West Asia's Investments in Space Technologies

Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Ajey Lele

Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

123 Ajey Lele Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses Rao Tula Ram Marg New Delhi India

ISBN 978-81-322-0732-0 ISBN 978-81-322-0733-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 Springer India Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

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Preface

Space discipline has attracted the attention of many for more than six decades. I first got allured to space science and astronomy as a student of Physics. Subsequently, as a part of my profession as an aviation meteorologist over a decade and half, I was the user of space technologies. For a decade or so, while working in a policy think tank on international relations and security issues, I am trying to juxtapose the theme of strategic technologies on a security domain. This book is an attempt to contextualise these efforts to develop an explicit idea. This book attempts to describe the current state of space programmes of various Asian states. It provides a summary of their programmes and highlights their major contributions. This work also deliberates about the strategic significance of various Asian space programmes. It is an attempt to find a connection between technology, interests, strategic relevance and power with regard to Asia’s space agenda. I owe my gratitude to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and my previous and present Directors General Mr N S Sisodia and Dr Arvind Gupta for encouraging me to undertake research on this subject. The IDSA library, a large storehouse of information I have ever came across, made my job simpler. I would like to thank particularly Mr Pitambar Datt and Mr Mukesh Kumar Jha for all the assistance provided to me in obtaining various material and data. Over the years, I have been interacting with various policy makers and academicians both within and outside India. I am grateful to them for many useful discussions. Lastly, my gratitude to my parents and wife Pramada and son Nipun for their support. The contents of this manuscript reflect my own personal views.

vii

Contents

Part I Introduction

1 Structure of the Book ...... 3 Reference ...... 6 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies ...... 7 What Is Asia? ...... 8 Asian Context ...... 9 Political Patronage for Technology Development ...... 11 Scientiﬁc and Technological Pragmatism...... 13 Growth of Technology in Asia ...... 14 Relevance of Space Technologies for Asia ...... 18 The Space Era and Asia ...... 19 Space Power...... 22 Key Asian Space Players ...... 24 References...... 25

Part II Asian Space Narratives

3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies ...... 29 Iran...... 29 Israel ...... 34 Other States ...... 38 References...... 42 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities ...... 43 Space Plan ...... 44 Technology Revolution ...... 50 Assessment ...... 54 References...... 58

ix x Contents

5 India’s Space Programme ...... 59 References...... 67 6 East Asia’s Space Agenda ...... 69 North Korea ...... 69 South Korea ...... 73 Taiwan ...... 76 References...... 77 7 China’s Space Programme ...... 79 Assessment ...... 91 References...... 92 8 Japan’s Space Programme ...... 95 Organisational Structure ...... 96 Launch Vehicles...... 98 Satellite Systems ...... 100 Space Indigenization and the US Policies ...... 101 Change in Space Policy...... 102 Scientiﬁc Experiments and Interplanetary Missions ...... 104 Assessment ...... 106 References...... 107 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia ...... 109 Indonesia ...... 110 Malaysia ...... 115 Vietnam ...... 117 Other States ...... 120 References...... 121

Part III Strategic Implications of Space Technologies

10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums ...... 125 Nuclear Pierce...... 126 Concealed Missile Ambitions ...... 128 Missile Defence ...... 135 MIRV ...... 137 Assessment ...... 139 References...... 140 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia ...... 143 History...... 144 Present Generation Systems ...... 145 Asian Navigational Systems...... 146 Japan ...... 147 China ...... 149 India ...... 153 Contents xi

United Nations, Asia and Navigational Network...... 154 Appraisal ...... 155 References...... 156 12 Deep Space Agenda...... 159 Walking the Moon Since the 1960s ...... 160 Asian Moon Missions ...... 161 China ...... 161 Japan ...... 162 India ...... 163 Comparing Missions of Big Three ...... 164 Mission Instruments ...... 165 Deep Space Networks ...... 166 Mission Output ...... 167 Moon for What?...... 169 Asian Mars Missions ...... 171 Strategic Signiﬁcance of Deep Space Agenda...... 174 Assessment ...... 178 References...... 179 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation ...... 181 Prelude...... 182 Asia’s Security Milieu ...... 183 Space Militarisation...... 186 India ...... 188 China ...... 190 Japan ...... 193 Israel...... 196 Other States ...... 197 Space Weaponisation ...... 197 Assessment ...... 200 References...... 202 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station ...... 205 Background ...... 205 Japan ...... 207 China ...... 209 India ...... 212 Assessment...... 215 References...... 216 15 Space Power Soft Power ...... 219 Soft Power: A New Dimension of Power Dynamics ...... 219 Soft Power Relevance of Space Technology...... 221 China’s Soft (Space) Power Persuade...... 224 Assessment ...... 231 References...... 233 xii Contents

Part IV Conclusion

16 Future of Asian Space Powers...... 237 Foretelling the Future ...... 237 Drivers of Space Programme ...... 239 Power Dynamics ...... 239 International Cooperation ...... 241 Tool for Socioeconomic Development...... 243 Ballistic Missile Capability ...... 244 Deep Space Missions ...... 246 Economics ...... 246 Strategic Factors ...... 247 Other Important Drivers ...... 249 Scenarios ...... 251 Space Power as Soft Power ...... 251 Moon Still Not in Reach ...... 252 Wild Card: Star Wars ...... 252 Appraisal ...... 253 References...... 253 17 Scrutinising the Race ...... 255 References...... 272

Index ...... 273 Part I Introduction Chapter 1 Structure of the Book

This book attempts to explore the character and counters of the investments made by various Asian states in the space arena. It is an attempt towards understanding the geopolitical and geostrategic relevance of space technologies for the Asian states. It is also an attempt to understand the nature of contest amongst the Asian states in this regard. Today, in Asia, China, Japan and India appear to be investing in space technologies with similar social and scientific but divergent military goals. Few other states in the region like Israel, South Korea and Malaysia are also developing their space agenda. On the other hand, states like Iran and North Korea are using space launches as a demonstrative tool to achieve strategic objectives. Various states within the region are found cooperating as well as competing with each other in this field. Both at global and region level, nothing could be said with certitude in regard to the space becoming future battlefield in near future. No definitive trends of immediate confrontations in space are visible in this regard; however, there are certain indications of suggestive propensity. Over the years, officials from various Asian states have denied the existence of any rivalry amongst them in space field though many analysts have expressed an opinion that an escalating space race is taking place amongst the major Asian states. Fears have also been expressed in regard to space race turning into arms race. Hence, it is very important to debate about the existence and/or prospect of space race in the region. Is Asian space race for real or it is a subject more of an academic debate? Are there inconsistencies between the broad world view suggestive of the existence of Asian Space Race and actual ground realities? This book is about understanding the substructure of background thought upon which the lines of arguments are normally based in this regard. It attempts to recognise the presence or absence of the ‘space race’ in the Asian context. The book is not a theoretical, technical or technological discussion of the subject. It follows more a path of social science analysis with a scientific objectivity bias. This work attempts to discuss the investments in space technologies made by some Asian states towards accomplishing their socioeconomic mandate. Some of these states are found increasing their footprint in commercial sector and are also

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 1, 3 © Springer India 2013 4 1 Structure of the Book factoring these technologies in their security calculus. Appreciating the usage of space technologies for the purposes of civilian use alone in Asian context is not the core mandate for this book. This book is written with a predisposition to comprehend the strategic significance of space technologies for the Asian states. However, the inherent dual use capability of the space technologies does not allow a ‘strict’ analysis only from a strategic perspective. In view of this, there is a need to read between the lines to appreciate the strategic purpose behind the investments made by these states. No stringent research methodology has been used for this work. The research scope and methods are adjusted to bring out the ‘character’ of the subject under discussion. The book comprises several interrelated layers of research. Attempt has been made to avoid the repetition of information. However, in certain places, some details could be found repeated in order to emphasise and elicit the exact relevance of the subject under discussion. The book is overwhelmingly based on a study of documents from printed and electronic records with a minor usage of interviews. The book has four sections. The first section is introductory in nature. It attempts to rationalise and explain the concept of Asia, tries to understand the relevance of technology for Asia, explains the notion of space power and highlights the significance of Asian investments in the field of science and technology, elucidates the Asian response to space age and also identifies key Asian space players. Second section is about space narratives. Usually, narratives are offered to present an account of a sequence of events. However, it is not necessary that all narratives are full-length stories. One of the fundamental aims of narrative is to present the significant facts of a particular event or an ongoing activity. In some sense, narrative is a history, and obviously like any other historical recitation, it would/could be told differently by different set of people. From individual to state and from religion to society, different narratives have been found told by different set of people mostly based on their perceptions and largely told for the purpose of self-representation. Years after the launch of first satellite Sputnik (1957), it has been realised that space exploration assumes a critical role in defining the growth, success and at times superiority of the state. Significant achievements in this arena have impacted the feeling of nationalism. Naturally, the narratives of successes (and failures too) in space field in literature could have resulted based on certain prejudices. In some cases, it could be self-congratulatory and in some cases, the treatment could be iniquitous. The journey in space undertaken by few states so far and the quest of others to join the select group of spacefaring nations demonstrate that a relationship exists between national identity and space technologies. Countries have historically justified space exploration by appealing to one (or a grouping) of five different motivations: human destiny, geopolitics, national security, economic competitiveness, and scientific discovery [1]. Various nation-states in Asia depending on their country-specific rationale for such investments, available technological expertise, economic status and nature of assistance received from developed nations have 1 Structure of the Book 5 started their space programmes. However, at times the narratives of these states are not found carried on in objective and universally valid manners. Here, the narratives are presented as factual stories; however, any narratives always have an account which is beyond face value. These narratives need to be viewed as a mode of discourse. These narratives do not tell in micro details about the each and every aspects of the space programmes of various states. The basic purpose is to put in context the investments of various states in this field and understand the possible trajectory for the future. The space agenda of JapanÐChinaÐ India and to certain extent Israel gets significant attention in this book for two reasons: one, their geostrategic and geo-economical importance and two, these are the states with significant investments and achievements into space arena. Various other regional players are also discussed in the book with an aim to understand and highlight their current and futuristic space agendas and policies. Since, the layout of the book is more thematic in nature; at places, some repetition of information was found inevitable. Particularly, the space programmes of JapanÐChinaÐIndia do find very many references in various sections of the book. Hence, care has been taken to provide only the basic information in the narrative section about the space programmes of these three states. The third section of the book brings out various tenets of strategic significance in context of Asian space programmes. The various chapters in this section attempt to find connection between technology, interests, strategic relevance and power in regard to specific tenet of space agenda. It is important to appreciate that the security challenges faced by various Asian states are to a great extent different than the rest of the world. Investments into space technologies by some of the Asian nations have a definitive security bias. This section analyses the Asian investments by ‘accounting’ for the strategic compulsions of the states. Asian states have realised the importance of satellites for their armed forces. Particularly, the 1991 Gulf War has showcased the importance of space technologies for the militaries. On the other hand, the antisatellite test (ASAT) conducted by China in 2007 has increased the fear battle ground shifting to the outer space. There are concerns about the lack of globally approved space security architecture. Few Asian nations are found contributing towards the evolvement of process in regard to the changing global space order while few others in the region are anxiously monitoring this change. This section in limited sense also endeavours to analyse the ongoing trends in Asian space domain and the developing ambitions of the states in the region. The fourth and last section offers an analysis in regard to new visions of possible futures (say three/four decades from hence) for Asian states in space arena. It attempts to peep into the future with an aim that it would allow states to be more aware of the possible challenges ahead and help to develop an agenda for response. This section also offers an overall assessment in regard to the basic theme of the book that is ‘the existence or likelihood of Asian Space Race’. 6 1 Structure of the Book

Reference

1. Launius RD. Compelling rationales for spaceﬂight? History and the search for relevance. In: Dick SJ, Launius RD, editors. Critical issues in the history of spaceﬂight. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 2006. p. 37Ð70. Chapter 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies

