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Mediterranean 1919-1945 A volume in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY of WESTERN CIVILIZATION Mediterranean Fascism 1919-1945

Edited by CHARLES F. DELZELL

MACMILLAN MEDITERRANEAN FASCISM, 1919-1945

Introduction, editorial notes, translations by the editor, and compilation copyright© 1970 by Charles F. Delzell. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1970 978-0-333-0343 7-8

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission. First published in the United States 1970 First published in the United Kingdom by The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1971

Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Associated companies inNew York Toronto Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras SBN 333 03437 6

ISBN 978-1-349-00242-9 ISBN 978-1-349-00240-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-00240-5 Contents

Introduction Xl I. FASCISM IN

I. The Birth of Fascism 1 Report of Inspector-General of Public Security, G. Gasti, Regarding Mussolini 4 The Birth of the Movement 7 Program of the Italian Fascist Movement 12 Postulates of the Fascist Program 14 Fascist Agrarian Program 18 Mussolini's First Speech in the Chamber of Deputies 22 New Program of the (PNF) 27 ltalo Balbo's 37 Mussolini's Speech Regarding the House of 38 Prelude to the March on : Mussolini's Speech 40

2. The Path to the Totalitarian State 44 Mussolini's First Speech as Premier to the Chamber of Deputies 45 Mussolini's First Speech as Premier to the Senate 51 Decree Establishing the Fascist Militia (MVSN) 52 Decree Regulating tJ.le Press 53 Mussolini's Coup d'Etat of January 3, 1925 57 Decree on Powers of the Head of the Government 62 Decree on Public Safety 64 The Exceptional Decrees: Law for the Defense of the State 67 The Fascist Electoral Law of 1928 70 The Fascist Grand Council 75 Statute of the National Fascist Party 77 Mussolini's Doctrine of Fascism 91

3. The Corporative State 107 The Palazzo Chigi Pact 108 The Palazzo Vidoni Pact 110 Vlll CONTENTS The Rocco Labor and Antistrike Law Ill The Labor Charter 121 Law on Formation and Functions of the Corporations 126 Law Creating the Chamber of and of Corpo- rations 129

4. Social, Economic, and Youth Programs 13 3 Law Creating the Dopolavoro Organization 13 3 Law Creating the National Organization for Mater- nity and Child Welfare 134 Law Creating the Balilla Youth Organization 139 Law Creating Italian Youth of the Lictors 14 3 The Fascist Decalogue 145 Fascist Loyalty Oath Imposed upon Professors 14 7 The Fascist School Charter 148

5. Fascism, the , and the Jews 156 Treaty Between the and Italy 157 Between the Holy See and Italy 160 The Church and the Fascist-Type Corporative State: 167 Pius XI on Catholic Action: Non abbiamo bisogno 169 Manifesto of the Racist Scientists 17 4 Mussolini's Defense of Racist Policy 177 Provisions for the Defense of the Italian Race 17 8

6. The Day of the Lion 185 Fascism a Universal Phenomenon 186 The Stresa Conference 190 Mussolini Launches the War in Ethiopia 193 Sanctions Against Italy 195 The Fascist Grand Council's Resolution 198 Mussolini Proclaims Victory in Ethiopia 199 Mussolini's Announcement of the Rome- Axis 201 Mussolini Reaffirms the Rome-Berlin Axis 202 Italy's Accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact 206 "" Between Germany and Italy 208 Mussolini's Message to Hitler Regarding Italian Sup- port 211 Hitler's Message to Mussolini 212 CONTENTS ~ Mussolini's Speech Declaring War 213 Three-Power Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan 216 The Italian Ultimatum to Greece 217

7. Monarchist Coup d'Etat and Republican Fascism 221 's Resolution at the Fascist Grand Council 222 Marshal Badoglio's Continuation of the War 223 Marshal Badoglio's Proclamation of the Armistice 224 Instrument of Surrender of Italy 225 Tripartite Declaration of Moscow Regarding Italy 228 King Victor Emmanuel III's Announcement of With- drawal 230 The Sforza Purge Law Regarding Fascist Crimes 2 31 Mussolini's Denunciation of the 235 The Verona Manifesto of Mussolini's 2 37 Mussolini's Last Public Address 243 The Execution of Mussolini 254

