Integrity, Identity, and Why Moral Exemplars Do What Is Right
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Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) 1-1-2011 Integrity, Identity, and Why Moral Exemplars Do What Is Right David Bauman Washington University in St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd Recommended Citation Bauman, David, "Integrity, Identity, and Why Moral Exemplars Do What Is Right" (2011). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 34. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/34 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS Department of Philosophy Dissertation Examination Committee Christopher Heath Wellman, Chair Eric Brown Kurt Dirks John Doris Larry May Simine Vazire INTEGRITY, IDENTITY, AND WHY MORAL EXEMPLARS DO WHAT IS RIGHT by David Bauman A dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2011 Saint Louis, Missouri Copyright by David Curt Bauman 2011 Abstract Many people think that integrity is a central concept for moral reasoning. Political, educational, and business leaders tout the importance of integrity for our society’s moral health. But there are reasons to doubt that it is solely a moral concept. Our intuitions seem to confirm that a committed Mafia boss may have some form of integrity. Or one might say that integrity is the mere expression of other moral commitments or depict it as a formal virtue lacking any moral content. Others question whether or not it is even desirable or achievable. In this dissertation, I develop an account of integrity that defends integrity from these doubts and present it as a central moral concept. In Chapter 1, I distill a basic notion of integrity from existing discussions to answer the question, “What is integrity?”. My analysis provides a “bare bones” account that captures the central features of integrity without addressing its moral or immoral content. The identity account of integrity I present requires a person of integrity to have coherent commitments that constitute her identity as well as the determination to actualize them. In Chapter 2 I answer the question, “Is integrity a moral concept?” I start by reviewing recent attempts to resolve a dilemma facing all integrity accounts. The first horn of the dilemma is the intuition problem which is that it seems that both tyrants and heroes could have some kind of integrity. The second horn is the moral integrity problem which is that integrity is commonly regarded as a moral concept that cannot apply to ii tyrants. Any optimal account of integrity should explain our diverging intuitions about integrity while recognizing integrity as a moral concept. I resolve the dilemma by first making a distinction between substantive integrity and formal integrity. When I say, “Mary is a person of integrity,” most speakers presuppose that she is morally trustworthy. When I say that a tyrant has integrity, however, I must qualify my statement by pointing to some strongly held non-moral commitments that explain my attribution. I argue that substantive integrity refers to a person who has a whole and coherent identity that is morally uncorrupted, while formal integrity refers to a person who merely has a whole and coherent identity. In the remainder of Chapter 2, I develop a moral identity account of integrity that resolves the dilemma by accounting for the similarities and differences between tyrants and heroes as well as explaining the moral content of integrity. In Chapter 3 I answer the question “Is integrity a virtue?” by addressing claims that integrity is not a virtue or that it is merely the expression of other virtues. Against these positions I argue that integrity is a virtue, namely the disposition to "be true" to oneself by maintaining a coherent self. I first build on the moral identity account to explain what constitutes a coherent “self.” I then explain how a person of integrity organizes her commitments according to her most important ends and how a desire for self-consistency motivates her to fulfill her commitments. This should suffice to show that integrity is a virtue. But my account faces questions about how the person of integrity maintains coherence, and I end Chapter 3 by responding to four such questions. 1) Can “honest thieves” have substantive integrity? 2) Can a person of substantive integrity ever lie in order to actualize another virtue? 3) Can a person of substantive iii integrity alter or change her identity and still have integrity? 4) Can two people have opposed moral beliefs and both have substantive integrity? In Chapter 4 I respond to an important empirical objection to the moral identity account of integrity. John Doris and Gilbert Harman argue that consistency of character is doubtful because situational factors often overwhelm a person’s moral identity. The purpose of this chapter is not to contradict the findings of the social psychology experiments presented in defense of their position, but rather to show that the moral identity account of integrity can better explain their findings. I argue that integrity based on a person’s moral identity is not as situationally flexible as Doris and Harman claim. Recent research on how a person’s moral commitments can become more or less accessible to her working memory demonstrates that a person’s moral identity can actually mediate behavior across situations. In Chapter 5 I take up another empirical challenge to integrity as a moral virtue. David Luban claims that the quest for integrity is dangerous for two reasons. First, in our quest to maintain harmony between our beliefs and conduct, we tend to change our moral principles to justify our immoral behavior. Second, we also tend to rationalize our immoral behaviors because we want to appear upright to ourselves and others. Against Luban’s position, I argue that what he labels a quest for integrity is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce the moral corruption and rationalization that he fears. A person may rationalize her conduct in a quest for achievement and wealth, but rarely would she do so in a quest for substantive integrity. iv Acknowledgements Attaining a doctoral degree in philosophy has been a great challenge because of its rigorous requirements and long-term commitment. I benefitted greatly from the support and encouragement of many people who helped me achieve this milestone. Below I acknowledge those who made a significant contribution to my completion of this dissertation and degree. Anyone who I do not mentioned for lack of space should certainly know that I appreciate their contribution as well. I want to thank the Graduate School of Washington University in St. Louis for its financial support during my years of study. I also want to thank the graduate students who entered the PhD program with me and who gave me the support to start and finish the program. Thanks to Jill Delston, Ben Floyd-Clapman, Amy Goodman-Wilson, Don Goodman-Wilson, Zach Hoskins, Matthew James, and Rawdon Waller for their humor and encouragement. Thanks to the many professors who guided me through my classes, qualifying papers, and eventually my dissertation. In particular, Larry May patiently helped me narrow my dissertation topic into something that would actually fit into one book, Kit Wellman guided me through the long and arduous first draft stage, and Eric Brown gave me insightful and candid feedback on my outlines and concepts. Thanks also to John Doris whose work inspired the last two chapters. I also appreciate the insightful questions and comments of my other committee members, Simine Vazire and Kurt Dirks. I am also indebted to my friends and family at New Creation in Christ who reminded me that God, music, prayer, and friendship make for a full life. Thanks also to Grace Pope who encouraged me to “keep writing” and made sure I stayed on track. Finally I acknowledge my family. My parents, Harvey and Judy Bauman, who gave moral support as their son pursued his dream of studying and teaching ethics. Art and Marie Docken who provided a home-away-from-home to rest, think, and talk out my ideas. My wife and friend Lila Docken Bauman whose constant support and sacrifice carried me to this finish line. And last but not least, my son Scott Bauman who embraced my journey and joyfully skipped along with me to the top of “mount PhD.” I dedicate my dissertation to all those who have courageously and humbly stood up for what is ethically right, even in the face of powerful opposition. v Table of Contents Abstract............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. v Introduction......................................................................................................................... 2 Chapter 1 - Integrity: An Account for Heroes and Tyrants ................................................ 4 Section 1: What Is Integrity? .......................................................................................... 4 Section 2: Integrity without Morality ..........................................................................