CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Congressional-Executive Commission on China 243 Ford House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

202-226-3766 ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION www.cecc.gov DECEMBER 2020 ▼ Hong Kong riot police arrest a protester during a police dispersal operation to clear thousands of pro-democracy protesters. September 29, 2020.

▲ Nurses and doctors at Huichang People’s Hospital pay tribute as China holds ▲ Padlock and surveillance camera on Uyghur mosque at the Mausoleum of Apak national mourning for those who died of COVID–19 in Ganzhou municipality, Khoja and Tomb of the Fragrant Concubine in Kashgar municipality, Xinjiang Jiangxi province. April 4, 2020. Imaginechina Limited/Alamy Stock Photo. Uyghur Autonomous Region. karenfoleyphotography/Alamy Stock Photo. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE James P. McGovern, Massachusetts, Marco Rubio, Florida, Chair Co-Chair Marcy Kaptur, Ohio James Lankford, Oklahoma Thomas Suozzi, New York Tom Cotton, Arkansas Tom Malinowski, New Jersey Steve Daines, Montana Ben McAdams, Utah Todd Young, Indiana Christopher Smith, New Jersey Dianne Feinstein, California Brian Mast, Florida Jeff Merkley, Oregon Vicky Hartzler, Missouri Gary Peters, Michigan Angus King, Maine

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

TO BE APPOINTED

COMMISSION STAFF Jonathan Stivers, Staff Director Peter Mattis, Deputy Staff Director STATEMENT FROM THE CHAIRS

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Commission) was established by the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106–286) as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) prepared to enter the World Trade Organization. The Commission is mandated by law to issue an annual report to the President and the Congress focusing on whether the acts of the PRC are in compliance with or in violation of internationally recognized human rights, including the rights to free expression, peaceful assembly, and religious belief and practice, as well as any progress or regression on the development of the rule of law. The Commission is also mandated to maintain a database of political prisoners in China—individuals who have been detained or imprisoned for exercising their internationally recognized civil and political rights, as well as rights protected by China’s Constitution and other domestic laws. The Commission’s 2020 Annual Report covers the period from July 1, 2019 to July 1, 2020. As discussed in the subsequent chapters of this report, the Chinese government and Communist Party have taken unprecedented steps in the last year to extend their repressive policies through censorship, intimidation, and the detention of individuals and groups for exercising their funda- mental human rights, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Hong Kong. In recent years, the Commission has become increasingly concerned that the Chinese government and Party have expanded their human rights violations around the world, even reaching the American people. These efforts include threatening and intimidating critics, blocking social media content, pressuring publishers to censor their content in China, influencing academic institutions to the detriment of academic freedom, interfering in multilateral institutions, and pressuring U.S. and international companies to suppress practices that do not conform to the political narratives and demands of Chinese officials. The Commission has contributed to bringing these issues to light with a series of hearings on the Chinese government’s “long arm of authoritarianism.” Building on this initiative, we are pleased that the 2020 Annual Report includes a new chapter on the Chinese government’s human rights violations in the United States and globally, along with a new set of policy recommendations. Another key part of the Commission’s mandate is to provide recommendations for legislative and executive action. In addition to the recommendations contained in this report, the Commission drafted, edited, and provided support for key legislative ini- tiatives including the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, the PROTECT Hong Kong Act, the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, the Tibetan Policy and Support Act, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and many other House and Senate bills and resolutions related to China and human rights. We are proud of the role the Commission played in moving each of these initiatives forward in Congress. During the 116th Congress, the Commission held hearings on “Hong Kong’s Future in the Balance: Eroding Autonomy and Challenges to Human Rights,” “Tiananmen at 30: Examining the Evolution of Repression in China,” “Hong Kong’s Summer of Discontent and U.S. Policy Responses,” “Forced Labor, Mass Internment, and Social Control in Xinjiang,” and “The Human Rights Situation in Tibet and the International Response.” The Commission also held a town hall event in New York City with Tibetan communities from New York and New Jersey on “U.S. Policy on Tibet and Critical Issues Prevailing Inside Tibet,” and a roundtable on “Global Supply Chains, Forced Labor, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” The Commission regularly holds congressional briefings and meetings with U.S. and international non-governmental orga- nizations, journalists, and academics, and Chinese, Tibetan, Hong Kong, and Uyghur human rights advocates. We have also met with family members of individuals detained and imprisoned in China; many of these individuals’ cases are available in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. As legislative and executive branch decisionmakers seek a more effective strategy for promoting human rights and the rule of law in China, the Commission plays an essential role in reporting on conditions, raising awareness of human rights violations, and informing U.S. policy. We are grateful for the opportunity to serve as the Commission Chair and Co-Chair, and we appreciate the attention of the U.S. Congress and Administration to the issues highlighted in this report.

Representative James P. McGovern Senator Marco Rubio Chair Co-Chair OVERVIEW

ver the last year, the Congressional-Executive extrajudicial mass internment camps where they are subjected Commission on China (Commission) found that the to forced labor, torture, and political indoctrination. In the last Chinese government and Communist Party have year, leaked Chinese government documents provided additional Otaken unprecedented steps to extend their repressive policies evidence that the mass internment camp system was organized at through censorship, intimidation, and the detention of peo- the direction of top Party officials and confirmed the prevalence ple in China for exercising their fundamental human rights. of the use of coercive force and punishment for inmates. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Xinjiang Uyghur Forced labor in the XUAR is widespread and systematic Autonomous Region (XUAR) where new evidence emerged that and exists within the mass internment camps and elsewhere crimes against humanity—and possibly genocide—are occur- throughout the region, as part of a targeted campaign of repres- ring, and in Hong Kong, where the “one country, two systems” sion against Turkic and Muslim minorities. These facts are framework has been effectively dismantled. confirmed by the testimony of former camp detainees, satellite These policies are in direct violation of China’s Constitution, imagery, media reports, and leaked government documents. which guarantees “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, Many U.S., international, and Chinese companies are increas- of association, of procession and of demonstration,” as well as ingly at risk of complicity in the exploitation of forced labor “freedom of religious belief.” The actions of the Chinese gov- involving Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities. ernment also contravene both the letter and the spirit of the In last year’s annual report, the Commission stated that Universal Declaration of Human Rights; violate its obligations the situation in the XUAR may constitute crimes against under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, humanity as outlined in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute of which the Chinese government has signed but not ratified; and the International Criminal Court. In March 2020, the Simon- violate the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United Cultural Rights, ratified in 2001. Further, the Chinese govern- States Holocaust Memorial Museum stated that there is a “rea- ment has abandoned any pretense of adhering to the legally sonable basis to believe the government of China is committing binding commitments it made to the international community crimes against humanity” in the XUAR. when it signed the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Disturbing new evidence has also emerged of a systematic future of Hong Kong. and widespread policy of forced sterilization and birth suppres- President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has tight- sion of the Uyghur and other minority populations. Further, an ened his grip over China’s one-party authoritarian system, official XUAR policy document from 2017 stated that nearly and the Party has further absorbed key government func- half a million middle and elementary school-age children in tions while also enhancing its control over universities and the XUAR were attending boarding schools, many of whom businesses. Authorities promoted the official ideology of “Xi were involuntarily separated from their families. These trends Jinping Thought” on social media and required Party mem- suggest that the Chinese government is intentionally working bers, government officials, journalists, and students to study to destroy Uyghur and other minority families, culture, and it, making the ideology both pervasive, and for much of the religious adherence, all of which should be considered when country, mandatory. determining whether the Chinese government is responsible In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), it is for perpetrating atrocity crimes—including genocide—against now estimated that up to 1.8 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic and predominantly Hui, and others have been arbitrarily detained in a system of Muslim ethnic minorities in China.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 ■ OVERVIEW

In Hong Kong, the “one country, two systems” framework that mandate acceptance and promotion of government ethnic has been dismantled, severely undermining the rule of law and and religious policy. respect for human rights that the territory has long enjoyed. It has been 25 years since Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th The political turmoil in Hong Kong over the past year is the Panchen Lama, was abducted along with his parents and forc- result of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments’ refusal to ibly disappeared. Since then, they have not been seen or heard address the legitimate demands of the Hong Kong people that from by anyone outside China, and to this day they remain excessive police violence against peaceful protesters be stopped among the world’s longest detained political and religious pris- and investigated. Authorities arrested pro-democracy leaders, oners. The members of the Commission continue to call for prevented journalists from reporting, applied political pressure their immediate and unconditional release. on the judiciary, and allowed the Hong Kong Police Force to The outbreak of COVID–19 in Wuhan municipality, grow increasingly abusive toward non-violent protesters. Hubei province, in late 2019 caused incalculable suffering for Instead of reducing tensions, the Chinese government the people of China and presented a major challenge to the bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council to impose national Chinese Communist Party’s leadership. The strategy employed security legislation that directly threatens Hong Kong residents’ by the Chinese government in response to the pandemic echoed right to due process, as well as their freedoms of expression and its responses to other domestic and international challenges. association. The legislation is clearly meant to target, intimidate, Chinese officials used the heavy hand of repression, censorship, and silence Hong Kong’s robust civil society, including the and secrecy to control the public narrative in a manner designed many organizations that have advocated for human rights in to preserve the political legitimacy of the Party. Attempts to min- mainland China from the relative safety of Hong Kong. imize the severity of the outbreak by censoring vital information Despite these challenges, the spirit of democracy and and silencing doctors exacerbated the spread of COVID–19 in human rights remains strong in Hong Kong. Hundreds of China and around the world. Instead of providing a full and thousands gathered in Victoria Park to commemorate the transparent accounting of the emergence of the novel coronavi- 31st anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, even though rus in China, the Chinese government pushed back against calls the Hong Kong Police Force refused to authorize the annual for an independent international investigation. candlelight vigil. The Chinese government continued its hardline approach Chinese officials continue to avoid transparency and to exerting control over journalists and other independent accountability to the families of those killed, tortured, impris- voices. In 2019, China reportedly had detained the highest oned, or exiled for their participation in the pro-democracy number of journalists in the world. This past year, the Chinese demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and throughout China government expelled New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and during the spring of 1989. The Tiananmen Mothers, a group in Washington Post journalists from mainland China and Hong China composed of parents and family members of individuals Kong while strengthening government and Party control of killed, annually call for justice, truth, and accountability about domestic media outlets. Hundreds of citizens have been penal- the massacre. ized for sharing online information and concerns about the In Tibet, the Chinese government continued—as it has COVID–19 outbreak and have been accused of “rumor-mon- for over a decade—to block dialogue with the Dalai Lama, his gering.” Authorities reportedly detained two Beijing-based legal representatives, or the Central Tibetan Administration toward scholars—prominent civil society advocate Xu Zhiyong and a negotiated agreement. Religious freedom continued to be leading public intellectual Xu Zhangrun—in connection with severely curtailed as new measures have been implemented their criticism of Xi Jinping. to manage and shape Tibetan Buddhism as part of the policy Civil society played a critical role in the COVID–19 of “sinicizing religion.” Chinese officials continued to claim response, as citizens worked through civil society organizations that they have the sole authority to select the next reincarna- and grassroots volunteer groups to assist the most vulnera- tion of the Dalai Lama, in violation of the religious freedom of ble people impacted by the pandemic. The people of China the Tibetan Buddhist community. In the Tibet Autonomous continued to participate in diverse forms of collective organi- Region, new regulations on “ethnic unity” were passed this year zation for mutual and public interest, including popular protest,