II. FASCISM IN SPAIN

8. The Falange Espanola 257 Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera on the Foundation of the Spanish Falange 259 Basic Points of the Falange 266 The Falangist Oath 272 The Twenty-Six-Point Program of the Falange 273 Jose Antonio's Statement Regarding the International Fascist Congress 27 8 Jose Antonio's Instructions from Prison 280

9· The Civil War and Franco's Triumph 283 German and Italian Policy Toward the 284 German-Nationalist Spain Protocol of March 20, 1937 285 German and Italian Policy Toward the Falange and General Franco 287 Franco's Call for Unification of the Fighting Forces 289 Franco's Call for Unification of the Militias 293 X CONTENTS Statutes of the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las JONS 296 The Labor Charter 304 Law Regarding the Press 312 Order Restricting Meetings, Manifestations, and Pub- lic Activities 314 Law Suppressing Masonry and 316 Decree Regulating of Association 317 German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship 318 Italian-German-Spanish Secret Protocol 322 Hitler-Mussolini Conference Regarding , Franco's Spain, and Greece 324 Ostracism of Franco's Spain by 329

III. SALAZAR'S

10. The Clerico-Corporative Estado Novo 331 Political and Economic Doctrines of Salazar 33 3 Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 338 Salazar's Views of World War II as Reported by the German Minister in Lisbon 348

Select Bibliography 3 51 Index 357 Introduction

IN THE aftermath of much of Europe found itself engaged in a three-cornered ideological struggle, while the United States withdrew into smug isolationism. Parliamentary and demo­ cratic , undergirded by commercial and agrari­ anism, was in serious crisis in a continent that was rapidly becom­ ing disrupted by the impact of industrialization and the problems and frustrations brought about by modern "mass" society and aggravated by the war. On the left it was challenged by Marxism, which burst upon the political scene in totalitarian Communist garb in Russia in November, 1917, and in milder democratic-socialist forms elsewhere in Europe. On the right it was attacked by a militantly ultranationalist and radical that emerged as a reaction to the threat (real or imagined) of Communism, the frustrations of the war and peace settlement, the economic disloca­ tion, and the political breakdown of liberal parliamentary govern­ ment. Coming to be known as fascism, this radicalism of the right manifested itself chiefly in three areas: the Mediterranean region in its original and most authentic dress; in east-central Europe in a somewhat mixed and often racist guise; and in Germany in a strongly racist form and with dreams of unlimited conquest. The fascistic movements pushed forward in three distinct waves -from 1919 to 1923; from 1929 to the mid-1930's; and again from 19 39 to 194 3. Italy was the major beachhead of the first wave, 's Fascist party gaining political power by the end of October, 1922. In Germany, 's Nazis were frus­ trated in the Munich of November, 1923. The coming of the , however, served to resuscitate Hitler's National Socialist movement and to stimulate a variety of other fascistic movements throughout Europe. Finally, the years of the Axis military offensive in World War II saw the temporary imposition of other more or less fascistic regimes in many parts of the Continent.

