wanted to become a CEO of a top- notch company someday, and instead landed a career in the film industry. Such a sense of making the future better meant that middle-class prepared for different

18 Singh (2007: 3). 95

outcomes, and if the first preference did not work out, it was ready with other talents and skills to take advantage of the time and situation.19

Such moderation and pragmatism did not always prevail in the overambitious middle-class discourses. As if a child actor of a popular Bollywood film apparently disagreed on everything one associates with the modern Indian middle-class (e.g., excitement of opportunity, to put in the best effort, and pragmatic moderation in the face of new opportunities), famously claimed that evoked tremendous popular imagination of the middle-class: “I should be nominated not in the category of „the best child actor‟ but in the category of „the best actor‟” (Aaj Tak February 6, 2008).20 What is significant here is that by attracting attention of others to his aspirations “I should be nominated …” this child actor evoked sentiments of the millions of the middle-class who thought that they possessed talent and skills to make their future better over the present conditions.21 The strength of such excitement about improving the future becomes even more inescapable if we pay attention to his use of everyday language. In making his claim, this child-actor juxtaposed closely the categories of “best child actor” against the “best actor” that found resounding echo in the middle-class.

This is mainly because it evoked some of the strong sentiments of the role of that class in the contemporary Indian society. For instance, the use of contradictory categories clearly enabled the child actor to relax the separation between the

19 See, Gurcharan Das “The respect they deserve,” Times Asia (November 29, 2004). http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501041206/two_indias_vpt_das.html (Accessed May 15, 2010). 20 See Arun Shouri, “When Spirit is Willing, Flesh has a Way,” Indian Express, February 4, 2004.http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/40417/# (Accessed April 12, 2010). 21 Alagh (2004: 19-37). 96

categories of “child” and “adult” and their respective efforts. Relaxing of those categories further enabled this child actor to shift the focus away from his relative inexperience and age to the quality of his performance and the spirit of doing even better in the future.

As the middle-class shared his attention to high quality work and a spirit of using that performance to make future situations better, there were two main sentiments that constituted the middle-class identity of those gripped by the boldness of this child. First, this actor claimed to be recognized as the best for his performance indicated that such a spirit was increasingly becoming pervasive not just among the weak and the novice but also large swaths of the Indian masses.

Those who found opportunity to demonstrate their talent and merit, unencumbered by other considerations, treated this claim of the child actor speaking directly to their experiences. Such individual spirit of competition proved to be so infectious that the claim of the child actor to be awarded according to the quality of the acting and not according to his age received wide popular support on account of his stellar performance. Significantly, many of the highly regarded actors supported his contention.22

In a measure that demonstrated that the political elites intently followed this bold claim of the child actor, they fashioned their political strategies around such connections between creating conditions which facilitated improving the life ahead and making India resurgent in the future. The Congress Party23 finalized its

22 Aaj Tak (February 6, 2008); The Times of India (February 8, 2008). 23 Known formally as the Indian National Congress, this political party was the dominant political force from 1947 and 1989 with a brief interregnum in 1977-79. The advent of the coalition 97

2009 election campaign on the slogan: “A vote for the Congress is a vote for your future, and the future of your children.”24 Eager to portray that they can deliver a secure future, the political elites made explicit connections between the “future” and the “children.” By emphasizing that they could secure the future of the children, other major political actors also participated in this middle-class discourse. For example, Advani enunciated in a major speech to the National

Executive meet of the BJP, “All the children of Bharat Mata {mother India} can live in …. prosperity, irrespective of their caste, religious or regional affiliations.”25 By identifying that the future will be different from the present and today‟s children have a major stake in that future, political elites clearly showed that they did not escape this middle-class discourse. Advani‟s direct appeal that all children of the Mother India will live in prosperity and the slogan of the

Congress Party that voting for the Congress meant voting for the future of one‟s children evinced influences of the middle-class discourse about the uncertain future. This is particularly significant when one considers that the middle-class had been unsure of the benefits of its talents and skills in the past, the new middle-class was extremely eager to insure that the opportunities for bringing a change in the future remain open.

Thus, it follows from above that the recovery of the domestic DA of the popular texts in the year 2008 suggests that a strong sense of making the future better shaped elites‟ preferences of India in that year. In this respect, Indians were politics since the late 1980s has ended the dominant status of the Congress Party. This party has been ruling at the national level since 2004. 24 http://www.congress.org.in/new/common-minimum-programme.php (accessed 9/12/2010). 25 See Advani (2008: 540). 98

moved by the opportunities to putting forward their best effort for progressing, desire to obtain recognition of that desire in the public domain, and dealing with the uncertainty of such transformation, without the consideration of whether it was feasible or practical. The more widely this middle-class discourse was found in the speeches of political elites, the greater the probability that India‟s political elites‟ preferences were shaped by this discourse. With this context, a strong sense of making the future better and the desire of the country to be recognized as a responsible and mature power in international relations became imaginable, intelligible, and possible. Hence, the logic of this hypothesis is that the greater the impact of this overambitious middle-class identity on the political elites, the stronger the strategic partnership between India and the United States.

II. Discourse of Pragmatic Middle-Class

The second dominant identity cluster recovered through my discourse analysis was the pragmatic middle-class, characterized by hard work, initiative- taking, and technological proficiency. These discourses and narratives shaped

India‟s political context in 2008. For example, one of the chief engineering architects of the Tata Nano car expressed this identity discourse after putting the design together, “I had built small trucks before, but designing a cheap car was a different game. In nine months, we had the design ready.”26 This discourse

26 The Times of India (January 11, 2008). Also see, Nilekani (2009). 99

centered around a spirit of hard work, which captured Indian people‟s willingness to achieve their goals, as well as to do so in limited time frame.

First, this engineer expressed thinking of a vast majority of the Indian middle-class when he said that “I had built small trucks before, but designing a cheap car was a different game.” In comparing his present positive achievements of building small trucks in the past and stepping forward to move into the fairly unchartered territory in the present, this engineer expressed determination of millions of middle-class Indians to accomplish things unthinkable in the past. The contrast between the limits of the past and the possibilities of the present could not be more stark. The middle-class‟s ability and hard work produced new possibilities for personal growth and professional progress.27 Echoing such determination to work hard and to change positively one‟s life circumstances,

Raja Chaudhari, a small town regular guy, reflected on the success he achieved after moving to a big city, “I came from small town Meerut and joined this high powered company, I never thought I would succeed. Two months ago it was disorienting to adjust to this metro life, now I am fine with it.”28

Such widespread self-confidence in reaping the rewards of one‟s capabilities meant that there was readiness and willingness to accept newer challenges by working hard and achieving success. For instance, by expressing fears of taking risks of moving to a large town, Raja Chaudhari eventually

27 For an excellent analysis of such growing tendencies of India’s middle-class to accept risk for improving life circumstances, see Fernandes (2006: chap 3). 28 Aaj Tak (November 22, 2008). Also see The Financial Express (January 26, 2007): http://www.financialexpress.com/news/emerging-indias-amazing-social-confidence/191269/0 (Accessed May 20, 2010). 100

decided to accept the challenge. Typical of a middle-class upstart, he claimed only in two months to have adjusted to a new life style: “I came from small town

Meerut and joined this high powered company, I never thought I would succeed.”29 Such determination to accept challenges and to move forward constitutes a middle-class identity as typical. Returning to the Nano car‟s chief engineer, for instance, even though he had designed small trucks earlier, he was willing to jump onto a totally new and different project. His sense of self- confidence in achieving success in the new endeavor came out when he said,

“Designing a cheap car was a different game.” Similar to pragmatic middle-class members, the chief engineer was conscious of the consequences of his actions: the risks of failure. By accepting a new project, the engineer was confident that his hard work would make him successful in this new task.

As if the Congress Party removed a leaf from the experience of the Nano design engineer, it made central to harness creative energies of the professional middle-class as part of its forthcoming election manifesto. This basic pillar echoed the importance of professional experience: “To unleash creative energies of our professionals and our entrepreneurs, the cutting-edge of our middle- class.”30 The explicit recognition of the need to create environment “to unleash creative energies of our professional and entrepreneurs” meant that the political parties recognized the immense value of partaking in the discourse of the middle- class. The excitement of accepting challenges that put to test the creative energies

29 Aaj Tak (November 2, 2008). 30 http://www.congress.org.in/new/3Speeches%20of%20Congress%20Leaders.php (accessed 9/10/2010). 101

of the middle-class professionals affected political strategies of all the political parties. By associating “the cutting edge of our middle-class” with professionals and entrepreneurs, like other political parties, the Congress Party‟s platform was shaped by the pragmatic middle-class discourse. Take also the example of the

BJP, the other large political party in the Indian national parliament. Specifically, the pragmatic middle-class willingness to accept the new and time bound challenges required a positive environment in which the fulfillment of such challenges was possible. The possibility of meeting these challenges was absent, argued the BJP, if the country continued the Congress policies. Therefore, the former Finance and Foreign Minister in the BJP government Jasvant Singh recalled, “There is one economic philosophy I have always believed to be one of cultural foundations of Indian society. This philosophy enjoins all of us to endeavor to utmost, to achieve the maximum possible production, no matter what field of activity we are engaged in; that is our duty, our dharma”31 (emphasis added).

This dharma, as Singh described as India‟s cultural foundation, was riding on the back of a widespread middle-class discourse of individual effort and industry. While addressing the annual gathering of his technology company,

Sanjay, the main male protagonist of the most popular Hindi film Gajini of 2008 envisioned, “I want to take this company to the highest popular rating in three years for its product” (Gajini 2008). While declaring his personal resolve to achieve this feat in a fixed time period, he continued, “This is not borne out of my

31 Singh (2007: 335). 102

arrogance but out of our potential” (Gajini 2008).32 Significantly, by focusing on

“… our potential” soon after he disclaimed that the tight schedule he worked out for his company did not come out of his arrogance, this young technology entrepreneur showed his employees that he possessed what the former Finance

Minister understood as “effort and industry” to translate the entrepreneur‟s plans into reality. With this knowledge of a carefully-crafted plan, the employees of the company took immense pride in their jobs. This is because they later confided into each other that they enjoyed working for a company that had a goal and was led by an industrious manager.

Recall here that by putting forward a time bound plan to achieve his goals,

Sanjay was participating discursively in the thoughts and actions of the Nano car‟s design engineer. In particular, in expressing his immense sense of self- confidence at the completion of the initial design phase of the car, the chief engineer of the Nano said, “In nine months, we had the design ready.”33

Noteworthy here is that by highlighting the part of the sentence “In nine months,” and following it up with words like “we had the design ready,” the engineer attempted to distance his work from the earlier Indian state-run projects, which suffered from time and budget overruns. As if this engineer was expressing thinking of millions of other middle-class members like Sanjay, the excerpt emphasized the growing pragmatic middle-class‟s discourse of consistently working with a clearly laid out plan. The use of the phrase “In nine months”

32 For different ways in which discourses of the popular films have influenced identities in India, see Prasad (1998). 33 The Times of India (January 11, 2008). 103

further reinforced this growing trend. Hence, this design engineer captured the growing confidence of the middle-class that it had the ability and talent to work hard. In an attempt to project itself as a middle-class-friendly party, the Congress

Party explicitly incorporated in its election manifestos that demonstrated the party resolve to institute and promote the measures, to return to the achievements of middle-class engineers like the chief design engineer of Nano car and Sanjay as a manager, for overcoming the challenges of designing and developing new industrial products, and do so successfully in a time bound manner.34

Noteworthy here is that my discourse analysis also recovered many uncertainties in this middle-class identity. These uncertainties were expressed through everyday language of this class. They related mainly to the anxieties about not doing as well as others and falling behind those others. Simran, the main female protagonist of Rabne, “By coming here {to her husband‟s homed}, I am losing my skills. I have to do much more than this to be as good as my friends.” This woman who married and traveled to another city to live with her husband was constantly worried about the ways in which she was not using her skills to the optimal extent. By highlighting that “I am losing my skills,” showed that her anxiety about not doing as well as her colleagues in other city. Such anxieties constantly occupied and appeared quite frequently in her daily language.

Moreover, “I have to do something much more than this” {more than what she was already doing}, she expressed yet another cause of her anxiety. That is, the middle-class identity discourse conditioned individuals to strive to do better in

34 http://www.congress.org.in/new/3Speeches%20of%20Congress%20Leaders.php (accessed 9/10/2010). 104

order to keep them ahead in the game, as well as making sure that they were not socially and economically left behind.

Such a feeling of losing one‟s place in the middle-class was amply echoed when a man vented his anxiety out loud, “I was doing very well in my community until couple of years ago. I carried home fifty thousand rupees. Today everyone seems to make money more than that. What is the point of my degree and the experience I have!”35 Such anxieties of being left behind in comparison with others were not eased with the growth of the new economy jobs in the year 2008, particularly when the young and recent graduates from college found jobs with far higher pays than their older counterparts. Comparing his income with other much less experienced neighbors, this man captured widespread anxieties of middle- class citizens. The cause of such anxieties in this social segment originated from the comparisons of individual attributes as well as others‟ life styles that constituted who they were and how they were treated in their community.

Recalling the sentiments of this middle-class man, “Until couple of years ago, I was doing very well in my community …” meaning that he enjoyed a much higher respect in the community because “I {this man} earned fifty thousand rupees a month.”

As if the BJP heard these anxieties of the middle-class, the party fashioned its election manifesto: “The BJP, immediately upon coming to power, will address the key issues of … economy.”36 It outlined specific measures to overcome the anxieties of middle-class citizens like Simran and that previously

35 Aaj Tak (May 28, 2008). 36 See http://www.bjp.org/content/view/765/428/ (accessed 9/17/2010). 105

respected man. Therefore, the BJP manifesto further continued, “It will resume the employment-generating, prosperity-creating policies of the NDA … through massive investments in infrastructure projects …. and by making credit easily accessible to industry ….” Through the pursuit of “employment generating” policies, the party will produce prosperity for millions of middle-class people like that man. Such anxieties of being left behind of his other middle-class compatriots, the party will also ensure flow of credit to industry. This would help the people who suffered from anxieties of losing to others find new jobs and to overcome their sense of psychological anxiety and social backwardness.

Significant here is that my recovery of the discourse analysis also suggests some contradictions in the middle-class discursive identity about hard work and reaping its rewards in the year 2008. The constitutive features of the self- understanding of the middle-class as experimenter with new life challenges (Raja

Chaudhari), efficient and calculative manager (Sanjay), innovator (Nano chief design engineer), are in contravention with the exclusive popular focus on engineers concerned with advance and sensitive technologies. One regular middle-class member expressed this spirit, “We can build things here, but we need serious recognition.”37 In echoing this sentiment, this man highlighted strongly what has been lacking for the use of the creative genius of the middle- class. Voicing “We need serious recognition,” clearly revealed that the conditions necessary for the utilization of those creative talents have been absent.38 Such voicing of the concerns of the middle-class acquires particular significance when

37 Aaj Tak (August 8, 2008). 38 Also see Nilekani (2009: 25-29). 106

such absence of conditions for valuing of the middle-class talents is preceded by the assertion “We can build anything.” This assertion of building anything with an important qualification that “we need serious recognition” echoed the disconnect between the readiness of working hard and employing creative talents of the middle-class and the less than satisfactory conditions for the use of those talents.

Such disconnect between the aspirations to employ existing genius and the less than satisfactory conditions for their use comes into a sharper contrast with the use of conjunction “but.” The use of this contrasting conjunction “but” successfully captured the contradictions in the pragmatic middle-class discursive content.

This divergence in the self-understanding of the pragmatic middle-class discourse and the elite recognition of only a small segment of the creative and productive energies of this class became unmistakable with regard to many national development projects. For instance, the BJP reveled in the fact that the nuclear tests under its stewardship in 1998 like never-before served to highlight the accomplishments of indigenous scientific and technological talents. In highlighting the significance of this step, “the motive was to demonstrate to

Indians what they were capable of achieving,” recorded in his memoirs the then

Home Minister in the BJP government (Advani 2008: 541).39 The widespread popular celebration of the nuclear tests and the subsequent advancements in that field brought tremendous applaud to the scientific community, of which the middle-class formed a major component. However, there was a widespread

39 Also see Corbridge and Harris (2000). 107

feeling that it was the first time that the middle-class hard work received open and public recognition. In his memoir, Jasvant Singh recalled, “the purpose was to demonstrate the scientific and technological competence behind the tests.”40

However, the self-understanding of the middle-class about using modern technologies to improve its own and lives of others did not escaped many of the elite decisions and public recognition. Recall the satisfaction of the engineer after designing the cheapest car. When putting together the design of the Nano car together, the engineer expressed his satisfaction, “It was a great learning experience. I am proud we could do it in India” (TOI January 11, 2008).

Noteworthy here is that the first sentence of the quotation expresses immense satisfaction typical of the middle-class that it possesses the required engineering skills to accomplish the tasks necessary for improving living conditions of the country. Similar to thinking of many of the scientists and technicians working with sensitive dual use nuclear technology, mechanical engineers, software writers, medical doctors, and others derive immense pride from their professions.41 Significantly, all these professionals belong to the pragmatic middle-class, whose discursive content did not shape thoughts and actions of the political elites in the past.

Such a divergence between the middle-class discursive identity and the actions and thoughts of elites was acknowledged when the Prime Minister Singh in a parliamentary debate argued that software industry had become an important

40 Singh (2007: 99). 41 For a good analysis of the contributions of engineers and professionals other than sensitive nuclear technology experts in the development of India as a modern nation, see Thomas and Gupta (2007). 108

component for nation-building. When this idea was first put forward, many people scoffed at it: “Today, information technology and software is a sunrise industry … I venture to think our atomic industry will play a similar role in the transformation of India‟s economy.”42 Noteworthy here is that such citing of the engineers other than nuclear scientists and technologists in the context of the nuclear agreement elevated the countless technical and professional contributions middle-class makes in addition to the sensitive and high-tech ones. As if the

Prime Minister borrowed his speech from the sentiments of the chief engineer of the Nano, “I am glad that we could do it in India” that marked a real change in the elite discourse. This sense of satisfaction has at least two components that relate directly to the middle-class.

First, India‟s middle-class shaped content of the political discourses in the form of creating opportunities for the multifaceted use of middle-class hardworking traits. The traits of initiative-taking and technological proficiency produced readiness and willingness in the middle-class to partake in development opportunities. These aspirations related directly to the opportunities for inventing new and attractive technologies. These technologies relate to the invention of the cheapest car, the cheapest air conditioners,43 production of world class life-saving generic drugs,44 or high-tech lunar missions.45 This discourse centered on these technologies to build a modern Indian nation. Some of them help build nation

42 For an analysis of the information technology’s role in the development of India, see, Fuller and Narasimhan (2007: 121-150). 43 The Times of India (January 11, 2008). 44 The Times of India (January 22; April 6, 2008). 45 Aaj Tak (November 14, 2008); Bhaskar (December 1, 2008). 109

from bottom-up and others enhance its prestige as a highly science-oriented nation. Many of these bottom-up national development needed continuous search for the new and improved solutions to the problems facing India in the contemporary period. Such goods require technical and engineering talents drawn from the disciplines of automotive, chemical engineering, electronics, metallurgical science, etc. It is this scientific and technological talent that undertakes designing, demonstrating, and developing of a variety of important in modern lifestyle goods.46

Influenced by this pragmatic middle-class discourse, India drafted a national level innovation policy in the year 2008. This draft policy was consciously designed to make use of diverse technical and engineering skills for the development of the country. In particular, it offered special incentives to the new and upcoming entrepreneurs to set up new ventures in a variety of technical and professional fields.47 Thus, other segments of the technical and engineering establishments that partake in the regular discourse of the middle-class are more likely to be involved in either building new and innovative technologies or starting small and energetic enterprises than just the nuclear and the space technologies.

Second, the services offered by the middle-class, important for the modern lifestyles, also shaped thoughts and actions of the political elites. The main

46 There was widespread feeling that the contributions of large numbers of engineering and science students engaged in fields other than high-tech research and engineering disciplines of nuclear and space technologies go unrecognized. Contributions of these students go unrecognized in India because of the overwhelming focus on those high-tech and sensitive technologies. See Thomas (1990: 831-34). 47 Draft Innovation Policy, Government of India, (2008). 110

protagonist of the second-most popular Hindi film of the year 2008 embodied the discursive content of a technically-oriented middle-class regular member, “I work at a scooter service workshop, but we will soon start repairing those shiny foreign cars” (Rabne 2008). Declaring to his newly wed-wife that he worked at a scooter service workshop, the protagonist showed tremendous pride in the profession he chose and the type of job he performed everyday. This is particularly significant when this protagonist of the film Rabne juxtaposes his statement with “… we will soon start repairing those shiny foreign cars.” For him, the prospects of transitioning to repair those shiny foreign cars not only constituted his identity but also made him proud of the profession he had chosen for his livelihood. Such services require fairly high level of technical and engineering skills generally acquired by the middle-class members, who graduated in thousands of hundreds every year in India. The technical skills other than those considered high-tech

(nuclear and space) require middle-class technical and engineering professionals to run them efficiently.48 The former Foreign and Finance Minister Jasvant Singh echoed content of this discourse when he exhorted the middle-class to be proud of what they pursue as professions. He argued that the country could do it “… by generating optimism, raising morale, and building confidence in the enterprise

….”49 This strong sentiment of the former Foreign Minister to build self- confidence of the middle-class in the enterprise is what had been missing in India for long.50

48 The Times of India (April 16, 2008). 49 Singh (2007 335). 50 Also see Draft Innovation Policy (2008). 111

Thus, the recovery of this pragmatic middle-class DA about its hard work and reaping rewards in the present shaped elite thoughts and decisions that defined purposes of the Indian state in the year 2008. My recovery of this cluster of identity discourse shows that this segment possessed skills and talents to contribute to national development as well as to succeed at individual level. This discursive identity shaped elite preferences by generating ambiguities toward

India‟s relations with the US. Specifically, the discourse revealed that this middle- class can use its skills and talents to develop country‟s domestic conditions and use the India-U.S. strategic partnership to that effect. The DA also highlighted that this segment of the middle-class identity would vastly benefit from stronger relations with the US. This is because improved and better relationship with the

US would provide many educational and economic opportunities to this social group of India. Despite such contradictions, this domestic discourse about middle- class identity had unmistakable impact on the preferences of the political elites of

India in that year. Specifically, the greater the impact of the domestic pragmatic middle-class identity discourse, the greater the likelihood of cooperative relations with the United States over the issues of developing India‟s indigenous talents and skills in the present.

III. Discourse of Disillusioned Middle-Class

Although the middle-class discourse constituted a fairly stable identity in

India in the year 2008, there were some discernible contestations in that social 112

structure. While the new middle-class driven by a sense of making the future better and hard work in the present was celebratory, the contestation of that celebratory nature was recovered through the popular texts through my DA. This contestatory DA celebrated accomplishments of the middle-class in the past under the state-led, socialist system. This state-led, socialist system was rooted in the old, Gandhian, Nehruvian system.51 Shweta, who was raising her daughter alone as a single mom reminisced the days when her parents could visit her in the school as well as go to the office, “I would really like to work in the public sector, one did not worry about being fired for small delays in reaching the office in the morning or stepping out early if your kids got home early. But company bosses these days act as gods and think they can fire you any day if you were late.”52

Noteworthy here is that by highlighting that “Bosses these days act like gods …” Shweta vented out loud her frustrations of dealing with managers fixated on efficiency and dedication to the work irrespective of the personal pressures and the anxieties of the employees. By cynically venting her frustration that these bosses observed rules about work habits and demanded strict accountability for the output, she would rather return to the old state-led, public sector work environment. By drawing a contrast between her own experiences of working in a contemporary private company with that of her parents, where there was little or no accountability, she expressed her longing to return to the days of the old middle-class. It was in those days of state enterprises that managers did not mind how many hours did the employees work, or how much the output was.

51 Roy 2006: 200-232); Fernandes (2006). 52 Bhaskar (December 6, 2008). 113

Furthermore, Shweta‟s wishing to returning to the days of state-led enterprises was also driven by the impression that she would have exercised far greater control over her life under the earlier work environment than the contemporary economy: “But company bosses these days act as gods and think they can fire you any day …” meant that there was no questioning of the merits of the decisions of the management. By not taking into account her circumstances for coming in late or being absent from the job, this management in Shweta‟s view then turns ironically into something totally opposite of the god: people without any feelings and emotions. Significantly, Shweta like millions of middle- class members in the contemporary time expressed her intense longing for the return to the old and socialist ways of lifestyle.53 Using her ordinary language, she captured not only the pressures of living in the contemporary liberalized economic circumstances, but also expressed a deep yearning to return to the old ways of state-led development.