4 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA OVERVIEW ■

issue-based grassroots advocacy, and professionalized charities Chinese government retaliated against the National Basketball and social enterprises. In recent years, rights advocates working Association after Houston Rockets General Manager Daryl on a broad range of issues, from gender equality to labor to dis- Morey posted a tweet in October 2019 in support of pro-de- ability rights, have been targets of government repression and mocracy protests in Hong Kong. The targets also included exclusion. For example, several rights advocates who gathered Chinese students studying abroad, Uyghurs living in the United informally to discuss civil society developments in December States, and U.S and international companies. Authorities even 2019 were detained and charged with “inciting subversion of attempted to silence or otherwise intimidate individuals living state power.” Meanwhile, organizations aligned with official in the United States—particularly Uyghurs—by coercing or priorities have become integral to providing public services. threatening their family members living in China. Criminal law and police power continued to be used to Women in China have faced even more difficult cir- punish government critics, rights advocates, religious believ- cumstances due to the disproportionate risks and burdens ers, and ethnic minority groups. Various types of arbitrary associated with the essential role they have played in the detention, including some forms of extrajudicial detention, COVID–19 response. During the pandemic, domestic violence were used to deprive individuals of their liberty, contravening rose substantially, and experts predicted that already existing international human rights standards. gender gaps in employment and well-being would be further Five years after the July 2015 “709 Crackdown” on human exacerbated by the economic and social disruption caused by rights lawyers and rights defenders, many of those Chinese the outbreak. Women’s rights advocacy continues to face heavy lawyers and rights defenders are surveilled by public security repression, but the inclusion of anti-sexual-harassment provi- authorities in what one leading expert has termed “non-release sions in the Civil Code in May 2020 shows that their advocacy release.” Lawyers continued to face repression, intimidation, has had an impact. and punishment for attempting to protect human rights in Independent trade unions are banned in China. Labor China. Besides detention and imprisonment, the Chinese gov- rights advocates and citizen journalists continued to be tar- ernment used administrative measures, including disbarment, geted and detained for their work, including for documenting to target lawyers who express critical views or who advocate for numerous workers’ strikes and subsequent crackdowns. The clients whom the Chinese government has tried to suppress. level of unemployment and labor unrest is significant, although The Chinese government further intensified the cam- the severity is difficult to ascertain due to censorship and gov- paign of “sinicization” to bring religion in China under closer ernment control of information. official control and in line with officially sanctioned interpreta- Everyone deserves a government that respects their human tions of Chinese culture, thereby curtailing religious freedom. rights, their culture, and their hopes and dreams for a better life The rights of religious believers continued to be violated, as for themselves and their families. As the Chinese government churches, mosques, and temples were demolished; underground expands its global influence, the international community must religious groups were targeted; surveillance was expanded; be aware that intensifying authoritarianism in China is also a and religious leaders were detained and imprisoned. Wang Yi, threat to internationally recognized human rights norms as the founder and pastor of the Early Rain Covenant Church, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is was sentenced to nine years in prison for “inciting subversion essential that the U.S. Congress and the Administration work of state power,” despite the UN Working Group on Arbitrary together to promote effective policies to support human rights Detention deeming his detention “arbitrary” according to inter- and the rule of law in China. national human rights standards. The Chinese government has increasingly worked to suppress free speech outside China. Economic coercion, surveillance, intimidation, and censorship on China-based social media platforms were all employed to silence critics, punish foreign organizations for private speech of individual employees, and encourage self-censorship. Most visibly, the

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 KEY FINDINGS

Freedom of Expression state and Party media journalist Chen Jieren to 15 years’ imprisonment on multiple charges in connection to his ■ The Chinese government and Communist Party’s per- vasive information controls contributed to the severity of critical commentary and reports online. the outbreak in late 2019 of a novel coronavirus and the ■ The Chinese government expelled or failed to renew the resulting COVID–19 pandemic. Official suppression of work visas for nearly 19 foreign journalists this past year. information about the outbreak, particularly authorities’ The expulsions from China of U.S. journalists from the censorship of the media, and actions to silence frontline New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall hospital personnel who sought to inform community Street Journal reportedly were in retaliation for the U.S. members, sparked outrage in China and led to unprec- Government requirement that five state- and Party-run edented calls by Chinese citizens for freedom of speech, media outlets working in the United States register as along with criticism of the censorship system in China. foreign missions. As part of the same retaliatory action, Chinese authorities also forced many Chinese nationals ■ Several Chinese media outlets, particularly China Business News, Caixin, and Beijing News published crit- working at the China offices of the New York Times, the ical investigative reports, interviews, and editorials about Wall Street Journal, CNN, and Voice of America to resign. the government’s response to the COVID–19 outbreak. ■ In its 2019 annual report on internet freedom throughout the While many of these reports were subsequently censored world, Freedom House again found the Chinese government by the government, several citizen-led projects to archive to be the world’s worst abuser of internet freedom, the fourth disappearing reports emerged. Public security author- consecutive year China has held that position. This past year, ities detained three individuals from one such project, the Cyberspace Administration of China released provisions Terminus 2049. State and Party media pushed a positive that aim to promote “a positive online ecosystem, to ensure narrative about the government’s efforts to contain the the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons, and spread, featuring President and Party General Secretary other organizations; and to preserve national security and Xi Jinping as “commander” of the “people’s war” against the public interest.” The provisions also place greater pres- the virus. sure and liability on internet and social media platforms to monitor online content, which may lead to “overzealous ■ Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) 2020 press freedom index ranked China the fourth worst country in the world censorship,” according to an expert. Additionally, these for press freedom (177 out of 180) for the second year in platforms are instructed to manipulate artificial intelligence a row. RSF pointed to ongoing censorship, harassment (AI)-based algorithms to shape—and restrict—online users’ and detention of journalists, and the pervasive spread of access to information, such as content from user searches, surveillance as key factors in its assessment. China impris- trending topics, and pop-ups. oned the most journalists in the world in 2019, according Worker Rights to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Many of the detained Chinese journalists on CPJ’s list are “citizen ■ Chinese authorities continued to arbitrarily detain many journalists,” some of whom are non-professional or former prominent labor advocates and censor reporting and social journalists who use digital media platforms to document media comments on unemployment, strikes, and other rights abuses. In April 2020, authorities sentenced former issues involving workers. During the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to detain

6 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA KEY FINDINGS ■

three citizen journalists from the iLabour (Xin Shengdai) Hongyuan, a 13-year veteran of Huawei, who obtained website, Yang Zhengjun, Ke Chengbing, and Wei Zhili, as a court award for about 108,000 yuan (US$15,000) in well as non-governmental organization (NGO) worker Li compensation after authorities detained him for 251 days Dajun. All of them had advocated on behalf of pneumo- following a request by Huawei due to a dispute over his coniosis victims and were taken into custody in 2019. severance pay.

■ Officially reported Chinese statistics—widely regarded as unreliable—continue to mask the true levels of unemploy- Criminal Justice ment, labor protests, and worker safety concerns, potentially ■ The Chinese government and Communist Party continued distorting coverage by the international organizations and to use criminal law and police power to punish govern- media that use them. In 2019, the Chinese government again ment critics and to “maintain stability” with the goal of did not publicly report the number of worker strikes and perpetuating one-party rule. The Commission observed protests, making it challenging to obtain comprehensive that the Chinese government targeted the following groups information on worker actions. The Hong Kong-based in particular: rights advocates and lawyers; doctors and NGO China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data other citizens who shared information about the novel on worker actions collected from traditional news sources coronavirus outbreak; supporters in mainland China of and social media, documented 1,385 strikes and other labor protests in Hong Kong; religious believers and clergy; and actions in 2019. CLB estimates that they are able to docu- ethnic minority groups. In so doing, the Chinese govern- ment between 5 and 10 percent of total worker actions. ment violated the freedoms of Chinese citizens protected

■ The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China Federation under PRC laws and international human rights standards. of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union ■ The Chinese government continues to arbitrarily detain organization permitted under Chinese law, and workers are Chinese citizens, circumventing judicial oversight and the not allowed to establish independent unions. Official praise protection of detainees’ rights under the PRC Criminal for workers does not indicate genuine government support Procedure Law. Forms of arbitrary detention used to for workers’ rights. State-run media celebrated the efforts deprive individuals of their liberty include extralegal of Chinese construction workers for working long hours “black jails” and forced psychiatric commitment of indi- to construct quarantine hospitals rapidly. Police, however, viduals who are engaged in petitioning or other activities responded violently when hundreds of these workers pro- that authorities find politically troublesome. Provisions tested after they were not paid adequate wages. Research by under the PRC Criminal Law such as crimes of “endan- China Labour Bulletin found that the ACFTU did not ade- gering state security” and “picking quarrels and provoking quately protect the rights of workers and played only a limited trouble”—provide a legal basis for authorities to suppress role in assisting workers during the novel coronavirus crisis. rights advocacy and other activities protected under inter-