In recent years, the idea of Asia is generating great excitement. The resurgence of Asia is resulting as a turning point in the world history. The emerging Asia is no longer been viewed with the earlier stereotyped vision as a quagmire of poverty, illiteracy, religious fundamentalism and border disputes. The region’s different identity in terms of faiths, religions, cultures, political systems and economic inequalities is now been skillfully used by the Asian states for their own development. Various regions of Asia have acknowledged the liberal and democratic values of the West but at the same time have identified and adopted their own model linked to their respective cultures and values. Over the years, knowledge economy has played a major role towards the growth of Asia. This concept of knowledge needs to be viewed in a more holistic sense while debating Asian growth. Knowledge could be said to contribute both as a product and also as a tool towards this development. The application of knowledge in science and technology has played a crucial role towards the growth and development in this region. The region has a history of various scientific inventions to its credit. However, for last few centuries major inventions have originated mainly from the European and American soil. Fundamental research has not been the Asian forte for many years now. Nevertheless, some change is being witnessed in this field recently. Presently, major emphases have been given for applied research by various Asian states. But, in overall analysis for many years, the internal stimuli for innovative research have mostly behind been found lacking in some sectors of science and technology. Interestingly, the narrative in regard to the rocket science and high technology looks bit different. Space technology is one area where the contributions by few Asian states have been noteworthy particularly both in basic and applied fields during last few decades. Military angle behind the development of rocket science in Asian states should not be ruled out. In turn space science also appears to have benefited from this. This book is an attempt to explore the character and counters of the Asian Space Race. The book talks about the successful use of space technologies made by spacefaring Asian states towards achieving their socioeconomic mandate, increasing the global footprint in commercial sector and factoring these technologies in their

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 2, 7 © Springer India 2013 8 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies security calculus. The book also talks about the investments being made by non- spacefaring Asian states in this ﬁeld. The book could be viewed as an attempt made towards understanding the space agendas of Asian states and their relationships with other states (both inter- and intra-regional) in respect of cooperation, geopolitics, strategic relevance and economics. This chapter, more as a backgrounder, attempts to develop the context for this book by taking into account the Asian settings and situating the relevance of space technologies into it. It starts with underlining few basic facts mainly with a view to reiterate and set the tone form the point of view of this work.

What Is Asia?

Asia is viewed as the congregation of some of the world’s most primitive civilisa- tions. In recent past, this region was also viewed by few as a region of backwardness; however, this conceptualisation was not entirely true. This continent constitutes more than 60% of the Earth’s population and around 30% of land area. The region has people with different religions, languages and cultures. The concept of Asia needs to be viewed at two distinct levels. At one level, Asia needs to be viewed beyond a meagre geographic identity because it represents much more. While at other more practical level, it becomes important to ‘quantify’ Asia by identifying the nation-states forming a part of this region. The word Asia was probably invented by the Europeans and its concept has been propagated by European geographers, politicians and encyclopedia writers. Naturally, there could be regional and extra-regional biases to ‘define’ Asia in strict geographical sense. In simple sense, Asia is the region which encompasses the Europe [1]. The definition and boundaries of Asia at times vary when viewed from a physical geography and political geography perspective. The best option to identify the states from Asia could be use the United Nations (UN) geoscheme for Asia. As per this, Asia is subdivided to four broad categories: Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Southeastern Asia and Western Asia.1 Even part of Russia is sometimes been referred falling in the Asian continent. It is referred as North Asia or Northern Asia (Asian portion of Russia). However, experts view that Russia sees itself more of a European and Western nation with critical interests in Asia. Probably, in the twenty-first century, the Russians see themselves culturally and ethnically more as Europeans rather than Asians [2]. For the purpose of this study, Russia is excluded from Asia both because of geographical and technical reasons. This is mainly because Russia is one of the most developed spacefaring nation and it would not be accurate to bracket it with the other developing Asian space powers. Also, Central Asian region has not been included in this study basically because presently

1http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#asia, accessed on Apr 6, 2011. Asian Context 9 very minimal investments in space arena are being made over there and states like Kazakhstan are mainly catering for the Russian interests in space arena (launch station Baikonur has been leased by the Kazakhstan government to Russia). Considering various historical, geopolitical and technological realities, for the purpose of this work Asia has been subdivided into four regions. These regions along with the few of their important states (mainly from the point of interest for this study) are as follows: 1. West Asia: Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey (it is partially in Europe) 2. East Asia: China, Japan, Taiwan, North and South Korea 3. Southeast Asia: Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 4. South Asia: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka

Asian Context

In the post-Cold War world, Asia is rediscovering itself both economically and strategically. A new sense of identity is getting revealed by this multicultural, multilinguistic and multireligious community. The geopolitical scenario in this region is assuming greater importance for major powers in the world. The superior position of the Europeans and that of the United States (US) in the global affairs since the nineteenth century is been challenged by few Asian powers. This is mainly happening because these states have succeeded in rapidly increasing their economic and strategic might. It is also important to note that in Asia along with various ‘islands’ of prosperity and peace also a vast ‘landmass’ of poverty and conflict exists. This overall transformation of Asia is being viewed as a ‘Rise of Asia’. It is argued that the overall growth of economies in Asia is shifting the balance of world economic power away from the Europe and the USA. An optimistic view is that this ‘civilisation in making’ may take the entire world under its sphere of influence in coming years [3]. It is expected that the economic growth of the region may ultimately get translated into power. However, for this to happen, it is essential that the sustained economic development of the region takes place. Any assessment about the future of Asia needs to factor various facets augmenting and limiting the rise of Asia. The likely rise of Asia is expected to bring in a significant global transformation. The process of the modernisation of Asia (substantial parts of Asia) is almost getting completed by the beginning of twenty-first century. Half a century ago, there appeared to be mainly two modern societies in Asia, namely, Japan and Israel. However, the states within the region particularly the states geographically and culturally close to Japan were quick to learn from the Japanese success. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore started emulating Japan [4]. On the other 10 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies hand, China also understood the advantages of modernising. The growth of China since 1980s has been unique, and by beginning of twenty-first, it became the fastest growing economy of the world. By 2011, China overtook Japan and became the second largest economy in the world. With this, the second and the third (Japan) largest economies in the world are now residing in Asia. Along with the rising China, another country to witness the exponential growth in the region is India (fourth position in terms of purchasing power parity in 2010 estimate). The stride of Asia towards prosperity and development has become possible because of the opening of their economies, creation of global market for their projects, engaging Western states in economic activities and creating Asian dependence, developing a science and technology base, making trained employable manpower available catering of both regional and global needs. The biggest advantage the Asian region has is the availability of English speaking people2 which is helping in enhancing their overall global footprint. In strategic realm, Asia is the most ‘happening’ continent in the world. The most significant military conflicts of the twenty-first century like Iraq and Afghanistan are being fought in the Asian theatre. Also, political conflicts like Iran and North Korea are being fought from the Asian soil. Like the rest of the world, Asian region is also marred from threats of terrorism, climate change, natural disasters, piracy and drug trafficking. But, in spite of such limitations, the Asia as a whole is found rising. The future of Asia will depend on Asians and their efforts to assert themselves. A significant number of Asian Diaspora staying outside Asia is also contributing towards brightening this future. Asian inventiveness, Asian industries, Asian management skills and Asian governance needs to make their presence felt at global level and should be in a position to provide the ‘Asian models for prosperity’ to the rest of the world. Asia has potential to contribute towards to the growth and development of continents like Africa and Latin America.3 Post-1990s, it has been observed that few Asian states have made significant inroads into various areas of technologies like electronics, nuclear technology, information technology and biotechnology, etc. In few spheres of technology like electronics and information technology, the domination of Asia is global. Space technology is another area where some Asian states have developed themselves into a major spacefaring nation (nations with capability to launch their own satellites to orbit) and have also established various bilateral and multilateral initiatives with developed spacefaring nations. Few of the Asian states are also engaging the African and Latin American states and are helping them for the developments of their space programme. Asian

2Various studies are available which justify this argument. However, ﬁgures vary in most of such studies for various reasons like methodology, data collection, biases, etc. Academic paper like Tom McArthur, “English as an Asian Language”, http://www.accu.or.jp/appreb/09/pdf33-2/33- 2P003-004.pdf, accessed on Oct 6, 2011, highlight this argument by putting across empirical, observational and theoretical arguments. 3Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia while expressing his views on “The Future of Asia” at 6th Nikkei Shimbun International Conference on “The Future of Asia” Tokyo, 9 June 2000, available at http://www.aseansec.org/2807.htm, accessed on Jan 12, 2010. Political Patronage for Technology Development 11 states have commercial interests attached to their space journey. The present level of achievements by few Asia states in space arena and their roadmaps for the future indicates that the prospects of growth in Asian space industry are very encouraging. Also, once the ‘space tourism’ becomes a reality, Asian states are expected to develop in this sector too. Asia’s response to space epoch needs to be understood at the backdrop of the appreciation of the overall growth of technology and the political/governmental support received by the scientiﬁc community in this quest for technology.

Political Patronage for Technology Development

Technology development is crucial for the growth of nation-states. Globalisation has made technology central to the process of development. Technology helps to improve leaving standards, increase productivity, generate new industries and employment opportunities, and create more competitive products in world market. In general, technology is knowledge applicable to the practical problems.4 Technol- ogy development necessitates investment from both the public and private sector. Particularly, the public sector Research and Development (R&D) has played a vital role in developing some of the key technologies of the twentieth century both globally and in Asia, including aeronautics, electronics and nuclear power.5 It has also played a signiﬁcant role in the development of space technologies. The bulk of the space technologies in various parts of world have been developed in response to the explicit and strong government support. Technology programmes are as vulnerable to the pulls and pushes of politics as other socioeconomic programmes. The governmental stake in developing technologies indirectly plays a role to decide the future of these technologies. Both political and ﬁnancial backing is essential for any large-scale development of technology. It is important for the space agency managers (technocrats) to control their political environment or their programmes become its victims. It is important for them to negotiate the process of developments of technical programme with the political system. For this purposes, many a time they engage in certain metaphorical and coalition-building strategies. The metaphorical strategies allow them to garner wide public support by making a technology compatible/comparable with some overarching value that is easily understood. The strategies of coalition building also involve expression of another kind where an idea and requirement of collaborating with other states is presented to the political authorities [5, p. 64].

4http://catarina.udlap.mx/u dl a/tales/documentos/lim/kerﬁn c ma/capitulo2.pdf, accessed on Jan 25, 2012. 5“Climate Change: Technology Development and Technology Transfer”, United Nations Depart- ment of Economic and Social Affairs, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res pdfs/publications/ sdt tec/tec technology dev.pdf 12 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies

Developing a new technology is mostly a complicated affair, given the myriad technical uncertainties. The expense of large-scale technologies increases economic uncertainties. When a technology has government as its primary developer, a host of political uncertainties arise. This could happen mainly when various government departments are involved simultaneously in the process of technology development. Such situation at times ends up in making design of technology problematic. Also, political conflict can stop a technology from being successfully developed or, if developed, productively applied. A process of technological change is also dependent on political decision-making concerning that technology [5,p.47]. It is important to appreciate that certain technological experimentation has faced the favour from of the world, and in certain cases, the world has overlooked few inventions. The availability of technology with one state has brought in a paradigm shift into the policies of others. The ‘Space Age’ was born with the launch of first artificial Earth satellite Sputnik by the erstwhile USSR in the autumn of 1957. The only event in recent history which can match Sputnik in general public awareness was the exploration of atom bomb in 1945 [6, p. 555]. Sputnik launch had shaken the USA’s confidence about their technology and military strength [6, p. 570]. It perhaps reversed the foundations of the post-World War II international order. ‘The launch promised imminent Soviet strategic parity, placed the US under direct military threat for the first time since 1814, triggered a quantum jump in the arms race, and undermined the calculus on which European, Chinese, and neutralist relations with the superpowers had been based. The space and missile challenge was then mediated by massive state-sponsored complexes for research and development, in the US and throughout the industrial world, into institutionalized technological revolution and, hence, accelerating social, economic, and perhaps cultural change. Space technology altered the very proportions of human power to the natural environment in a way unparalleled since the spread of the railroads’ [7, p. 1010]. This concept of having a technology which could view the Earth dispassionately from a distance brought a momentous change in both policy and scientific thinking. The idea of operating and experimenting in negligible/zero gravity was caught on by the scientific community. It probably made a major impact in regard to growth of natural sciences. The four areas most often cited as the loci of revolutionary change in the Space Age are ‘(1) international politics (2) the political role of science and scientists (3) the relationship of the state to technological change and (4) political culture and values in nations of high technology’ [7, p. 1011]. In early years after the launch of first satellite, the growth of space technologies was rapid. During 1961, with the first human visiting the space, the USSR supremacy in this field was restated. Yuri Gagarin’s space flight came as a ‘bolt from space’ for the USA. This ‘loss of face’ forced the USA to significantly increase NASA’s budget. One positive outcome of the superpower rivalry in space was the Apollo programmes, which led to the overall development of space and rocket science. When Neil Armstrong became the first man to reach the moon, the USA believed that it had stolen a march on the USSR in the space race. It could be said that in the Cold War era, the relevance of space supremacy had social, political and scientific tenets. Scientific and Technological Pragmatism 13

In present era, the interest of various governments towards supporting any technology development is essentially dependent on its assessment about its utility mainly for socioeconomical progress. The Cold War era race was the outcome of the superpower rivalry and the investments in technology were made from the one- upmanship standpoint. In the post-Cold War era, particularly in Asian context where the developments in space technologies started much later, such compulsions were non-existent. The political support in Asian context towards the development of space sciences emerged mainly out of the social and scientific reasons. In twenty- first century, this development is also found taking place for the economic and military reasons. Also, states are attempting to find the availability of resources on the other planets, and certain space efforts are directed in that direction too.