It is the Mediterranean region, and more precisely the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, with which this documentary history is con- xu INTRODUCTION cerned. Mussolini's Italy was, of course, the country par excellence of authentic fascism. In contrast to the very brutal National Social­ ism of Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's regime seemed to many foreigners relatively moderate and respectable, at least until the last half of the 1930's, when it, too, became bellicose and racist. Mussolini's much-touted Charter of Labor and various socio­ economic innovations, along with several aspects of his political mystique and Party-Militia-State structure, attracted a number of willing imitators, especially in the Latin world (though Hitler's movement also found converts in Spain and elsewhere). Drawing much of his initial support from returning World War I veterans who were outraged by "leftist" subversion, Mussolini and his handful of backers soon organized blackshirted squadristi (militiamen) to fight the "Reds" (and also the democratic liberals and Catholics) and to impose their own peculiar brand of "law and order." Hoodlums and semicriminal elements of the cities and countryside were drawn to fascism by the opportunities for violent action. Starting out with a program that was a curious blend of , anticlericalism, and socio-economic reformism, the Italian Fascists soon discovered that they could gain political power much faster by working out opportunistic and cynical bargains with such "established" power groups as the large landholders, industrialists, Army, , and Church. Many leaders of these latter groups were inclined to pursue a misguided strategy: they were willing to let the Fascist squadristi demolish the left­ wing labor and farm organizations, expecting that afterward the Fascists could be "tamed" and brought into the existing political "system." In due course the Fascist movement fused with the prewar Nationalist party, thereby gaining new strength and a more respectable philosophical foundation. Meanwhile, the Fascists came to espouse a tightly regimented, patriotic program of "national " that would preserve private property while at the same time eliminating free labor unions and the threat of strikes and lockouts. In this way they made a peculiar appeal not only to well-to-do conservatives but also to a good many white-collar and lower-middle-class people who stood in fear of Bolshevism and who were often the greatest victims of inflation and other economic crises. Eventually Fascist national syndicalism evolved into the so-called Corporative State, which sought to regiment the dominant economic and political institutions of Italy under the supreme control of the Fascist party. INTRODUCTION XIIl From the outset the Fascists made a concerted effort to recruit and mobilize the youth into their movement. They achieved much success, though this attraction subsided in later years as the move­ ment crystallized into a hierarchic and bureaucratic party. The Fascists managed also to gain a substantial following from some of the working class (though by no means all), to whom they offered various social and psychological surrogates for their former eco­ nomic and political freedoms. There was, to be sure, considerable resistance to the emerging Fascist , and this was most conspicuous among the ranks of the outlawed leftist political parties and labor organizations, stifled journalists, and harassed academicians and professional people. But eventually millions of were swept off their feet by the way in which Mussolini, a most effective and charismatic orator, played on their emotions. There was always a strong element of irrationalism in the Fascist appeal. Mussolini, in his role as the infallible leader () of the party, proved to be a consummate propagandizer of the "myths" of and , evoking past glories like the and utilizing such ancient symbols of authority as the fasci of the Roman Republic. At first Fascism was presented to the Italians for domestic consumption; but by the early 1930's Mus­ solini was openly extolling the desirability of Fascism "for export." Soon became synonymous with war, and Musso­ lini's fate came to be inextricably tied to that of Hitler. Mussolini's "" occurred in October, 1922. It was not until three years later that he was in a position to nail down the so-called totalitarian state. This came about in the wake of his successful surmounting of the great Aventine crisis of the last half of 1924-the brutal assassination of the reformist Socialist leader, . The Duce's triumph was in no small measure due to the ready availability of the Fascists' Blackshirt . In establishing their own totalitarian Party-State, the Fascists were to borrow many of the techniques of the Communist party of Soviet Russia. And in their common hostility to democratic parlia­ mentary government, the Fascists and Communists often found themselves appealing to the same kinds of alienated people. A good many Fascists (beginning with Mussolini himself) came from the ranks of left-wing Marxism and syndicalism; and when the Fascist regime was overthrown in 1943-45 it was not hard for a certain number of ex- to swing to left-wing political extremism. The Fascists owed a good deal of their mystique and emphasis on XIV INTRODUCTION the creative role of violence to 's revolutionary syndicalism and to the integral nationalism of 's Action Franc;aise, both of which had emerged at the turn of the century and proved quite influential, particularly in the Latin world. 1 In a general sort of way and in diverse measure, they also were indebted to the doctrines of Niccolo Machiavelli, Georg F. W. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Maurice Barres, and even William James, to name but the most obvious. But theory was never the long suit of the Fascists; they preferred activism. Theories could be rationalized later; in any case, they must always remain subject to pragmatic change. Thus Mussolini's ideology should be studied genetically; its platforms changed considerably over the years. There were relatively few "constants" except for nationalism and anti-Bolshevism. It was always easier to pinpoint what fascism was opposed to than what it stood for. Spain saw the emergence of fascistic National Syndicalist and Falangist groups in the early 1930's-in the midst of the Depres­ sion and the political extremism that erupted with the overthrow of the Bourbon Monarchy in 1931. There were a good many similarities between the blue-shined Falangist movement of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera and Mussolini's Blackshirts. One can only speculate how the F alangist movement might have fared had its attractive leader not been killed in 19 36. As it was, the F alangists and their various ideological allies were rather speedily and cyni­ cally "subjugated" by General and the old-line army elements during the Civil War. Despite their setback, how­ ever, the Falangists continued to be a not inconsiderable political force in Nationalist Spain-certainly until the defeat of the in 1945. But Franco was always determined to utilize the Falange only to the degree that it suited his own political purposes, and for a quarter of a century he has demonstrated how skillful he can be at playing them off against the Monarchists.