■ Chinese corporations are often able to enlist the local police national human rights standards. in resolving labor and business disputes. In December ■ The National People’s Congress Standing Committee 2019, Chinese and international media reported on Li repealed “custody and education,” a frequently abused

Percentage of Worker Strikes and Other Labor Actions (as Documented by China Labour Bulletin) Total Number Year Manufacturing Construction Transportation Services Other Documented

2019 13.8% (191) 42.8% (593) 12.3% (171) 23.0% (319) 7.7% (107) 1,385

2018 15.5% (265) 44.8% (764) 15.9% (272) 16.8% (286) 7.0% (119) 1,703

2017 21.1% (265) 41.4% (521) 9.2% (116) 20.7% (261) 7.6% (95) 1,258

Source: China Labour Bulletin. Note that the percentages indicate the percentage of total worker actions documented that year.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 ■ KEY FINDINGS

form of administrative detention. Under custody and appointment of four bishops as of July 1, 2020, and some education, public security officials were able to detain friendly high-level interaction between the two sides. sex workers and their clients for six months to two years Critics said, however, that authorities had used the without judicial oversight. One longtime advocate for the agreement to increase pressure on unregistered Catholic abolition of “custody and education” called the develop- clergy to agree to a separation (i.e., “independence”) of ment a “rare victory for a vulnerable group in China.” the Church in China from the Holy See, and to join the

■ Chinese Communist Party control over law enforcement Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), a gov- has prompted the deployment of mass surveillance technol- ernment body that oversees this separation. Authorities ogies in the name of public safety against those committing subjected unregistered (or “underground”) Catholic clergy political as well as criminal offenses. Authorities continued who resisted to pressure tactics, detention, surveillance, to develop technology-based means to help public security and removal from their churches and duties. Authorities officials track persons of interest—based in part on large- also continued to demolish Catholic church buildings, scale, sometimes involuntary collection of personal data. remove crosses, cancel religious activities and pilgrimages, This endangers Chinese citizens’ privacy and increases the and pursue the “sinicization” campaign. potential for public security officials to use this technology to ■ Violations of the religious freedom of Hui Muslim believers crack down on rights advocates and other targeted persons. continued to intensify, with plans to apply “anti-terror- ism” measures currently used in the Xinjiang Uyghur Freedom of Religion Autonomous Region in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous ■ Chinese believers and outside experts compared the cur- Region—a region with a high concentration of Hui Muslim rent situation to the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), believers. Authorities required Islamic religious leaders to widely seen as the most repressive era for religions in PRC study Party ideology and demonstrate their political reli- history, with one expert describing the present situation ability or risk losing their legal status. A five-year plan to as “a toxic blend of Mao’s ruthlessness and sophisticated “sinicize” Islam in China continued in 2020, leading officials 21st-century surveillance techniques—in effect, an updated in many locations to demolish mosques; remove minarets, religious Cultural Revolution." domes, and other Islamic features from buildings; place surveillance cameras inside mosques; close Islamic schools; ■ Chinese authorities at the national level in February 2020 and restrict Islamic preaching, clothing, Arabic script, halal implemented the new Measures on the Administration of food, and use of the Islamic financial system. Religious Groups, supplementing the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs of 2018. The measures subject all reg- ■ Authorities also subjected registered Protestant churches istered religious groups to even tighter government control to the intensified restrictions described above, and con- and surveillance than before, requiring their leaders and tinued to shut down unregistered or “house churches,” lay believers to accept, support, and promote the Party’s and continued to detain some leaders for refusing to join leadership among their leaders and lay believers, publicize the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. Authorities charged Party policies, and implement the Party’s campaign to one house church pastor, Zhao Huaiguo, with “inciting “sinicize” religions—i.e., to force them to conform to the subversion of state power,” and sentenced pastor Wang Yi Party’s version of Chinese culture. The Measures essen- of Early Rain Covenant Church, whom they previously tially render all unregistered groups illegal, whereas there charged with the same crime, to nine years in prison. previously had been some tolerance for many of them. ■ Officials continued to persecute members of “illegal” Critics wrote that these combined Regulations (2018) and spiritual groups such as Falun Gong and the Church of Measures (2020) led to increased control over or persecu- Almighty God, especially those labeled by authorities as tion of religious groups. “evil cults” (xiejiao), under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal

■ The Sino-Vatican agreement on the appointment of bish- Law, which forbids “organizing and using a cult to under- ops signed in September 2018 led to the jointly approved mine implementation of the law.”

8 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA KEY FINDINGS ■

Ethnic Minority Rights ■ Chinese authorities implemented the “universal two-child policy” for a fourth consecutive year in 2019, and the latest ■ The Chinese Communist Party and government carried out efforts to solidify their control over the cultural identity government statistics showed that the policy’s effect was of the country’s ethnic minority groups, in contravention limited. National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) data of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. In a September showed that the total number of births in 2019—reportedly 2019 speech, Party General Secretary and President Xi the lowest since 1961—dropped by 580,000 in comparison Jinping appeared to endorse a “second generation” of to the 2018 figure, with some independent demographers ethnic policies, promoted by some Chinese officials and claiming that China’s number of births and total popula- scholars, that would dismantle regional and local auton- tion are significantly lower than the official NBS statistics. omy frameworks and replace them with policies aimed at ■ In 2019, China’s fertility rate remained around 1.6 births diluting ethnic minority cultures. per woman, below the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman necessary to maintain a stable population. The ■ Officials in areas with large Hui populations continued to implement policies and restrictions limiting Hui Muslims’ birth rate was 10.48 per 1,000 persons, reportedly the low- ability to practice their religion and culture. According to a est since 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was September 2019 New York Times report, in 2018 the State founded. The working-age population declined by 890,000, Council issued a confidential directive mandating local its eighth consecutive decline, while the elderly population officials’ implementation of policies reducing the role of increased by 4.39 million. China’s overall sex ratio in 2018 Islam in government and community institutions. Hui was 104.45 males to 100 females, and there were approxi- community members and other observers expressed the mately 30.49 million more males than females in China. belief that the “Xinjiang model” of detention and religious ■ The Chinese government’s restrictive population control repression appeared to be further expanding into Hui- policies have exacerbated China’s sex ratio imbalance, populated areas. which reportedly has fueled the demand for foreign women and resulted in human trafficking for purposes of forced ■ In January 2020, security officials in Jinan municipality, Shandong province, criminally detained Hui poet Cui marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. Haoxin on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking Human Rights Violations in the United States and Globally trouble.” Cui, who uses the pen name An Ran, had, in recent years, been critical of official policies toward ethnic ■ During and prior to the Commission’s 2020 reporting minorities. Cui’s detention, after his longtime criticism of year, the Chinese government and Communist Party, as official ethnic policies, may mark a further narrowing of well as entities acting with their encouragement or at their the space for dissent and expression among Hui commu- direction, took steps to limit the freedom of expression nities in China. of American corporations and citizens outside China through the use of targeted economic coercion. These steps Population Control were generally taken to discourage through threatening or inflicting disproportionate economic damage the expres- ■ Central government authorities rejected calls to end birth restrictions, despite population experts voicing sion by American companies, entities, and their employees demographic, economic, and human rights concerns or customers of political views considered unacceptable over China’s population control policies. Experts urged by the Chinese Communist Party on a range of issues, the Chinese government to implement policies, includ- including events in Hong Kong, the Tibet Autonomous ing financial incentives and other forms of assistance, Region and other Tibetan areas of China, the Xinjiang to encourage couples to have children. If not adequately Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and Taiwan. addressed, China’s decades-long birth limit policies and ■ The government and Party continued to surveil and intim- resultant demographic challenges could undermine idate students from China and Hong Kong studying at China’s economy and political stability. universities in the United States, through means such

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 ■ KEY FINDINGS

as government-supervised student organizations, social ■ Gender-based violence in China remains a serious issue, media surveillance and harassment, and state media intim- including that perpetrated by the state against Uyghur and idation of students who publicly express political views other ethnic minority women. The number of incidents objectionable to the Party. This had a documented chilling reported under the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law effect on the willingness of students from these localities remains low. Domestic violence rose substantially during to exercise their freedom of expression while studying in the epidemic due to enforced co-habitation and rising ten- the United States. sion in households from economic strain and fear about the virus, according to experts on gender-based violence. The ■ Identified agents of the Chinese government intimidated Commission observed reports of gender-based violence and harassed members of China’s Turkic Muslim minori- against ethnic minority women in the Xinjiang Uyghur ties residing in the United States, particularly those from Autonomous Region; interviews of Uyghur and Kazakh the Uyghur community. In many cases, this harassment women released from mass internment camps have indi- included threats to family members still in China, and was cated acts of rape, forced abortion, and forced sterilization. conducted through China-based social media platforms such as WeChat. Uyghurs inside the United States who chose ■ A grassroots feminist movement has persisted in Chinese to speak out about worsening persecution of their commu- political and cultural life in recent years despite gov- nity by the Chinese government reported retaliation against ernment restrictions and censorship. Feminist activists family members and acquaintances still in China. continued working on issues including employment dis- crimination, gender-based violence, and the rights of ■ The government and Party continued a longstanding cam- single women to access services and benefits related to paign to impede or redirect the work of United Nations pregnancy and birth—as well as to acquire legal docu- human rights bodies and to reshape international consen- mentation for their children—for which current policies sus around human rights in ways that elevate state power require proof of marriage. Young Chinese people outside and diminish the power of the individual to seek redress China have also played an increasingly important role from the state. This included concerted efforts to downplay, in feminist activism in China as the government inten- or avoid scrutiny of, events in the XUAR by accredited UN sifies restrictions within China’s borders. The inclusion human rights bodies. of anti-sexual harassment provisions in the Civil Code in May 2020 was a sign that women’s rights advocacy is Status of Women having an impact even as it has been severely suppressed. ■ Women in China face persistent gender inequality that During the COVID–19 outbreak, grassroots volunteers scholars attribute to economic liberalization and the pro- and civil society organizations brought attention to gaps motion of sexist and regressive gender norms in official in support for women during the epidemic and marshaled discourse in recent years. Women in China experience donations, services, and volunteers to address needs over- severe discrimination throughout their careers, from job looked in the official response. recruitment and hiring to wages and promotions.