Scientiﬁc and Technological Pragmatism

Progress in science and technology (S&T) has been responsible for vast improvements in the physical conditions and living standards of the majority of the world’s population. In a way, technological advancement has played a major role towards the global transformation and has offered competitive advantages to the states. Progression of technology has allowed cultures to communicate with each other and learn more about each other. It has also been responsible in bringing economic interdependence which indirectly could be viewed as one of the important cause for the cessation of conflicts.6 All this has been possible because of the social, political and economic support gathered by various fields of technology development. In recent times, mostly after the Second World War, states have started making significant investments in technologies in various parts of the world. The same has been the story in Asian context too. States in the region have understood the significant social, economical, political and strategic advantages for acquiring and developing various new technologies. However, technology progress assessment in regards to Asia as a whole tends to present a serrated image. Particularly during the Cold War period, Japan was the only Asian country making a mark on the global level. Subsequently, few of East Asian and Southeast Asian states like China, Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines and Singapore made rapid technological developments. The level of development in technologies in states like India and Israel has also been noteworthy. At the same time, there are various other states in the region which are technologically reticent. In overall analysis, it is very important to do a nuanced distinction amid the scientific and technological independence of the nation states. ‘Scientific independence

6“Basic Human Needs, Science, And Technology”, Panel on Technology for Basic Needs, United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development, Published jointly by the International Development Research Centre Ottawa, Canada and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Switzerland, 1997, op cit. 14 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies is the capacity of a country to create and sustain its own scientific institutions, traditions and programmes in the process of making significant and original contributions to the advancement of world science. Technological independence at the national level means national autonomy in technology acquisition and technological innovation; it is the capacity of domestic firms to forecast, assess, select, acquire or generate, and commercialize the technologies they need to create and sustain competitive advantages for themselves and self-sustaining growth for the national economy. Technological independence can be attained by a country through the adoption, imitation, learning and improvement of foreign technologies. Such technological independence, however, can be easily undermined by countries that have the capacity to become technological leaders and pioneers through the continuous creation of new technologies from endogenous research and development (R&D). Hence, a country cannot sustain its technological independence unless it also has scientific independence. Technological independence that is not based on scientific independence will sooner or later be reduced to technological followership; technological independence that is supported by scientific independence can develop into technological leadership’ [8]. Appreciating the limits of technological independence, the countries in Asia are found making independent efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. Few states in the region like India have undergone technological apartheid for many years for various political reasons. Particularly the decade 1995Ð2005 has witnessed dramatic increase in government spending by many Asian states. The research contributions by the Asian scholars working in Asian research institutes have increased multifold, and also a sharp increase in number of PhD holding scientists and engineers is on the rise [9]. Strengthening of research infrastructure of many states has also attracted the native talent back to the motherland from the Western countries. The economic instability in the West particularly after the 2008 global financial has also contributed to the process of reverse brain drain. Alternatively, understanding the economic importance of the region, developed states have started selectively tweaking their rigid technology denial positions and policies. The 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal is the case in point.

Growth of Technology in Asia

Technological growth cannot be studied in isolation. Presence (or absence) of any form of growth is mainly controlled by various sociopolitical, geopolitical and economic factors. The growth of technology in any state could be the result of overall development process. There is no single, all-embracing formula explaining and evaluating the growth of technology in a particular state or a region. The same story holds good for the Asian region too. It is said that, ‘the economic development directly translates into power’. Is the same true case in regards to technological development in Asian theatre? From consumer field to military, the technology dictates developments in every field Scientific and Technological Pragmatism 15 of life. The technology spectrum with Asia is wide ranging from agricultural technologies to energy technologies to military technologies. In regard to West Asia mainly the oil factor has been the major factor for development, and also the USA influence over the region plays a vital role. The technological focus in Asia is more visible in East Asia and parts of SE Asia. Developed economies of Japan, China, Singapore and few other states in the region are the result of their technological achievements in electronics and consumer goods sector. In South Asia, India’s achievements are linked with their achievements in information technology sector. Japan is the best example, where the Asian development suggests that absence of natural resources is unlikely to hinder growth. However, it is also important to note that the availability of technology alone does not guarantee the growth. China was technologically more advanced than Europe in many fields in the late medieval and early modern period. Yet Asia did not industrialise before the intervention of the West [10]. The growth with various Asian states is witnessed post-1980s particularly after the process of economic liberalisation begun. Also, the process of industrialisation became a reality partly because of the technology transfer within and outside the region. Presently, Asian states understand that for the various investments in S&T is the key. They have also learnt few things from their Western experience. Unfortunately, for many decades Asia had fallen behind mainly from the Western nations, in the field of S&T. Luckily, the twenty-first century situation is looking much brighter, and Asians have started dominating the S&T turf. There are many PhD holding scientists and engineers residing in Asia, and significant amount of research is being undertaken by various Asian states [11]. States like China have more than doubled their earlier investments in this field. States like India have developed their own infrastructure in technology training (Institute Institutes of Technologies or IITs) which matches with the best in the world. Between 1980 and 2000, Asian states suffered from brain drain when many talented individuals had migrated to Western countries to the greener pastures. However, in the beginning of twenty-first century, the process of reverse brain drain has began for various reasons including economic crisis in the West and boosting opportunities in Asia. The quality of education in Asian states like China and India is of high standard particularly in subjects like physics and mathematics. This is giving Asian states an added advantage both for innovation as well as for adaption of new technologies. In Asia, Japan7 was the early starter in regard to developments in S&T and associated R&D issues. Japan’s technological skills have always drawn worldwide respect. In the 1970s, Japan started with ‘applied R&D’ activities with help from abroad. This was more of a catch-up policy. In 1980s, the policy shifted to focus on basic research with the realisation that an indigenous science base was needed to prepare for subsequent level technology life cycles. Over the years, they have succeeded to re-establish themselves as one of the world leaders in technological capability. Relative to its labour force size, Japan has more engineers than any

7The country specific information in the section is taken from Nabanita R. Krishnan [12]. 16 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies leading industrial nation, except Sweden. These are concentrated in the fields of electronics and electrical engineering and in computer science with over 70% are in industry, 13% in education and about 6% in government. China is another Asian country with strong technological base. It caters for both civilian/commercial requirements and its military modernisation programme. China’s national security and economic competitiveness has been guided by four main principles: acquisition of foreign systems by technology transfer through joint ventures, licensing and co-production arrangements, promotion of commercial initiatives in scientific labs, creation of venture capital industry towards innovative technology start-ups and promotion of greater role for industries in R&D. As a result, its industrial growth has taken off almost simultaneously with technological growth. Its vast defence infrastructure has transformed itself into a strategic enterprise with close active cooperation with research institutes and universities. China has understood the necessity of a sustainable S&T infrastructure for a rapid economic growth. It has launched in quick succession major programmes which would be the backbone of its technological growth. They are: ¥ National High-Tech R&D Development Program (National 863 Program), which aims at promoting the applied research and accelerating high-tech development. China’s high-tech priorities, including IT, biotechnology and advanced agricultural technology, advanced materials technology, advanced manufacturing and automation technology, energy technology as well as resource and environment technology ¥ National Basic Research Program of China (National 973 Program), for the development of comprehensive and multidisciplinary basic research and also involves important cutting-edge basic research and fostering outstanding scientists with creativity ¥ National Key Technologies R&D Program which works to provide technical support to industrial restructuring, the sustainable development of society and the enhancement of living standards by achieving breakthroughs in key technologies, introducing technical innovation and applying high and new technologies ¥ Program 211 which aimed at building about 100 higher education institutions and key disciplines as a national priority to greatly enhance the teaching quality, level of scientific research and administrative efficiency of higher education institutions8 These programmes laid the foundation of what is today a thriving S&T organisation which is paying rich dividends to all major spheres including defence. In regard to development in technology, India has witnessed various ups and downs. Particularly, because of its nuclear policies (nuclear tests carried out during 1974 and 1998), India had to face technological apartheid for many years. Political establishment gave support for scientific progress in spite of financial constraints.

860 years of progress in Science and Technology, http://www.china.org.cn/china/60th science and technology/2009-9/11/content 18510361.htm, accessed on Jun 24, 2011. Scientiﬁc and Technological Pragmatism 17

Till 1990s, India’s economic situation was not very healthy. Even by the year 2003, the expenditure on S&T in India was about US$5 per capita compared to US$240 for South Korea and US$705 for the USA. As per the global research report on science and engineering research currently in India, the government spending on science research is 0.9% of GDP which is expected to go up to 1.2% in 2012. However, the availability of qualified researchers has not kept pace with intended enhanced spending. A growth in scientific publications of 80% in 7 years, however, places India at only 3% of the world output, far below that of Japan. China which had slumbered through 1980s/1990s has shown a dramatic growth after 2003 [13]. India has done remarkable progress in the field of information technology sector. The country is also taking lead in the field of biotechnology. South Korea is another country in Asia which is developing a broad technology base. Till 1980s, the state was the major contributor for R&D projects, but subsequently since 1990s, private industry is found involved in various technologies development arenas except core technologies. South Korea was assessed in 2007 to be about 6Ð7 in world ranking in terms of science competitiveness and technologies by the International Institute of Management Development. Presently, it has risen to 5 in science competitiveness while falling to 14th position in technology competitiveness. To regain the lost ground, they are following a model of outsourcing and technology integration as a means of boosting R&D capability. Post-Iranian revolution in 1979 followed by the sanctions by the West forced Iran to pursue a path of self-sufficiency. This required Iran to develop its technological base mainly without any outside support. Particularly, under its second 5-year plan (1995Ð2000), S&T was declared as a top national goal with stress on infrastructure, research and education. The emphasis on R&D centres was on three key fundamental areas—metallurgy, electronics and aerospace. The aim of state funded centres was to develop a scientific and professional technical community anchored within the country. At the same time support for S&T education was given a major boost with expansion in Iranian academia. All of this combined to give a major boost to S&T in Iran. Pakistan’s focus on S&T achieved a 6.25 fold jump from 1965 to 1995 in terms of numbers of scientists and technologists in the workforce. About 47 universities and 237 R&D institutes are engaged in S&T. One important R&D unit is National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) which reportedly is a civilian controlled scientific and research organisation carrying out research in many engineering and scientific areas, with focus on the design and production of the defence systems. Overall in Asian context, it has been viewed that historically every country was not very closely affiliated to the scientific pursuits. However, in recent past, such states are found making significant efforts to develop scientifically and technologically. As an example, Iran’s case could be considered. Historically, Iran was not a knowledge-oriented society. Naturally, issues related to science and technology had either political or economical patronage. There was not much motivation of inventions. Also, Iran’s role in the invention of science and technology at the international level was very low. There were no efficient national and legal 18 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies mechanisms for safeguarding the material and intellectual rights of scientists and technologists.9 However, this situation is changing. Particularly, post-1995 Iran is found making investments into various fields of existing and emerging technologies. Government and to certain extent private industry is also found supporting scientific research and development. It is important to appreciate the fact that scientific research and technological progress always has a military dimension to it. Historically, it has been observed that many a time technologies are developed essentially for military purposes and subsequently they find their usefulness in the civilian field. Most commonly known examples of this are computer and internet. This pattern appears to be reversing in present times. Presently, market economics is pushing the technological development and various new inventions are getting introduced for their industrial and/or consumer project utility. Subsequently, military technologists are identifying their defence usefulness. Post-World War II various discoveries in various fields like mathematics, physics, meteorology, material sciences, communication, electronics, aerodynamics and physical sciences have taken place. Particularly, nation-states have invested significant amount of resources towards development, testing and production of various missile systems for their armed forces. This overall development of various technologies has directly or indirectly helped the development of rocket science in few Asian states. Also, it is important to note that this technology growth need not have happened indigenously alone. Significant amount of help has been received from the Western states for such developments.

