INDO.PAK RELATIONS A SELECT ANNOTATB) BBLIOQRAPHY
•UVMITTiD IN f»AIITIAL PUiRiMCNT FOR THi Mumo OP rm Mmnu. OF 4laMer of libratp tktitntt Xi
BY MOHD. HASHIM SIDDIQUI Ron NO. H Ulf-.10 BarataMI M«^ lt*7M7
MR. S. HASAN ZAMARRUD LMtUCff
mrARTMBNT OF UBRARY SaENCE ikLIOARH aUSUM UNIVERSITY AUOARH 1990 DS2386 ^Dedicated to the hxsting mgmory iqfmi Father Cate Tflf. IqUl f&imad Siddiqui CONTSHTS
Acknowl •dgement Pre£ ac«
PART I ISTBOEUGTIOW Historical account Trade and economic Foreign policy Kashadr Creation o£ Bast Pakistan Deterioration o£ relations Siala meeting Compeuriaon of Tashkent and Simla Agrewnent Implementation of the Simla Agreement Relations in 1970s Defence relations and Attitude of big powers Pakistan's nuclear capability and India's response Relations in 1980s
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
LIST OF JOURNALS DOCUMBNTBD
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
PART III
KJTHOR IMDBX
TI1LB IHDBX ACKN0HL8D6BMBMT
I acknowledge my debt o£ gratitude to the Supervisor ML S. HASiMH ZAHARRUD without whose guidance and cooperation it would have been difficult for me to complete this work. I am also highly thankful to MR* S. mSTMfK ZAIDI for his invaluable suggestions at the moment I needed most. His help came at a time when my Supervisor MR« S HASAN ZAMARRITD was away for attending a refresher course.
My thanks are dae to Professor MOHD. SABIR HtJSAZN, Chairman* Department of Library Science, A.M.U., Allgarh for his valuable guidance and helping hand in completing the bibliography.
I am grateful to MR. M.-MJZtfFAR KHNI, MU SHMAHAT aJSAIN« MISS SBBMA RAZ and other staff of the Department of Library Science for their cooperation and timely help in the completion of this work.
I escpress my sincere thanks to Professor HOOHDL HASMI KHAN and staff of Maulana tead Library, A.M.U.» Allgarh for their kind help in my search for the materials.
No amount of thmks can suffice to my mother and brothers who have taken every pain in getting me educated. They supported and encouraged me in every way. I an grate£t3l to MU MDHD. OWAZS KHMi responsible for typing the manuscript In a short time.
Last bat not the least I %fOuld like to thank my friends Ml. JMUL HASIR and MR. AZBBM BA8HBBR for their cooperation*
( MOHD. HASHZN SH^IOTX ) PRE F AC K
India and Pakistan have gone through very uneasy relationship £ioro their very inception. Being closest neighbour* they are miles apart in showing their friendli ness.
In my dissertation, I have given the bsKSkground of Pakistan's creation and some major disputes between India and Pakistan which resulted in two major wars and culKdnated in the division o£ Pakistan.
The emphasis is mainly put on the events after the creation of Bangladesh, discussing in detail the process of normalisation of relations between Paikistan and India.
STWDARD FOLLOWED
The Indian Standards recommended for bibliographi cal references and classified catalogue code of Or. S.R. Ranganathan have been followed. In some cases where ISI do not give any guidance, I have taken appropriate decision.
30BJBCT HBADIHG3
I have tried my best to give co-extensive subject headings, ta effort has been made to follow postulates and principles given by S.R. Ranganathan in the formation of subject Headings. ARRWGBMSHT
The entries are arranged under subject headings which are arranged alphabetically following letter by letter method. The ENTRY BLSMEMT of the author(s) is in capitals followed by the Secondary Element in paran- thesis using capital and small letters and then the title of the articles* sub-title (if any) their, name of the periodical being underlined in abbreviated or full form. It is followed by the volume nunber, issue nuoiser, the year, month and date (if any) given by using inclusive notation of the pages of the article. Each citation is followed by an abstract.
The items of bibliographical reference for each entry of a periodical article/arranged as followst-
a) Name (s) of the author(s) b) Pull Stop (•) d Title of contribution including sub*title, if any d) Pull Stop (.) e) Title of the periodical in abbreviated/full form f) Pull Stop (.) g) Volume nunibers h) Coma (,) i) Issue nunber j) Semi colon (;) k) Year of publication 1) Coma (,) m) Dat^ of publication n) Semi colon (;) o) Inclusive pages of the article. 8PBCIMBK ENTRY
INDO-PAK RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICIES
SMtAMAT ALI. Bade to the old refrains Indo-Pakistani relations worsen yet again. Far East Econ Review 134, 411 1986, 11, 20; 52.
Last years high hopes o£ a thaw in indo-Pa)d.8tani relations have faded away at last. The two countries are their usual no-war-no-peace relationship New Delhi seems reconciled to the view that it has managed to get along without normalisation with Islamabad so far and can con tinue to do so far the foreable future. The hopes of breakthrough in bilateral ties had reached their height at the end of last yet following a series of events. How ever, even as the mutual recriminations continue unabated Pakistan also has its long litany of con^laints— foreign analyst do not expect on outbreak of major armed hostilities.
Two separate indexes namely Author Index and Title Index have been given in the third part for convenience of the users. A list of abbreviated journals has been given along with their place of publication and frequency. Another list consisting of the names of months and season in abbreviated form together with their full form is also provided. No subject index has been provided as bibliography itself arranged alphabetically through subject headings.
The libraries visited^consulting the Primary source are as £ollowss-
1. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Mjsliin University Aligarh. 2. Centre of West Asian Studies Library, Aligarh Maslim University, Aligarh. 3. Centre for stratefic studies, Aligarh Maslim University, Aligarh. 4. Seminar Library of Political Science Department, Aligarh Maslim University, Aligarh. 5. Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Sapru House, New Delhi. 6. American centra Library, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi. 7. British Council, Rafi Marg, New Delhi. 8. Nehru Library, Teen Hirti House, New Delhi.
The secondary sources consulted in Maulana Azad Library, A M.U., Aligarh to find the location of articles aret-
1. Index India (Rajasthan University Jaipur) , 2. Indian Press Index (Indian Documentation service, Gu rgaon) 3. International Studies. 4. Guide to Indian Periodical literature (Delhi Library Association) 5. Social Science Index 6. Time Index. PART ONE INTRODUCTION gl rr•' -I •, 'S 3 < z U •
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XMTROOUCTIOH
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
South Asia contains a tremendous assortment of racial groups and subgroups, their ditributions appear ing to bear tittle relationsto present national bounda- ries. The whole region is the cluster/differenof t countries, different in culture, traditions and languages , but sharing a common post; at historical experience of colonial rule.
The first major breach in walls of colonic. domination cane with peaceful ending of British rule in India in 1947 and the creation of the union of India the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as successor states.
Pakistan came into existence under quite unfavoura ble conditions. Circumstances that created the feelings of mistrust between India and Pakistan were mostly due to the events %d)ich took place immediately after the partition, India's attitude towards Pakistan remained harsh and unsympathetic, ihey not only with held Pakistan's share of military supplies* but also denied Pakistan its share of cash balances. Ihe latter was released when Gandhi threatened to go on an indefinite fast. Relations between India and Pakistan became tense In 1949 t^en following the devaluation of the British pound sterling vis-a-vis the American dollar* India similarly devalued her rupee and Pakistan did not. India was shocked with this decision of Pakistan and refused to pay the 30 percent higher price for Pakistan jute, cotton and food grains.
RELATIONS BETHBEN any two sovereign countrL«s, especially tiiose between India and Pakistan %«hlch were bound together for cectdries by common history, cultural heritage and above all by inter-dependence of economy, could have become a model for good neighbourly relations. That this did not happen after India and Pakistan came Into being In 1947, after the British rulers had to handover power to the people of these t%#o covntries, is in Itself quite a disturbing fact of history. On the contrary «A)at has happeaed Isthat Indo-Pak relations have never been on an even keel except for a short period after the Simla Agreement had been signed in 1971. One abvlous explana tion for this is that IndO-Pak relations did not and perhaps could not develop in the direction in which ttiey should have in the larger interests of the people of the two countries becavise the United India had been divided on the basis of the "two oaticxi" theory, nils 6
explanation, however* does not £ully eiqplaln the existing state of Indo-Pak relatldns, though this Is an Important factor.
Relations between two Independent and sovereign countries are like sensitive plants. They need constant care and have to be nurtured assiduously. What Is impor tant to note inthls connection is that India and its top leaders acc^ted the partition of united India without any mental reservations because it was realised that it was not possibleto coerce# even with force* unwilling parts to remain within India* Such an action would lead strife to continiied internal/and turmoil and bring the progress of India to a standstill. On the other hand* the rulers of Pakistan had entert
TRADB AND ECONOMIC
Indo-Pak political and economic relations are characterised by a long series o£ accords and discords. The reasons for such a state of affairs can be traced to vize, geographical proximity, economic base, human race and military rlvalxy, besides other intangibles like the past history, ideological legacy, national interests and objectives, identity, image and status of conflict. The correlation ofthese forces provides a proper focus for understanding of relations between thetwo countries.
As a geographical area, India is bigger than Pakistan by more ^an four times and terms of popula tion, it is by eight times. Because of her size, population and economic potentiatities, India is conscious of her strategic importance in Asia in Pedicular and in the world in general. India's economic structure is certainly sv^erior to that of Pakistan. However, Pakistan is better placed in agriculture, raw materials and food. Besides, a nuaber of other factors indicate that Pakistan is potentially a weaker nation than India. The mutual faith and trust has never appeared. However, one needs to note that the Indo-Pak relations were not alvrays a record of continued retrogression. In this process* Pakistan secured some coicessions form India with regard to canal waters settlement, evacuee property and financial issues. In such a hostile rela tionship, the economic issues remained subservient to the political objectives and goals. Trends in economic relationship closely followed those of political under standing. Therefore, there has been a see-saw in the economic relationship too. This backdrop %fill help us to analyse the economic relationship in its proper perspective.
Economic relationship between India and Pakistan has been largely confined to trade interaction. The circumstances in v^ich Pakistan and India became inde pendent did not prove conducive to any harmonious ecoaomic and political relations between the two countries. Ho%iever, trade did exist between the two nations and continued till 1964-65, after which the trade relations were severely restricted because of the 1965 war.
The Simla Agreement of 1972, tA)ich constituted on an enduring basis the normalisation of relations betifeen the two coxmtires, provided that * trade and G
cooperation In economic and other agreed fields will be resuned as far as possible and that to this end delega tion from tiie two countires will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details". The Indo^Pak trade linkstAiich were snapped abruptly in 1965 were re-estab lished in 1974, following the Simla Agreement Thereafter« a trade agreement was signed in January 1975 for three years. This agreeneit envisaged trade on a govemmoit- to-govemmeit basis through state trading agencies.
The trade agreoaent signed in 1975 expired in 1978. Since then, efforts to reach a new trade agreement were made but without much success. After the resumption of trade between the two countries from 1975-76 to 1982-83, India did esqperience a surplus in the balance thrice and Pakistan five times. Mhen India constantly showed surplus in bilateral trade for three successive year8« Pakistan government unilaterally stopped its private sector to import from India. This particular action swung the trade balance continuously in favour of Pakistan. The present exchange of commodities is limited to a few items, India's exports to Pakistan largely consist of *
Bidi Leaves, Medicinal herbs. Iron and Steel products, engineering items, Tyers and Tubes Iron Ore/ Metal Han\i£acture8# Stone and sand gravel* Cotton fabrics , Glass virare.
During the 1983* some of the additional items that were exported included betel leaves^ seamless. Latex, valve bladder, aluminium phosphate tablets, fresh ginger, onions and tea.
India*s imports from Pakistan comprise largely t Naphtha, Furnace oil. Rock salt. Pig iron. Fruits and vegetables, crude fertilisers and crude minerals, crude vegetable materials.
An efforts have been made by the Indian private sector as well as the government to nozmalise trade relation %fith Pakistan. It has been identified that India can offer as many items as covered in the free list of iRqports by Pakistan. These include t
Artificial limbs, hearing aids and parts thereof. Ball-point pens and refills thereof and parts, and fountain pen nibs. Carbon ribbon for electric typewriters, Da^iture powder. Drugs and medicines. Dry battery cells. Duplicating stencils. Electric lamps (bulbs only). Journal magazines, periodicals and daily newspapers. Locks, Musical instruments. Painter's material. Shaving soap. Record players and records. Safety helmets of fiber glass/pla«itic. 8
shoe laces. Stationery, Watches and Clocks, X-ray films and plates, Bidl leaves. Book binding cloth. Chemicals, Egg trays of paper. Pood colours, flavours and essences. Glass bottles. Jute goods, Leatherand products thereof, Uinbrella fittings. Maintenance spares for domestic and car air- conditioners. Needles, Tyres and Txibes, Air- conditioners (Demestic).
a!he Pakistan Delegation vAiich visited India in November 1981 evinced Interest in exports to India for the following products s Naphtha, Cotton (short steple); Dry dates; Medicinal herbs; Rock slat; Furnace oil, SteAl, particularly reinforced for general use; Stainless steel utensils; switch boards.
India and Pakistan could also effectively coqperate in trade in textiles in the %#orld market. The textile trade of the two countries at the global level is governed by Multi-Fibre Arrangements, The industrial cooperation may also take place betweoi India and Pakistani firms in tyres andtubes, casting and forgings, machine- tools. Chemicals electronic goodsand automobile spare parts.
Dialogues between India and Pakistan both of the government and at the business level are afoot. But it is the shedding of natural suspicion, distrust and y
recrimination Which will pave the way for a gmentlng trade exchanges between the two neighbouring countries. Ihe Indo-Pak bilateral trade can grow with a sense o£ objactivity and commonality of interests witiiin the frame work of national priorities. If trade relations have to be normalised« both the countries should adhere to the principles of non-discrimination and mutual gains. The adoption of trade deflection to the Indo-Pak commer cial reality is one major possibility. Both the count ries should arrange trade fairs to project the image of their products ^idh they would like to sell in eaCh others' market.
FOREIGN POLIOf
Pakistan's policy towards India over the years has passed through a number of phases. However* it has all along been guided by suspicion. Jealousy and hatred towards India this vitiated outlook of Pakistan's rulers naturally gave them %^ich have determined theforeign policy of Pakistan* especially its attitude towards India, are the need to maintain a dictatorship or semi-indepen dence of thecountry fed no foreign aid, which almost entirely cfGimes from the Western caa^* the bulk coming from the J^. This peculiar feature of Pakistani, unlike •0
India's, can be \mdierstood if one keeps In mind that the departiire ofthe British rulers left a political vac jn in the territories i4ilch now comprise Pakistan, particu larly those areas which provide the political elite to the country* that is, Punjab. The areas tAiich constitute Pakistan now or even before the ^ ration of -die Bangla desh %#ere predominantly agrarian.
Nonetheless, it is significant that .%d. thin three to four months after Pakistan had come into being, a struggle between anti-imperialist and secular minded people on one hand and pro-imperialist and fundamenta list forces on the other hand begun. Jinnah's dilemma arose out o€ this contradiction. Jinnah seriously considered at one stage the possibility of declaring the Muslim League a secular party and changing its nameto the Pakistan National League. Ihe fact was disclosed by the then left-wing d^ly, Pakistan Times, Later this fact %ias corroborated by Mian Iftekhar-ud-din, founder of Pakistan Times andthe \irdu daily Imroz. However, the secular and anti-imperialist trend in Pakistan's polity was too weak to assert itself.
Ttie period between 1947 and 1953 was characterised by a foxmative stage in the evolution of Pakistan's power structure. Though Pakistan's Leaders claimed during this period that they were following a policy of nonallgnra«it, the description was nisLeading. It is txue that in this period Pakistan «ras not linked %fith military blocs through military alliances. At a meeting in West Pakistan in Hgrch 1951, Liaguat All Khan stated that Pakistan was not tied to the apron strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor vras she a caoip follower of the communist bloc, Pakistan, he claimed had voted in the United Nations sometime with the nastem bloc and at others Mitti the conmtmist bloc. A closer look into that period however* reveals that the policy of Pakistan was far from «^at no alignment connotes, This was the period lihen Pakistan was waging a war to wrest Kashmir from India.
After the Jinnah's death and Liaquat All's asssa- sslnation, Pakistan's foreign policy and its relations with India under-went a dramatic change.
In the post Jlnnah and post Liaquat period a nvnber of changes took place in Pakistan that gradually drew Pakistan closer to the United States, In 1954, a military agreement between Pakistan and USA was signed. This was followed by a military alliances between Pakis tan and Turkey the latter having already become one of the signatories ofthe SSATO. In fact, the US state department was not averse to giving Pakistan a long rope and allowing into flaunt the Chinese 'alliance*. It was felt in Washington that this might, on the one hand. 2
have the wholesome effect of knocking sense into India v^ile on the other it was calculated to help USA to sake inroads into such regions of Africa and Asia as were resisting US pressure.
In the mid-sixties Pakistan had taken great pains to publicise its sympathies for other Muslim countries, with the exception of Turkey and Iran \i^ich were raenibers of CS^TTO, did not favourably respondto Pakistani approaches. However, the hypooricy and doiible dealing whic^ made of Pakistan's attitude towards India from the midfifties to the early sixties was exposed in a well reasoned govern- molt of India publication entitled s "Aggression on Kashmir". It is relevant to quote from this document because its basic thesis holds good even today, in the mid-eighties perhaps with greater vigour than when it had been written. This also will enable us to analyse why Pakistani aggression on India took place in 1965 and how it was directly related to the new emerging axis betwen Pakistan and America on the one hand and Pakistan and Qiina alliance on the other.
Dealing with Indo-Pakistan talks h&ld at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 it says %
"During these talks, pakistan like China, tried to make a virture of aggression and demanded tjhat t^e Kashmir "S
issue should be solved on the basis of the cornplete surrender by India. Unmindful of the realities of the situation^ legal or constitutional rights and any sense of equity, the Pakistan delegation claimed the whole of Jamnu and Kashmir, except for a small packet of about 3,000 square miles in the southern Part of the state. It is not surprising that the patent absurdity of the claim and the unusual axguments pat forward to sustain it should eventually have wrecked the talks.
KASHMIR
Of all the issues dividing India and Palcistan, the Kashmir dispute has proved to be the most tenacious. Kashmir has prompted three wars between the two countries and still remains the major obstacle to a peace settle ment in the sub-continent*
After the Indian government had announced in Deceiriber 1947 that it would place its dispute with Pak istan before the U.N. Security council. The U.N. arran ged a tenuous ceasefire between the belligeents, but by that time the territory of Kashmir had inf act been divided into Indian and Pakistani controlled portions. In defending their version of the United Nations delibera tions and decisions both India and Pakistan tend to stress ; 4
different pa^s of the relevant 1948-1949 docutoents. Since the resolutions comadt both nations on specific matters^r various conditions have to be met by both of the interes ted parties before the conflict can be settled.
The interest of Pakistan in Kashmir is not only ideological. It has other interests too* one of which is economic. Economically speaking, Pakistan depends on the waters of the Indus for its irrigation. It has been a constant fear to Pakistani leaders that India would exploit this potontial and their fear were confirmed in the times of crisis in 1948 and 1965. Religious and cultural affi nity is also one of the factors that has injected a strong feeling of emotionalism among the people.
Another equally iirportant factor is the strategic position of Kashmir for Pakistan in its relations with India. Afghanistan and China. During the first war in Kashmir, Pakistan fought desperately to retain the nor- theim areas in order to prevent India from gaining territory which would provide a link with Afghanistan. Pakistan, disturbed by its ally's attitude, which was acting in opposition to her national interests began to change her national policies infavour of China fearing that both the USSR and US would support India's politi cal and military needs while undermining her own, Pakistan 0
recognizad Chinese claims to northern Ladakh. In return, she received from China the acknowledgement the other parts o£ Kashmir irightfully belonged to Pakistan.
Thus political forces vrithin and outside of India, Pakistan and united Nations have made any legal or politi cal settlement of the manifold Kashmir dispute even more difficult to realize. Noless than three major wars (1948 1965, 1971) involving Kashmir and innumerable skirmishes and ceasefire violations have kept alive the Pakistani- Indian hostilities. India and Pakistan have tried to settle the dispute through negotiations but these failed too.
CREATION OP EAST PAKISTAN
Pakistan differs from most other Asian states which attained independence after the second world war in that it is not merely a cblonial successor state but the portion of a colonial successor state. Britain's India empire was partitioned in such a way that the Muslim majority areas in and contiguous to Punjab and Bengal were joined toge ther in one political entity, Pakistan#west Pakistan and East Pakistan, apart from Islam, had very little in common with each other. The union between the two parts was an uneasy one from the beginning. The ?ast Pakistan had 6
complaints about the unequal distribution of economic resources between the two wings of Pakistan. They accuiad the west Pakistani of exploitation. The capital of the country was in western part. Most government officials came from the west. The army was made up of west Pakistani9#the major portion comprised of the Pub- Jabis yet a majority of Pakistanis (55 percent) lived in the Bast.
Despite these differences, the fragile union con tinued until 1969 when the government of General Ayub Khan collapsed as a result of a mass movement seeking his over throw and restoration of democracy. Ayub Khan handed over power to another military general« Yahya Khan. The 1970 general elections were the first ever held in Pakistan on the basis of univeraal adult franchise. These elections showed that none of the political parties was popular in both wings of Pakistan. The At^ami league hadi mass support in both Pakistan and the Pakistan people Party had strong support in the West.
SHEIKH WJIBUR RAHMAN, THE AWAMI LEAGUE, AND TPffi NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN EAST PAKISTiW.
The post election period in Pakistan brought three major powers to the forefront which had to dictate the 17 course of the events in its history. The Yahya Khan regime. The Awami League* and the people's party were to find a solution of the pioblen which became difficult due to the divergent and conflicting nature of their policies. President Yahya Khan triggered the crisis when he announced the postponement of the National Assenbly*s session to be convened in Dacca. The Awami League, percie- ving this as a deliberate attempt to disregard popular mandate for Bengali autonomy, launched a campaign of civic disobedience.
Sheikh Hi Jib at this point was under great pressure the radicals of his own party to declare independence. He resisted that pressure for the time being and decided to adopt a middle course. He launched a non violent non-coo peration aovement which gave him the opportunity to force the regime to accept his terms, faced with Ma Jib's de facto assuaoption of power Yahya Khan came to Dacca to talk with him in order to finalies tiie solution of the crisis. After five days of continous talks, Yahya Khan and the Awami League agreed on a draft proclamation to be issued by Yahya Khan for an interim arrangement for a transfer of power. Bhutto suggested direct negotiations with Sheikh Mujib but his request did not get any attention from the Awami league which was now under heavy pressures 18 to declare Independence as the non-cooperation movemebt had conpleted Its one month. The Avaml leagae pressed the govemm^it for quick acceptance o£ its draft proposal. He ordered ttoiBHnediate arrest of Awani league leaders and directed the army to crush the secessionist movein^it and restore full authority to the c^itral goTremment. Thus was begun the civil war which led to the end of a united Pakistan.
DBTBRIORATION OP THB RBLATIOM BBTWSSN INDIA MID PAKISTNi
Relations between India and Pakistan, already tense, escalated sharply as a result of the civil war in Sast Pakistan, It started with acrimonious exchange of notes between the two countries and to numerous chaurges and couhter chaxges by each side. The immediate aftermath of the civil war in Bast Pakistan was mass influx of refu gees was one of the reasons that drew India into the civil conflict and led to the war. By mid-Jbly, Mrs. Gandhi had evidence that a war tilth Pakistan %fould be cheaper than thet economic burden of coping with the refugee problem for a single year, facing this situation, the most desirable foreign policy goal for India was to create a 9(kparate state in Bast Pakistan. Such a state would be able to take back the millions of refugees, relieving the economic and administrative burden they imposed on India. Such estate would have the additional benefit for 19
India by reducing Pakistan's power and thus its ability to threaten India secuirlty. India began a series o£ dip lomatic and military moves that by themselves might have persuaded the Pakistan'to allow Bangladesh its independance, but, if not, would also serve as preparations for a war with Pakistan to accomplish the sas» goal. The Indian main attack evidently was deUber ately delayed until late fall, when pz^arations were completed and the winter snow had closed the Himalayan passes, preventing any Chinese assistance to Pakistan. The war itself began on Deceicber 3, 1971, and lasted two weeks until the cease fire on Dec, 17, 1971. Indian recognition of Bangladesh* provi sional government came on Dec. 6. By this time the situation was oitirely in the hands of the Indian army. The Indian army chief of staff. General Manekshaw, on Dec. 7 asked the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan to surren der "before it was too late. Finally, on the morning of Dec. 16, General Niazi accepted the Indian terms of Surrender.
THE SIMLA MEETING : DEMittiDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THE SIMLA SUMMIT
The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 and the Simla Agree ment of 1972 were the watermark in normalising the relations between thetwo countries. The Simla Agreement of Jlily 1972 put both India and Pakistan on a path of a gradual normali zation of their relations. 20 Talks with India at Slnda were not expected to be easy. Considering the strong Indian position at the negotiating table« it was not beyond expectations that India could conae tip with the idea of signing a no-war pact. This concept to out law the use of war, while Indo-Pakistan disputes remained unexpected to be a tough point of diseussion at Simla Bhuttos stand on Kashmir used to be giiite unbending.
"We have fought three wars on Kashmir. We cannot forget the Kashmir dispute. Bv^ if we forget the Kashmir dispute, the people of Kashmir will not forget it." It was the first India-PakistaD dialogue at the highest level sincethe Tashkent meeting.
THB SIMLA JCCORD-TBXT OF THE AGRBBMBNT COMPARISON OF THB TASHKENT M9D SlfC^A AGREEMENTS.
The meeting lasted for five days. At that time it appeared that the suinnit would end in failure. However, after much arguementation on both sides, exchange of numerous drafts, and a last minute private meeting between Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi an agreement was reached in July 2, 1972.
ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT AND ITS COMPARISON WITH THE
TASHKENT A:X:ORD.
The Simla agreement was signed under the circumstances 21 when Pakistan was reduced in its size a£ter losing Its East %flng. Under these circumstances* Pakistan was with out any effective bargaining power, India had full control of the situation. The Tashkent and Simla agree ments were signed In ^itlrely different circumstances. In 1965, the fighting was limited to West Pakistan, whereas in 1971 the war engulfed both the wings and resulted In the separation of the Bastem wing Pakistan, and Indian Positions in the two meetings were different.
NORMilLISATION OF RELATIONS
If we compare the two agreem«its, the Prime objective in their problems to be foubd is the nozmalizatlon of relations between the two countties. One thing common betwe«) both agreements is that the settlement of basic Issues was left for future negotiations between the two countries.
Both these agreements were desciribed as " no war pacts * and subjected to strong criticism.
Kashmir Isthe pivot to India-Pakistan relations. It clearly emerges that the two sides agreed to diaagiree on Kashmir but resolved to work on a permanent solution for the pix>blem. However, neither India nor Pakistan formally abandoned their claims to Kashmir, which was 22
declared to be a dispated issue. Despite certain basic differences both agremients contain jibout the same mater ial on peace and harmony In the relations between t%io countries. Both envisage steps to be taken to normalize relations and most c:rltlcal of all* both leave the Kashmir dispute unsolved.
IMPLBMEKTATIOM OF THB SIMLA AGRBSMEKT
Signing of the accord was Just a small step towards the completion of the most difficult task that was yet to be dealt with. Thoughthe formalities involved in its ratification were carried out quickly* some difficulties arose at thetime of its inplementatlon. Contrary to the Simla agreement, India made the withdrawal of forces along the international border conditional upon agreement on the line of control in Kashmir.
India moved further and emphasized the r«noval of UN observers. Removal of UN observers would not only have strengthened its position* but also would have thrown the Kashmir question into cold storage.
Pakistan refused to accept this condition. It seemed that the Simla agreement was Just impossible to carry out. There was no flexibility in the attitudes of the two countries on the matter. ^3
The matter was settled after long discussions and as later on declared by both the governments, the diapjite was solved by the spirit of *• give and take ".
The roost important and at the some time very diffi cult problem faced by Pakistan was related to the return of its prisoners of war. The question of the release of the POWs was complicated by three factors*
(1) While the Indian Government was prepared to exchange the prisoners taken on the Western front, Pakistan pressed for the release of all prisoners,
(2) As the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan had surrendered to a "joint" Indian-Bangladesh command, India contended that the prisoners could not be released with out the concurrence of Bangladesh, and insisted that Pakistan must settle the question through trilateral negotiations after recognizing the new state, and
(3) The Bangladesh goventent's intention to try a number of the prisoners for alleged war crimes.
RBCOGNITION OF BANGLADESH
The recognition of Bangladesh was a highly emotional issue for Pa3cistan President Bhutto was personally in favour of recognition yet the took time in explaining the pros and cons of tWs action to his country men. Actually he was 24 loolcing for some proper time at which the decision would aroase as little opposition as possible f roin the general pablic. The occasion for such an action turned out to be the Islamic sununit meeting held at Lahore in February 1974.