As if the political elites shared anxieties and frustrations of Shveta to adjust to the contemporary middle-class conditions, the Communist Party of India

(Marxist) lamented, “neoliberal policies have resulted in distorted economic growth,” which meant that they did not benefit weak and poor and instead created opportunities for those who were already powerful or rich.54 The distortion arose because those neoliberal policies gave tremendous power to the private sector to demand accountability and efficiency from their employees. It was precisely this

53 For a good analysis of the privileges the old middle class enjoyed until the onset of the liberalization in the mid-1980s, see Fernandes (2006: 19-22). 54 See the Communist Party of India (Marxist) election manifesto here: http://www.indian-elections.com/partymanifestoes/cpim.html (accessed October 30, 2010). 114

strict enforcement of such accountability of output and work efficiency that made

Shveta as a middle-class single mom cynically call her managers as “gods” in making hiring and firing decisions. Unlike her parents who could take liberty with their work in adhering to company rules as part of the public sector, this woman considered that she was being deprived off the flexibility to run her life in the contemporary private sector. Therefore, according to the Communist Party

(Marxist), the growth of the country was misguided because it did not take into account human and social costs of the economic growth. As if rights of the people employed in the contemporary private enterprises needed to be restored, the party promised to undertake “aggressive expansion of public sector units …”55

Significantly, partaking in this old and disillusioned middle-class discourse, elites from other political parties also expressed their determination to make the lives of the ordinary middle-class employees better by restoring the credibility of the public sector in the year 2008. For example, the leader of the

Congress Party Sonya Gandhi said, “public sector institutions have given our economy the stability and resilience we are now witnessing …” meaning that a secure supply of employment through public sector in earlier days generated stability for vast number of masses of the Indian middle-class.56 This stability was particularly significant because it was this segment of the society (informed and educated) that helped build up vast scientific and industrial sectors. This early

55 Ibid. 56 For this address by Sonya Gandhi, see, “Indira 1968 Saved India 2008, Sonia Outlefts Left (Indian Express, November 22, 2008): http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indira-1968-saved-india-2008-sonia-outlefts/389214/ (accessed October 30, 2010). 115

industrialization enabled India to produce goods en masse to meet the basic needs of the masses. More importantly, the public sector created the conditions suitable to raise families, educate children, and produce young and new generations of technical and managerial people who ran private enterprises in the contemporary period. Participating discursively in the experiences of Shveta that she could be fired for being late or taking a day off for her family, Sonya Gandhi counseled the private sector that the rules should be “sensitive” and not “heavy-handed.”57

Just as Shveta wished to return to the work habits under the state-led socialist enterprises, so did Kalpana harbor strong yearning for buying some of the objects of the old middle-class that served as symbols of its lifestyle. As if

Shveta and Kalpana sat together to work out their yearning to return to the ways of the old middle-class under the state patronage until the early 1990s, they shared similar views about that past. Kalpana, the main female protagonist of the film

Gajini (2008), yearned to reconstitute her father‟s middle-class identity by purchasing cars he owned before start of the economic liberalization. “My father had three Ambassador cars but he lost them all. I want to buy Ambassadors that my father had,” articulates Kalpana (Gajini 2008).58 By asserting “I want to buy

Ambassadors that my father had,” Kalpana evinced two contradictory feelings.

First, she expressed her longing for the days when Ambassador was a symbol of the middle-class. Before liberalization, owning this car was considered

57 Ibid. 58 Note that the Ambassador car symbolized state authority because all government cars belonged to that brand until the start of the process of liberalization in the mid-1980s. For a good description of the officialdom associated with the white Ambassador cars in India, see James Traub, “Keeping up with the Shidhayes: India’s New Middle Class,” New York Times Magazine (April 15, 2001). 116

a major constituent of the middle-class identity. By using her ordinary language,

“My father had three Ambassador cars …” Kalpana expressed the intense pride the middle-class attached to this car. It was considered a major symbol of the middle-class identity in those days. The extent of her sense of loss of this symbol became loud and clear when Kalpana continued, “… but he lost them all,” and this sense of loss is particularly heightened by her use of “but” as a contrasting conjunction. This use of ordinary language to express her sadness and the attempt to reconnect with the time when her father possessed those cars demonstrated the deep and enduring sense of attachment Kalpana and her family had for that symbol of the middle-class. Noteworthy is that now Kalpana lived in a megacity of India with ambitions of doing extremely well in the film industry, but still wanted to recreate her parents‟ identity by owning an Ambassador car.

Significantly, her fiancée drove one of the most expensive cars in the contemporary times, yet she wanted to return to the old model of cars. This conflict over her past and present identities generated tremendous ambiguities in her life.

Second, Kalpana only an upstart in the film industry, wanted to relive the dream of her parents of owning cars even when she was barely an adult. She was only 22 but nearly fulfilled her parent‟s long-cherished dream of re-owning a car.

This dream came to fruition when she actually bought the car of her parents‟ dreams. This contrast between her young age and the ability to buy a car meant that she was conflicted by holding those two images. One image belonged to her as a struggling but self-confident young woman to be a successful member of the

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middle-class as soon as possible in the contemporary liberalizing period. The other image belonged to her trying to own and do things that her parents did in the past. Significant here is that by using the phrase “My father ….” to signify a time different from her own, Kalpana successfully managed to draw a distinction between the times she was living in and her past that belonged to her father. Even more remarkable here is that she successfully helped focus our attention on the differences in the material accoutrements of the two times (e.g., the old middle- class possessed Ambassadors and the new middle-class drove flashy foreign cars) that constituted important aspects in those two different times.59

With this conflicted identity like the millions of other middle-class members, Kalpana shaped thoughts and actions of many decision makers in the government. The former Foreign Minister Natvar Singh as an archetypical model of the Nehruvian modernity argued, “Our faith in being the architects of new and modern civilization is falling apart. We no longer have faith in building a strong and viable society that works with a careful plan. We have fallen prey to crass materialism.”60 In asserting that India had a role in building a modern civilization,

MR. Natvar Singh was invoking one of the constitutive features of the Nehruvian conception of modernity. This conception of modernity was firmly rooted in building large and robust industrial complexes that served as cornerstones of modern state.

59 For an excellent analysis of the differences between the lifestyles of old and new middle classes, see Mazzarella (2003: Chap 3). 60 See Saubhik Chakrabarti, “Natvar is one of Us,” Indian Express (August 14, 2006): http://www.indianexpress.com/news/natwar-is-one-of-us/10522/0 (accessed October 31, 2010). 118

In this modernity founded on large industrial complexes, there was a large role for the educated and technically trained middle-class. This middle-class, working under the guiding hand of the state, lived with modest and moderate lifestyle. By invoking this concept of the Nehruvian modernity, MR. Natvar Singh locked his thinking into the time when Kalpana‟s father possessed only modest

Ambassador cars as opposed to new and flashy foreign ones of today. Moreover, in asserting, “We no longer have faith in building a strong and viable society that works with a careful plan,” like some of the other decision makers, the former minister was expressing his dismay that there was no carefully planned system that might guide people to the construction of a strong state. According to his thinking, if we followed a carefully planned system, we would not have these flashy foreign cars and other associated objects of crass materialism. Clearly, a lack of a plan is leading this new middle-class, to which Kalpana and her cohorts belonged, fall prey to this lifestyle. As a result, and contrary to the new middle- class, India was losing its dominant self-understanding as an architect of a new and modern civilization. This contestation in the content of the contemporary middle-class discourse is captured succinctly by Fernandes (2006: xv):

While in the early years of independence, large dams and mass-based factories were the national symbols of progress and development, cell phones washing machines, and color televisions—goods that were not available easily during earlier decades of state-controlled markets—now seem to serve as the symbols of the liberalizing Indian nation. While earlier state socialist ideologies tended to depict workers or rural villagers as the archetypical objects of development, such ideologies now compete with mainstream political discourses that increasingly portray middle-class as the representative citizens of the liberalizing India.

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Thus, it follows from this section that there were identifiable and clear patterns of disillusioned middle-class discursive identity shaping thoughts and decisions of the political elites in the year 2008. This pattern of middle-class identity shaping preferences of political elites was evident in the foreign policy pursuits of India in that year as well. The hypothesis that follows from this contestatory middle-class is: the greater the influence of the disillusioned middle- class identity on the foreign policy making elites of India, the greater the probability that India will have adversarial relations with the US.

Conclusions

To recapitulate, in this chapter, I analyzed select popular texts widely distributed in India in the year 2008. My recovery of the discourse analysis from those texts generated middle-class as the dominant identity discourse. Within this discourse, my analysis revealed three clusters of middle-class discursive categories. The first identity cluster dealt with the discourse of improving the future. The influence this cluster exerts on India‟s political elites is to concentrate on the future with overambitious and overzealous policy preferences. Thus, the implications for my India-U.S. strategic partnership project is to expect a strong preference to form close relationship with the United States without regard to whether India could sustain such a partnership. This connection between domestic discourse and the foreign policy outcome operates in the following manner. 120

Specifically, this discursive content was driven by aspirations and ambitions to move forward and to make the future better than the present, without considerations whether it was feasible, practical, or desirable for the country. The greater the influence of this middle-class content on the domestic politics of India, the greater the probability that India would pursue the logic of this sense of making the future better in its relations with the United States.

The second cluster of middle-class identity recovered in my DA related to the pragmatic feature of this social segment. Specifically, it related with hard work and reaping its rewards in the present. It suggests that this segment of India possessed skills and talents to contribute to develop the nation as well as to succeed at the individual level. This discursive identity shaped elite preferences by generating a pragmatic perspective toward India‟s relations with the US. The

DA also highlighted that this segment of the middle-class identity would vastly benefit from stronger relations with the US. This is because improved and better relationship with the US would provide many educational and economic opportunities to this social group. Therefore, one can hypothesize that the middle- class discursive identity influenced the one of the most prominent issues of foreign policy of India in the year 2008, the civil nuclear agreement with the

United States. Specifically, the greater the impact of the domestic discursive middle-class identity about its hard work and reaping rewards, the greater ambiguity and uncertainty in that bilateral relationship.

The third cluster of identity recovered through my DA constituted many of the components of the old, Nehruvian middle-class, dominant until the mid-

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1980s. This pattern of the middle-class identity shaping preferences of political elites was evident in the domestic policy statements of those elites in that year.

The hypothesis that follows from this contestatory middle-class is as follows: the greater the influence of the old middle-class thinking on the foreign policy of

India, the greater the probability that India will revert to old and adversarial relations with the US. Specifically, the greater the influence of the middle-class identity on the civil nuclear agreement with the US, the lower the probability of that agreement coming through.

After drawing hypotheses from the domestic identities in this chapter, I will now turn to the analysis of the foreign policy strategy (dependent variable) in the following chapter. More specifically, that chapter will assess the ways in which this domestic identity shaped foreign policy of India with regard to the civil nuclear agreement between India and the United States in the year 2008. The subsequent chapters will employ the discursive identity recovered in this present chapter to assess its influence on the India-US relations on the issues of climate change and trade.

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Chapter 5: The India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement: the Impact of Shifting

Middle-Class Discourses

“The future belongs to those who produce atomic energy that is going to be chief national power of the future” —Jawaharlal Nehru (quoted in Karnad 2008: 40)

Introduction

In this chapter, I use a domestic framework of social cognitive identity and my sequential, multimethod research design to answer a substantive puzzle: how and why India‟s civil cooperation with the United States in the nuclear field became possible when such cooperation was unthinkable until only a few years ago. Settling for civil nuclear cooperation in place of a full military cooperation indeed marked the most concrete manifestation of the changing orientation of

India‟s contemporary foreign policy. In positing identity as a cause of the civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States, I am arguing that social cognitive identities inside states make one set of foreign policy outcomes more likely than others, hence leading to differentiated outcomes in state relations.1

In my framework, I conceptualize state decisions and actions in terms of processes of domestic identity formation that generate particular foreign policy outcomes. My claim is twofold. First, the dominant discourse of identity shapes foreign policy by predisposing decision-making elites to favor one cooperative or

1 For similar arguments, see Abdelal (2005); Hopf (2002; 2009); Katzenstein (2006). 123

conflictual outcome over others. Second, the individual cognitive capacity of citizens to comprehend the dominant discourses defines the level of agreement or disagreement within the discourses that limit the actions and decisions of elites concerning foreign policy cooperative, accommodative, or conflictual outcomes.

In other words, the middle-class social cognitive identity is the independent variable, elite decision making is the intervening variable, and the foreign policy options is the dependent variable of the research.

Using the sequential, multimethod design, I first conducted discourse analysis of select texts, which generated themes and clusters that converged consistently around certain ideas, thoughts, and practices. These social and individual themes converged on the value of being hard-working in the present, improving the future, and disillusionment and yearning to return to the past.2

These traits relate most directly to the middle class of India. The pervasiveness of this middle-class discourse is not surprising, because the role of the middle class in India has received tremendous political and scholarly attention for its domestic economic and political consequences. The economic consequences of the increase in the number of the middle class relate to the growth of a selfish and excessive consumerist culture. Whereas some argue that the middle class, at the expense of others, benefited the most from economic liberalization during the past two

2 One pertinent question arises concerning how we know whether these elements actually belong to India’s middle class. Although other studies also point to some of the similar elements of the middle class, my multimethod inductive approach pointed to substantively different meanings of those constituent elements of this segment. Whereas existing studies associated these elements with consumerism, my research found strong associations of these elements with belief in a better future, hard work in the present, and a yearning to return to the past. For good reviews of the similar constituents of the middle class in the Indian context in other works, see Fernandes (2006); Mazzarala (2003). 124

decades,3 others blame this economic success for the growth of an excessive and ostentatious consumerist culture in India.4 Similarly, the deleterious political consequences of the rise of the Indian middle class in the recent past become manifest in the growing indifference and apathy of this social segment with regard to participation in the electoral processes.5

From my perspective, however, Leela Fernandes6 comes closer to the truth when she argues that the middle class makes conscious efforts to enter into the neoliberal economic system, and works hard to move up the social ladder. In this research, I build on the findings of Fernandes and claim that the middle-class social cognitive identity constitutes a significantly productive segment of Indian society. My sequential, multimethod approach highlighted two specific features that are largely unobservable in the existing research on the middle-class identity:

(1) The meaning of the middle-class identity is not associated with just being a member of the consumerist class but also with being a productive member of the society, and (2) the middle-class identity is not indifferent to political processes but shapes policy agenda through discursive processes. These findings have profound implications for the middle-class role in shaping India‟s domestic political as well as foreign policy options.

3 See Lefebvre (2008: 88-106); Upadhyay (2008: 56-87). 4 Verma (1998; 2002). 5 Jaffrelot argues that India’s middle class does not participate in the electoral processes for a variety of reasons that includes inconveniences of voting, widespread voter fraud, corruption, opportunistic political alliances, and the simple choice of remaining aloof from the process. See Jefferlot (2007: 77-99; 2008: 40-44). 6 Fernandes (2004; 2006). Also see Singh (2008). 125

The Indian middle-class identity shapes foreign policy elites‟ decision- making environment, which, in turn, generates specific foreign-policy outcomes.

My empirical findings show that there emerged three discursive clusters of middle-class identity within India, each of which had different content and divergent time horizons for their roles and status, which shaped elite preferences about nuclear agreement with the United States. At the time of formulating this nuclear agreement in 2008, India faced three options: full military nuclear cooperation, civil nuclear cooperation, and no nuclear cooperation. These three options mapped fairly closely onto the three discursive identity clusters of middle class in terms of providing the content for the foreign policy elite preferences.

This environment predisposed elites toward one set of policy options over others in regard to the nuclear issue. The differences in the content and time horizons of each identity cluster generated contestation in the middle-class identity, which shaped the final outcome of the India-US nuclear agreement. Rejecting the options of full military nuclear cooperation and no nuclear cooperation, India and the United States accepted the final agreement in the form of civil nuclear cooperation.

I. Importance of the Nuclear Agreement in the

India-U.S. Strategic Partnership

The India-U.S. nuclear agreement of 2008 allowed India to access nuclear technology and fuel from the United States and other suppliers in return for the

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separation of its military and civil nuclear facilities. Specifically, this agreement made two significant changes in the United States‟ long-standing opposition to

India‟s status as a non-signatory state to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

First, without according India formal status of a nuclear state, the United States agreed to confer the former benefits of being a nuclear state. The argument was that India had been a responsible state with a large network of nuclear complexes and it should, therefore, be able to acquire advantages and benefits like other nuclear states.7

Toward this end, the United States promised to remove restrictions on transfer of nuclear technology and fuel to India. Second, the United States also promised to work with friends and allies in the institutions of the non-proliferation regime to secure status of a “nuclear state” to India without signing the Non-

Proliferation Treaty.8 The substantive implication of this international move was to remove sanctions against India under the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG)9 and others so that India could buy nuclear-related technology on the international market. In return, India undertook to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and put civilian components under international supervision.10 India further agreed to observe a moratorium on nuclear testing, which limited its ability to undertake important tests for refining its nuclear-

7 Mistry (2006: 683). 8 Mistry (2006: 683); Raja Mohan (2009: 43-44). 9 The Non-Suppliers Group (NSG) is an informal group of nearly 45 states that adhere to common guidelines restricting the export of nuclear technologies, material, and fuel to other countries. One of these better known guidelines restricts transfers of civilian nuclear technology to nonsignatory states of the nonproliferation treaty, including India. 10 Fair (2009: 148-151); Mistry (2006: 683) 127

weapon technology. Finally, India agreed to adhere to international guidelines designed to control the export of nuclear and missile technology.11 To sum up, this India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement marked a radical shift in the bilateral cooperation of the two states, as well as opened opportunities for engagement in other international institutions.

Significant here is that policy makers and scholars readily agree that this progress over the nuclear issue formed a foundation for any “strategic partnership” or “natural alliance”12 between India and the United States.

Recognizing the nuclear issue as the main bone of contention between the two countries, both President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement on July 18, 2005 in which they made removal of this impediment from the bilateral relations as one of their foreign policy priorities.

The joint statement said, “as a responsible state with advance nuclear technology,

India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states.”13 President

Bush reinforced this statement by declaring his intention of a “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation”14 with India. This agreement was finalized by the 110th

Congress in 2008 (P.L. 110-369) and concluded with President Bush‟s signature in October of 2008.

Similar to policy makers, scholars agree that the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation marked a thaw in frozen bilateral relations, which had the potential of

11 See the Congressional Research Service LR33072, written by Kronstadt (2005: 1-2). 12 For early discussion of these terms in the context of the India-U.S. relations, see Blank (2005). A treatment of these concepts from a practitioner’s perspective, see Wickery (2011: chaps 2-4). 13 See the Congressional Research Service LR33072, written by Kronstadt (2005: 2). 14 See CRS report LR33072, written by Kronstadt (2005: 1). 128

becoming one of the most significant partnerships in international relations of the early twenty-first century. The arguments in favor of the nuclear agreement between India and the United States included the neorealist balance-of-power considerations of containing the growing Chinese power15 and elite self- interests.16 Some proponents of the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation argued that the sources of India‟s interests in pursuing a nuclear agreement were the elite rational self-interests instead of their domestic social-cognitive identities.17 Competition in elite preferences generate foreign policy shifts, spurring struggles from which victorious elites affect the fundamental changes in core foreign policy issues.

India‟s pursuit of nuclear agreement with the U.S. became possible only when political leaders (e.g., Jasvant Singh, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Manmohan

Singh) pushed the agreement forward.18 Contrary to the rational choice approach,

I claim that domestic identities generate foreign policy shifts, spurring struggles from which victorious elites effect the fundamental changes in core foreign policy issues. India had pursued nuclear capability for nearly forty years as a core foreign policy goal, but my empirical findings demonstrate that the civil nature of that cooperation with the United States was shaped in 2008 fundamentally by the domestic social cognitive identities.

15 Ganguly (2008); Paul (2008); Raja Mohan (2009: 43-55); Rice (2000). 16 Perkovich (1999); Mistry (2006). 17 For an excellent overview of elite self-interests driving state foreign and security policies, see Firon (1997: 68-90); Snyder (1991). 18 For good analysis of the elite-driven view of the India’s nuclear policy, see Perkovich (1999); Mistry (2006). 129

Another set of scholars that supported the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation subscribed to neorealist theory.19 In neorealism, external, systemic distribution of capabilities determine state policies. These systemic pressures constrain states to change their existing position through balancing.20 To apply this logic to the

India-U.S. nuclear agreement, the United States wanted to preserve its dominance in the system by strengthening India‟s nuclear capability as a bulwark to balance against China.21 Therefore, India found the United States as a ready partner to cooperate in improving its nuclear capability, which the United States until 2008 had worked assiduously to restrain and reverse through bilateral and multilateral pressures.22 Contrary to the neorealist theory, one major contribution of my research is to demonstrate the central role of India‟s middle-class in enabling

Indian elites to pursue a nuclear agreement with the United States. This middle- class generated a domestic environment in which the pursuit of a nuclear agreement with the United States became possible and intelligible. In particular, it became possible to reject India‟s traditional insistence upon a full military nuclear or no nuclear cooperation with the United States and, instead, accept a civil nuclear cooperation. My empirical findings demonstrate that this agreement was possible because of middle-class pressure to achieve not military power, but a

19 For an original statement of this theory, see Waltz (1979; 1993; 1997; 2002). For an offensive variant of this theory, see Mearsheimer (1994/95; 2002). 20 Waltz (1979: 126; 1993); Layne (1993). 21 Raja Mohan (2004; 2008); Ganguly (2008). 22 For an opposing neorealist view that India’s nuclear capability was relatively low and its nuclear armament would make little difference to the existing distribution of capabilities in the international system, see Haggerty (2009: 23-41). 130

comprehensive measure of power through the India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation.

Given that both scholars and policy makers agree on the significance of the India-U.S. nuclear agreement, regardless of whether they were in favor or against this agreement, then the real question is what made this shift possible? In this chapter, I demonstrate that there was a shift in the domestic-level social- cognitive identities of the Indian masses that made it possible for the political elites to overcome decades-long distrust of American policies. This shift in identities enabled elites to accept a nuclear agreement with the United States. The main claim I advance here is that the domestic middle-class identity discourse, focusing on achieving country‟s development through the conclusion of a civil nuclear agreement including the associated technology, enabled the Indian political elites to sign the nuclear agreement with the United States. As a result of this pressure, the Indian elites dropped their traditional insistence on a full nuclear military cooperation or no nuclear cooperation, and instead, accepted a civil nuclear agreement with the United States in 2008.

II. Pragmatic Middle Class and the Civil Nuclear Agreement

In 2008, Indian foreign policy elites spent tremendous time and energy debating a common theme that marked their country‟s most radical foreign policy shift: the conclusion of the India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement. To

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these elites, this bilateral cooperation represented an opportunity to secure a comprehensive measure of power. For this reason, despite the options of full military nuclear cooperation23 and no nuclear cooperation,24 the final agreement between India and the United States separated the military and civil aspects, with the civil component constituting a much larger part.25 My empirical findings demonstrate that the final content and nature of this civil nuclear cooperation was shaped by the Indian domestic middle-class identity discourse of hard work.

Specifically, this identity discourse constituted the elite decision-making environment in which the traits of initiative taking, achievement orientation, and technological proficiency26 predisposed foreign policy elites to reject other options and, instead, opt for a civil nuclear cooperation.27

Table 5.1: Hardworking Middle-Class Discursive Components

Identities Constituent components Hardworking Initiative-driven, achievement oriented, and technically proficient.

23 See the section on the constitutive influence of the overambitious middle-class identity discourse later in this paper. 24 See the section on the constitutive impact of the disillusioned middle-class discourse later in this paper. 25 Tellis (2005); Mistry (2006: 677-680). 26 See Table 1 for specific components of the middle-class identity. Note also that I label this middle-class discourse as “pragmatic” largely because of these three constituent traits. For similar labeling of this class in India, see Fernandes (2006). For similar use of middle-class identity content in Brazil, see O’Dougherty (2002: chap 3). 27 Note that this civil nuclear cooperation is particularly significant when we keep in mind that India defied and remained nearly forty years outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an international regime created and maintained under the leadership of the United States. For the official statement on the discriminatory nature of the NPT from India’s perspective, see former Foreign Minister Singh’s writings (1998; 2007). 132

In choosing from different options, Indian elites‟ preferences for a nuclear agreement with the United States converged mainly on securing a comprehensive measure of power by signing a civil nuclear agreement. This comprehensive power stood for securing country‟s development through the use of its talent and technologies. Use of such talent and technologies constituted a dominant middle- class discourse. This discourse centered around themes of hard work, which generated a pragmatic attitude toward country‟s strategic partnership with the

United States. This discourse enabled some and constrained other elite preferences.

The social-cognitive middle-class discourse about initiative-seizing trait significantly conditioned India‟s political elite decisions. As Millekend (1998) persuasively argued that the categories of discourse generate categories of policies, Indian political elites repeatedly return to country‟s middle-class initiative-seizing trait to describe and explain their civil nuclear policy. Referring to this middle-class trait in justifying his stance on the nuclear agreement, Prime

Minister Singh opined, “I venture to think our atomic industry will play a similar role in the transformation of India‟s economy,”28 as had the software industry in the past. As the Indian software engineers took the initiative for setting up new ventures and persisted in securing successes even in the face of many obstacles,

Prime Minister Singh strongly believed that similar middle-class traits of initiative

28 See the speech of the Prime Minister delivered during the “no-confidence” proceedings in the national parliament on the issue of nuclear agreement with the United States, http://www.congress.org.in/new/home-layout.php?id=58 (accessed September 11, 2010). 133

taking would turn India‟s atomic sector into yet another transformative industry.29

In this view, India could harness potential of the atomic industry to bring positive change for the good of the nation, which would emerge only when people with the quality of initiative could come forward. The Prime Minister further argued that, when the idea of software industry was first put forward in the early 1980s, many people scoffed at it: “Today, information technology and software is a sunrise industry. . . . I have no doubt in my mind that the people of India have that confidence”30 to produce similar success with the atomic industry.