Relevance of Space Technologies for Asia

Space technologies are relevant to states in Asia for the similar reasons they are important to the other states outside the region. The only subtle difference could have been that most of the Asian states particularly during the first two to three decades of space era were not in a position to make investments in space from the point of view of catering exotic ideas like fulfilling the ‘human curiosity’, etc. For Asia, the space technologies are relevant for remote sensing, communication, education, etc. Understanding the increasing significance of satellite technologies in various other fields for development Asian states have also started employing them in newer areas. Appreciating the need to address various new sets of challenges being encountered the Asian states are probing the realm of space technologies further to find its utility.

9“Science and Technology Assessment in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The First Macro Assess- ment Program 2003”, http://www.arzyabi.ir/pdf/dabirkhane/arzyabi/az-book-08x.pdf, accessed on Mar 12, 2011. The Space Era and Asia 19

Economic prosperity appears to be the main goal of various states in the world [14] and same could be true for Asia too. However, states within Asia understand that economic prosperity alone is not a solution to the various challenges the world is facing today or likely to face in future. Various issues from rise in population, to food security to climate change to inappropriate distribution of natural resources demand attention. Space technologies have major relevance for all these ﬁelds. Good environmental research is possible only with the help from various space technologies. Also, space could offer a solution to the issue related to resources crunch on Earth. The real challenge is to get the resources from space (other planets) to the Earth. Few Asian states appear to have accepted this challenge and are found systematically working towards making such possibility a reality. Some countries, including many in Asia, are effective adopters of technology while displaying little innovation. East Asia has been the most successful region in the developing world in adopting technologies from the innovating economies. For example, the electronics and semiconductor production throughout southeast Asia and coastal China is based on technology that came from the USA and Japan originally few decades before [15]. To their credit, some states within the region created institutional arrangements for transfer of technology, research and commercial production of these technologies which has helped them to become the key global centres for electronics industries. Some states with the region are found attempting the similar model in space arena too and also found depending on international assistance for future development. However, even though rocket science has got its intrinsic complexities, still its military relevance is undisputed; hence, few states with the region are making their own efforts to develop this technology. States within the region are in a process of transition from being a technological adopter to becoming a core centre for innovation. Presently, very few Asian states have achieved the status of spacefaring nations, but increasing number of states is found investing into space technologies, and some of them are also aiming to work towards gaining spacefaring status.

The Space Era and Asia

As seen, the role of outer space applications has evolved considerably over last few decades for education, meteorology, resources management and communication. On the other hand, the wars fought in the post-Cold War era have brought to fore the importance of space technologies for the militaries. Both the Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) and Afghanistan conflict (2001) has demonstrated to the world the value of space assets towards controlling the modern warfare. This has also lead to the development of space doctrines for various nation-states. During last two to three decades, a marked increase in the development of indigenous outer space programmes and related joint ventures has been observed. Various 20 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies states in Asia are found investing to space technologies. In some cases, the space programmes are somewhat indigenous in nature while many states are developing their programmes mostly in collaboration with the USA, European Union (EU) or Russia. Nonetheless, the expansion in the number of states possessing outer space technologies is also bringing in the issue of duel-capable technologies to the fore. The pre-1990 period could be viewed as the Space War period between the two superpowers. The USA and the erstwhile USSR had made significant investments in space-based assets. However, mostly their focus was to use the space technologies for the purposes of monitoring each other nuclear assets. In the final analysis, it could be said that the Soviets could not sustain the space domination race mainly because of economic compulsions. In regard to Asian states, it has been observed that their investments in space did not have any significant military or one-upmanship bias of the Cold War era. They were fully aware about the erstwhile USSR experience of the space race engagement. At the same time, it is also important to note that states having vital strategic objectives usually tend to modernise faster than others. Also, states having developed missile capabilities tend to have advantage in the space arena (converse is also true). Asia hosts some of the shrewdest powers in the world. Naturally, their investment in space needs to be viewed not in isolation but at the backdrop of prevailing geopolitical and geostrategic realities. Today, the Asian states could be distributed into two broad groupings in regard to their space capabilities: satellite system holders based on borrowed technology and states with satellite launch capabilities (spacefaring nations). In today’s world, it’s not mandatory to possess all the technical capabilities to own a satellite. There are states owning satellites without having either launch capabilities and/or satellite manufacturing potential. This becomes possible because of international collaborations either done at political or commercial level. Approximately, more than 15 Asian states have their own satellites placed in outer space. The states which have successfully demonstrated launch capabilities till date are Japan, China, India, Israel and Iran. North Korea has made claims regarding successful orbital launches but scientific community is not fully convinced about it. Amongst the Asian states mainly Japan, China and India have significant investments in the space arena. Israel also to an extent could be said to belong to this club; however, their investments are much limited in nature. All these states are capable of designing and developing their own satellites and launchers. Some of them have limitations in regard to putting heavier satellites (more than 3,000 kg) into the geostationary (36,000 km) orbits. Following table offers basic information in regard to the number of satellites in possession of individual countries in the region. The Space Era and Asia 21

Year of 1st Payloads in orbit Name of country launch (2010Ð11)10 Japan 1970 127 China 1970 120 India 1975 45 Indonesia 1976 10 Israel 1988 10 Pakistan 1990 5 South Korea 1992 12 Thailand 1993 6 Turkey 1994 5 Ukraine 1995 6 Malaysia 1996 4 Philippines 1997 2 Egypt 1998 3 Singapore 1998 3 Taiwan 1999 9 Saudi Arabia 2000 12 United Arab Emirate 2000 3 Iran 2005 4 Kazakhstan 2006 2 Vietnam 2008 2

Amongst these, states like South Korea and Malaysia are keen to enhance their space capabilities and are demonstrating keenness to develop the programme in the near future. Unfortunately, South Korea has to witness failures in regard to the development of launch technologies. States like Indonesia, South Korea and Saudi Arabia have ten or more satellites in space; however, it is important to note that there is no direct correlation between the number of satellites and the space potential. What essentially this number could indicate is the interest of these states in this technology and their wiliness for monetary investments. Various other states from the region also have a considerable requirement for satellite-derived products, but they probably face ﬁnancial limitations and hence do not ‘own’ any satellites. Many such states are purchasing required products either from Asian or global market to reduce the ‘deﬁcit’ of not owning any satellite systems. Iran and North Korea are found using space launches as a technology demonstrator to implicitly inform the world about their ballistic missile capability. However,

10http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satellite, accessed on Sep 15, 2012. 22 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies it may not be totally correct to view Iran only with the ‘missile’ label. They have demonstrated some significant achievements in the space sciences field too and have successfully undertaken few launches. Amongst JapanÐChinaÐIndia, the investments and the space assets of Japan and China far exceed India. Deep space missions (missions to put satellites beyond 100,000 km—e.g. Moon and Mars missions) are one area where the journey of all these states could be more or less comparable to a certain extent. In recent times, particularly China’s progress has been most noteworthy with their successful human spaceflights and their efforts towards launching indigenous space station. China has caused a ‘space tsunami’ by successfully carrying out an antisatellite test during 2007. This has brought to the fore the issues related to the ‘weaponisation of space’.11 When issues related to space are debated at the backdrop of geostrategic realities, it becomes essential to understand the ability of space realm in regard to power projection to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events. It is important to understand military strategy and power projection premise of the issues related to space.

Space Power

The notion of space power is a universal. However, there is no single definition of space power. Many analysts have attempted to typify, describe and predict the character, connotation and functioning of space power. The term space power is found in writing as early as 1964, but there was no clear attempt to define it. Probably, one of the early attempts to define it was done as late as 1988. Lt Col David Lupton, in his book titled On Space Warfare, A Space Power Doctrine, published by Air University (U.S.) Press, presented the formal definition. Lupton has argued the requirement to derive the definition on the pattern of definitions of land, sea and air power offered by Mahan, Mitchell, Arnold and others. These definitions basically underscore three characteristics: (1) elements of national power, (2) purposes that are military and non-military, and (3) systems that are military and civilian. By contextualising these features, Lupton offered this definition: ‘Space power is the ability of a nation to exploit the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purposes and includes the entire astronautical capabilities of the nation.’ Alternatively, Space Power could also be viewed as an ability to exploit the civil, commercial and national security

11‘Militarisation of space’ is about using satellites for the purposes of military communication, reconnaissance and navigation. Such usage is universally accepted and is not in violation of any treaty regime. ‘Weaponisation of space’ means causing intentional damage to the space assets of other states either of permanent or temporary in nature. Space Power 23 space systems (it includes space element, a terrestrial element and a link element) and associated infrastructure in support of national security strategy [16]. Another comprehensive description puts across space power as “the combination of technology, demographic, economic, industrial, military, national will, and other factors that contribute to the coercive and persuasive ability of a country to politically inﬂuence the actions of other states and other kinds of players or to otherwise achieve national goals through space activity” [17]. Since space power is viewed in context of national security strategy, it brings the dimension of security dilemma to the fore. The security dilemma spins around the paradox that the measures taken by a state to make it more secure will normally leads to making itself less secure. This is because the actions taken by the state leads to making their adversaries feel more insecure and hence attempts to measures to gain matching capabilities. The Asian region could be viewed as the place which presents the most widespread and exceptional security dilemma in the world. South Asia, Korean Peninsula, Taiwan tangle, Indo-China, Japan-China and Iran-Israel are all the cases of mutual misunderstandings where the concern for security dominates the geopolitical discourse presenting a picture of a region trapped in a security dilemma. Alliteratively, a major criticism of the security dilemma concept emerges from the question of the validity of the offenceÐdefence balance. Since weapons of offence and that of defence are the same, how can the distinction between the two be connected with a state’s intentions [18]? This is truer in case of space technologies which are inherently dual use in nature. However, particularity in the Asian context very less cooperative space activity is being witnessed. The real challenge in Asia would be whether the powers within the region can overcome the insecurity that drives the security dilemma. The notion of space power becomes important particularly when space is being viewed as a medium to achieve strategic superiority. Philosophy of air power is found being extended to the idea of space power by some analysts. This has mainly directed the formulation of the concept of ‘high ground of space’. This notion was put into words way back in 1957 by General Thomas White. He had argued that ‘ :::. in the future it is likely that those who have the capability to control space will likewise control the earth’s surface’ [19]. It has also been argued that ‘he who can secure control of space, deny an adversary access to space, and defeat weapons moving into or through space may cause an adversary to capitulate before forces act against each other on the earth’ [20]. The often quoted theory from the realm of International Relations, the theory of Balance of Power (BoP) could be used to appreciate the perspective of space security and space race. This is the most basic concept behind international politics and provides a structure for explaining some of the critical principles behind international relations [21]. BoP could be said to exit when there is parity amongst the competing forces. Successful space programmes of some of the Asian states contribute substantially to raise their stature as a dominant political power in Asia. States possessing such capabilities could use them for undertaking healthy interaction in this ﬁeld and forging a stronger relationship. This could have a positive effect on the BoP. 24 2 Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies

For various Asian states, the key focus of investment in space arena has been for the purposes of using space applications for the betterment of the society. Asia is also a late starter in making investments into space ﬁeld. The geopolitics of the region and the military capabilities of Asian states indicate that the development and inﬂuences of Asian space capabilities would have a more socioeconomic bias. The security challenges in the region could be viewed as more complex than rest of the world. But, at the same time, none of the Asian states are at the pinnacle of their space accomplishments; hence, it is unlikely that they would be preparing to achieve all out ‘space superiority’ from the warfare perspective. Hence, the notion of space power in Asian ‘wisdom’ appears to be more of a broad concept which includes projection of achievements in space technologies from a holistic sense inclusive of strategic dimension.