The accord signed at Simla was not an easy one to implement. But after resolving the complicated Issues of troops withdrawal and return of the Prisoners of war, it was esq^ected that other issues like diplomatic relations resun^tion of trade, and postal and coinnunication services would not be difficult to tackle, Bven the most crucial and emotional issue of the recognition of Bangladesh had been resolved. Pakistan successfully mobilized world opinion against nuclear weapons in India and got assurance against an Indian nuclear threat. Having done this, Pakis tan showed a willingness to start negotiations on implemen tations of other phases of the Simla accord.
ResureptloD of trade was a major achievement based on the Simla agreement, as the trade relations had been cut off since the 1965 war. Though the Tashk^at declaration provided for its resumptions, it never h^pened because of Inflexible attitudes by both sides.
RELATIONS IN 1970* S
Since the return of the POWs, the exxhange of their 25
respective citizens between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the recognition ofthe latter by Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan relations were quite correct. India's detonation of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974, did not alter the intention of bettering future relations, nor did Delhi's decision to make Kashmir an ordinary state within the Indian union. It is truethat in both instances, Bhutto made statements critical of the Indian government. But his public declara tions were meant primarily for donestic consumption, intended to pacify his audiences.
Pakistan under Bhutto's leadership (1972-77) tried to move with the times* Realizing that the old militant attitude towards India would not profit him or his couhtry, he onphasized reducing old enmities while maMng new friends. For roorethan two decades, Pakistan had haz±>oured the notion, that it was the equal of India, despite that country's vast numerical superiority. As a result, succ essive Pakistani governments assumed an aggressive posture towards India that made any kind of meaningful accommoda tion difficult.
Since July 5,1977, Pakistan came under another spell of martial law. South Asia saw a brand of population in the early 1970s. Prom Colombo to New Delhi and from Islama bad to Dacca, regimes were swet>t into office and stayed in 2^ power by aroaslng the expectations of the masses through leftist slogans and progranmes. Aimed forces of Pakistan, particularly the airmy, have played a dominant role in the country since its existence. They have been engaged in four armed conflicts with India in 40 years. Normalization of relations is taking place slowly but steadily. The process has been started by the exchange of visitors. Efforts have been made by both countries to provide visa facilities to people to travel easily in both countries. To create good will and to ease tension, hockey and cri cket teams of India and Pakistan have exchanged visits.
On the diplomatic scene, India's External Minister, A.M. Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in February 1978 was the most important development. He was thefirst Indian Foreign Minister with a pause of 14 years to come to Pakistan to negotiate with his PaJcistan counterpart on matters of mmtual interest. Besides e3q>loring the possi bilities of improving trade, both sides showed ke^n interest in promoting exchanges in various fields like culture and sports. An important topic which came under discussion related to the Salaidam project on the Chenab River in Jamimi and Kashmir. The talks resulted in an agreement. The good will generated by the normalization of relations between the two countries in mid seventies was not allowed to suffer a setback during that decade which witnessed inter nal changes in governments in both countries. 27
PROSPECTS OF RELATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
The evoits o£ 1971 culminating In the separation of Bast Pakistan from West Pakistan radically transformed the very character of the Pakistan state. As a result of the loss of the East wing» Pakistan for the first time in its history is on the threshold of evolving a viable national identity for itself based on territorial terms. The signing of the Simla agreement has ushered in a new era of peace through bilateral negotiations in this trou bled subcontinent. The optimism regarding Indo-Pakistan relations is also due to the establishnent of a new power equilibrium in South Asia.
The prospects of an Indo-Pakistan detente, which emerged from the Simla agreement in 1972« are reasonably good. Its progress depends primarily on the development of political trust in each other by the ;ruling elite of India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, this has always been lacking in the Indo-Pakistan relationship.
With Pakistan reduced in size and inroilitary power— even less of a match for India than before—Indians and Indian policy makers need not see Pakistan as a threat to their security. For the first time since 1947, and particularly since 1954 when Pakistan's militaries were augmented by its military alliance with the United States, '^8 the Indian makers can take a relatively zrelaxed view of In do-Pakistani relations. This assessment means a return to normality in Indian reflexes towards Pakistani moves.
DEFENCE RELATIONS AND ATTIIUDE OF BIG POWERS TOWARDS INDIA AND PAKISTAN
After the partition in 1947 the atmosphere of suspicion, quarrel and conflict between India and Pakistan drew the attention of non-regional countries to thei r develojxnents. The external major power's involvement in South Asian region was sometimes related directly to their regional interests in the Subcontinent* but more after they were related to their larger goals of Inter national competition and domination. Their interests and related moves were further complicated by Indo-Pakistan relations and often made the regional cold war very bi^er and severe.
Pakistan also sees a threat to her security in foreign military assistance to India. •The only conclusion one can draw is that Pakistan's real aim in opposing the supply of aims to India is to strengthen China's military might, whatever the consequences'*.
An important factor agitating both foreign and defence policy in India is the strong rumour that a 29 revised version of CENTO is being revived. It is in the context of such developments in this region that Pakistan President General Zia-ul-Haq*s stat^nent that there was no possibility of better relations between India and Pakistan untill the irritant of Kashmir is out of the way^ has to be seoi,
Whatever the element of truth in these reports, Indian policy makers will have to resolve many a trickly point in their future negotiations with Pald.stan« the chief among them being India's own national interests and security problems. In this connection it is relevant to recall what Prime Minister India Gandhi told an Ameri can Journalist in early 1982, She had said: "The present US administration has said that the guns can be fired in any direction. We have no doubt that those guns equipment are meant to be used against India*. Another in^ortant development which has taken place in Pakistan is that it has embarked on the path of military buildup on an unpre cedented scale.
ANALYSIS OP THE ATTITUDE AND INTERESTS OP BIG POWERS IN THE REGION
The critical factor in the international politics of South Asia has been the power balance and the general 30 relationship between India and Pakistan, Paki starts capacity to challenge and attempt to reverse the south Asian United States and China has been reduced greatly after the events of 1970-71. Washington has also realized that it cannot curtial soviet influence in South Asia by pitting a hostile Pakistan against India. Such an American strategy would only result as it had done in the past in driving India further towards the Soviet Union in an attempt to restore any Indo-Pakistani balance upset by American actions.
Therefore, in the final analysis, while American policy towards Pakistan would in part be shaped by this latter* s proximity to the oil-rich Gulf and its capacity to enhance American interests in that strategic region the American interest in Pakistan is bound to be limited by consideration of the advance effects at might have on American interests in India and the rest of Asia. In China has been the main supplier of arms to Pakistan after 1971. In addition to that, its political support to Islamabad is not a secret. But China would also be cautions in encouraging Pakistan's anti Indian sentiments beyon a certain limit, because this would only push India further into the Soviet "orbit*.
As far as the third major power, the U.S.S.R, is ,31 concerned, it has, since the mid-1950s, traditionally as adopted a pro-Indian stance. It has no reason to prevent the emergence of good relations between India and Pakistan infact, Moscow Would welcome the idea since it may help to when away Pakistan from China and United States.
No war pact is an important constituent of the Simla Agreement. The agreement clearly lays it down that " the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through negotiations and that* the basic issues and causes of conflict" shall be resolved through •peaceful means* and that ^he two countries "will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY MfD INDIA'S RSSPONSB
Pakistan has been steadily preparing both its own people and the outside world about need to go nuclear. The former foreign Minister Agha Shahi spoke about the possibility ofthe Soviet Union deploying nuclear weapons in jii^anistan and South West Asia becoming a nuclear battle field. The Pakistani ambition to go nuclear is also a matter of national consensus in that country. ;^art from these factors there is the well-known explanation for cettain countries going nuclear jxit forward by the American strategic coranfiunity. The announcement of reaching 8^^ enrichment capability itself is a first major step in this strategy. This strategy has several serious impli cations for conventional war in Indo-Pakistan context and this perhaps is the most important area deserving of attention by our military planners. With a nuclear Pakis tan even if it is in possession oo3yaE two or three crude uranium boRft>s« any conventional superiority of India vis- avis that country will lose rouch of its significance. The Indian defence planner has to take into account the risks in having his forces concentrated especially on Pakistani soil.
It is obviously not in India's interest to become an overt nuclear weapon powers in response to Pakistani policy of anibivalance for that itself will provide PaScistan a Justification to declare itself a nuclear weapon power. The Palcistani strategy of ambivalence and impression that it has reached the stage of producing a weapon by announ cing its« enrichment capability.
RELATIONS IN 1980* S
Last year's hopes of a Thaw in Indo-Pakistan rela tions have faded away at last. The two countries are now back to their usual no war-no peace relationship. New Delhi se^ns reconciled to the view that it has managed to get along without normalisation with Islamabad so far and can 33 continue to do so for the for seeable future.
The hopes of a break through in bilateral ties had reached Iheir height at the end of last year follow ing a series of events. The two sides also agreed to hold several meetings of officials to develop cooperation on a series of Issues to pave the way for bilateral nor malization. New Delhi complained that Islamabad was not sincere in its professed aim to normalise ties. For instance Indian Finance Minister V.P. Singh and his counter part Mahbubul Haq, while discussing trade promotion in Jan, 1986, agreed in principle that bilateral tradeHlmited to a mere 41 items, should be expanded to about 200 items initially and all restrictions should be abolished even tually. Planned follow up meetings of bureaucrats to facilitate trade, however, did not take place.
Also in January, the Indian defence secretary went to Pakistan to discuss a dispute over the Siacha:i glacier in northern Kashmir where clashes betwe^i the two armies had occurred earlier. Both sides agreed not to use force to change the military status quo in that area. But India complained that Pakistan was not even willing to reiterate this understanding during subsequent talks. Intermittent clashes in the Siachen area have continued since.
India has also noted that after remaining silent 8 ,-1
for years, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at the UN General Ass^ttoly this year leading to a rebuttal by the Indian delegation. Another bone of contention is Sikh terrorism in the state of Punjab, Asserting that more than 90 Sikh terrorists trained in Pakistan are now being held in the state, the Indian dismiss Pakistan's denial of involvement with Sikh extrepiists.
Pakistan' s armed forces are in a state of battle preparedness, despite Islamabad's avowed preference for diplomatic measures to defuse tension on the border with India. Officials say Pakistan would continue to "press precautionary measureis into action without any overt alarm", in response to India's massive military motHlzation.
Although Indo-Pakistan relations have been tense s since last Noveirber, the current escalation followed India's demand for a withdrawl of Pakistani troops engaged in military exercises along the border. Pakistan argued that the demand for cancellation of Pakistani exercises was unjustified India llias itself been having multi-corps manoeuvres since Nov. involving as many as 200,000 soldiers and several armoured units.
The Indian Ambassador in Islamabad S.K. Singh was told by Minister of state for foreign affairs Zain Noorani that Pakistan would not accept unilateral withdrawal from an the border but was prepared to discuss measures to defuse the situation. Prior to the Noorani Singh meeting there had apparently been a gap in routine coronunication between military personnel of the two sides. Officials on both sides acknowledge that there is a lack of nutual confidence, which continually feeds periodic fears of military threat.
Although the arrival of a negotiating team from Islamabad has ended the fear of an Indo-Pakistan war breaking out« the two teams were still struggling with rival proposals to prevent further escalation of the current military confrontation on their common border.
Both sides had decided to keep their proposals secret untill the conclusion of the negotiations, though it is widely believed that India has been attributing the concentration of its forces in Rajasthan to nozmal military excercises.
Meamrhile, it accused Pakistan of adopting meana- cing posture by moving one of its armoured divisions across the sutlej river close to the border and concentrating another armoured group further north in the Shankargarh area on the borderwith Indian Punjab and the Jairam region of the disputed Jaimru and Kashmir state. 3G
President Zall Singh listed India's three main obstacles to normalisation with Pakistan in his 23 February state o£ the nation address to the budget session of parliament. They were Pa)clStan's clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability* its arms acquisition prograinne and its support to secessionist Sikhs in the Indian state o£ Punjab.
Indian Foreign Minister ND Tiwarl had earlier told Parliament on 27 February that New Delhi was keeping a close watch. Over Islamabad* s nuclear prograinne and would take action at the appropriate time. Vfhen some opposition members argued that Pakistan' s bomb was around the comer* Tiwarl said the government respected the peoples' senti ments and that if Pakistan did make a bomb* India would take action at that time.
Zla has eften said his country will sign the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPI) and subject its nuclear establishments to international sageguards* provided India does the same. Alternatively* it can Join India in a regional treaty to make the subcontinent free of nuclear weapons. The third alternative could be a Indo-Fakistan agreement renouncing nuclear weapons production and open ing all nuclear research and production facilities to inspnetion by the other side. 37
A verbal agreement between Gandhi and Zia not to attack each others nuclear establishments was announced in December 1985 but a formal one is still awaited. The second hurdle, Pakistanis arms-aquisition relation ship with the US, is considered by India fraught with serious implications for its security. Zia has always argued that since he had never objected to and had no objection even now to Indian acquisition of a far bigger arj^erjal from the Soviet Union and others sources, India should not objected to how Islamabad meets its own defence needs.
Against a backdrop of continuing Sikh terrorism largely blaaed in India on Pakistan's support for separation the two statements had raised hopes for the removal of at least one main hurdle to normalisation. However, the optimists did not seem to have taken into account the complexities of domestic compulsions that steer both countries foreign policy.
Pakistan had piDposed to India a Package deal committing the two countries to renunciation of overt or covett support for seccessionist movements in both the countries before Zia»s informal talks with Gandhi Zia repeated the offer to Gandhi during his visit. But it seems that some deep thinking will have to be 38 done before the proposal turns Into an agreenent*
The current positive factor in the traditionally adversarial relationship is the Pakistani appreciation that Gandhi -> being free of most of the traditional antipathies - is their best bet for normalisation. The two countries seems to be in a hurry because of their understanding that any significant loss of time could further entrench the bilateral relationship in the same old groove. But it is not clear what significant steps they propose to take beyond agreeing to the remaining military withdrawal from the borders and re-starting the stalled dialogue at the foreign- secretaries level.
In late January India and Pakistan the sub- continent*s perennial adversaries, came dangerously close to what could have been their fourth war since independence. As war games turned into an unintended battle of nervesy troops moved into battle positions on bothsides of the border before the forces could be pulled back from the brink. The latest confrontation originated last November» when the Indian Army began Operation Brass tacks, a large scale exercise to test it mechanised forces in the desert of Rajasthan, 60 km from the Pakistan border. 39
With the Brasstacks in full swing in Rajasthan, biani bad chose to move its troops close to the border facing Indian Punjab in January, New Delhi responded in kind by lifting reserve divisions to its own foi^ ward locations in Punjab and Kashmir* Protests and rebuttals began flying fr The difficulties in evolving the current Indian defence posture, in addition to the overall scarcity of resources, have included Pakistan's ability to aegalre sophisticated hardware under US assistance programmes, generous financial help from Islamic Gulf countries, and Chinese aid since the 1960s. In turn, India has resorted to strengthening its own defence industries, selective 40 coianerclal purchases fr<»B Western Europe and the Licensed production of Soviet weapons paid for under the rupee trade agreenent with Moscow* Thus Indian and Pakistan defence purchases have tended to be mirror Images of each other. Under the now-defunct Seato and Cento in the 1950s, the US supplied Pakistan with M47 and 48 Patton tanks, F 104 and F 86 fighters and B 57 Canberra bombers. India responded by going to France and Brltlan to buy Centurlan and AMX 13 tanks, and Hunter, Mystere and B 1 Canberra aircraft. In the 1971 war, Indian-Produced MIG 21 interceptors and Soviet-supplied Sukhoi 7B fighter- bombers gave the Indian Air Force (lAF) a distinct edge. But Pakistan had bought Mirage III aircraft from France, a weapon India could not match. In the 1980s as the lAF moved to acc|uire the British Jaguar and Soviet MIG 23/25 air craft and the army got Soviet T 72 tanks, it was Pakistan's turns to "leap-frog" to US F 16 fighters and M 901 TOW anti-tank missiles. The Indian decided to go for the Franch Mirage 2000. Thus, by the time of operation Brasstacks at the beginning of this year, India held are unquestioned superiority over Pakistan in army divisions, tanks, artittery and aircraft. The force balance in amy 41 divisions is 35 : 19* Indian defence planners are concerned that with weapons technology advancing so rapidly in the West, the US particular bigger and better force multipliers would be available to Pakistan and China in the future. Washington's plans to supply the airbom warning and control system (AWACS) to Islamabad which would allow Pakistani air surveillance deep into India - has worried New Delhi. For the foreseeable furutre, the Indian Navy's role in the event of a war would be - apart from imme diate coastal defence, protecting offshore assets like the Bombay High Oilfield, an escort support for the national merchant fleet - see control against the Pakistan the navies of bigger powers interfering in the war, the Indian Navy can at best harass and delay it opponents. The most daogerous aspect of the Indo-Pakistani confirmation is the potential of thv two sides to obtain a nuclear weapons capability. The suscontinents arch rivals have not signed the 1968 nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintain that there nuclear programnes are for peaceful purposes only. In early 1987, Washington tried to persuade Pakistan to sign the NPT to smooth the way for congressional 12 approval of long term aid. This cource, the US has poin ted out, would still leave open tfte option of going nuclear if Islamabad felt its national security was greatly threatened* But Pakistani President, Zia-ul- Haq refused to budge « India has consistently opposed th9 MPT. Which it says discriminates against non-nuclear powers. In the earlier stages of the UN debate on the NPT, Pakis tan seemed amenable to signing the treaty, but held back after assessing India's refusal. The defeat in 1971 war, stengthened Islamabad's resource to gain nuclear parity with India. In Pakistan's view. C^ly the nuclear option might guarantee its security against India. Indian strategists see their national security interests in a larger geopolitical framework. Pakistan is merely one part, though a significant one, of New [)elhi*s security concerns. In the i^ast the a[uestion facing New Delhi was whA^her a developing country could afford the high costs of going nuclear. In contrast, Pakistan has played down the economic aspect, because it views the nuclear - weapons deterrent as a matter of national survival. However, as India spends under Aji of its grows national product on defence - as against 6»byi in Pakistan > and is among the bottom end of tne scale among nations on that scope* the country can bear extra security outlays* In the short run. New Delhi and Islaiaabad are likely to continue to react in kind to each others nuclear moves* In any case both sub-continental adver saries could continue improving their nuclear potential without going openly nuclear* Seizing the nuclear option unilaterally would have far-reaching international repur- cussions for both countries* The Indian Defence Ministry's latest annual report to parliament highlights the deterioration of the security environment in South Asia and expectedly singles out Pakistan as the main cause, while mentioning China's improved military position in Tibet. The report argued that, alongwith a quantitative increase in its armed forces, Pakistan had sought to gain a technological edge over India* Affecting regional security was the enhancement of Pakistan Air Force's electronic counter-measure and precision - strike capa bility. The report claimed that such acquisitions and quest for Alrbom Warning and control systems, were for beyond Pakistan's genuine defence needs. Islamabad had 4-1 justified its aims purchases on defensive needs arising froB the Soviet-Afghan threat. The report also accused Pakistan of continuing to pursue a weapons-oriented nuclear programme* Further charges against Pakistan included hostile activities in the disputed Siachen glacier area in Kashnir t involve ment in Sikh separatist activities in Punjab, and other unspecified "negative actions** that prevented nomali- sation in the wake of de-escalation of the year 1987 border tension. Terrorist attacks in India's north-western state of Punjab, bordering Pakistan, have escalated into a guedlla war with Sikh separatists anbushing paramilitary forces and mounting rocket attacks on selected targets. Concerned by the rising death toll. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi cut short histour of the eastern state on 2 April to rush back to New Delhi and preside over a high-level nightlong meeting on Punjab. The first part is to cut off the terrorists foreign links by sealing off border with Pakistan. The second element is to devise a tighter internal intelligence system. The third is to muster political support to solve the problem. Despite all the security measures taken in recent years. 45 Punjab's 533 km border with Pakistan has remained porous with separatists allegedly slipping in arms and men from Pakistan. Steps are to be taken to real off* Punjab as well as Rajasthan and Quj«rat states from Pakistan. The border between India's Jammu and Kashmir state and Pakistan, heavily guarded by the two armies, is also to be closed* The government has announced plans to ere at a barbed wire fence, whenever possible* along the border. New Delhi watch towers are to be built at many places. In addition, patrolling is to be intensified using low flying aircraft equipped with search li^ts and two-way radio communication. The Punjab-Pakistan border is guarded by the paramilitary BSF, parts of which are suspected of involvement in the cross border traffic of smugglers, Sikh militants, weapons, narcotics and a wide range of other illegal activities. Political analysts visiting Punjab and talking to the relatively moderate Sikhs are pessimistic about the prospects of a political settlement. While the extretnists want outright separation, the moderate Sikhs argue that New Delhi should allow Punjab a special autonomous position much better than that enjoyed by Jamnu and Kashmir under the Indian constitution. 4B The instant raport between prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto of India and Pakistan at the 29-31 December SAARC holds hope for the end of the hostility partition of the subcontinent and has taken in three wars since. Both leaders agree that there is posiibility for their countries to make a fresh start. At their joint press conference on 1 Januaary, Bhotto said " a momentum for peace** had begun. ** We will go step by step **, she added Gandhi said that the recent agreements signed between the two countries marked the first major step forward since the Simla agreement in 1972 after the Bangladesh war of liberation. Although both countries signed a treaty not to attack each others nuclear facilities, and have agreed to spare each others airlines from doubt taxation and cooperate on cultural and education matters, some out standing problems remain. While the occasion of the SAARC suBBdt proved positive for India-Pakistan relations. With the India-Pakistan thaw, however, hopes have risen for the first time that the Saarc could become an effective regional organisation, especially in economic affairs* UntiU now, Saarc could not discuss cooperation in trade and industry because Pakistan ISMi/f"lMTg!flPI % of GDP m^.mmm:Mmm^. m^^mmmmmmmmL 1988 I 5,470 g^ij^^raf-!?^d^iy^^ 989 6,320 3.2 6.9 2,353 f> 1987-88 9,730» n.a. n.a. 2,540» 47 feared Indian industry would smother its flidling production capabilities* The Indians have now decided to leave it entirely to Pakistan to select the itens for bilateral trade and the fields of other econonic cooperation. India and Pakistan have accused each other for years of building military capabilities far in excess of any reasonable requirements. But neither has ever set out objective yardsticks by which their own build ups should be measured. It is a typical case of looking for the mote in the brothers eye but ignoring the beam in one's own. The growth rate nevertheless highlights the arms race between India and Pakistan* thanks to the links each has with its respective superpower friend. India was the second » largest recipient of Soviet arms deli veries to the Third World in 1982-86. Over the same period, Pakistan ranked fourth among beneficiaries of military credits from the US. Both India and Pakistan explain their accelerated arms build-up in the 1980s by claiming a sharp deter^ iorition in their security environment. Pakistan has made much of the danger to it from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. MIUTARY STRENGTH 19 INDIA PAKISTAN ^^H Armed Forces ^^H 1.262,000 Actlvo 480,600 t 240,000 + Reserves 513.000 1,100,000 Army 450,000 I 47,000 Navy 13.000 . 115,000 Air Force 17,600 ±1 48 Indian claims are Just as dubious. The agreenent that India has to be on guard against China has sone merit. Chinese deployments in Tibet have increased, a fact kightighted in the latest report of the Indian Defence Ministry. The large sums India and Pakistan have spent on acquiring weapons have greatly increased their lethal capabilities but the relative poisition remains basi cally unchanged. Pakistan's purpose is deterrence, hence the search for a nuclear capability as a safeguard against blackmial by a neighbour India seeks a sufficient edge to that Pakistan will be dissuaded from chancing its luck. MILITARY STRENGTH INDIA (ARMED FORCES | PAiaSTAN 1,262,000 Active 480,600 240,000 + Reserves 513,000 1,100,000 Amy 450,000 47,000 Navy 13,000 115,000 Air Force 17,600 Any attempts to establish which of the two is the 49 bigger sinner is pointless* The figures conpiled by outside observers* For exafflple> show that Pakistan's nilitary spending, has twice as fast as India. Where do the two go from here ? This is a complex question but three points stand out* Economic constraints are becoming increasingly severe in both countries* Both have announce of freeze in spending* and both have been dropping hints - largely for the benifit of the aid givers in Pakistan's case * that future growth will be modest* Secondly* the superpower suppliers may not be as generous as they have been in recent years* Thridly* India and Pakistan are moving, though very scoroly* to allay some of the worst fears they have of each other* An agree ment to refrain from attacks on nuclear facilities is now ready for signature* There is* since the soring 1987 scene over the real intent of large formations engaging in exercises close to both sides of the border, an interest in creating mechanisims to avoid misunderstandings* Best of all* non-official contacts between the two countries are now much greater than at any time in the past 25 years* This is reviving the love part of the Cove- hate relationship between two countries that have so much so much in common* 50 CULTURAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS The long-standing ennity between India and Pakistan has its historical and cultural roots in the conmunal conflict which led to partition* Pakis tan's very identity as a nation has involved the need to differentiate the two countries* cultures and the fear of Indian '* reabsorption ** of Pakistan. The KashBiir issue has b#en particularly intractable because it pitted Pakistan*s Islaoiic identity against India's equally sensitive identity as a 'secular* state* The present regime has established '*Islamization*' as a prinary political goal and has enacted several reforms designed to help create an Islamic polity and economy* Islamization and labour migration to the Middle East appear to be contributing to an increases sense of self-confidence in Pakistan* This observation is difficult to measure systematically in the absence of regular public opinion polls in Pakistan, but the phenomenon has been noted by more than one outside observer* If Islamization contributes identity in Pakistan* it may indeed help to provide a cultural base for Pakistan's foreign policy initiatives* r 1 SUMMING UP Indo^Pak relations cannot and must not be studies as an isolated phenomenon. It is a raulti-faceted problem and without examining all the linkages, one is apt to get a hopsided if not wholly distorted view of the painful reality. Since its inception in 1947 Pakistan's stance towards India has been of open confrontation in all spheres. Inbued with a false sense of history and achievement, it continued to regard itself as superior to India both as a race and as a nation. However, realising that the was weaker than India militarily. Her military strategy till the Simla Pact, and for a while thereafter, was visibly aggressive with liberation', or more candidly, the annexation of Kashmir by force of arms as an avowed aisw The need to live with India as a stronger and better endowed neighbour came as a slow, reluctant and even painful realisation to the elite of Pakistan. By mid- 1970, after a phase of revanchist display, understandable in the light of its military defeat vrtiich was more apparently more realistic and defensive, at time hording on a sense of insecurity. Despite there developments. ^ 'J Kid the BKitual distrust between India and Pakistan did not dininish to any appreciable extent* India and Pakistan are not only neighbours but have a long comnon historical past and socio-cultural affinity. Developoent of trade and other economic relations between them is natural and necessary to maintain historical continuity. Expansion of these relations can help in a big way to relax tensions in the subcontinent which is in the interest of both. PART TWO BIBLIOGRAPHY 53 INDO - PAK RELATIONS 1, CHOPRA (Surendra) Indo - Pak relations: The need of a new paradigra. Strategic Studies Journal 2,2; 1989,43-68, Indo - Pak relations have shifted from conflict to de-escalation to conflict and again to de-escalation but very seldom to cooperation. In the unending history of conflictual relationship between the two countries there have been different irritants on different occasions. Most of the irritants between the two countries are the product of perceptual divergence* Inspite of the severe strain on Indo - Pak relations many right-thinking people in both countries have all along been emphasizing the advantages of mutually beneficial cooperative relationship. The two countries have so mach in common that the unending story of conflictual relationship seems to be a challonge to commonsense* 2. GHOSH (Partha S) Indo - Pak relations* Portents and un certain Ities* Mainstream 21*24,? 