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Practice Test Version 1.8 LPI 117-101: Practice Exam QUESTION NO: 1 CORRECT TEXT
LPI 117-101 117-101 LPI 101 General Linux, Part I Practice Test Version 1.8 LPI 117-101: Practice Exam QUESTION NO: 1 CORRECT TEXT You suspect that a new ethernet card might be conflicting with another device. Which file should you check within the /proc tree to learn which IRQs are being used by which kernel drives? Answer: interrupts QUESTION NO: 2 How many SCSI ids for peripherals can SCSI-1 support? A. 5 B. 6 C. 7 D. 8 Answer: C Explanation: SCSI-1 support total 7 peripherals. There are several different types of SCSI devices. The original SCSI specification is commonly referred to as SCSI-1. The newer specification, SCSI-2, offers increased speed and performance, as well as new commands. Fast SCSI increases throughput to more than 10MB per second. Fast-Wide SCSI provides a wider data path and throughput of up to 40MB per second and up to 15 devices. There there are Ultra-SCSI and Ultra-Wide-SCSI QUESTION NO: 3 You need to install a fax server. Which type of fax/modem should you install to insure Linux compatibility? Test-King.com A. External Serial Fax/modem B. External USB Fax/modem C. Internal ISA Fax/modem D. Internal PCI Fax/modem Answer: A QUESTION NO: 4 You are running Linux 2.0.36 and you need to add a USB mouse to your system. Which of the following statements is true? "Welcome to Certification's Main Event" - www.test-king.com 2 LPI 117-101: Practice Exam A. You need to rebuild the kernel. -
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Oracle Linux 7 Kernel Crypto
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Oracle Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validation Software Version: R7-2.0.0 Date: December 7, 2018 Document Version 1.1 ©Oracle Corporation This document may be reproduced whole and intact including the Copyright notice. Title: Oracle Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Security Policy December 07, 2018 Author: Atsec Information Security Contributing Authors: Oracle Linux Engineering Oracle Security Evaluations – Global Product Security Oracle Corporation World Headquarters 500 Oracle Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065 U.S.A. Worldwide Inquiries: Phone: +1.650.506.7000 Fax: +1.650.506.7200 oracle.com Copyright © 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This document is provided for information purposes only and the contents hereof are subject to change without notice. This document is not warranted to be error-free, nor subject to any other warranties or conditions, whether expressed orally or implied in law, including implied warranties and conditions of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Oracle specifically disclaim any liability with respect to this document and no contractual obligations are formed either directly or indirectly by this document. This document may reproduced or distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Oracle and Java are registered trademarks of Oracle and/or its affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. Oracle Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic -
I.MX Linux® Reference Manual
i.MX Linux® Reference Manual Document Number: IMXLXRM Rev. 1, 01/2017 i.MX Linux® Reference Manual, Rev. 1, 01/2017 2 NXP Semiconductors Contents Section number Title Page Chapter 1 About this Book 1.1 Audience....................................................................................................................................................................... 27 1.1.1 Conventions................................................................................................................................................... 27 1.1.2 Definitions, Acronyms, and Abbreviations....................................................................................................27 Chapter 2 Introduction 2.1 Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................31 2.1.1 Software Base................................................................................................................................................ 31 2.1.2 Features.......................................................................................................................................................... 31 Chapter 3 Machine-Specific Layer (MSL) 3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................37 3.2 Interrupts (Operation).................................................................................................................................................. -