This elite conception of the middle-class role originated from this class‟s self-understanding as the most initiative-seizing group and thus the country‟s most productive segment. In particular, popular discourses about the ability to produce the world‟s smallest car,31 efficient air conditioners,32 low-cost, life- saving medical drugs,33 and other popularly used goods constituted components of this identity. This discourse brought the traits of Indian middle-class into popular consciousness as never before. This discourse also centered around the invention of much of the high-value, high-tech gadgetry that, historically, remained a preserve of rich and developed countries. The discourse focused on the stories of India‟s middle-class engineers who successfully invented and

29 Meredith (2007: chaps 2, 4); Nilekani (2009: 25-30, 95-101). 30 See Prime Minister Singh’s speech delivered at the national parliament while debating in favor of the nuclear agreement here: http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content4print.asp?id=592 (accessed March 19, 2010). 31 The Times of India (January 11, 2008). 32 The Times of India (January 11, 2008); The Dainik Bhaskar (February 15, 2008). 33 The Times of India (January 26; April 6, 2008). 134

operated sophisticated technology, such as nuclear plants on earth, as well as to be the first to discover water on the moon.34

As crosstabulation in table 2 demonstrates below, this pragmatic middle- class‟s self-confidence shaped mass perceptions of country‟s growth potential.

These discourses defined the content and contestations in ordinary individual‟s attitudes and beliefs. I captured these individual attitudes and beliefs through a large-n survey, using the themes recovered from the discourse analysis.35 In response to the survey item in Table 2, a respondent plurality of 65.9%, 530 of

804, self-identified as belonging to the middle-class. Of this 530 population, 324

(40.5% of the total 804) agreed that India offered conducive conditions for achieving success. This middle-class discourse was so deeply entrenched in the society that 152 (18.9%) of the total 804 respondents expressed strong agreement with the proposition. However, the survey also clearly demonstrates that not all

Indian citizens were influenced by this discourse. A sizable minority 173 (little over 21.5%) did not want to belong to that social group. From my perspective, what is important about this minority is that 111 out of 173 respondents (a little under 19% of the total 804) still believed that India possessed conditions suitable for middle-class hard work. Such a high level of popular understanding of this

34 Aaj Tak (November 14, 2008). 35 Note that it is here my sequential, multimethod approach comes into practice that first conducts discourse analysis and then employs those discursive categories to design a large-n survey. The items of this survey were created using themes recovered from the discourse analysis of the select popular texts of India. I designed this survey and hired a polling agency (TNS India) to field it in the two Indian cities of Delhi and Mumbai with a sample size of 804 respondents. For full discussion of the design and administration of this survey based on the themes of discourse analysis, see other parts on methodology of this larger research. 135

social group confirms the extent to which this middle-class discourse widely prevailed in India.

Table 5.2: India’s Pragmatic Middle-Class Traits

Q1. Q5.Agree or disagree with the statement: Total “One hears different stories “India provides conditions in which people can realistically about being part of the aspire for success.” middle class these days in Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly India. In this regard, which disagree agree of the following statements describes you the best?” I am among those 0 5 28 8 41 who want to become a part of the middle class I consider myself a 4 50 324 152 530 part of the middle class I do not want to be 2 27 111 33 173 a part of the middle class No opinion 0 18 24 16 58 Total 6 100 487 209 802

This widespread discourse of the initiative-driven traits of the middle-class generated a shift in elite consensus from no nuclear cooperation with the United

States to the positive merits of a civil nuclear agreement between the United

States and India, a consensus that cut across party lines. Making such positive links between the middle-class initiative-taking traits of attaining high standards in dealing with the modern technology and the civil nuclear agreement, the former

Foreign Minister in the BJP government, Jasvant Singh, argued that the civil nuclear agreement along with its technology-transfer clauses, “demonstrate the

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scientific and technological competence”36 of India. Signing the civil nuclear agreement would recognize Indian people‟s high level of technological and scientific talents at international level. Such international recognition would then open opportunities to use initiative-taking traits of Indians to benefit from the technology-transfer clause of the U.S.-India agreement. Similar to Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh‟s claim in the national parliament, Jasvant Singh also predicted that the initiative-taking traits of the middle class would turn India into a serious competitor in the field of civil nuclear technology. To enter this nuclear technology market, India needed a civil nuclear agreement with the United States, a country which had been a leading opponent of India‟s entry into the nuclear regime for nearly forty years.

Significantly, under the influence of the pragmatic middle-class, the terms of engagement with the United States shifted from the autonomy and responsibility of India as a mature state deserving a full-fledged military nuclear cooperation37 or the rejection of cooperation altogether38 to a totally different cooperation unimaginable in the past: signing a civil nuclear agreement with the

United States. As Table 2 demonstrated above, this shift from the past to the present in 2008 occurred mainly because of the pervasive middle-class discourse about its own self-confidence in benefiting the country. Specifically, the middle- class was highly confident in its own ability to take advantage of new

36 See Jasvant Singh’s personal memoirs Call to Honor (2007: 99). 37 See the section on the influence of overambitious middle-class discourse on nuclear cooperation later in this paper. 38 See the section on the disillusioned middle class concerning the nuclear cooperation later in this paper. 137

opportunities arising from a civil nuclear agreement with the United States. Of those who self-identified themselves as middle-class, 19% strongly agreed and

69% agreed with the statement that the India-U.S. nuclear agreement benefited the middle-class segment of the country. If we add up the two percentages (19% plus 69%), we find an overwhelming majority (88%) accepting the benefits of the

India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement.

In 2008, India‟s foreign policy-making elite across party lines argued that the civilian uses of nuclear technology were more important than the military ones.39 In these elite views, the middle-class self-understanding of its achievement-oriented and technologically proficient traits opened the opportunities to strengthen all the aspects of state power through the pursuit of the civil nuclear agreement. This discourse underlaid the speech of the former Deputy

Prime Minister L. K. Advani: “To be strong secure, India should look beyond military power, and should strengthen all the ingredients of state power.”40

Strengthening all the elements of state power -- according to Advani -- meant two things. First, similar to other elites, Advani began to view power in far more comprehensive terms than the somewhat narrow and restrictive sense with which the BJP had generally been associated in the past. The BJP‟s traditional view of

India‟s power had been to prepare the nation for military victories through military preparedness.41 In shifting his focus from an exclusively military- centered to a comprehensive understanding of power, Advani reflected the

39 Karnad (2008: 47); Tellis (2008: 130-138). 40 See Advani’s personal memoir My Country My Life (2008: 611). 41 Cohen (2000: 44); Dasa (2008). 138

socializing influence of the middle class on his thinking, namely, that the power did not only lie in preparing for military strength, but resided also in its civilian uses. Similarly, other political elites began to view the U.S.-India civil cooperation as a means of country‟s development. These benefits centered on two aspects of the cooperation. First, India‟s elites repeatedly referred to the opportunities the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation would open for scientific and engineering population of the country. In this statement of Advani to consider

“other aspects of power,” other than military power, assumed tremendous significance. Similarly, the Prime Minister Singh explicitly, time and again, highlighted that this nuclear cooperation formed merely a springboard to inspire self-confidence among Indian people about their abilities to achieve things unimaginable in the past.42 Unimaginable in the past for India had been to form a cooperative relationship with the United States based on the use of country‟s scientific abilities.

Second, and more important, was the tentative but steady opening up of

India‟s nuclear industry to private operators. As a definite departure from the previous practice, The government decided to open the nuclear-related industry to the private sector. In the past, this industry had been the exclusive domain of the public sector43 and was subject to extreme secrecy.44 Such opening of the nuclear sector to private industry becomes understandable only when this unprecedented

42 See Prime Minister’s speech here: http://www.congress.org.in/new/home-layout.php?id=58 (accessed September 11, 2010). 43 Mistry (2006: 677-79); Perkovich (1999: 394-7). 44 For excellent analyses of the extreme secrecy practiced by the Indian state about the nuclear program since its independence, see Abraham (1998: 5, 13); Chacko (2010: 206-7); Frey (2009: 197-99); Perkovich 1999: 356-64). 139

government move is interpreted in light of the middle-class discursive influence on political elites. First, as Prime Minister Singh projected the U.S.-India nuclear agreement as an instrument of development, the government drew up explicit plans to involve the private sector in nuclear and defense production. One significant move spurred by the growing recognition of middle-class engineers and professionals was the active attempt of the government to involve the private sector in defense-related nuclear equipment production. Toward realizing these goals, the government established a committee to recommend procedures for identifying and selecting corporations for defense production in the private sector.

The preamble of the committee stated:

In order to entail an effective participation of the private sector in the defense production, the Committee has recommended . . . that tier I industries may be identified and their involvement could then be systematically encouraged to contribute in defense production and to assume role of system integrators of large weapon systems and producers of platforms required by the defense forces.45

As a result of this committee report, a large number of high-tech nuclear subfields, which in the past had been reserved strictly for the Department of

Atomic Energy and its related subsidiaries, were opened to the domestic private industry. Several Indian private companies stepped forward to take advantage of such technology-intensive opportunities. For example, Reliance Power, GVK

Power and Infrastructure, and GMR Power appeared most eager in this context.46

Following the conclusion of the US-India nuclear agreement, many of the private

45 See Report of the Committee for Identification/Selection of Raksha Udyog Ratnas (Defense Industry Champions) (2006), Ministry of Defense, Department of Defense Procurement, Government of India. 46 These are some of the private sector companies of India with tremendous expertise in building infrastructure. 140

and government-owned public sector companies also drew up plans to engage in the foreign collaboration. Specifically, Reliance Power along with the NCPIL and the BHEL47 said that they planned to invest US $50 billion over the next five years to expand their manufacturing in the nuclear energy sector. Similarly, in

August of 2010, Tata Consulting Engineering (a private company) signed a contract with GE Hitachi of the United States to explore opportunities to engage in the design of nuclear plants and to develop a work force for domestic and foreign markets. Furthermore, the Bharat Forge (a public sector company) signed a contract with the French company Areva to manufacture nuclear components for domestic and export markets in September 2009.48

These steps, first to relax rules for private sector entry into the defense industry and then to solicit its participation in the nuclear sector, marked dramatic departures from the long-established Indian government‟s practice of public sector dominance or foreign participation in the defense-related industry. Such departures were riding on the back of the pragmatic middle-class discourse of technological proficiency and achievement orientation. As a reflection of these socializing influences, there was a growing recognition among political elites that

India had a large and well-trained pool of engineering and professional manpower that could help the country achieve a comprehensive measure of power, emphatically stated by Advani or implicitly accepted by Prime Minister Singh.

47 The acronym NCIL stands for Nuclear Corporation of India Limited and is the nodal government agency for dealing with all issues related with the nuclear sector. The acronym BHEL stands for Bharat Heavy Electronics Limited and is one of the government-owned heavy-engineering companies of India. 48 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html (accessed May 12, 2011). 141

This recognition among elites led to further realization that securing such a

comprehensive measure of power could become possible not through a military

but a civil nuclear agreement with the United States.

As correlation of responses to a question item, whether India-US relations

should be determined by the cooperation over nuclear issues in table 3 shows, the

Indian middle-class overwhelmingly believed with 81% supporting the

proposition that the bilateral relations of the two states should be determined by

this issue. With only 9% rejecting the idea and 10% expressing no opinion, the

support of an overwhelming middle-class majority for a positive outcome of the

nuclear agreement became critical for India-U.S. bilateral relations.

Table 5.3: Correlations of Middle-Class Identification and Nuclear Preferences

Q1.One hears different stories about being part of the middle class these days in India. In this regard, which of the following statements describes you the best? (High values = middle class self- identifiers) Q21.Do you think India-US relations Pearson Correlation should be determined by .245(***) cooperation over nuclear issues? Sig. (2-tailed) .000

N 801

Q22.How strongly do you feel about Pearson Correlation .246(***) this issue of nuclear power? Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 803 *** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed).

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As a consequence, the final nuclear agreement signed between the United States and India separated military and civil aspects, and it is this civil aspect that formed a much larger component of India‟s nuclear program.49 As table 4 below demonstrates, in 2008, India had twenty-two operating or nearly completed nuclear facilities, of which fourteen were designated as civil or safeguarded under the U.S.-India agreement. This nuclear agreement was completed on October 21,

2008, when the two chambers of the U.S. Congress passed and President Bush signed the agreement into law.

Table 5.4: India’s Civil Nuclear Plants

Reactor Commercial operation Year of Safeguard Status Tarapur 1 and 2 1969 2008 Rajasthan 1 and 2 1973, 1981 2008 Kudankulam 1 and 2 12/2010, Mid 2011 2008 Rajasthan 3 and 4 1999-2000 2010 Rajasthan 5 and 6 Feb & April 2010 2009 Kakrapar 1 and 2 1993-95 2012 Narora 1 and 2 1991-92 2014

To conclude, this section highlighted the ways in which the middle-class discourse of hard work shaped the decisions of Indian political elites to sign the

India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation. This agreement, based on the separation of the military and civil aspects, opened opportunities for the use of middle-class inventive and productive capacities, thereby benefiting the country. Thus,

49 Mistry (2006: 677-680); Tellis (2005). 143

developing the country required signing the civil agreement with the United

States and had to be pursued. Given this middle-class discursive environment,

Indian foreign policy elites jettisoned the other two preferences, and instead, accepted separation of the military and civil aspects of the nuclear agreement in

2008. In the following section, I address two other Indian middle-class discourses that shaped elite preferences, resulting in different outcomes from the nuclear cooperation with the United States.

III. Contestations in Middle-Class Discourses and the Nuclear Cooperation:

Overambitious and Disillusioned Middle-Class Discourses

In addition to the dominant hard-working discourse that shaped Indian foreign policy elite decisions concerning the India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation, two other discourses also influenced the elite environment: the disillusioned and the overambitious middle-class identities. For some segment of the political elites, the overambitious middle-class discourse served as a terrain upon which the

India-U.S. nuclear agreement stood as an unprecedented opportunity to secure full military nuclear cooperation with the United States. To those elites, this cooperation embodied a means to improve India‟s future, ambitions to move up the ladder of international hierarchy, and transition to proverbial adulthood in international relations to enhance country‟s autonomy.

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This understanding of the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation rendered some foreign policy options as non-viable and others as viable. The viable option focused on accepting only a full-fledged nuclear cooperation between the United

States and India, without considering the feasibility of securing such a military nuclear agreement. Pursuit of any outcome short of full-fledged military nuclear cooperation became nonviable option for these Indian elites, however difficult the attainment of this goal may have appeared to them.50 Such elite expectations from the nuclear agreement cut across a large number of political parties. For the political elites from those different parties, these expectations defined the India-

U.S. nuclear agreement as an opportunity to improve India‟s position in international politics.51

Table 5.5: Overambitious Middle-Class Discursive Components

Identities Constituent components Making Future Better High aspirations, acute sense of future, over-ambitious, maturing, and idealist.

50 The argument here is that India’s elite preferences for a full-fledged military nuclear cooperation with the United States were significantly shaped by the domestic discourses rather than their own instrumental preferences. For similar argument that supports such influences of the domestic societal discourses on elite foreign policy preferences, see Hopf (2002); Rousseau (2006: 93, 99). For an opposite argument that elite preferences originate from their own instrumental self-interests, see Firon (1994); Shultz (1993); Snyder (1991). 51 Contrary to these expectations, the dominant neorealist theory postulates that state behavior is constrained by the international system defined by the distribution of capabilities, and that masses do not possess knowledge of the international pressures faced by states; See Waltz (1979: 77). For an argument from the constructivist perspective that the neorealist theory focuses only on the structural constraints on states and thus presents only a partial picture of the international politics, see Hopf (1998: 174); Wendt (1992: 393-95). 145

The constituent elements in Table 5, coupled with my survey results, clearly show the overambitious middle-class identity generated an intersubjective discursive structure that influenced elite preferences for improving country‟s future. Intervening in the debate in the national parliament on the India-U.S. nuclear agreement, the Congress Party52 Finance Minister P. Chitambaram revealed the influence of this theme of improving the future by saying, “We can make our future; the future is in our hands. We can make our future, if we decide to have the vision and the farsightedness that can take this country forward.”53

Such elite preferences consisted of two specific aspects of the overambitious middle class. First, Indian foreign policy elites were enamored at the prospect of demonstrating the self-worth of the country to others, an idea that profoundly shaped their interpretations of the nuclear agreement. These elites interpreted the nuclear agreement with the United States as a significant component of India‟s self-understanding as a nuclear-capable country. Therefore, the Finance Minister asserted that the future of the country lay in the hands of its citizens and they could certainly improve that future by adding the military nuclear capability through an agreement with the United States. A full military nuclear agreement was consistent with the overambitious middle-class identity discourse because of

52 The Congress Party was the governing party when the civil nuclear agreement between the United States and India was signed in 2008. It is a center-left party and has governed the country for most of its independent history. 53 See P. Chidambaram, “Some People Want China, and Not India, to Become Economic Super Power,” Debate on the Motion of Confidence in Loksabha, July 22, 2008, http://www.congress.org.in/new/ 3Speeches%20of%20Congress%20Leaders.php (accessed September 10, 2010). 146

the self-understanding of this class as being capable of shifting its destination

from the present to an improved future.

Second, the theme of an acute sense of future strongly influenced the

political elites. Specifically, India‟s elites repeatedly reflected this future while

acknowledging the absence of strong leadership with a clear vision to take the

country forward, as the Finance Minister Chitambaram argued. This discourse of

India‟s acute future rendered the military nuclear agreement with the United

States interpretable as a step toward the next rung of the international ladder. In

this elite interpretation, the opportunity to climb that metaphorical ladder was

present in 2008 in the form of a military nuclear agreement between the United

States and India. However, this opportunity would be lost in the absence of a

strong and visionary leadership if it failed to comprehend and interpret middle-

class overambitious traits.

Table 5.6: Correlation of Middle Class Identification and Military-Nuclear Cooperation Q1.One hears different stories about being part of the middle class these days in India. In this regard, which of the following statements describes you the best? (High values = middle class self- identifiers)

Q23.Agree or disagree with the Pearson Correlation statement- The middle class sets unrealistic goals for the progress of .074(*) India like seeking full military nuclear cooperation with the US Sig. (2-tailed) .036 N 803 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

147

In addition to the pragmatic discourse, the overambitious middle-class discourse also generated elite preferences to accept India‟s status as a transitioning country to a major power. This transitioning status concerned the growing feeling in the middle-class of maturing up to a firm standing in Indian sociopolitical structures. Specifically, this discourse often drew upon India‟s transitioning from childhood to adulthood in the context of nuclear power. This was evident in the elite discourse in two specific ways. First, political elites argued that the country had voluntarily exercised tremendous restraint in dealing with nuclear technology. This voluntary restraint was observable in the “no-first- use” of nuclear weapons against other states. The no-first-use declaration assumed that the states possessing nuclear weapons would not launch nuclear attacks on others even in the face of external provocations. The foreign policy elites argued that India‟s acceptance of this principle of non-use of nuclear weapons was significant because the country was surrounded by a hostile nuclear state

(Pakistan), whose foreign policy was India-centric. This acceptance was even more significant given India‟s boundary disputes with its neighbor—China--that possessed a large number of sophisticated nuclear weapon systems. By voluntarily declaring and then adhering to the no-first-use policy in the face of several provocations, India‟s foreign policy elites fervently believed that this behavior marked mature or adult behavior in international politics.

Extending further the logic of such a transition, the Foreign Minister

Pranab Mukherjee offered other evidence to attest to India‟s increasing maturity

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in international relations. Minister Mukherjee declared to the NSG54 in September of 2008, “We have always tempered our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. We affirm our policy of No-First-Use of nuclear weapons.”55

Underlying such balancing of autonomy and responsibility in foreign policy, in the words of the Foreign Minister, India was demonstrating its unmistakable maturity. Such desire to show a mature behavior in foreign policy emanated from the heightened awareness of transitioning to the next level of international standing, something akin to a child‟s claim to adulthood. In particular, making the statement about the voluntary declaration of the no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons combined with India‟s demonstration of global responsibility, the

Foreign Minister demonstrated strong evidence of the socializing influence of the middle-class discourse of transitioning from childhood to adulthood.

However, the final nuclear agreement signed between the United States and India in 2008 did not culminate in a full-fledged military nuclear cooperation.

The pursuit of this goal was purely idealistic: a product of an overambitious middle-class‟s discursive influences on elite policy preferences. Instead, the agreement separated the civil and military installations of India and prohibited the latter from receiving American technology and fuel transfers. In 2008, India possessed twenty-two operating or nearly completed nuclear facilities, of which only eight were designated as military in nature. To the extent that Indian foreign policy elites argued successfully to separate the civil and military nuclear reactors, and had persuaded the United States to keep the latter outside the international

54 See footnote 40 for a description of the NSG. 55 Quoted in Chari (2009: 4); Mukherjee (2009: 15-17). 149

inspections, the overambitious middle-class discourse influenced this agreement.

These empirical findings demonstrate that improving the future, (which consisted of overambition, an acute perception of future possibilities, and idealism) produced a social environment. This social environment generated themes of mature, responsible, adult behavior, and that a sense of entitlement to autonomy, which influenced the elite‟s decision making toward India‟s nuclear agreement with the United States. My analysis demonstrates significant correlations between these overambitious middle-class traits and people‟s preferences for a military nuclear agreement with the United States. This discourse framed the military nature of the nuclear agreement as a means of asserting India‟s autonomy in international relations. However, this overambitious middle-class narrative was not as pervasive as the pragmatic middle-class discourse. As a result, the influence of the former on India‟s foreign policy makers was limited. Thus, of twenty-two nuclear reactors, only eight were designated as military.

In 2008, yet another option was widely debated in Indian foreign policy circles: no nuclear cooperation with the United States. My empirical findings show that the disillusioned middle-class discourse profoundly shaped decisions of these elites and their foreign policy option of no nuclear cooperation. According to this elite worldview, in the past, India had successfully resisted U.S. pressures to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty and to give up its nuclear program. This resistance enabled India to build an indigenous nuclear program in the past that ensured the autonomy of the country as well as opened the possibility of nuclear disarmament of the world. Therefore, India needed to reject any nuclear

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cooperation with the United States in 2008 and, instead, to return to the previous policy of distancing itself from that country.56

Such foreign policy elite views were strongly shaped by a social-cognitive identity I call the “disillusioned middle-class”.57 The content of this discourse inclined positively toward the quasi-socialist domestic lifestyle of the past which had provided the interpretive lenses to political elites. These interpretive lenses enabled those political elites to understand changes in the contemporary Indian foreign policies from a negative perspective. As a consequence, these political elites frequently evoked elements of that past quasi-socialist lifestyle to reject the

U.S.-India nuclear agreement. In particular, this discursive structure socialized political elites to reject the U.S.-India nuclear agreement in its entirety in 2008, the most concrete manifestation of the changing orientation of India‟s contemporary foreign policy.

Table 5.7: Disillusioned Middle-Class Discursive Components

Identities Constituent Components Disillusioned Middle Class Longing for the past, stable life, sense of building a new civilization.58

56 See Mistry (2006: 686). 57 For similar content but labeling of this segment of the society as the “old middle-class,” see Fernandes (2006). This segment of the middle-class resisted new changes in India’s domestic economic and social policies since early 1990s; see Shridharan (2004: 404-6). 58 Note that ideology could be an explanatory variable here and I take no issue with that, but I treat the question of causation as an empirical one. That is, it does not matter whether it was ideology or any other ideas that explain opposition to the US-India nuclear agreement as long as they were pervasive in discourses of the day. For a similar approach, see Abdelal (2005); Hopf (2002: chap 3). For a view that ideology played an important part in opposition from some segments of India’s population to the nuclear agreement with the United States, see Mistry (2006: 685-7). 151

Influenced by this disillusioned middle-class discourse composed of the elements in Table 7, political elites across different parties opposed the India-US nuclear cooperation. The United National Progressive Alliance (UNPA)59 equated the “pro-American” nuclear policies of the government with “anti-people” policies.60 In the worldview of this political elite, Government‟s nuclear policy became interpretable as anti-people because it introduced the private sector into defense production (something not permitted in India‟s system) and the exploitative tendency of that private sector. These policies understood as making people work harder than before, a question item on the survey asked respondents whether and how strongly they agreed that the middle-class had to work harder today than in the past. As Table 11 shows, 18% of the respondents strongly agreed and 58% agreed with this statement. This overwhelming support in the middle-class about the worsening work conditions and their direct correlation with government policies meant that this discourse prevailed at both individual as well as social levels.

This discourse significantly influenced foreign policy preferences of political elites. Making a direct connection between the nuclear agreement and people‟s lives, the alliance elaborated that the reason the Congress government

59 This was a group of eight socialist parties in the national parliament during the process of negotiating the nuclear agreement with the United States. Together, they held close to 45 seats in the national parliament, the impact of which was magnified on the stability of the government because of its lack of majority support in the national parliament. 60 The Hindu (August 5, 2007). 152

was unable to mitigate immense uncertainty in the lives of the Indian masses was precisely because of the fascination with everything “American.” This negative sense of everything “American” meant that the proposed U.S.-India nuclear agreement did not promote the interests of Indian people. Similar to the uncertainty in the lives of Indian people as the result of rapid privatization, the nuclear agreement generated immense uncertainty in the defense policy of India.