1983. 2,12> 13-4 and 30. Recent trends for peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan are rooted in several Major changes in the political-strategic-economlc ecology of the global system as well as the south Asian sub-system* On the 51 domestic political front, the ruling elites of both India and Pakistan are becoming aware of the growing irrelevence of the PaMstan factor and the India factor in their respective polities* Economic consideration must have also contributed to the peace efforts. The deep>rooted atti- tudinal obstacles that marred Indo - Pak relations in the Past and which are dormant now may revive any time, pushing the relations back to square one. The possibility of their taking a bold joint initiative to turn a new leaf in their strategic relationship regardless of the wishes and preferences of the superpowers appears to be remote. 5. HITCH IN Indo - Pakistan Relations, ed, Janata 37,5; 1982, 3, 7; 2. There are two opinions in both countries about the desirability of signing a solemn no-war pact. But there ate no two opinions on one thing that the people at large in both countries are keen on establishing friendly relations between them. Infact, some opposftit in the name of laying a sound basis for promoting friendlier relations, albeit some time in the future. Such widespread agreement and realisation should have normally led to serious discu ssions on a mutual assistance pact and not only on a mere no-war pact. What is really surprising is that with neither b') country prepared to lower its guard-for any eventuality— both are afraid of being led up the garden path and down into the valley of death. 4. KARNAD (Bharat) , Indo - PaX relations* A calculus of fear. HT; 1980, 2, 20. The Indo - Pak relations are bedevilled by an irra tional fear. The 1971 war had changed the political and military equation in the region, Pakistan might be for given for its efforts to protect itself from further loss in a war with India. The distinction between dt€ensive and offensive weapons are not clesur to all. In the case of India and Pakistan each imagines that the other party is being hostile and unreasonable. Religious fanaticism and bigotry inform the relations between the two countries. To improve the situation. The alternative is to stock up the ongoing hysteria which may lead to yet another war and insecurity which everybody wants to avoid. 5. NAVSED AHMAD Recent developments in Indo - Pakistan relations. Pakistan Horizon 35,2; 182;71-95. The Strategic and political changes brought about in the region by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Pakistan's subsequent acceptance of the American $3.2 billion military sales and economic aid package, added a new 5i; dliaentlon to the already strained relations between India and Pakistan, To assure India of its goodwill Pakistan offered India a no-war pact. Because Pakistan had gained definite diplomatic advantage through its peace initiative, the Indian Govemniait was in no position to reject the offer in an off hand manner, Negotiations began between the two countries and the situation seemed encouraging when the Indian Government suddenly took offence over the Pakistan delegate's statement reiterating PaJcistan's stand on Kashmir. Hence another deadlock ensued. 6. SAREBN (Rajendra) . Low BBB in Indo - Pak ties. Tribune? 1986,10,15. Indo - Pak relations have entered an uncertain phase. The outlook is bleak. There is plenty to cause worry very little to raise hope. The two countries have lived through long spells of uneasy peace but recent trends have not at all been conductive to the prospect of peace either in the bilateral or in the regional context. The pattern of Pakistan's involvement in Punjab and Kashmir has changed Unfortunately, Pakistan does not seem to realise that if driven beyond a point, these are matters of war and peace. The issue involved is not lack of desire for friendly relations with Pakistan but safegaurding the viability of the India has no claims on Pakistan, 5/ 7. SONDHI (ML). Fact sheet on Pakistan. Tribune? 1985,12,30. The conceptual franework which views India's re lations with Pakistan only In terras of crisis management does not take into account the underlying causes of the destabilising trends In south Asia. Particular problems with Pakistan Bwst always be related to the overall challange which Islamabad poses to India's geostrateglc and military planning. While India has to continue to deter Pakistan from exercising adventurous options. .There Is no short cut to ending the India - Pakistan conflict. —, OONPLICT, ANALYSES. 8. FISHER (Ronald J), Third - party consultation workshop on the India - Pakistan conflict. Journal of Social Psychology 112,2| 1980 Dec; 191-206, A problem-solving workshop on the India - Pakistan conflict was designed and evaluated with the use of a model of third-Party consultation Intended for the study and resolution of social conflict. Six Pakistan and Indian Nationals participated In a series of separate and Joint discussions focusing on the present relationship, the national Images^ the possible Ideal relationship, and the major problems and potential solutions to the conflict. 58 A content description and a process analysis o£ the work shop are provided. The results Indicate that the model was successfully operationallzed and that the workshop has benlfldal effects on the attitudes of the participants. ,., BORDER 9. CHATTERJBE (RiO . Indians lamd bordetrst Problems and challenges. New Delhi, Sterling Pubs India-Pakistan relations. 1978, On the Pakistan borders, there has been continuous tensions right ftom the beginning. Kashmir, however, continued to be Pakistan's preoccupation and in 1965 thousands of armed infiltrators from Pakistan entered Kashmir and indulged in sabotage and destruction of internal defence of the state. This led to the 1965 war with Pak 10, REDDY (Narendra) , Lessons of In do - Pak border crisis. IE; 1987,1, 7; . The tension on the Indo - Pakistan border and the diplomatic efforts launched this week to de-escalate it 9 has three Important lessons: the armed forces on both sides of the border are so close to each other and any consequen tial move made by the other only further escalates the tension. The political leadership in each country aware of the impact on the public of these tension and finally diplomatic manoeuvres are under takon to resolve the tensions, An important element in the strategic situation along the Indo - Pakistan border is that the peace time locations are very near the border on the Pakistan side. ,-,-, KASHMIR, SIACHEN 11. INDIA MID Pakistan to continue Dialogue on Siachen: Joint statement on New Delhi talks. Foreign Affairs Record 32,6; 1986 JUne; 171. The second round of the talks between the Defence Secretaries of India and Pakistan took place in New Delhi from June 10 to 12, 1986. They talfed in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. They reiterated their resolve to find a negotiated settlement of the Siachen issue in acoor- dan ce with the Simla Agreement. They discussed various ideas for an amicable resolution of the problem and agreed to report these to their respective Governments. 12. INDO - PAK Relations! Borders come alive. Current Topics 12,1; 1985 Dec; 10-11. GO For the first time since the Indo - Pak conflict in 1971 there have been border clashes which cannot be dismi ssed as Riinor skirmishes. In the border areas of Ladakh, Pakistani troops have made repeated but vain attempts to drive away Indian troops stationed at the 6000-metre high Siachen glacier. ,-,-,-, SIACHEN GLACIER 13. INDO - PAK Relations: Fighting on the snow. Current Topics 14,4; 1988 April; 204. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi talks to newsman that the siachen glacier was situated in Indian territory and there was no question of Pakistan being allowed to have a foothold in the area. According to press reports Pakistan had finalised an agreeinent with the American Boeing firm for the purchase of heavy assault helicopters with upgraded engines for operations at very high altitutes in extreme weather conditions. With the siachen area becoming a major Indo • Pak skirimish area, Islamabad has decided to step up the air operations. 14, INDO - PAK Relations: Shaking off legacy difficult. Current Topics 15,5; 1989 April; 268-9. Ms Benazir Bhutto said that to help establish good Gi neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan^ India should withdraw its forces from Siachen glacier to the pre - Simla agreement position. She said that the Siachen glacier issue had becoine unnecessary irritant in bilateral relations. External Affairs Minister, Mr PV Narsiinha Rao had said in Harare that India looked forward to a "hope ful future* for normalisation of relations with Pakistan, The Prime Ministers of both countries had struck a very good c^poi^ and in the future we can expect normalisation of relations to go ahead. 15. JDSHI (VT^ . Rajiv, Junejo may discuss Siachen. Tl; 1987,11,3. The controversial Siachen issue may figure in the bilateral talks between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and India, Mr Jlinejo and Mr Rajiv Gandhi at the time of third SAARC summit. Among other ticklish issues of significance at the conference is the question of admission of Afghan. Pakistan had made clear its stand that af^zer the withdrawal of Soviet troops and installation of an independent regime in Afghanistan. 16. PASRICHA (Prt) . Conflict in the Snow-lx Siachen Glacier at boiling point. Statesman? 1985, 11,6. The exchange of fire and minor skirmishes between India effld Pakistan along the erstwhile cease-fire line have been almost routine eversince the 1949 truce. Recent G:^ reports of some serious fighting in the Siachen Glacier region of Ladalch have, however, given a new and discon certing dimension to Indo - Pakistan hostility along the Jamna and Kashmir border. The Simla agreement, while converting the cease-fire line into the line of actual oontcol, in-explicably failed to rectify this lacuna. 17. SARIN (Ritu). Siachen fiascot India rejects Pakistan's claim that the glacier dispute has been resolved, Sunday 16,31; 1989, JUly 2-8; 14-5, For over three decades India and Pakistan have fought to gain control of the disputed Siachen glacier, Pakistan's arbitrary claim would normally have elicited a strong protest from the Indian foreign office in New Delhi, But in keeping with the spirit of understanding that has marked Indo - Pak relations ever since Ms Bhutto took over in Pakistan, The PMO instructed the MEA to playdown the fiasco, India and Pakistan are making honest efforts to solve the Siachen problem because the stakes for both the countries in the icy territory are very high. But it will take several years before the issue is sorted out, India and Pakistan blame each other for violating the terms of the 1972 treaty. G:^ 18. SIACHSN GLACIER: Indo - Pak talks. Current Topics 14, 6; 1988 JUne; 332. The defence forces of India and Pakistan have been engaged In intermittent clashes in the siachen Glacier region since /^ril 1984, The two sides have also tried to come to a settlement through bilateral talks. Indo> Pak talks on the issue would take place shortly. India may utilise the occasion to raise the issue of Pakistan's interference in Punjab, 19. WIG (AR). Talks with Pakistan on Siachen in May. OT 66, 103; 1989, 4, 14; 1. In, yet, another attempt to remove a major irritant in their bilateral relations, India is sending Defence secretary, Naresh Chandra to Islamabad to help resolve the Siachen glacier issue. In a personal letter to Rajiv Gandhi, Ms Bhutto wrote to work together in the internatio nal arena, had stated in a recent interview that Indian troops must withdraw to the pre-Simla (1972) positions in the Siachen glacier region to remove this "Unnecessary irritant* in their relations. India considers Ms Bhutto was very positive on the need for normalisation of relations. Gl , CONFLICT, WAR 1971 20. CHMJDHRY (GW) , Dismeinberroent of Pakistan, 1971: Its international implications. Orbis 18,1? 1974, Spr; 179-200. External forces played a large role in the civil war in Bangladesh and the Indo - Pak war of 1971. These crisis enabled the Great Powers to extend their influence in this region. 21. MARWAH (Onkar). India's Military intervention in East Pakistan, 1971-1972. Modem Asian Studies 13,4j 1979,Oct; 549-80. The balance between gains and losses in the Indian intervention in East Pakistan is in favour of the action taken by India. The losses remain emphemeral, long distant, and speculati^re. The major strategic aftermath was that following the creation of Bangladesh there is no longer any mention of "balances" in the sub-continent, but of the "predominance" of India. As such, war was undoubtedly a watershed in South Asian history, redefining the role of the local states in respect to each other, in relational relationship, and in interactions with the great powers. 22. MISRA (KP) . Trilateralism in South Asia. Asian Survey 14,7; 1974 July; 627-36. G.^ The Oecenber 1971 Indo - Pakistani war is a surprising example of political metamorphosis with a view towards normalization of relations between belli gerents. ,-, , POST - WAR 23, BURKE (SH) , Postwar diplomacy of the Indo - Pakistani war of 1971, Asian Survey 13,11; 1973, Nov; 103 6-49, Normalisation of indo - Pakistani relations was delayed because India refused to release Pakistani POWs without Bangladesh's consent, Bangladesh insisted upon tirying 195 prisoners for war crimes, and Pakistan refused to recoghi:i# Bangladesh till all prisoners were repatria ted. A 3 way exchange of (1) Pakistani POWs in India except the 195, (2) Bengalis detained in Pakistan, and (3) Non-Bengalis in Bangladesh wishing to retain Pakistani citizenship, was agreed upon on 28 August 1973. The fate of the 195 will be decided by conference between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, India and Pakistan continue to suffer from internal problems though Bhutto has done much better than expected and Mrs Gandhi less well. India's and Pakistan's reduced importance shows that respect internationally is won by actual performance, not by simply reciting high principles of democracy, socialism and the like. GG , COOPERATION 24, BARAL (Lok Raj) , Nation building and region building in south Asia. Asia Pacific Conanunity 28; 1985 Spr; 54-73. For both internal and regional purposes, the present strained relationships between India and Paistan and between India Sri Lanka are counter productive. The manner in which India and Pakistan have been showing their enthu siasm in South Asia Regional cooperation, exercises now clear that the intemecive crises bedevilling the South Asian states can best be neuteralized by joint endeavours of the regional states themselves. 25. JOHAL (Sarabjit). Regional cooperation and Indo - Pakistan relations. JSAMES 8,2; 1984,win; 29-42. Ever since their independence in 1947, Indian and Pakistani Governments have been grappling with the basic problem of how to normalize their relations. The poverty in both countries has several implications for their regional capabilities. Indo - Pakistan economic relations will depend upon how each Govt perceives the economic strengths and weaknesses of the other. Indian and Pakistani nuclear energy capabilities are examined here for two major reasons: to compare their scientific and technolo gical capabilities with other countries and to show the b ^ effect of nuclear energy development on Indo - Pak relations, compared to the developed countries, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear power progranomes are small. The political assets of the two countries have varied remarkably since 1947. Each country could use its domestic political capabilities for power and influence. India took an* early lead over Pakistan in political development. ,-, ECONOMIC 26. BHAT (Taranath) . India and Pakistani See-Saw economic relations. In, Seminar on Indo - Pak relations (New Delhi) (1984). Studies in Indo - Pak relations* Papers. Bd by VD Chopra, 216-30, Indo - Pak political and economic relations are characterised by a long series of accords and discords. India's economic structure is certainly superior to that of Pakistan. However, Pakistan is better placed in agri culture, raw materials and food. Economic relationship between India and PaJcistan has been largely confined to trade interaction. The Indo - Pak trade links which were snapped abruptly in 1965 we re-established in 1974, follow ing the Simla agreement. An effort has been made by the Indian private sector as well as the government to norma lised trade relations with Pakistan. The Indo - Pak bilateral trade can grow with a lense of objectivity and commonality 08 of interests with in the framework of national priorities. 27, INDO - PAKISTANI economic cooperation. Commerce 150, 3850; 1985, 3, 9; 437, The level of economic development in India and Pakistan is comparable although because of the differing sizes of the two countries and their population, there are in evitable differences in the composition of the economic life Pakistan major imports are: wheat, Petrolium, crude, diesel oil, palm oil, tea, dairy products, agricultural tractors and others. Its e^qxjrts arej rice, row, cotton, cotton yam, rug and mats, leather and others. The trade between the two countries testifies to the pacify of their performance. Perhaps the trade between them would receive the mwch needed impetus if, alongwith the apex organisations visited each other provided there is political will on both sides. 28. PUN J (VP) . Indo - Pak economic cooperation. Indian and Foreign Review 20,16? 1983, ^Pilne 144; 9-10. In the new era of in do - Pak relations, trade and commerce will not only provide the basis of amity but strengthening of economic relations between the two coun tries. In order to translate into reality the concept of total economic cooperation an environment permissive for G9 accelerated Indo • Pak relations Is Imperative. Now that the climate £or better understanding and dialogue has been created, there should be increasing and regular exchange of trade delegations between the two countries and participation in trade fairs and exhibitions, ,-,-, COMMERCE 29, APTE (Vlnod), Trade with Pakistani Good beginning towards normalisation. Commerce 152, 3897; 1986, 1, 25; 153-6. The tt«o Finance Ministers of Indo - Pakistan have certainly paved the way towards normalisation of trade and economic relations between the two countries. The economies of both countries are complementary to each other and both the countries can help one another in their trade. Despite concerted efforts to improve the economic ties, the rela tions between the two sides during the past years were plagued by political tension. During the discussions Foreign Ministers of both side recognised the need to encourage greater contact between the industrial and trad ing communities of the two countries. 30. FREE TRADE Winds, editorial. lE^ 1985, 1, 19. The agreement between India and Pakistan to increase significantly the levels of their trade and other forms of 70 mutual economic involvement is good news. Particularly at a time when there is a heavy overhang of political distrust between the two countries. To wait for an appix>- priate political climate even to begin to discuss improve ment of economic relations is clearly an obtuse attitude. The momentum given by the current agreement should be consciously accelerated. Without In do - Pakistan economic cooperation, grandiose declarations of commitment to SAAE%C are empty rhetoric, 31, GILL (Sucha Singh) and GHUMM3 (RS) . Indo - Fak trade: prospects and constraints, In^ Seminar on Indo - Fak relations (New Delhi) (1984) , Studies in Indo - Pak relations* Papers ED by VD Chopra. 187-205. India and Pakistan are not only neighbours but have a long common historical past and socio-cMltural affinity. Development of trade and other economic relations between them is natural and necessairy to maintain historical conti nuity. Expansion of these relations can help in a big way to relax tensions in the sub-continent wiiich is in the interest of both. Trade between India and Pakistan was the direct outcome of the partition in 1947 and to a large extent reflects what was at one time free internal trade between the region those now constitute the two independent, countries. Recently certain efforts have been made to 71 activate the trade relations between both the countries. 32. JAVED AKHTAR (SM). Pakistan's trade with India. Indian and Foreign Review 20,16; 1983, June 1-14; 7-8. Pakistan foreign trade has grown substantially in recent years. Pakistan is trying to expand its trade with India. Pa)dtstan• s trade with India has been subjected to wide fluctuations, Currently it accounts for 0.8 percent of Pakistan's overall trade and just under 0.3 percent of India's trade. Indo - Pak trade links were cut off during the 1965 war and trade between them remained completely suspended for almost ten years. The two countries, however, re-established their trade protocol signed in November 197 4. It was followed by a formal trade agreement in January 1975. There is inmense scope of bilateral trade. Its potential is manifold. 33. TRADE WITH Pakistan, editorial. Amrit Bazar? 1985. 11, 20. It has always been India' s view that closer trade and economic cooperation with Pakistan will make a constru- ctiv€> contribution to iraporve overall relations between India and Pakistan which are now under a several strain. The Joint Indo - Pak commission, with a sub-commission on trade and economic collaboration, was set up mainly to achieve this end. Much would no depend on the joint ( C commission and the sub-comnlsslon on trade which will consider the goods to be exchanged both at private setter and state levels. Though the economies of the two count ries are complementary to each other. Taking into consi deration the mounting tension in the relations between the two countries, if the agreement constitutes a break through in economic relations will be helpful in reducing that tension. • effect of APGHANISTN5 34. NAVESD AHMAD. Recent developments in Indian foreign policy. Pakistan Horizon 33. 3; 1980; 47-95. Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in 1980 coincides with a serious exacerbation of international tension and grave impairment of detente. The tests of Mrs Gandhi's present policies is provided by the Afghan crisis, for it has changed the strategic balance and the diplomatic environment to the detriment of both India and Pakistan. From this change there arise new compulsions for both India and Pakistan to seek greater mutual understanding. Although President Zia-ul-Haq has proposed that relations be impro ved, the Indian Prime Minister has as yet shown no interest in taking up the offer. 7 'i 35, RIEN COURT (Amawry de). India and Pakistan in the shadow of Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs 61, 2; 1983-83 Win; 416-37. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the most serious and dangerous demonstration of Soviet Marxist imperialism since the end of the Second World War. It is essential that the west, and the US in particular, realize that India holds the key to successful resistance of further Soviet encro«;hments and that all their efforts should tend towards the re-establishmental level. Failure on the part of India and Pakistan to achieve the required settlements of their outstanding differences might ruin both of them, 36. WRIGGINS (Howard W) . Pakistan's search for a Foreign Policy After the invasion of Afghanistan, Pacific Agfairs 5, 2; 1984 Sum; 284-302. By maintaining a certain distance from Washington, Pakistan has made clear that it is not seeking to involve the US in regioned affairs. By the autuim of 1983 the quite dialogue established by India and Pakistan continued, and both parties were exploring ways of dealing with specific areas of difference and distrust. Both states now seem able to accept the other's relationship with the US with some good grace. But, in the face of the Soviet presence at the door of the sub-continent, it would appear that 74 leaders in both Pakistan and India are themselves beginning to change their sense of priorities. Yet, for the first time in many years India and Pakistan are dealing some what more eonstmctively with their ancient fears and suspicions. , effect of BANGLADESH 37. INDO - PAK - Bangla Relations, 1971-74| Background note. Foreicm jtffatrg Reports 23, 5; 1974, Mayj 80-2. Soon after the liberation of Bangladesh in Decerrber 1971, India alongwith Bangladesh made frantic efforts to normalise relations with Pakistan. India altered into a series of negotiations with Pakistan on this issue resul ting from the conflict of Decemner 1971, These negotiations brought about Simla agreement between India and Palcistan on July 1972. The two sides reviewed the developments since the signing of the Simla agreematit. Relations between the two countries were bogged down on the repatriation of POWs and exchange of Bengalies in Pakistan. , effect of FUNDAMENTALISM, ISLAM 38. BRHAIXJR (KallnO . Islamic fundamentalism and Indo - Pak relations, Ijn^ Seminar on Indo - Pak relations (New Delhi) (1984) . Studies in Indo - Pak relations* Papers. Ed by VD Chopra. 251-8. Alnost all the shades of Indian Islamic fundamenta lists opposed the Pakistan movemeat. VThereas the majority of Indian Ulama belonging to the Jarolat-ul-Ulamat-1-Hlnd. Pakistan's ruling classes had wanted to use Islamic soli darity in its struggle with India over the issue of Kashmir, Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists have been as mach obsessed with India as the rulers of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan had some agreements with India which had not been abrogated and diplomatic relations between the two countries were being maintained, in such a situation the war in Kashmir was not a Jihad. Islamic fundamentalists have seen India as a Hindu state. On the indo - Pak relations Islamic fundamenta list would continue to spearhead the most aggressive and communal elements in Pakistan. • effect of PERSIAN GULF 39. TAHIR-KHELI (Shirin) . India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. In thirty fifth roefeting of Association Studies (San Pran- sisco) (1983) I Prospects for detente in South Asia: Internal and External factor in India - Pakistan relations. Asian Affairs 10,3; 1983 Pall; 24-31. The involvement of India and Pakistan with the countries of the Persian Gulf region accelerated after 1971. The impetus for improved and closer relations with the Persian Gulf countries came from PaJcistan. Pakistan's task has become more complicated in recent years. From 1971 to 1979, Islamabad augmented its needs by deliberately shifting its focus from South Asia to Southwest Asia. After 1979, Southwest Asia no longer seemed so free of trouble and cost to Palcistan. The recent es^hasis of Pakistani policy foreign/on the search for a permanwat normalisation with India is as much a recognition of the problems of the Gulf as it is an acceptance of India's primacy in South Asia. • effect of POLITICS, INTERNAL, PAKISTAN 40. GANDHI (Indira) . Selected Statements* Indo - Pak relations. India Quart 41, 1; 1985, Jan- Mar; 129-35. We are not afraid of Pakistan; But we do realise that the danger is not so much from Pakistan as it is from those forces who envisage confrontation on this sub continent. It is in our interest that the effort to turn the face of Pakistan from its Past hatred and bitterness to a new future of peace and friendship is supported by us. With the Simla agreement India is in a better position to face the future. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil. The suppression of democracy is the original cause of all the trouble in Pakistan. 41. INDIA AND Benazir, editorial. Tl; 1986, 6, 25; 8. 77 Gen Zia-ul-Haq has charged that India is secretly financing to Miss Benazir Bhutto's current political com- paln. The external Affairs Ministry has promptly refuted this preposteroui allegation. International Media has recorded the extent and warmth of her reception in various Pakistani cities and it cannot be any body's connection that public demonstrations on such a manmonth scale could be the handiwork of a foreign power. It cannot and need not be denied that press and political leaders in India have shown considerable Interest in popular response to Miss Bhutto in Pakistan. This is entirely because she is deemed to be a rallying point for democratic forces in Pakistan. 42. MUSHAHID HUSAIN. Pak policy on India has not changed. TIj 1989, 8,2. In the wave of recent efforts of the PPP government to promote normalisation of relations with India, Ms Bhutto is under attack from the opposition. Interestingly, in a couple of key areas where Pakistan and India have improved relations under the new civlliam government, the basis was laid during the previous regime. The problem for the PPP government regarding its guest for better ties with India will be two-fold. '^" 78 43. PM: Pak interference has affected relations, editorial. Patriot? 1986, 10, 13. The involvement of Pakistan in the internal affairs of India, particularly assistance and training to terrorists from across the border, has affected Indo - Pak relations. There was "very difinitely involvement from across the border" Mr Gandhi said in an interview. India has very hard information that terrorist were being helped, assisted and trained by Pakistan, this has always affected our relations. 44. RICHIER (William L) . Domestic factors in Pakistan's India policy. In_ Thirty fifth meeting of Association Studies (San Fransisoo) (1983) t Prospects for detente in South Asia: Internal and External factor in India-Palcistan rela tions. Asian Affaits 10, 3; 1983, Pall; 24-31. Despite the political frustration of martial law and of the unfulfilled promises to restore civilian male, the present regime im Pakistan has taken greater steps towards normalisation of relations with India than any of its predecessors. Whether the present direction of policy can be sustained probably depends more upon external than internal factors, but increased domestic political turmoil could create problems. The relative absence of domestic 0 criticism of Pakistan's current India policy bodes well for its continuation beyond the life of the current regime, but the resolution of difficult issues like Kashmir remain uncertain. 45, SABHERWAL (OP) • What clouds indo - Pak relations. Main stream 18, 48; 1980, 7, 26; 3-4. Ministerial level talks between India Pakistan that have taken place during the last few years, have brought to the surface a dual trend in the relations between the t%*o countries. The desire for normalization of relations, for closing the chapter of animosity and conflict and fosteirih^ close ties* beginning with economic and cultural spheres is one discernible trend, Islamabad Junta, there fore, moves between the devil and the deep sea, the first beginning domestic compulsion, and the second Islamabad external ties-up. It is on there two denominators that the shape of Indo - Pakistan relations depend. 46. SARSEN (Rajendra) . Political scene in Pakistan, IPSA Journal 13, 2; 1980, Oct - Dec? 217-34. Pakistan is unlikely to attain political harmony under Gen Zia's rule. For all its tough postures, the ruling Military junta essentially remain vulnerable. The failure of Political system in Pakistan ten be traced 80 to the domination in the early period of national politics by leadersii*»o ndgrated from India to the new country in 1947. Another source of instability is the manifestation of sectarian ant gonisms rooted in the theological dogmas which divide the musiims of Pakistan, The hoplessness of war against India appears to have finally registered on the national psyche of Pakistan, Hence India's diplomatic thrust should be to'reassure Pakistan, 47. THAPAR (Karan) , Uaderstanding Pakistan. HT; 1980, 4, 12, Prom the standpoint pf bilateral, sub-continental relations, the important point about Pakistan is that it has not come to terms with itself Pa3cistan is in search of an Islamic Identity and for this it has deliberately iden tified itself with the Islamic countries on its west. But the persisting cultural, familial and geographical affini ties that link Pakistan with India are also the realities which Pakistan cannot erode. The people of Pakistan look towards India and feel that they could have also progressed if they were given a fair chance by their government. At the popwlar level there is no animosity for India, People on both sides of borders only relate through the processes the govt provide for them. The Govt of India and the Govt of Pakistan need therefore, show an understanding towards each other. 