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Gas Explosion Handbook

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Gas Explosion Handbook Gas Explosion Handbook Authors: Dag Bjerketvedt Jan Roar Bakke Kees van Wingerden Gas Explosion Handbook (1992) Preamble The original Gas Explosion Handbook was written by CMR (later CMR Gexcon) in 1992 and distributed as a set of HTML files. We recently decided to instead distribute a printable pdf version with an updated frontpage and preamble, to make it easier to print and to search within the content. Apart from these changed the content is identical to the HTML version from 1992. Obviously, since the publication of this handbook 25 years ago, more research has been done into the various types of explosion phenomena and some of the previous insights may have changed or have been refined over the years. However, the described main mechanisms and the majority of the content are still equally valid today and the handbook should still be a useful starting point for understanding explosion phenomena today. Dr. Kees van Wingerden Senior Vice President Gexcon AS (previously CMR Gexcon) February 2019, Bergen Norway For information on the various related services and software products Gexcon provides, please visit our website at: www.gexcon.com. Disclaimer: Gexcon AS accepts no legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequences of unqualified use or misuse of this book or any results thereof. © Gexcon AS. The information contained herein is to be used by the recipient solely for the purpose for which it was supplied. It shall not be disclosed in whole or in part, by any other party without the written permission of Gexcon AS. GAS EXPLOSION HANDBOOK Authors: Dag Bjerketvedt Jan Roar Bakke Kees van Wingerden TABLE OF CONTENTS • FOREWORD • 1. INTRODUCTION TO GAS EXPLOSIONS • 2. DEFINITIONS • 3. FORMATION OF EXPLOSIVE GAS CLOUDS • 4. COMBUSTION PROPERTIES OF FUEL-AIR MIXTURES • 5. DEFLAGRATIONS • 6. DETONATIONS • 7. BLAST WAVES • 8. RESPONSE OF STRUCTURES • 9. GAS EXPLOSIONS IN VESSELS, PIPES, CHANNELS AND TUNNELS • 10. GAS EXPLOSIONS IN COMPARTMENTS, BUILDINGS AND OFFSHORE MODULES • 11. GAS EXPLOSIONS IN PROCESS AREAS AND UNCONFINED AREAS • 12. FLACS SIMULATIONS • 13. µFLACS SIMULATIONS • 14. ACCIDET INVESTIGATION • 15. LIST OF TERMS AND EXPRESSIONS • ANIMATIONS • ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS • REFERENCES • COMMENT FORM Disclaimer: Christian Michelsen Research AS accepts no legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequences of unqualified use or misuse of this book or any results thereof. Page 2 • How to Read this Handbook • Objectives of the Handbook Foreword • Gas Explosion Activities at CMR This handbook has been written as a part of Christian Michelsen Research's (CMR) research programme "Gas Safety Programme 19901992" (GSP90-92). The participants of the programme are: BP Norway Limited U.A., Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie, Conoco Norway Inc., Elf Petroleum Norge A/S, Esso Norge A/S, Gaz de France, Health and Safety Executive, Mobil Exploration Norway Inc., Norsk Hydro, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Phillips Petroleum Company Norway and Statoil. The purpose of this handbook is to give a brief introduction to gas explosion safety, based on our current knowledge of the subject and on our experience in applying this knowledge to practical problems in the industry. Because of the intended brevity and simplicity of the handbook the information provided may in some cases be strongly simplified and/or incomplete. For in-depth information on the various subjects the reader is referred to the literature described in the References . The user of this handbook is intended to be a process- , design- or structural engineer, but the handbook should also be useful for safety engineers. How to Read this Handbook The handbook is divided into 15 chapters. The individual chapters can be grouped in four categories: i) Introduction, ii) Background and Basics, iii) Practical Aspects and iv) Tools and Analysis. The chapters of each category are shown in Figure 1. Foreword Introduction 1. Introduction to Gas Explosions 2. Definitions 3. Formation of Explosive Gas Clouds 4. Combustion Properties of Fuel-Air Mixtures Background and 5. Deflagrations Basics 6. Detonations 7. Blast Waves 8. Response of Structures Practical Aspects 9. Gas Explosions in Vessels, Pipes, Channels and Tunnels Page 3 10. Gas Explosions in Compartments, Buildings and Offshore Modules 11. Gas Explosions in Process Areas and Unconfined Areas 12. FLACS Simulations 13. µFlacs Simulations 14. Accident Investigation Tools and Analysis 15. List of Terms and Expressions Animations Acknowledgements References Figure 1. Organisation of the handbook. The chapters in the first category "Introduction" contain the description and physics of gas explosion phenomena, definitions and loss experience. Under "Background and Basics", cloud formation, gas explosions, blast waves and structural response are described. The part "Practical Aspects" relates the information presented in "Background and Basics" to different industrial situations The final part on "Tools