Key Asian Space Players

To understand what the future will unfold in the space arena is respect of Asia, it is important to examine whether Asian states will continue with the present pace of economic and technical growth or lose momentum. For any state, future growth in the technological area would be dictated by various nontechnical factors too. Apart from economics, the bilateral and multilateral arrangements undertaken by the state would play a greater role in the development of the space futures of the countries in the region. From this perspective, it would be important to know about the past and present of the space roadmaps of the states within the region. To build up a broad scale understanding about the investments and achievements of the Asian states in the space arena, subsequent chapters mention the details about the space programmes of few of the states. In regard to certain states since their space programmes are still in nascent stages, there is nothing much to examine. Mostly this is because they have either hired the satellite services or have total dependence on other states to implement their space agenda. Few other Asian states which do not ﬁnd mention in the above table (simply because they do not have satellites) are also attempting the develop space programmes. For example, states like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and few others that have established space agencies are in the process of developing the space roadmap for their countries. The big three in Asia, JapanÐChinaÐIndia are in the business of space almost for four decades now. Their yearly space budgets range from approximately 1,000Ð 2,000 million US$ (India has the lowest). It could even be argued that they view space as an important element of their comprehensive national power. Their investments in space are for the sake of national pride, growth of S&T and for the overall socioeconomic development. The strategic importance of these technologies particularly in the twenty-ﬁrst century when the states in the region are facing both conventional and asymmetric challenges cannot be overlooked. States in the region are found investing or have plans to invest in space technology for both socioeconomical and geostrategic requirements. References 25

References

1. Bowring P. Was is Asia? Far East Econ Rev. 1987;135(7). 2. Bailey J. Great power strategy in Asia. London: Routledge; 2007. p. 210. 3. Tipton FB. The rise of Asia. London: Macmillan Press Ltd; 1998. p. 1. 4. Mahbubani K. The New Asian Hemisphere. Public Affairs. New York, 2008. p. 2. 5. Henry Lambright W. The political construction of space satellite technology. Technol Hum Values. 1994;19(1, Winter):64. 6. Almond GA. Public opinion and the development of space technology. Public Opin Q. 1960;24(4, Winter):555. 7. McDougall WA. Technocracy and statecraft in the space age Ð toward the history of a saltation. Am Hist Rev. 1982;87(4):1010. 8. Posadas R. The development of science and technology in South-East Asia: status and prospects. Sci Technol Soc. 1999;4(1):116Ð7. 9. Hartung D. Asia’s great science experiment. Time. Oct 2006. 10. Tipton FB. The rise of Asia. London: Macmillan Press Ltd; 1998. p. 5Ð7. 11. Mahbubani K. The New Asian Hemisphere. New York: Perseus Books Group; 2008. p. 57Ð66. 12. Krishnan NR. Defence R & D in Asia. In: Lele A, Goswami N, editors. Imagining Asia in 2030. New Delhi: Academic Foundation; 2011. p. 403Ð46. 13. Chidambaram R. Measures of progress in science and technology. Curr Sci. 2005;88(6):856. 14. Olla P, editor. Space technologies for the benefit of human society and earth. Dordrecht: Springer; 2009. p. 1Ð5. 15. Sachs JD, McArthur JW. Technological advancement and economic growth in Asia, p. 164Ð 70. http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/tech new economy02.pdf. Accessed 24 Jan 2012. 16. Jusell JJ. USAF. Space power theory a rising star. Alabama: Maxwell AFB; April 1998. http:// www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/98-144.pdf. Accessed 2 Jan 2012. 17. Oberg JE. Space power theory. Colorado Springs: US Air Force Academy/Government Printing Office; 1999. p. 1. 18. Lynn-Jones SM. Offense-defense theory and its critics. Secur Stud. 1995;4(4, Summer): 660Ð91 (Published by Frank Cass, London). 19. Air University. Space reference guide, vol. 2. Montgomery: Maxwell AFB; 1999. p. 17Ð7. 20. Lupton DE. On space warfare: a space power doctrine. Montgomery: Air University Press/Maxwell AFB; 1988. p. 38. 21. Sheehan MJ. The balance of power: history and theory. New York: Routledge; 1996. Part II Asian Space Narratives Chapter 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies

West Asia (also known as Middle East) is the westernmost portion of Asia. It is a region containing large areas of mountainous terrain and also has major desert regions. Historically, the region is famous for its kingdoms and big cities. Over centuries, the people in various parts of this region are trying to stay independent, but either the invaders or the people within the region have always tried to overpower them. Over the years in this region, the means and methods of power grabbing could have changed, but the basic instinct remains the same. The region has gained importance globally mainly because of the signiﬁcant availability of the energy sources. During last three to four decades, the region has witnessed few of the major wars fought in the recent history. Presently, the region could be viewed as one of the most unstable regions in the world. One nuclear and two spacefaring states fall in this region. This chapter elaborates on the space programmes of two spacefaring states and also discusses in brief the investments made by few other important states within the region.

Iran

Iran is an ancient country which experienced two full-scale revolutions in the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, this state has been looked with ‘interest’ by many particularly because of its nuclear and anti-West policies. Obviously, Iran’s policies have important security implications both at regional and global levels. Iran is fully aware of its geostrategic importance and significance of its oil economy for the rest of the world. The state is found formulating its economic, political and strategic policies firmly, precisely and with full awareness of these circumstances. As per the report published, Science-Metrix—a Montreal-based company dedicated to the quantitative and qualitative evaluation and measurement of science, technology and innovation—in 2010 ‘geopolitical shifts in knowledge creation’ is taking place. Since 1980, the standard growth in the West Asia, particularly in Iran

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 3, 29 © Springer India 2013 30 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies and Turkey, is found nearly four times faster than the world average, and Iran is showing fastest worldwide growth in science. Iran’s publications have somewhat emphasised on nuclear chemistry and particle physics; the country has also made significant progress in medical science agriculture development, stem cell and cloning research. The published work also covers field of aerospace technologies.1 It is interesting to note that despite political tensions between the USA and Iran, scientific collaboration has proven surprisingly resilient. Between the periods 1996Ð 2002 to 2004Ð2008, co-authored papers between these two countries increased from just 388 papers to 1,831 papers, an increase of 472%. Following the Iranian elections in June 2009, Iranian scientists called out to the international research community to ‘do everything possible to promote continued contact with colleagues in Iran, if only to promote detente« between Iran and the West when relations are contentious’.2 Iran has been keen to develop space technology for many years. Its interests in technical as well as arms control issues related to space sciences and technologies go back to late 1950s. It was 1 of the 24 founding members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) during 1959 and has also signed the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in late 1960s. The history of Iran’s space efforts and its drive to pursue independent space projects began during the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, king of Iran’s (1941Ð 1979) time. During Shah’s reign in 1977, an idea was mooted to establish an Iranian communications satellite system. In addition, several Iranian organisations were involved in plans to send small research satellites into space that would pave the way for launching a military intelligence-gathering satellite. However, not much of activity took place for almost two decades in this regard. By 1997, few reports originated giving details of a RussianÐIranian agreement on the transfer of technology enabling Iran to build its own research satellite. The name of the proposed satellite, Mesbah (variously translated as ‘dawn’, ‘lighthouse’ and ‘flashlight’), was announced in 1999. Few were of the opinion that actually a spy satellite launch has been planned [1]. Iran had plans of launching three satellites by 2002Ð2003; however, it took 6 more years to become a spacefaring nation. Iran’s first satellite called Sinah-1 was launched on October 28, 2005, by Russia from the Plesetsk Space Center. It was reported that on August 17, 2008, Iran had attempted to launch a dummy satellite by using the two-stage rocket called Safir, but the rocket had failed shortly after liftoff. Within 6 months on Feb 3, 2009, Iran successfully launched its first domestically manufactured satellite ‘Omid’ (Hope), which was carried into space by the Safir-2 space rocket. Since both the launcher and the satellite were made in Iran and also the launch was carried out form Iranian soil, it could be said that Iran achieved the status of the spacefaring nation on that day.

1“Iran’s science progress fastest in world: Canadian report”, Feb 19, 2010, http://edition.presstv.ir/ detail/118977.html, accessed on Nov 20, 2011. 2Iran and Global scientiﬁc collaboration in the 21st century, Sep 3, 2011, http://www.apsih.org/ index.php/news/english-news/275-iran-and-global-scientiﬁc-collaboration-in-the-21st-century, accessed on Dec 12, 2011. Iran 31

As discussed elsewhere in this book, Iranian effort to advance its space programme is generally being viewed as a case of using civil space programme clandestinely to manufacture longer-range missiles and also to indirectly demonstrate their missile capability. During the year 2000, the then Iranian Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani had announced that Iran was investing in space technology to strengthen the country’s deterrence capabilities. He had mentioned that “we are also investing in production of that military equipment that, with minimum cost, can have maximum effects on our deterrence capabilities. In fact we are investing in [our access] to space technology or its prerequisite field like missile technology by improving the range, accuracy, and destruction power of missiles. This is one of our main aims [2].” However, the overall progress made by Iran post-2009 onwards indicates that Iran has interest in developing its space programme too (could be for civil and military applications), and it could be incorrect to view their space programme only as covert means to demonstrate their missile capabilities. Eight years of IranÐIraq conflict (September 1980 to August 1988) had played a major role for significantly corrupting Iran’s various socioeconomic structures. Naturally, after the end of conflict in order to rebuild the state, Iran started making efforts at social, political and economic levels. Reformist leaders like Muhammad Khatami helped the country to view space power capabilities as a vehicle for modernity. Iran’s vision in regard to its ambitions in space could be judged from the goals enumerated at a 2002 UNCOPUOS meeting. Promoting international cooperation based on concepts of joint benefits and commercialisation of space programme appears to be the key focus of the Iran’s space agenda.3 Iran apparently attempted to meet some of the above-noted goals starting in April 2003. The legislature approved a bill to create the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) to serve as a policy-formulating organisation for space initiatives. The ISA performs research on remote sensing projects and coordinates various space-related activities within the country.4 Iran’s international collaboration with few states appears to have helped towards development of its space programme. Post 1995, Iran was reported to be working together with a number of Asian countries in constructing a small research satellite.