As the dismantling of public sector jobs and other associated lifestyles generated immense uncertainty and instability in the lives of the people (see Table 8 below), so the reducing of the role of the public sector in the nuclear field created tremendous uncertainty and instability in the defense policy of the country.61

Table 5.8: Question Measuring Disillusioned Middle-Class Traits

Agree or disagree: Middle class people employed in the public sector in the past didn‟t have to put in long hours to try and meet demanding expectations. Response Percentage of responses Strongly Agree 18 Agree 58 Disagree 18 Strongly Disagree 5 Not sure 1 No opinion 0

61 A wide variety of industrial plants had been set up under the supervision of the Department of Atomic Energy of India. For good analyses of various industrial plants of this nature, see Frey (2009: 197-99); Mistry (2006: 677-79). 153

As a consequence of the fascination with everything “American,” the nuclear sector, the placing of which in the hands of the private sector would have been unimaginable only a few years earlier, was now being opened to foreign countries.62 The General Secretary of the UNPA, Amar Singh, argued, “It is very disgusting to see how the government allowed not only privatization of nuclear industry but also entry of the foreign players in that field.”63 According to the political elites of this persuasion, the India-U.S. agreement not only created uncertainty about India‟s security policies, but also generated instability in the country‟s foreign policy. Attributing such uncertainty and instability to the particular political actors, the UNPA argued that “pro-American” policies of both the Congress Party and the BJP were responsible for this change in people‟s lives.64 Contrary to the future-oriented overambitious and hard-working middle- class discourses elaborated earlier, this disillusioned middle-class discourse shaped elite thinking toward the defense sector concerning private industry as jeopardizing the national interest. In this thinking, to avoid jeopardizing the national interests of India, there was a strong need to keep defense, science, and engineering in the hands of the government-run public sector.65

Such abandoning of India‟s policy of indigenous defense production in favor of a nuclear agreement with the United States would also lead to the loss of

62 See Mistry (2006: 685-7); Tellis (2010: 10-12). 63 “N-Deal: UNPA Seeks Parliamentary Approval,” The Economic Times, August 27, 2007, http://articles .economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-08-20/news/28441546_1_unpa-nuclear- deal-left-parties. 64 See The Hindu (August 3, 2007). 65 For good accounts of the different nuclear plants under the control of the Atomic Energy Department of India, see Mistry (2006); Thomas (1999). 154

the strategic autonomy of the country, according to these elites. Loss of strategic autonomy meant that India would not be free to determine the content and pursuit of its military preparedness and military doctrines. Specifically, it amounted to the loss of India‟s strategic autonomy and turned the country into a “slave of the

United States.”66 Treating the nuclear agreement with the United States as a treaty that would turn the country into a slave, the political elites of the UNPA proceeded to link that agreement with the diminishing of India‟s strategic autonomy. Underlying the emphasis on viewing the nuclear agreement in the wider strategic context, these elites interpreted that agreement as being against

India‟s interests.67 Furthermore, India‟s strategic autonomy did not lie in opposing friendly states like Iran, a state that had many common strategic interests with

India, but many differences with the United States. In view of this elite, the

United States pressured India to vote against Iran in the United Nations to oppose the pursuit of nuclear technology by that country.68 Iran‟s pursuit of nuclear technology did not undermine India‟s strategic preparedness in any way.

However, India still opposed that country after abandoning its own interests under

U.S. pressures.

66 The Times of India (July 3, 2008). 67 There was criticism of this agreement also from other parties like the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM) although the rhetoric of the UNPA was quite similar to that of the CPIM, but there were many substantive differences. See the official CPIM rejection of the nuclear agreement in a press release: “The agreement should be seen in the context of wider implications of India being bound into a strategic alliance with the United States and its adverse consequences for an independent foreign policy, sovereignty, and economic interests” (CPIM Polit Bureau Release, August 18, 2007). 68 See the personal memoirs of the General Secretary of the CPIM Prakash Karat (2007: chaps 3- 4). 155

As a result of such a compromise, the Congress government led by Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh had to face a “no-confidence” vote in the national parliament on July 22, 2008. The consequences of this no-confidence motion were twofold. First, the government almost lost that vote when the political elites of the disillusioned middle-class persuasion withdrew their support for the Singh- led government. Had this motion been carried in affirmative, the Congress-led government would have been ousted from power. Second and more importantly, the Congress government faced this no-confidence motion exclusively for its insistence on pushing ahead with the India-U.S. nuclear agreement. Such rejection of the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation in its entirety represented a powerful foreign policy terrain from which this disillusioned middle-class identity discourse operated to reject the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation, India‟s most radical foreign policy change in the contemporary history.

Conclusions

The politics of India‟s strategic partnership with the United States in 2008 evinced a significant shift in mass support in favor of stronger relations with the latter country. This shift in popular support enabled elites to opt for foreign policy concerning the India-U.S. strategic partnership unthinkable in the previous years.

In this paper, I assess influence of this mass-level support on the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation as part of their larger strategic partnership. Analysis of this partnership demonstrated that the India‟s elites faced three options in the context

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of India-U.S. nuclear cooperation: full military nuclear cooperation, civil nuclear cooperation, and no nuclear cooperation. The final agreement signed between the two countries rejected the options of full military and no nuclear cooperation and, instead, opted for civil nuclear cooperation. In this research, I have claimed that

India‟s domestic identities of its citizens—composed of social discourses and individual cognitive elements—predisposed foreign policy elites toward avoiding some and opting for other nuclear options. The empirical findings of the research support this claim and demonstrate that the final content and nature of the nuclear agreement was a result of India‟s dominant middle-class hard-working social cognitive identity. The other two nuclear options of full military nuclear cooperation and no nuclear cooperation map fairly closely onto other identity discourses of the overambitious and disillusioned middle class, respectively.

In light of these findings, I conclude by highlighting three primary contributions of my research to the field of International Relations. First, the state interests of India in the nuclear cooperation with the United States originated from domestic social cognitive identities and not from international structural pressures. The second contribution of this research relates to demonstrating an alternative pathway to the liberal propositions of pacific union of democracies in which the norms and institutions of democracy create conditions for cooperation among states.69 My empirical findings show that India‟s interests in pursuing a civil nuclear agreement with the United States emanated not from the liberal

69 For initial explication of democracy and its correlation with international peace, see Doyle (1983: 205-235; 1986: 1151-1169). For later development and refinement of democratic peace propositions along different dimensions, see Russett (1993); Russett and O’Neal (2001). 157

propositions of a pacific union of democracies, but from domestic social and cognitive identities. These social and individual identities combined to produce a robust measure of what citizens of a democracy understand as their interests, generating a favorable social cognitive environment inside the state and shaping the pursuit of those state interests. The liberal, democratic peace propositions do not explain India‟s pursuit of state interests in the form of civil nuclear cooperation with the United States. Both partners had been democracies for nearly sixty years prior to this agreement. Neither India nor the United States experienced any significant changes in their internal democratic norms or institutional structures to produce a different outcome from the previous pattern of their bilateral relations in 2008. My empirical findings demonstrate that what actually changed in 2008 in the historical patterns of noncooperative bilateral relations was a shift of focus from democratic institutions and norms to social and cognitive elements of Indian citizens. These citizens‟ social and cognitive components constituted the citizens as a middle-class identity or what I call “a community of sentiments,” which shared views about domestic and international politics or visions about the nature of India‟n state interests.

Finally, one of the most important contributions of this research to the field of International Relations is the application of a sequential, multimethod research design. In this research, I used discourse analysis and a large-n survey in a sequential manner to investigate the existence of social cognitive identities and their effects on India‟s foreign policy options. To my surprise, the middle-class emerged as the critically important constituent of the domestic society that, until

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recently, had been only intuitively linked with foreign policy options, or had been completely disconnected from any matters related with politics. Contrary to these existing attitudes toward the role and relevance of the middle-class, the use of a sequential, multimethod approach demonstrated systematic and clear correlations between India‟s middle class and its foreign policy goals. The application of such sequential, multimethod research design offers great leverage in analyzing connections between intuitively linked or previously nonsystematically correlated phenomena in International Relations. The use of two research techniques in a single study increases not only the validity but also the robustness of the findings.

According to my empirical findings, the correlations between foreign policy goals and domestic identity were systematic and robust, and they convincingly explained the civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States, the most radical foreign policy change in India‟s contemporary history.

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Addendum B: Questions Measuring India‟s Middle-Class Support for India-U.S.

Nuclear Cooperation1

How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that the nuclear deal India signed with the U.S. couple of years ago is opening new opportunities for the middle-class of India?

Response Percentage of responses Strongly Agree 19 Agree 69 Disagree 10 Strongly Disagree 2

Do you think India-US relations should be determined by cooperation over nuclear issue?

Response Percentage of responses No 9 Yes 81 Not sure 10 No opinion 0

How strongly do you feel about this issue of nuclear power?

Response Percentage of responses Feel mildly 7 Feel somewhat mildly 25 Feel somewhat strongly 51 Feel strongly 16

1 Total respondents 804. 160

Chapter 6: The India-U.S. Economic Relations:

The Impact of Middle-class Identity

“Decision makers are creatures of {discourse}, not just policy wonks who shed their images of others like raincoats at the office door.” —Andrew Rotter (2000: xx) Introduction

In this chapter I will focus on the influences of the middle-class discourse on India‟s economic foreign policy toward the United States in 2008. The discourse demonstrates that the improvement of economic foreign relations was an important dimension of this bilateral relationship, but variations in that discourse produced markedly different foci. These differing strands of discourse produced two elite policy options. The first strand of discourse focused on improving economic relations with the United States as steppingstone to an affluent and advanced economy and to restore India‟s civilizational glory. This futuristically-oriented discourse framed these prospects as extremely celebratory.

The second strand framed the India-U.S. economic bilateral relations as an opportunity to overcome India‟s developmental problems. This discourse framed improvement in the India-U.S. economic relations as a pragmatic opportunity to improve the living conditions of its people in the present.

In this chapter I will demonstrate the importance of domestic constructivist framework for analyzing the economic policies of India toward the United States.

Through the conduct of discourse analysis and large-n survey, my domestic

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constructivism attributes this aspect of the bilateral relationship to India‟s middle- class. In India‟s popular perception, it is this middle-class that identifies most readily with the United States and is considered to influence the bilateral economic issues the most. Given such focus, the application of dominant neorealist, neoliberal,1 and systemic constructivist2 theoretical analysis of economic foreign policies in terms of the questions of “who governs” and “who benefits” is woefully inadequate. These theories proffer international structural pressures or elite decision making agencies as the causes of existing rules, object of this study. These theories also frame the middle-class as the exclusive beneficiaries of state policies. My domestic constructivist framework, based on social cognitive discourses, enables me to shift from those static institutional and elite theories toward analyzing the precariously situated middle-classes. Strictly speaking, this group is neither part of the elites nor beneficiaries of state policies.

My domestic constructivist approach offers a productive framework to study the impact of this perilously placed social group on the economic foreign policies of

India toward the United States.

This chapter has three sections, the first of which will focus on the most vocal middle-class discourse of this overambitious group on India-U.S. economic

1 Note that international regimes are products of self-interested, value-maximizing states from which states can pull out any time (Keohane 1984), but the question is, whose interests do states pursue in those institutions? For an excellent argument that neoliberalism needs to include social elements to remain a useful framework, see Johnston (2003). 2 If systemic constructivism promises to include social factors in the mainstream of International Relations, then it must go beyond focusing on elites. This strand of systemic constructivist theorizing has been applied predominantly to the case of the European Union, in which elites do the heavy lifting of integration, leaving society out of the equation. For such elite-driven analyses, see Parsons (2003); Barnett and Finnemore (2004). 162

foreign policies. This discourse is focused on escaping to an affluent economic future and restoring past glory. The second section will demonstrate the influence of pragmatic discourse on the bilateral relations of India-U.S. The section will focus on using middle-class modern skills and traits to meet India‟s present development requirements. This argument is driven by the assumption that access to technical training and better economic development in the present would improve the bilateral economic relations of the two states. This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the significance of my research for the field of

International Relations.

I. Importance of Economic Relations in the India-U.S. Strategic Partnership

Economic relations with the United States traditionally have remained marginal to India‟s foreign policy,3 but in recent years have acquired tremendous significance.4 Both foreign policy practitioners and scholars treat the economic basis of the India-U.S. strategic partnership as central to its continued growth.

Stephen Cohen, as one of the foremost scholars on India-U.S. relations, stated at a recent seminar that, among various issues of bilateral cooperation, economic aspects of the strategic partnership are most subject to popular pressures.5

Similarly, a longtime scholar and practitioner of India-U.S. relations, Teresita

3 Baru (2007; Sinha and Dorschner (2010: 76). 4 Schaffer (2009: 5). 5 ISA Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, (March 31, 2012). 163

Schaffer argued that a central feature of this partnership was the consistently high enthusiasm of the Indian people for close economic ties with the United States.6

Likewise, foreign policy practitioners consider the economic pillar of the

India-U.S. strategic partnership as being critical to their bilateral cooperation. In her considered judgment, the Secretary of State, Condaleeza Rice, framed relations with India as “America‟s opportunity”7 mainly in terms of economic relations. Moreover, President Bush directly credited the India-U.S. strategic partnership to India‟s middle-class‟s skills and talents. At the time of signing the joint communiqué on the India-U.S. strategic partnership on July 18, 2005,

President George W. Bush said, “we‟re also committed to increasing the prosperity of the people of India and America.8 Likewise, India‟s Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh opined, “A strategic relationship that is not underpinned by a strong economic relationship is unlikely to prosper.”9 Such convergence of political leaders‟ views on the critical importance of bilateral economic ties shows that both countries attached tremendous importance to this aspect of their strategic partnership. It became even more important for India when Prime Minister Singh further affirmed that economic relationship was “the bedrock upon which social, cultural, and political relationships are built.”10

If economic relations between India and the United States gave the impression of being critical to bilateral relations and so were subject to popular

6 Schaffer (2009: 4-5). 7 Rice (2000; 2006). 8 Quoted in Vickery (2011: 9). 9 Quoted in Vickery (2011: 8). 10 Ibid. 164

pressures (as Stephen Cohen asserted at a recent seminar11 and Prime Minister

Singh and President Bush recognized) why did they peak only in 2008? How did such popular pressures influence elite decision making? Were there any variations in these popular pressures on elite economic decisions? In what follows, I will address these questions.

II. “Piper at the Gates,”12 The Influence of the Overambitious Middle-Class and

the Futuristically-oriented India-U.S. Economic Relations

A definite indication of the growing bilateral relations of India and the

United States in 2008 was an increasing emphasis on strengthening their economic ties. Although India‟s total trade with the United States consistently ranked below twelfth place among American trading partners, and did not even feature among the fifteen top trading partners until 2008,13 India made improving bilateral trade between the two countries as one of the central pillars of their partnership. My discourse analysis of popular texts and the subsequent survey demonstrated that the overambitious middle-class discourse predisposed elite decisions toward strengthening these bilateral economic foreign policies. At the core of these policy decisions laid the assumptions that increasing trade with the

11 ISA Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, (March 31, 2012). 12 This newspaper headline succinctly captured the ambitious nature of some aspects of India’s foreign economic policy toward the United States in 2008. See the Times of India (January 8, 2008). For related metaphors that indicate the varying strength of such sentiments see “India arrived” (Brosius 2010: 3) and “India unbound” India Today (August 15, 2005). 13 See the United States Trade Representative website: http://www.ustr.gov/trade- agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (accessed February 27, 2012). 165

United States would not only propel India to an affluent future but also would help regain its lost autonomy. The assumption was that these two elements would restore India‟s past glory and help India to eventually overtake the existing great powers. My analysis of India‟s elite public announcements and speeches shows that such accumulated desire to escape into the future and to secure the country‟s autonomy originated from a strong middle-class image of the future.14

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I defined this middle-class segment as the “overambitious.” My discourse analysis and the subsequent survey results consistently demonstrated themes that downplayed obstacles and overemphasized the country‟s lofty goals of becoming an affluent economy and a great power.15

Consistent with my domestic constructivist framework, this discourse produced an intersubjective structure that socialized political elites into popular discourses.

As a consequence, this intersubjective structure shaped the thoughts and decisions of Indian political elites to consider some economic foreign policy options as unviable and others as viable. The viable option focused on improving trade relations with the United States and to overtake that country in its global power position, however idealistic the attainment of this goal may have been.16

14 For a constructivist perspective on the non-elite shaping state foreign policies, see Hopf 2002). For an application of domestic constructivist framework to economic policies, see Hobson and Seabrook (2007: 4-9); Seabrook (2007: 795-810). 15 The existing literature uses different adjectives to describe this group. The description varies from aspirers, seekers, strivers, near rich, clear rich, sheer rich, and super rich. For these different labels, see Fernandes (2006: 38-40, 76); Brosius (2010: 3); Verma (1998: 71). 16Note that the argument here is that elite preferences were shaped by the domestic discourse and not that the elite preferences produced those idealistic goals. For an argument in support of the latter logic, see Jack Snyder, (1991). 166

Table 6.1. Overambitious Middle-Class Discursive Components Identities Constituent components Making Future Better High aspirations, acute sense of future, over-ambitious, maturing, and idealist.

India‟s foreign policy witnessed a spate of economic measures in 2008 with regard to strengthening the country‟s bilateral relations with the United States. My discourse analysis reveals that such heightened attention to improving bilateral economic relations originated from a widespread feeling of regaining India‟s autonomy and leaping to an affluent economic future. The discourse of future affluence stood for the ability or desire to enjoy economic affluence and to move forward into a new world, as some call, “a world, full of light, comfort, and prosperity.”17 This discourse shaped India‟s economic foreign policies in significant ways. The one-time Finance and Foreign Minister Jasvant Singh reflected this overambitious middle-class influence on his thinking, “to endeavor to utmost, to achieve the maximum possible production of wealth, no matter what field of activity we are engaged in; that is our duty, our dharma.”18 By framing the maximum generation of wealth as a duty, the Finance Minister evinced socializing influences of millions of middle-class people on the India-U.S. economic foreign policy in a significant way.

17 Brosius (2007: 1); Fernandes (2006). 18 See Jasvant Singh’s memoirs, In Service of a Nation (2007: 332) 167

By implying that the Indian people had in the past been stifled in their effort, the Minister reflected that he wanted to enable people to enjoy the benefits of an open economic system as it exists in the United States. The U.S. economic system enabled its citizens to invest abroad, which raised the country to the status of a great power.19 In the elites‟ opinion, India also was capable of achieving that status in the near future.20

Such overoptimistic elite views derived much of their substance from the overambitious middle-class discourse of avoiding the present and escaping into the future. When interviewing people about what they considered most important in their lives, The Times of India reported this discourse of excapism. One resident of a small town said, “I know Money is the paramount thing in this world, I will soon be one of the crorepatis.”21 In this popular discourse there were two middle-class sentiments most relevant for my analysis. First, there was widespread sentiment that people wanted to move away from their existing conditions and step into a different future. This sense of jumping into the future often manifested in an urgent desire to shift the economy into a “fast-forward” mode.22

19 Ibid. 20 Note that my dissertation uses thematic categories generated through discourse analysis of popular texts and assesses their impact on political elites by examining the language used to express those thoughts and decisions. For a cogent reasoning that foreign policy decision makers are products of culture and other domestic social discourses, see Rotter (2000: xxi). 21 Note “crore” is a monetary unit which stands for 10 million rupees and anyone who possesses that amount is known as “crorepati.” See “Crorepatis on the Rise in Nagpur,” The Times of India (July 16, 2008). 22 See “Fast-Forward the Economy,” The Times of India (July 26, 2008). 168

In this discourse, there was intense desire to “switch off” the present and enjoy the future life of an affluent society. This life, first and foremost, included approximation of the conditions enjoyed by American citizens. Second, this middle-class discourse demonstrated a high level of certainty in the popular attitude toward reaching that collective goal. Quite often this discourse did not specify the exact content of middle-class discourse, yet it revealed significantly high levels of optimism. Thus, the respondent‟s statement, “I will soon be a crorepati” represented widespread sentiment of India‟s overambitious middle- class about reaching the living standards of American people.23

The discourse about escaping into the future was rooted in a widespread assumption that India‟s middle-class aspiration of achieving something great would fast-forward the country to that future. This collective feeling was vividly evident among those individuals who self-identified as part of this social group.

As table 6.2 below shows, one item on my survey quizzed respondents directly on this theme.24 Of those who considered themselves belonging to the middle-class,

484 out of 804 (60.2 percent) were positive about the statement that the contemporary Indian middle-class aspires to something big and great in life.25

This majority also affected identity content of other segments of Indian society.

23 My discourse also shows widespread sentiment of being “unbound” and “feeling good” about such overambitious thinking. For similar descriptions of India’s middle-class, see Brosius (2010: 3, 25). 24 Noteworthy here is that my research adopted a sequential, multimethod approach. That is, it first conducted discourse analysis of select popular texts and then designed a large-n survey and fielded it in two Indian cities: New Delhi and Mumbai. 25 Anuradha Varma, “Meet the dream catchers,” The Times of India (July 21, 2008), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3254858.cms (accessed July 22: 2010).

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More specifically, what makes this overambitious identity interesting is its prevalence even among those who self-identified as not belonging to this group.

Of total 804, 155 (19.5 percent) self-identified as not belonging to the middle- class still responded that this group aspires to do big and great things in life.

Table 6.2. Big Achievements

Whether you think changes in the traits of middle class today, let say traits of being focused on achieving something big in life, makes it any different from the middle class in the past Responses Count Percentage No 58 7 Yes 710 88 Not Sure 34 4 No Answer 2 0

The second theme that surfaced frequently in the overambitious middle- class discourse was to regain India‟s autonomy. This state autonomy meant that the goal of economic foreign policy had to be guided by the attainment of India‟s preeminent international status. This status forced the world to consider India as one of few powerful states. It also consisted of leaving behind other competitors.

This political goal emanated from a widespread middle-class discourse about a climber who managed to make his way over a narrow path flanked by high mountains on the one hand and deep valleys on the other.26 This story focused middle-class attention on the two extremes it faces: falling into the deep valley

26 Aaj Tak (August 25, 2008). 170

and soaring like the high mountains. The discourse focused overwhelmingly on

“soaring like the high mountains” by gaining mastery over the future or by being a “big boss.”27 This idea of gaining mastery over the future meant that the Indian economic foreign policies must not only create affluence for the country but also overtake contemporary affluent states. This concept of autonomy relates not just to the modern state autonomy but also to the civilizational autonomy. In this discourse, civilizational autonomy meant striving for an economic future in where

India‟s rich and prosperous civilizational glory could be restored. This glory was firmly within the grasp by pursuing visionary economic foreign policies.

The effects of this intersubjective middle-class structure were observable on elites‟ policy preferences. Addressing a global consultancy company, Prime

Minister Singh strongly echoed this theme of securing India‟s lost autonomy:

“India is a nation on the move. I am confident our time has come. India is all set to regain its due place in the comity of nations.”28 There were two themes of middle-class discourse that influenced Prime Minister Singh‟s thoughts and decisions about India‟s economic relations. First, there was a strong sentiment of moving forward India‟s economic relations with the United States. These relations had stagnated because of India‟s pursuit of quasi-socialist economic model. This model was founded in the restrictive individual liberty and pursuit of opportunities. At its core, this economic model was backward-looking and

27 The discourse of gaining mastery of one’s future comes from a television reality show entitled “big boss.” This show significantly gripped popular imagination in the year 2008. See Aaj Tak (August 19, August 21, August 26, November 11, and November 19, 2008). 28 See Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s collected speeches (New Delhi: Government of India Publication Division, 2008) p. 204. 171

pointed to the past as a preferred destination for the country (see section later in this chapter). Those past restrictions stifled economic foreign relations of the two countries. However, there were tremendous opportunities to move away from those days of stagnant bilateral relations. This opportunity was to fast-forward to a new and different relationship, which would enable India to cast off its old image of a backward and outdated nation. Similar to the main protagonist of the film Rabne, who desired to move away from servicing old motorbikes to working with modern foreign cars, the Prime Minister expressed the middle-class sentiment of an India on the move.29 This movement was inexorably toward a future waiting to embrace India.

Second, as if there were no stopping the country on its path to regaining its autonomy, Singh proudly proclaimed that India‟s time had come to embrace an open economy and open society.30 This open economy and society would help build India‟s capacity to move into that long awaited future. As a result of such capacity building, India would secure its deserved place in the comity of nations.

By implication, India‟s securing such a deserved place in the international community indicated that it had lost that place at some previous point. This loss, described by the Prime Minister as India‟s “respectable” or “due” place in the international community, could be regained only when there existed an open economy and society.