and Analysis" focuses on what one can do to improve gas explosion safety. In particular a description is given of the FLACS and µFlacs codes, and how these tools can be applied for predicting the consequences of gas explosions in an industrial environment. When writing this handbook, it was our intention that the reader could start directly in one chapter listed under "Practical Aspects" or "Tools and Analysis" and use the other chapters for supplementary information. However, if the field of gas explosions is new to the reader, we would recommend going through Chapters 1 and 2 as a first introduction to the subject. Chapter 15 contains a list of terms and expressions. To avoid too much cross-referencing and thereby making the use of the handbook more cumbersome, there is a certain amount of overlap between what is contained in the two first parts and the two last parts. This makes each of the two halves more self- contained and the handbook may therefore be used as a reference work without having to read it all. Objectives of the Handbook Today there is a lot of information available in scientific papers and reports on gas explosions. However, in most cases the practical implications of this information are very hard to extract. A need for a handbook with simpler presentation of the available information that can be used in the industry, has therefore been identified. Page 4 This handbook summarises the main results and experience from our previous research programmes and consultancy activity on gas explosion safety (Bakke et al., 1991). We are focusing on pressure build-up during gas explosions. Important areas of gas explosion safety, such as how to prevent leaks and what is the ignition probability, are not covered. In this handbook we assume that the premixed combustible gas has been generated and ignited. Phenomena of flame propagation and pressure build-up are discussed. The important factors influencing pressure build-up are pointed out and some simple guidelines are presented. The use of numerical codes (FLACS and µFlacs) for simulation of gas explosions in industrial environments is also covered. Figure The Handbook, µFlacs and FLACS constitute a complementary set of 2. tools. The handbook is one of three tools for analysis of gas explosions, which have been provided by CMR. The two other tools are FLACS and µFlacs. FLACS is the most advanced code of the two. FLACS is used for detailed analysis, while µFlacs is a PC screening tool and does not require the same amount of detailed input and resources as FLACS. Our goal is that the handbook, FLACS and µFlacs are used together in gas explosion analyses as supplementary tools. Which tool to use will depend on the stage of the analysis and the detail of information required. Our intention is that the CMR gas explosion handbook is a "live" document that will be updated when new information is available. Further comments and suggestions for improvement of the handbook will be gratefully received. A comment form is included in the handbook. Gas Explosion Activities at CMR In the late 60's and in the 70's, large oil and gas fields were discovered in the North Sea. It was recognised that gas explosions might constitute a hazard for the drilling and production installations in the North Sea and that the knowledge about gas explosions in industrial environments was limited. At Chr. Michelsen Institute's Dept. of Science and Technology (CMI-DST, from June 1992 Christian Michelsen Research - CMR), gas explosion research was started in the late 1970's as part of the programme "Sikkerhet På Sokkelen". Since then gas explosion research has been an important activity at CMI/CMR, as shown in Figure 3. The gas explosion research Page 5 was a continuation of the research work on dust explosions. The dust explosion research work is described by Eckhoff (1991). Figure 3. Research programmes and consultancy activity on explosions at CMR. In the period 1980-1990 CMI carried out two major research programmes on gas explosions. A total of 80 man-years of research have provided new insight into gas dispersion and gas explosions in industrial environments. The primary objectives of the work have been to generate know-how and tools for minimising the effect of accidental explosions. CMI's strategy has been to combine large- and small-scale experimental work with the development of advanced fluid-dynamic codes. In GEP 80-86 pressure development due to flame acceleration by obstacle-generated turbulence was studied. This mechanism was identified as being mainly responsible for explosions occurring in complex geometries typically found on offshore platforms. The phenomenon was studied both in small and large scale (0.2 m3 and 50 m3) for geometrical layouts of increasing complexity. The most complex layout was a scale 1:5 offshore module. Different gases and ignition strengths were studied, as were ignition positions and vent arrangements. Results from these experiments served two purposes: they provided new insight about flame acceleration in complex geometries and also data for validation of computer codes developed for explosion overpressure prediction.
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