■ Due to existing gender inequality in the distribution Human Trafficking

of labor, both paid and unpaid, women bore greater ■ Under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish risk of infection and more of the burden for treatment Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and containment during the coronavirus disease 2019 (Palermo Protocol), forced labor constitutes a form of (COVID–19) outbreak. UN Women warned that because human trafficking. The Chinese government continued of already existing gender gaps in earnings, savings, and to force individuals who have not been criminally con- job security, the long-term effects of the epidemic would victed to perform labor—including in the Xinjiang Uyghur disproportionately affect the livelihoods of women, par- Autonomous Region (XUAR) and in forms of administra- ticularly those at the margins with fewer resources to tive detention throughout China. weather economic losses.

10 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA KEY FINDINGS ■

■ Chinese authorities transferred Uyghurs and other ethnic DPRK authorities during the novel coronavirus outbreak minorities from the XUAR to factories in other parts of indirectly hampered missionary efforts to facilitate the China for forced labor. These transfers were part of com- movement of refugees in China. pany participation in “Xinjiang Aid” programs that exploit ethnic minority labor and promote investment in the Public Health XUAR. Authorities placed transferred ethnic minorities ■ The outbreak of a novel coronavirus in 2019 and the result- in conditions of surveillance and indoctrination similar ing infectious disease (COVID–19) in mainland China to those of ethnic minority workers in the XUAR. went unchecked for weeks as the Chinese government and ■ Women and girls were trafficked in China for the purposes Communist Party downplayed the potential severity of of forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Their countries human-to-human transmission. Starting on January 23, of origin included Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, 2020 (at least six weeks after the earliest cases of atypical Laos, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, pneumonia were identified), the central government moved Paraguay, Uganda, Ukraine, and Vietnam. to impose drastic measures to contain the virus, including the lockdown of millions of people; tight community-level North Korean Refugees in China controls based on “grid management” restrictions on move- ■ The Chinese government continued to detain North ment; and contact tracing and testing of millions of people.

Korean refugees in China and repatriate them to the ■ The Chinese government has emphasized the right to life Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). North and right to health as key human rights priorities during Korean refugees face severe punishments upon repatri- the COVID–19 pandemic. These rights, however, exist in ation to the DPRK, including torture, imprisonment, the broad context of international human rights norms, forced labor, and even execution. The repatriation of particularly with regard to access to information. The right North Korean refugees violates China’s obligations to information is inextricably intertwined with the rights under international human rights law and refugee law. to life and to health. The government and Party have failed The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the to communicate full, accurate, and timely information to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has stated that such the Chinese public, the World Health Organization, and repatriation may amount to “aiding and abetting crimes the international community. While international rights against humanity.” The Chinese government routinely norms, based on Article 19 of the International Covenant prioritizes the stability of the DPRK government over the on Civil and Political Rights, permit some restrictions on well-being of the North Korean people. speech and movement during public health emergencies, ■ Chinese and North Korean authorities continue to impose these restrictions must be legal, proportional, and neces- strict border controls. These controls are meant to deter sary. Government and Party use of stability maintenance North Korean refugees from escaping the DPRK. The and information control measures have not complied with South Korean government reported that about 1,047 North international human rights standards.

Korean refugees escaped to South Korea in 2019, com- ■ Experts have observed that data transparency is crucial to pared to the 2009 peak of 2,914 refugees. The majority of tracing the source of the virus and developing effective treat- North Korean refugees escape to South Korea via China ment. To date, the Chinese government has refused to permit and Southeast Asian countries. an independent international investigation of the outbreak.

■ Chinese authorities’ crackdown on and expulsions of South ■ Information control measures have been widely observed Korean missionaries have undermined refugee rescue work in the government and Party’s response to the pandemic, carried out by the missionaries. South Korean missionaries including online censorship and press restrictions. The and organizations play a crucial role in assisting and facil- international non-governmental organization (NGO) itating the movement of North Korean refugees in China. Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) documented Additionally, further restrictions placed by Chinese and nearly 900 cases of purported “rumor-mongers” whom

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 ■ KEY FINDINGS

authorities criminally or administratively detained, disci- for traditional Chinese medicine. In January 2020, the plined, “educated,” or otherwise intimidated for social media Chinese government announced a temporary ban on the posts about the COVID–19 outbreak between January 1, sale of wildlife, and in February, the National People’s 2020 and March 21, 2020. Among the individuals detained Congress issued a decision banning the sale of wildlife for for commenting on the government and Party’s response consumption; however, wildlife trade was still permitted to the outbreak were legal experts Xu Zhiyong and Xu for traditional Chinese medicine, and illegal trade in wild- Zhangrun, citizen journalists Chen Qiushi, Fang Bin, and life reportedly continued to be widespread.

Zhang Zhan, and businessman Ren Zhiqiang. Medical ■ In 2019, although an estimated 71 percent of China’s and health workers also were disciplined or “educated” for power plants were more expensive to run than building sharing information. new renewables, coal-fired power plant capacity increased ■ Public health advocacy remained politically sensitive. by around 40 gigawatts (GW) (a 4-percent increase). Cheng Yuan, Liu Dazhi, and Wu Gejianxiong—the Analysis of officially reported Chinese government data co-founder and two staff members of the anti-health-dis- indicated that carbon dioxide emissions in China increased crimination NGO Changsha Funeng in Hunan by approximately 2 percent. Domestic and international province—remained in detention for alleged “subversion environmental organizations raised concerns that China’s of state power” in connection with Changsha Funeng’s planned economic stimulus measures may promote the efforts to submit open government information requests use of coal and investment in heavily polluting industries, and engage in other legal processes to promote the rights resulting in significant additional environmental pollution. of persons with health conditions. Business and Human Rights The Environment and Climate Change ■ Chinese and international businesses are increasingly at ■ During the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, top Chinese risk of complicity in—and profiting from—abuses com- Communist Party and government officials continued to mitted by the Chinese government and Communist Party. highlight the importance of protecting the environment, Of particular concern over the past year are reports that yet environmental pollution remained a major challenge the government has increased the use of forced labor as a in China. Pollution remained a challenge due in part to part of the campaign to suppress ethnic minorities in the authorities’ top-down approach to environmental prob- Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where the lems, uneven enforcement, transparency shortcomings, Chinese government is committing crimes against human- and the suppression and detention of environmental ity and possibly genocide. XUAR authorities systematically researchers and advocates. forced predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, including

■ The Party continued to control environmental protec- Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others, to engage in forced labor, tion efforts, and in April 2020, Sun Jinlong was appointed both in the XUAR and in other parts of China. Reports of Party Secretary and Vice Minister of Ecology and the possible forced labor in cotton production and spinning, Environment. Previously, Sun had been the Party Secretary as well as in the apparel industry in general, mean that the of the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction supply chains of many major brands may now be tainted Corps. Despite widespread international criticism, reports with forced labor. Moreover, firms cannot rely on factory emerged in November 2019 and March 2020 that Chinese audits to ensure that their supply chains are free of forced authorities were reportedly planning to execute envi- labor in the XUAR. ronmental researcher and former Xinjiang University ■ Companies are at great risk of complicity in crimes against President Tashpolat Teyip. humanity, forced labor, and other rights violations if they

■ Although Chinese and international concern focused do business with the Xinjiang Production and Construction on the zoonotic origin of the novel coronavirus, the Corps (XPCC), its affiliated companies, or with other com- Chinese government continued to permit wildlife trade panies that have close ties to the XPCC. The XPCC is deeply

12 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA KEY FINDINGS ■

involved in human rights violations and also in a variety of Civil Society industries in the XUAR. Large firms with close ties to the ■ The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) outbreak was XPCC include the state-owned enterprise COFCO, an agri- a pivotal event for Chinese civil society. The civil society cultural conglomerate that sells sugar, tomatoes, and other response revealed Chinese citizens’ capacity for grassroots products to a wide range of international brands; and Esquel organizing and voicing dissent even while Chinese govern- Group, a garment manufacturer that supplies numerous ment policies continued to centralize control and suppress well-known brands. Esquel Group reported that, in April information challenging official narratives. During the 2020, they completed divestment from a joint venture with coronavirus outbreak, large numbers of Chinese citizens the Third Division of the XPCC. worked collectively through civil society organizations ■ Chinese government restrictions on freedom of and grassroots volunteer efforts to assist vulnerable and expression increased this past year, and companies—par- impacted groups, as well as to disseminate and archive infor- ticularly tech companies—were both targets and enablers mation about the epidemic. Informal volunteer groups were of Chinese government censorship. Faced with the pos- especially responsive to regions, groups, and issues that were sibility of lost revenue or punishment, both domestic overlooked or de-prioritized in the official response. After and international companies engaged in self-censorship. the death of COVID–19 whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang, For example, between January 1 and February 15, 2020, Chinese citizens expressed anger on a massive public scale Tencent’s WeChat reportedly censored messages con- at the government’s handling of the epidemic. taining at least 516 keyword combinations criticizing ■ Registered social organizations aligned with official pri- the official response to the novel coronavirus (COVID– orities have become integral to providing public services 19) and suspended user accounts for posting politically and are being given more resources and latitude for devel- sensitive posts about the virus. Also this past year, opment. The government has emphasized that it needs Shutterstock reportedly created a search query blacklist to lean more heavily on providing services through civil to censor sensitive keywords for its customers in China. society in order to modernize governance. This means a Apple removed the emoji depicting the Taiwanese flag broader scope of operation for these organizations, while from its mobile device operating system for users in more independent, advocacy-based groups are increasingly mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. being driven underground. Grassroots rights advocates ■ Companies have both a moral responsibility and a finan- and groups with foreign connections have been targets cial interest in honestly assessing the risk that they may be for government repression and exclusion. Even in the face contributing to human rights abuses in China. The UN of increasing harassment and pressure from authorities, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights state some of these groups were still able to mobilize large-scale that businesses have a responsibility to respect human advocacy campaigns. Young Chinese people living over- rights and should seek to avoid “contributing to adverse seas have also made significant contributions to advocacy. human rights impacts . . . .” While the Chinese government ■ Chinese government authorities restricted and censored requires companies to comply with domestic laws and reg- the activities of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and ulations that may infringe on internationally recognized questioning (LGBTQ) organizations—as they have with rights such as the right to privacy and freedom of expres- other civil society organizations—and reports of discrim- sion, this does not absolve companies of their responsibility ination against and harassment of LGBTQ individuals to respect human rights. Moreover, knowing or unknow- continued. There is no law that criminalizes same-sex ing complicity in human rights abuses poses substantial relationships among adults, and acceptance of LGBTQ risks for international businesses. In the case of complicity persons is increasing in China, including steps taken in forced or prison labor, for example, companies may run in the past year by some government officials in two afoul of U.S. laws prohibiting the import of products made municipalities to provide legal rights to same-sex couples. with such labor. Nevertheless, new rules restricting “negative content”