29 Rabne is one of the two popular Hindi films in my sampled texts. This film was one of the top two films in the year 2008. For complete discussion of the sampling strategies, see the chapter on methodology. 30 See Prime Minister Singh’s selected speeches (2008: 203). 172

An implicit reference to the “glory days” of India is significant in the discourse of regaining the country‟s due place in the international community. In that past, India lost its autonomous standing in international relations because of the colonial rule and did not find its due place even after independence. However, with the embrace of both an open economy and society, the country would be able to find a well-deserved place in the international community. In particular, India would be able to regain its due place if it established strong economic relations with the most open economy and society in the world. In other words, if India could form close economic ties with the United States, founded on a shared commitment to open economy and society, then it would regain its past civilizational glory.31

Such aspirations to regaining the country‟s autonomy in the future, typical of the overambitious middle class, pervaded the entire political spectrum. The former Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, wrote in his memoirs:

In the BJP‟s perspective about the future, one detects two main elements of the overambitious middle-class discourse: one, India was moving inexorably toward a great power status, and two, it was readying itself to shoulder the

31 For an excellent discussion of the influences of identity discourses on India’s recent foreign policies, see Commuri (2010). For a good discussion of the changing nature of India’s economic foreign policies toward the United States, see Baru (2007). 32 See Advani’s memoirs, My Life, My Country (2008) p. 541. 173

responsibilities of that new future role. This growing consensus across political parties about the country‟s international status revealed that India would celebrate the opening up of its economy to American companies. Such an opening would promote India‟s trade with America, which in turn would create affluence. Thus, this would impart autonomy to India in that new future.33 My survey revealed that there was overwhelming support for opening the economy to trade with such companies. The table 6.5, (on page 186 below) shows that there was overwhelming support for promoting Indian trade with the United States.

Responding to a survey item about whether exports to the U.S. protected or hurt

India‟s middle-class interests, there was an overwhelming popular evaluation of its positive benefits. Of 804 respondents, 573 (71.3 percent) considered Indian export to the U.S. beneficial for the country. If we remove the extreme values on this item‟s response, this 573 response in favor of Indian exports demonstrates that there was a widespread consensus within the middle-class to continue and strengthen those exports in the future. It was that future to which the overambitious middle-class strongly expected to reach.

This overambitious discourse about the country‟s tremendous growth prospects often referred to many historical cases to buttress its logic. This demonstrated a consistent pattern of progressive reduction in the number of years countries took to increase their world share of economic output. Following this trend, India was poised to secure a great power status and thus regain its

33 There is still a great deal of controversy over the extent to which there have been differences in policy preferences of the Congress Party and the BJP. For an extensive discussion of the similarities in policy preferences of the two parties, see Chaulia (2002); Chiriyankandanth and Vyatt (2005: 193-211). 174

autonomy in the shortest time. In particular, Indian political elites invoked the

European experience of gaining a preeminent position in just one century. The argument was that Europe increased its share of the world‟s economy from 0 percent in 1800 to 20.5 percent in 1900. Similarly, the United States increased its world share of economic output from 1.8 percent in 1820 to 18.9 percent in 1913.

The United States achieved this growth rate in less than ninety years. The

Japanese experience was even more dramatic: its world share of economic output rose from 3.0 to 8.6 percent from 1950 to 1990.34 Following this economic trajectory, elites predicted that India‟s world share of economic output will grow from 2.0 in 2007 to 18.9 percent in 2039.35 It was precisely this prospect of status change from a middle power to a major power (and in less than forty years) was extremely celebratory for political elites. This prospect also influenced political elites to regain its lost autonomy, whether it was former deputy Prime Minister

L.K. Advani‟s futuristically-oriented economic foreign policies or reigning Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh‟s sense of securing state autonomy in the future international power configuration.

This middle-class-driven discourse rendered the country‟s prospects for progress as so palpable that many economic and market reports resonated themes of India‟s affluent future. A report produced by Goldman Sachs, an investment and forecasting company, predicted that India, along with other growth economies, would be the story of economic growth in the twentieth-century.

34 See the report of the Emerging Markets Forum in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (2009: 14). 35 Ibid., (2009: 12-14). 175

According to this report, many of India‟s favorable domestic conditions will turn the country into the third largest in the world by 2050.36 In a follow-up document, which appeared right after the World Bank report, that elevated India‟s position from low to middle-low income in 2007,37 Goldman Sachs predicted that India‟s gross domestic product per capita income will see a fourfold rise from 940 dollars in 2007 to 3,760 dollars in 2020. If the favorable conditions existed, this rise would continue and India‟s economy would be larger than that of the U.S. by

2043.38

Another report prepared by the Emerging Market Forum (EMF) in 2009 was even more overambitious. It highlighted that the Indian economy in 2007 crossed the trillion dollar mark, which placed it as twelfth in the world with 940 dollars per capita income.39 According to the report, this change in income demonstrated

“the promise of India” that would be realized over the next three decades. By

2039, the report went on to project, India would easily have a total gross output of

36 trillion dollars and would become an advanced, developed economy with a total per capita income of 22,000 per year. With such economic growth, India would become the second-largest, after China and ahead of the United States.40

This is the promise of India that can become a reality within a generation: moving

36 See Goldman Sachs report (2003). 37 See this World Bank report for the year 2006 here: http://www.worldbank.org.in/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:295609~pagePK:141132 ~piPK:141109~theSitePK:295584,00.html (accessed February 22, 2012). 38 See Goldman Sachs report (2007). 39 See the Emerging Market Forum report (2009). Also see Goldman Sachs report (2007: 3). 40 EMF report (2009: 3, 10, 12). 176

from a relatively poor country to an affluent, developed economy.41 After describing the impact of the overambitious middle-class discourse on the economic foreign policies with the United States, I will proceed with a discussion of the influence of the pragmatic middle-class in the following section.

III. Middle-Class and India‟s Pragmatic Economic Foreign Policy

In addition to shaping elite views about India‟s futuristically-oriented economic foreign relations toward the United States, there were hardworking discourses that influenced Indian political elites‟ foreign economic policies.

Postponing discussion of the disillusioned middle-class until the following section, I here describe the economic impact of India‟s hardworking segment of the middle-class. This hardworking discourse predisposed elites‟ motivations of emphasizing India‟s economic development by using middle-class modern traits and skills. In elite views, this would promote bilateral economic relations of India and the United States. Contrary to the overambitious middle-class discourse of fast-forwarding India into the future and restoring lost glory, this section demonstrates the influence of the hardworking middle class discursive content on the elite preferences. These preferences were to pursue economic foreign policies toward the United States that centered on using middle-class skills to secure the country‟s present development.

41 Ibid. 177

Table 6.3. Hardworking Middle-Class Discursive Components42 Identities Constituent components Hardworking Initiative-driven, achievement oriented, and technically proficient.

One of the most passionately debated issues in 2008 was the promotion of

India‟s economic relations with the United States. Contrary to the rapid growth and future-oriented affluent conditions associated with the overambitious discourse, the hardworking middle-class discourse influenced elite decisions and thoughts about pursuing India‟s economic development in the present. This discourse echoed strongly in the political circles of different persuasions. While advocating stronger ties with the United States, Rahul Gandhi argued,that “there are two distinct voices among India‟s people today. The louder of these voices comes from an India that is empowered, an India that has itself an and to the world proven that it will shape the future. [sic] It is an India rich with opportunity and talent, straining to be unleashed.”43 There were two specific sentiments

Gandhi captured of the hardworking middle-class discourse. First, there was candid acceptance of the world-class talents and energies of India‟s middle-class, which had been tested in different parts of the world but not in India. My discourse analysis demonstrates that there was widespread sentiment in the hardworking middle-class that Society would benefit from its talents and skills, which made this class famous worldwide.

42 Note that discussion of the sources of these identities forms a part of Chapter 3, Methodology. 43 http://aicc.org.in/new/rahul-gandhi-13-march-2008.php (accessed 9/12/2010). 178

Such hardworking middle-class discourse shaped thoughts and decisions of other elites. Baru, as an advisor to the reigning Prime Minister Singh, argued that

India‟s ability to produce world-class bankers, scientists, doctors, engineers, and computer scientists was universally recognized. He further said that India celebrated traits of modern hardworking middle-class employees whenever people talked about economic development of the country.44 In such a perception of this social group, the Prime Minister‟s advisor drew a clear link between the use of middle-class traits and improving the country‟s present conditions. The middle- class traits, according to Baru, would play a critical role in overcoming present problems. What India needed in 2008 was to improve not only its standing as a producer of such world-class bankers, engineers, and computers, but also domestic conditions to benefit from their skills. These skills would benefit India when the country provided conditions suitable for the use of their talents.45

This political discourse about using middle-class creativity drew its content from a widespread discourse. One of the chief engineering architects of the Tata

Nano car succinctly captured elements of this identity: “I had built small trucks before, but designing a cheap car was a different game. In nine months, we had the design ready.”46 This discourse about hard work reflected the popular middle- class mood in two specific ways. First, the Nano engineer expressed sentiments of

44 This advisor was a seasoned journalist who had written extensively on the strategic consequences of economic development of India before taking his position as advisor to the Prime Minister. See Sanjay Baru (2006: 149). 45 For an excellent discussion of middle-class traits and the ways in which that class adapted its skills to meet India’s requirements under recent economic reforms, see Fernandes (2006: chap 2, 4, 5); Lefebvre (2009: 88-108); Upadhya (2009: 55-87). 46 See Times of India (January 11, 2008). 179

a vast majority of the Indian middle class when he said, “I had built small trucks before, but designing a cheap car was a different game.” This engineer reflected the widespread middle-class sentiment of accomplishing things that were once unthinkable, through his narratives of comparing his past achievements of building small trucks to moving into unchartered territory in the present.47 This language also captured successfully India‟s middle-class‟s thinking that an appropriate use of their abilities would generate achievements previously unimagined.

Second, this middle-class social group possessed a willingness to take professional risks. As Fernandes argues, the present middle-class demonstrates the ability and willingness to “recredential” itself to shift its earlier attitude of professional risk-aversion to risk-acceptance.48 In this new attitude of the middle- class, scholars observe high levels of energy and motivation to set high targets for middle-class members. The Nano engineer‟s assertion that his team could ensure that the engine was ready in nine months reflected this new hardworking middle- class attitude. This attitude clearly demonstrates that the middle-class shared these sentiments, but with the realization that such achievements will be predicated on nothing less than their hard work. It is this attitude that makes this social segment willing and able to undertake risks in their professional lives.

Such an attitude toward taking risks in professional life was clearly evident in the survey items I created, based on my discourse analysis. In response to an

47 For personal reflections of entrepreneurs on such changes, see Nilekani (2009); Rai (2005: 195- 198); Prestowitz (2005). 48 Fernandes (2006: 39) 180

item of whether India was adopting American values of hard work, there was an overwhelming majority of respondents who strongly agreed with the proposition.

Out of 804 total respondents, 584 (72.6 percent) agreed that Indians are adopting

American values, of which 495 (or 61.5 percent) considered

Table 6.4. Correlation of India’s Middle Class Values of Hard Work and Belief in Adoption of American Values Q16_01.Now, I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements- Indian middle class today is adopting American values How important do you Pearson Correlation 0.126(**) think the following aspects are for .000 improving middle class Sig. (2-tailed) life?-Hard work

804 N ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).49

hard work as very important. Another group of 90 respondents (11 percent) expressed strong agreement that Indians were learning American values and considered it very important to work hard. The Nano engineer and his team belonged to this social group, which set high goals for themselves and worked hard to achieve them in a stipulated time period.50 As the above table 6.4 clearly shows, the traits of hardwork and the adoption of American values by this

49 See Addendum C for raw data in this table. 50 Also see Rahul Sachinand “India’s Innovators,” Business Today (July 28, 2008),. http://www.nif.org.in/nifnews/business/index.php.htm (accessed March 6, 2012). 181

segment of the Indian middle-class depicts a high significant correlation. Such high correlation implies not only a pervasive discourse of these traits, but also a strong inclination of this demographic segment to hold a positive valuation of the

United States. However, this opinion was not universally shared among the Indian masses. Out of total 804 respondents, 104 (12.9 percent) disagreed that Indians were learning any values from America.

Nonetheless, the middle-class discourse certainly generated a high level of elite confidence in the traits of initiative-taking, achievement-orientation, and technological proficiency in improving India-U.S. relations. However, it forcefully highlighted the conditions impeding the use of those traits. Evincing this frustration, one regular middle-class entrepreneur vented, “we can compete very well in the world market, but we need serious recognition.”51 This statement captured two popular adverse sentiments related with the middle-class discourse.

The perceptions of the middle-class as driven by consumerism instead of creative entrepreneurial energies caused anxiety that this portion of the population would not be productive52 This misperception of this social group also promoted a selfish and materialist image in the use of its technical skills. In this negative opinion, the use of middle-class technical skills remained focused on producing consumer items for its own pleasure.53 Consequently, the use of middle-class creativity and effort was misconstrued in the larger Indian society. Such distrust

51 See Aaj Tak (May 2, 2008). 52 For a forceful view that India’s middle-class was focused exclusively on consumer culture, see Verma (1998). 53Ibid. 182

of the hardworking middle-class was eroding the confidence in this class to contribute to the development of the country.54

Noteworthy here is that the Indian political elites in 2008 recognized the significant loss the country was incurring by overlooking the traits and skills that were critical for promoting India-U.S. bilateral economic relations. The use of those skills became central in elite views for improving those bilateral relations.

Echoing such views, the BJP in its National Executive meeting articulated,

“India-US relationship is a vital relationship for us,”55 and then further continued,

“we have full faith in the capacities of our hard working businessmen and traders, innovative managers, professionals, and talented scientists to achieve this goal.”56

Significant in such political party formulations was the heightened attention paid to the middle-class traits and the impediments to improve India-U.S. economic relations. This attention focused on two main obstacles for the improvement of bilateral relations.

First, political elites and their parties realized that there was a tremendous reserve of untapped hardworking people with creative skills which could be profitably employed to improve India‟s relations with the U.S. Such a realization that India had a pool of talented, skilled managers and scientists could be used to build strong ties between the two states. There was also the realization that use of these untapped skills required the creation of opportunities for their employment.

Therefore, in the same document, the party highlighted, "Upon coming to power,

54 Among others see Indersen (2001); Singh (2007); Advani (2008). 55 See the BJP National Executive statement on Foreign Policy and National Security (July 2, 2008) http://www.bjp.org/content/view/856/376/ (accessed 9/17/2010). 56 http://www.bjp.org/content/view/765/428/ (accessed 9/17/2010). 183

the BJP will pursue income-generating and employment-creating policies for the middle-class.” India‟s political elites, as indicated through my discourse analysis, evinced a focused attention to the untapped potential of the middle-class and to the obstacles it faced in employing its technical skills. For the first time, the political elites publically acknowledged the contributions that the middle-class could make to India‟s foreign economic development.57

Such BJP views about the critical role of middle-class traits of initiative- taking, achievement-orientation, and technological proficiency in improving vital

India-U.S. relations found wide resonance across political parties. While advocating the strengthening of ties with the United States in 2008, the Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh outlined significant measures to radically enhance

India‟s technical education. In this speech, the Prime Minister focused overwhelmingly on setting up colleges for basic technical training. He announced that the government will start thirty new universities, eight new world-class

Indian Institutes of Technology, seven management institutes, along with one thousand technical colleges.58 In this speech, designed to highlight the significance of strengthening ties with the United States, the Prime Minister spent a considerable time on building India‟s technical competence. Specifically, the speech drew extensively on the hardworking middle-class discourse in which the

United States symbolized a steppingstone to secure access to technical education.

57 For an accessible discussion of the obstacles for the use of Indian middle-class skills, see Khanna (2007: 31-53); Mukherji (2008: 316-317). For journalistic accounts of such impediments faced by the middle-class professionals, see Meredith (2007: chaps 2, 4, 6); Lewis (2008). 58 See Prime Minister Singh’s speech here: http://www.congress.org.in/new/home- layout.php?id=58 (accessed September 11, 2010). 184

In this discourse, access to such education became framed as opening a door to opportunities for competing in the world economy. In the past the Indian middle- class received technical education in America and then contributed to the world economy.59 In 2008, India was preparing to impart that technical education at home in order to compete successfully in the American market. Thus, India had to strengthen its technical base to gain entry into the American market.60 Therefore, the Indian elite views about improving bilateral relations with the United States included a significant role for technical education.

Noteworthy is that these elements of the middle-class discourse were widely shared among individual members of that group. Two of the items on my survey asked middle-class members about the correlation between their hardworking traits and American investment in India. A crosstabulation of the two responses shows a high correlation between middle-class hardworking traits and American investment in India. Those who treated the traits of hard work in their lives as very important were overwhelmingly positive about the benefits of

American investment for the middle-class. Out of 804 respondents, 561 (69.8 percent) viewed American investment as being good for that group. Certainly, the elite pronouncements about building strong India-U.S. economic relations were significantly drawn from the country‟s middle-class. The survey results also showed that even those who considered hardworking traits only somewhat important in their lives were still quite positive about the increasing investment

59 Prestovitz (2005: chap 4-5); Nilekani (2009). 60 For a cogent discussion of the relevance of economic conditions in improving India-U.S. relations, see Kapur and Ganguly (2007: 648-649); Mukherjee (2009: 15-23). 185

from the United States. Out of 804 respondents, those who treated traits of hardwork as only somewhat important in their lives 81 (10.1 percent) still considered this investment as being positive for the social group. Significant here is that a large number of respondents, who thought the traits of hardwork were very important, also viewed American investment as bad for the middle-class.

83(10.3 percent) out of 804, considered middle-class traits very important, but at the same time viewed American investment as bad for the country. This middle- class group represents the values of the old, past-oriented, and ideologically- motivated cluster, which is opposed American investment.

Table 6.5. Correlation of India’s Middle Class Values of Hard Work and Support for Foreign Investment

Q13.A lot of American companies are coming to India these days. Do you think it is good or bad for the middle class that foreign companies are investing in India? How important do you think the Pearson following aspects are for Correlation -0.154(**) improving middle class life?- Hard work Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 804 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).61

61 See Addendum D for raw data in this table. 186

Furthermore, another item on my survey quizzed respondents about the value of India‟s growing trade with the United States. Out of total 804 respondents, 122 (15.2 percent) considered it very good and only 38 (4.7 percent) evaluated it as being very bad for the middle-class. 70 respondents (8.7 percent) considered the growing India-U.S. trade as being bad for the middle-class.

Noteworthy is that an overwhelming majority 573 (71.2 percent) viewed this growing trade between India and the United States as being good for the middle- class. These survey results correlate strongly with bilateral trade patterns over the years. Table 6.6 shows that Indian exports to the United States present a pattern of growth over the years. For the years since data has been made available, India-

U.S. trade, both exports and imports, has grown, peeking in 2008.

Table 6.6. "Trade in Goods with India" (in billions of dollars) Year U.S. Imports to India Indian Exports to U.S. Balance 2000 3,667.3 10,686.6 -7,019.3 2001 3,757.0 9,737.3 -5,980.3 2002 4,101.0 11,818.4 -7,717.4 2003 4,979.7 13,055.3 -8,075.6 2004 6,109.4 15,572.0 -9,462.7 2005 7,918.6 18,804.2 -10,885.6 2006 9,673.6 21,830.8 -12,157.3 2007 14,968.8 24,073.3 -9,104.4 2008 17,682.1 25,704.4 -8,022.3 2009 16,441.4 21,166.0 -4,724.6 2010 19,250.1 29,532.6 -10,282.5 2011 21,627.6 36,167.4 -14,539.8

Source: United States Department of Commerce

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Given such growing patterns of India-U.S. economic relations and the widespread Indian middle-class discourse of sharing American values, I conclude that India‟s economic foreign policies toward the United States in 2008 were strongly shaped by the hardworking middle-class discourse. Significant in this discourse is that one does not find the desire to fast-track India into the future.

The focus in this middle-class discourse was to improve the country‟s present conditions. As I observed earlier, these conditions in the present relate to removing barriers to using middle-class traits, establishing new technical colleges, and improving economic relations with the United States. Such tying of middle- class traits and their technical education with promoting trade with the United

States demonstrate a strong pragmatic middle-class tendency to focus on the present situation. This group confronted the lack of opportunities to use its skills for country‟s development. Furthermore, the focus in this discourse was not on reaching to an affluent future and thus, restoring India to its “glorious past,” but the focus was overwhelmingly on improving the country‟s economic relations with the most developed state in the contemporary world.

My conclusion that hardworking middle-class discourse influenced India-

U.S. bilateral economic relations follows from the discourse analysis and the subsequent survey results. These results show a strong correlation between India‟s middle-class identity and the promotion of India-U.S. economic relations. These findings also show the clear influence of this discourse on the elites‟ thoughts and decisions regarding policy options about that bilateral relationship. Thus, following the framework of this dissertation, domestic discourse functioned as the

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independent variable, elites as the intervening variable, and the economic foreign policy as the dependent variable in this chapter.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I analyzed the effects of middle-class discourse on the India-

U.S. economic foreign policy. The chapter focused on two main clusters of middle-class discourse and showed that it was the second discourse, the hardworking discourse, which generated the most significant impact on India-U.S. economic relations. There are two main contributions of such a study of discourse-driven research to India-U.S. economic relations. First, the findings of this research demonstrate contestations in middle-class influences on bilateral relations, as opposed to an intuitively assumed and uniform impact of this social group. The significant finding is that the variations in the discourse demonstrate that there is not a single, invariant interest of the Indian middle-class in promoting economic bilateral relations between India and the United States. Instead, my findings show that the overambitious and pragmatic segments of the middle-class converge on promoting India-U.S. economic relations, but vary in their motivations and strategies. Whereas the pragmatic discourse is motivated by the considerations of promoting domestic economic development by using middle- class skills, the overambitious discourse is driven by advancing to an affluent economic status by escaping into the future.

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Second, this chapter demonstrated the importance of a domestic constructivist framework for analyzing the economic policies of India toward the

United States: the country with which the Indian middle-class most readily identified and the issue for which this group is most widely known. Given this finding, my research shows that the application of dominant neorealist, neoliberal, and systemic constructivist analyses of economic foreign policies in terms of the questions of “who governs” and “who benefits” is woefully inadequate. These theories proffer some international structures or political elites as the governors to maintain the existing system and thus, the objects of study. They also frame the middle-class as the exclusive beneficiaries of India‟s policies. My domestic constructivist framework, based on social cognitive discourses, enabled me to shift away from those static institutional and elite theories and toward analyzing the precariously situated middle-classes. Strictly speaking, this group is neither part of the elites nor is it part of the beneficiaries of state policies. My domestic constructivist approach offered a productive framework to study the impact of this precariously placed social group on the economic foreign policies of India toward the United States. In the next chapter, I will address the issue of India-U.S. climate change relations.

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Addendum C: Correlations of India‟s Middle-Class Values and American Middle-

Class Values

Question 1: How important do you think the following aspects are for improving middle-class life?-Hard work * Question 2: Now, I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements-Indian middle-class today is adopting American values Question 2:Now, I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements-Indian middle-class today is adopting American values Strongly Strongly disagree Disagree Agree agree Total Question 1:How Not important 3 2 6 0 11 important do Somewhat not 0 7 21 1 29 you think the important following Somewhat 4 16 61 23 104 aspects are for important improving Very important 8 66 495 90 659 middle-class No Opinion life?-Hard work 0 0 1 0 1 Total 15 91 584 114 804

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Addendum D: Correlations of India‟s Middle-Class Values and Foreign

Investment

Question 1: How important do you think the following aspects are for improving middle-class life?-Hard work * Question 2: Lot of American companies are coming to India these days. Do you think it is good or bad for the middle-class that foreign companies are investing in India? Question 2: A lot of American companies are coming to India these days. Do you think it is good or bad for the middle-class that foreign companies are investing in India? It is bad for It is good for the middle- the middle- class class Not sure Total Question 1: Not important 4 3 4 11 How important Somewhat not 7 18 4 29 do you think important the following Somewhat 20 81 3 104 aspects are for important improving Very important 83 561 15 659 middle-class No Opinion life?-Hard work 0 1 0 1 Total 114 664 26 804

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Chapter 7: India‟s Constraints in the U.S.-India Climate Change Agreement: The

Impact of Shifting Middle-Class Consensus

“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal. Most of the observed increase in the globally averaged temperatures since mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed GHG anthropogenic concentrations” —Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007)1

“India‟s role has become crucial for dealing with the issue of climate change” —India‟s Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee (2008)2

Introduction

In this chapter I address a substantive foreign policy puzzle: how and why

India‟s accommodative climate change policy with the United States became a possible option. This was despite opposing preferences of a large segment of the

Indian elite for rejecting any cooperation or favoring full cooperation over climate change.3 To reject the United States‟ preferred preference that India accept the principle of common responsibility,4 and instead accommodate the American position through limited but unilateral measures. This indeed, marked the most concrete manifestation of India‟s changing policy in this climate change issue- area. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that climate change remains a non-

1 See the synthesis of the 4th IPCC report, released for policy makers (November 17, 2007). 2 Mukherjee (2008: 14). 3 In this chapter, the term “climate change” means the emission of certain greenhouse gases (GHG) into the environment that have multiple effects, including an increase in earth’s temperature with its attendant consequences. For the definition of climate change used in various international climate negotiations, see the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997). 4 Schaffer (2009a: 81-84); Martin et al. (2007: 10). 193

issue for India‟s political elites5 and the Indian public have little role in influencing the country‟s foreign policy in this issue area,6 I posit that India‟s middle-class significantly influenced country‟s bilateral relations with the United

States over climate change.