Intel FPGA Programmable Acceleration Card N3000
Intel® Acceleration Stack User Guide Intel FPGA Programmable Acceleration Card N3000 Updated for Intel® Acceleration Stack for Intel® Xeon® CPU with FPGAs: 1.1 Subscribe UG-20244 | 2021.06.14 Send Feedback Latest document on the web: PDF | HTML Contents Contents 1. About this Document...................................................................................................... 4 1.1. Acronym List ........................................................................................................5 2. System Requirements..................................................................................................... 7 2.1. Cooling Requirements............................................................................................ 7 3. Hardware Installation................................................................................................... 11 3.1. Installing the Intel FPGA PAC N3000.......................................................................11 4. Installing the OPAE Software........................................................................................16 4.1. Install Additional Packages.................................................................................... 17 4.2. Install the Release Package................................................................................... 17 4.2.1. Remove Previous OPAE Packages............................................................... 18 4.2.2. Install the Acceleration Stack for Runtime.................................................. -
Namespacing in Selinux
Namespacing in SELinux Linux.conf.au 2018 Sydney, Australia James Morris [email protected] Introduction ● Who am I? – Linux security subsystem maintainer ● Previously: Crypto API, Netfilter, SELinux, LSM, IPSec, MCS, sVirt ● Recovering manager ● blog.namei.org ● @xjamesmorris ● Overview – Briefly review technologies – Discuss requirements – SELinux namespace prototype – Current work: inode labeling – Future work SELinux ● Label-based mandatory access control (MAC) – Set security labels on: ● Subjects ● Objects – Define permissions – Centrally managed policy – Enforced by kernel ● Generalized ● Separation of policy and mechanism Linux Security Modules (LSM) ● Kernel API for access control ● Hooks – Located at security decision points – All security relevant information available – Race-free ● Kind of like Netfilter but for the whole kernel ● Pluggable: Smack, SELinux, AppArmor etc. Linux Namespaces ● Private views of global resources – mount, network, ipc, pid, user, uts, cgroup ● APIs: clone(2), setns(2), unshare(2) ● See also: pam_namespace(8) ● Uses: – Sandboxes – Containers – Multi-level security (!) ● No namespacing of LSM or other security APIs Containers ● Not a Thing ™ ● Actually namespaces + cgroups + magic – Docker, lxc, lxd etc. ● Very popular ● Kernel security APIs not containerized, e.g. – Limits functionality for OS-like containers – SELinux on Fedora-based distros pretends to be disabled inside container, and yet … ! Use Cases ● Enable SELinux confinement within a container – Currently runs as one global label and appears -
Speeding up Linux Disk Encryption Ignat Korchagin @Ignatkn $ Whoami
Speeding Up Linux Disk Encryption Ignat Korchagin @ignatkn $ whoami ● Performance and security at Cloudflare ● Passionate about security and crypto ● Enjoy low level programming @ignatkn Encrypting data at rest The storage stack applications @ignatkn The storage stack applications filesystems @ignatkn The storage stack applications filesystems block subsystem @ignatkn The storage stack applications filesystems block subsystem storage hardware @ignatkn Encryption at rest layers applications filesystems block subsystem SED, OPAL storage hardware @ignatkn Encryption at rest layers applications filesystems LUKS/dm-crypt, BitLocker, FileVault block subsystem SED, OPAL storage hardware @ignatkn Encryption at rest layers applications ecryptfs, ext4 encryption or fscrypt filesystems LUKS/dm-crypt, BitLocker, FileVault block subsystem SED, OPAL storage hardware @ignatkn Encryption at rest layers DBMS, PGP, OpenSSL, Themis applications ecryptfs, ext4 encryption or fscrypt filesystems LUKS/dm-crypt, BitLocker, FileVault block subsystem SED, OPAL storage hardware @ignatkn Storage hardware encryption Pros: ● it’s there ● little configuration needed ● fully transparent to applications ● usually faster than other layers @ignatkn Storage hardware encryption Pros: ● it’s there ● little configuration needed ● fully transparent to applications ● usually faster than other layers Cons: ● no visibility into the implementation ● no auditability ● sometimes poor security https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4516071/windows-10-update-kb4516071 @ignatkn Block -