3International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States in 2002 National Activities of Iran (Islamic Republic of), United Nations Ofﬁce for Outer Space Affairs, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/natact/2002/iran.html, last updated February 7, 2003. The current documentation available on the UNOOSA website is from 2004 to 2009 covering few countries and no information on Iran is available, accessed on Dec 13, 2011. 4“International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States in 2003,” United Nations Ofﬁce for Outer Space Affairs, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/natact/2003/ iran.html, last updated January 27, 2004. Presently this link is not working, accessed on Dec 13, 2011. This and earlier footnote are based on Lee Kass, “Iran’s Space Program: The Next Genie In A Bottle?”, The Middile East Review of International Affairs, Volume 10, No. 3, Article 2/10 Ð September 2006, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a2.html, accessed on Dec 12, 2011. 32 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies

The cooperation in Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) project was jointly signed by China, Iran, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan and Thailand on April 22, 1998, in Bangkok. Bangladesh joined the programme in 1999. Subsequently, till 2005 various project committee meetings were held. It has been reported that China, Thailand and Iran were working on a joint Small Multimission Spacecraft (SMMS) devoted to civilian remote-sensing and communications experiments.5 Probably, the aim was to provide Iran and Pakistan a semi-autonomous space-imaging capability. No further details about this project are available; however, active participation by Iran should have given it the exposure and access to various related technologies. A locally produced satellite Rasad-1 (Observation-1) satellite was launched by Iran during June 2011. This was Iran’s second independently launched satellite and by using the same Safir rocket used for the first launched. This LEO satellite was placed into orbit 260 km above the Earth, and it beams back to earth pictures with 150-m resolution. The Safir is the first Iranian expendable launch system meant to place a satellite into the orbit. In February 2008, Iran launched a sounding rocket into outer space to mark the opening of its first space centre.6 This rocket essentially belonged to the ‘category’ of instrument-carrying crafts. Such crafts are designed to take measurements and perform scientific experiments during their suborbital flight. A suborbital test flight, named Kavoshgar-1, was conducted on February 4, 2008. As per experts, Kavoshgar-1 bores a close resemblance to Iran’s longer-range missile Shahab-3. Iranian officials have declared that Kavoshgar-1 used a two-stage rocket. Iran had launched Kavoshgar-2, which carried a space-lab and a restoration system in November 2008. The Kavoshgar-3 was launched on February 3, 2010, with one rodent, two turtles and several worms into suborbital space and returned them to Earth alive. Subsequently, Iran had announced to carry a monkey into the space. On March 15, 2011, the Kavoshgar-4 rocket carrying the capsule designed to carry a live monkey was launched, but there were no living creatures on board. Later it was acknowledged by Iran that the Kavoshgar-5 rocket carrying a capsule with a live animal (a monkey) and the mission was launched during Shahrivar, an Iranian calendar month spanning August 23 to September 22, 2011, but the mission failed.7 On February 3, 2012, Iran successfully launched a new domestically manufactured satellite called Navid (Herald). It has been manufactured by Iran University of Science and Technology. It was sent into space aboard the Safir rocket. The satellite weighs about 50 kg in weight and is designed to collect data on weather conditions and monitor for natural disasters. It has advanced control technology, a higher resolution camera and photocells to generate power. Iran also proposes to

5“Small Multimission Spacecraft (SMMS)”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/ smms.htm, accessed on Dec 8, 2011. 6http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jFpohlpSs7iLXpyOB9MalGwKRIgQ 7http://news.discovery.com/space/iran-launch-monkey-rocket-fail-111012.html Iran 33 launch two more domestically designed satellites dubbed Fajr (Dawn) and Tolou (Sunrise) in near future.8 Iran has various plans for future to launch reconnaissance and communication satellites of different make. Italy was building a telecommunication satellite for Iran called Mesbah,9 and Russia was expected to launch it. However, both the states have gone back on their promise probably due to the sanctions issue. Tehran is keen to receive the satellite from Italy because it is now confident that it could launch this satellite by using own rocket launcher. However, having understood the geopolitical compulsions, Iran has also begun construction of a derivative of the Italian satellite called Mesbah-2. Iran’s ambitions are not limited towards launching satellites only, and the state has announced that they propose putting a man in orbit space by 2019 and also propose to undertake a manned moon mission by 2025. Iran has also plans to establish a national satellite launch base in the southeast of the country, adjacent to the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has ordered his cabinet to approve the plan and earmark funding for the project.10 Iran’s public articulation about its future plans in space arena indicates that there is clarity about its space roadmap for future and the state intends to become a leading space power by 2020Ð2025. Post 2008, Iran has successfully undertaken two independent satellite launches. Iranian authorities over the years have claimed that their satellite programme is meant for scientific research and exploiting its civilian utility. However, the Iranian space programme is a growing source of international unease. States like the USA, the UK, France and Israel have reacted negatively to the Iranian satellite launch capability. In their view, Iran’s space capability implicitly demonstrates that Iran is inching closer towards ballistic missile capability. They feel that along with its covert nuclear weapon programme, Iran is simultaneously working towards developing technology for delivering nuclear weapons. In overall assessment till now, Iran has successfully demonstrated rudimentary space launch capabilities. Iran’s second satellite the Rasad-1 weighs around 50 kg. This clearly indicates that Iran is yet to produce a launcher comparable to the power and sophistication of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Iran appears to be following a twofold agenda of developing satellite systems with dual use utility. Satellites meant for the reconnaissance and telecommunications have both civilian and military usages. However, such investments by Iran cannot be challenged because every other spacefaring nation has similar benefits. At the same time, a direct correlation exists between Iran’s (covert) nuclear

8“Iran launches newest satellite into space”, Feb 3, 2012, http://www.payvand.com/news/12/feb/ 1034.html accessed on Feb 8, 2012. 9The Iran Telecommunications Research Center (ITRC) and the Iran Science Organization of Science and Technology (IROST) were jointly building this micro-satellite with the Italian company Carlo Gavazzi Space. 10“Iran to launch new generation of satellites”, Feb 08, 2012, http://www.space-travel.com/reports/ Iran to launch new generation of satellites 999.html, accessed on Feb 08, 2012. 34 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies ambitions and the gains which they are expected to receive for their ballistic missile programme from the satellite-launching systems. From Iran’s point of view, nuclear and space arena are directly related to their national pride. Looking at their present level of development in the space arena, it looks unlikely that Iran could realise its stated ambition of manned moon mission within next 10Ð15 years. However, a space visit for an Iranian astronaut could not be ruled out particularly if China offers Iran a trip to their space station. As of 2012, Iran could be viewed as a late entrant but moderately progressing actor in this ﬁeld. Iran’s nuclear ambitions when seen in unison with its investments in space clearly signify their strategic interest and intentions.

Israel

On March 26, 1979, the historic peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed in Washington, DC. This peace treaty is considered as a watershed event in the geopolitics of West Asia. Interestingly, this peace treaty was indirectly instrumental towards founding of Israel’s space programme. After agreeing to abide by the provisions of the treaty, the Israel’s government realised that they do not have adequate technological capability to verify Egyptian compliance with the treaty regulations on the aspects like demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula. Israel was politically constrained to use reconnaissance aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) because as per the accord, they were not in a position to violate the territorial sovereignty of a now friendly neighbour. To overcome this difﬁculty, Israeli government approved the development of information gathering satellites and thus the space programme began.11 However, this does not mean that the thinking and the experimentation in the arena of space only started then. The Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities had established National Committee of Space Research (NCSR) during 1960s. Interestingly, even then Egypt was one of the reasons for Israel thinking ‘space’. On July 5, 1961, a solid two-stage sounding rocket was tested with metrological payload. One of the purposes behind this launch was to demonstrate to superiority of Israeli rocketry to the Egyptian rocketry [3, pp. 386Ð87]. Subsequently, almost after three decades, Israel became spacefaring nation during 1988 with the launch of Ofeq-1, a reconnaissance satellite using own launcher called Shavit. This was preceded by the formation of Israel Space Agency (ISA) in 1983 in afﬁliation to the Ministry of Science, Culture and Sport. Presently, the emphasis continues on building a broad space infrastructure. The space programme caters for both military

11Remarks by Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, Chairman, Israel Space Agency, at the Space Security Conference, held at New Delhi 13Ð14 Nov 2007. The conference was jointly organised by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India and Center for Defence and International Security Studies (CDiSS), UK. Israel 35 and civilian requirements. Israel’s growing space industry could be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the defence industrial infrastructure [4]. Strategic implications of the Israeli space agenda is evident from the fact that many scientists employed with the civilian space infrastructure and space industry have military sector background [5, pp. 90Ð6].12 Israel compared to its neighbouring Arab countries has a very small geographical extent. Israel’s relationship with most of their neighbours is not harmonious. Because of such geopolitical and geographical concerns and also because of other safety concerns, Israel can launch satellites only westwards, over the Mediterranean [5]. For any westward launch, significant amount of energy is lost (eastward launch—the launch in the direction of the rotation of the earth is always the best option) which forces the launcher-state for various fuel and weight compromises. This puts Israel’s space programme into a huge disadvantage and severely limits potential operational trajectories, such as polar and equatorial orbits [3, p. 386]. Since westward launch demands production of satellites less in weight, compromises with number of sensors and life of a satellite are required to be made. Such limitations indicate that Israel has no option but to invest in small satellites. Probably, Israel ranks fourth in the world in scientific activity. It puts Israel behind Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark in terms of the number of scientific publications per million citizens. One report mentions that Israel’s role in global scientific activity is ten times larger than its percentage of the world’s population [6]. On the whole, Israel’s investments and achievements in science and technology have been noteworthy for many years. Various research and academic institutions in Israel has been undertaking research into space activities and related issues since the 1960s. The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities formally established the National Committee for Space Research in 1963. The Academy has observer status at the European Science Foundation. The decision to establish a separate space agency for the purposes of satellite manufacture came much later. The Israel Space Agency (ISA) was established in 1983 with a wider mandate of inclusive of the initiation of international space projects to projects of the UV telescope for astronomical observations to support various private space activities. Israel formally pierced into the Space Age with the launch of its first satellite, Ofeq-1, from the locally built Shavit launch vehicle on September 19, 1988. Sub- sequently, during last two decades, Israel has since made significant contributions in a number of areas in space area. They have handled multiple areas including laser communication, study into embryo development and osteoporosis, monitoring pollution and mapping geology, soil and vegetation in semi-arid environments [7]. Ofeq series is a reconnaissance satellite series, and till date the last satellite launched in this series is Ofeq-9 which was launched on June 22, 2010. First three launches of this series (till Ofeq-3) were successful. Ofeq-3 was launched with an advanced electro-optical payload. This system more than doubled its expected lifespan and successfully sent images of superior quality. However, Ofeq-4 was a not

12It may be noted that the fourth ranking is as per a 2005 report. 36 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies success story. This satellite encountered problems in the second stage of its January 1998 launch.13 It burned up, affecting Israel’s satellite reconnaissance programme significantly. Ofeq-6, launched September 6, 2004, was also a failure. The launch failed due to the launcher failure: the third stage of the Shavit launcher failed. Subsequently, Israel had asked India to launch Ofeq-8 under commercial commitment. This satellite was launched by the India’s PSLV launcher on January 21, 2008. This satellite called TecSAR is synthetic aperture radar satellite fitted with a large dishlike antenna to transmit and receive radar signals capable of penetrating darkness and thick clouds [8]. Israel had multiple reasons for asking India to launch this satellite. In case of the launch from the Israeli soil, the required orbit could not have been reached because of the geographical location of the Israel and their political compulsions to undertake the launch from a particular direction. Also, they were not very comfortable to use a vehicle like Shavit because of its partial success rate. Probably, the cost of launch charged by the Indian space agency is lesser than Israeli launching systems. Iran had criticised India for undertaking this commitment because Iran is convinced that this is a spy satellite directed against them. Apart from reconnaissance satellites programme and communication satellite programme, Israel has also made investments in few other space endeavours. In early 2003, the US flight-space shuttle Columbia carried the first Israeli astronaut to the international space station where he lived for 16 days along with six other crewmembers but unfortunately could not get back to the earth because of the Columbia shuttle disaster. Amos or AMOS is the Israeli communications satellites series developed by the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and operated by Spacecom. The latest in the series called Amos-5 was launched on December 11, 2011, by a Russian rocket. This satellite has joined the satellites Amos-2 and Amos-3 which are already operational. It is the first Israeli satellite not produced by IAI. The communications services offered by Spacecom till now were covering West Asia, Europe and the USA; however, with Amos-5 now Africa has also been covered. This is one region where largest communications market exists.14 Amos-5 has significant commercial utility. Over 55% of Amos-5 capacity was sold before the launch to a variety of customers, including broadcasters, telecom providers, communications companies and government agencies.15 By 2014, one to two more satellites in this series are expected to be launched. The first satellite in this series Amos-1 was launched on May 16, 1996. EROSs (Earth Resources Observation Satellite) are the Israeli commercial earth observation satellites, designed and manufactured by the IAI, with optical payload