81 48. V2NKAT NARA.YAN (S) , Hope of new era in Indo - Pak relations. Patriot? 1988, 10, 2. The party based parliamentary election in this country, may verily herald the beginning of a new era in India-Pakistan relations. During Zia-ul-Haq's 11- years rule, relations between the two countries had hit an all time low. The g«ieral*s five visit to India and his eight meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in India and abroad did not help change the tense bilateral relation ship. The two most important reasons for the souring of bilateral relations are India's belief that Pakistan aiding and abetting sikh terrorists to create trouble in Punjab and Pakistan nuclear programme. ,_-,_,-, MILITARY 49. KUKEREJA (Veena) , Military intervention in politics: Contrasting cases of Pakistan and India. India Quart 38, 3 & 4; 1982, July-Dec; 302-14, Hie Pakistani and Indian political systems share many common features relating to history, military organisation and over all areal culture, the two systems have displayed contrasting patterns of civil military relations. The armies of both the countries inherited the British Indian military traditions of non-involvement in politics, but in 82 Pakistan the army eroded this tradition by intervening decisively and frequently whereas in India, the principle civilian supermacy remains intact. Their post independence development, composition, and relationship with the civilian authority has been markedly different. This has a direct bearing upon the divergent roles of the armies of the two countries. Given the variety of hypotheses that have been suggested as explanations for the contrasting behaviour of the two successor armies of British India. , FOREIGN POLICIES 50. BANBRJBB (Jyotirmoy) • Hot and cold diplomacy in Indo- Pakistan relations. Asian Survey 23, 3j 1983 Mar; 280-301. The Afghan crisis renewed US strategic interest in military co-operation with Zia-ul-Haq*s Pakistan. With Mrs Indira Gan^!it*s return to power in New Delhi in early 1980, a game of hot and cold diplomacy accelerated betwe«j the two South Asian leaters. Islamabad have been project ing are image of being a modest junior of India which is preoccupied with the Soviet military presense in Afghanis tan. Indo - Pakistan relations reached a new low in Feb 1982 over Kashmir. Top-level talks and public relations gestures notwithstanding, the historic mutual mistrust lurks beneath the surface as seen in the need for a new pact despite the 197 2 Simla Agreement. 83 51, BARAL (JK), Indo - Pale diplomacy since 1981: Motivaticai, strategies and prospects. Foreign .Affairs ReT»rt 35, 4&5; 1986, i^r-May; 29-47. Pakistan has sent several 'peace' proposals to India: Kowar pact. Ratio Fornula, and South Asia as a nuclear Weapons Free Zone. It may be pertinent to refer to Zia's advice to New Delhi to maintain a low profit for sake of peace in the sub-continent. It is not precisely clear whet Gen 2ia means by'low key* what he expect, India to do when he impliedly advised Mrs Gandhi to maintain •Low Key*. The dual between Pakistan's proposal of No War Pact and Indians proposal of Treaty of peace and friendship is really a game of one-up-manship between these two count ries. Pakistan wants a No war Pact with India without much improvement in social, cultural and economic relations. It argues that a pledgd by both countries that neither would go to war would lead to improvement in over all relations between the«i. 52. BASHIRUDDIN AHMAD, Pakistan: An unending quest for vali dation. China ReTX>rt 18, 4; 1982, July-Aag; 35-57. This paper deals with changes in Pakistan foreign policy and public opinion towards India and draws the implications of these changes for Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan's foreign policy has a larger set of objectives Ok than mere pre-occupation with India, and these are sought to be realized in a time-frame of long duration. Having failed to resolve the issue of the character of its state and formulate durable constitution Pakistan has looked for success all these years in the field of foreign relations. With the realization that India's industrial, military and political development close the option for Pakistan to gain self-reipect in its own eyes and that of the world community. Its attempts to make up with India is one of the first steps in the realisation of this objective* There is considerable public support in Pakistan for nor malising its relations with India and widespread admiration for the allround development registered by the latter, 53. BHOGAL (Parminder S) . Pakistan's India policy-Shift from Zia to Benazir. India Quarterly 45,1; 1990, Jan-Kar; 35-45. Pakistan's foreign policy mainly revolves round its India policy, the reason being the historical background of Indo - Fak relations. However, with the change of leadership in Pakistan. Some changes were brought in the countries policy towards India. General Zia adopted a hawkish policy of convest war with India and also meddled in India's internal ethnic problems. Even in SAARC, Zia maintained hostile postures. Besides another controversial issue of Siachen Glacier emerged during his era. After 85 Zia's death Benazir came to power and established a demo cratic form of government, her arrival would help improve bilateral relations between the two neighbours. Although early months of Benazir's rule were encouraging and there has been a &hift from Zia's beaten track, yet remains to be seen whether there would be an actual improvement in In do - Pak relations in the long run or not. 54, BOSE (Pradip) , Future demands better Indo - Fak relations. Janata 37, 19; 1982, 6, 20; 7-9. The demand of the future which will have increasing influence in the thinking, feeling and behaviour of the two people, and that will exest a more positive influence on the relationship between the two countries in the future. Diplomats of both countries often find themselves in an endaarassing position of having to explain controver- cial statements on the Indo - Pakistan relationship. The affer of no- war pact by Pakistani president was not genuine, and was meant primarily to influence the US congressional opinion in favour of the US mili tary supplies to Pakistan. 55. GOHEN (Stephen Philip) and WEINB/4JM (Marvin G) , Pakistan in 1981: Staying on Asian Survey 22, 2; 1982 Feb; 136-46. In 1981 Pakistan demonstrated a sophistication in 8G Its foreign relations. The year saw the revival of a strategic relationship with US, the initiative of a no- war agreement with mdia, several important Islamic sta tes, and even the USSR. This skillfully conceived and implemented foreign policy reflects the two domestic con- traints of military bureaucratic necessity and popular supports for non-alignment, 56. FOREIGN POLICY issues of Pakistan: Indo-Pakistan relations Strategic Studies 10, 3; 1987, Spr; 106. The turbulence recently esqierienced in Pakistan India relations has one important lesson to offer. The dialogue between the two countries must oontinue to avoid periods of regression and despondency. Prudence demands that the two countries remain firmly engaged in the task of improving relations. While we shallpursue the para mount objective of establishing a good neighbourly and cooperative relations with India, which we believe is the logically course diltated by history and geography, we are also constrained to note some unhelpful trends in India. 57. GHOSH (Partha S) , India - Pakistan relations: Problem and prospects. Foreign Affairs Retx>rts 32, 5; 1983, May; 70-85. India's Foreign policy in the South Asian region being largely dependent on Its relations with Pakistan, a clear understanding of the problem involved imperative. The problem that besets Indo - Pak relations is thus two fold: first, it pertains to the national ethos of both the coun tries, particularly Pakistan; and second, to the interna tional system which seldom allows a small power to play a role independent of the super power systems particularly in a strategic area. 58. HAQQjttJI (HUSAIN) , Ready for peace, or War: Pakistan seeks to ease tensions with India but prepares for war. Far East Boon Review 135, 7; 1987, 2, 12? 16-7. Pakistan* s armed forces are in a state of battle preparedness, despite Islamabad's avowed preference for diplomatic measures to defuse tension on the border with India. PaMstan would continue to "press precautionary measures into action without any overt alarm* in response to India's massive military mobilisation. Although Indo- Pakistan relations have been tense since last November, the current escalation followed India's demand for a with drawal of Pakistani troops engaged in military exercises along the border. 59. INDO - PAK talks: Zia's diplomatic weapons. Link 25, 3; 1982, 8, 29; 14-5. 88 Good nelghboutly relations between India and Palcis- tan are necessary for peace not only in the sub-continent but in the whole of South Asia. At the official level talks, not only was India's friendship treaty proposal discussed but also its suggestions for the setting up of a joint indo - Pak economic oonunission. Relations between these two sides have passed through many ups and downs. Between India and Pakistan there are many porblems and issues: the occupied areas of Kashmir, river water dispute, etc. much more serious. The supply of P-16 aircraft capable of hitting targets deep inside India including our nuclear power generation and research facilities have added a new dimension to Indo - Pak discord. In short, religious fanaticism, lack of democracy, aggressive military posturs backed by massive US arms there are some of the major causes of lack of accord and friendship between India and Pakistan. This is the crux of Indo - Pak relations. 60. JDSHI (VT). Better indo - Pak ties foreseen, Tl; 1988,9,23. What will be the shape of indo - Pak relations in the 2Ist century? The occasion was pregnant with possibility of an incisive, objective and educated review of Indo- Pak relations. It was all the more surprising that Gen Kamal Matinuddin seemed to invite an exposition of the Pakistani 89 mind* rather than question to eliclte information or rectify wrong perceptions for the betterment of relations between the two countries. The only silver lining came from a formet pakistani diplomat who largely endorsed the robust and optimistic propositions of the Indian envoy, and suggested that Indo-Pakistan ties were bound to improve in the next century because of the changing global situa tion and the breath - taking technological advances. 61. JDSHI (VT) . Indo - Pak ties under a cloud. TI; 1985,10,10. With virtual standing matches on one score or another in the Past few weeks, Indo-Fak relations appears to be coming under a cloud again, if not exactly heading for a crisis. Close on the heels of a sharp rebuke from the Pakistan foreign office for India's "insinuations'* regard ing the attempt on Mr Rajiv Gandhi's life at Rajghat last week comes the accusation of India s double standards on the acquisition of arms by the two countries. 62. JOSHI (VT). Positive trends in Indo-Pak relations. TI; 1989, 5, 29. The long-awaited meeting between the Home Secretaries of Pakistan and India, reinforcing the promising trend in bilateral relations since the two prime Ministers met 90 last Deceniber, The tone and tenor of the discussions on crucial border issues was said to be happily devoid of polemics or acrimony. Both sides stated their concems and apprehensions clearly and categorically. The hope of inrprovement in the ground situation raised by the Islamabad meeting are valid dep«ads on what happens in the next few months. 63. KATYAL (KK), Relations with India— Zia's contradictions. Hindu? 1980, 6, 2. The Indian public is not to blame if it feels bewildered by the conflicting pointers from Pakistan about its ideas on bilateral relationship. But Pakistan's atti tude would continue to be ambiguous and India should recog nise it as an essential part of the diplomatic reality and deal with it accordingly. It has not been possible to efface the old memories from the minds of Pakistani rulers. But there are positive developments also in the In do - Pak relations, like promotion of tourism and trade between the two countries, 54. MOHAMMAD SARWAR. Indian Foreign Relations in South Asia Jan-JUne 1987: Indo - Pakistan. South Asian Studies 4,2; 1989, JUly-Dec; 7 6-88, The Indian diplomacy remained bogged down in its nore ^; 1 inanediate neighbourhood with no signs of any improvement in her relations with Pakistan, indo - Pakistan relations during the period under review remained clouded under border tension, accusation by India on Pakistan's nuclear programme and Pakistan's involvement in East Punjab, The forces of the two countries cewie to the close to fight after the Indian operation of Brasstacks. The armed forces on both sides moved in forward positions along the Punjab border and were pwt on "red alert". In annual report of the External Affairs Ministry reiterated India's desire to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan demonstrated. The Pakistan's Foreign Minister informed that establishment of tension free good neighbourly relat- tLons with India on the basis of equality of Pakistan foreign policy. 65. PANDIT (CS) . Hopes of Indo - Pak understanding on firmer garound. Ipdian Nation? 1986, 1, 9. This week will witness a fresh and determined beginn ing on the Part of India and Pakistan to normalise their relations. For onething; the efforts that will be set in nation are the direct result of the agreement reached between President Zia-ul-Haq and the Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi, during the former's stopover in New Delhi 13 2 last month on his way back from his official visit to rocaldives, apart from reaching a solemn understanding not to attack each others nuclear installations fiaesd a firm time frame to reactivate the dialogue at various political and official levels to sort out differences that persist between the two countries, 66. SALAMKP itt.1. Back to the old refrain: Indo- Pakistani relations worsen yet again. Par East Boon Review 134,47; 1986, 11, 20; 52. Last years high lK>pes of a thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations have faded away at la&t. The two countries are now back to their usual no-war-no-peace relationship New DelVJi seems reconciled to the view that it has managed to get alon^ without normalisation with Islamabad so far and can continue to do so for the forsceaible future. The hopes of breakthrough in bilateral ties had reached their beght at the end of last year following a series of events. However, even as the mutual recriminations continue un abated - Pakistan also has its long litany of complaints foreign analyst do not expect an outbreak of major armed hostilities. 67, SALAMAT ALL Obstacle remain: Indo-Pak normalisation hurdles outlined. Far East Boon. Review 135, 11; 1987, 3, 12; 35-6. <; ' A verbal agreement between Gandhi and Zia not to attack each other's nuclear establishments was announced in Deceirber 1985 But a formal one is still awaited. Against a backdrop of continuing Sikh terrorism largely blamed in India on Pakistan's support for separatism the two state ments had raised hopes for the removal of at least one main hurdle to normalisation. However, the optimists did not seem to have taken into account the complexities of domes tic compulsion that steer both countries' foreign policy. 68. ZIRING (Lawrance) . Pakistan and Indiax Politics, Persona lities and Foreign Policy. Asian Survey 17, 7> 1978, July; 706 - 30. India's Foreign Policy was also shaped by its strained relations with Pakistan. In spite of protesta tions to the contrary, India's primary objective lay in peutralizing Pakistan's military capability. All matters considered, its foreign policy continues to be influenced by fear and bittex^ness toward India. It therefore continues to judge the US by its remoteness or intimacy with its larger neighbour and sworn enemy.. ,--., DIPLOfMCY 69. INDO - PAK Talks. Current Topics 10,8; 1984, July ; 472. The talk between the Indian and Pakistan Foreign 94 Secretaries of May 20 cjovered the whole range of Indo-Pak relations— the Treaty of Friendship and cooperation offered by India and the Non-aggression Pact offered by Pakistan. They also signed an agreement on group tourism and exchange letters on amending visa rules. 70. MADHU LIMAY8. India and Pakistan* Some comron problems. Mainstream; 1982, Republic Day; 15-8. Some Indian Intellectuals, tend to adopt a superior moral attitude towards Pakistan. The fact of the matter Is that the Indian polity and society are plaugoedby the same problem as our Immediate neighbour. When Pakistan fell under military dictatorship Jawaher Lai Nehru was at the helm of our affairs. Neverthless alarming tendencies azBvisible everywhere which connot but raise doubts about the future of democratic Institution like judiciary, the press and the legislatures. Just as fundament all sm and obscurantism are playing havoc with Pali£stai and the musllm community here, social exeluslveness of the Hindu society and the utter selfishness and aggr^.dlsement of Its ruling elite are threatening Indian democracy with annihilation. 71. PAKISTAN: Indo - Pak Joint Press Statement, Foreign Affairs Record 31, 8; 1985, Aug; 251. 95 The Foreign Secretaries noted with satisfaction that meetings at different levels between India and Pakistan were becoming regular and frequent. They met four tiroes this year. There was a candid review of various aspects of Indo - Pak relations in a cordial and constructive atmosphere. Both sides sought further classi fications and agreed to continue efforts aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty between two countries, , FOREIGN POLICY, PAKISTAN 72. CHOPRA (Surendra) Evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy and its relations with India. In. Seminar on Indo - Pak relations (New Delhi) (1984). Studies in Indo - Pak relations* papers. Ed by VD Chopra. 231 - 46. Paldstan's foreign policy is an important and challenging subject which has engaged the interest of many analysts and researchers. Her policy can be divided into four periods ~ 1947 to 1954, 1954 to 1958, 1958 to 1971 and the period since 1971, The one thread running throughout these four phases has been that Pakistan's foreign policy had been India — centered. The history of Indo - Pak relations has been mainly a stor^ of con flict and discord, mutual distrust and suspicion. It has resulted from a nuntoer of intricate factors like 9G legacy, the difference in religion, conflicting national interests and objectives of ideology divergent perception of the world situation, perception of each other and of themselves and various bilateral disputes including Kash mir, This is in brief is the legacy whlich determined the psche of the elites of the two countries and conditioned their bilateral relations, A part from this major deter minant there are other determinants which have influenced Indo - Pak relations, , —, _, effect of COMMONWEALTH 73, ISLAM (Z) , Pakistan's foreign policy issue since her with drawal from the Commonwealth. Pakistan Horizon 27,2; 1974j 3-17. Pakistan withdrawal from the comnonwealth in the wake of the totally unprincipled stand of senior common wealth members towards the dismemberment of the country through naked aggression. Ever since, Pakistan's policy vis-a-vis Britain and other commonwealth countries is based upon bilateralism. Pakistan has pursued relentlessly her policy of normalising relations with Bangladesh and India but it firmly opposed to hegemonism in the region. She has closely identified herself with the causes and aspirations of Third World, strengthened bonds with Maslim h ( countries and stood firmly by all people fighting opera tion, aggression, intervention subversion and exploitation. , —, -, effect of POLITICS, INTERNAL 74, GUPTA (S) • Pakistan's domestic crisis and foreign policy— problem of identity and relations with India, South Asian Studies 7, 1; 1972, Jan; 114 - 26. There has been a clear inter - relation between the internal developments in Pakistan and evaluation of its foreign policy. The military alliance with the USA strengthened the position of the armed forces as a factor in Pakistani politics and endx>ldened them to impose an authoritarian structure on a highly complex society. The conflict with India severely strained the concept of a single Pakistani nation, since much of Pakistani unity depended on the acceptance of the fact of a common sub continental civilization, , —, -, effect of SUPER POWERS 75. MUSHAHID HUSAIN. Pakistan's foreign policy: An Exercise in tight rope walking, Pakistan Jotrmal of American studies 2,2; 1984, Sep; 14 -21. There are basically two major influences on Pakistan ^8 foreign policy, domestic and regional. Its location which straddles the volatile middle East and an unstable South Asia makes Pakistan a key element in the foreign policy of both super power as well as countries in the region. Regional instability has not proved adverse in short term. The other main influence on Pakistanis foreign policy is the region itself, where both super powers are engaged in alternating policies of collusion and contension for spheres of influence. The India factor has been decisive. Bilateral relations have now reached a new phasej the institution of a joint commission and Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact followed by India' s proposal for a treaty of friendship, although Palcistan's nuclear programme is also seen by India as a major flash point in bilateral ties. —, —, -, effect of USA 76. SITANSHU DAS. Benazir's India policy and the US. Link 31, 18; 1988, 12, 11; 4-5. America cast its weight behind Benazir Bhutto and persuaded the Pakistan military high command to except her as Prime Minister. Benazir has accepted the real politik of the Pakistan situation by plighting her word that she , would not touch the militarY budget. The new Primer's Foreign Policy mirrors the care which has gone into the 09 making of her policy. Benazir Bhutto's India policy offers high hope and some forebodings. Her India policy, it Is feirvently hoped is her own and is not the other side of what she obliged, by force of circumstances to pursue in relation to Afghanistan and the USSR, —.-, GEOPOLITICS 77. CHAUDHRI (MohOTimad Ahsen) . Geopolitical factor in Pakistan- India Relations. Pakistan Horizon 40, 1; 1987; 30 - 50. Even after 39 years of Independence, relation between Pakistan and India remain in a state of flux. Pakistan's offer of no-war pact has not received a very positive Indian response. It seems that India has yet to reooncil itself to the existence of Pakistan as a sovereign state. At any rate the process of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan received an impe tus after the change of leadership in India and Pakistan in 1977, Pakistan would like to live in peace with India but not at the expense of its sovereign rights. Moreover, rivalry between India and Pakistan is enhancing the influ ence of super powers in the region. 78, COHEN (Stephen Philip) . Geostrategic factors in India - Pakistan relations. In_ Thirty fifth meeting of Associa tion of Asian Studies (San Pransisco) (1983): Prospects for detente In South Aslat Internal and External factors in India - Palcistan relations. Asian Affairs 10, 3; 1983, Pall; 24 -31. Ul»n independence, India in particular rejected the kind of geostrategic logic so carefully developed by the British, Instead, Nehru sought to deflect India's important neighbours with good will, while Pakistani lea ders proclaimed their support of the "great game," their concerns were primarily directed against the much larger and better ei|Qi^p^>ed India. A number of factors rest upon boundary between region and the border international sys tem. These are by far of greatest importance to outsiders worried about India and Pakistan's relationship to the "arc of crisis," although not necessarily with in India or Pakistan; the uncertain quality of Chinese and American interaction with both Pakistan and India. India and Pakistan, the major military states of South Asia, are each locked in a triple strugle. , HISTORY 79. BOMBWALL (KR). Indo - Pakistan relations: Continuing Logjam. Current Tbpics 11, 9; 1985, Aug; 539 - 41. In January 1966 India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent pact to restore normal relations between two -L countries. Likewise in July 1972 Simla agreement envisaged noimialisation of relations. The paradore of Indo - Pakistan relations is difficwlt to understand. Gen Zia's offer to sign a no-war pact with India - Pakistan to make some gesture of ooncilation towards India, k new factor that has entered into the orbit of Indo - Pakistan relations. Normalisation will have to wait till Pakistan is able to make up its mind on what kind of an equation it wants with its neighbour. Whose hand of friendship has always been stretched towards it. We refer to Pakistan involvement with Sikh separatists. 80. CHELLANY (Brahma) . Roots of Indo - Pak conflict. Tl/ 1988, 3, 16. The origins of three wars between India and Pakistan, Dr Sumit Ganguly looks at three principle issuesi the disengagement strategy of British colonial Govt the partition ideological differences between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League and dispute over Kashmir. The three wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 were rooted in common issue. Two major developments since 1971 have changed the strategic and military equation in the sub-continent and diminished the possibility of a fourth war between India and Pakistan. In opposition to the Weberian conten tion that modernization weakens ethnic ties and loyalties. \ d'} conflicts In South Asia have shown that traditional attri butes can easily adapt to a modern VIbrld and provide the identification for group interests. 81, CHOPRA (VD) . Indo - Pak relations* A historical perspec tive. In, Seminar on Indo - Pak relations (New Delhi) (1984) , Studies in Indo - Pak relations* Papers. Ed by VD Chopra. 259 -70. No objective study of Indo - Pak irelations is complete without an assessment of the role of imperialism in this sub-continent, both before and after the two countries became independent and sovereign states. The range of the confrontation did not get beyond the frame work of Indo - Pak conflicts. Indo - Pak tensions have international ramifications, an entirely new development dominating Indo - Pak relations at present. Just as Indo- Pak relations, the socio-economic structure of Pakistan too has a direct and determining influence on these rela tions. Tb say all this should not mean that one should throw up one* s hands and compeletely rule out the possibi lity of bringing Indo - Pak relations on an even keel. Fortunately, the main thrust of Indians policy has been and continues to be to nortnalise relations between the two countries. 13 82. JAMIL RASHID, Pakistan and India at forty. Patriot; 1987, 10, 20. On 14 - 15 August 1987, Pakistan and India, the twin states of the post-imperial sub-continent, celebera- ted forty years as independent states. It has be repeatedly argued that India developed as a bourgeois- capitalist state, it has bright future in the long run. Pakistan has remained in the clutches of imperialism. India and Pakistan have been developing into different socio-economic and political formation. In Pakistan, colo nial capitalism had created uneven development. The Indian was a true successor of the colonial state with all its trappings. With these development India and Pakistan at forty are moving in different directions. It is quite legitimate to argue that in the first decade, there were signs that Pakistan was shaping into a "Secularised" society. It was only during the fourth decade that religion and religious ideology became the focus for confrontation and discussion. 83. MANSERGH (Nicholas) . India and Pakistan: Whither have they turned? Int Journal 39, 2; 1984,Spr; 466-80. Refers to earlier article in 1958 revi w ing British commonwealth Affairs, Problem of wartime cooperation and 14 post war change 1939 - 1952, in which the world in 1947 waited to see what policies India and Pakistan would pursue on attaining independence. Particular attention is given to the role of both countries in the ending of colonialism, which was heralded by the transfer of power in India to their reconciliation of anti-colonialism with commonwealth menibership and to India's conceptual forrtula- tion of non-alignment in the Panch Shila and her leadership status in the non-aligned World today. In Delhi, in 1947, the ending of colonialism in South Asia was thought likely to prove a landmark in World history, as momentous in its way as the French or Russian revolutions. How is it to be reckoned, nearly forty years later ? 84. MISRA (KP) , Regional peace and security* Coalesence and Clash in Indo - Pakistan relations. India Quart 40, 3-4; 1984, July-Dec; 262 - 73. Ever since independence, India and Pakistan have been involved in serious differences leading sometimes to open warfare. The divergences are of a fundamental and multiple nature and they have outstripped convergences. The situa tion is complicated by the conflict of the super powers. India and Pakistan must learn that no external power can bail out third world countries from their economic and security problems. 1 5 85. RAJ (J). Indo - Pakistan relations since the 1971 war— An Indian view point. Aastral J Polit Piist 20, 1; 1974, Apr; 22 - 31. The indo - Paid.stan sub - continent has been plagued by four conflicts in its first 25 years of freedom. There have been two wars in Kashmir, a limited action in Kutch, and the latest one over the political crisis in East Pakistan. The futility of continuous confrontation was realized both in India and Pa!kistan soon after the 1971 war. But even after the Sinda agreement signed in the early hours of 3 July 1972 and the Delhi agreement on POWs on 28 August 1973, the basic issue still predominates the distrust of India by Pakistan. The question arises as to whether Pakistan is really interested in peace and everlasting friendship with India. 86. RASHID AHMAD. Indo - Pak Ties in a flux. HT 66, 358; 1989, 12, 26; 11. After the forty years, Pakistan faces a new chall- ange in dealing with the nefw Indian leadership. The election of VP Singh leaves a big question mark hanging over the future course of impproving relations between the two countries. rhe inmediate issues having fire between the two are the Siachen Glacier dispute and Indi an plan to biiild a barrage over the Jhelum river. 1 t* 1 o 87. SATISH KUMAR. India - Pakistan tensions, OT? 1985, 10,1. The cause of India - Pakistan tensions are well known. Vfliat we must do is to consider concrete steps which must be taken to improve the hard core of Indo - Pak relations. The period since 1971 may be divided into two partsie up to 1977, when a civilian govemrnent ruled Paldstan and after 1977, when a niilitary regime seized power. A nuntoer of bold and significant steps towards normalization of relations between the two countries were taken in the first period, both countries have been dragging their feet on all vi^al matters in the second period, Indo - Pakistan trade is vital not only to their two coun tries but also to the success of South Asian Regional co operation. And Regional cooperation in South Asia is linked so much to Indo - Pak relations that they nust improve. , IMPROVEMENT 88. ABRAHAM (A). Indo - Pakistani Dialogue: Some crucial questions. TI^ 149, 38; 1986, 2, 7; 8. Over the last few weeks, there has been a great flurry of Indo - Pakistani political and diplomatic acti vity. Indo - Pakistani exchange has not set Indian mis givings on some crucial questions at rest. Does it believe i 7 that Pakistan has at last conne to realise that good rela tions with India are necessary for their own sake and for Pakistani stability. 89, BAHADUR (Kallm) . Recent developments In Pakistan's inter nal and exteraal affairs. Int Stud 13, 1; 197 4,Jan^Mar; 105 - 27. Pakistan provides an Interesting subject of study for India and foreign researches because of Its strategic Importance and Its role among the developing countries. Numerous books and articles have been devoted to its political and economic history, to problems of Integra tion of Muslims and Hindus, to Bangladesh and to Interna tional relations, 90. BERINDRANATH (Dewan) . Indo - Pak dialogue: A step forward. Democratic World 11, 6; 1982, 2, 7; 5-6. While sumDoing up his discussions with Indian leaders the Pakistan Foreign Minister said that the New Delhi talks were in no way discouraging. The two countries had so widely differed not only In their views but also in the matter of global and regional perceptions. The decision to institute a joint Indo - Pakistan commission appears the nost tangible result of the players. In case the two decide to normalise relations it would be a great step 1 8 forward. India and Pakistan have a major stake in nor malising trade at least in border areas. 