Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) / Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)

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Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) / Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) 86 Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) / Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) INVESTMENT COMPONENT Modernization # 2!-COMPONENTSYSTEMSINCLUDETHE enhancements include development/ PROGRAM STATUS FOLLOWING&ORWARD!REA!IR$EFENSE deployment of Ka and Ku-band s#URRENTSustainment of fielded Recapitalization #OMMANDAND#ONTROL&!!$# AND -&2&3SENSORSFORDETECTIONOFHIGH # 2!-3O3CAPABILITYIN/%&AND Maintenance Air and Missile Defense Workstation low quadrant elevation rockets and Iraq !-$73 FOR#,IGHTWEIGHT#OUNTER improvised rocket assisted munitions, s1&9#OMPLETED# 2!-SENSE -ORTAR2ADARS,#-2 &IRElNDER and an enhanced interceptor for ANDWARNlELDINGTO/%& MISSION 2ADARS AND+A BAND-ULTI &UNCTION improved mobility and extended range. s1&9)NITIAL+A-&2&3DECLARED Integrates multiple Army and DoD 2ADIO&REQUENCY3YSTEMS-&2&3 FULLYOPERATIONALIN/%& managed systems and commercial for sense; Land-based Phalanx SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCIES s1&9Initiated support for off-the-shelf (COTS) systems with Weapon System (LPWS) and emerging )NTHIS0UBLICATION # 2!-SENSEANDWARNFOR$O3 Accelerated Improved Intercept None a command and control (C2) system, /3# ) Initiative (AI3) for intercept; Wireless s1&9Approval of a Directed to provide protection of fixed and warn; and a wireless Local Area /THER-AJOR)NTERDEPENDENCIES Requirement for the AI3 semi-fixed sites from rockets and Network (LAN) for comms integration !RMYAND-ARINE#ORPS"ATTLE s1&9+A-&2&3lELDING mortar rounds. of all components. Response is provided #OMMAND3YSTEMS 3ENTINEL2ADAR complete THRU# 2!-INTEGRATIONWITH!RMY DESCRIPTION *OINTMISSIONCOMMANDSYSTEMS PROJECTED ACTIVITIES 4HE#OUNTER 2OCKET !RTILLERY -ORTAR s1&9$EPLOYINITIAL+U-&2&3 # 2!- )NDIRECT&IRE0ROTECTION # 2!-SENSEANDWARNISCURRENTLY TO/%& #APABILITY)&0# SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS deployed to forward operating bases s1&9#ONDUCT!)LIVElRE (SoS) was developed in response to a &/"S IN)RAQINSUPPORTOF$EPARTMENT testing -ULTI .ATIONAL&ORCE )RAQ/PERATIONAL OF3TATE/FlCEOF3ECURITY#OOPERATION Needs Statement (ONS) validated in )RAQ$O3/3# ) OPERATIONSANDIN September 2004. An innovative SoS Afghanistan in support of Operation approach was implemented in which %NDURING&REEDOM/%& # 2!-S multiple DoD acquisition program sense and warn performance has been SYSTEMSWEREINTEGRATEDWITH#/43 extremely successful, providing timely ITEMSTOPROVIDESEVEN# 2!- WARNINGFORMORETHAN ROCKET functions: sense, warn, respond, ANDMORTARATTACKSAGAINST# 2!- INTERCEPT # SHAPE ANDPROTECT EQUIPPED&/"S WITHMINIMUMFALSE WARNINGS#URRENT/.3 BASEDCAPABILITY ACQUISITION PHASE Technology Development Engineering & Manufacturing Development Production & Deployment Operations & Support UNITED STATES ARMY 87 Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) / Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES Australia, United Kingdom CONTRACTORS Hardware/Integration/Fielding/ Contractor Logistics Support: Northrop Grumman (Huntsville, AL) Land-based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS): Raytheon Missile Systems (Tucson, AZ) Software Development/Maintenance: Northrop Grumman (Redondo Beach, CA) Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars (LCMR): SRCTec Inc. (Syracuse, NY) Common Hardware, Software: General Dynamics (Taunton, MA) WEAPON SYSTEMS 2013.
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