13“Focus on Israel: Israel in Space”, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA//1/Focus+on+Israel-+Israel+in+Space. htm, Jan 1, 2003, accessed on Nov 15, 2011Cached. 14http://www.defpro.com/news/details/30645/?SID=b2138ee2c3f220b24fd99d2b35924800,Dec 11, 2011, accessed on Dec 14, 2011. 15http://www.space-travel.com/reports/AMOS 5 Communications Satellite Successfully Launched 999.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2011. Israel 37 provided by El-Op. These satellites are owned and operated by an Israeli company, ImageSat International. The first in the series, EROS-A, launched on December 5, 2000, is the lightest commercial high-resolution imaging satellite weighing only 250 kg providing high-quality digital imaging for a wide range of commercial applications. EROS-B was launched on April 25, 2006. Work on Eros-C system has probably began in 2011 [9, 10]. It is important to note that Israel is not forwarding its space agenda by isolating itself from others and working alone. Understanding the need to have country’s stakes in an international navigation constellation, Israel has signed an agreement with the EU during July 2004 to become a partner in the Galileo project. The investments for the Israeli side are expected to be to the tune of US$30Ð$50 million.16 It has also undertaken few bilateral agreements and is participating in few new multilateral initiatives. In June 1999, NASA and ISA signed an agreement to share information through NASA’s Earth Observation System Data Information System (EOSDIS). Here, ISA gets information from EOSDIS useful for weather prediction, agriculture and meteorology. From its side, Israeli universities and research institutes contribute their own Earth observation data.17 Israel is also making attempts to expand its space development and space industry base and has signed a cooperation agreement with ESA on January 30, 2011. The objective of this agreement is to allow Israel and ESA to create the framework for more intensive cooperation in ESA projects in the future.18 Israel has also established scientific research collaboration with the Indian space agency. One on the satellite launched by India to cater for their security needs in 2008 called RISAT-2 is built by the Israel Aerospace Industries. Israel’s space programme is also suffering from various limitations too. Some projects are found lagging behind the schedule. Projects like FrenchÐIsraeli micro- satellite VENUS (based on the Israeli satellite design-proposed launch was to take place in 2008) are still incomplete. It has been reported that this project is experiencing certain difficulties because of the problems in cooperation between Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries. However, the basic reason for the slowdown of the overall space programme appears to be financial. The ISA is a very small and poor institution and has limited budgetary support. This organisation has signed various pacts with other agencies, but their future solely depends on the Israeli government’s financial backing [11]. Various Israeli officials directly or indirectly related to the space programme are of the opinion that there is a requirement to do more in this field and formulate a clear-cut policy and establish a well thought off-road map.

16Israel Joins Galileo, “Intelligence Online, March 26, 2004, in “Israel To Take Part in European Galileo Project,” FBIS Document EUP20040329000444. Cited in “Space: Israel: Military Pro- gramme,” at http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/israel/mil.htm, accessed on Aug 16, 2007. 17http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/nasa.html, accessed on Sept 23, 2008. 18http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMKE3Y1LJG index 0.html, accessed on Dec 14, 2011. 38 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies

In sum, Israel’s space programme is a story of small but proficient programme basically an offshoot of a military initiative. The main investment in this field has been from the point view of intelligence gathering and surveillance. The state has succeeded in establishing few important international collaborators to achieve quicker progress and is also found exploiting the commercial angle of this technology. The country has concentrated more towards developing microsatellites weighing 300Ð400 kg and is expected to concentrate in this field in future too.

Other States

Apart from Iran and Israel, few other states from West Asia have keen interest in space technologies. Many of them could be viewed as the beginners in this field. Some of them are making significant investments in the space arena by fully being appreciative of the potential of this technology in various fields. This segment analyses the developing space programmes of few more states from the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federation of seven states, has found steadily building a portfolio of space resources. It has put one satellite in orbit with a two more on order. DubaiSat-1, a remote sensing satellite with 5 m resolution built by South Korea and weighing in at 200 kg [12], was launched in 2009 by the Russian Dnepr-1 vehicle. Second satellite DubaiSat-2 is slated to be launched in 2012, and UAE expects a completely ‘made in the UAE’ satellite Dubai-Sat-3 to be launched in near future. UAE’s capital Abu Dhabi is an advanced city in the region in regard to its infrastructure facilities. Virgin Galactic, a space enterprise of the Virgin Group, is interested in building a spaceport in Abu Dhabi (subject to approval from the US authorities). In fact Abu Dhabi’s Aabar Investments has already acquired 32% stake in Virgin Galactic by paying $280 million. Virgin Galactic is proposing to build a commercial space visit facility here after their spacecraft becomes operational in near future. It may cost $200,000 for a trip to space. The company envisages having six passengers and two pilots to fly up into suborbital space, stay there for 5 min and return. Six UAE residents have booked their seats for first suborbital flight [13]. Apart from commercial interests in the space field, the UAE administration is also keen to develop technical expertise in various disciplines of rocket science. They have an ongoing initiative to help train UAE’s aerospace engineers with NASA. They have organised few conferences on space issue to be in more awareness on the subject and also to establish associations with the other business and government organisations in this field. In short, the UAE is keen to develop Abu Dhabi as a major space port. UAE appears to have identified ‘space’ as a major sector for future investments and is found systematically making efforts in that direction. On April 23, 2011, a ‘built in’ UAE satellite Y1A was successfully launched from the European Space Center in Kourou, French Guiana. It was built by Yahsat, the Emirates’ Al Yah Satellite Communications Co., and a wholly owned subsidiary of Other States 39

Mubadala Development Company, the Abu Dhabi-based Investment and Develop- ment Company. Yahsat has commissioned two satellites to create regionally focused capacity to manage the expanding requirements for government, commercial and consumer satellite communication services. A second satellite, Y1B, is likely to be launched in 2012 to complete the $1.66 billion Yahsat programme. Y1A and Y1B will also provide commercial communications across the West Asia, Africa, Southwest Asia and Europe.19 Saudi Arabia is another country in the region having potential (and interest) for growth in space field. Their interest in this field goes back to early 1980s. Two interesting events of that period need a mention. Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Salman Abdel Aziz Al-Saud was the first Arab to fly in space for 7 days in 1985 in shuttle Discovery (the second Arab was a Syrian cosmonaut who spent 8 days in 1987 at Mir station). The other incident is that Riyadh, the capital and largest city of Saudi Arabia, is the headquarters of the Arab Satellite Communications Organization which operates the Arabsat GEO telecommunications system since 1985 with more than 20 member countries. Arabsat was created to deliver satellite-based, public and private telecommunications services to the Arab States, in accordance with international standards, and currently five satellite platforms (Arabsat-2B, BADR-4, BADR-5, BADR-6 and Arabsat-5A) are performing this task.20 The major investments by Saudi Arabia have been in the field of low orbit micro- communication satellites. SaudiComsat 1 to SaudiComsat 7 satellites were launched with the help of a Russian launcher Dnepr-1 during 2004Ð2007.21 Saudi Arabia has launched 12 satellites till date from the Baikonur site in Kazakhstan.22 Presently, Saudi Arabia is found keen in developing its own space agenda and make additional investments. In 2010, they have signed agreements with India and Ukraine. With India, the agreement is of cooperation on peaceful use of outer space. Indian space agency is helping them to develop an indigenous space programme. Under commercial agreement, India is also expected to help Saudi Arabia to launch their satellites in near future. The agreement with Ukraine stipulates that Saudi Arabian and Ukrainian scientists will cooperate in fundamental space research and a range of applied sciences, particularly geophysics. The agreement offers broad opportunities for scientists from the both countries to hold joint symposiums and conferences, share results of experiments. Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan have signed an agreement

19“Emirates close to French satellite buy”, Dec 23, 2011, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/ Emirates close to French satellite buy 999.html, and “Yahsat’s Y1A satellite launched”, Apr 23, 2011, http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/yahsat-s-y1a-satellite-launched-2011-04- 23-1.384269, accessed on Dec 26, 2011. 20“Arabsat Ð Saudi Arabia and Communication Satellite Systems”, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/ saudi/comm/index.html,andhttp://www.emiratesweek.com/2010/05/1224 accessed on Dec 15, 2011. 21http://space.skyrocket.de/doc sdat/saudicomsat-1.htm, accessed Dec 14, 2011. 22“Saudi Satellites: Crossroads Arabia” http://xrdarabia.org/2008/10/30/saudi-satellites/?utm source=INK&utm medium=copy&utm campaign=share, accessed on Dec 14, 2011. 40 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies for bilateral cooperation in space exploration on November 20, 2011. They would be cooperating on satellite telecommunication research and space exploration for peaceful purposes.23 For a state like Turkey living in a geopolitically rough neighbourhood, the strategic utility of space systems is obvious. Turkey’s interests in satellite arena are mainly concentrated towards putting them in use for the communication purposes which has both civilian and military utility. Their various communication satellites belong to the Turksat series. Amongst Turksat 1A, Turksat 1B, Turksat 1C, Turksat 2A24 and Turksat 3A satellites launched so far the first launch in 1994 of Turksat 1A had to witness failure because of the malfunction of the rocket. Turksat 1C had encountered some problems after a successful launch, but the agencies were successful in keeping it in operational conduction for 14 years but went of use in 2010. Turksat 3A was launched during June 2008 and is presently functioning well. To cater for its imagery requirements, Turkey being a NATO member has some access to information from US satellites, and they can also buy imagery on the open market from Spot Image, DigitalGlobe, or others. However, Turkey understands that depending on allies has its own limitation. Theoretically, Turkey requires all-weather radar imaging system and multi- and hyperspectral capability [14]. Appreciating such type of needs and few other emerging strategic, social and commercial needs, Turkey has started making more investments into various satellite technologies. Turkey’s first national earth observation satellite, RASAT, was launched successfully on August 17, 2011. This 100-kg satellite with a design life of 3 years has been designed and manufactured by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey—Space Technologies Research Institute (TUBITAK-UZAY).25 The satellite was launched by Russian Dnepr space launch vehicle. Turkey has an ambitious plan for sending indigenous communication satellite in space by 2015. This launch also could be viewed as learning experience for various future satellite launches. Turkey has devised a 10-year satellite strategy and has plan for few launches during 2015 and 2017 period.26 Turkey during March 2011 has signed a US$571 million deal with Japanese firm Mitsubishi Electric Corporation to procure and launch two communications

