ARMOURED WARFARE THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN EAST AFRICA, 1940-1941 by Evert Philippus Kleynhans Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Science (Military History) in the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University Supervisor: Prof I.J. van der Waag Co-supervisor: Prof A.J. Esterhuyse December 2014 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za “Declaration” By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original, work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. Date: 12 November 2014 Copyright © 2014 Stellenbosch University All rights reserved Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za ABSTRACT Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za OPSOMMING Na Suid-Afrika se toetrede tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op 6 September 1939, het die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) verander vanaf ‘n verouderde vredestydse weermag na ‘n moderne mag met offensiewe projeksievermoëns. Gedurende die tussenoorlogperiode het ‘n gevoel van swaarmoedigheid in terme van militêre inovasie in die UVM geheers. Die resultaat hiervan was verwarde denke ten opsigte van pantseroorlogvoering en meganisasie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeplanners het nie die offensiewe potensiaal van pantsermagte verstaan nie. Die gevolg was dat die UVM in September 1939 slegs oor ‘n simboliese pantsermag beskik het. Die Suid-Afrikaanse toetrede tot die oorlog het die stukrag vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n lewensvatbare pantsermag binne die UVM verleen. Gevolglik is die Suid-Afrikaanse Tenkkorps (SATK) in Mei 1940 gestig. Veranderinge in beide die aard en organisatoriese struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsinstellings het gevolg. Die Italiaanse teenwoordigheid in Abessinië en Italiaans-Somaliland is as ‘n direkte bedreiging vir die aangrensende Britse Oos-Afrika gebiede gesien. In Junie 1940, kort na die Italiaanse oorlogsverklaring, is Suid-Afrikaanse magte na Kenia ontplooi. Die UVM ontplooiing na Oos-Afrika was die eerste in ‘n gereelde oorlogsituasie sedert die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Ten spyte van die doktrine wat die Suid-Afrikaanse ontplooiing van pantsermagte na Oos-Afrika ondersteun het, het die SATK-eenhede gou geleer dat die aanvaarde doktrine, ontleen aan die Britse Ministerie van Oorlog gedurende die tussenoorlogsjare, slegs ‘n gids was tot offensiewe aanwending. Die storie van die Suid- Afrikaanse ontplooiing in Oos-Afrika gedurende die oorlog, word as ‘n lens gebruik waardeur die rol en aanwending van beide die UVM se pantserkarre en ligte tenks ondersoek word. Die geallieerde offensiewe deur Italiaans-Somaliland en suidelike Abessiniȅ gedurende 1940 – 1941 illustreer duidelik dat die taktiese en operasionele aanwending van die Suid- Afrkaanse pantsermagte gedurende hierdie tydperk van groot belang was vir die suksesse en mislukkings van die veldtog. Die aard van die opponerende magte in Oos-Afrika, die voortdurend veranderende topografie en klimaat van die operasionele teater, asook die aard van die Suid-Afrikaanse offensiewe operasies gedurende die veldtog, het gekombineer om die unieke manier waarop die pantserkarre en tenks van die UVM van 1940 tot 1941 aangewend is, te vorm. Die operasionele ervarings wat die UVM opgedoen het gedurende die Oos-Afrika Veldtog, het die verdere ontplooiings van Suid-Afrikaanse pantser na Noord- Afrika, Madagaskar en Italiȅ gedurende die res van die oorlog gevorm. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za i CONTENTS Terminology iii Abbreviations vi Illustrations viii Maps ix Tables and Graphs ix Introduction x Chapter 1: Melancholy, Muddles and Machines: South Africa, the Union Defence Force and the South African Tank Corps, 1918- 1940 1 1.1. The South African Experience during the First World War 2 1.2. Strategic, Organisational and Doctrinal Developments in the UDF 4 1.3. Furtive Steps towards Armour in the Union Defence Force 16 1.4. Declaration of War – Impetus for Growth in UDF and SATC 21 1.5. Formation of Armoured Car Companies 23 Chapter 2: Appreciation, Apprehensiveness and Adventure: The South African Deployment to East Africa, 1940 30 2.1. The East African Theatre of Operations 31 2.2. The Italian Declaration of War 41 2.3. The South African Preparations for War in East Africa 43 2.4. The Arrival of the South African Tank Corps in East Africa 49 2.5. The Advance into Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland Planned 54 Chapter 3: Roads, Rivers and a Rout: South African Armour operations in Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia, December 1940 – May 1941 60 3.1. The Battle of El Wak: South African Armour in Action 61 3.2. Interlude to Somaliland Operations 68 3.3. Thrust into Somaliland: Assault on Gobwen and Kismayu 69 3.4. Advance on Addis Ababa 82 3.5. Combolcia and Dessie 88 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za ii Chapter 4: Frontiers, Fighting and Forts: South African Armour with the 1st South African Division in Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941 96 4.1. Pensive Thrusts and Operational Positioning 97 4.2. First Blood at El Yibo 102 4.3. Across the Abyssinian Frontier: Gorai, El Gumu and Hobo k 114 4.4 Banno and the Shifta Revolt 124 4.5. Final Showdown at Mega 130 Chapter 5: Bogs, Bluffs and Bastions: South African Armour in the East African Campaign’s ‘Sideshows’ – March 1941 to November 1941 138 5.1. The Consolidation of Southern Abyssinia – Soroppa and Giarso 139 5.2. The Assault of the Hills 141 5.3. Subjugating Central Abyssinia: Uaddara and Rees’ Rout 146 5.4. The Battle Around the Seven Lakes 154 5.5. Finale in Abyssinia – Assault on Gondar 161 Chapter 6: Ingenuity, Improvisation and Innovation A Strategic and Operational Analysis of the Employment of South African Armour in East Africa 1940-1941 167 6.1. An Analysis of the South Africa Armour Doctrine 167 6.2. An Analysis of the SATC Deployment in East Africa 171 Summary and Conclusion 184 Sources 189 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za iii TERMINOLOGY The terminology used throughout the thesis is based upon the historical context of the time and the archival documentation available at the Department of Defence Documentation Centre (DOD Archives) surrounding the South African deployment to East Africa during 1940-1941. As such, care has been taken to refer to both geographical and political features in their historical context, as mentioned in Harry Klein’s 1965 text Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War II.1 For instance, Gimma is today known as Jimma, and Abyssinia known as Ethiopia. The use of metric units is adhered to throughout the text; though in the original sources, distances were often expressed in miles. The military terminology used throughout the thesis, can at times be confusing. While care has been taken to avoid the use of overly complicated military terminology, a number of military terms should be explained as contained within the manuals that guided the South African employment of armour in East Africa during the Second World War.2 Line Ahead Formation: “Each tank or vehicle following one behind the other, is the simplest of all formations, and is normally used for road movement...Although ‘line ahead’ will seldom be used by a regiment, or even by a squadron, it will frequently be used by a troop.