91. DEY (Sudhin) • Breakthrough in indo - Pak discussions. Statesman; 1986, 11, 18. There has been a modest breakthrough towards normalization of Indo - Pakistani relations which have been overshadowing the SAARC meeting. Mr Gandhi wanted to establish good and friendly relations with Pakistan and was interested in reviving the process of normaliza tion. Mr Gandhi has charged Pakistan' that Pakistan is training slkh terrorist on it soil. Mr Junejo charged that India was also running some training camps on its side and interfering in Pakistan's affairs especially in Sindh. These charges and counter-charges would be tackled during the secretary level meeting next month in Lahore. 92. INDO - PAK talkss Strides in bilateral relations. Link 24, 26; 1982, 2, 7; 9 - 10. The Indo - Pak talks between the two Foreign Ministers of the two countries were frank and constructive but they have no treaty of non-aggression. There was no illusion on India's part that despite their Issues follow ing from the two countries divergent understandings of the regional situation, a non-aggression pact could not be J 9 easily finalised. The strides taken in the direction of linproving bilateral ties. The indisputable fact of these talks is that far from being confined to the no-war pact proposal^ these discussion have bom fruits in the sphere is of bilateral relations. If PaJcistan/interested in peace, it should not go for the sophisticated weaponary from US. 93. KAMATH (MV), Time is ripe for India and Pakistan to come together. Telegraph; 1986, 1, 9. India and Pakistan may be two separate states in theory, but they are one in spirit. Partition was a socio political aberration, a historical necessity and an econo mic mostrt>sity. Whether Indians and Pakistanis like it or not and whatever some people may say, the prospect of India and Pakistan coming together is getting brighter. It is not that president 2ia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi are now expected to go on to make further construc tive moves towards establishing peace in the sub-continent, But, once Pakistan realises that its future is with India and thereafter decides to throw away the foreign yoke, prosperity is its for the asking. The time has come. 94. KATYAL (KK) . Intangibles in new set-up. Hindu; 1985,12,23, For the first time after a long period there is hope of an upswing in indo - Pakistan ties. This is so even though none of the basic problems plaguing their IIU bilateral relationship was tackled, during the recent discussion between Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and Gen Zia-ul-Haq. How will the change-over to civilian rtile in Pakistan affect the cours-e of indo - Pakistan relations. The first test of Pakistan's intentions would come in the first week of January next year wh«:i the Finance Ministers of the two countries meet to tap the trade potential, only a fraction of which is now made use of. 95. KOTRU (ML). Indo - Pak Ties: Benazir for step-by-step approach. Statesman; 1989, 5^ 5> 1. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, believes that India and Pakistan must resolve all their out standing disputes in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness. The approach, she underlines, will have to be step- by - step one. The positions of the two coun tries have been fully recognized in the accord which provides for a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. Ms Bhutto believes that ever since her meeting with Mr Rajiv Gandhi during the SAARC summit a forward movement in bilateral relations was discernible. 96. MALHOTRA (inder) , SATISH KUMAR, KHOKHAR (Riaz Husain) and AURORA (Jagjit Singh) , Peace and Indo - Pak relations. Ill Foreign AEfarls Retorts 31, 4; 1982, J^r; 67-80. Indo - Pak friendship is a subject in which every single Indian and every Pakistani has a stake. We are both sworn to the Simla agreement. The Main threat is under development and poverty. This has been given abso lutely no attention by the two governments as far as relations between them are concern. Pakistan's position in the dispute of Jamnu and Kashmir is well known to India. The Simla agreement requires that between two sides be governed by the purposes and principle of United Nations Charter. The essense of the Simla agreement was that we would try an resolve our porblems on a bilateral basis, is Kashmir is a problem which/difficult to swallow on either side. Despite Simla agreement Pakistani representative have made different formulation in international forums. 97. NAYAR (Raldip) . Need for India - Pakistan detente. IE; 1980, 1, 16. For the first time in many years Pakistan appears to be in a mood to keep Kashmir aside and talk about steps to secure peace in the region. Islamabad may well be inclined to seek a firmer relationship with New Delhi without insisting on the settlement of the Kashmir question first. India should try to organise a joint move to \1: '^ persuade the Soviet Union to quit Afghanistan without further loss of time. In this context, the India - Pak istan detente becomes necessary. 98, NORMALISING INDO - PAK Relations. Current Topics 14, 7; 1988, July? 394. Normalisation of Indo - Pak relations has been the subject of continuing discussions between the representa tive of India and Pakistan for more than four years now. The main issue at the talks has beai the jjjssibility of concluding a non-aggression Pact and an agreement under taking not to attack each other's nuclear installations. India is understood to have insisted that Pakistan hand over to India Sikh terrorist operating from Pakistan, Another subject that has come in the talks is increasing indo - Pak trade, 99. PASRICHA (PM) , Relation with Pakistan, Year Book on India's Foreign Policy? 1984-85; 105 - 115, Mentions that a prominent aspect of Indo - Pakistan relations is the dominance of the normalization process by a highly surcharged emotional approach rather than cold logic on both sides, highlighting the acute sense of dis trust of each other at both the official and non-official levels. This relationship can be regarded as a oontlnuation 1.. 3 of the pre-lndependence civil conflict waged on communal lines, aggravated by the syndrome of typical neighbourly jealousies and one-upmanship. The key to the improvement lies in trusting each other even with an element of calculated risk, 100. PM in Islamabad, editorial! Patriotg 1989, 7, 18. Hopes of a qualitative change in indo - Pak relations have existed since Ms Bhutto assumed the office of PK last December, The resolution of the Siachen tangle would reduce tensions between the two countries. That PaJcistan's nuclear programme is still a big issue in Indo - Fak rela tions was clear from Rajiv Gandhi's remark that, unlike India the nuclear programme in Pakistan is very much controlled by the army. The talks between the two leaders and emphasis on step-to-setp approach to normalisation mark a significant setp forward which can gradually replace suspicion and hostility with trust and good will. 101, RASGOTRA (Maharaja Krishna) , Dialogue with Pakistan, IE; 1987, 1, 16. Pakistan is India's most difficult and also it most important neighbour. The fun and beauty, of India- Pakistan diplomacy lie in the fact of their talking together, not in what the talks achieve. Dialogue Itself 1 ^ is the roost vital tiling in the relations between India and Pakistan: their drift towards war begins when they cease to talk. In relation to India, the apprehensions felt in Pakistan about its security are largely of Pakistan's making for our bilateral differences, the venkateswaran- sattre masting did not resolve the argument over the clause to be inserted in the treaty under negotiation about the inadmissibly of foreign bases in the territories of India and Pakistan, The initiative in our dialogue with the neighbours should always be with us. 102. REDDY (GK). India Invites Pak for talks. Hindu, 1987,1,25. The Government of Inclia asked Pakistan to s«3d a secretary level delegation at its earliest con^venience to Delhi for talk on de-escalation of the border tension. In discussing such withdrawals by both the armies to their normal peace stations, the Govt of India will have to draw a distinction between the nulti-crops force of many divisions that has been assembled in southern Rajasthan for the triennial exercise away from the Pakistan borders and the ask forces now deployed by both sides at forward positions in different sectors. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan is interested in an early de-escalation by concentrating on the more immediate need for disengage ment to avoid the risk of conflicts. 1 i 5 103, SAREEN (Rajendra) • Easing of Indo - Pak tensions. Tribune; 1989, 5, 29. The Home Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan first began in 1986 following India's allegations that Pakistan was involved in promoting terrorism in Punjab. The two countries have agreed to take concrete measures to contain terrorism and illicit border crossings. In the event it has become necessary to ensure that political relations between India and Pakistan are not exploited by turbulent elements. Their ^al^s were part of an ongoing process of dismantling the super structure of hostility that came to dominate the Indo-Pak relations under 3ia, The Indo-Pak summit at Islamabad on Oecenber 31 last year set in motion the process of normalisation of relationship between the two countries. 104. SAMHNEY (RG) . Indo-Pak relationst Road to rapproachment. Strategic Analysis 9,1; 1985, Apr; 1-10. Bridges cannot be built without strong foundations and supporting structures, so also relations between nations. The relations between India and Pakistan suffer from many structural and attitudinal impediments. The deep rooted distrust between the two people continues to plague their relationship. The primary factor which bedevils Ind6-Pak relations is the national ethos in 1 i. G Pakistan aPd also to some extent In India. The historic Simla agreement of 1972 paved the way for several measures which could help In the development of peaceful and mutua- llybeneficial relations. Over the last few years. Gen 21 a- ul-Haq, in his typical approach to relations with India, has been making proposals off amd on for normalisation of relations between the two countries. In the ultimate analysis, the Simla agreement already provides a durable basis for bilateral relations. 105. SENGUPTA (Bhabani) . Shine in indo-Pak relations.NH; 1989,1,9, If a new leaf was turned in India Pakistan relations as 1988 was breathing away into history. A number of factors made it possible for the two young Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, at their very first meeting, to make a new beginning in relations of the two still-quite- distant neighbours. The two Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan eeallsed that both of them were under a global pressure to recast India-Pakistan relations in the mould of worldwide perestroika. They also know that they would have to face formidable resistance in their efforts to transform India-Pakistan relations from a cold peace to wainn good-neighboumess. 106. SHARMA (SK) , Framework for Indo - Pakistan relations j 1.. An Indian perspective. Asian Affairs 7,4; 1985, Oct-Dec; 41-57. The cxjnfllctual pattern of Indo - Pak relations can be analysed at the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the difference between a large developing polity and a small developing polity, and the difference in strategy and external environment account for oonflic- tual patterns of In do - Pak relations. At the micro level, the differing religious, patterns of economic development and patterns of political system account for the conflictual relations. All these factors have operated in Indo-Pak- istan relations not separately but simultaneously and in unison. 107, SMALL STEP, forward, editorial. Tribune; 1986, 7, 9. Reports of positive developments in India- Pakistan relations are so few and rare that one has to rejoice at such a peripheral event as the recent identification by scientist of the two countries of areas of mutual coopera tion in agricultural research. It was 14 years ago that the two countries signed the Simla agreement and resolved on a "step-by-step" approach to progressively restore and normalise their relations. The recent agreement between the agricultural scientists of the two countties is welcome, if only for the reason that it may constitute one small 118 step towards the cherished objective of political under standing and cooperation between the two neighbours. 108, SRIRAM (K) . Craving for friendship in two countries. IE.; 1987, 1, 6. The common people on both sides want to be friends and good neighbours. It is the two governments that do not allow them to be so despite their loud professions to the country. Process of normalisation to which both the Govts are coranjtted is making such sluggish progress. Yet, some others were critical of the Indian side's repeated reference to the Simla agreement. 109, SRIRAM (K) . Talks with Pak beginsi India offers second rail link, IB; 1986, 12, 28, India and Pakistan took yet another small, but significant, step towards resuming the stated process of normalization of relations when the foreign secretaries of the two countries held wide-ranging discussions cover ing the entire spectrum of bilateral relations. There was also discussion at length of how to give practical shape to the year-old joint residue of the Prime Minister Gandhi and the President Mr Zia-ul-Haq of not attacking each others nuclear installations because the proposal of peace and friendship treaty and no-war pact were gone into in-depth J-.9 With a view to finding out a nutually acceptable fomwla- tion on the two sides. 110. WARIAVWALLA (B), Indo - Pakistani Agreement and stability in the sub-continent. Survival 16,1; 1974, Jan-Peb; 17-20. The present international setting is more conducive t6 keeping Indo - Pakistani tensions ver^ much within the limits o£ the sub-continent. For the United States, this region is of peripheral importance to her security and economic interests and largely for this reason she is will ing to endorse India's primacy there. The sub-continant carries weight in the context of sino - Soviet rivalry, but less than Indian self-esteem would like to believe, , -, NO - WAR PACT 111. BURKE (St Pakistan has uniformarly welcomed the offer provided the slogan of no - war is givan real meaning by adding to it an agreed formula which would ensure the fair settlement of the main disputes between the two countries which could erupt into war if allowed to foster too long. 112. GANGAL {SC), Indo- Pak relations No-war dialogue: What next. Link 24, 24; 1982, 1, 26; 27 - 8. 123 Pakistan's Foreign Minister, ^ha Shahl visit India for talks on the proposed no-war pact. Leaving aside the possibility of some over emphasis, here and thete^ the reasons advanced for India's early reluctance to respond to the Pakistani no-war move seemed sensible and substain- tial. In December 24 communication India has suggested that the two countries should respect each others territorial integrity settle all disputes peacefully and bilaterally* In the Indo - Pa3d.stani context, the emphasis should not be on the game of nuntoers or on half-hearted, unreal guarantees in a row, Sof ar, even at the best of times, the Indo - Pakistani relationship has been tangential. The need is to make it widely interacting and interlocking. 113. KARNAD (Bharat) , Pakistan's no-lose option. HT; 1982,1,9. The Indian government has designed to discuss a no-war pact with Pakistan, It has done so not because it thinks such an agreement necessary but because it wants to prevent the peace offer made by Islamabad from turning into a public relations disaster for India. A no-war pact should be an ultimate and not just an expedient political document. The no-war pact, by lessening the prospect of super power involvement in the Indo - Pak dispute, will defuse tension in South Asia. 114. PRWPB (ishtllcant) . India and Pakistan: Beyond the No-rwar Pact, Strategic Studies 8^ 4; 1985; 58-63. India and Pa)d.stan Interaction on the no-war pact has sparked a good deal of debate on the policies and intentions of the t%*o countries. The no-war pact is a plain non-aggression agreement which would entail both countries to desist from committing an aggression against another. The two roost important watersheds were the Tashkent Agreem^at of 19 66 and the Simla Agreement of 1972. The Simla Agreement of 1972 that accepts the principles of durable peace and bilateral diplomacy states on the issue of Kashmir. 115. RAMARiO (R). Behind Zia's No-War Pact. Link 24, 41; 1982* 5, 23; 37. Palcistan had offered India a no-war pact. Pakistan also having made it clear that it was for India to accept or reject his no-pact war offer. It has to be remeiribered that Prtihe Minister Indira Gandhi had gone step further and had unilaterally declared that pact or no pact India would and attack Pa3d.stan and that India would be happy to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with PaJcistan. It is diffi cult to understand General Zia's stand that he will consider the peace and friendship treaty idea only if India notified 1; 2 that it has rejected his no-war pact offer. Gen has reiterated that India's proposal that a joint conmission be set up to suggest ways and means of improving bilateral trade and cultural exchanges* will be taken up only after the signing of no-war pact, 116, SENGUFTA (Bhabani) , Indo - Pakistan relations: Spring in Winter, I£; 1985, 12, 24. Six hours on a cloudy and cheerless day in mid- December have brought India and Pakistan tantalisingly close to a breakthrough in their faulted relationship of near-forty years. The agreemait that binds the two countries not to attack each others nuclear installations is, for all practical purposes, a mini-no-war pact verba lly concluded between the two heads of government. The Simla agreement rules out war in order to resolve the Kashmir issue. There is reasonable ground for hope that a treaty relationship will bind the two neighbours before time. 117. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Reflections on Indo - Pak talks. Main stream 20, 25; 1982, 2, 20; 17 - 22. The Prime Minister's of India give suggestion to have a joint commission set up to review and promote Indo - Pakistan relations is indicative of India's anxiety .i and concern to advance confidence building to underpin any pact of non-aggression. It is now no secret that there are very serious differences in the perspective of the two countries in respect of strategic environment, non-alignment^ bilateralism and disposition of armed forces* It is not going to be easy to narrow down the very deep differences between our respective world views. Pakistan was infact inposed on the unwilling Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis by the will of the entire Muslim coiwnunity of the Indian sub-continent. , _, SALAL DAM 118, MEHTA (Jagat S) « Salal Dam: A microcosm of Indo-Fak ties. IE; 1988, 4, 8. The Salal story is worth recounting as it is a microcosm of Indo-Pak relations. Economic gains became hostage to fear about national security, but both coun tries have demonstrated their capacity to break out of the vicious grip of mutual paranoia to reach bilateral agreements. All the rivers of the Indus system flow throu gh Indian territory b^ore they enter Pakistan, under the treaty. This treaty was signed by the Late Jawaherlal Nehru and the Late Presidffl^t Ayub Khan in Karachi in Sep tember 1960 after 12 years of well-nigh continuous and U.S.S.R. y"-! .,r- JAMMU AND KASHMIR i^Wheoti'ARice ^Maize .^?s ilk worms INDUSTRIES-^Telephone J<;4 often tortuous negotiations. The Salal story shows that successful negotiations depend on a proper understanding of the political constraints of the adversary, # -# role of SUPER POWERS 119, CHAtJDHRI (Mohaininad Ahsen) . Pakistan and the changing pattern of power relations in South Asia, Pak Horizon 31, 1; 1978; 71 - 101. The stability of South Asia depends on good rela tions between India and Pakistan. The fall of Mrs Gandhi in India and of Z A Bhutto in Paidstan in 1977 further change the situation. The new leaders in India and Pak istan improved relations between their two countries on the basis of equality respect for sovereignty and terri torial integrity. The super powers, motivated by their global interests, may continue to support one state against the other, but it is not interest of peace that states with in south Asia act as powers in the game, , KASHMIR 120, BANERJIE (Indranil) , Inside, looking out, Sunday 17, 8; 1990, 2, 25; 38 - 42, Tb the Indians, Kashmiri militants are plain tern>- rists, who have gunned down government officials, security K 5 personnel and prondnent supporters of the Indian Govt, In the eyes of the Pakistanis* however* the militants are loijaheddln (feedom fighters) struggling against barbaric Indian oppressors. The average Pakistani gen uinely believes that Kashnilr has been forcibly taken over by India and that It Is his religious and patriotic duty to help liberate It, 121. BANBRJIE (IndranllX Is war the answer?: As violence mounts In Kashmir, India holds Pakistan responsible. Sunday 17, 6; 1990, Feb, 11 - 17; 24 - 30. VThlle war hysteria Is mounting on both sides, the authorities of the two countries, oddly enough, are vehe ment In discounting any possibility of actual war. The no-war scenario hinges on the presumption that the v,p Singh governments tough posturing against Pakistan will douse the uprising in Kashmir. If it does not, then the government could be faced with two equally unpleasant options: either tacitly acknowledge that it cannot do any thing to prevent Pakistan from interfering in Kashmir or go to war. Peace between India and Pakistan consequently depends on whether the VP Singh government can find a quick solution to the Kashmir crisis and prevent the break-out of guerilla warfare. o 122, BLAMING PAKISTAN: Government is overlooking the real problems in Kashmir, Sunday 17, 4; 1990, Jan, 28; 12 -3, The Indian Govt has been complaining about Pak istan's help to Sikh extremists for years without any effect. The Pakistan Govt of Benazir Bhutto wanted to atleast give the iir^jression that she was serious about improving relations with India. It could be argued that a healthy relationship is a surest guarantee of non-inter ference then a mere show of pique. By blaiming Pakistan the Indian Govt is failing to focus on the real issue in Kashmir, The Govt has not been quite straight forward in its dealings with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Relations between the two countries have predictably taken a turn for the worse, 123. DAYAL (Gyaneshwar) .& SABEEHA MANZOOR. Even babes cry freedom. One- Nation Chronicle? 1990, June, 1 - 15^10 -15, Once described as the Switzerland of Asia, the Kashmir valley today wears the look of war reai^aged battle field with silent streets, half-burnt building and gun toting soldiers standing behind sandbag bunkers. The frenzy for freedom has reached a crescendo. Even school going children are running from their homes to cross over to Pakistan held Kashmir for arms training. 124, DHAR (0 N) , India must counter Pak belligerence. States man? 1990, 7, 17; 5. The violence in Kashmir is bound to escalate further in coming weeks. The visualized scenario in Islamabad can only be one of intensified "struggle* on the valley and increased "atrocities" by the security forces. The only way India can turn tables on Pakistan is to come out with detailed facts and figures of how hundreds of innocent Kashmiri Hindus, as also Hi slims, have been murdered under a systematic pogrom of extermination of minorities and secular-minded Muslims; how their properties are being destroyed through arson and bomb blasts, 125. PYZEE (AAA), Accession of Kashmir is not final. One Nation Chronicle; 1990, June, 1-15; 20-21. At the time of partition, the ruler of Kashmir did not accede to either of the states when however, a part of his own territory was disturbed by raiders from across the border, India's assistance was sought and India made it a condition that such assistance could be granted only if he acceded to Indian union. In the two resolutions passed in the united Nation Security council it was made clear that India did not consider the accession as final and irrevocable rather India pledged itself to see that J. 8 the question of the accession of the state of Jairatu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan shall be decided through the denx>cratic method of a free and impartial. 126. MAJUMDAR (Ananda). In-filtration—major challenge for B S P, Statesman; 1990, 7, 17; 7. The B s P's area of responsibility along the line of control covers 254 km and as far intelligences agencies have identified 108 Infiltration routes along it. The major challenge, however, lies in another area. There are between 4,000 and 6,000 trained Kashmiri militants on the other side of the line of control waiting for an opportu nity to get into India. And it is keeping them at bay that has been one of the prime tasks of the B SP, It is not that infiltration has been greatly curbed. Nonetheless facts indicate that Border Security Porce personnel have succeeded in making infiltration increasingly difficult. 127. MALHOTRA (Inder) Can India counter Pakistan's chalte^nge on the Kashmir issue?: Hostile winds. Sunday 17, 6; 1990, Peb, 11-7; 9. There are three stands in Pakistan* s Kashmir policy which are unacceptable to India and have therefore to be resisted. Pirst, Pakistan is determined to go on giving Kashmiri terrorist and secessionist gangs all manner of J.:9 help seoond, Pakistan is trying to p"* military pressure on the line of control. Third, Pakistan is out to inter nationalise the Kashmir issue, take it back to the u N and flog the dead horse of plebiscite. However, Indian capacity to resist or mitigate hostile international opinion %«ould depend almost entirely on how soon we bring internal disorder and subversion under control, 128, MALrHOTRA (Inder). Gen Zia and Kashmir issue - highly negative stance, TI.; 1980, 5, 29, Since an inprovement in relations with Pakistan is one of India's major foreign policy planks it would be both unrealistic and unhelpful to overlook the misgivings that have arisen of late on this score. These am large ly from what Gen Zia-ul-Haq has chosen to say about Kashmir and tend to cloud the optimisn generated by Mr Swaran Singh's Mission, Gen Zia is raising the Kashmir issue at a wrong time when the developments in Afghanistan warrant better relations between India and Paidstan. Gen Zia recent acts make one wonder whether he has started losing interest in better relations with India which he had shown initially. 129, MALHOTRA (Inder), Kashmir issue threatens to sour Indo-Fak relations:Unf riendly vibes. Sunday 17,5; 1990, Feb, 4-10; 7, 1 'V^ 1 « ) ^' What a quirk of irony it is. The more sincerely India's new government tries to make South Asia an "area of friendship* the more it is thwarted by melgin forces that cannot be wished away from the subcontinent =?1 scene. A part from giving terrorist and seccessionists of Kashmir ample covert help, in the form of Kalashnikovs, cash, training, indoctrination and sanctuary, Pakistan is now planning to internationalise the issue by taking it back to the UN, They realise that if India- Pakistan relations over Kashimr continue to deteriorate at the current rate, the US policy of befriending both India and Pakistan, of gliding military aid and political support to Pakistan and economic and technological assistance to India, would become untenable, 130, MUSTAFA (ZX Kashmir dispute and the Simla Agreement, Pakistan Horizon 25, 3,y 1972; 38 - 52, It is now clear that the final settlement of Kash mir issue will be determined not only by the policies adopted by India and Pakistan, but also the attitude taken by the people of Kashmir on either side of the ceasefire line and also the shape the power struggle bet ween china and the USSR assumes in the region. 131, PALIWAL (Shyamdatta) . Avenging a betrayal. One Nation 131 Chronicle; 1990, June, 1-15? 16-18 After independence India had refused to sign the argeement which Maharaja Hari Singh had concluded with Pakistan. Pakistan knew that with the release of Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmiri's would have a popular movement for their accession to India and therefore took recourse to aggression. The Indian Govt forgot its first promise of not interfering in the internal affairs of Kashmir, Kash mir was humiliated and repressed for a long time but till Sheikh Abdullah was there the state presented the best example of comninal harmony. The rise of fundamentalism and terrorism began after his death and the central Govt did nothing to counter it. On the other hand it gave it respectability, 132. RAHMAN (IA) . Whose Kashmir ? Sunday 17, 6; 1990, Feb, 11-17; 31. Even the moderates in Pakistan fail to accept the Indian view that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that this cannot be the subject of negotiation. What leaders in both countries must realise is that both Indians and Pakistanis have had to pay a prohibitive price for their attitudes on Kashmir and that the search for a new basis of understanding must begin with a clear realisation that they have to fall in line with the epoch-making changes occurring all over the World, lo2 133. SIDHVA (Shiraz). Kashmir: Rule of the gun. Sunday 17, 8; 1990, Feb, 25- Mar 3; 20-29. That the people are with the militants is quite clear in the one month since the new administration has taken over, not a single militants has been captured. The militants who now enjoy the widespread support of the people are slowly abadoning their earlier caution and restraint. The violence and terror continue. Mean while, arms and poeple continue to be snuggled in from Pakistan occupied Kashmir to help their "trapped brethren," 134. SIDHVA (Shiraz). Who runs the valley? Sunday 17, 20; 1990, 5, 20-28, 32-5, According to intelligence sources the two reigning militant groups at this juncture are these who call the shots in the valley while the JKLP has over the years earned the support of a large section of the valley, it is the HM that has gained popularity. It enjoys considerable clout in terms of money and arms, because of the tremendous backing it receives from the JEI in Pakistan and other "sympathetic" Islamic counttles. While the two main groups launch their attacks separately, they are careful to help each other underground, and are said to even have met recently across the border to discuss a coordinated counter J .S 3 offensive against the Indian govt's recent crackdown. They also help each other with funds and money. Together, they enjoy the mass support of the people - the JKLP through popular appeal and the HM through threats and fear. , MILITARY 135. SHARMA (P) . India - Pak arms race continues. HT 66, 278; 1989, 10, 6; 14. Despite improved political relations between India and Pakistan, both countries continue to invest heavily in their armed forces, according to ISIS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) . The report of ISIS has pointed out th^it India and Pakistan had clashed on several occasions during the year in the disputed Siachen glacier region but a ceasefire has now been agreed. Both countries are expanding their defence industries to improve their armeJforces. Tbe report said that both Indian and Pakis tani airforces had increased their combat strength, -.^-, -, ARMS, BALLISTIC, PAKISTAN 136. JASJIT SINGH, Ballistic Missiles in Pakistan. Tl; 152, 59; 1989, 2, 28; 6. All of a sudden a rash of ballistic missiles appea- res to have erupted in Pakistan. The achievement of a J () -t significant ballistic capability had been percieved as a remote future possibility. Pakistan adopted a raultipron- ged approach which extended to delivery systems as well. The reality of a ballistic missile programme reaching a level of maturity in PaXistan must be recognised. Pakistan can improve accuracies to levels where conventionally armed ballistic missiles will be of significant military value. , _, -, AIRPLAN3S, P-16, PAKISTAN 137. CHAKRAVARTI (Subhash) , India concerned at Pak more to buy 60 P-16s. TI_; 152, 19; 1989, 1, 19; 1. If the US administration were to comply with Pak istan* s request to sell it 60 additional P-16 fighter altcraft then it would be a matter of great concern to the Indian Govt. Pakistan move made it clear today that its adverse impact on the developing relations between India and Pakistan was known in Washington. She cannot afford to withdraw the request by may privately slgfial than Ms Bhutto is not pressing it. The F-16 request would raise Pakistan overall strength in combat aircraft. 