BSD UNIX Toolbox 1000+ Commands for Freebsd, Openbsd
76034ffirs.qxd:Toolbox 4/2/08 12:50 PM Page iii BSD UNIX® TOOLBOX 1000+ Commands for FreeBSD®, OpenBSD, and NetBSD®Power Users Christopher Negus François Caen 76034ffirs.qxd:Toolbox 4/2/08 12:50 PM Page ii 76034ffirs.qxd:Toolbox 4/2/08 12:50 PM Page i BSD UNIX® TOOLBOX 76034ffirs.qxd:Toolbox 4/2/08 12:50 PM Page ii 76034ffirs.qxd:Toolbox 4/2/08 12:50 PM Page iii BSD UNIX® TOOLBOX 1000+ Commands for FreeBSD®, OpenBSD, and NetBSD®Power Users Christopher Negus François Caen 76034ffirs.qxd:Toolbox 4/2/08 12:50 PM Page iv BSD UNIX® Toolbox: 1000+ Commands for FreeBSD®, OpenBSD, and NetBSD® Power Users Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc. 10475 Crosspoint Boulevard Indianapolis, IN 46256 www.wiley.com Copyright © 2008 by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana Published simultaneously in Canada ISBN: 978-0-470-37603-4 Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the publisher. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except as permitted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600. Requests to the Publisher for permis- sion should be addressed to the Legal Department, Wiley Publishing, Inc., 10475 Crosspoint Blvd., Indianapolis, IN 46256, (317) 572-3447, fax (317) 572-4355, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions. -
Linux® 用户的freebsd 快速入门向导
Linux® 用户的 FreeBSD 快速入门向导 John Ferrell 修订: db2a5c8513 版权 © 2008 The FreeBSD Documentation Project FreeBSD 是 FreeBSD 基金会的注册商标 Linux 是 Linus Torvalds 的注册商标。 Intel, Celeron, Centrino, Core, EtherExpress, i386, i486, Itanium, Pentium, 和 Xeon 是 Intel Corporation 及其分支机构在美国和其他国家的商标或注册商标。 Red Hat, RPM, 是 Red Hat, Inc. 在美国和其他国家的注册商标。 UNIX是 Open Group 在美国和其它国家的注册商标。 许多制造商和经销商使用一些称为商标的图案或文字设计来彰显自己的产品。 本文档中 出现的, 为 FreeBSD Project 所知晓的商标,后面将以 “™” 或 “®” 符号来标注。 2020-12-24 01:34:44 +0000 由 Guangyuan Yang. 摘要 本文档旨在快速使那些高级 Linux® 用户熟悉FreeBSD的一些基础知识。 目录 1. 简介 ...................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Shell程序:没有Bash吗? ......................................................................................................... 1 3. Packages和Ports:在 FreeBSD 中添加软件 ................................................................................... 2 4. 系统启动:运行级别在哪里? ................................................................................................... 3 5. 网络配置 ............................................................................................................................... 4 6. 防火墙 .................................................................................................................................. 4 7. 升级 FreeBSD .......................................................................................................................... 5 8. procfs:已是过去式但仍未被遗忘 ........................................................................................... -
Virtualizing Servers with Xen
Virtualization Xen Features Escalabilidade Performance QoS Implementation Future Virtualizing servers with Xen Evaldo Gardenali VI International Conference of Unix at UNINET Virtualization Xen Features Escalabilidade Performance QoS Implementation Future Outline Virtualization Xen Features Scalability Performance Quality of Service Implementation Future of Xen Virtualization Xen Features Escalabilidade Performance QoS Implementation Future Overview Why? Support heterogeneous environments: Linux r 2.4 e 2.6, NetBSD r , Plan9 r FreeBSD r , OpenSolaris r Consolidate work Legacy Systems Gradual Upgrade Service Isolation Quality of Service Isolated testing and development Ease of administration Ease of relocation and migration Virtualization Xen Features Escalabilidade Performance QoS Implementation Future Virtualization Techniques Single System Image: Ensim r , Vservers, CKRM, VirtuozzoTM, BSD r jail(), Solaris r Zones √ Groups processes in “resource containers” Hard to get isolation × Emulation: QEMU, Bochs √ Portable Extremely slow × Virtualization: VMware r , VirtualPC r √ Runs unmodified Operating Systems Virtualizing x86 is inefficient × User Mode Kernel: User Mode Linux, CoLinux Guest runs as a process on the host OS × Low performance (I/O, context switches) × Paravirtualization: Xen r , Denali √ Excellent performance Requires port to special architecture × Virtualization Xen Features Escalabilidade Performance QoS Implementation Future Virtualization Techniques Single System Image: Ensim r , Vservers, CKRM, VirtuozzoTM, BSD r jail(), Solaris -