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 ■ KEY FINDINGS

harming “social mores” were issued last year that could Access to Justice also bar LGBTQ content on television and the internet. ■ To the extent that citizens rely on courts to protect their Despite ongoing restrictions and censorship, advocacy rights against state encroachment, political influence on organizations remain active in their public outreach, the court system undermines their ability to access justice. pushing for reforms to protect the rights of members of The Chinese Communist Party goes beyond mere influ- the LGBTQ community. ence and expressly requires absolute loyalty and obedience from the courts. Institutions of Democratic Governance ■ This past year, the Chinese Communist Party maintained ■ The Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to extend con- control by sending a political inspection team on a two- trol over all sectors of society violate citizens’ right to month-long tour to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and fully participate in public affairs. As the Party’s dom- reiterated the theme of subservience expressed in the last inance permeates society, the space for institutions of political inspection in 2016. democratic governance diminishes, thereby weakening ■ An SPC judge highlighted the judiciary’s role as being part citizens’ ability to hold authorities accountable for human of the political-legal system, stressing that courts must rights violations such as the mass internment of Uyghurs be unequivocally political. Given its role, the judiciary and other ethnic minorities. must operate under the leadership of the Political-Legal ■ The Party used evaluation mechanisms to reinforce its Committee (a Party organization having authority over both priorities in the academic and business realms. In the the public security and judicial systems) and take part in academic realm, the Ministry of Education launched a political initiatives like the “root cause management” scheme program in which it assigned certain courses a “first rate” designed to seek out and resolve disputes before they become designation, giving it the power to withhold or revoke such litigated matters. Acting as the Party’s agent will undermine a designation for ideological misalignment. In the business the judiciary’s capacity to adjudicate cases impartially. realm, the Party handed down its rating of 33 million com- ■ Authorities suppressed speech describing the universal panies and directed local governments and agencies to use conception of the rule of law and persecuted lawyers by these evaluations as the basis for credit rating. The criteria detaining them and revoking their law licenses for their and methodology used, however, were not disclosed. democracy and constitutional-reform advocacy, or for their ■ In contrast, the Commission did not observe development representation of defendants in politically sensitive cases. of evaluation mechanisms for monitoring government agencies and Party organizations. The Party retained Xinjiang exclusive control over the disciplinary process for Party ■ During the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, authori- members and public servants. Moreover, disciplinary ties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) measures for actual misconduct and political missteps are maintained a system of extrajudicial mass internment carried out by the same state apparatus, which recently camps in which they have arbitrarily detained up to 1.8 detained a prominent businessman for his political speech million individuals from predominantly Muslim ethnic and a high-ranking official for “not showing respect.” minority groups, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, ■ The Party issued a rule requiring the Party secretary of Hui, and others. a village organization to also be the village committee ■ Internal Chinese government and Communist Party director. Existing law provides, however, that the village documents obtained by international media and rights committee director must be chosen in open election. groups during this reporting year revealed authori- The new rule bypasses the normal legislative procedure ties’ mandate to use coercive force and punishment on and has the effect of augmenting Party control in grass- inmates; the connection between family members’ behav- roots-level elections. ior and authorities’ treatment of inmates; and the extreme

14 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA KEY FINDINGS ■

secrecy enforced by authorities regarding the implemen- Law on the Protection of Minors and the United Nations tation of the camp system. The documents also revealed Convention on the Rights of the Child. Many of the children the presence of a significant level of opposition from some placed in these facilities had at least one parent in detention. local officials to mass internment camp detentions. Reports indicated that authorities often placed children in

■ The Commission observed additional evidence this past year such facilities without the consent of their families. that Chinese government persecution of ethnic minorities in ■ As XUAR officials detained hundreds of thousands of the XUAR constitutes crimes against humanity. International Turkic and Muslim individuals in mass internment camps, observers, including the United States Holocaust Memorial there was also a significant increase in arrests, trials, and Museum, argued in support of applying the “crimes against formal imprisonment of ethnic minority individuals in humanity” framework to the persecution of Uyghurs and the region, beginning in 2017. Authorities’ increased sen- other Turkic and Muslim ethnic minorities in the XUAR. tencing of ethnic minority individuals to prison terms may Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal mark a shift away from their detention in mass internment Court provides a list of 11 acts, any one of which may consti- camps and into other forms of detention and social con- tute crimes against humanity “when committed as part of a trol, including forced labor. In 2017, courts in the XUAR widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian sentenced 10 times more defendants than the previous population, with knowledge of the attack.” year to prison terms of five years or longer and carried out

■ Reports published during the past year detailed the expan- 8 times the number of arrests and 5 times the number of sive and systematic nature of authorities’ separation of ethnic prosecutions as in the previous year. minority children from their families in the XUAR and their forcible placement in orphanages, welfare centers, and Tibet boarding schools. An official policy document issued by ■ The Commission did not observe any interest or progress on XUAR officials stated that by early 2017, nearly half a million the part of Chinese Communist Party and government offi- elementary and middle school-age children in the XUAR cials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s were attending boarding schools. This forcible displacement representatives. The negotiations have been stalled since the of children has been carried out in violation of the PRC ninth round of negotiations was held in January 2010.

Acts listed in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute Possible Application to the Treatment of Muslims in the XUAR (c) Enslavement Satellite imagery, personal accounts, and official documents indicate that XUAR authorities are sys- tematically forcing predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others, to engage in forced labor in the XUAR and other parts of China. (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in Security personnel have carried out the arbitrary, prolonged detention of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, violation of fundamental rules of international law and others in mass internment camps in the XUAR since around April 2017; authorities have also increas- ingly sentenced ethnic minority individuals to lengthy prison terms for political reasons since 2017. (f) Torture Security personnel in mass internment camps in the XUAR subjected detainees to widespread torture, including electric shocks and shackling people in uncomfortable positions. (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on Security personnel have detained up to 1.8 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui; enforced harsh, political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as widespread restrictions on peaceful Islamic practices of XUAR residents; and subjected Turkic and defined in Paragraph 3 [Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute], or Muslim XUAR residents to intense surveillance, checkpoints, intimidation, and involuntary biometric other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible data collection. In addition, authorities in the XUAR have reportedly placed the children of both mass under international law, in connection with any act referred to internment camp detainees and individuals forced to work into orphanages, welfare centers, and in this paragraph [Article 7 of the Rome Statute] or any crime boarding schools, often without the consent of their families, raising concerns of forcible assimilation. within the jurisdiction of the Court (i) Enforced disappearance of persons The conditions under which authorities detained many Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui and others in mass internment camps amount to enforced disappearance.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15 ■ KEY FINDINGS

■ The Chinese government and Communist Party continued because it contains vaguely defined criminal offenses that to assert control over the processes of selection and recog- are can be used to unduly restrict fundamental freedoms. nition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, including ■ Prompted by an extradition bill that could expose people in the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhist Hong Kong to arbitrary detention by Chinese authorities, leaders outside China maintained that the decision to rein- Hong Kong residents held over 900 protests beginning in carnate, or not, belongs to the individual in question and March 2019. While protesters who resorted to vandalism members of the Tibetan Buddhist religious community. and violence remained in the minority, Hong Kong police ■ The Party and government continued to use legal and pol- employed crowd-control measures in ways that effectively icy measures to manage and shape the religious practices denied the majority their right to participate in peaceful of Tibetans. Tibetan Buddhism is one of five state-recog- assemblies and processions. Police used excessive force and nized religions and falls under the formal jurisdiction of the misused crowd-control projectiles and chemical irritants, state-controlled Buddhist Association of China, which this but the government refused to form an independent inves- year issued two revised measures governing the credential- tigative body and chose instead to let the police investigate ing of Tibetan Buddhist religious personnel and the hiring of themselves. Police on occasion refused to issue permits monastic leaders at Tibetan Buddhist religious institutions. for assemblies or revoked such permits shortly after the ■ The Tibet Autonomous Region government passed reg- scheduled start time, allowing them to make arrests under ulations on “ethnic unity” that mandate acceptance and the charge of “unauthorized assembly.”

promotion of Communist Party and government ethnic ■ Many protesters detained by police were denied the right and religious policy across a wide variety of social sectors to legal counsel, and some were abused while they were and at multiple levels of society. The regulations include in custody. Several protesters who spent time in prison vague language providing for criminal sanctions for those revealed that prison officials repeatedly abused them and who have “irresolute stances and attitudes in the fight other protesters, with one inmate having attempted suicide against separatism.” to escape torture.