1. Action Fran~aise was in many respects a kind of halfway station on the ideological road to fascism. This protofascist movement emerged at the turn of the century in hostility to the Dreyfusards and looked back nostalgically to the pre-Revolutionary era when "forty kings in a thousand years" had made France. Regarding it, see especially Eugen Weber, Action Franfaise: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University, 1962); and Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Franyaise, Italian Fascism, National (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966). INTRODUCTION XV Portugal is a somewhat different case. In the wake of a series of incompetent military after the advent of the Republic in 1910, that country's generals in 1928 invited a mild-mannered professor of economics, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, to take unrestricted political power. He thereupon established a one-party, clerico-corporativist regime labeled the Estado Novo (New State). Though the title seemed to suggest a kind of Portuguese replica of Mussolini's one-party Corporative State, Salazar's system drew most of its inspiration not so much from the examples of twentieth­ century totalitarian dictatorship as from an earlier age. Like Maur­ ras's Action Fran<;aise, Salazar found inspiration in his own coun­ try's imperial and Catholic . He also paid close attention to the modern Church's social -e.g., , issued in 1891 by Leo XIII and updated forty years later by Pius XL Salazar's regime was authoritarian and semifascist; it stopped short of being totalitarian. After the fall of the in June, 1940, there was, to a limited degree, a kind of reverse flow of political ideas from Portugal to France. At least some of the organizers of Marshal Philippe Petain's Vichy regime-or, to be more precise, his series of Vichy regimes-were impressed by certain features of Salazar's clerico-corporative state as well as by Action Fran<;aise and other models. Limitations of space in this volume, however, preclude any insertion of documents that are illustrative of the authoritarian and ramshackle Vichy regime of 1940-44 that ex­ tolled the traditional virtues of "Work, Family, Country."2 Nor is it possible here to include documentary examples of the numerous right-wing radical movements and leagues that mushroomed in France during the Depression years in conscious imitation of Mus­ solini's and Hitler's , and that gained renewed vigor in Paris under the German occupation.3