In hypothesizing identity as a cause of India‟s accommodative foreign policy outcome with the United States over climate change, I am arguing that social cognitive identities inside the Indian state make one set of foreign policy outcomes more viable than others, hence producing differentiated outcomes in the country‟s foreign policies. Testing of this hypothesis reveals significant correlations between India‟s position on climate change toward the United States and its domestic identities. In this context, Billett highlights that the climate change does not exist in isolation from society. He argued, “information and knowledge about the physical world are part of a social chamber, in which they are interpreted in the context of specific social values and cultural norms.”7 Thus, discursive contexts of society affect social and climate change. In my domestic constructivist framework, the processes of domestic identity formation constrain some and enable other foreign policy outcomes.8 My claim here is twofold. First, the dominant discourse of identity shapes India‟s foreign policy option of accommodating the American demands for greater responsibility with regard to climate change mitigation, albeit in a limited sense. Second, the individual

5 Shearman and Smith (2007). 6 For excellent reviews of the political elites’ engagements with India’s climate issues, see Prabhu (2012: 231-245); Ramesh (2012: x-xvii). 7 Billett (2010:2). 8 Abdelal (2005: 20-21); Hopf (1998: 175-176); Larson (1997: 2-5). 194

cognitive capacity of citizens to comprehend the dominant discourses defines the level of agreement or disagreement within the discourses that set important limits on the decisions of elites concerning foreign policy outcomes. In other words, this chapter also follows the framework used in rest of the dissertation: the middle- class social cognitive identity is the independent variable, elite decision making is the intervening variable, and the foreign policy outcome is the dependent variable.

According to my conceptual framework, the Indian middle-class identity shapes the foreign policy elites‟ decision-making environment, which, in turn, generates specific foreign-policy outcomes. Similar to other empirical chapters, this chapter presents the influences of the three discursive clusters of middle-class identity within India, each of which had different content and divergent time horizons for their roles and status. These discourses shaped the elites‟ decision- making processes about climate change. In the context of cooperating with the

United States over climate change, India faced three options. First, India faced the option of insisting on the common but differentiated responsibility, based on fairness and equity in resource use and, thus, rejecting any agreement with the

United States. Second, India had the option of accepting the common responsibility principle without compensatory resources to sign an agreement with the United States. Finally, India could pressure the United States to accept the principle of differentiated responsibility but with a maneuverability for unilateral actions. These three options map fairly closely onto the discursive identity clusters of the middle-class, in terms of providing content for the foreign policy elites‟ decision-making. This environment predisposed elites toward one

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set of policy options over others with regard to the climate change issue. The differences in the content and time horizons of each identity cluster generated contestation in the elites‟ policy preferences, which shaped the final outcome of the India-U.S. climate agreement.

The disillusioned middle-class discourse revolved around the slogan, “it‟s an unfair world!” in which India‟s foreign policy had to reject any agreement with the United States. I lay out this discourse in the first section of the chapter. The overambitious middle-class discourse centered on the slogan, “it‟s our turn!” meaning that India had to join hands with the United States to bring the benefits of an advanced lifestyle to India. I present this middle-class discourse in the second section. Finally, the pragmatic middle-class discourse focuses on the idea

“it‟s our opportunity!” that revolves around gaining access to the American financial and technological resources through an agreement but using indigenous talent to adapt them to the Indian conditions. I describe this middle-class discourse in the third section of the chapter. Rejecting the options of “no responsibility” and accepting “common responsibility,” India and the United

States reached an understanding in the form of common but differentiated responsibility, with unilateral actions of the former.

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Importance of Climate Change in the India-U.S. Strategic Partnership

The India-U.S. strategic partnership has been one of the most visible changes in twenty-first century international relations,9 but the two countries continue to be poles apart over the nature of climate change and the measures for remedying its effects. Both states proffer different solutions to the problem of climate change. Each state views the other as a poster-child for major hurdles to conclude an international agreement. India accepts that responding to climate change is vital for the future of the world,10 but that it is mainly the responsibility of the developed states.11 It considers the United States as the archetype of developed states, unwilling to accept any responsibility for the adverse consequences of indiscriminate industrialization.12 In this Indian view, such cumulative responsibility of polluting the environment and, thus, cleaning it must be shared by the developed states in general and the United States in particular. In this conception, however, developing countries like India must not be overburdened by climate change responsibility, which would undermine their capacity to achieve development. From this perspective, India resists the imposition of any binding responsibilities for greenhouse gas emission reductions.13

9 Feigenbaum (2010); Mistry (2006); Tellis (2009). 10 See the Indian government’s position paper on climate change (2008). 11 India reiterates this position first included in the UNFCC (1992) that exempted developing states from the responsibility of any binding commitments and made developed countries or annex I states to take active measures to overcome climate change problems. For an Indian reiteration of this stance, see the National Action Plan on Climate Change or NAPCC (2008). For the international position on this issue, see the UNFCC document (1992). 12 Dubash (2012); Sengupta (2012: 113-114). 13 See Schaffer (2009A: 82; 2009B: 198-203). 197

8 7 2000, 7.0 2009, 6.6 6 1990, 6.2 5 4

3 GHG (Billion Tons) (Billion GHG 2 2007, 1.9 1 1994, 1.2 0 India 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 United States Year

Figure 1: India-U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Sources: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate (2007) and Stockholm Institute for Environment Policy Brief (2010)

However, the United States views India as a poster-child for large, industrializing developing states, contributing significantly to current greenhouse gases.14 In this American view, India is not only emitting large amounts of greenhouse gases in the present but is also bound to contribute to much higher levels of emissions in the future. These future emissions will come from its rapid industrialization and economic growth. Consequently, the United States contends that India must accept responsibilities to mitigate effects of climate change. In practical terms, any agreement that does not carry responsibilities for states as large as India faces tremendous challenges in American domestic politics. The

U.S. is concerned that any agreement, which imposes no obligations on

14 Martin (2007: 3); Schaffer (2009a: 82). 198

developing states like India for climate change, would contribute to the flight of

American investments overseas and thus, job losses at home.15 It was precisely the absence of any binding responsibilities for the developing states under the

Kyoto Protocol that made it extremely unpopular in the American Congress.16 For these reasons, the U.S. wanted to ensure that India did not remain part of the climate change problem and instead became part of the solution.17

It is clear from the forgoing discussion that the disagreement between

India and the United States boils down to a main sticking point about climate change: the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.18 In international climate change negotiations, the application of this responsibility principle to a country has thus far been contingent upon whether a state belonged to a developed or developing category. This principle means that while all states, developing and developed, have responsibilities for monitoring and reporting their emissions, only developed states have the obligation to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions.19 Although there are multiple responses to climate change, the issue has attracted three main responses to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility from India: binding obligations, differentiated obligations, and differentiated but unilateral obligations. It is this shift in India‟s position over climate change from differentiated responsibilities to differentiated but unilateral

15 See the Senate resolution passed in the 105th Congress’ first session that rejected the Kyoto Protocol on July 25, 1997, known as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution here: http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html (accessed April 10, 2012). 16 Ghosh (2012: 158); Schaffer (2009A: 83). 17 See Schaffer (2009A: 83-84). 18 See UNFCC and Kyoto Protocol. 19 See CRS Report for Congress prepared by Martin Fletcher RL34260 (2007: 2). 199

responsibilities that one observes the biggest shift since the Kyoto Protocol, which in turn, produced cooperation between India and the United States, albeit a nascent one.

Prior to 2008, India clearly aligned with the developing states and argued forcefully in favor of an exemption from binding responsibility for addressing climate change. The core of India‟s argument related with the cumulative responsibility of developed states. In this argument, the developed countries were responsible for emitting greenhouse gases over the past two hundred years. In other words, India argued that the United States, along with other developed states, would assume the responsibility for accepting binding commitments for the reduction of greenhouse gases. On the contrary, India would not accept binding commitments for those greenhouse gas emissions because it was relatively new to industrialization. However, India and the United States considerably narrowed their differences in 2008. India took unilateral measures to impose GHG emission cuts.20 These GHG reduction measures included identification and acceptance of eight national goals for promoting environment-friendly technologies and economic development.21 Specifically, two of these eight national missions dealt directly with climate change measures. Accompanying these measures, India‟s

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also made a unilateral announcement that his

20 There are emerging accounts of the reasons for India’s position remaining solidly in favor of developing states. Sengupta (2012: 113-114) claims that a narrow constituency of climate negotiators, scientists, and environmentally-concerned non-governmental organizations monopolized the discourse in the past. Since early 2007 and particularly in 2008, the discourses in the popular arena became widespread and popular inputs became particularly important in shaping elite views. 21 See the National Action Plan on Climate Change, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change (2008). 200

country‟s greenhouse gas emissions would never exceed that of the developed states.22

The United States also accommodated India‟s stance on pressuring developed countries to supply technical and financial aid to developing countries for addressing climate change.23 In particular, President Bush accepted that climate change was a global problem and the United States as a developed country had to play a leading role in its solution in November of 2007. To demonstrate his country‟s commitment, President Bush further highlighted that his country had spent more than 20 billion dollars between 2001 and 2007 on climate change issues.24 Moreover, the United States took several initiatives for the transfer of technological and financial resources to developing countries like

India to deal with climate change problems. In particular, the United States formed the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.25

In this chapter, I argue that such a shift in India‟s climate change policy in relation to the United States occurred under India‟s middle class pressure.

Specifically, the discourses and individual preferences of the middle-class generated a domestic intersubjective structure in which the decision makers became predisposed toward the principle of differentiated responsibility but with maneuverability for unilateral actions in the climate issue-area. This generated a

22 See the Indian Prime Minister’s intervention at the climate change meeting at Heiligenbamm, Germany (June 8, 2007) http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=515712895 (accessed May 12, 2012). 23 See the joint communiqué, “U.S.-India Partnership to Advance Climate Change” (July 19, 2011) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168743.htm (accessed March 19, 2012). 24 Eastin et al. (2008: 22-23). 25 http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx (accessed May 12, 2012). 201

nascent but important shift in India‟s policy preference as opposed to the country‟s traditional stance of no responsibility in mitigating climate change.

I. “It‟s an Unfair World!”26 India‟s Disillusioned Middle-Class and the

Differentiated Responsibility in Climate Change

In 2008 India and the United States undertook a flurry of diplomatic activities to improve their bilateral relations, including the thorny nuclear issue, but they made only limited progress in bridging their differences over the issue of climate change. I argue here that this failure to arrive at a mutually agreeable position stems from India‟s middle-class influence on the country‟s political elites to insist on a “development first” strategy. In this chapter, I bracket American politics and focus on the Indian side of the equation to demonstrate ways in which

India‟s middle-class shaped the elites‟ worldviews on climate change. These ideas and worldviews constrained elites to conclude a mutually-beneficial agreement with the United States over climate change. Both India and the United States had been participating in international global negotiations for the past two decades, but did not bridge their differences over the issue of climate change. The problem arose, I argue in this section, from a considerable influence of the disillusioned

Indian middle-class on its political elites. The elite worldviews and decisions had been shaped by a pervasive discourse of equity over the causes and consequences of climate change.

26 For using this term to describe development-first advocates in India, see Dubash (2012: 203). 202

In this discourse, the problem of climate change originated from the developed countries‟ indiscriminate carbon and other gase emissions into the atmosphere.27 The consequences of these changes in climate were particularly negative because they deprived people of their existing livelihoods, destabilized life patterns, and adversely affected future plans.28 In this discourse, the causes of climate change originated from the absence of equity and fairness principles in modern development strategies. Such disregarding of equity and fairness principles occurred because of the ostentatious lifestyles of the few. Such lifestyles siphoned off precious resources from developing states like India to developed countries such as the United States, perpetuating the backward status of developing countries.29 Given such irresponsible use of precious resources by a few and their adverse consequences for many, the American insistence on making

India bear the burden of climate change violated the basic principle of equity.

This equity principle was violated mainly because of the insistence of the United

States on disproportionately large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions from late- industrializing, developing countries on the basis of their current emissions. In this discourse, India was a developing country and could not afford to forgo its industrialization and development in the name of climate change.30

On the contrary, there was a strong sentiment that India demand acceptance of the historical responsibility of the developed countries for releasing disproportionate amounts of greenhouse gases. Thus, there was a strong sentiment

27 Scholz (2008: 40); Billett (2010: 15). 28 Billett (10: 11). 29 See Panagariya (2009: 1, 67, 80-82). 30 For an excellent analysis of this point, see Panagariya (2009: 64-66). 203

in the discourse that the developed states should compensate developing countries by offering technical and financial assistance.31 To secure such compensation, a segment of the Indian elites insisted on the strict implementation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, outlined in the United Nations

Framework on Climate Change. Implication of this implementation of the principle was that India‟s responsibility would be different from that of the United

States. More specifically, in India‟s elite worldview, cooperation with the United

States would fundamentally be a breach of the principle of equity and fairness.

Thus, the solution to the problem of climate change lay in actively seeking the acceptance of the principle of equity in the form of “development first.”32

Table 7.2. Middle-Class Discursive Components Identities Constituent Components Disillusioned Middle Longing for the past, stable life, sense of Class architecting a new civilization.

Despite significant diplomatic India-U.S. activities in 2008,33 the bilateral negotiations over climate change did not witness much progress. My findings show that the middle-class discourse of equity and justice concerning the development strategy introduced important nuances in the India-U.S. climate change policy preferences. The disillusioned middle-class‟s influence on minority

31 Sengupta (2012: 112). 32 Dubash (2012: 203). 33 Feigenbaum (2010); Tellis (2009). 204

but vocal political elites turned this issue into a problem; this middle-class discourse introduced issues of equity and justice in addressing climate change.

This political stance centered on two main arguments: India‟s insistence that the

United States accept its historical responsibility of emitting greenhouse gases

(GHG) into the atmosphere, and uphold the principle of differentiated responsibility.34

While aimed at exciting its popular base, the CPI (M)35 promised,

“comprehensive steps will be taken to protect the environment. Development programs will take into account the necessity to sustain the ecological balance.”36

In this worldview, there was a strong correlation between environmental protection and the development strategy. The elites relied heavily on something known as “limit-to-growth” strategy, centered on the argument that uncontrolled growth of economic development would lead to environmental collapse.37 More specifically, these arguments highlighted that the current, private market-based resource utilization would lead to catastrophic consequences for the environment.38 This strategy strongly influenced India‟s disillusioned middle class elites, who argued that avoidance of such adverse consequences would involve the alteration of that country‟s resource use patterns. In this elite

34 For a general statement that the U.S. standing among foreign public declines and the consequent popular support for cooperation with it suffers when the U.S. is perceived as not playing by the rules, applying double standards, and engaging in hypocrisy. For an excellent exposition of this point, see APSA report “U.S. Standing in the World,” (2009: 8). 35 Note the abbreviation CPI stands for the Communist Party of India and (M) refers to its Marxist leaning. This is a Left-leaning political party which supported the Congress-led government without formally joining that government in 2007-2008. 36 Communist Party of India (Marxist) election manifesto (2009: 30). 37 For an extensive discussion of this Limit-to-Growth or “LtG” strategy in the context of environmental policy in 1970s, see Eastin, and associates (2010: 17-19). 38 Eastin and associates (2010: 18). 205

worldview, India‟s contemporary economic development under neoliberal policies were producing adverse consequences for the domestic climate and global environment.39 In other words, there was a strong understanding among these elites that such changes would lead to equity-based economic development that would help minimize climate change as well as ensure India‟s development.

This political stance had two specific implications. First, despite tremendous external pressure to shift India‟s support away from the differentiated responsibility principle concerning climate change, the disillusioned middle class elites continued to argue that any cooperation over the issue with the United

States would aggravate the problem. In this respect, India‟s emulation of the

American development model would aggravate the problem. Specifically, climate change was a negative consequence of the Indian contemporary development policies that accorded privileged positions to the private sector. Therefore, these elites considered India‟s long and existing official stance of common but differentiated responsibility on climate change as the best outcome for India.40

Implying that the rest of the political spectrum, including the BJP and Congress

Party, treated the problem of climate change in a piecemeal fashion, the CPIM expressed a strong commitment to address the situation through wide-ranging measures.

This elite view about climate change stemmed from a widespread middle class discourse. In this discourse, the adoption of an American development model disrupted the stable life under the earlier government-run development

39 Dubash (2012: 200-201). 40 Sengupta (2012: 113-114). 206

strategy. This produced adverse consequences for climate. These consequences created a “crisis of faith”41 in the country‟s development strategy or simply led to reckless exploitation of the natural environment.42 This exploitation originated from misguided steps that disconnected people from their surroundings. The adverse consequences of such disconnect became manifest in peoples‟ negative orientations toward climate change measures. The newspaper, Times of India highlighted that the crisis of faith in the current climate change measures demonstrated that it was a wrong turn to adopt a development strategy that overlooked the interests of people who lived closest to the natural resources.43 Aaj

Tak devoted a half hour TV program to the analysis of negative results of the indiscriminate privatization of the economy for climate change. In its report, the news channel highlighted, “people‟s stable life patterns have been upset; their precious earnings have been washed away from unseasonal floods and perished in prolonged droughts.”44

As the television channel, Aaj Tak highlighted that these climatic vagaries wrought unseasonably high levels of flood in the city of Mumbai in 2005 (Revi,

2005) and the devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 in

Gandhinagar, that negatively upset the pattern of middle class life. The stable life patterns of these people were vulnerable to such changes on two accounts. First, indiscriminate development spearheaded by private companies overlooked many of the basic requirements of urban life. The imperatives of water, sanitation,

41 The Times of India (October 1, 2008). 42 The Times of India (July 11, 2008). 43 Ibid. 44 Aaj Tak (February 5, 2008). 207

drainage, power, and equitable land access to most of the city dwellers fell disproportionately on the middle-class.45 Second, climate changes put a heavy drain on limited middle class economic resources. Droughts and floods reduced the availability of drinking water and increased food and fuel prices.46

Moreover, Indian elites also insisted that the United States accept its historical responsibility for emitting disproportionately large amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Thus, the United States should compensate

India as a developing state for bearing the consequences of climate change.47

These issues went to the heart of India‟s concerns for equity and justice in climate change diplomacy. The obstinate stance of the United States toward climate change, according to the CPI (M), originated from that country‟s refusal to deal with the problem on an equitable basis.48 American rejection of the equity principle in ameliorating the problem of climate change disproportionately affected the middle-class. The party forcefully argued that the middle-class suffered the consequences of climate change due to ever-increasing prices, mounting unemployment, and the destruction of living facilities.49 In particular, these harsh results stemmed directly from the growing floods and droughts in large urban areas that originated from the accumulated problem of climate change.

45 Revi (2008: 211). 46 Revi (2008: 2011-213). 47 Panagariya (2009: 1, 67, 80-82). 48 See CPI (M) Manifesto (2009: 34); Karat 2007: 97-99). 49 CPI (M) manifesto (2009: 35). 208

This equity-based argument emphasized the principle of differentiated responsibility in dealing with the climate change issue. India, along with other developed countries, succeeded in including article 3.1 of the United Nations

Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC). This principle remained India‟s familiar position in negotiating with the United States until 2008. This stance originated from a widespread consensus inside India, that the United States often came to be characterized as obstinate, and the most hostile country to the differentiated responsibility principle.50 In this elite worldview, such obstinacy of the United States stemmed from its negative attitude to India‟s development imperatives and the consequent increasing greenhouse gas emissions. More specifically, India‟s increasing greenhouse gases were certainly rising, but this growth had been to bring much needed development to vast numbers of people. In this view, the United States, along with other developed countries, must accept the responsibility of emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere51 In this elite worldview, speeches like the one delivered by Indira Gandhi at the United

Nations in 1972 repeatedly surfaced, emphasizing that the environment could not be improved in conditions of economic scarcity.52

There were two specific elements of this political stance that remained prominent in the political discourse. First, the idea of building a new civilization formed the core of India‟s argument that poverty alleviation or development was

50 Sengupta 2012: 113). 51 For a succinct recap of this view, see the CRS report (2009) 62. Also see the Indian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Climate Negotiations Shyam Saran’s speech “Climate Change: Will India’s Growth Story Confront a New Constraint?” (July 26, 2008): http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=515714101 (accessed May 8, 2012). 52 Quoted in Billett (2010: 3). 209

the paramount goal of the country, and that taking on an additional burden under such conditions would severely impede the achievement of those goals. These goals would serve as signposts for the country in pursuing negotiations with the

United States over climate change. In this elite view, the United States, as the leader of developed countries, sought to impose a form of exploitative system popularly known as “carbon colonialism.”53 This carbon colonialism perpetuated the economic gap between developing and developed states in the name of limiting carbon-generated gases in the atmosphere. Thus, in adopting this national defensive stance, India heavily relied on the argument that the protection of disillusioned middle-class interests was the real focus of the country in climate change negotiations with the United States.

Second, the implications of Indira Gandhi‟s statement about equity in climate change was based in the removal of historically accumulated economic backwardness of India. This continued to resonate with several succeeding generations of disillusioned middle-class elites. One of India‟s delegates at the

United Nations in 1991 argued, “if the per capita emissions of all countries had been on the same level, as that of the developing states, the world would not have faced the threat of global warming.”54 In this discourse, the United States appeared as a poster-child for setting off the challenge of global ecological threat.

This threat originated from misguided neoliberal economic policies. These policies were first implemented in a U.S. focused exclusively on profit motive,

53 Agrawal and Raina (1991; 2006). 54 The Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India, Statement of Indian delegates to the United Nations IPCC (1991). 210

and then were adopted by India under pressure from America. The private- market, profit-motive-oriented domestic policies aggravated the threat to India‟s ecological system. The policy of indiscriminate privatization of public sector industries contributed to the destabilization of India‟s fragile ecological balance.

In this discourse, the United States pressured successive governments under the

BJP and the Congress Party to lower environmental standards for establishing new industries. These new industries were predominantly set up as private enterprises, in which the government‟s ability to supervise and monitor standards of climate change was seriously restricted. From such reduced supervision, it was the American companies that overwhelmingly benefited. (Cites)

To reduce adverse effects of climate change, in this view, required the use of sophisticated modern Indian technology. Such access to modern technology could be secured by using public sector industries. Public sector inputs and initiative for addressing developmental problems could reduce the adverse effects of climate change on India. In this discourse, there was strong sentiment in favor of returning to India‟s quazi-socialist, government-driven economic development.

The “government power plant,” or other such industrial plants, became central to overcoming the effects of climate change. Thus, it was only the government that could adopt a set of policies to overcome climate change problems.55

As a consequence, this disillusioned middle-class discourse influenced

India‟s one segment of elite worldviews about the threat of climate change and the country‟s policy options toward the United States. Prakash Karat, the General

55 For different middle-class views on the government’s role in protecting environment, see Mawdsley (2004: 91-92). 211

Secretary of the CPI (M), argued forcefully to reject any cooperation with the

United States in tackling the problem of climate change. “Criminals cannot be allowed to set the rules for others when they already have stain of polluting the environment.”56 There was tremendous opposition to cooperate with the United

States over these climate change issues in this segment of the political spectrum of the country. Thus, there was overwhelming support to maintain India‟s traditional stance of privileging “development first” strategy to reject binding greenhouse gas emission targets in any agreement with the United States.

II. “It‟s Our Turn!”57 Overambitious Middle-Class and India‟s Differentiated but

Unilateral Cooperation over Climate Change

In 2008, the second dominant cluster in the middle-class discourse that focused on making the future better, significantly shaped India‟s elite decisions about climate change. This middle-class strand influenced one segment of elites‟ decisions toward maintaining the principle of differentiated responsibility but focusing on assuming greater obligation through unilateral actions. In this decision, political elites became influenced by an overambitious middle-class discourse, focused on achieving a developed country status for India. This rendered some elite decisions as non-viable and others as viable. The non-viable decisions were to remain with India‟s traditional stance of common but differentiated responsibility. This responsibility allowed India and other

56 See Karat’s personal memoirs (2007: 11, 49). 57 Dubash (2012: 205). 212

developing states to remain free of any obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this option, the responsibility of addressing the climate change laid exclusively with the developed states like the U.S. This insistence on India‟s traditional position became increasingly untenable and found little resonance in one segment of the popular discourse. This popular discourse pressured the country‟s political elites to adopt new options. The new and viable elite options were to accept India‟s responsibility in climate change and opt for an active role in addressing the related issues.

Table 7.3. Overambitious Middle-Class Discursive Components Identities Constituent components Making Future Better High aspirations, acute sense of future, over-ambitious, maturing, and idealist.

In this active Indian stance in negotiations with the United States over climate change, the overambitious middle-class discourse significantly shaped elite thoughts and decisions. In shifting the country‟s stance from total rejection of no responsibility to accepting binding commitments for reducing gas emissions at home and cooperating actively with the United States in international organizations, the Indian political elites repeatedly returned to the overambitious middle-class discourse to buttress their decisions. There emerged a powerful set of elite preferences that marked a substantive shift in India‟s traditional response

213

to the issue. This shift included the Environment and Forest Minister‟s desire to move from being part of the problem to being part of the solution, as well as many opposition leaders‟ advocacy of shifting the country‟s climate policy to being more receptive to the United States position (description to follow later in this section).