138. JASJIT SINGH. More arms for Pakistan: Request for P-15. HT; 66, 26; 1989, 1, 26; 11. J ty '-) Pakistan is seeking an additional 60 P-16 combat aircraft from the US, India was sincerely, looking for ward to better relations with Pakistan in the days ahead. The reinforcement of militarist approach in inter-state relations reflects the military-dominated froeign policy in Pakistan. At the same time, glib Justifications are only likely to fuel mistrust between India and Pakistan and force the window of opportunity for improvement of bilateral relations to close. The opportunity of the century in improving Indo-Pak relations, , _, -, NUCLEAR 139. AKMAL HUSAIN. Indo-Pakistan threat perception. Asian Stu dies: 1987, 5, 9; 23-37. Discusses that the historical rivalry between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim league in British India has continued in the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. The conflicting threat perception emana ting from each other has brought them closer to their respective super power allies, India's status as a regio nal power since 1972 has been challenged by Pa3cistan through her search. or nuclear parity. The Soviet inter vention in Afghanistan in 1979 has added new complexities in Indo - Pakistan relations. Pakistan, according to her J3G policy makers, would under take "Limited" remodelling of its armed forces with the newly acquired US arms. This conflicting threat perception cannot create the required environment of peace for SAARC, 140. ANITA (SN) Islamic Bomb and India: An appraisal. Main stream 17, 45; 1979, 7, 7> 11-2. Pakistan is on the verge of exploding the first ever nuclear deterrent by an Islamic country. It must be fully appreciated that without massive financial aid from some oil rich Arab countries, Pakistan could not have achieved the nuclear capability. The 'Islamic' nuclear deterroit will not be the sole property of Pakistan but a joint Arab venture, which will obviously be controlled by the Arab Nations and will require their unanimous sanction for use against India. India's national policy of using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes has been made amplyclear to the world. Those who are enamoured of the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons should remember that there will be no victors in a nuclear war. 141. BIDWAI (Praful) . Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Seminar 19 66, Aug; 27-33. The pace at which India and Pakistan have moved to J ;^ 7 make the horific possibility realisable. In both the countries vigorous efforts are underway to acquire a nuclear weapon capability and more weapon grade fissile material and auxiliary equipment. The evidence to this effect is fairly strong and lobbies in both the countries have grown stronger and more vocal in the recent past. The creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, as nuclear weapon are not and can never be legitimate instru ments of state policy. There is a silver lining to South Asia dark nuclear clouds in the sense that pressure groups arguing and compaigning against a nuclear bomb and nuclear weapons Free Zone in South Asia are everging are both India and Pakistan. 142. CHARI (PR). Pakistan's nuclear posture and India's options. Bconomic and Political weeklvl5,3? 1989, Jan; 117-22, Given the history of the Conflict between India and Pakistan, and given India's own nuclear explosion in May 197 4, the activation of Pakistan's foreign and nuclear policy to counter the perceived threat from India has hardly been unesqpected. This article describes PaJcistan's exist ing nuclear facilities, its future plans in the direction of achieving military nuclear capabilities, and the options available to India to meet them. J 38 143. KHAS (iAnsar Ali) . Pakistan's pentad—India* s obstinancy Nuclear debate in the region. South Asian Studies 4, 2; 1987, JUlyj 65 - 74, Pakistan has offered India one concrete and practi cal proposal after the other which have now transformed into a pented, India has not only rejected every proposal but has also eiitoarked upon a malicious propaganda against Pakistan, Instead of evaluating her own ambitions she is obstreperous about Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme. What are the real motives behind India's obstina<:y and Rejection ? To erase even the last traces of suspicion and doubt Paikistan has offered India a pentad consisting of jointly signing the NPT 1968-70 or a bilateral NPT inter national or bilateral inspection of each others nuclear facilities and joint renunciation of the use of nuclear weapon. If India really desires peace in the region, she mast give a supporting hand to Pakistan's proposals. 144. KULKAPNI (VG) . Indo-Pakistani rivalry boosts nuclear options. Far East Econ Rev 136, 15; 1987, 4, 9; 40-41, The most dangerous aspect of the Indo - Pakistani confrontation is the potential of the two sides to obtain a nuclear-weapons capability. In the short run. New Delhi and Islamabad are likely to continue to react in kind to each other* s nuclear moves. In any case both sub-continental 130 adversaries cx>uld continue Improving their nuclear potential without going openly nuclear. Seizing the nuclear option unilaterally would have far reaching Inter national repercussions for both countries. 145. MARWAH (Onkar) . India and Pakistani Nuclear rivals In South Asia. Int Org 35, 1; 1981, Win; 165 - 79, The new International nuclear regime requires accession to full scope safeguards and an acceptance of the formal restraints Imposed by the London, Nuclear Suppliers Group on the Worldwide availability of sensitive nuclear technology, materials and equipment. Pakistan has capitalized on the existence of such a market to acquire the means to make nuclear weapons. Though South Asia is likely to be the first region outside the central strategic system to harbour nuclear-armed national rivals, the situation is manageable through the imposition of innovative institutionalized constraints on the region. In the long run, the imbalance of capabilities between India and Pakistan will manifest itself in the nuclear field as it has in others. 146. MEHROTRA (0 N) . Imminence of Indo-Pak Arms Race. Strategic Analysis 3, 11; 1980, Feb; 401-5. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in .140 December last year posses many serious problems for the world in general and for the states In this region in particular. Since the ndlitary intervention was by one of the super powers, other super power the united states got naturally concerned by the action. The present situa tion is in a sense grimmer because Pakistan'is also seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and the US has virtually given up its efforts to restrain Pakistan. Pakistan has been trying to strengthen its defence build up by security assistances from the United States and its allies. The indo- Pak arms race is a direct corollary of action-rela tion phenomenon of their effotts to acquire arms. Time is already running out and therefore some serious efforts have to be made to control the arms race between the two neighbouts - India and Pakistan, 147. INDO - PAK relations! More on the Islamic bomb. Current Topics 13,6; 1987, May; 329 -30. The magazine "Time" of USA has reported on March 22 that Gen 2ia-ul-Haq had admitted his country to build up a nuclear bomb. He told New Delhi. according to the correspondent of Time:"Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes. Once you have acquired the technology which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you like". Mr Gandhi has said that any nuclear weapon produced by Islamabad J4l would infact be an "Islamic bomb,,, which is funded by Arabs and will be made available to the Arab's", 148. SUBRAHMANYAM (lO , Our Nuclear predicament. Strategic Analysis 9,7; 1985, Oct, 647 - 68. The talk of Indian nuclear predicament in terms of Pakistan only ±n terms of Pakistan and china only is to ignore the most crucial and dominant factor in interna tional relations and strategy. In such circumstances to ignore the nuclear factor in all its dimensions and to look at it as an Indo - Pak or Indo- China factor will be to continue to display the credulity and negligence. Its extremely doubtful whether the already delicate political relations between India and Pakistan can stand the strain of intrusive mutual insoection. If India is to remain non- nuclear surrounded by the three major nuclear weapon powers and with Pakistan having reached the capability to produce nuclear weapons our sense of insecurity will be such that pressures to expand our conventional forces will be never ending. 149. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . Pakistan's nuclear capability and India's response, In_ Seminar on Indo-Pak relations (New Delhi) (1984), Studies in Indo-Pak relations: papers, Ed by VD Chopra. 120-34. The Pakistani ambition to go nuclear is also \^'d a matter of national consensus in that country, A part from these factors there is the well-known explanation for certain countries going nuclear put forward by the American strategic cummunity. Early in 1978 the Indian Foreign Minister first disclosed in Parliament that Pak istani nuclear efforts had non peaceful dimensions. Since PaldLstan has reached the uranium enrichment capability, it is to be assumed that they will be in a position to build up an arsenal of uranium bombs constrained only by the out put of their centrifuge plant. The announce ment of reaching enrichment capability itself is a first major step in this strategy. This strategy has several serious mplications for conventional war in the Indo- Pakistan. 150, SUBRAMANIAN (RR) . India Vs Pakistan: the nuclear option. Foreign Affairs ReTX>rt3 34, 5; 1985, May; 59-68. In the mid 1980s, the strategic environment of South Asia displays a markedly different character from that prevailing in the seventies. At that time, largely as a result of the Bangladesh war, India's credentials as the dominant power in the region had been clearly estab-. lished. The proximity of the South Asian region to South west Asia may cause the tensions there to have their spillover into the former. Added to this the nuclear J 4 -. factor, on that has assumed some degree of importance, in view of the recent success that Pakistan has achieved in developing a nuclear weapons capability. , -, -, -, INDIA 151« MUKERJEB (D) . India's nuclear test and Pakistan. India Quart 30, 4; 1974, Oct - Dec; 262 - 70. If it is to maintain the credibility of its peace ful professions, India will have to give a very convincing arguement for any objection to the Pakistani UN proposal that Indian nuclear facilities should be put under inter national safeguard. Beyond this, the Pakistani have argued that South Asia should be a zone of peace from which nuclear weapons are barred. Neverthelsss; even of the 1974 Pakistani proposal were to be adopted, mutual suspi cions between India and Pakistan would still not be dissipated on the nuclear issue if the ongoing underlying friction between them did not cease with respect to border long term questions* 152. POULOUSE (TT) . India and the nuclear safeguards contro versy. India Quart 35, 2; 1979, Apr-June; 153 - 62. India's nuclear policy from its inception has been to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy and to ^emphasize to 141 importance of nuclear weapons in international politics. India has all along favoured universal, non-discriminatory safeguards applicable to all nations and to all nuclear facilities. The Pakistani move to acquire nuclear weapons thirough the uranium route can only reinforce the rationale of retaining India* s nuclear option, 153. SUBRAMWIMJ (RR) . India and the bonibi to overview. India Quart 30, 4; 1974, Oct - Dec; 295-9. India' s peaceful nuclear explosion can be viewed in terms of a "domestic" political decision taken in the light of various international developments during the past two decades. Although the "bonto" decision was made over two years ago following the exhibition of an irrational policy of "Gunboat Diplomacy" on the part of US in pursuance of the Kissinger till theory, the actual denodation came at the time when India was determined to destroy the "equal India to Pakistan" theory. Indian Foreign policy, in the context of South Asia, has witnessed the effect of the above theory via the military arming of Pakistan by the peoples Republic of China and the US. Also the so called "Nixon-Mao Shock" arising from Kissinger's secret journey to peking from Islamabad had necessitated an explicit demonstration of "Nuclear weapons capability." The mis conception that India and Pakistan figure in a balance of power calculus is greatly removed by India's bomb. .1 4') , -, _, -, PAKISTAN 154. CHEEMA (Pervez Iqbal) . Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology. Past Outlook 34, 2; 1980, Aig; 188 - 9 6. Pakistan will continue experimentations in the nuclear field and will not subject its researches to international safeguards and inspection untill its nei ghbours, India, agrees to do the same. Although the Indian nuclear explosion accelerated Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, western pressure to influence Pakistan to refrain from undertaking the course of action has strengthened the will of the Pakistanis to go nuclear. 155. KAUSHIK (Brij Mohan), Pakistan's nucLear policy. Punjab Journal of Politics 7, 1; 1983, Jan-Oune; 15-33. Pakistan's nuclear policy is by and large a func tion of India's nuclear policy. Pakistan intends to go in for nuclear weapons because she perceives India as a nuclear weapon power. India has made no efforts to assuage Pakistan's apprehensions in this regard. If Pakistan has, therefore, failed to have a nuclear explosion so far, it is not because of any lack of political will on its part but because of the difficulties in enriching uranium for weapons purposes. There should be a diplomatic offensive J 4 '^ by India so as to check Pakistan from going nuclear, for nuclear cooperation between India and Pakistan as the possible way to stop the prospective nuclear arms race in the sub-continent. 156. INDO - PAK RELATIONS: Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Current Topics 13, 7? 1987, OUne; 394. Sahibzada Yaqub Khan initiating in a debate on April 20 pleaded for a constructive dialogue between India and Pakistan on the thorny issue of nuclear weapons to avoide proliferation in the region. Mr KC Pant had told the Lok Sabha that the weapon oriented nuclear policy of Pakistan and the emerging threat from that country were forcing India to review its options in the matter. Be noted that India's efforts to mormalise rela tions with Pakistan had not proceeded beyond a certain point. 157, INDO - PAK RELATIONS: Progress in Pak N-Programme. Current Topics 13, 4; 1987, Mar; 202. The US ambassador, Mr Dean Hinton ha« said that Pakistan was going ahead with its nuclear weapons progra mme, further he added some Pakistani people shared the Late Zulfiqar All Bhutto's view that "we should eat grass to have nuclear weapons." J47 158, KAFUR (Ashok) . Nuclearizing Pakistan: Some hypotheses. Asian Survey 20, 5; 1980, May; 495-516. There Is evidence in Pakistan's declaratory policy and its development of capability since India's 1974 test, to move towards a boixib decision. The theses of In do- Pakistan "action-reaction" should be crltically-exandned because Pakistan's nuclear policy making process is respon sive to domestic, regional and international factors. The indo - Paid Stan "action-reaction" focus should not be over stated because Pakistan's nuclear history can be divided into four parts. Before Pakistan decides to engage India in a nuclear race there will be an in house debate.Pak istan' s nuclear policy is a reaction to Mr Garter' s anti- proliferation policy and it is cautious and arribiguous. 159. MOHAMMED ASLAM. Pakistan's halting steps. HS; 197 5,1,21. The process of India-Pakistan reconciliation is moving slow. There are many reasons for this Pakistan still doubts India's intention towards it, in spite of Indian assurance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr Bhutto knows he cannot be completely indifferent to normalizations neither does he want instantaneous friend ship because of the international situation and domestic public opinion respectively. If peace and progress is J4^> to be achieved in Simla accord is necessary. But this is possible only if Mr Bhutto gives up his policy of delaying things in one way or the other, 160. NAMBOODIRI (PKS). Pakistan's nuclear strategy. Strategic Analysis 4, 9; 1980, Dec; 403 - 7, Pakistan has made a decision to acquire nuclear weapon in 1972. This clearly tells that Pakistan's nuclear ambition was not an offshoot of India's nuclear explosion in May 1974. The water resource of India pro vides her a great opportunity to lift the bulk of her population from the morass of poverty and disease. The challenge of the eighties is to provide the technical ingenuity and needed will to use this resource wisely. There is a greater need today to evolve low-cost techniques to arrest if not eradicate, water pollution. , -, _, -, role of IRW^ 161. BETTS (Richard K) . Incentives for nuclear weapons: India, Iran, Asian Survey 19, 11; 1979, Nov; 1053-7 2. India and Pakistan have sample security incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons. Both face major threats and tack reliable allies India may need nuclear weapons to to counter China's nuclear araenal, and Pakistan has no J 43 hope of matching India's power at the conventional level. Iran has potential incentives for nuclear weapons. Domestic political deterndnants of nuclear decisions in the three countries are also discussed. , -, -, role of SUPER POWERS 162. HAMMOND (J Casey) . Aplonib or the borrib: Outlook for Indo- Pakistani relations in a global perspective. India Quart 37, 4; 1981, Oct-Dec; 590 - 98. The US, the USSR and China would do well to realize that their own secutlty would be enhanced if they helped to develop a non-aligned sub-continent. In particular, the US should reassess its relationship with Pakistan. The US must do all it can to build a stable and popular Govt,in Pakistan; only then would India reach an accord with Pak istan. In addition, the US irust recognize India for what it is the strongest and most influential country in South Asia. , -, -, role of USA 163. IN DO - PAK RELATIONS: Concern over Pak arms build-up. Current Topics 14, 6; 1988, June; 333, Mr Prank Carlucci said in Islamabad that even after the Soviet troops leave Afghanistan, the USA will continue 5:: to supply arms to Pakistan. India looksup the matter with The USA and coveyed to Washington its concern over the massive supply of sophisticated American arms to Pakistan, A state official was reported to have said, "We have strong relations with Pakistan and they will continue." Mr Gandhi said, "we are very worried about US arms to Pakistan, What it means is that we have to spend a lot of our money on defence which is totally contrary to our economic develop ment," 164, JOHAL (Sarabjit) . America's arming of Pakistan: India views in the 1950s and 1980s. Strategic Studies 9, 2? 1986, Win; 68-79, The Indian Govts response to the recent re-arming is thus heavily influenced by its perceptions of the earlier United States - Pakistan alliances. India and Pakistan have been negotiating to permanently normalise relations between the two countries. Some progress has been made in setting up a joint commission for economic and cultural cooperations, Indo-Pakistan relations have deteriorated over such matters as Kashmir and alleged Pakistan support to Sikh secessionists in the Punjab, For Indian policy makers the 1981 rearming of Pakistan closely parallels the 1954 arming of Pakistan, J -J JL 165. NARAYANA (KR) . American arms, India and Pakistan. Free Press Journal; 1984, 11, 12. The two aspects of American policy-strengthening Pakistan military in the »ab-continent and projecting it globally as a link in the Chain of anti-communist strategy- went side by side reinforcing each other. The fact that in the past American arms were used by Pakistan against, and only agadnst India makes us examine closely the ques tion of the basis of the current supply of sophisticated and deadly arms to Pakistan. As the supply of arros to Pakistan is intert nded with America? S global policies and has the effect of accentuating Pakistan's differences and competition with India, a relaxation of international tensions generally and of the conflicts in South West Asia and the Persian Gulf particularly, is essential in a very practical sensefor improving India's relations with the USA and Pakistan. 166. PARIMDO (JN) . PM tells Reagan of Pak N-plan threat. TI^; 1985, 10, 25. Indo - Pakistan relations were the focus of Mr Rajiv Gandhi's meeting with US president, Mr Ronald Reagan Mr. Gandhi voiced the growing concern of the people of India over Pakistan's nuclear weapons making progranme. 152 Mrleagan told Mr Gandhi that President Zia had no plans to make the boinb. The US President suggested that the two countries should resolve this issue through mutual cooperations. India's growing concern over the continued us supply of arms to Pakistan Mr Reagan suggest that the best solution to the problem lay in India improving it relations with Pakistan. , MILITARY POLICY 167. BAID (Samuel) and SREBDHAR. Pakistan's defence potential. Foreign Affairs Reports 25, 4; 197 6, ^r; 53 - 66. The continued tension system in Pakistan and India de ives Primarily from the former's persistent belief that India constitutes a threat to her security. Against this backdrop the authors examine Pakistan's defence potential in the next decade. The article is divided into five sections: experiences during the three wars, the present economic base, the threat perception of Pakistan, its arms build-up in the recent years, and possible future trends. 168. ELKIN (Jerrold P) and RITEZEL (w Andrew) . Indo - Pakistani military balance Asian Survey 26,5; 1986, May; 518-38. Islamabad's acqusition of sophisticated American .15 a weaponry has done little to alter pejeaci.sting power asy mmetries in the sub-continent, India countinues to enjoy an overwhelming numirecal and qualitative advan tage in most weapon categories, and a like superiority in command, control, and conwwnication logistics; and the indegenous manufacture of armaments. New Delhi regularly adduces the threat presented by Pakistan in Justifying its arms purchases. However, an expanded arsenal also facilitates achievement of more sweeping policy objectives, such as gaining an ascendent power position in the Indian ocean and ultimately, attaining major power status. 169. GUPTA (Amit). Pakistan's acquisition of armss Rationale, quest and implications for India. IPSA Journal 14, 3> 1982, Jan-Mar; 422 -43. The existence of a well-armed American proxy, Pakistan, on India's border limits India's ability to act as a regional power and restricts it from playing its due role in global politics. An armed Pakistan encouraged by the tacit support of the US may be tempted to wage a war to re-establish its military pre-eminence or to use the conflict to resolve domestic problems. At least , this development will menace the existing regional power balance and push India into a arms race. J5r . 1 170, JAIPAL (Rikhi) Non-nuclear ration able, NH; 1989, 4,4. The nuclear danger to mankind's survival has been uppemost in the minds of India's leaders. In the view of the late Smt Indira Gandhi, nuclear weapons represent the ultimate in force, and any attempt to eliminate force as the determining factor in international relations nust begin with practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. It is in this context that we should consider the nuclear threat emerging from Pakistan, Such a threat can be met by signing the non-proliferation Treaty or by establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. 171. MOONIS AHMAR. Security perceptions in the Indo-Pakistan relationship, Pak Horizon 37, 1; 1984; 100 - 119, India and Pakistan form the core of the South Asian security system and any adverse development in their rela tions inevitably affects the geo-political and security environment of the entire region, India-Pakistan relation since the time of the partition are marred with historical animosities, mutual, suspicion, arms build up and political tension. Security relations between India and Pakistan are to be studied from historical, religious, military and and political aspects, A conducive security perception between India and Pakistan demands their convergence on external security threats and internal political disputes. 15rr 5r 17 2. MUKERJBE (Dillp) . Hi-tech players in a dangerous game of catch. Far East Soon Review 140,23j 1989, 6,9; 32-4. India and Pakistan have accused each other for years of building military capabilities far in ejcass of any reasonable requirements. But neither has ever set out objective yardsticks by which their own build-ups should be measured. Both India and Pakistan explain their accelerated arms build-up in the 19803 by claiming a sharp deterioration in their security environment. Best of all, non-official contacts between the two countries are now mach greater than any time in the past 25 years. This is reviving the love part of the love-hate relation ship between two countries that have so nuch in common. 173. PASRICHA (PH) . Military balance between India and Pakis tan. In, Seminar on Indo-Pak relations (New Delhi) (1984) . Studies in Indo-Pak relations: papers. Ed by VD Chopra, 135 - 151. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 can be regarded as a watershed in indo-Pak relations. The supply of arms by the US to Pakistan fits partly with the basic need of moder. nisation and most of the remainder dovetails with the Pakistani role in West Asia as assigned by the US. India, on the other hand, has its own larger and long .15G term security needs to cater to through noder nisation of its armed forces. It is a delusion to think that friendship between India and Pakistan would iiwnediately end the inoderanisation process or reduce weapon pro gramme. India cannot afford to ignore the portent of likely active US support to Pakistan in the event of a war with India. 174. RAMA RX) (ft)t India and Pakistan : Differing security perceptions. India Quart 41, 1 ; 1985, Jan - Mar ; 28-35. Every country has certain basic security concerns arising from its geostrategic location, strength and attitudes at any givoi time of neighbouring countries. In the case of Pakistan, threats from external sources have been minimal if not altogether absent. There is increasing concern in India on this account. Several factors tend to rein force this concern. First, Pakistan has secured extremely powerful air, naval and land attack weapons in the form of aircraft. Second, Pakistarfeelectronic surveillance system, would enable Pakistan forces to destroy Indian forces. Third, Pakistan is already a nuclear power and its capability may be approaching that of Israel in this regard. lb/ ,—, PAKISTAN 175. CHMJDHRI (Mohammed Ahsen) . Pakistan and regional securltyi A Paldstanl view. India Quart 36, 2; 1980, i^r-June; 179-91. Pakistan Is worried over New Delhi's failure to uhderstand the Implications for the sub-continent of the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. Yet, India Is opposed to any Pakistani move to strengthen its defences. It gives the impression that India does not want to irrprove rela tions with Pakistan on the basis of equality Pakistan is bedevilled by the vision of Scenario in which slmrultaneous pressure from India and the USSR is accompanied by the danger of an internal subversion edmed at under mining the Ideological basis of PaJdstan. At the same time Pakistan is trying to improve relations with India because any strain in their relations is likely to aggravate the situation in the region. 176. RI25VI (Hasan-Askarl) . Pakistan's defence policy. Pak Horizon 36, 1; 1983; 32-56. A comprehensive review of PaJdstan's defence policy since 1947, taking into account the geo-strategic context. Security problems goals and strategies. The author examines the InrpllcatL ons of establishment of Bangladesh on Pakistan's defence policy, India's nuclear explosion in 1974 Pakistan's Indian Ocean strategy the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan's options in 1980s. 177. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . Pakistan's Armed Forces : A stute modernisation strategy, TI_ 152, 58; 1989, 2, 27; 6. An objective assessm&it of Pakistan's military preparedness not only by itself but also in comparison with India is a necessary first step in fixing our priorities for arms acquisition. Any objective assess ment of Pakistani forces for a person in India outside Government is far more difficult than for a Pakistan in respect of India. Pakistan would incur no penalty for proceedings with its nuclear and missile prograiranes. The best course for our modernisation prograinne is to secure a nuclear missile shield and thereafter adjust the pace of our conventional force modernisation to our means. 178. SYBD (AH). Pakistan's security problem s A bill of constraints. Orbis 16, 4i 1973, Win; 952-74. Palcistan's security problan arises mainly from the tense state of her relations with India, It is aggravated by an Indian - Soviet combination against China and Pakis tan. Pakistan may be willing to end the old confrontation with India but is notwilling to accept subordinate status in relation to India. If India insist on being the domi nant power in South Asia, PakistatJfesecurity problem will remain severe. In dealing vd.th this probl«n domestic cohesion and national integeration are Just as important as military capability. , PROSPECTS 179. BSRINDRWATH (Dewan) . Indo-Pak talks t Zia's tactics. Democratic World 11, 10; 1982, 2, 7. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi herself has been touring round the globe strenghtening bilateral relations and giving India a pivotal role in several multilateral and international gathering. Pakistan had continued to harp upon a bilateral issue like Kashmir in intezmational forums of the Simla agre«na)t would tend to preclude this. India could have come out with a bold and imaginative proposal for lowering of trade and travel barriers, cooperation in field like Science, Technology and Culture and a mutually acceptable frame work of bi lateral assurance on the peaceful use of nuclear energy by the two countries. The lacuna in Gen Zia's oft-repeated no-war pact including some doubts over its motivations. New Delhi has its right to point out, 180. DAYAL (R) . India and Pakistan j Opportunities and compul sions. India Quart 28, 2y 197 2, Apr-JUne; 106-8, The situation of In do-Pakistani relations is useful of opportunities and there are inherent compulsions which 103 must propel the two countries towards seeking a pattern of peaceful co-existence in which the ever-recurring spectre of war is for ever banished. 181. DHAR (MK) . Thaw in relations with Pak likely. HT; 1989,7,19. Mr Gandhi has made it clear that India can talk with a democratically elected government^ though itwill take time for relations, frozen for four decades, to thaw, India's main concern is Pakistan's huge arms build-up and hence the need to normalise relations to end a hostile relation ship with Pakistan and usher in peace so that the two countries could reduce their esqpenditure on armaments. India is also concerned over infiltration of terrorists into Punjab and Kashmir. It is felt that to give more meaningful thrust to bilateral trades, it should be per mitted in all those items which have been allowed to be freely traded with other countries. 182. INDO-PAK SUSPICIONS persist. Link 24, 27; 1982, 2, 14; 8-9. Indo-Pak relations have again become a major topic of discussion in India and elsewhere, particularly non- aligned block. India is believed to have told Pakistan that a no-war pact by Itself would not achieve the objective of normalising relations between the two countries. Neverthe less, India not yet been able to see through President JG Zia-ul-Haq*s motive for pushing the no-war pact projxisal to India, Indian policymakers *d.ll have to resolve many a prickly point in their future negotiations with Pakistan, 183. KATYAL (KK). Big gulf. Uphill task. Hindu? 1986, 6, 2. Since Mr Rajiv Gandhi and Gen 2ia-ul-Haq met in New Delhi last December, the progress towards normalisa tion of relations between India and PaMstan has been negligible. There is a wide gap between the perception of the two neighbours and bridging it will not be an easy task. It has not been possible to integrate their res pective formulations,- Pakistan's paper on a no-war pact and India's draft treaty of peace friendship and coopera tion. There is a genuine gap in perceptions between New Delhi and Islamabad, 184. KATYAL (KiO . New phase in Indo-Pak relations, Hindu, 1989, 1, 17. There are several points of contrast in the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union and Pakistan, in Islamabad, the idea was to give a push to the process of changing the long time adversarial rela tionship into dealings, based on trust and understanding. The Indo-Pakistan relations, are poised for a switch from the unsavoury, bitter past, to a new phase, which made JG:^ a cautious start in December last year. The fact remains that perhaps for the first time New Delhi finds a genuine desire to improve relations with India and is keen to reciprocate it. The two side have started with a clean slate on which could be written the norms for free travel, frequent exchanges now and a trade pact and the Siachen agreement later, 185. KUNDU (Samarendra) . What ails Indo-Pak relations. Janata 37, 8; 1982, 3, 28; 6-7. It is indeed a tragedy that India suffered two important diplomatic reverses recently while handling its assignment on Pakistan. In the Simla agreement that all disputes between India and Padistan should be solved bilaterally and in a "peaceful manner." Unfortunately, Pakistan raises the Kashmir issue again and again in various international forums. The bungling goes on un abated between the rule of the father and the daughter. All bridges built between the two countries to leave in peace and friendship were shattered by the approach of the father and by eccentric behaviour of the "she" factor of the daughter. bo 186, mSRA (GS) . Indo-Pak relations* A permanent stalemate. Patriot? 