GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2016 Berkshire's Blemishes: Lessons for Buffett's Successors, Peers, and Policy Lawrence A. Cunningham George Washington University Law School,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Cunningham, Lawrence A., Berkshire's Blemishes: Lessons for Buffett's Successors, Peers, and Policy (2016). Columbia University Business Law Review (July 2016); GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-28; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2807131 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES: LESSONS FOR BUFFETT’S SUCCESSORS, PEERS, AND POLICY Lawrence A. Cunningham* Berkshire Hathaway’s unique managerial model is lauded for its great value; this article highlights its costs. Most costs stem from the same features that yield such great value, which boil down, ironically, to Berkshire trying to be something it isn’t: it is a massive industrial conglomerate run as an old-fashioned investment partnership. An advisory board gives unchecked power to a single manager (Warren Buffett); Buffett makes huge capital allocations and pivotal executive hiring-and-firing decisions with modest investigation and scant oversight; Berkshire’s autonomous and decentralized structure grants operating managers enormous discretion with limited second-guessing; its trust-based culture relies on a cultivated vision of integrity more than internal controls; and its thrifty anti-bureaucracy means no central departments, such as public relations or general counsel.