In this overambitious middle-class discourse, the United States was understood as the future country that India aspired to become. In my discourse analysis, this sentiment of embodying the United States in the future became particularly significant. This included embodying behavior and wealth of the

United States. Specifically, the United States used its power to bolster its position in climate change negotiations, and at the same time maintained a luxurious life style. The prospect of India doing the same in the future acquired a palpable meaning. Arun Shouri, the outspoken opponent of the ruling party, argued, “far from arresting growth, steps to preserve and restore the environment present a great economic opportunity for India.”58 This great economic opportunity, as

Shouri put it, had two main features about the country‟s new decision making stance. First, climate change became an issue India had to face without an option to jettison it from both domestic and international agendas. This option became unavailable to the country because of its manifest benefits. These benefits rendered untenable India‟s traditional policy of considering climate change as an obstacle to economic development. This position turned unsustainable because the decision makers had begun to view climate change very differently than before.

58 Arun Shouri, “Changing Course on Climate,” Indian Express (July 2, 2009) http://www.indianexpress.com/news/changing-course-on-climate/484211/0 214

The elite began to consider measures to remedy climate change, not as a drain on

India‟s scarce resources, but instead viewing it as an opportunity to address the country‟s developmental requirements.

Second, when Shouri framed the climate change issue as an opportunity, he was mindful that these measures would lift four hundred million people out of bleak economic conditions into a luxurious lifestyle. This lifestyle will be in the people‟s grasp when climate change measures generate wealth. Arun Shouri went on to say, “The nearest opportunity is afforded by two-trillion dollars in carbon trade of the Clean Development Mechanism.”59 This mechanism, designed to compensate developing countries for historical backwardness of their industrial development, would benefit the country in significant ways. Through these mechanisms, Indians would secure much needed resources from the United States to achieve their own economic development. It was precisely for these reasons that India became a prominent member of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, which became an important institutional structure to deal with climate change issues under American leadership. In this partnership, large countries like India became eligible to receive economic and institutional support for bolstering their measures to address climate change. With such clear benefits of addressing the issue actively, the Indian decision makers treated climate change opportunities they did not want to miss.

Such an elite worldview about considering climate change as an opportunity for producing a luxurious lifestyle originated from overambitious

59 Arun Shouri, “Changing Course on Climate,” Indian Express (July 2, 2009) http://www.indianexpress.com/news/changing-course-on-climate/484211/0 215

middle-class discourse. This ostentatious lifestyle concerned considerably altering existing natural conditions. The overwhelming sentiment was that the Americans overcome their adverse conditions and produce lifestyles unimaginable elsewhere.

This occurred despite apparently insurmountable obstacles in the past; what

Americans have generated something close to extraordinary. Consider how incredible it would be to create Monsoon-like rains in the desert of Rajastan,60 something simply magical for Indian citizens. Indian citizens began to yearn for such fantastic phenomena to overcome their extreme life conditions of record- breaking heat, frequent droughts, and growing desertification. My discourse reveals that Indian citizens evoke human courage and bravery to overcome natural phenomena in these conditions.61 As the newspaper reported, the story generated tremendous popular interest and made the desert state of Rajasthan the subject of immense popular admiration. This admiration, as one local witness of the

“magical Monsoon in Jaipur” highlighted, “we wish India could make this a reality.”62 This magical phenomena of producing rain in the desert region of India also meant that the country would have to change its old habit of “doing nothing to alter the nature” and to adopt a “girgit ki chal” or a chameleon-like strategy.63

This chameleon strategy in the popular discourse implied that changing the color and appearance according to one‟s conditions would produce an adaptation to the circumstances.64 The popular understanding of this strategy shed much of its

60 The Times of India (July 21, 2008). 61 Aaj Tak (February 5, 2008); The Times of India (October 11, 2008). 62 Aaj Tak (February 5, 2008; February 21, 2008). 63 Ibid. (February 21, 2008). 64 Ibid. (February 21, 2008). 216

negative connotation and carried significantly positive meanings of the word. The positive connotations related to human adaptability, bravery, and courage.65

India‟s political elites became discursively influenced by this chameleon strategy in significant ways. This realization became quite palpable in political circles concerned with climate change issues. Capturing this sentiment, the

Environment and Forest Minister (the foremost official on climate change negotiations with the United States) argued that India wanted to be part of the solution, and not the problem.66 This shift from being an ardent opponent of the existing climate change arrangements to desirous of being part of the solution had two main elements of middle-class‟s chameleon strategy. First, there was a strong realization in the political elites that India‟s traditional insistence on implementing the principle of differentiated responsibility for dealing with climate change had run its course. In particular, the country had to take into account its own growing greenhouse gas emissions in negotiations with the United States. Although much lower than the U.S., India‟s gas emissions had steadily increased since the principle of differentiated responsibility was first codified in the UNFCC (1992) and sanctified in the Kyoto Protocol (1997).

This changed the reality required for adapting a new strategy to address the issue. Such a strategy would be akin to working like a chameleon, adapting to new realities and taking measures to consciously alter its color and appearance.

This strong desire to alter its reality resides in a country no other than the United

States. Thus, the Forest and Environment Minister‟s argument that India needed

65 The Times of India (July 16, 2008); Rabne (2008). 66 Ramesh (2012: xx). 217

to be a part of the solution of climate change and not part of the problem became particularly significant. This new position over climate change is important when one considers that India‟s middle-class was strongly in favor of closer ties with the United States. In the discourses of this middle-class, the United States promoted many of the technological solutions to several world problems. One of these problems was climate change. The solution to this problem was the United

States‟ ability to encourage other countries to adopt its own position. Given the recent warming of relations between the United States and India, the latter would be served better by not opposing the former in climate change policy.67

Second, Indian decision makers became overawed by the United States‟ ability to create new institutional structures to initiate an alternative policy agenda. Specifically, India‟s decision makers were impressed with the creation of new international organizations like the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean

Technology and Climate68 and other Technological Initiatives to promote an alternative policy platform. These offered an alternative to the negotiations under the auspices of the UNFCC. Indian elites began to advocate for active participation in those initiatives under American leadership. They also expressed

India‟s agreement with the United States‟ position. India‟s elite discourse shifted from affixing sole responsibility to countries like the United States, to accepting

India‟s role in climate change. Specifically, this included not only accepting the

United States‟ long-held position that developing states like India should bear the

67 Raghunandan 2012: 175); Schaffer (2009a: 80). 68 See several projects initiated and completed under this program here: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/pr_cross_cutting_other.aspx#Project_1 (accessed May 12, 2012). 218

burden of tackling climate change issues, but it also made many unilateral decisions to adapt and mitigate the problem of climate change. To sum up, the overambitious middle-class discourse about future, American-style development shaped worldviews of a small but significant minority elite worldviews toward the

India-U.S. climate change agreement.

III. “It is our Opportunity!”69 Pragmatic Middle-Class and the Unilateral

Acceptance of Differentiated Responsibility

Contrary to disillusioned and overambitious middle-class discourses that influenced Indian elites‟ preferences toward the United States on climate change in opposing ways, there was yet another discourse which influenced India‟s elite preferences for accepting common but differentiated responsibility. This discourse was rooted in the middle-class segment that focused on the traits of hardwork, initiative-taking, and technological proficiency. A focus on these traits generated a discourse that centered on the significance of the “sustainable development.” This Indian middle-class discourse framed the United States as the only country capable of mitigating the adverse consequences of that challenge effectively. More specifically, India lacked the necessary technology to tackle the threat of climate change on its own, but the United States could aid the country in that effort.

69 Note that it is my twist on Dubash’s “It’s unfair World!” sentiment of India’s sustainable development advocates. (See Dubash (2012: 203). 219

The spate of diplomatic activities over climate change in 2008 witnessed a small but significant shift in India‟s policy options. This shift was from the country‟s traditional insistence on the principle of differentiated responsibility to unilateral actions for mitigating climate change. In this shift, India‟s elite worldviews and ideas centered on using middle-class traits to address climate change. More specifically, there was a growing realization among the Indian elites that their country could meet the challenge of climate change by using its middle-class traits. Use of these traits would put the country on a path of sustainable development; such development would require technological and financial transfers from developed countries. The United States was more readily forthcoming than other countries in sharing technological and financial resources with India. Thus, sustainable development formed India‟s core of climate negotiations with the United States, and this shift in elite worldviews emanated from India‟s pragmatic middle-class discourse.

Table 7.4. Hardworking Middle-Class Discursive Components Identities Constituent components

Hardworking Initiative-driven, achievement oriented, and technically

proficient.

220

In 2008 the India-U.S. bilateral cooperation over climate change witnessed a shift in India‟s position when its political elites started “rooting for climate change”70 and “warming up to climate change.”71 In this elite worldview, there was a discernible shift of focus from “development” to “sustainable development.” Sustainable development in India‟s climate change negotiations with the United States meant that India‟s development strategy would be fashioned in a manner that meets present requirements without compromising ability of future generations to fulfill their needs.72 In this Indian elite worldview, there was a growing preference for cooperation with the United States over climate change. This cooperation would produce positive outcomes for India if it used its middle-class traits of being initiative-driven and achievement oriented.

By benefiting from the use of these characteristics, according to Foreign Minister

Mukherjee, India was “warming up to climate change,” so to speak.73 Addressing a seminar at the Asia Society in New York, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed strong confidence in his fellow-Indians‟ ability to produce low-cost, sustainable solutions to the climate change problem. The Minister highlighted,

“promoting research and development and strengthening innovations” would be the national priority.74

70 The Times of India (January 6, 2008). 71 The Times of India (July 11, 2008). 72 Dubash (2012: 8). 73 See Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s speech to the Asia Society in New York (September 30, 2008). http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530114226 (accessed May 12, 2012). 74 Ibid. (September 30, 2008). 221

There were two aspects of this low-cost solution to climate change in

Indian elite policy preference. First, there was growing realization among political elites that efforts to provide affordable solutions to the climate change problem would rely heavily on the initiative-taking and achievement-oriented traits of the middle-class.75 In particular, the Foreign Minister touted his country‟s success in keeping its emission rates significantly behind the economic growth because of the country‟s hardworking inventers and engineers. Specifically, India‟s economy grew nearly eight percent per year but its emission intensity increased only four percent per year in that period.76 The report produced by the Pew Foundation further highlighted that India‟s greenhouse emissions were twenty percent lower than the world average and fifteen percent lower than the United States.77 The

Foreign Minister pointed out these low emissions in his speech to the Asia

Society. He asserted that the country‟s climate change national action plan depended heavily on middle-class talents for invention and research. This research and consequent solutions became attributable to India‟s hardworking scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs. This domestic pool of the hardworking middle-class significantly influenced Indian government strategy.78

Second, in undertaking such efforts to reduce emissions, India is already successful at significantly dealing with the problem. In particular, India had achieved high levels of improved energy efficiency, increased its use of

75 For growing literature on such middle-class-centered elite policies, see Fernandes (2004); Jefferlot (2008). 76 See PEW report “Climate Mitigation Measures in India,” International Brief 2, (September 8, 2008) p. 2. 77 PEW Report (2008: 1). 78 Bhushan (2009: 14). 222

renewable and nuclear power, expanded public transport, and affected better energy pricing.79 This approach of realizing the dual nature of greenhouse reduction measures is known in the climate change negotiations as the “co- benefits” that defined India‟s stance.80 The co-benefits of dealing with climate change means that solutions to the problem would produce positive results, as well as tackle the climate change challenge. In co-benefiting from the low-cost solutions to the problem, as the Foreign Minister said, India would rely on its middle-class. The solutions to climate change require a positive orientation toward initiative and achievement. As Ahmed and Reinfeld argued, enterprising citizens, with the necessary experience and ability, would seize opportunities.81

Echoing this sentiment, the Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said, “emission reduction will follow as a result of sustainable development and not be the vehicle for the sustainable development.”82

This change in elite worldview originated from India‟s hardworking middle-class discourse. There were two implications of this altered popular discourse on the country‟s climate change negotiations with the United States.

First, contrary to the disillusioned middle-class discourse in which the indiscriminate privatization of industries generated climate change, this popular discourse accepted the participation of private entrepreneurs and middle-class traits as critical elements in preparing for meeting that challenge. There is growing popular sentiment for accepting India‟s footprint in climate change.

79 PEW International Brief 2, (2008: 1). 80 Dubash (2012: 3). 81 Ahmed and Reinfeld (2001: 8). 82 Mukherjee at the Asia Society (September 30, 2008). 223

However, there is also a feeling that it should not arrest the country‟s development. More specifically, a response to the climate change challenge needed a strategy that ensured India‟s development, but that development took place in a sustainable manner. As a consequence, “warming up to climate change” and “rooting for climate change” occupied a large part of the popular discourse. In this discourse, The United States represented a potential source for solving the climate problem, but had previously occupied a negative role within the middle- class discourse for polluting the climate. Evincing this sentiment, Aaj Tak headlined, “our people also suffer from climate change, we need American support to deal with it.”83

In this discourse, the United State loomed large for having the technology and financial capacity to assist India in meeting this challenge. There were two features of this discourse particularly relevant for India-U.S. cooperation over climate change. First, there was growing awareness in this middle-class discourse of the adverse consequences of climate change. The statement, “our people also suffer from climate change” indicated a realization that the adverse consequences of this phenomenon affect middle-class livelihoods in significant ways. In particular, the negative consequences of climate change put a damper on the professional and domestic lives of middle-class people by disrupting their work schedule and destroying their homes and workplaces in floods and droughts.84

83 Aaj Tak was one of the two newspapers in my sampled texts for this research. It is the only Hindi newspaper channel with national reach. 84 Revi (2008). 224

Hence, the shifting focus was not on “development” but on “sustainable development.”

Second, close cooperation with the United States over climate adaptation and mitigation strategies would involve significant financial and technical cooperation. The technical cooperation would involve transfer of knowledge and research results from experiments and innovations. Specifically, India‟s Prime

Minister Singh argued, “critical and promising clean technologies are made affordable to developing countries. IPR should balance with the reward innovators with common good.”85 In this attempt to balance rewards of innovators and the common good, the Prime Minister sought to attract American knowledge about climate change mitigation strategies. Significant in this strategy was to use

American technology but employ India‟s own middle-class engineers and innovators. This is because India did not want the direct transfer of technology from the United States and other developed states; instead, it was making a different demand. The transfer of knowledge would be useful for India mainly because the country‟s engineers and scientists could adapt that knowledge to local needs and requirements.

This middle-class discourse found strong support in an item on my survey

(Table 7.5 below). This item asked respondents about their confidence in making cooperation over climate change mitigation between India and the United States the central feature of bilateral relations; my findings demonstrate that there was an overwhelming majority of respondents who expressed a high level of confidence

85 See PM Singh’s speech at Heiligenbamm meeting (June 8, 2007), http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=515712895 (accessed May 12, 2012). 225

in this proposition. Out of 804 total respondents, only 103 (13 percent) expressed no confidence or very little confidence in turning climate change as the central feature of the India-U.S. bilateral relations. In contrast to this minority negative opinion, 559 (69 percent) majority respondents expressed fairly strong confidence in India‟s climate change foreign policy toward the United States. In addition, there was yet another middle-class segment that expressed very strong confidence in making climate change as the main feature of India‟s relations with the United

States. In this group, 149 (19 percent) of the total respondents were very confident about this aspect of the country‟s foreign policy toward the United States.86

Table 7.5. How confident are you that India-U.S. relations should be driven by cooperation over issues of climate change?

Response Percentage Count Not at all confident 2.5 20 Somewhat not confident 10.3 83 Somewhat confident 69 552 Very confident 19 149

Consequently, this pragmatic middle-class discourse shaped Indian political elites‟ policy preferences toward climate change in significant ways.

Specifically, the Indian political elites of this persuasion emphasized two forms of simultaneous responsibility. First, Indian elites emphasized principles of

86 For such similarly high levels of popular support for climate change issues in other survey results, see “Most Indians Say India Should Limit its Greenhouse Gases,” (March 1, 2006) http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/169.php?nid=&id=&pnt=169&l b=bras. (accessed April 9, 2012). 226

sustainable development. In pursuit of such development, they adopted unilateral measures to mitigate or adapt to climate change. One of these measures included

Prime Minister Singh‟s unilateral commitment that India‟s greenhouse gas emissions would never exceed that of the developed states.87 In affirming this new commitment, the Prime Minister indicated a new direction and substance of the

India-U.S. climate change negotiations. That is, regardless of the enormous disparity between Indian and American greenhouse gas emissions, India was interested in contributing to the solution of the problem. India‟s interlocutor to the climate negotiations with the United States, Shyam Saran, reaffirmed the country‟s resolve to contribute constructively to solve the problems. Saran points out that the Indian Prime Minister must assure the United State of India‟s commitment not to exceed U.S. levels of emissions. This argument by Saran offered a point-by-point response to American criticism that India was unwilling to accept cuts in emissions and expected the United States to shoulder all the burden of climate change88 Saran thus established a clear link between India‟s emissions and that of the developed countries in general, and the United States in particular. He highlighted, “the more ambitious they [emission cuts] are, the lower the limit India would be prepared to accept.”89 At the base of these unilateral actions were considerations that setting up some cuts would allow the country to

87 See Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s intervention at the Heijilinbaumm meeting (June 8, 2007), http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=515712895 (accessed May 12, 2012). 88 Shyam Saran’s speech “Climate Change: From Backroom to Boardroom” (April 21, 2008) http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530113883 (May 8, 2012). 89 Ibid. (April 21, 2008). 227

introduce self-accountability and to strengthen a somewhat nascent partnership over climate change with the United States.90

Second, in their attempt to match commitments with actions, Indian political elites shifted their traditional insistence from non-binding, differentiated responsibility to adopting concrete policy measures in 2008. Specifically, Prime

Minister Singh established the Council on Climate Change under his chairmanship, which issued its recommendations that came to be known as the

National Action Plan on Climate Change. This policy document identified eight national missions for environmental protection, two of which dealt specifically with climate change. This document clearly outlined “India‟s willingness and desire as a responsible member of the global community to do all that is possible

… for all, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.”91 On this issue, Indian elites became eager to demonstrate to the

United States that they were taking seriously the responsibility to solve climate change problems. This growing sense of responsibility toward others originated middle-class‟s trait of technological proficiency.

The discourse about middle-class traits emphasized the ability to find alternative solutions to the problem. Specifically, it focused on shifting India‟s dependence to alternative fuel options. Among different fuel alternatives that were widely debated was the one that became popularly known as “green gas.”92

This green gas would not prevent the world from becoming a “red planet,” which

90 Raghunandan (2012: 176). 91 NAPCC (2008: 13). 92 The Times of India (July 16, 2008). 228

had become a prominent symbol of the adverse consequences of the changing climate, but it would certainly help secure India‟s alternative resources to advance the country.93 Influenced by this discourse, India‟s political elites also shifted their preferences to alternative fuels. These new and renewable fuels formed a significant part of the National Action Plan on Climate Change. It included an increase in biofuel plantations, acceleration of nuclear and hydro power generation, and efficient capture of gas from coal mines.94

In these elite worldviews, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” opens up new possibilities for interpretation. The interpretation of this principle in 2008 showed that India would do its best to overcome the climate change, as the National Action Plan stated, but the country will actually take policy measures to affect those changes. Specifically, India would not put forward its developmental logic for not assuming binding measures dealing with climate change; it would instead proffer a strategy for sustainable development to tackle the problems of climate change.

Thus, the India-U.S. partnership on climate change in 2008 witnessed limited but significant progress. It involved India‟s shifting preferences from developmental logic to a sustainable development strategy, underpinned by a significant shift in middle-class discourse. This change from disillusioned to pragmatic middle-class discourse enabled, albeit in limited ways, India‟s understanding of the UNFCC principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Such reinterpretation of this responsibility principle in the India-

93 The Times of India (October 11, 2008). 94 NAPCC (2008: 3); PEW Report (2008: 2). 229

U.S. context meant that burden sharing would occur according to “respective capabilities” of the two partners.95 According to this burden sharing principle,

India will undertake policy measures that would use its resources of middle-class traits of initiative-driven, achievement oriented, and technological proficient to produce new and inventive solutions to problems of climate change. The United

States will aid India to invent technologies to mitigate the problem. It will also provide financial assistance to India to counter climate change. Thus, the United

States agreed to compensate India to opt for environmentally friendly technology and financial aid to speed up its economic development in the shortest time span.

To summarize, India‟s pragmatic middle-class discourse shaped elite policy preferences for common but differentiated responsibility in cooperation with the

United States to overcome the challenge of climate change and its effects.

Conclusions

The domestic politics of India presented three options in the context of

India-U.S. climate cooperation: accept full responsibility, reject any responsibility, and accept some responsibility but with room for unilateral actions.

The final agreement signed between the two countries rejected the options of no responsibility and full responsibility, and instead opted for differentiated but unilateral responsibility. In this chapter, I have claimed that India‟s domestic identities of its citizens, composed of social discourses and individual cognitive

95 NAPCC (2008: 13). 230

elements, predisposed foreign policy elites toward avoiding some and opting for other options concerning climate change. The empirical findings of this chapter support my claim and demonstrate that the final content and nature of the agreement over climate change was a result of India‟s dominant middle-class hard-working social cognitive identity. The other two options of no responsibility and full responsibility map fairly closely onto other identity discourses of the disillusioned and overambitious middle-class, respectively.

In light of these findings, I conclude by highlighting the following contributions of my research to the analysis of India‟s stance on climate change in international arena. First, the state interests of India in the agreement over climate change with the United States originated from domestic social cognitive identities and not from international structural pressures. In neorealist theory, these pressures constrain states to alter their existing positions through the balancing actions of those states that are already part of the existing system. Applying this logic to the India-U.S. agreement over India‟s common but differentiated responsibility in the context of climate change, the United States loomed large enough in the negotiations over climate change that would constrain any Indian move to influence the American position. Instead, India found the United States cooperative in climate change solutions, in which the U.S. in the past had worked assiduously to restrain and reverse through bilateral and multilateral pressures.

Second, another contribution of my research is to highlight that the emergence and growth of India‟s domestic middle-class identity influenced this positive change in the American attitude toward India‟s climate change policy.

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This middle class generated a domestic environment in which the pursuit of a common but differentiated responsibility-based agreement with the United States became possible and intelligible. In particular, it became possible to reject India‟s traditional insistence upon accepting no responsibility for mitigating the adverse effects of climate change with the United States and, instead, accept a common but differentiated agreement. My empirical findings demonstrate that this agreement was possible because of India‟s middle-class desire to secure foreign financial and technological assistance to adopt development strategies that were beneficial for the country. These technologies would also mitigate the negative effects of climate change. After analyzing the issue of climate change in this chapter, the following and concluding chapter will address alternative theoretical approaches to explain the India-U.S. strategic partnership.

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Chapter 8: Conclusions

Introduction

This dissertation addressed a general question of how do shifts occur in state foreign policy in the absence of external pressures and non-interests of elites? By way of answering that general puzzle, it addressed a more specific question: how and why did India and the United States form a strategic partnership in 2008? Bracketing the American side of the equation, this dissertation focused on the Indian side to respond to the main question. To address the puzzle of the ways in which India‟s foreign policy toward the United

States changed without external pressures and elites‟ non-interests, the dissertation used a sequential, multi-method approach to investigate domestic conditions of India. This investigation centered on the social and individual (or social-cognitive) elements that I hypothesized to constrain or enable foreign policy preferences of India‟s political elites.

My dissertation produced two main findings. First, middle-class identity constrained some and enabled other foreign policy preferences of elites across the issue-areas of nuclear agreement, economic ties, and climate negotiations with the

United States in 2008. In particular, India‟s dominant social-cognitive elements that constitute middle-class discourses shape content and contestation in country‟s

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foreign policy elite preferences. Thus, my research demonstrated the relevance of domestic social-cognitive identities in state foreign policies.

The second major finding was that the use of multi-method research approach with sequencing of two techniques in a single research produces valid and reliable results for a previously under-researched phenomenon (such as the middle-class impact on India‟s foreign policy). The results of this research show that the use of multi-method research design is particularly significant when the object of interest lies in the previously under-researched issue-area. For instance, the middle-class as the independent variable of the India-US strategic partnership had been intuitively acknowledged but never systematically investigated. Faced with such a research puzzle, the use of the multi-method approach showed the relevance of middle class as a reliable predictor of India‟s foreign policy toward the United States in 2008. It was also shown that the sequencing of two data collection techniques in a single research helps yield evidence critical to support such findings. Similarly, the India-U.S. strategic partnership as the dependent variable of this research is barely emerging in the foreign policy arena. Significant is that this partnership remains an emergent phenomenon, which faces several critical questions about its conceptual and empirical foundations. In view of such conceptual and empirical uncertainty about the nature and stability of the India-

U.S. strategic partnership, the dual nature of the multi-method research helped produce plausible explanations of this growing partnership. In the following two sections, I will present methodological and theoretical significance of my research. In the first section, I will briefly highlight the methodological

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importance of the sequential, mixed-method research design and lay out the ways in which it enhanced my empirical findings. In the second section, I present some of the alternative theories to explain the phenomenon of strategic partnership and the ways in which my bottom-up constructivist framework adds to and modifies those competing approaches.

Methodological Significance

One of the most important contributions of this research to the field of

International Relations is the application of a sequential, multi-method research design. In this research, I used discourse analysis and a large-n survey in a sequential manner to investigate the existence of social cognitive identities and their effects on India‟s foreign policy options. Substantively, to my surprise, the middle class emerged as the critically important constituent of the domestic society that, until recently, had been only intuitively linked with foreign policy options or completely disconnected from any matters related with politics.