1986, 9, 30, Pour decades after partition, India and Pakistan remain locked in an adversary relationship. The occa sional oosmetlc words of good neighbourly relations notwithstanding. Fourteen years after the Simla pact, Pakistani leadership have repeatedly come to the conclu sion that normal trade with India is not in their interest, that cultural relations with India are harmful, and that Pakistan's strategic interests preclude normalisation of relations with India and require a state of near tension, obviously, a state of deliberate and prolonged adversary approach reflects something deeper, Infact, the political stalemate is a reflection of a military strategic stalemate, 187, MUGHA (Nazir ;0 . Inching together or a mile apartx India and Pakistan towards detente, Pak.,Horizon 29, 3; 197 6; 20-32, Although it would be unwise to be overly optimistic, the prospects of the rapproachment between India and Pak istan seem to be good. In view of the present balance of power in the Indian sub-continent, the domestic problems facing both countries, and the limited capabilities of external powers to intervene in a decisive fashion, the prospects of Indo-Palcistan detente are encouraging. There are many recent premonitions of such a development. 188, NORMALISING INDO - PAK Relations. Current Topics 15,4; 1989, Mar; 202, Describes that the people of both sides of the Indo- Pak border have been on the look out for signs of injyrove- roent in Indo-Pak relations and there has been lot of wishful thinking on that score. Leaders in both countries have expressed their keen desire to normalise bilateral relations. Prime Minister Bhutto said that a solution to the Kashmir issue was necessary for total normalisation of relations with India, 189. PANDIT (GS), Pakistan today: Relations with India, World Focus 2, 3; 1981, Mar; 35-7, There are certain elements in Pakistan who keep up the anti-India bogey to perpetuate themselves in power. They have been using Kashmir for the purpose, India regards the Simla agreement to be a sound basis for improving Indo-Pakistan relations. The basic question is how relations between India and Pakistan would become normal and friendly ? Pakistan's current efforts to secure nuclear capability may be motivated by the tradi tional desire of having parity with India, but India ] T) o should welcome this effort so long as it is £or peaceful purposes. 190. PARTHASARTHY (Milini) , SymbOlis of thaK in Inc3o-Pak ties. Hindu; 1989, 1,1. The nost significant agreement that has been signed between India Pakistan is the prohibition of attack against nuclear installations and facilities of India and Pakistan by each other. The agreement which was first verbally ass«ited to by the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and the late Pak President 21a-ul-Haq, had been set aside as the Indo-Pakistani relations became chiller in the subsequent months. The signing of the agreemait unlike a treaty of mutual verification or a nuclear weapons free zone proposal would not pre-empt its options, but would represent only a measure to build mutual confidence and strengthen the peace process. 191. PATRA (Sarla) . India-Pakistan relations touch a new low. Patriot; 1986, 10, 16. Unless a major shift takes place in Pakistan's attitude towards India, there is hardly any chance of carrying forward the process of normalisation of relations between the two neighbours. These are not f rozai, but have touclTed a new Ipw. it may not be totally unrelated IGG that Islamabads anti-India propaganda during the recent past has risen in volume and intensity along with its widely reported dexterity in handling nuclear fission material. Whether Pakistan has a nuclear bont? or not, there is no little doubt that it has acquired the capa bility of producing nuclear weapons with the facilities already established in that country. While Gen 2ia-ul-Haq will continue to complain in world forums about his perceptions of India's alleged misdemeanour against Pakistan. 192. POLITICAL CHANGE In Pakistan-IIj A breakthrough in Indo- Pak relations. Current Topics 15, 4> 1989, Mar; 216 - 8, Describes that Pakistan is a matter of special interest in normalization of relations between the two distant neighbours for four decades. During these four decades the two countries have fought four wars and have been indulging in eye-ball-to-eye-ball confrontation, India and Pakistan have signed three agreements providing for a commitment not to attack on others nuclear installa tions, avoiding double taxation and expanding cultural exchanges. In the area of foreign policy and more espe cially in the area of Indo - Pak relations in subject to strong and apparent constraints. On a scale and at a I i) i pace of her own choosing for the steady development of good neighbourly relations with India she can help in the removal of bilateral as well as regional misunder standings. 193. RICHTER (William L) . Pakistan — A new "Front line" state. Current History? 1982, May; 202 - 6, 225, In spite of its affirmation that it is only a caretaker government the present Pakistani regime has embarked on a series of steps directed towards the trans formation of Pakistan's society, economy and polity into a new Islamic order. Pakistan has secured the means to upgrade and modernize its military without giving up its non-aligned status or being forced to make any serious corranitments on the use of its new weapons. At the same time, Pakistan has attempted diplomatically to minimise the adverse impact of its arms build - up on its relations with both India and Soviet Union, While it has offered India a mutual no-war pact and the foreign Ministers of the two countries have exchanged visits. 194. TACTICAL AMBIVALANCE. ed. IE; 1985, 11, 20. Indo- Pakistan relations have been bedevilled for too long by accidents (?) , antoiguities and contradictions IGH of this kind for anyone to be overly disconcerted by it. It would be as naively optimistic to see in the Hi scat meeting a breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan relations as it would be naively negative to be upset by Zia's speaking for the record to a British Newspaper, The studies antoivalance of the Pakistani President was evident in the curious rider he made to his assertion of India's nuclear weapon capability. Given the imperatives of sub-continen tal harmony , it would be wrong to let purely propagandist allegations mar the efforts towards improvement of Indo- pakistani relations. 195. TOBA (Reijiro) . In search of stability on the Indian sub continent, Asia Pacific community 28; 1985, Spr; 1-14, One of the basic conditions for stability on the Indian sub-continent is that India and Pakistan try to reduce their almost hyterical antagonism and establish friendly and cooperative relations. This would conttlbute to his goals of stabilizing India's domestic politics and attaining economic growth, Gandhi nust take initiative of efEorts to resume and expand talks between the two countries. \ JAMMU AND KASHMIR PUNJAB H A R Y A N A CROPS- ^Wheat jWt Rice A, Moize Q Cotton'JT;^ Sugarcane ^Bajra INDUSTRIES- A fertilizers ^^1^ Hosiery Goods#k Bicycle fe Agricultural )GG 19 6. MEPiTA (Vinod) . India should make the first nove because Pakistan won't: Go on Be Daring. Sunday 17, l; 1990, Jan, 7 - 13; 10 - 11. Iirproving ties with Pakistan is not a subject vfrdch can be discussed openly. The Pakistan are always creating trouble, while we the innocent victims are caught unawares. India and Pakistan have averted war by a hair's breath. We nust ask with some anxiety whether this is the benchmark on which Indo-Pak rela tions are to be measured. A climate will be created in which relations can be normalised. The Indo- Pak dead lock cannot be broksTn by time, the great healer. Some thing dramatic is required. Yes, even the grand gesture. , PUNJAB 197. PAHMIDA ASHRAP. Strategemes: Pakistan India Relations. Strategic Studies 12, 1; 1988, J>ug; 12-3. The conflictual nature of Pakistan-India relations is an important factor in the South Asian polities. The Indian charge regarding Pakistan's support for terrorism in India is related to the Sikh agitation in the State of East Punjab for a separate homeland. Pakistan has been vehemently denying the above Indian charge. India is also apprehensive about Pakistan's nuclear programme. .170 198, HAMLYN (Michael) . India blames Pakistan for arming Sikhss carlucei seeks to calm border tension. Time? 1988,4, 7, The US secretary expressed Washington* s concern over cross-border tension between India and Pakistan. The Indian Government is apparently carrying on a campaign to persuade world and local opinion that much of the problem in Punjab is to be blamed on the activities of the Pakis tan Govt in encouraging Sikh separatists. The Pakistan Govt has been unable to prevent these from falling into the hands of bandits in the southern province of Sindh, Mr Carlucei declined to accept that Washington was respon sible for increasing tension through its moves to supply more arms to Pakistan. 199, JDSHI (VT) . indo-Pak talks begin on illicit arms trade. Tl; 1987, 9, 9. New bortieff guidelines are to be framed to deal with problems relating to smuggling, illegal border crossing and illicit arms trade between India and Pakistan. The halting pace of normalisation, a lapse of just ninemonths should not be a surprise. The need for evolving new and effective rules had arisen in view of the changed situation in the wake of the Punjab problem and the Indian Govt's charge against Pakistan of harbouring and aiding Sikh terrorist. i JL 200. KATYAL (KK) . Indo - Pak relations in deep-freeze, Hindu; 1988, 8, 6. Plagued by many a snag the Indo-Paklstan relations have been put in a deep-freeze as a result of the latest Govt Statement in Parliament on Islamabad's complicity in terrorist violence in Punjab. The two countries have been in a no-contact syndrome after the abortive discuss ion of their Foreign secretaries. There could be some hope of ending the stalemate in the bilateral relations in case Pakistan responds positively to India's repeated pleas for the handing over the terrorists - 10 to 15 of them — operating from its territory. 201. KATYAL (KK) , Stalemate continues in indo-Pak ties, Hindu; 1988, 6, 22. Indo-Pakistan relations continue to be stalemated after the none too productive talks of Foreign secretaries. There is no more for any significant contact from either side and even the plans for the meetings of the joint coironission or sub-commissions are not mentioned any more. A part from the Punjab factor, the current Stalemate had its origin in the beginning of 1986 when Pakistani Ministers took a hawkish line on Kashmir and the trade issue. Logically, the departure of Mr Junejo and Mr Noorain should have had a positive impact on Indo-Pakistan relations but 172 it has not happened that way. 202. MALHOTRA (Avtar Singh) , Need for wider debate on Punjab. Patriot? 1988, 12, 28. The prospects of improvement in indo-Pak relations is making Punjab extremists jittery. After the air crash of Gen 2ia they were feeling orphaned and apprehensive about the successor. If India and Pakistan come closer and on the basis of bilateral relations. The extretnists training camps and the most convenient channel of arms supply would be in jeopardy, 203. MARWAH (Bhushan) , PM blames Pak for tensions. HT; 1988, 4, 24; 1. Pakistan was solely responsible for aggravating tensions on the sub-continent by balatantly convi ing with the Punjab terrorists and assisting the latter in their attempt to subvert the peace and stability of this countiry. It was unfortunate that Pakistan had been unresponsive to all moves made by this country to improve bilateral ties, Rajiv Gandhi has made it clear that if Pakistan was honest about normalisation of relations with India, it should abandon its nuclear pretensions and cease forthwith hostile postures on Siachen. 173 }4. PAK INVOLVS^EN,T,editorial. TI, 1986# 8, 16; 8. The report on the iaterro^atioos o£ 173 Sikh Youth elsewhere in this issvie can not leave the snallest scope for doxibt texTorist can^aign in Punjab. An Indian agency engaged in such a £abricati(Xi would tend to exaggerate Pakistan's involvement and not to represent it as tl^ low^cast and low-risk operation it is. The interrogators shoxxld look for it in the oiaterial at their disposal. 35. SALAMAT ALI. Behind the barbed wire t Ptinjab seals the Pakistan border to contain Sikhs. Far East Econ. Review 140, 15; 1988« 4« 14; 36-7. Terrorist attacks in India's north-western state of Punjab, bordering Pakistan* have escalated into a guerilla war %rith Sikh separatists arabushing paramilitary forces and mounting rocket attacks on selected targets. In a high-level night long meeting on Punjab. In while decided on what is widely touted as a three-pronged strategy. The first part is to cut off the terrorist foreign links by sealing off the border with Pakistan. The second element is to devise a tighter Interanl intelligence system. The thrid is to muster political suppoxrt to solve the problem. , role of CHINA 206. VERM^ ( S p), India* pakistaaa nd China t A study of regional imbalances* Soiit)! Asian Studies 6« 2; 1971, July; 1-29. A Study of the triangiilar relationship developed iaetween the three Asian g nts during the last qtiarter of a century* covering the evaluation of bilateral relations or adversity and their ideological* territorial and his torical origins. The role played by the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA in the region is considered inasmuch as their respective policies led to the rearrangement of alliances• # role of INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 207, SAINI (Mahander Kinar). Role of multinational coirporations in lndo->Pak relations. In Seminar on Indo-pak relations (Mew Delhi) (1984)• Studies in Indo-PaX relations t papers. Ed by V D Chopra, 206-14. An analysis of role of multinational corporations in Indo-pak relations will not be coB(>lete without a brief review of developments which took place in third world due to the operations of MNCs in these covintries. Equally important is the trend in Pakistan's foreign trade with 1 : O the other coxmtrles; and with India In the last few years. In 1979 when talks for in^roving the relations between India and Pakistan were at the peak« people's Democratic Front accused that the leading MMCs operating in Pakistan were worried over these developiMn'ts, * role of SAARC 208. IMDIA-PAKIS^N Relations* Democratic World 15«47; 1986» 11» 23; 4. The prospect looked dismal before the SAARC submit jri Bangalore^ but in|>roved a wee bit after tt. This is the only assessment possible in the study of the current phase of Indo-^akistan relations as it has emerged from Banglore^ which was the venue for some bilateral exchanges between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. In regard to the statement in the normalisation process« Mr. Gandhi ppinted out that the main questicm coming in the way of concluding a no*war pact or friendship treaty was the locatJ.on of foreign bases. The fact that misunderstandings can arise in such hic^-level exchanges by itself testified to the tenuous natture of Indo-pak relations. All these indicate that relations be-tween the neighbours will tend to worsen more and more before they can or will get better. /J 209. NilUlOTRA (lader). Political Coosneatary : New Phase in Indo-Pak ties, TI 152, 11# 61; 1989, 3, 2; 6. A democratic Governraeot in Pakistan will be friendlier to India than the preceeding rnllitary dictatorship, MS Bhutto gave an excellent start to the new phase in India-Pakistan relations during the SAARC sunxait at Islamabad at the end of 1988. To dwell on these circumstances is not a plea for in action in Indo-4>ak relations. The most encoxiraging development in Indo-Pak relations has been the return to the Simla spirit, 210, NIHAL SINGH, SAARC Crisis. HT 66, 190; 1989, 7, 10; 11. SAARC started timoroiisly with modest agenda. Keeping out the core sectors of economic and trade and bilateral political issues. A beginning was made at the Islamabad summit at the end of the year 1988 to look at the economic and trade issties within an agreed time frame, Pakistan as also some of the smaller neighbours, are still obsezrved with fean of Indian he emony. The great value of SAARC has been to provide a nuetral setting cor resolving bilateral political problems out side the strict framework of organisation. 1 7 7 The only element of hope lies in the measured steps being taken by India and Pakistan to iiqprove relations, 211. SAIAMAT ALI. Gandhi-Bhutto rapport may end the hostility: A hint of hope. Far East Econ. Revew 143, 2; 1989, 1,12; 10-11. Although, Palcistan and India signed a treaty not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, and have agreed to spare each others airlines from dotible taxation and cooperate on cultural and education matt ers, some outstanding problems remain with the indo- Pakistan thaw, however, hopes have risen for the first time that the SAARC coxild become an effective regional organisation, especially in economic affairs. The Indians have how decided to leave it entirely to Pakis tan to select the items for bilateral trade and the fields of other econcmiic cooperation. 212. SAREEN (Rajendra) SAARC Sumnit at Dhaka. Tribune; 1985, 12, 11. By the time the summit came to conclusion, it was clear that it had succeeded beyond the expectations of both the participants and those who watched it from the sidelines, it is a major step forward for these 1 V 8 seven nations to proclaim themselves as belonging to an area %fhlch has a distinct; Identity and an over all connionallty of Interests, The cllraate o£ fellow - feeling and good will among the Heads of State and Government helped make a nuniber of far reaching changes to give added substance to SAARC* The problem of inhibitions-arising out of disparities in the size of the seven countries« there resources and levels of development is not to be under estimated. ,—, REGIONAL 213. tCMOM (N C). problems and promise of SAARC. HT; 1985«11«11 SAARC is designed to promote self-reliance and contribute to mutual trust* understanding and apprecia tion of one anothers problems. Basically« emphasize regional cooperaticm in economic« social« cultural, technical and scientific fields among the seven member states. SAARC has no such adversarial groxip focus- which coxild be a problem* but might also be a promise of better results* slower perhaps« but a lot steadier. With the best of regional cooperation cannot really taXe off* unless there is common political will to add the necessary momentum. 173 # role of SUPER POWERS 214* A6HA SHAHI. pakistaa-India relations ai^ super powers* policies* JSAMES 10(4); 1987 Svmt 3-16. Pakistan and India are the inheritors of two of the richest cultures and civilizations of the world. The three issues namely Pakistan's stand on the Jaramu and Kashmir dispute, its acquisition of American arms« and its unwillingness to acknowledge in explicit have been seen by India as major obstacles to normal rela tions with Pakistan. The history of India-pakistan relations is not exclusively a record of wars §nd tensions. The Soviet Union has made common caxise with lindi^ and warned that it would not tolerate a Pakistani nuclear capability* The danger stems fr 215. MOHAMMED AYOOB. India* Pakistan and super power rivalry. World Today , 38, 5; 1982 May; 194-202. India's preocT;pation with leverage and manoeuvrabi lity even towards an avowedly friendly power like USSR is I 80 a reflection o£ India's basic foreign policy concerns. However, in the context of a renewed or an iinainent military confrontation with Pakistan,India need for Soviet assistance to neutralize a US-supported Pakis tan might outweigh more long-tezm considerations, although neither India nor Pakistan would emerge as the real victor in such a war. t role of U K 216. SHMUA (P). Benazir, Howe hold talks on Indo-Pak ties. HJ ; 1989, 7, 7. Indo-pak relations were discussed when British Foreign Secretary Sir Jeoffrey Howe called on visiting Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The British reaction to this is boxind to be positive. But it is surprising that the question of Indo-Pak relations cropped yxg between MS Bhutto and Sir Geoffrey. It was thoxight that the overall situation in the Indian subcontinent may be discvissed. It shows what in^ortance MS Bhutto gives to the Indo-Pak relations even thougpi the question was disctissed without going into the details. ^- '^3 0 0 181 —•-# role of USA 217. ABRAHAM (A S). Indo-Paklstan - US ties. TI? 1984«10«19. Indo-pakistan relations« never very cordial of the best o£ tiraes, have In recent weeks been deterio rating precipitoiisly. The peace dialogue between them has stalled as a resiilt of number of developoients. The recent* sporadic clashes in Kashmir's snowbotind border regions between India and Pakistan* troops« the fai-> lure of US Satellite tracking stations to detect two Indian Air Force squadrons recently and demand for an array of sophisticated weapon^ ry frcn the US on the ground that Pakistan needed to "defend" its nuclear installations are these developmental US cannot even hope to make India party of any "strategic consensus" Domestic crises or wide-spread communal rioting are grist to Pakistan's diplomatic mills and it will not lose any opportunity* to put India on the spot. 218. ABRAHAM (A). Pakistan as America's ally : Bid to alter US perceptions TI 149, 203; 1986* 7* 26; 8. Indo-Pakistani relations have not inipioved as .18:^ a result o£ Paldstaa's recent^ Intensified efforts to cozy rxp to the United States. The US would be well advised to distance itself from India in the realisation that its interests are better served by strengthening its links with Pakistan, American policy is to keeping Pakistan happy by aiding it generously« but also maintaining close links with India in the hope that Indo-US ties will warm up eventually into an effect gaunt gUows of amicability. 219* KAPUR (P C)« India, Pakistan and the USA : An American perceptJ6tu Democratic World 17, 10; 1988, 3, 6j 9-11. Hot with standing Pakistan's attempts under American pressure to sabotage Soviet initiative to solve the Afghan problem, there is xreasonable ground for caution optimism that the tragic episode may in deed soon come to an end. This possibility has raised important questions for India. The impact of US military balance and the impact US military assistance on regional nuclear proliferation. It seems clear from such an analysis that a strong US aid plan is vital to countering growing Soviet political and military pre ssure on India and Pakistan. It would need an extra ordinary amount of na vty on the part of any Indian Ib'S analyst of nurtxire h(^es of an early end to American commitment to bolster tip Pakistan as a counter balance to an independent and non-aligned India. 220. MMJHOTRA (Inder). Dialogue witii Pakistan - promise and pitfall. TI? 1980, 3, 13. Pakistan's rejection of the US package of economic and military aid creates a promising atmosphere for the continuation of the India-Pakistan dialogue that began with Mr. R.D. Sathe*s recent visit to Islamabad. There are atleast two factors which should be taken note of while Initiating any Indo-Pakistan dialogue at this stage. Firsts what Pakistan has rejected is the size of the US package^ second the more the people of Pakis tan wants good relations with India. There is yet another pitfall, whatever tries to befreind Pakistan at this stage autoraatically shores vp the unpoptilar military regime and thus xnins t^e risk of alienating the people of Pakistan. 221. PANT (Girijesh C). Major Developments in India's Foreign Policy and Relations January-Jxine 1981. Interna tional Studies 22, 1; 1985, Jan-Mar; 59-77. The process of normalisation of relations between J64 India and Pakistan was stymld by the decision o£ the US to supply F-16 air craft and other advance military hardware to Pakistan, This created doubt and apprehe nsion in India about Pakistan's sincerity about norma lization o£ its relations with India. 222. RAJIV'S GANDHI'S tour abroad. Cxirrent Topics 11, 9; 1985 Aug; 529-30. States that the Reagan Rajiv talks have failed to resolve the differences over the Americans tilt towards Pakistan. The talks helped in forging a better understanding of the two countries perceptions on global and bilateral issues. 223. REDOY (O K). Moves to end drift in Indo-Pak ties. Hindu. 1985, 10, 24; The United States is making some moves behind the scenes to persiiade and prod India and Pakistan to strive for a detente in the subcontinent with a broad measure of understanding on frac ious issues that continue to generate frictions and produce tendons between them. The US - president, Mr. Ronald Reagan is e^qpected to urge the prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the president of Pakistan, Gen Ziaul Haq, when he 65 meets them separately in New York to end the current drift in Indo-Pak relations with some meaningful initiatives to create an atmosphere of mutual for bearance • 224. SAMINA YASMBEN. India and Pakistan : Why the latest excercise in brinloaanship• Australian Joxirnal of Politics and History 34, 1; 1988; 64-72. States that in early 1987 India and Pakistan came close to fighting their fourth major war in less than forty years. The sxidden worsening of Indo-Pak relations was also related to the US administrations decisions to seek authorization fron congress for another six year aid package worth 4 ^ billions for Pakistan. India was using the possibility of a war with Pakistan to convey to the US congress the inherent dangers of arming a South Asian state. Pakistan, on the other hand was \ising the same incident to quletendoraestic opposition to the US-pakistan strategic relationship. 225. SETH (J D). Dangerous vacuum. Trib\ine ; 1989. 7, 12. Indo-Pak relations have entered a rather curious phase of xincertainity. The heightened arms race between the two countries xioder US tutelage points definitely 6 b towards some kind of a morbidly entasgled puzzle. Besides arming the two nations« Washington is fully- backing both Rajiv and Benazir and has given them large economic and technological aid. It is dangerous to believe, that the terroristsare on the run. The hardcore terrorists are slowly moving away from political objectives to wide spread criminal activities. 226. VENXATASUBBAIAH (H) • Pakistan : Politics of guns and butter, Hindi, 1975, 2, 14. It is but natural that India views with concern the recent turn of Pakistan-US relations. India is having economic and cultural relations with USA. The developing countries should have the political will to take steps may some times even prove to be a threat to "middle class democracy ** sof countries like India and contribute to the growth of illiberal authorita rianism. India planners however, feel that the rich peasent will willingly cooperate in bringing about social transformation. India does not view with delight the relative priorities the Americans have given to aims - aid and economic aid. Arms aid is used as an instrument of foreign policy. .1 c^ c 227. YADAVA (Leela). India's reaction to%mrds US military aid to Pakistan, Punjab Journal of Potities 4, 1; 1980« Jan - June; 28-49. There is fear in India that American arms to Pakistan will distxirb the strategic balance and escalate the arms race in the sub-continent, India has always opposed the American strategy to use Pakistan as a buffer to prevent Soviet expansion into the Indian ocasan., India considers that the natureof the arms aid provided by the US to Pakistan was such that it could notbe use against China or Russia* thus these arms vtere meant to be used against India. —-' role of WEST ASIA 228» PASRICHA (PM)• Indo-Pak arm races Image and reality. Mainstream 12, 17; 1983, 12, 24; 7-12. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 can be reQarded as a watershed in Indo-Pak relations, l^e need to live with India as a stronger and better endowed neighbour came as a slow, reluctant and even painful relation to the elite of Pakistan. The mutual distrust between India and Pakistan did not diminish to any appreciable extent. Pakistan becoming part of strategic consensus vdth the US to safeguard the Gulf need not come as a surprise. lb 8 One must also appreciate US Saudi Arabian interest in the improvement of Indo-Pak relations, India feel that Pak's success in an armed conflict in West Asia would enhance its image to bur deterLment. In these circums tances it will be a misnomer to call the Indian defence preparedness as participation in an arms race. , SPORTS, ATHLETICS, PAKISTAN 229. MCHAN (KP)• Times are changing in Pakistan. Sports Star 12, 46; 1989, 11, 18; 26-7. Time might be changing in Pakistan as far as %fom«n and sports go. However, generally every one was in agreement that it was high time the Pakistan women were give their due in sports arena. Hussain Shah of Pakistan the ultimate winner in middle-weight seweats it out against tenacious Mukund killer of India in SAF games in Islamabad. , -, CRICKET, FIVE DAY PAKISTAN 230. HUSAIN (Sultan F). Traditional rivalry. Howzzat ;184. Wienever mention is made of traditional tivalry on the cricket field, the names which come most eadily to mind are oxford and Cambridge. England,Avistralia j^^e crescent versxis Mandot and quite a few others, Pakistan and India fall into the same category. The two top teams from the Asian Sub-continent have somehow come to be regarded as old or traditional rivals, even though their history is not half as old as that of England and Australia for the mythical Ashes. , -, -, -, -, FAISLABAD 231. MOHAN (R). Yet another close call. Sports Star 12, 49; 1989, 9; 6 - 8, Given the circumstances in which the tour began with Pakistan on an unprecedented high and India at an unplumbed depth uhat India has achieved so far is a near miracle. If a draw against Pakistan is to be deemed a victory theti this team has done very well indeed. The Faislabad Test between India and Pakistan draw, there is no result between them. 190 , -, -, -, -, KARACHI 232. MDHMl (R) Encounter with a fanatic. STx>rt3 Star 12, 48; 1989, 12, 2; 10-11. India's first Test at this National Stadium in Karachi, it is possible that some day the tragic figure may end up somewhere else other than a hospital. The fanatic Ziauddin who macfeit to the playing arena and the threatened the Indians, is being whisked away. He was trying to provoke Indian cricketers into retaliating mouthing all kinds of stupid comments about Hindustan and Pakistan. 233. MOHAN (R) . Salvaging some prestige. Sports Star 12, 48, 1989, 12, 2; 6-9. The visit to the National Stadium was not an inti midating experience. The last time out it has been a different story for the Indian team , The team did manage in one of the two Karachi Test of the 1982-83 season but the defeat there was the worst drubbing India had had in years. There wasn't enough spectator support to make the match more successful in terms of selling India - Pakistan cricket bqt at least here was a crowd that second to appreciate the finer points of the langer ]91 version of the game. The Karachi Test was also draw between them* —, -, -, -, -, LAHORE 234, MOHAN (R). Runs in slumberland. Sports Star 12, 50; 1989, 12, 16; 6-9, Test matches are saved or won on the strength of big innings. Tti& lessons have probably beai taught to them early because of their cricketing background. But in a world that is going erazy with the one->day game there is atleast some solace that there are indeed some players like these v^o are more happy do ing vAiat they can in the Test match arena. The third test of India Vs Pakistan at Lahore at the Gadaffi Stadiixn was draw, —, -, -, ONE-DAY, NEHRU CUP INDIA, CALCUTTA 235. R M, Pseud. Middle order collapse. Sports Star 12,45; 1985, 11, 11; 14-5. At Calcutta October 28th Nehru Cup one-day international cricket match was played betweoi India and Pakistan, In which Pakistan was winner by 77 rtrns over India, }-:'2 , -, -, -, PAKISTAN 236, MOHAN (R). Farcical one-day series. Sports Star 12, 52; 1989, 12, 30; 8-10. It was the non-event of the year. The teams rushed from centre to centre in the winter only to find the conditions inlraical to truly competitive limited over cricket. The one-day international cricket matches series between India and Pakistan was held at the Gujranwala, Karachi and Lahore. The Karachi match was abandoned and series was wone by Pakistan, , -, -, -, SHARJAH 237, ASIF IQBAL. Malik on the rampage. Sports Star 12, 44; 1989, 11, 4; 19-20. Pakistan had got its act together so well in the early part of the tournament itself that it was certain to beat India in the last game in the league Matches between India and Pakistan are a very vital part of the economy of cricket in Sharjah. Where would we be without them? A good close contest may ensure the trend of maximum attention being focxised on these mat&hes being maintained. Malik had a fine 1 -. '^• run in the champions Trophy and these could be no argu ment over his becoming the man of the tournament. —, SUMMIT 1972 238. GUPT2^ (S). Issues for the Indo-Pak Sutimit. India Quart 28, 2; 1972, Apr-June; 126-31. No Indo-Pak summit meeting was ever called upon to deal with as many challenges and opportxinities and resolve as com;lex a set of issues as the proposed Indira- Bhutto meeting in June 1972. , SUMMIT 1982 239, DUA (HK). An hour's summit. IE ; 1982, 11, 11. At their meeting in Delhi recently, both Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zia-ul-Haq shared the view that a lasting peace was that the people of the two countries needed most. They agreed to set V5> a joint commission and to resume the secretary level talks on Pakistan's draft for a no-war pact and India's draft for a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation These are positive signs but ma^ydifferences continue to exist. Differences have arisen on the scope of the proposed joint commission. A major negotiating problem J^4 will be the contents of the peace drafts the two Govts have exchanged. As on Kashmir* the differences on the question of bases and facilities are bound to stall the progress of the Indo-Pcikistan dialogue* 240, THAW IN,India - Pakistan relations. Commerce 145, 3726; 1982, 11, 6; 677-8. The first sumnit meeting on November 1 between Pakistan Presidoit, Gen 2ia-ul-Haq, and the Prime Minis ter, Mrs Indira Gnadhi has brought some concrete results, though they might not be termed as a breakthrough to wards normalisation of relations between the two neigh bours of this sub-continent, "Rxe hxirdleshave been formid able and no early way-out could be expected in settling all the differences that have soured the Indo- Pak relations. These are wide areas and nromalisation of trade and economic cooperation itself could build xsp a good foundation for healthy Indo-Pakistan relation. , SUMMIT 1984 241. CLASP HANDS, editorial? IE; 1985, 12, 16, Presid^t Zia6meeting with Mr Rajiv Gandhi will deteimine the future course of Indo-Pakistan relations. 