■ Developments in Hong Kong And Macau The Hong Kong government exhibited a pattern of selective enforcement when it prosecuted protesters and democracy ■ During the 2020 reporting year, a number of deeply trou- advocates with diligence but did not match the same level bling developments in Hong Kong undermined the “one of commitment when addressing misconduct by police country, two systems” governance framework, which led and people hostile to protesters. For example, during the the U.S. Secretary of State to find that Hong Kong has not July 21, 2019, incident in which a mob carried out an indis- maintained a high degree of autonomy for the first time criminate attack at a subway station in Yuen Long, police since the handover in July 1997. arrived at the scene 45 minutes later despite numerous ■ On June 30, 2020, the National People’s Congress Standing emergency calls and made no arrests that day. In contrast, Committee passed the Law of the People’s Republic of police arrested many prominent democracy advocates for China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong unauthorized assembly although they had not engaged in Kong Special Administrative Region (National Security any violent acts. Law), bypassing Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. To the extent that this law criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with foreign states, this piece of legislation violates Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which specifies that Hong Kong shall pass laws concerning national security. Additionally, the National Security Law raises human rights and rule of law concerns because it vio- lates principles such as the presumption of innocence and

16 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA POLITICAL PRISONER CASES OF CONCERN

embers of Congress and the Administration are peacefully exercising their internationally recognized human encouraged to consult the Commission’s Political rights. Members of Congress and the Administration are Prisoner Database (PPD) for credible and up encouraged to advocate for these individuals in meetings Mto date information on individual prisoners or groups of with Chinese government and Communist Party offi- prisoners. The Cases of Concern in the Commission’s 2020 cials. For more information on these cases and other cases Annual Report highlight a small number of individuals raised in the Annual Report, see the Commission’s Political whom Chinese authorities have detained or sentenced for Prisoner Database.

Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of July 2020)

Place of Detention Context Additional Information Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) A non-governmental organization Wangdu was previously detained Prison (Drapchi), Lhasa municipality, (NGO) worker, HIV/AIDS activist, in March 1989. Authorities initially TAR and former monk, Wangdu was ordered him to serve three years’ Wangdu detained the day protests and rioting reeducation through labor, which Charge 2004-00243 erupted in Lhasa. He was sentenced was extended to an eight-year Espionage along with three other Tibetans on prison sentence after he and other Date of Detention Status accusations of distributing material detainees signed a petition stating March 14, 2008 Sentenced to life imprisonment inciting a “Tibetan people’s uprising” that the Chinese government’s 1951 and collecting “intelligence” to send assertion of sovereignty over Tibet to Tibetans in exile. was invalid.

Place of Detention peared from his Pattaya, Thailand, to mainland Chinese customers. In Unknown, believed to be in Ningbo home on October 17, 2015. Three October 2017, authorities released municipality, Zhejiang province of his coworkers went missing Gui from custody but did not allow in China the same month, and a him to leave China. In January Charge Gui Minhai fourth in Hong Kong in December. 2018, police seized Gui as he trav- Illegally providing intelligence abroad 2016-00090 In January 2016, Chinese state eled to Beijing municipality with Status media aired a confession by Gui in Swedish diplomats for a medical Date of Detention Sentenced to 10 years which he said that he turned him- exam for symptoms consistent October 2015 self in to Chinese authorities after with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis Context fleeing China in 2004 while serving (ALS). He was sentenced to 10 Gui Minhai, a Swedish citizen and a suspended sentence. In February years in prison in February 2020. co-owner of Hong Kong’s Mighty 2016, Gui gave another televised The trial court claimed that Gui Current Media, which sold books confession, to “illegal business applied to reinstate his Chinese critical of Chinese leaders, disap- activity” related to selling books citizenship in 2018.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17 ■ POLITICAL PRISONERS

Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of July 2020)

Place of Detention Status lated motif “Truth, Forbearance, Ha’erbin Municipal No. 2 PSB Deten- Sentenced to 15 years Compassion.” Authorities have tion Center, Heilongjiang province repeatedly harassed or punished Cui Context in connection with her adherence Charge Falun Gong practitioner Cui Fenglan to Falun Gong since the Chinese Cui Fenglan Organizing or using a cult organiza- was detained in May 2016 when government banned the spiritual 2020-00122 tion to undermine implementation she went to pick up packages that movement in 1999. of the law authorities alleged contained good Date of Detention luck charms bearing Falun Gong-re- May 16, 2016

Place of Detention Context in May 2019, and sentenced him in Suzhou Municipal No. 1 PSB Deten- Ge Jueping was detained in Novem- June 2020. tion Center, Jiangsu province ber 2016 in reported connection with Additional Information a larger crackdown on other rights Charge During Ge’s extended detention, his Ge Jueping advocates in Suzhou that began in Inciting subversion of state power health has suffered due to poor living 2016-00475 September 2016. Authorities initially conditions and lack of access to ade- Status placed Ge under “residential sur- quate medical care. Ge previously Date of Detention Sentenced to four years and six veillance at a designated location” had cancer and currently suffers November 4, 2016 months before his formal arrest six months high blood pressure requiring daily later in May 2017. The Suzhou medication, as well as a possible Intermediate People’s Court tried Ge cardiac condition.

Place of Detention Context Additional Information Bazhong Prison, Bazhong municipal- Citizen journalist and founder of the Officials have refused requests for ity, Sichuan province rights website 64 Tianwang, which medical parole despite Huang’s reported on petitioners and other life-threatening kidney disease. Charge human rights issues in China. Huang Authorities have kept Huang’s Huang Qi Illegally providing state secrets to previously served prison sentences 86-year-old mother Pu Wenqing 2004-04053 foreign entities, intentionally leaking for posting articles online about the in confinement at home and at a state secrets Date of Detention 1989 Tiananmen protests and Falun hospital since December 2018. November 28, 2016 Status Gong, and for aiding the parents Sentenced to 12 years of children who died in the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan.

Place of Detention Context Additional Information Unknown, possibly Ghulja (Yining) Sa’adet Bawudun and her husband, Their daughter Gulshat Hemit was city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous retired Ili government official Hemit reportedly detained on April 28, Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autono- Abdurahman, were detained amid the 2018, in connection with their deten- Sa’adet Bawudun mous Region (XUAR) ongoing campaign of mass deten- tions. She is believed to be held in a tions in the XUAR. Their son sought mass internment camp. 2020-00056 Charge asylum in Sweden and is an activist Unknown Date of Detention there, and they visited him in Turkey January 27, 2017 Status in 2014. Their detentions are believed Sentenced to 18 years to be related to that visit.

18 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA POLITICAL PRISONERS ■

Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of July 2020)

Place of Detention Context computer when his brother visited Prison in Urumqi municipality, XUAR An ethnic Tatar, Shafkat Abas owned him in Urumqi. In November 2019, and ran a traditional Uyghur medical his parents and wife visited him in Charge clinic in Urumqi. Family members, prison for 15 minutes; he appeared Unknown Shafkat Abas including a brother who lives to be in poor health. 2020-00118 Status abroad, suggested his detention was Sentenced, reportedly to 10 years connected with religious or histor- Date of Detention ical books he kept at his clinic, or March 13, 2017 foreign websites accessed from his

Place of Detention Context to urinate on her food, denied her Shenyang Municipal No. 1 PSB A lawyer, Li previously represented hot water for showering, denied her Detention Center, Liaoning province rights lawyer Wang Yu, whom medical treatment, and threatened authorities detained in a crackdown that they would beat her to death. Charge Li Yuhan on human rights legal professionals In March 2018, Li went on a hunger Picking quarrels and provoking 2017-00361 that began in mid-2015. strike to protest mistreatment, which trouble, fraud prompted detention center officials Additional Information Date of Detention Status to force-feed her. Detention center Li suffers from various health October 9, 2017 Formally arrested, awaiting trial officials have blocked her lawyer from conditions including heart disease, meeting her since January 2020, hypertension, and hyperthyroid- citing the coronavirus disease 2019 ism. Staff at the detention center (COVID–19) pandemic. reportedly instructed other inmates

Place of Detention Context her sentencing, authorities may have Unknown, possibly a prison in the Authorities in Urumqi municipality, held her in a mass internment camp. XUAR XUAR, detained Reshide Dawut, a prominent Uyghur singer and Charge Reshide Dawut member of an official performing Separatism (unconfirmed) 2020-00159 arts group, the Xinjiang Muqam Status Ensemble. Local officials confirmed Date of Detention Sentenced, reportedly to 15 years that Dawut was sentenced, report- Unknown, believed to be in 2018 edly to 15 years in prison. Prior to

Place of Detention Context Xuzhou, where he was placed Xuzhou Municipal PSB Detention On January 18, 2018, rights lawyer under “residential surveillance Center, Jiangsu province Yu Wensheng published an open at a designated location.” In May letter calling for democratic reforms 2019, his wife received a phone call Charge to China’s Constitution, including informing her that Yu had been tried Yu Wensheng Inciting subversion of state power 2014-00387 subordinating the Communist Party several days prior, though neither Status to constitutional and legal oversight. she nor Yu’s lawyers were notified Date of Detention Sentenced to 4 years The next day, Beijing police detained beforehand. The court sentenced Yu January 19, 2018 him outside his home. Later that over a year later, in June 2020. month, authorities sent him to

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19 ■ POLITICAL PRISONERS

Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of July 2020)

Place of Detention connected to factory workers’ about 50 individuals who had gath- Beijing municipality attempts to form a labor union at ered in Shenzhen to show support Shenzhen Jasic (Jiashi) Technol- for the detained Jasic workers. Charge ogy Co. Ltd. (Jasic) in Shenzhen Unknown Additional Information Yue Xin municipality, Guangdong province. In January 2019, Yue and other 2018-00665 Status On August 19, Peking University student Jasic supporters including Unknown graduate Yue Xin published an open Gu Jiayue, Zheng Yongming, and Date of Detention letter calling on central authorities to Context Shen Mengyu appeared in a video August 24, 2018 permit the workers to unionize. On giving what appeared to be forced Beginning in July 2018, authorities August 24, police detained Yue and took into custody over 60 individuals confessions.

Place of Detention Status poverty alleviation funds allocated to Machen (Maqin) County PSB Sentenced to 7 years assist resettled nomads. Detention Center, Golog (Guoluo) Context Additional Information Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tibetan anticorruption advocate Authorities also detained nine other Qinghai province Anya Sengdra Anya Sengdra was accused of using Tibetans in connection with Anya 2016-00353 Charge several WeChat groups which he Sengdra’s case, sentencing eight of Picking quarrels and provoking created or administered to lead local them in December 2019 to prison Date of Detention trouble, gathering a crowd to disturb residents against the government. His terms of unknown length. Anya September 4, 2018 social order wife wrote that authorities detained Sengdra’s brother Jamtri died in him in retaliation for his accusations detention before sentencing. of official embezzlement or misuse of

Place of Detention officially banning the unregistered Additional Information Prison in Sichuan province Protestant church located in In addition to Wang, authorities Chengdu municipality, Sichuan. detained at least 100 Early Rain Charge Wang’s detention took place members beginning in Decem- Inciting subversion of state power, Wang Yi amid a broad crackdown on ber 2018. Among those whom illegal business activity 2018-00615 unregistered churches in China. authorities released, many remained Status Authorities refused to allow the under surveillance, including Wang’s Date of Detention Sentenced to 9 years lawyer hired by Wang’s family to wife Jiang Rong. Church members December 9, 2018 represent him at his December reported that while in detention they Context 2019 trial and sentencing. were force-fed unknown medication Authorities detained Early Rain and coerced to confess or to falsely Covenant Church pastor and accuse Wang and other church founder Wang Yi one day before leaders of wrongdoing.