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module V4.0
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module v4.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Version 1.2 Last update: 2016-08-29 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation 9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260 Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.co m ©2016 Red Hat Enterprise Linux / atsec information security corporation Page 1 of 24 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module v4.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table of Contents 1Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................4 1.1Module Overview...........................................................................................................4 1.2FIPS 140-2 validation.....................................................................................................6 1.3Modes of Operations......................................................................................................7 2Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces.............................................................................8 3Roles, Services and Authentication.........................................................................................9 3.1Roles.............................................................................................................................. 9 3.2Services........................................................................................................................ -
Demystifying Internet of Things Security Successful Iot Device/Edge and Platform Security Deployment — Sunil Cheruvu Anil Kumar Ned Smith David M
Demystifying Internet of Things Security Successful IoT Device/Edge and Platform Security Deployment — Sunil Cheruvu Anil Kumar Ned Smith David M. Wheeler Demystifying Internet of Things Security Successful IoT Device/Edge and Platform Security Deployment Sunil Cheruvu Anil Kumar Ned Smith David M. Wheeler Demystifying Internet of Things Security: Successful IoT Device/Edge and Platform Security Deployment Sunil Cheruvu Anil Kumar Chandler, AZ, USA Chandler, AZ, USA Ned Smith David M. Wheeler Beaverton, OR, USA Gilbert, AZ, USA ISBN-13 (pbk): 978-1-4842-2895-1 ISBN-13 (electronic): 978-1-4842-2896-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-2896-8 Copyright © 2020 by The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. -
Sergei Miroshnichenko Linux Pi
Setting up the PCIe hotplug in Kernel for exible setups Sergei Miroshnichenko September 27, 2019 Sergei Miroshnichenko Setting up the PCIe hotplug in Kernel for exible setups Why do we need PCIe hotplug: replace Replace/add/remove NVME drives in front panel of the server chassis Sergei Miroshnichenko Setting up the PCIe hotplug in Kernel for exible setups Why do we need PCIe hotplug: PCIe-JBOD Connect/detach a PCIe-JBOD to a server Sergei Miroshnichenko Setting up the PCIe hotplug in Kernel for exible setups Why do we need PCIe hotplug: Fabric Mode Handle rerouting of TLP packets for virtualized topologies in Fabric Mode Sergei Miroshnichenko Setting up the PCIe hotplug in Kernel for exible setups Why do we need PCIe hotplug: misc But there's more: Connect/detach a enclosure full of NVME drives inside a chassis Reconnect to a switch after changing its settings Testing procedures during manufacturing Some x86 64 machines (even servers) can't boot with NVME enclosures attached Sergei Miroshnichenko Setting up the PCIe hotplug in Kernel for exible setups Hotplug today Check if the Linux kernel supports PCIe hotplug: % grep HOTPLUG PCI /boot/config-5.2.0-pciehp+ CONFIG HOTPLUG PCI PCIE=y CONFIG HOTPLUG_PCI=y Check if a switch supports PCIe hotplug: % sudo lspci -vvv -s 0000:02:00.0 | grep --color HotPlug SltCap: AttnBtn- PwrCtrl+ MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise- Check if a free slot available: % lspci -tv +-[0021:00]---00.0-[01-11]--+-00.0-[02-11]--+-00.0-[03-07]-- | | +-01.0-[08-0c]-- | | n-02.0-[0d-11]-- Check if a free space for