2. For an introduction to the complex history of the Vichy regime, see especially Aron, The Vichy Regime, 1940-44 (London: Putnam, 1958); and Rene Remond, The Right Wing in France from 1815 to De Gaulle (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1966). 3. Such leagues included 's Francistes; Pierre Taittinger's Jeunesses Patriotes; Major Jean Renaud's Solidarite Franc;;aise; 's quite large Parti Populaire Franc;;ais; the Comite Secret d'Action Revolutionnaire ("Cagoulards"); and numerous others. In the war years the gulf between Vichy and Paris grew wider-at least until 1944, when the Paris totalitarians managed to cross it and establish a measure of in­ fluence within the Vichy government. XVI INTRODUCTION Likewise, no attempt can be made in this book to discuss the rather old-fashioned military dictatorship that General John Metaxas established in Greece between 19 36 and 1941. His regime was not fascist in the strict sense of the term. Indeed, the label "fascism" should not be confused with old­ style royalist or military regimes. One of the noteworthy charac­ teristics of fascist regimes was that they had their own party militia, and this often acted as a rival to the regular armed forces of the state. Fascist dictatorships aspired to endure, in Hitler's grandi­ ose vision, for at least "a thousand years," whereas military dic­ tatorships were usually intended to be temporary affairs. More­ over, military dictatorships did not usually have their origins in the problems of the new "mass" societies in the way that fascist regimes did; after all, military dictatorships have come and gone with frequency over the centuries. It is important also to emphasize that fascism is a "post-liberal" ideology. It presupposes the existence of a liberal political system that has fallen into a state of crisis with the concomitant threat of a left-wing revolution. Thus, it would be incorrect to label as "fas­ cist" the authoritarian, secular, and Westernizing regime of Mus­ tafa Kemal Atatiirk in Turkey after the overthrow of the Otto­ man Empire. The Young Turks had had insufficient time to get a truly "liberal" system into operation prior to Mustafa Kemal's take­ over; nor was there any serious threat of a Communist victory. In differentiating fascistic regimes from backward-looking au­ thoritarian systems it is important to keep in mind that demagogic leaders like Hitler and Mussolini did not emerge from the tradi­ tional ruling classes. Instead they usually rose from a different and humbler social stratum (though there were some exceptions, such as the aristocratic Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera in Spain and Sir in Britain). Moreover, they intended to create a new ruling class. Yet in spite of the fact that fascist parties were strongly "elitist" in theory, they did not always maintain high selectivity; in Italy, for example, there was to be a considerable influx of the masses as time went on. The fascists intended to eliminate the existing "liberal" and "socialist" political parties and replace them by a single-party system that often made use of some form of the "corporative state." Ideally, there was to be an identity of Party and State; in practice, however, friction sometimes occurred. In none of the Mediterranean countries did fascism become truly INTRODUCTION xvii "totalitarian," despite the fact that Mussolini coined the term. Certainly the Duce's Italy was nowhere nearly so "totalitarian" or "monolithic" as Stalin's Russia-or even Hitler's Germany (which we now know had a surprising number of competing agencies and contradictory sources of authority beneath the Fuhrer). This was partly because of Mussolini's frequent deference to the machinery of the state: "Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State! "4 And that, in turn, was probably the result of the philosophical influence of the older, conservative Nationalist party of Alfredo Rocco and that merged with the Fascists in 192 3. The chronic chaos of the bureaucracy and the humanitarian, almost anarchistic tendencies of the Italian people were also factors. Lastly and most obviously, the failure to achieve complete in Italy was due to Mussolini's inability to get rid of the House of Savoy and the Church. King Victor Emmanuel III, to be sure, never made a public show of hostility to the Duce for more than two decades, but in July, 1943, he became the instrument for overthrowing Mussolini, just as he had been the instrument for bringing him to power in October, 1922. The Church, on the other hand, did find itself occasionally at odds with the regime after the euphoria of the Lateran pacts of 1929; this was true in the clash over Catholic Action in 1931 and again when Mussolini announced the anti­ Semitic decrees in 1938. In the case of the Iberian countries, the failure to achieve complete totalitarianism was even more apparent, given the powerful position of the Church, the army, and other conservative forces. For many years three more or less "standard" interpretations of fascism have dominated the scene: ( 1) the rather dogmatic asser­ tion of Communist spokesmen in the 1920's and early 1930's that fascism was the inevitable and final stage of dying capitalism; (2) the contention of liberal-conservatives (e.g., Benedetto Croce and Friedrich Meinecke) that fascism was a moral sickness that sud­ denly afflicted an essentially healthy body politic and, once cured, would not likely recur; and ( 3) the democratic-radical thesis (set forth by Luigi Salvatorelli, , and others) that fascism should be considered as one of several possible forms of political and social organization that may emerge in modern mass society at

4. Speech of October 28, 1925, quoted in Opera Omnia di Benito Musso­ lini, ed. by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1951-63), Vol. XXI, p. 425. xviii INTRODUCTION a certain stage in its development and under certain crisis condi... tions. To these three may be added various Catholic historiographi­ cal currents (e.g., Jacques Maritain and Augusto Del Noce); the contention that fascism can be subsumed under the category of "totalitarianism" (e.g., Hannah Arendt and Carl Friedrich); and a variety of other interpretations stemming from the disciplines of the social sciences (e.g., Erich Fromm and Seymour Lipset). The author of this volume finds elements to commend themselves in several of the categories mentioned above, and especially in the democratic-radical one, but he is unwilling to restrict himself to any single-track approach to the complex problem. This docu­ mentary collection, however, is not directly concerned with the interpretations of fascism set forth by its critics; that is a topic for another book. 5 Here the editor has generally chosen to let various fascists speak for themselves. As the title indicates, this study covers the years 1919 to 1945- the classic "age of fascism" in the Mediterranean region. What about fascism since that time? In Spain and Portugal a factitious and attenuated form of the ideology managed to survive the shock of World War 11-perhaps more because of the isolation of these countries (and physical exhaustion in the case of Spain) than through the positive achievements of their regimes. At this writing in 1969 there seem to be signs of a decision to whittle away more of the fa<;ade of fascism in both Iberian nations; but if past experi­ ence is a guide, the foreign observer will be well advised to wait and see. In Italy Mussolini came to a violent death in April, 1945, but his movement had already largely fallen apart several years before. There continues to be a small neo-fascist party (the , MSI), but at least at this time it does not pose a major threat. The factors that favored the growth of fascism after W odd War I have not been operative in the same measure after the second world conflict. In the latter case the transition to economic reconstruction was facilitated by massive American assistance. After W odd War II, moreover, it became increasingly clear that capitalism had far more possibilities for renovation than anyone