Place of Detention Context Additional Information Hunan Provincial State Security State security officials from Hunan Changsha Funeng conducted advo- Department Detention Center, detained Cheng Yuan, co-founder cacy for individuals with disabilities Changsha municipality, Hunan and staffer at the public interest NGO and for vulnerable groups, and Cheng Yuan Changsha Funeng, at his home in used open government information Charge 2019-00300 Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong requests to promote transparency. Subversion of state power province, and transferred him to Prior to his detention, Cheng Yuan Date of Detention Status detention in Hunan. At the same reportedly traveled to Hong Kong July 22, 2019 Formally arrested time, authorities detained two other for work. Changsha Funeng staffers, Liu Dazhi (Liu Yongze) and Wu Gejianxiong.

20 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA POLITICAL PRISONERS ■

Name PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of July 2020)

Place of Detention Context Region and the destruction of Jinan municipality, Shandong Cui Haoxin is a Hui Muslim poet and mosques. Prior to this detention, province writer, also known by his pen name authorities detained and questioned An Ran. He has publicly criticized him about his online posts on Charge Chinese government policies toward several occasions. Cui Haoxin Picking quarrels and provoking Muslims, including the mass deten- 2020-00071 trouble tion of Uyghurs and members of Date of Detention Status other largely Muslim ethnic groups January 24, 2020 Criminally detained in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Place of Detention the New Citizens’ Movement (also Prior to Xu’s arrest, authorities held Linshu County PSB Detention known as China Citizens Movement). Xu under “residential surveillance Center, Linyi municipality, Shandong His detention is linked to other rights at a designated location” possibly in province advocates detained in December Shandong province. Xu Zhiyong 2019 following a gathering at which Charge Additional Information 2005-00199 participants discussed Chinese Inciting subversion of state power On February 16, 2020, Beijing police politics and civil society. Xu evaded detained Li Qiaochu, a women’s and Date of Detention Status a police search for 50 days prior to labor rights advocate and Xu’s part- February 15, 2020 Formally arrested his detention, during which time he ner; on June 18, authorities released publicly urged President and Party her on bail. Xu previously served 4 Context General Secretary Xi Jinping to years in prison from 2013 to 2017 Xu Zhiyong is a prominent legal leave office due to the government’s for his rights advocacy work. advocate and one of the initiators of handling of the COVID–19 pandemic.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

he 116th Congress passed important and bipartisan Address Atrocities in the XUAR legislation on human rights in China, responding The Administration should quickly implement the Uyghur in part to the Chinese government and Communist Human Rights Policy Act (Public Law No. 116–145) and work TParty’s increasingly brutal domestic repression and the chal- with Congress on necessary steps to address likely atrocity crimes lenges created by the global export of the Party’s authoritarian in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), including: political, development, and surveillance models. Moving ■ Issuing a formal determination of whether atrocity crimes, forward, the U.S. Government should develop coordinated including crimes against humanity and genocide, are policies that press the Chinese government for greater trans- occurring in the XUAR. parency, reciprocity, and adherence to international rules ■ Establishing new export regulations for the sale of emerg- and norms. This is necessary to advance American interests ing technologies including facial recognition systems, and the interests of Chinese citizens eager for peace, rights machine learning, and biometric and artificial intelligence protections, the rule of law, and genuine political reform. The technology, and continuing to place XUAR agencies and Commission makes the following recommendations, recog- businesses employing these technologies for mass surveil- nizing that a shared commitment to universal human rights lance and social control on the Department of Commerce’s and the rule of law is the foundation for the cooperative alli- “Entity List.” ances, partnerships, and multilateral consultative mechanisms that have underpinned international stability and prosperity ■ Continuing to employ Global Magnitsky Human Rights since the end of World War II. Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114–328) and other

Despite a police ban, thousands of Hong Kong residents gather in Victoria Park to commemorate the 31st anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. June 4, 2020.

22 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ■

available sanction authorities, to hold responsible Chinese Support the People of Hong Kong officials and other entities complicit in mass internment, The Administration should fully implement the Hong Kong forced labor, forced renunciations of faith, and forced ster- Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA) (Public Law ilizations, forced abortions, and other coercive or violent No. 116–76), including by issuing robust reporting on the status measures to control family size. of Hong Kong’s autonomy and detailed justification for any new

■ Engaging in multilateral forums by requesting an open sanctions levied on individuals for undermining fundamental debate or, at the very least, an Arria-formula briefing at the freedoms and autonomy in Hong Kong. In addition: UN Security Council on the XUAR. ■ The Department of Commerce should issue the report,

■ Working with allies and partners at the UN to request the required by the HKHRDA, detailing efforts by Chinese appointment of a special rapporteur on the XUAR and entities to undermine U.S. export regulations and sanc- other special procedures to address the Chinese govern- tions law in Hong Kong. ment’s serious human rights abuses in the region. ■ The Administration should continue to prohibit all U.S. exports of police equipment and crowd-control technol- Stop Goods Made with Forced Labor from Entering ogy to the Hong Kong police, including the prohibition U.S. Markets required by Public Law No. 116–77. Global supply chains are increasingly at risk of being com- ■ The Administration should offer humanitarian parole promised with goods made with forced labor in or from to any pro-democracy leaders needing urgent protection the XUAR. Congress should pass the Uyghur Forced Labor and work with Congress on a permanent solution that Prevention Act (H.R. 6210/S. 3471), creating a “rebuttable pre- will allow a pathway for protesters, activists, students, and sumption” requiring companies to prove that goods imported others impacted by the loss of Hong Kong’s autonomy to from the XUAR are not made with forced labor. In addition, legally enter the United States from Hong Kong. the Administration should:

■ Issue additional Withhold Release Orders (WRO) through Protect Tibetan Identity and Culture Customs and Border Protection pursuant to 19 CFR The Administration should use the tools available in the Tibet 12.42(e), targeting companies engaged in forced labor in Policy Act of 2002 (Public Law No. 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 6901) and the XUAR. the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (Public Law No. 115–330) to ■ Ensure that individuals engaged in significant labor traf- try to gain access to Tibetan areas and help sustain Tibetan cul- ficking in the XUAR are identified and sanctioned under ture and identity. Congress should also pass the Tibet Policy and Section 111 (22 U.S.C. 7108) of the Trafficking Victims Support Act (H.R. 4331/S. 2539) to further affirm the protection Protection Act of 2000, as amended (Public Law No. of Tibetan human rights in U.S. policy, strengthen the role of 106–386). the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, and address ■ Enforce U.S. prohibition of the import of goods made with Chinese government interference in the selection of Tibetan forced labor by prosecuting individuals or entities know- religious leaders and a future 15th Dalai Lama. Members of ingly violating U.S. law. Congress and Administration officials should interact regularly

■ Conduct an interagency assessment of the Xinjiang with the leaders of the Central Tibetan Administration and Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to evaluate with parliamentarians globally to build international coalitions the extent of this paramilitary organization’s complic- to protect Tibetan human rights. To further affirm the priority ity in mass internment and forced labor, and determine of Tibetan human rights in U.S. policy, the Administration whether any goods or products produced by XPCC enti- should appoint a high-level official, at or above the rank of ties are exported to the U.S. market or procured by U.S. Under Secretary of State, to the position of Special Coordinator Federal agencies. for Tibetan Issues.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 23 ■ GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

Communicate the Challenges Posed by the ■ Amending the U.S. Higher Education Act to require U.S. Chinese Government colleges and universities to publicly report all foreign gifts, The Administration and Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, should contracts, and in-kind contributions that exceed $10,000 per communicate to the American people the nature, scope, and scale year from a single foreign government or institution and any of the human rights challenges while clearly differentiating the entity affiliated primarily with a foreign government. peoples and cultures of China from the Chinese government ■ Conditioning certain federal assistance to U.S. universi- and Communist Party. Poorly designed and communicated ties and colleges on the requirement that their contracts efforts regarding Chinese government policies can be exploited or agreements establishing Confucius Institutes include in Chinese government and Communist Party propaganda, clear provisions protecting academic freedom and the and can lead to intolerance or harassment of Chinese and other civil rights of the Chinese employees of Confucius Asian Americans. The United States should always be clear that Institutes as well as granting full managerial authority it stands for human rights and the rule of law, and against racism. to the college or university.

■ Supporting initiatives to increase funding and resources Protect the Rights of American Citizens and Residents for Chinese language instruction to decrease the need The Chinese government and Communist Party actively engage for Confucius Institutes or other resources from foreign in disruptive and racially divisive activities including efforts governments and entities. to intimidate or censor individuals of Chinese, Tibetan, and Uyghur descent living in the United States. Administration ■ Requiring that U.S. think tanks and other non-govern- officials and Members of Congress should clearly communi- mental organizations (NGOs) publicly disclose all foreign cate that the civil rights of U.S. citizens and residents of Asian grants and gifts as part of their tax filings to maintain and Chinese descent, and Chinese nationals living or study- non-profit status. ing in the United States, will be protected, including freedom ■ Seeking a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) from coercion or intimidation, freedom of expression, and the study of the “Thousand Talents Program” to assess the freedom of religion. U.S. officials should also publish relevant extent to which this program is used to co-opt researchers information about the Chinese government, Communist Party, or students at U.S. universities and think tanks to unlaw- and entities and individuals engaged in malign foreign influ- fully appropriate research, intellectual property, and other ence operations, including through passage by Congress of the knowledge for the benefit of the Chinese military, govern- Countering the Chinese Government and Communist Party’s ment, companies, or interests.