1''5 long embittered and punctuated with mutual suspicion to the common detriment of the two neighbours and of South Asia *«hich is anxious to promote its collective wellbeing through SAARC, More than any agreement, the first requisite for improved Indo-Pakistan ties is confidence-building and the creation fo mutual trust. Relations between the two countries have been conspi- cuosly accident prone with relatively minor incidents or slip being given ecaggerated importance thus leading to avoidable overreaction. The groundwork for economic and cultural cooperation has been laid in previous meet ings and it should be possible to announce an agreement in Delhi. , SUMMIT 1986 242. MC»iAMMAD SARVIAR. India's Foreign Relations with special reference to South Asian countries July-Dec 1986: Indo- Pakistan, South Asian Studies 4, 1; 1987,Jan; 103-21, During the period under review a general stale mate continued in Indo-Pakistan relations. The Indian leadership was conceivably unwilling to let Pakistan get any good publicity at such a large g thering of Third World Nations and also used the NAM summit to IbG make her parochial point about Indo-Pakistani relations. Rajiv-Junejo talks were held in Banglore he discussed the problem areas to the process of normalisation bet ween Pakistan and India, —-, SUMMIT 1988 243. CHAKRA VARTTY (Nikhil), Indo-Pakistan suramitJ Improved ties now in right. TI; 151, 359; 1988, 12, 28; 6. Gandhi's brief encovinter this week with Ms Bhutto opens \xp a new vista of Indo-Pak relations. The new international environment either India nor Pakistan can afford to ignore the winds of change that are blowing in all comers of the globe. This imposes upon us the responsibility of first redesigning Indo-Pak relations. Benazir has rejected Gen Zia's stunt offer of a no-war pact to India, pref ering adherence to the Simla agree ment instead. 244, PAL (Samir). Rajiv, Benazir to work for new phase of relations. HT; 1988, 12, 31. Bilateral talks between Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have clearly brought forth their earnest desire to werk -i 1 '"I towards a new phase of relationship between the two coxintries. This will set in motion a process of improve ment of relations to build mutual confidence and trust. Work will be initiated on both sides on matters that make for lessening of tensions. The discussions between the two leaders also covered international issues, —-, SUMMIT 1989 245. GUPTA (Rakesh), Indo-Pak ties after Islamabad meet. Patriot; 1989, 1, 7, The recent bilateral talks between the two Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan are significant. They are so because after the Simla suntmit. Prime Ministers of the two countries have met. In term of tendencies of changing style and form of international relations, bilateralism is the order of the day. The bilateral issues between India and Pakistan can be tackled at both the levels. Both countries need to draw up measures in the conventional areas. It is possible that the u S may increasingly induce China to help Pakistan and establish a triangular relationship which may cause delays in the Indo-Pakistan process. Ib8 246, INDO - PAK iUSIATIONS: Rajiv in Islamabad. Currant Topics 15, 10; 1989 Sep; 586 - 7, Ms Bhutto said it was difficult to see a dramatic transformation in Indo-Palc relations and asserted that "the step-bystep approach* adopted by the two countries to improve their relations. The need to normalise rela tions to end a hostile relationship with Pakistan and usher in peace so that the two countties could reduce their expenditure on armaments. The talk between two leaders show that a thaw has started ^n Indo-Pak rela tions and two countries could be reasonal^l^y expected to initiate confidence building up i^ich reduce tensions along border and also improve bilateral relations. Ms Bhutto was reported to have made it clear to Mr Gandhi and the India t^at improving relations between India and Pakistan had to be long winded process and they had Just started on the long Journey, 247, NIHAL SlNOi. Indo-Pak reconciliation* Rajivbvisit a step forward. HT; 1989, 1, 10. It is typical of the tangled web of Indo-Pakistani relations that popular Pakistani expectations from the Rajiv Gandhi visit were pitched at an impossible level. Ib9 Beyond a point, gestures have a limited role to play in Indo-Pakistani relations. The constant aspects of Indo-Pakistani relations has been the propensity of agreements to disappear into thin air. The non-fulfil ment of agreements arises from new strains in relations. Perhaps the new winds of change blowing across the world will help the process of Indo-Pakistani reconciliation, A real improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations is for the long haul* 248. PARTHASARTHY (Milini), After euphoria realism in: Indo- Pak relations, Hindu; 1989, 4, 24. After the meeting of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in Islamabad both Govts have been averring that bilateral relations have now been placed in a brighter context characterised by mutual good will and cordiality. The eagerness to impart a new tone to the relations had been couched with realism right from the start, India must be seen as responding to Pakistani concerns and the new Govt perceived as having achieved something siibsta ntial from the new strategic approach to bilateral relations, 249. RAJIV MEETS Benazir. Current Topics 15,3?1989, Feb; 136. Discusses that the visit of the Prime Minister 2lM-' Rajiv Gandhi in Islamabad caught the headlines in news papers all over the world for the high hopes it generated of the dawn of a new era in Indo-Pak relations. The foxmal talksbetween the two countries were the first major attempt in three decades to put bilateral rela tions on a new footing. The aim of two countries to facilitate and oicourage cooperations in the field of Arts, culture. Archeology, Education, Mass-Media and Sports, -—, TREATIES 250. ALI (M) Simla and Tashkent Agreements, Pakistan Horizon 25, 3; 1972; 53 - 74. Like the Tashkent Declaration, the Simla accord also puts off the basic disputes for future negotiations. In so far as Kashmir was concerned, the Tashkent Agree ment was not a step forward (but a sharp retreat to the pre-war, situation). The Simla accord, on the other hand, is a step forwards in t» a n%m ^ti^ction, 251. INDO-PAK accord and divergences. Mainstream 11,8,1983; 1, 1; 3 - 4. The Indian side has no reason to feel dissatisfied with the out come of the ti*oday*s talks with Pakistani officials. The talks were held in persusnce of mandate from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistan's military ruler Zia-ul-Haq to finalise the statutes of the proposed Indo-Pak joint commission and to consider sim ultaneously the Pakistani proposal for no-war pact and the Indian proposal for a treaty of peace, friendship and coopera tion. This was the first time the Indian proposal formed a subject of discussion at an Indo-pak meeting. India might well like to keep the talks going without being in a hurry to sign any treaty that may only enhance Zia's prestige. 252. HASAN AKHTAR. India and Pakistan work towards a peace treaty. Times; 1986, 1, 8. Several rounds of formal high level meetings between India and Pakistan are planned in the next fortnight to improve relations and with the objective of signing a peace treaty later this year. The finance Ministers of the two countries will also open talks in Islamabad today to examine the possibility of increasing trade and economic collaborations. 2 '^ 253. NAYAR (Kuldip). India to offer peace treaty to Pak. Tribune; 1985, 11, 10. India is to offer a comprehensive friendship treaty to Pakistan after it lifts martial law. The treaty will include Pakistan's no-war draft pact. The two objections voiced by Pakistan against India's peace and friendship treaty and Delhi's insistence that Islamabad will not raise the Kashmir issue out-side India - Pakistan forums and will not offer base to any foreign power, and secondly, the presence of any third power in the sub-continent will nullify the proposeino- war pact. Gen Zia's offer for mutual inspection of nuclear installations has gone down well even in India India still sees Pakistan behind cross frontier infil tration in Kashmir and punjab, 254. NOORANI (AG). Beyond an Indo-Pakistan treaty, IE; 1982, 12, 18. Indo-Pakistan differences are ewlTiently solvable and are based on more than distrust bred by estrangement. The two major points of disagreement between the two countries in finalising the text of the proposed treaty arise from India's proposal that the Simla formula of bilaterialism be so defined as explicitly to rule out 2 any resource to an outside, agency for resolution of diffem ces, India's diplomatic leverage with Great power and with Pakistan will be a more effective deterent than any treaty provision. In its quest for better relationship, India will have to show greater regard for Pakistani susceptibilities. There is an unlimited scope for econcxnic as well as cultural coo peration between the two countries, , TREATIES OF SIMLA 255, BHUTTO (2A). Simla Accord. Pak Horizon 25,3;1972;3-16, It is for the people of India to decide the kind of relationship they want between themselves. From that point of view the Simla Accord between India and Pak istan is important; it is the starting point and a starting point one can turn into any direction; in the direction of peace, temporary, peace or in the direction of immediate confrontation, 256. CHOPRA (Surendira), Indo-Pakistan relations* A study of new challenges and opportunities, Pttnlab Journal of Polities 4, 1; 1980, Jan-June; 193-237, Indo-Pak relations which had been marked by conflict and discord, mutual distrust and suspicion 2 11 entered a new phase after the Simla Agreement thereby reducing perceptual distance. Ihe democratic regime in Pakistan f a\bured nonnalization and President Bhutto supported peace and bilateralism with India. India's nuclear explosion at Pakistan in May 1974 impeded the process of nozmalization. The much talked of bilatera lism or "beneficial bilateralism" has yet to take root, , -, SIMLA AGREEMENT, 1971 257. NARSIMHA RAO (PV). India and Pakistan* A framework for friendship. Pak Horizon 34, 2; 1981; 12-22, Both India and Pakistan acknowledge that the Simla agreement provides a framework for expanding relations betvreen the two countries and for encourag ing a common endeavor for peace and stability in the region. India's desire for class and friendly relations with Pakistan is founded on a realistic appreciation in India of Pakistan's inherent strength. Already, scores of Pakistani writers and poets, journalists and commen tators, musicians and other artists have been received in India. 2 -^ , TREATIES, SIMLA 258. ROY (RT). Some foreign policy problems of Pakistan, Pak Horizon 25, 3? 1972; 17 - 22. The Simla agreement accepts the principles that India-Pakistan problem should be resolved by peaceful means. It Looks forward to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, without prejudice to the positions of the either side. Despite its pre-occupation with Pak istan's external relations, the Government had moved swiftly in the domestic fiels to change the inequitous socio-economic and pollticolegal structu£«s, and intro duced a series of socio-economic reforms designed primarily to eradicate mass poverty in Pakistan. 259. TAHIR KHELI (Shirin). Bilateralism in South Asia. World Affairs 136, 1; 1973 sum; 74-87. The signing of Simla accord by the leaders of India and Pakistan opened 19 a new dimension of Indo- Pakistan relationss The agreement was hailed as one that had been reached without interference frcxn outside powers and one that was expected to be only a prelude to the setting up of machinery to deal with a host of mutual problems. Bilateralism in the affairs of the subcontinent J is a relatively new phenomenon. It deserves close analysis* both in its historical perspective and in its future implications. , _, TASHKENT 260, JHA (DC), Indo-Pakistani relations since the Tashkent Declaration. Ind J polit Sci 32, 4; 1971, Oct-Dec;502-21. This paper attempts to analyse Indo-Pakistan relati^is by dividing them broadly into t*io periodss first, relations since the Tashkent talks to March 1971 and second, relations since the unilateral declaration of independence by East Pakistan as a sovereign republic of Bangladesh and continuance of their struggle for independence frora the rule of West Pakistan. 261. MUKHTAR ZAMAN. Thoughts on Indo-Pakistan relations in the Tashkent era. Pak Horizon 22, 2;1969,Jan-Mar;127-34, The year 1965 marks the climax of a long legacy of strained relationship between India and Pakistan ever since their energence as two independent countries. In the Tashkent declaration of 10 January 1966 the President of Pakistan and Prime Minister of India reaffirmed their obligations under the UN charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. It should be remembered that the Tashkent Decleration did not precede but followed the easefire Which was agreed xapon earlier in the security council. 2 ''•{) LIST OF PERIODICALS s^. urn- ilbbrevi atlon s P;iace Frequency 1. Amrlt Bazar daily Patrika 2. Asia Pacific Japan Quarterly Coiranunity 3. Asian AEfadrs HongKong/ Pour England Monthly 4, Asian Studies Calcutta Quarterly 5. Asian Survey Berkely, htonthly Cal 6. Australian Aas J o£ Pol Australia Pour Journal of Politics and His Monthly and History 7. Australian out look 8. China Report New Delhi Bi-monthly 9. CoHvnerce Bombay Weekly 10. Current History USA Monthly 11. Current Topics India Monthly 12. Democratic World New Delhi Weekly 13. Economic and Scon and Pol Boirbay weekly Political weekly 14, Far Eastern Far East Econ HongKong Weekly Economic Review Review 15. Foreign Affairs New York 5/ year 16. Foreign Affairs India monthly Record 17. Foreign Affairs New Delhi monthly Reports 2 y IS. Free Press Jouznal 19, Hindi 20. Hindu Madras Daily 21. Hindustan H S Standard 22. Hindustan Times H T New Delhi Daily 23. Hbwzzat 24. India and Foreign New Delhi Semi- Review Monthly 25. India Quarterly India Quart New Delhi Quarterly 26. Indian Express I E New Delhi Daily 27. Indian Journal of Political Indian J of Pol Bhagalpur Quarterly Science Sc 28. Indian Nation I N 29. Institute of IDSA Journal New Delhi Quarterly Defence Studies and Analysis Journal 30. International Int Affairs England/ Qu arterly Affairs Moscow 31. International Int Journal Canada Quarterly Journal 32. International Int Org . USA Quarterly Organisation 33. International Int Stud New Delhi Quarterly Studies 34. Janata Bondaay Weekly 35. Journal of Social Psychology 36. Journal of South JSAMSS Asian & Middle Eastern Studies 9 .1 'J 37. Link New Delhi tfeefcly 38. Mainstream New Delhi Weekly 39. Modem Asian Studies 40. National Herald N H New Belhi Daily 41. One Nation Chronicle New Delhi Weekly 42. Pennsylvania/ Otbis Phildelphia 43. Canada/ Pacific Affairs New York Quarterly 44. Pakistan Horizon Pak Horison 45. Pakistan Journal Pak J of American of American Studies Stud 46. Patriot New Delhi Daily 47. Punjab Journal of Politics 48, Seminar New Delhi monthly 49. South Asian Studies India 50. Sport Star India Weekly 51. Statesman New Delhi Daily 52. Strategic Analysis New Delhi monthly 53. Strategic Studies New Delhi Monthly 54. Strategic Studies Journal 55. Sunday Calcutta Weekly 56. Survival London Bi-monthly 57. Telegraph 58. Time New York •~ i -«- 59. Times of India T I New Delhi Daily 60, Tribune Chandigarh Weekly 61. World Affairs Washington Qu arterly 62. world Pocus India Monthly 63. World Today London monthly 64. Year Book on Indias Foreign Policy 2.H LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Apr April fug August Aut Autunn Dec Deceirtoer ed Editor Edited Editorial Feb February Jan Janu ary Mar March Nov November Oct October Paeud Pseudonym Sep September Spr Spring Sum Sumner Win Winter PART THREE INDEXES 2: a AUTHOR I N D-^ ( A) ABRAHAM (A) 88, 218 ABRAHAM (A S) 217 M3HA SHAHI 214 AKMAL HUSAIN 139 ALI (M) 250 ANITA (S N) 140 APTB (Vlnod) 29 ASIP IQBAL 237 AURORA (Jagjit Singh) 96 ( B ) BAHADUR (Kallm) 38, 89 BAID (Sanuel) 167 BM7ERJEB (Jyotirmoy) 50 BANBRJIB (Indranil ) 120, 121 BARM4 (J K ) 51 BARAL (Lok Raj ) 24 BASHBBRUODIN AHMBD 52 BBRBNDRANATH (Dewan ) 179, 90 BETTS (Richard K ) 151 BHAT (Taranath ) 27 2.; BHOGAL (Pamdnder S ) 53 BHUTTO (Z A) 255 BIDWAI (Praful ) 141 BOMBWALL (K R) 79 BOSK (Pradip ) 54 BURKE (S M) 23, 111 ( C ) CHAKRAVARTI (Subhash) 137 CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhll) 243 CHARI (P R) 142 CHATTERJBE (R K ) 9 CHWDHRI (Mohammed Ahsen ) 77, 119, 17 5 CH^ttJDHRY (G W ) 20 CHEEMA (Pervez Ic^al ) 154 CHECLANY (Brahna ) 80 CHOPRA (Surendra ) 1, 72, 256 CHOPRA (V D ) 81 COHEN (Stephen Philip ) 55, 78 ( D) DAYAL (Gyaneshwar ) 123 DAYAL (R ) 180 DEY (Sudhin ) 91 DHAR (M K ) 181 2 .^r ^ 3 DHAR (0 N ) 124 DUA (H K ) 239 ( B ) ELKIN (Jerrold P ) 168 ( P ) PAHMIDA ASHRAP 197 PISHSR (Ronald J ) 6 PYZEE (AAA) 125 ( G ) GANDHI (Indira ) 40 Gf^Gfij (S C ) 112 GHOSH (Parthar S ) 57, 2 GHCJMAN (R S ) 31 GILL (Sucha Singh ) 31 GUPTA (Amit ) 169 GUPTA (Takesh ) 245 GUPTA ( S ) 74, 238 ( H ) HAMLYN (Michael ) 198 HAMMDND (J Casey ) 162 HASN AKHTAR 252 2^o HAOOANI (Husaln ) 58 HUSMN (Sultan F ) 230 ( I ) ISLAM ( 2 ) 73 t J ) JMPMi (Rikhi ) 170 JAMIL RASHID 83 JASJIT SINGH 136, 138 JAVED AKHTAR (S M ) 32 JHA (D C ) 260, 25 JOHAL (Sarabjit ) 164 ODSHI (V T ) 60, 199, 61,62,1 ( K ) KAMATH (M V ) 93 KAPUR (Ashok ) 158 KAPUR (PC) 219 KARNAD (Bharat ) 4, 113 KATYAL (K K ) 201,184,63,200, 183,94 KAUSHIK (Brij ffehan ) 155 KHAS (Ansar Ali ) 143 KHOKHAR (Riaz Hasatn ) 96 KOTRU (ML) 95 KJKBREJA (Veen a ) 50 2w KULKARNI (V G ) 144 KUNDU (Samarendra ) 185 ( M) MADHT LIMX^B 71 MAJUMOAR (Ananda ) 126 MALHOTRA (Avtar Singh ) 202 MALHOTRA (Inder ) 96, 127,128, 129, 209, 220 hUttJSERGH (Nicholas ) 83 MARWAH (Bhashan ) 203 MARWAH (Onkar ) 21, 145 MSHROTRA (0 N ) 146 MBHTA (Jagat S ) 118 MEHTA (Vinod ) 19 6 MENON (N C ) 213 MISRA (G S ) 22, 84 MOHAMMAD SARWAR 64, 242 MOHAMMED ASLAM 159 MOHAMMED AYQOB 215 MOHWJ (K P ) 229 MOHAN (R ) 231, 232,233, 234, 236 MOONIS AHMAR 171 MJGHA (Nazlr A ) 187 MJKERJEB (Dillp ) 151, 17 2 MUKHTAR ZAtmi 261 2.8 MJSHAHID HLJSAIN 42, 7 5 MJSTJ^A (Z) 130 NAMBOODIRI (P K S ) 160 NARAYANA (K R ) 165 NARSIMHA RJID (P V ) 257 NAVBSD AHMAD S, 34 NAYAR (Kuldip ) 97, 253 NIHAL SINGH 218, 247 NOORANI (AG) 254 ( P ) PALIWAL (Shyam datta ) 131 PAL (Samir ) 244 PANDIT (C S ) 65, 189 PANT (Glrijesh C ) 221 PARIMOO (J N ) 166 PARTHSARTHY (Milini ) 248 PASRICHA (P M ) 16,99, 173, 228 PATRA (Saria ) 191 POULOUSE (T T ) 152 PRANPB (Shrikant ) 114 PUNJ (V P ) 28 ( R) RAHMAN ( I A ) 132 RAJ ( J ) 35 2A^ RAMA RAD ( R ) 174, 115 RASGOTRA (Maharaja Krishna ) 101 RASHID AHMAD 86 REDDY (G K ) 223 RBDOY (Narendra ) 10 RICHTER (William L ) 193, 44 RISNCOURT (Anauryde ) 35 RZTBZSL (W Andrew ) 166 RIZVI (Hasan Askarl ) 17 6 R M, Pseud 235 ROY (R T ) 258 ( S ) SABHBRWAL (OP) 45 SABBBHA MAN200R 123 SAINI (Mahandar Kumar ) 207 SM.AMAT ALI 6,7,205,211 SAMINA YASMBBN 224 SARBBN (Rajedra) 6,46,103,212 SARIN (Rita ) 17 SATISH KUMAR 87, 96 SAMHNBY (R Q ) 104 SBNGUPTA (Bhabani ) 105, 116 3BTH (J D ) 225 SHARMA (P) 216, 135 SHARMA (S K ) 106 2c u SIDHVA (Shlraz ) 133, 134 SITWSHJ DAS 7 6 SONDHI (M L ) 7 SRBBDHAR 167 SRI RAM (K ) 108, 109 SOBRAHMANYAM (K) 117,148,149,117 SaSRAhfUAN (R R ) 150, 153 ( T) TAHIR KHBLI (Shirln) 39, 259 THAPAR (Karan ) 47 TOBA (Reijiro ) 195 ( V) VARMA (S P ) 20 6 VSNKATASUBBAIAH (H) 226 VBNKAT NARAYMl ( S ) 48 ( W) WARIVfALLA (B ) 110 WBINBM7M (Marvin G ) 55 WIG (A R ) 19 WRIGGIMS (Howard W ) 36 ( Y) YADAVA (Leela ) 227 ( Z ) ZIRING (Lawranca ) 68 22 TITLB INDEX Title ( ^) NO^ Accession of Kashmir is not final, 125 After euphoria realism in: Indo-Pak relations. 248 American arms, India and Pakistan 165 America's Arming of Pakistan: India views in the 1950s and 1980s, 164 J^lomb or the bosA): outlook for in do-Pakistani relations in a global perspective. 162 Avenging a betrayal. 131 ( B ) Back to the old refrain: India Pakistani relations worsen yet again. 66 Ballistic Missiles in Pakistan. 136 Behind the barbed wire: Punjab seals the Pakistan border to contain Sikhs. 205 Behind Zia's No-war pact. 115 Benazir, Howe hold talks on Indo-Pak ties. 216 Benazir's India policy and the US 76 Better Indo-Pak ties foreseen. 60 Beyond an Indo-Pakistan treaty. 254 Big gulf, upliill task. 183 Bilateralism in South Asia. 259 Blaiming Pakistan: Government is overlooking the real problems in Kashmir. 122 Breakthrough in Indo-Pak discussions. 91 2cZ ( c ) Can India counter Pakistan's challenge on the Kashmir issue ? Hostile winds. 127 Clasp hands. 241 Craving for friendship in two countries. 108 Ii:Conflic t in the snow-I: Siachen Glacier at boiling point. 16 ( D ) Dangerous vacuum. 225 Dialogue with Pakistan. 101 Dialogue with Pakis tan-promise and pitfall. 220 Dismenibennent of Pakistan, 197Ix Its interna tional implications. 20 Domestic factors in Pakistan's India policy. 44 ( E ) Basing of Indo-Pak tensions. 103 Encounter with a fanatic. 223 Even babes cry freedom. 123 Evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy and its relations with India, 7 2 ( P ) Pact sheet on Pakistan. 7 Farcical one-day series 236 For Pol issues of Pakistan: Indo-Pakistan relation 56 Framework for Indo-Pakistan relations* An Indian perspective. 10 6 2^3 Free trade winds. 30 Future demands better Indo-Pak relations 54 ( G ) Gandhi - Bhutto rapport may end the hostility A hint of hope 211 Gen 2ia and Kashmir issue-highly negative stance. 128 Geopolitical factor in Pakistan-India Relations. 77 Geostrategic factors in India-Pakistan relations. 78 ( H ) Hitch in Indo-Pak relations, ed 3 Hi-tech players in a dangerous game of catch, 17 2 Hope of new era in Indo-Pak relations. 48 Hopers of Indo-Pak understanding on firmer ground- 65 Hot and cold diplomacy in Indo-Pakistan relations. 50 Hour's summit. 239 ( I ) Imminence of Indo-Pak Arms Race. 146 Incentives for nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran. 161 Inching together or a mile apart» India and Pak istan towards detente. 187 India and Benazir. 41 India and Pakistan* A fraroewoUcfor friendship. 257 2-4 India and Pakistan: Beyond the no-war pact, 114 India and pakistant Differing security perceptions. 174 India and Pakistan:in the shadow of Afghanistan, 35 India and Pakistan: Nuclear rivals in South Asia. 145 India and Pa)d.stan: Opportunities and compulsions, 180 India and Pakistan: See-Saw economic relations. 27 India and Pakistan: Some common problems. 70 India and Paldstan to continue Dialogue on Siachen: Joint statement on New Delhi talks. 11 India and Pakistan: Whither" have they turned, 83 India and Pakistan: Why the latest exercise in brinkmanship. 224 India and Pakistan work towards a peace treaty. 252 India and the bomb: An overview. 153 India and the nuclear safeguard controversy. 152 India blames Pakistan for arming Sikhs: carlucie to cilm border tension. 198 India concerned at Pak move to by 60 P-16s. 137 India's Foreign Relations with special reference to south Asia countries July-Dec 1986: Indo- Pakistan. 242 India invites Pak for talks. 102 India's land borders:Problems and challenges 9 India's military intervention in East Pakistan, 21 India must counter Pak belligerence. 124 India's nuclear test and Pakistan. 151 India's offer of a no-war declaration to Pakistan: Its history and import. Ill 2.5 India-Pak race continues. 135 India, Pakistan and China* A study of regional inibalances. 20 6 India, Pakistan and super power rivalry. 215 India, Pakistan and the persian Gulf In Third fifth meeting of Association studies (SanPrancisco) Prospects for detente in South Asias Internal and External factor in India-Pakistan relations, 39 India, Pakistan and the USA t An American preceptic. 219 India- Pald.stan relations. 208 India- Pakistan relations: Problem and prospects, 57 India- Pakistan relations touch a new low. 191 India- Pakistan tension. 87 India reaction towards US military aid to Pakistan 227 India should make the first move because Pakistan Won •t: GO on Be Daring. 19 6 India to offer peace treaty to Pak. 253 India Vs Pakistan: the nuclear option, 150 Indian Foreign Relations in South Asia Jan-June 1987: In do-Pakistan. 64 Indo-Pak accord and divergences. 251 Indo-Pak arm race:Image and reality. 228 Indo-Pak bangla Relations, 1971-74: Background note. 37 Indo-Pak dialogue: A step forward. 90 indo-Pak diplomacy since 1981: Motivations, strategies and prospects. 51 Indo-Pak economic cooperation, 28 2.-8 Indo-Pak reconciliationj Rajiv visit a step for ward. 247 indo-Pak relations: A calculus o£ fear. 4 Indo-Pak relations* A historical perspective. 81 Indo-Pak relations: A perxnan^it Stalemate. 186 Indo-Pak relations: Borders come alive. 12 Indo-Pak relations: concern over Pak arms build-up. 163 Indo-Pak relations: Fighting on the snow. 13 Indo-Pak relations in deep-freeze. 200 indo-Pak relations: More on the Islamic bomb. 147 Indo-Pak relations no-war dialogue: what next. 112 indo-Pak relations: Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. 156 indo-Pak relations: Portents and uncertainties. 2 Indo- Pak relations: Progress in Pak N-programme. 157 Indo-Pak relations: Rajiv in Islamabad. 246 Indo-Pak relations: Road to rapproachment. 104 Indo-Pak relations: Shaking off legacy difficult. 14 Indo-Pak relations: The need of a new paradigm. l Indo-Pak suspicioun persist. 182 indo-Pak Talks. 69 Indo-Pak talks begin on illicit arms trade. 199 indo-Pak talks: Strides in bilateral relations. 92 Indo-Pak talks: Zia' s diplomatic weapons. 59 Indo-Pak talks: Zia's tactics. 179 Indo-Pak ties after Islamabad meet. 245 2 7 Indo-Pak Ties* Benazir for step-by-step approach. 95 Indo-Pak ties In a flux. 86 Indo»PaX ties under a cloud. 61 indo-Pak tradei Prospects and constraints. 31 indo-Paklstan relations: A study of new challenges and opportunities. 256 Indo-Paklstan relations* Continuing logjam. 79 Indo-Paklstan relations since the 1971 war- An Indian view point, 85 Indo-Paklstanl relations since the Tashkent Declaration. 260 Indo-Paklstan relations: Spring In winter, 116 indo-Paklstan surnnitt In^roved ties now In right. 243 Indo-Paldstan threat perception, 139 Indo-Paklstan - US ties. 217 Indo-Paklstanl Agreement and stability in the sub-continent. 110 Indo-Paklstanl Dialogue: Some crucial question. 88 indo-Paklstani economic cooperation, 27 Indo-Paklstanl military balance. 168 Indo-Paklstanl rivalry boosts n»clear option. 144 Infiltration-major challenge for BSP. 126 In search of stability on the Indian sub-continent 195 Inside, looking out: 120 Intangibles in new set-up, 94 Islamic bombs and India: An appraisal. 140 2 8 Islainic funda»6n tali sen and Indo-Pak relations. 38 Issues for the Indo-Pak sutrrrdt. 238 Is war the answer?* As violence mounts in Kashmir, India holds Pakistan responsible. 121 ( K ) Kashmir dispute and the Simla Agreement, 130 Kashmir: Rule'of the gun. 133 Kashmir issue threatens to sour Indo-Pak rela tions: Unfriendly vibes. 129 ( L ) Lessons of Indo-Pak border crisis. 10 Low EBB in Indo-Pak ties, 6 ( M) Major developments in India's foreign policy and relations January-JUne 1981. 221 Malik on the rampage, 237 Middle order collapse, 235 Military balance between India and Pakistan, 173 Military interwention in politics: contrasting cases Pakistan and India, 49 More arms for Pakistan: Request for P-16, 139 Moves to end drift in Indo-Pak ties, 223 ( N ) Nation building and region building in South Asia. 24 2 9 Need for India-Pakistan detente, 97 Need for wider debate on Punjab. 202 New phase in Indo-Pak relations. 184 Non-nuclear rationable. 170 Normalising Indo-Pak relations. 188,98 Nuclear weapons Free Zones. 141 Nuclearizing Pakistan: Some hypotheses. 158 ( 0 ) Obstacles remain: Indo-Pak normalisation hurdles out lived. 67 Our nuclear predicament. 148 ( P ) Pak involvement. 204 Pak policy on India has not changed. 42 Pakistan's acquisition of arms: Relationate, guest and implications for India. 169 Pakistan and India at forty. 82 Pakistan and India: Politics, personalities and foreign policy. 68 Pakistan and regional security: A Pakistani vies. 175 Pakistan and the changing pattern of power relations in South Asia. 119 Pakistan - A new "Front line* state. 193 Palcistan: An unending quest for validation, 52 Pakistan's Armed forces: A stute modernisation strategy. 177 230 Pakistan as America* s allyt Biol to alter US pe rceptlon s, 218 Pakistan's defence policy. 176 Pakistan's defence potential. 167 PaMstan's domestic Crisis and foreign policy- problem of identity and relations with India. 74 Pakistan's foreign policy* An exercise in tight rope walking. 75 Pakistan's foreign policy issue since her with drawal from the commonwealth. 73 Pakistan's halting steps. 159 Pakistan's India policy-shift from 2ia to Benazir. 53 Pakistan-India relations and super powers policies 214 Pakistan in 1981 55 it Pakistan: Indo-Pak joint press statement. 71 Pakistan's no^lose option. 13 Pakistan's nuclear capability and India's response. 149 Pakistan's nuclear policy. 155 Pakistan's nuclear posture and India's options. 142 Pakistan's nuclear strategy. 160 Pakistan's pentad-India's obstinancy nuclear debate in the region. 143 Pakistan: politics of guns and butter. 226 Pakistanis quest for nuclear technology. 154 Pakistan's search for a Foreign policy after the invension of Afghanistan. 3 6 Pakistan's security problem: A bill of constraints. 178 231 Pakistan today: Relations with India. 189 Pakistan's trade with India. 32 Peace and indo-Fak relations. 9 6 PM blames Pak for tensions. 203 PM in Islamajsad 100 PM: Pak interference has affected relations. 43 PM tells Reagon of Pak N-plan threat. 166 Political change in Pakistan-II: A breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations. 192 Political coiranentary: New phase in Indo-Fak ties. 209 Political scene in Pakistan, 46 Positive trends in Indo-Pak relations. 62 Postwar diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. 23 Problems and promise of SAARC. 213 ( R) Rajiv, Benazir to work for new phase of relations, 244 Rajiv Gandhi's tour abroad. 222 Rajiv, June jo may discuss Siachen, 15 Rajiv meets Benazir, 249 Ready for peace, or war: Pakistan seeks to case tensions with India but prepares for war. 58 Recent developments in Indian foreign policy. 34 Recent developments in Indo-Pakistan relations, 5 Recent developments in Pakistan's internal and external affairs. 89 232 Reflection on Indo-Pak talks. 117 Regional cooperation and Indo-Pakistan relations. 25 Regional peace and security: coalsence and clash in Indo-Pakistan relations, 84 Relations with india-Zia's constradictions. 63 Relations with Pakistan. 99 Role of multinational cooperations in Indo-Pak relations. 207 Roots of Indo-Pak conflict. 80 Runs in Sluniberland. 234 ( S ) SAARC crisis. 210 SAARC summit at Dhaka 212 Salal dam i A microcosm of Indo-Pak ties 118 Salvaging some prestige- 234 Security perceptions in the Indo-Pakistan rela tionship, 171 Selected statements. Indo-Pak relations. 40 Shine in Indo-Pak relations, 105 Siachen fias^: India rejects Pakistanis claim that the glacier dispute has been resolved. 17 Siachen glaciers Indo-Pak talks, 18 Simla accord. 2 55 Simla and Tashkent Agreements, 250 Small step forward. 101 Some foreign policy problems of Pakistan. 258 /it)0 stalemate continues in Indo-Pak ties. 201 Stratagems: Pakistan India relations. 197 Symbolis of thaw in Indo- Pak:' ties. 190 ( T) Tactical antoivalence. 194 Talk with Pak begins: India offers second rail link. 109 Talks with Pakistan on Siachen in May, 19 Thaw in India-Pakistan relations. 240 Thaw in relations with Pak likely. 181 Third party consultation workshop on the India- Pakistan conflict, 8 Thoughts on Indo-Pakistan relations in the tashkent era. 261 Time is ripe for India and Pakistan to come together. 93 Times are changing in Pakistan 229 Traditional rivalry. 230 Trade with Pakistan ed. 33 Trade with Pakistan: Good beginning towards nromalisation. 29 Trilateralism in South Asia. 22 ( U ) Understanding Pakistan. 47 234 ( w ) What «;lls Zndo«-Pak relations. 185 What clouds Indo-PaX relations* 45 Who runs the valley. 134 Whose Kashndr. 132 { Y ) Yet another close call* 231