5. Pioneering efforts in this field include Renzo De Felice, Le interpreta­ zioni del fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1969); Ernst Nolte (ed.), Theorien iiber den Faschismus (Cologne: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967); and Costanzo Casucci (ed.), ll Fascismo: Antologia di scritti critici (: II Mulino, 1961). INTRODUCTION xix had thought possible back in 1919. Though Communism has re­ mained a powerful and subversive force since 1945, the currents that prefer to use the label "Socialist" have generally become quite democratic and no longer frighten the middle and upper classes in the way they did half a century ago. Anti-Communism has become "internationalized" by the Cold War and is no longer the monop­ oly of a particular rightist movement. Although parliamentary government is still far from being robust in Italy, there is at least greater popular participation in and control over government than was possible fifty years ago. There has also been a shoring up of free institutions thanks to the safeguards written into the new Constitution of the Italian Republic, the development of European "communities," and the security provided by NATO. Italy has grown accustomed to the peace settlement of 194 7; no longer occupies center stage in her politics, and certainly no one seriously proposes to revive imperialism. So far neither the Church nor the army has shown much inclination to play ball with neo­ fascism in Italy, though the latter movement does enjoy some co­ operation from the dwindling remnants of monarchists. Yet even if old -style Fascism with its Blackshirt militia and identification of Party and State is not likely to return to power in Italy in the foreseeable future, it would be foolhardy to say that never again could some related form of nativist right-wing political extremism find favor. This might occur under some combination of circumstances such as the appearance of a magnetic new dema­ gogue, or mounting popular disgust with the inability of parlia­ mentary government to cope with housing shortages and to bring about the renovation of political and educational institutions, or soaring frustration with the inconveniences brought about by spiraling strikes on the part of Communist-dominated organized labor, or anger over the disruptive behavior of thousands of alien­ ated university students. The course of events in Greece since the coup d' hat of the colonels in April, 1967, underscores the latent danger of new manifestations of right-wing extremism in the Mediterranean region. It is the editor's hope that the documents in this volume will help to guide the reader through the shifting and often far from crystalline currents of Mediterranean fascism. Many of them have been translated by the editor and are published here for the first time in English. Headnotes and connecting narrative are designed to place the selections in their historic context. XX INTRODUCTION For Mussolini's Italy the documents are arranged in seven chap­ ters. These include the period of the advent of fascism; the path to totalitarianism; the emergence of the corporative state; the socio­ economic and youth programs; the relationship with the Roman Catholic Church and later with the Jews; the increasingly aggres­ sive foreign policy; and finally the coup d'etat of July 25, 1943, and the brutal epilogue of neo-fascism in the German-occupied northern Italian Social Republic. Spain presents a different problem. Here the materials are of three types: documents that explain the nature of the Falange party during the brief life of its founder, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera; speeches and decrees of Generalissimo Franco, who im­ posed his own will on the Falange during the Civil War; and finally diplomatic agreements and reports that point up the often difficult relationship between Nationalist Spain and the Axis powers. In the case of Portugal, where the clerico-corporativist regime of Salazar was not brought into being by an already existent fascist party, the documents are fewer in number. They consist of ex­ cerpts from the dictator's speeches setting forth his political and economic philosophy, and key portions of the Constitution of 193 3 that laid the basis for his new corporative state (Estado Novo). The editor wishes to express his gratitude to Pilar Primo de Rivera, sister of the founder of the Falange Espanola; Jesus Unciti, director of Editora Nacional of the Spanish Ministry of Informa­ tion and Tourism; the United States Catholic Conference; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the Bruce Publish­ ing Company; the Cambridge University Press; Giulio Einaudi Editore; Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.; Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore; Arnaldo Mondadori Editore; and others for kindly per­ mitting him to include in English translation certain documents and excerpts that originally appeared elsewhere.