Contrary to these existing attitudes toward the role and relevance of the middle- class, the use of a sequential, multi-method approach demonstrated systematic and clear correlations between India‟s middle class and its foreign policy goals. Thus, the application of such a sequential, multi-method research design offers tremendous leverage to analyze the linkages between intuitively linked or previously non-systematically correlated phenomena in International Relations.

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The use of two research techniques in a single study increases not only the validity but also the robustness of findings.

There are two main contributions of this research to the field of

International Relations. First, the data employed here for the construction of identities is fairly unique because it combines textual analysis of popular culture1 with traditional survey techniques. This interdisciplinary dataset produces a far more robust concept of identities than exists in the literature, and yields a far more reliable explanation of the expected outcome. Second, substantively, as policymakers face an increasing number of previously underdeveloped states as emerging powers in the future, the relative lack of knowledge about the internal processes underpinning the foreign policies of those states presents a serious challenge. Policymakers confront a real dilemma: whether to overreact and initiate aggressive measures to prevent the rise of such states or to under-react and witness the rise of potentially dangerous powers. Through the case study of the discursive and cognitive processes of identity formation inside India, this research applied a template that would also be helpful for creating knowledge about the motivations and strategies of other contemporary powers.

1 For a good discussion of the treatment of textual analysis as data and the strategies for its effective use in social research, see Philips and Hardy (2002) and Wetherell et al. (2001). 236

Theoretical Significance

The domestic identity this research has identified as middle-class assists in explaining India‟s foreign policy processes. My analysis in this dissertation demonstrated the significance of this collective identity for forming a strategic partnership with the United States. The dissertation analyzed the influence of this social-cognitive identity across three different issue areas (chaps 5-7). In this section, I consider alternative approaches to explain the India-U.S. strategic partnership. The emphasis here is on identifying competitive and complementary elements of different theoretical approaches and the ways in which my domestic constructivist approach might contribute to their enrichment. These competing approaches are: elite rationalism, neorealism, and systemic constructivism.

Elite Self-Interests and the India-US Strategic Partnership

Critics of this dissertation may well ask: you have used mass identity construction to explain India‟s foreign policy; can you show how well it stands opponents‟ scrutiny? Toward addressing such critics, I here offer two main responses: I put forward evidence to support (1) the argument that citizens‟ social- cognitive discourses influence elite foreign policy preferences and (2) the ways in which these identity discourses modify elite agency arguments.

The first skeptical reaction to my research is that the ordinary masses do not influence foreign policy. They neither possess sufficient information to understand the complexity of international relations, nor have they appropriate

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skills to inform the foreign policy-making process.2 As a result, according to this perspective, citizens do not have clear preferences over foreign policy. They are mainly concerned with outcomes in domestic politics rather than foreign policy.

Therefore, political elites are not constrained by mass preferences in their foreign policy decisions. However, my social-cognitive approach contends that cultural and social aspects of political elites‟ lives shape their policy preferences.3 Using the logic of elite self-interest driving state foreign policy, I argue that elite policy preferences are conditional on elites‟ social and cultural experiences. Assuming that these aspects of social life shape preferences of general masses as well as that of elites, the latter‟s foreign policy preferences are shaped by wider domestic social-cognitive discourses.4 This socialization into societal discourses of elites produces similarities in their preferences with that of the larger society. If my testing of this hypothesis is correct, then we should observe policy preferences of political elites to conform with their constituents‟ discourses. In 2008, my findings demonstrated that India‟s political elites opted for a civil (over military) nuclear agreement, improving of economic relations, and faltering climate cooperation with the United States.

In view of my findings, if we focused exclusively on the instrumental calculations underpinning elite decisions, we would certainly miss important contrasting visions about different time horizons concerning India‟s foreign policy options. To take the example of the civil nuclear agreement with the United

2 Almond (1950); Rosenson et al. (2009: 76). 3 Gilbert and Grams (1991); Green and Gooth (1991); Burden (2007). 4 For a discussion of FPA’s tendency to treat social structures as “empty vessels,” which elites fill with their instrumental, rational interests, see Houghton (2007: 34-35); Carbo (2003). 238

States in 2008, my analysis demonstrates that elite approaches to the agreement were shaped by three competing mass-level discourses about India‟s place in the world. The futuristically-oriented, overambitious middle-class discourse strongly favored an agreement with the United States that allowed full military nuclear cooperation. In this discourse, securing a great power status alongside the United

States through the acquisition of military nuclear capability and the acceptance of the country as a nuclear power, exerted a powerful influence on the decisions and actions of certain segments of the political elites. On the contrary, historically- oriented, disillusioned middle-class discourse evinced a strong tendency to oppose any cooperation with the United States on the nuclear issue. The dominant theme in this discourse related with equating the United States with India‟s colonial past and the danger of being exploited once again in the future at the hands of yet another capitalist country. The final agreement signed between India and the

United States, however, found strong support in the pragmatic, present-oriented middle-class discourse. The nuclear agreement in this discourse represented an opportunity to use country‟s indigenous talent and build domestic infrastructure.

In this discourse, this nuclear agreement with the United States would allow use of the country‟s technical and scientific talent and develop India‟s infrastructure.

Thus, the foreign policy options of India‟s elites were undeniably constrained by domestic social discourses.

Noteworthy here is that elite responsiveness to constituent discourses, however, may or may not be driven by purely instrumental reasons. Consider

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‟s decision to subject the India-U.S. nuclear

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agreement to the parliamentary approval. Given that mass opinion over the past many years had consistently supported a closer relationship with the United

States, as well as a high level of optimism at the prospect of forming that relationship,5 depicted through everyday mass culture, Prime Minister Singh was confident that the parliament would support this agreement. If elite foreign policy preferences were purely instrumental, as they erroneously seemed to be at the time, such preferences were confined to only a handful of political elites. As the subsequent elections demonstrated, those political parties that opposed the India-

U.S. nuclear agreement lost heavily in the following elections. Both the parties of the Left and the BJP not only lost in the state elections but also the national elections held in 2009.6 On the contrary, if foreign policy preferences of those who supported the India-U.S. nuclear agreement were not purely instrumental in terms of deriving instant rewards of opposing the agreement, then my evidence is sufficient to consider content of these elite preferences as being constituted by wider social-cognitive discourses.7 To reiterate, the content of these social- cognitive discourses in my research showed a clear support for a close partnership with the United States. This support varied from one issue/area to another such as the state security8 (preference for civil over military agreement with the United

States), economic relations9 (as in the growing trade relations between India and the United States), or emerging but faltering cooperation over issues of climate

5 Data from Chicago Council on Foreign Relations for 2006, Pew data for 2008 and 2009 show this trend. Data available with author. Also see Pant 2011: 56); Tellis (2010: 11). 6 See For a discussion of this data on India’s election outcomes, see Jeffrelot and Verniers (2009). 7 Abdelal et al. (2009); Hopf (2002). 8 Katzenstein (1996: 2, 24) 9 Abdelal (2005) 240

change.10 Important to note here is that contestations within the discourses produced variations in the foreign policy elites‟ preferences and thus explain their foreign policy decisions.

The second set of skepticism my research confronts originates from the proponents of elite agency in foreign policy. These scholars point to the elites‟ ability to identify goals and initiate actions. As my research shows, and some argue, the agency of political elites is significantly constrained and modified by existing domestic political institutions11 or contexts. This context is created by citizens‟ identity discourses as well as their situations. These identities and situations constrain the ways and the extent to which elites can pursue their goals.

Rousseau argues that it is precisely because elites have to explain their decisions to the public in a democratic polity, the domestic discourses of citizens matter for foreign policy.12 Similarly, Firon argues that elites set foreign-policy goals only when there is a strong possibility of successful conclusion of their undertaking in the popular opinion.13 Thus, cooperation or conflict with other states is conditional on elites‟ perceiving a benefit from such an effort. A risk of foreign policy failure causes them to avoid losing the domestic audience. Hence, from my perspective, agency of political elites to calculate costs or benefits of their actions emanates from the discursive contexts in which they operate.

More specifically, the proponents of elite agency would significantly enrich their approach if they explicitly incorporated discursive and cognitive

10 Cass (2007); Pattenger (2007). 11 Nooruddin (2011: 9; 36). 12 Rousseau (2006: 98) 13 Firon (1997: 68-90) 241

elements in their theories. This is so, I claim, because the success or failure of these institutional constraints is conditional on the social and cultural practices in which actors are embedded in and circumscribed by discursive context. Without such embedding in the discourses of their time and context, political elites are unable to understand what actions are possible and desirable in a given institutional structure.14 In particular, institutionalists tend to overlook how actors deliberately package and frame their ideas to convince each other as well as the general population about the plausibility and acceptability of certain policy programs.15 These programs shaped by the discursive context provide a frame to organize individual‟s experiences into coherent social discourses. Such discourses help organize historical time into a coherent story, which in turn, offers “a collective understanding of how to understand the past, situate the present, and act toward the future.”16

The evidence produced through my research shows the importance of domestic constructivist framework for analyzing foreign policy of India toward the United States-- the country with which the Indian middle class is most readily identified. Given such a focus, the relevance of elite-oriented analyses of foreign policies in terms of “who governs” and “who benefits” is woefully inadequate.

These theories proffer some structures or elites as the governors to maintain the existing system and thus the object of study. They also frame the middle class as the exclusive beneficiaries of state policies. My domestic constructivist

14 Barnett (1999: 7); Hopf (2002). 15 Campbell (1998: 381); Barnett (1999: 8). 16 Barnett (1999: 8). 242

framework, based on social cognitive discourses, enabled me to shift away from those static institutional and elite theories and toward analyzing somewhat precariously situated, but significantly influential, middle-classes. Strictly speaking, this group is neither part of the elites nor is it part of the beneficiaries of state policies. My approach offered a productive framework to study the impact of this precariously placed social group on the foreign policies of India toward the

United States.

Neorealism and the India-US Strategic Partnership

Within the systemic materialist literature, themes of strategic partnership, focused on distribution of power, dominate the subfield, particularly highlighting analyses of change that show how externally produced shocks pressure states to cooperate with each other.17 My research, however, claims that domestic social- cognitive identity discourses enable some and constrain other state decisions. It makes two specific modifications to the neorealist literature: (1) it highlights the sources of change originating from endogenous, domestic sources of foreign policy than external ones and (2) includes societal identities to enhance explanatory power of neorealism.

First, my research findings show that the relaxing of systemic assumption of distribution of capabilities significantly improves neorealism‟s explanatory power. As my analysis clearly demonstrates, political elites become socialized in

17 Waltz (1979; 1993; 2000); Walt (1987). 243

their thoughts and actions, not by their systemic pressures, but in and through their domestic context. The neorealists scholars, who claim that leaders will ignore the external, systemic balancing at their peril (Waltz 1979), make a fundamental error of assuming that the systemic pressures leave no room for alternative courses of action at the hands of political elites.18 As a refutation of this top-down analysis, Whitkof demonstrated tremendous variety in the foreign policy decision makers‟ views in spite of their similar external situation of the

Cold War.19 Rousseau extends this logic and argues that many candidates to political offices possess shockingly low levels of foreign policy knowledge, let alone influences of systemic configurations on their decisions. This problem is further compounded by the tendency that political elites run for offices fairly late in their lives and it is thus unlikely for them to change their views under external pressures at such a late age.20 As Rousseau implies, and my analysis clearly demonstrates, that political elites, who have a profound impact on foreign policy decisions, become socialized in their thoughts and actions through their domestic context.

Significant here is that India‟s domestic contexts, constituted by middle- class discourses, socialized political elites to make certain decisions in 2008. One of these decisions, for example, related with signing a civil nuclear agreement

18 Many realists recognize this overemphasis of neorealism on the material systemic pressures to the neglect of domestic and society-based variables. For discussion on the significance of such domestic variables in neorealism, see Snyder (1993: 7-8). This realization later developed an entirely new strand of “neoclassical” realism. See Rose (1998); Schweller (1994; 1997: 927-930; 2006). 19 Whitkof (1994). 20 Rousseau (2006: 98). 244

with the United States, something unimaginable only a few years ago. India‟s external conditions had remained almost constant since the end of the Cold War.

The international politics had been experiencing sort of a unipolar moment,21 which was expected to last into the foreseeable future.22 Moreover, India‟s position in the world politics did not undergo significant change. Although India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, which some consider as systemic in nature for their effects on world stability,23 those tests did not have the potential to alter the world balance of power.24 Given such absence of international effects or their more limited, region-specific implications, as a counterfactual, the United States could have ignored India‟s nuclear tests of 1998 as the minor infractions of the

NPT (), or could have simply continued sanctions imposed in 1998. Indeed, continuation of the American sanctions against India would have been a clear confirmation of the neorealist contention of the systemic effects on India‟s foreign policy.

In contrast to the neorealist approach, my research demonstrates that the change was not in the systemic distribution of power; rather, the change was in

India‟s domestic identities that altered America‟s view of the country from negative to positive one. This shift occurred because India‟s social-cognitive

21 Kraudhammer (1990/91: 23-33; Mastanduno 1997). 22 For an opposing view that America’s unipolar position would last into the foreseeable future, see Layne (1993; 2006; 2012); Waltz (1994: 44-79; 2000). 23 For the neorealist logic that more nuclear weapons may be better for international stability, see Waltz (1981). For the application of this logic to the South Asian region, see Arquilla (1997: 13-31). 24 For rejecting any influence on world politics of Indian nuclear weapons, see Perkovich (2003: 129-133). However, for an excellent discussion of social meaning of these nuclear tests different from the systemic implications in a regional context, see Acharya (2007: 629-633). 245

identities enabled foreign policy makers to alter their long-established, deeply- entrenched skepticism of cooperation with the United States.25 With such change in elite attitudes, India could drop the country‟s traditional assertion of what was popularly known as the posture of “ambiguity”26 in which India refused to clarify the nature and purpose of its nuclear program. Whereas the country publically asserted that its nuclear program since 1974 had been of civil nature, it dogmatically insisted in the bilateral negotiations on a full military nuclear cooperation with the United States.27 Instead of a full military cooperation, India in 2008 opted for a civil nuclear agreement with the United States. This civil nuclear agreement became a viable policy option for India‟s political elites because of the socializing influences of the dominant middle-class discourses.

These discourses related with the using the middle class‟s talents and energies to improve country‟s social and economic conditions. These conditions could be improved by securing a civil nuclear agreement, which had the potential of improving the country‟s power supply, as well as by opening up technology transfers. Under such influences of the middle-class discourses, the country‟s political elites could alter India‟s traditional demand of securing full military nuclear cooperation with the United States and instead settle for a civil nuclear cooperation.

Second, in sharp contrast to neorealism, my research also demonstrates that the attempts at making identities derivative of material distribution of power

25 For a good discussion of instinctive India’s negative reactions to negotiations about its nuclear and other issues with the United States, see Narlikar (2006: 59-76; 2011). 26 Basrur (2001; 2009: 7-8). 27 Basrur (2001); Bajpai (2007). 246

tells at best a partial story of international relations. Relations among states bear the significant imprint of their situations, in Steve Walt‟s view (1987), but those situations are created exclusively by aggressive intentions or threats of others.28 It is a welcome development in neorealism to explicitly include a non-tangible component of identity in that power-driven, materialist theory, but this progress is unfortunately limited to the inclusion of aggressive intentions. As my research shows, state intentions could be aggressive or pacific toward others based on what society wants or how its leaders decide to pursue as their collective goals.29 In forming a strategic partnership with the United States, India‟s domestic middle- class identity discourses strongly influenced interpretations of American intentions toward India. No doubt, the perception of aggressive American intentions still formed a vocal but a minority middle-class discourse,30 which opposed a strategic partnership with that country, but the pragmatic middle-class discourse focused on the pacific or positive intentions of the United States and shaped the successful conclusion of the broader strategic partnership.

With such a focus on societal identities, in contrast to neorealist theory, my research places identity at the center of the strategic literature (), and this placement enriches International Relations field in a significant way. If neorealism‟s progress is measured in the form of Walt‟s expansion of variables by including some of the domestic-level identity components such as aggressive intentions and by broadening the focus from the narrow, power-centered Waltzian

28 Walt (1987: 21; 263-64; 1997: 933). 29 Also see Abdelal 2005; Rousseau 2006: 46). 30 See section on middle-class in chapter 5 of the dissertation. 247

approach, they are unfortunately the last of his independent variables.31 Implicitly, then, the neorealist view is that identities can be formed only through materialist interests, leaving domestic social discourses little capacity to reshape elite worldviews and ideas about policy change.32 My empirical findings clearly show that neorealism would enhance its explanatory power, and particularly the Walt‟s version of it, if it explicitly included domestic social identities in its theory. With this statement, I am, however, not rejecting that sources of India‟s interests in forming a strategic partnership with the United States certainly might lay in some measure to bolster its position in the international distribution of power. This, however, tells only a partial story of India‟s growing relationship with the United

States. The domestic social discourses, which encapsulate feelings and emotions of a vast middle class, create an enabling environment in which political elites find it easy to propose and enact certain policies rather than others. It is this creative and talented segment of India that enabled political elites in 2008 to make arguments for a stronger and closer relationship with the United States. No doubt, some aspects of the bilateral relations concerned the material gains for India, but it is a range of emotions and feelings of this middle class toward this bilateral partnership that significantly influenced political elites to propose and achieve a radical shift in the India-U.S. dyadic relationship. After this neorealist discussion,

I now turn to systemic constructivism in the following pages. Specifically, I will

31 By including aggressive intentions, Walt (1987) unavoidably expanded the neorealist scope to domestic-level variables. For more sustained efforts to produce a neorealist foreign policy, see Christensen and Snyder (1990); Elman (1996). 32 See Seabrook (2007: 798). 248

discuss how my domestic constructivist framework will contribute to the enhancement of the explanatory power of the systemic constructivism.

Systemic Constructivism and the India-US Strategic Partnership

In this dissertation, I demonstrated that domestic social-cognitive identity discourses enable or constrain political elites to adopt certain policy measures and reject others. In the empirical chapters, I clearly showed that the domestic social and cultural discourses, and not some exogenous, systemic forces, shape thoughts and decisions of the political elites responsible for making state foreign policy.

Critics of this research may still press one more valid question: why and how do systemic factors of international norms and values not account for India‟s behavior in international politics? I have a twofold response to this question: (1) systemic constructivism tells at best a partial story of the formation of norms and values, and my research helps complete the constructivist circle by adding a domestic component and (2) it outlines a framework to analyze identities located at different levels as not always conflictual but as complementary.

First, my domestic constructivist dissertation contributes to a growing body of works that seeks to overcome the lopsided nature of constructivist approach in general.33 By insisting on the systemic variables to explain international outcomes, the systemic approach severely limits explanatory potential of identity-driven accounts of state interests. Highlighting this major

33 For empirical works in this vein, see volume edited by Abdelal and associates (2009); Hopf (2002). 249

lacuna in top-down constructivism, Checkel opined that focusing on the systemic- level explanatory variables was a good strategy in the initial stage of the development of the approach, but the continued lack of research at the domestic level has stunted its ability to generate a productive research program.34

My research contributes to the development of such domestic-level constructivist research program. Specifically, given its focus on the bottom-up processes for explaining outcomes in international politics, my research used a domestic-level constructivist perspective with the potential for recovering many forms of identities that hitherto escaped scholarly attention. Such inattention to domestic identities resulted in overlooking many mass-level social and cognitive identities that, on certain occasions and on specific policy issues, exert a significant influence on state‟s international relations. A lack of focus on domestic middle-class identity, composed of social discourses and individual cognition, remained outside systemic constructivist accounts. Such focus on domestic-level middle-class identity also contributes to the production of more valid and robust constructions of state identities in international politics and can legitimately claim to generate complementary constructions of identity at the domestic level.35

Contrary to the systemic version of constructivism that demonstrates existence of an identity and generalizes it to the rest of the system,36 the domestic-level constructivism has the potential for uncovering local variations and thus set

34 See Checkel (1998: 83-114; 1999: 324-50). Also see Sikkink and Finnemore (2001: 391-416). 35 Campbell (1998); Hopf (2002). 36 Wendt (1994 384-96; 1999: chaps 3-5). 250

appropriate limits to application of those systemic identities.37 Thus, concentrating on the domestic construction of identities helped identify many constituents of India‟s middle-class discourses, which until recently had been considered marginal to domestic political outcomes in general and foreign policy in particular.

Second, this dissertation provides a corrective to the systemic constructivist tendency to consider identities at different levels at unavoidably conflictual. My dissertation corrects this significant flaw in systemic constructivism and shows that identities located at different levels produce complementary state interests. Klotz and Lynch rightly argue that different levels within states need not be treated as competing but rather complementary.38 In particular, the systemic constructivist tendency to consider various identities located at different levels within states as necessarily conflictual to produce competing national interests is empirically incorrect. It is incorrect because it casts doubts on the mass-level, socially-grounded processes to define content of national interest. It erroneously equates contestations over particular visions in social discourses with social conflicts. This equating of contestation with conflict has deleterious implications for domestic constructivist works. One consequence is to call into question the ability to produce reliable and valid findings. In particular, domestic societal analysis deals with fluidity and flux in the discursive terrain of states; it then raises the question of how that discourse could reliably define the national interest. And if the definition of national interest is in doubt,

37 Also see Kowert and Legro (1996: 488-90). 38 See Klotz and Lynch (2007: 86). 251

how would the pursuit of that national interest occur? Such competing national interests create confusion and impair the policy-making process. The assumption of considering different domestic actors as producing conflictual state interests thus renders them unhelpful in defining and defending those interests.

One extremely negative implication of considering content of state interests as always conflictual is to abandon its analysis. To abandon the analysis of mass-level, social discourses is to return to relatively simple systemic variables of global norms and identities. However, Klotz and Lynch correctly argue that different levels within states do not compete but rather complement each other and thus help in definition and pursuit of national interest.39 The sources of identities located at different levels (group and elite) inside a state can offer varying national interests that do not compete but complement each other.

Therefore, my dissertation contributed to the expansion of the scope conditions of constructivist scholarship in significant ways.

To conclude, my dissertation analyzed the India-U.S. strategic partnership and demonstrated the relevance of domestic social-cognitive identities for foreign policy analysis. By way of recommendations for future work, it would be interesting to assess effects of such domestic social-cognitive discourses across time and across case-countries. One limitation of my dissertation has been to assess effects of India‟s domestic discourses during a single year (2008). This seriously limited explanatory power of the research. Increasing the temporal range of such works will significantly enhance their analytical power. Moreover, the

39 Ibid., (2007: 86). 252

sequential, multi-method research approach of my dissertation produced fairly robust results. However, further work needs to be done to establish whether this research design could be replicated in other countries and other contexts. In particular, it would be interesting to apply this sequential, multi-method research to explore domestic social discourses in other case-countries. In particular, implementation of this design to the cases of non-democratic states will significantly advance usefulness of this sequential, multi-method research model.

253

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Appendices

Appendix A: Table of select popular texts

News sources

Hindi soap operas

Hindi popular films

Title Language Period covered Gajini Hindi 2008 Rab ne Bana di Jodi (God- Hindi 2008 made Couple)

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Appendix B: Questions Measuring India‟s Middle-Class Support for India-US

Nuclear Cooperation1

How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that the nuclear deal India signed with the US couple of years ago is opening new opportunities for the middle-class of India?

Response Percentage of responses Strongly Agree 19 Agree 69 Disagree 10 Strongly Disagree 2

Do you think India-US relations should be determined by cooperation over nuclear issue?

Response Percentage of responses No 9 Yes 81 Not sure 10 No opinion 0

How strongly do you feel about this issue of nuclear power?

Response Percentage of responses Feel mildly 7 Feel somewhat mildly 25 Feel somewhat strongly 51 Feel strongly 16

1 Total respondents 804. 270

Appendix C: Correlations of India‟s Middle-Class Values and American Middle-

Class Values

Question 1:How important do you think the following aspects are for improving middle class life?-Hard work * Question 2:Now, I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements- Indian middle class today is adopting American values Question 2:Now, I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements-Indian middle class today is adopting American values Strongly Strongly disagree Disagree Agree agree Total Question 1: Not important 3 2 6 0 11 How Somewhat not important do 0 7 21 1 29 important you think the following Somewhat 4 16 61 23 104 aspects are for important improving Very 8 66 495 90 659 middle class important life?-Hard work No Opinion 0 0 1 0 1 Total 15 91 584 114 804

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Appendix D: Correlations of India‟s Middle-Class Values and Foreign Investment

Question 1: How important do you think the following aspects are for improving middle class life?-Hard work * Question 2: Lot of American companies are coming to India these days. Do you think it is good or bad for the middle class that foreign companies are investing in India? Question 2:A lot of American companies are coming to India these days. Do you think it is good or bad for the middle class that foreign companies are investing in India? It is bad It is good for the for the middle middle Not class class sure Total Question 1: Not important 4 3 4 11 How important Somewhat not do you think the 7 18 4 29 important following aspects are for Somewhat 20 81 3 104 improving important middle class Very 83 561 15 659 life?-Hard work important No Opinion 0 1 0 1 Total 114 664 26 804

272