Political Influence Operations Act (S. 480/H.R. 1811). ■ Protecting any U.S. citizen fired for expressing opinions critical of Chinese government policies or supportive of Limit Ability to Exploit U.S. Openness human rights in China or Hong Kong by extending the The Chinese government and Communist Party exploit U.S. right to pursue civil litigation for wrongful employment openness to exert influence over U.S. policy, acquire critical termination. technologies, and transmit disinformation and propaganda to ■ Developing a multi-stakeholder action plan for all U.S. advance the Chinese government’s messages and interests. The NGOs and academic institutions interacting with Chinese Administration and Congress should work together to address government or Communist Party-affiliated entities, to the challenges posed by Chinese government disinformation, counter malign influence operations and to provide these economic coercion, and malign political influence operations institutions with the means to address censorship or in the United States by: restrictions on their activities. ■ Requiring mandatory disclaimers on direct foreign gov- ernment propaganda to prominently and clearly inform Overhaul the Legal Framework on Foreign Interference the consumer that this media was paid for by the Chinese The Administration and Congress should work together to government and/or Communist Party. update and expand the requirements of the Foreign Agents

24 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ■

Registration Act (FARA) (Public Law No. 75–583) to address Chinese government, both bilaterally and through international the unique challenges posed by the Chinese government’s organizations, and expand interagency coordination efforts to attempts to acquire technologies banned under U.S. export counter disinformation, censorship, malign political influence controls and limit academic freedom by acting through orga- operations, or economic coercion, particularly those targeting nizations like Chinese Students and Scholars Associations and diaspora communities, U.S. colleges and universities, and U.S. Confucius Institutes. FARA reform should include registration partners and allies. and reporting requirements for those firms lobbying on behalf of foreign commercial entities and organizations working on World Bank Accountability educational or scientific pursuits with significant foreign gov- A $50 million World Bank loan to XUAR entities for vocational ernment ties. And, in coordination with the Committee on training programs and previous World Bank funding for agri- Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), registration cultural development projects in the region raise questions as a foreign agent should be required for any entity accepting about accountability and oversight of World Bank loans to funding from a Chinese entity linked to the Chinese govern- China. The U.S. representatives to the International Bank for ment or Communist Party for the purpose of acquiring U.S. Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) should continue to companies or technology. oppose new lending, pursuant to China’s “Tier 3” designation for significant trafficking of persons. Congress should ask the Develop a Whole-of-Government Human Rights Strategy U.S. Governor for the IBRD to explore reforms and increased In order to ensure that the U.S. Government can strategically transparency in the bank’s lending to the world’s second largest address a more authoritarian China, the President should economy. In addition, Congress should ask for an annual report issue a policy directive to develop a comprehensive strategy from the Department of the Treasury on debt transparency and embedding human rights, the rule of law, and democratic debt management assistance efforts in relation to credit pro- governance and development goals into the critical mission vided by the Chinese government to other countries, including strategies of all U.S. government entities interacting with the through the Belt and Road Initiative.

A Hong Kong riot police officer kneels on the neck of a volunteer first aider as police attempt to disperse thousands of pro-democracy protesters on China’s National Day. October 1, 2020.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25 ■ GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

Hold Officials Responsible for Serious listed Chinese companies in U.S. capital markets to ensure Human Rights Abuses that U.S. retirement and investment dollars are not funding The Administration should strategically use the list-based companies with links to the Chinese government’s security sanctions available in the Global Magnitsky Human Rights apparatus or malevolent behavior. Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114–328), the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (Public Law No. 105–292), Strengthen Response to Pandemics the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of The Administration should work with allies and partners to 2000 (Public Law No. 106–386), and the Foreign Relations strengthen the International Health Regulations (IHR) to make Authorization Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106–113—Appendix clearer obligations for member states and consequences for G), among others, to ensure that Chinese officials complicit in those that fail to provide timely and transparent information human rights violations, including severe religious freedom about infectious disease outbreaks; create a regular Periodic restrictions and human trafficking, cannot benefit from access Review for compliance of member states with the IHR; and to the United States or its financial markets. create an independent mechanism that insulates the decision to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern Condition Access to U.S. Capital Markets (PHEIC) from political pressure of member states. In addition, Congress should ask the relevant executive branch depart- Congress should: ments and agencies to identify and list Chinese companies and ■ Ensure that the U.S. Global Health Security Agenda has the entities that have provided material support or technical capa- resources needed to increase global capacity for preventing, bilities in violation of U.S. law and that facilitate human rights detecting, and responding to infectious diseases and create abuses in China, including in the XUAR and Tibetan areas of standards that protect and promote global health, transpar- China, and require the Securities and Exchange Commission ency, and internationally recognized human rights. to strengthen disclosure and auditing requirements for any

Hong Kong medical workers line up to register their participation in the workers union strike in support of the HK-mainland border closure in combating the spread of COVID- 19. February 3, 2020.

26 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ■

■ Require the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center to issue reports on its efforts to counter disinfor- mation related to the novel coronavirus pandemic.

■ Issue appropriate sanctions and export licensing restric- tions for any individuals or entities identified as having been complicit in forced labor programs involving Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) production.

■ Urge the Administration to raise cases of those in China detained for exposing the origins of the virus and the Chinese government’s response to its transmission, and to find ways to honor Dr. Li Wenliang and all the other doctors, journalists, citizen journalists, and researchers punished or detained for their efforts to promote trans- SweetHour/Alamy Stock Photo. parency about the novel coronavirus outbreak in China. for civil society advocates; prioritizing an agenda that uses congressionally appropriated funds to help internet users to Address Digital Authoritarianism circumvent China’s “Great Firewall”; and creating other “smart The Chinese government is developing technology and uti- technologies” and equipment that provide the greatest possible lizing artificial intelligence (AI) to expand mass surveillance access to the internet in China and globally. Congress should and social control of its citizens and is exporting this technol- pass S. 4245, the Safeguarding Internet Freedom in Hong Kong ogy globally, undermining democratic values and governance Act of 2020, to bolster the availability of firewall circumvention structures. The Administration should work with Congress and tools for Hongkongers. like-minded allies and partners, where appropriate, to: ■ Develop a set of global principles for the use of facial rec- Strengthen International Organizations ognition and other forms of biometric surveillance that As the Chinese government increases its influence and pro- protect privacy and human rights. motes its autocratic model in international organizations, the ■ Employ targeted sanctions against perpetrators of cyber- Administration should coordinate with like-minded allies attacks used to steal intellectual property and sensitive and partners on public statements, diplomatic démarches, personal information, as well as against any entities bene- technical assistance programs, and public diplomacy efforts fiting from this type of intrusion. to condemn arbitrary detention, torture, and other serious

■ Launch a digital infrastructure initiative that uses the human rights abuses in China, and creatively communicate bipartisan BUILD Act (Public Law No. 115–254) to make these efforts to the Chinese people. Work together with allies information and communications technology a greater and partners to strengthen human rights mechanisms within priority for overseas development assistance. international institutions and to help special rapporteurs and other human rights experts gain unfettered access to member ■ Champion high-standard internet governance principles states in order to monitor human rights conditions. In addi- globally that support the freedom of expression and the tion, Congress should: protection of user privacy. ■ Request from the Secretary of State a strategy to counter Counter Internet Censorship Chinese government influence in international organiza- Congress and the Administration should counter internet cen- tions, particularly those related to human rights, internet sorship in China, including by actively opposing the Chinese sovereignty, the development of norms on artificial intelli- government’s efforts to establish a new international norm gence, labor, international standards setting, and freedom on “internet sovereignty”; expanding digital security training of navigation.

2020 ANNUAL REPORT—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 27 ■ GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

■ Request a report from the Director of National Intelligence meaningful participation of experts and NGOs from all on the scope, tactics, and effects of Chinese government participating countries. influence in international organizations. Advocate for Political Prisoners ■ Request from the Secretary of the Treasury a strategy to improve coordination with the Department of State and Members of Congress and Administration officials at the high- U.S. representatives at multilateral institutions, such as the est levels should raise specific prisoner cases in meetings with World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to align Chinese government officials. Experience demonstrates that efforts to combat China’s malign influence globally. consistently and prominently raising individual prisoner cases and the larger human rights issues they represent can result in Prioritize Religious Freedom Diplomacy improved treatment in detention, lighter sentences or, in some The Administration should use all the tools available in the cases, release from custody, detention, or imprisonment. The International Religious Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.), Administration should consider creating a Special Advisor for the Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public Religious and Political Prisoners to coordinate interagency Law No. 114–281), and Executive Order 13926 to improve U.S. resources on behalf of political and religious prisoners in China religious freedom diplomacy and provide targeted responses and globally. Members of Congress are encouraged to consult to escalating religious freedom abuses affecting all of China’s the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for reliable infor- diverse religious communities. The Administration and mation on cases of political and religious detention in China, Members of Congress should work with Vatican officials to and to “adopt” individual prisoners and advocate on their address increased repression of Catholics in China, offer tech- behalf through the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s nical assistance to protect Vatican diplomatic communications “Defending Freedoms Project.” from Chinese government cyberattacks and provide diplomatic assistance, as appropriate, to reevaluate the 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement on bishop appointments. In addition, Vatican offi- cials should be urged to publish the original agreement and any negotiated revisions to transparently evaluate the Chinese government’s compliance and whether the internationally rec- ognized right to the freedom of religion is being protected.

Develop Creative Human Rights Programs In China, U.S. efforts to promote human rights and the rule of law are characterized unfairly as threats to the stability of China. The Administration should work with Congress to:

■ Develop creative public messaging and programs that pri- oritize the rights violations that affect the largest numbers of Chinese citizens—workers, families, religious believers, internet users, women, and rural residents in particular.

■ Continue to fund capacity-building initiatives for rights and rule of law advocates in settings outside China, given growing restrictions on the funding of civil society orga- nizations in China and Hong Kong.

■ Create a public mechanism for coordinating human rights diplomacy and technical assistance programs with like-minded allies and partners that includes the

28 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Congressional-Executive Commission on China 243 Ford House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

202-226-3766 www.cecc.gov