23The Financial Express, New Delhi, Mar 06, 2010 and “Saudi Arabia to sign agreement with ISRO for its space program”, Jul 6, 2010, http://www.ummid.com/news/2010/July/06.07.2010/ saudi scientists to seek isro cooperation.htm and “Saudi Arabia, Ukraine to hold joint space exploration”, Nov 6, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/world/20101106/161229095.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2011. 24Turksat 2A is also known as Eurasiasat 1, the craft is operated by the Monaco-based company Eurasiasat, which was established in 1996 as a joint venture between Turk Telekom and Alcatel Space. 25“Turkey’s first national satellite launched” http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType= haber&ArticleID=77632, accessed on Dec 8, 2011. 26“Turkey To Launch Small Satellite Next Year”, May 10, 2010, http://www.spacedaily.com/ reports/Turkey To Launch Small Satellite Next Year 999.html, accessed on Dec 8, 2011. Other States 41 satellites by 2014. Turkey plans to place Turksat 4A into orbit by the last quarter of 2013 and launch Turksat 4B in 2014, with the two satellites having a lifespan of 30 years. Turkish engineers are also starting to produce another satellite Turksat 5A in cooperation with the Japanese firm.27 Turkey’s plans of launching Gokt¬¬ urk satellites have raised concerns from their neighbour Israel. As per the available information Telespazio, a Finmecca- nica/Thales company, has won in December 2008 a tender as prime contractor, supported by Thales Alenia Space (a Thales/Finmeccanica company), from the Turkish Ministry of Defence for the Gokt¬¬ urk 1 satellite system. This agreement allows the supply of an Earth observation satellite equipped with a high-resolution (0.8 m) optical sensor, an integration and test centre for satellites to be built in Turkey. Telespazio will also provide all satellite launch and test services.28 No further details about this mission are available. However, what is causing concerns in certain quarters is the proposal regarding the launch of Gokt¬¬ urk-2 satellite. It has been reported that China will launch Turkey’s first intelligence satellite, Gokt¬¬ urk-2, for US$20 million. Gokt¬¬ urk-2 is expected to detect the movements of objects smaller than even 1 m2, will help capture terrorists infiltrating Turkish borders. The optical camera for the satellite has been bought from South Korea, while all the other parts have been produced and manufactured in Turkey. Gokt¬¬ urk-2 is expected to be launched in 2012. Its civilian uses include control of forestland, tracking illegal construction, rapid assessment of damage after natural disasters, determination of agricultural boundaries and geographical data gathering.29 This satellite (technically a commercial satellite) is likely to become operational by 2012/2013 and would sell images of objects more detailed than 2 m (6 ft) across— currently the finest grain available when it comes to pictures of Israel. This capability is expected to become a bone of contention in future. All these years Israel had a support of the ‘shutter control’ policy adopted by the USA. A 1997 amendment to the US National Defence Authorisation Act bans dissemination of satellite images of Israel of a grain higher than that available from non-American commercial sources. The basic agreement was for 2-m resolution.30 Unlike with other nations that have fielded commercial satellites which can make the imagery of Israel available with great accuracy, Israel has little leverage over Turkey. Turkey has frozen relations with Israel and has no intentions to exercise any form of ‘shutter control’ when their satellite becomes operational. The resolution of this satellite is expected to be less than a metre, and this proposed launch by Turkey is definitely making Israel uncomfortable.

27“Turkey signs satellite deal with Japanese ﬁrm”, Mar 7, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/sci/2011-03/07/c 13765698.htm, accessed on Dec 15, 2011. 28http://space.skyrocket.de/doc sdat/gokturk-1.htm, accessed on Dec 6, 2011. 29http://www.trdefence.com/2011/06/06/china-to-launch-turkeys-ﬁrst-intelligence-satellite-in- december/, accessed on Dec 6, 2011. 30“Turkish satellite to roll back Israel’s turf veil”, Mar 10, 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/ 2011/03/10/140977.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2011. 42 3 West Asia’s Investments in Space Technologies

Many states from West Asia are expected to confront challenges from domestic politics to socioeconomic issues to interventionist policies of the West in future. At the same time, states in the region are keen to develop economically and bring in social development in their respective countries. To put in a nutshell, the states with the region understand that space technologies have various utilities and also dual-use signiﬁcance. Hence, West Asian states are found keenly working towards administering space in their development and security agenda.

References

1. Shapir Y. Iran’s efforts to conquer space. Strateg Assess. 2005 Nov;8(3). http://www.inss.org. il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=160&print=1 2. Vick CP. Shahab-4: satellite or strategic launch vehicles? GlobalSecurity.org, 2007 Feb 27. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-4.htm. Accessed 10 Dec 2011. 3. Brian H, et al. Emerging space powers. Chichester: Springer/Praxis Publishing Ltd; 2010. 4. Ben-Israel I, Kaplan Z. Out of this world: Israel’s space programme. http://www.mfa.gov.il/ NR/rdonlyres/A7C494F2-62C2-44BC-8FA1-148D776A67DA/0/ch76.pdf. Accessed 24 Jan 2011. 5. Paikowsky D. Israel’s space program as a national asset. Space Policy. 2007;23:92. 6. Ilani O. Israel ranks fourth in the world in scientific activity, study finds, 2009 Nov 17. http:// www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-ranks-fourth-in-the-world-in-scientific-activity- study-finds-1.4034. Accessed 2 Dec 2011. 7. Elliman W. Israeli space research. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Economy/ spaceres.html. Accessed 12 Dec 2011. 8. Koshy N. India and Israel Eye Iran. 2008 Feb 12. http://www.fpif.org/articles/india and israel eye iran. Accessed 17 Jan 2010. 9. Rajiv S. In: Lele A, editor. Space security and global cooperation. New Delhi: Academic Foundation; 2009. 10. Opall B. Israel’s ImageSat sheds some legal baggage. 2011 Jan 28. http://www.spacenews. com/earth observation/110128-settlement-iai-bond-purchase.html. Accessed 12 Dec 2011. 11. Shtull-Trauring A. Israel falling behind in space research, warns outgoing agency chief. 2011 Oct 16. http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/israel-falling-behind-in-space- research-warns-outgoing-agency-chief-1.390151. Accessed 14 Dec 2011. 12. Mohney D. United Arab Emirates builds space resources. 26 Jul 2010. http://satellite. tmcnet.com/topics/satellite/articles/93129-united-arab-emirates-builds-space-resources.htm. Accessed 14 Dec 2011. 13. Deulgaonkar P. Virgin Galactic wants Abu Dhabi spaceport. 2011 Feb 01. http://www. emirates247.com/news/virgin-galactic-wants-abu-dhabi-spaceport-2011-02-01-1.349881. Accessed 12 Dec 2011. 14. Dinerman T. Turkey’s military satellite program: a model for emerging regional powers. 2007 Jan 2. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/774/1. Accessed 10 Dec 2011. Chapter 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities

South Asia is the region of immense richness and diversity with great cultural heritage. Over centuries, it had developed trade and cultural links with the rest of the world. In the twentieth century, the region was destabilised by the cold war machinations, and in the twenty-first century, the region is facing the second Afghan War. The region is famous because of the IndiaÐPakistan rivalry, and the US dilemma is taking Pakistan’s help to fight the global war against terrorism. In this region, mainly affected by boundary wars and internal conflicts, India is found emerging as an island of prosperity. India is the only spacefaring nation from this region. This chapter and next chapter discuss the space agendas of two important states within the region, namely, Pakistan and India. Investments in space technologies for states like Pakistan need to be viewed at the backdrop of strategic realities of the region. Military parity with India has been an obsession of many Pakistani rulers in the past. Because of its strategic intimacy with global powers like the US and China, to an extent, Pakistan has succeeded in procuring some of state-of-the-art technologies in military hardware to match India. Presently, Pakistan has, to a certain degree, achieved missile prowess and, most importantly, a nuclear weapon possessor status. Such achievements were possible only because it could, either overtly or covertly, borrow these technologies from other states. But, at the same time, the strategic vision shown by the Pakistani leadership for ‘managing’ these technologies should be commended. Based on current trends in acquisition of new weapon technologies by Pakistan, it could be safely concluded that it is investing in the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Interestingly, Pakistan has made limited progress in space technology field. Compared to India’s space programme, Pakistan’s space programme seems diminutive. In the present RMA era, when space is regarded as the fourth dimension of warfare, what is the Pakistan’s standing in the field of space technologies and other related technologies? This chapter attempts to address these questions. It

This chapter is an updated version (with few additions) of Ajey Lele, Pakistan’s Space Capabilities, Air Power, New Delhi, Spring 2005, pp. 129Ð148.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 4, 43 © Springer India 2013 44 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities is argued that in near future Pakistan may not go all out for the development of indigenous space technologies and may depend more on joint collaborations with countries like China and also on commercially available satellite-derived products. Pakistan has unique security considerations. It is a state which appears to be always under the perpetual threat of conflict in some form or other. The state appears to have developed somewhat lopsided security policies. It continues to suffer from terrorism within but at the same is using terrorism as tool (covertly) to address differences with its both western and eastern neighbours. Post 9/11, the most wanted global fugitive Osama bin Laden was found staying in this country for many years, and finally, the US had to launch a secret mission on Pakistani soil to eliminate him (without taking the Pakistani government into confidence). There are concerns at global levels about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. In spite of threat from terrorism within and knowing fully well that its adversary India has no territorial ambitions, still Pakistan is making significant investments in its conventional security infrastructure and also covertly developing asymmetric strategies. Because of such peculiar security milieu, this chapter attempts of undertake the analysis of Pakistan’s space programme bit differently than the treatment given in other chapters to understand the space discourse of other states within the region. This chapter attempts to understand the Pakistan’s space investments mainly at the backdrop of the defence connotations of such investments.

Space Plan

In Pakistan, for the purpose of space science research and development, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) was established in 1961, and it started functioning from 1964. This national organisation with a high degree of autonomy, which implements the space policy of Pakistan, was established by the Space Research Council (SRC), whose president is the prime minister. The commission comprises the chairman and four members for space technology, space research, space electronics and finance, respectively.1 SUPARCO is headquartered at the Arabian Sea port of Karachi in southern Pakistan, with additional facilities at the University of the Punjab at Lahore. SUPARCO defines its primary mission as earth imaging and upper atmosphere research. Its programmes include the development and launch of sounding rockets and identification of satellite technology necessities for remote sensing and communications. Pakistan claims that the main motive behind SUPARCO is building of an infrastructure for both aeronautics and space research, with the means at hand.2 This Pakistan’s space agency had a low-profile existence for the first 30Ð35 years since its inception. Its progress in the research field also was not very significant.

1http://www.suparco.gov.pk/about.html, accessed Feb 12, 2005. 2http://www.suparco.gov.pk/about.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004. Space Plan 45

The commission started publishing its research achievements and other works of significance in the field of space technology through its quarterly journal, Space Horizon, in 1983, but ceased the publication in June 1991. The other quarterly journal, Suparco Times, published since 1982, met with the same fate and ceased publication in March 1994.3 However, in the recent past, the organisation has started maintaining its website (www.suparco.gov.pk), giving detailed inputs about its research activities and achievements. SUPARCO began launching imported sounding rockets in 1962 and has fired small sounding rockets on suborbital science flights from launch pads at its Sonmiani Beach (Maini Beach) flight-range, 58 km west of Karachi. By the 1970s, SUPARCO had developed the ability to fabricate rocket motors from raw materials at a solid-propellant manufacturing plant. By the early 1980s, SUPARCO announced plans for the development of the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. The organisation’s solid-propellant production facilities were enlarged by 1987 to support this effort. Tests of the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 were announced in April 1989, and the Hatf-2 was displayed publicly during a Pakistan Day Joint Services Parade later that year.4 Pakistan had imported ballistic missiles from China since the late 1980s. Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, with reference to Chinese M-11 missiles, in a statement to the Pakistani Senate on August 26, 1993, stated, ‘These missiles were bought keeping in mind Pakistan’s security needs’ which he went on to justify in relation to missiles across the borders from Afghanistan [1]. Chinese help in providing missile assistance to Pakistan was further extended towards developing a rocket factory. For 5 years, the American intelligence agency CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) had carefully tracked the flow of Chinese M-11 missile components into Pakistan. At the end of 1995, they discovered that ‘China was not only selling missiles to Pakistan but was also helping to build a factory to manufacture them’ [2]. In 1989, Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles were fired to ranges of 80 and 300 km, respectively. According to Pakistani sources,5 during the same period, Pakistan and China had signed a 10-year cooperation agreement in defence science, technology and industry, including joint procurement, research and development, production and technology transfer. SUPARCO oversees the production and testing of sounding rockets, with an average of three or four launches per year and carrying high altitude and ionosphere research payloads. Pakistan’s development of locally made sounding rockets continues with a long- term goal of launching small satellites [3]. As compared to launch technology, SUPARCO’s journey in the field of satellite technology started very late. SUPARCO first built a small amateur radio satellite in the late 1980s with the help of the Pakistan Amateur Radio Society. But, due to the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle, the launch of Pakistan’s first satellite was delayed. The satellite was finally launched in orbit (low earth orbit—LEO) by a

3http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004. 4http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004. 5http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/miss-miles.htm 46 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities

Chinese Long March LM-2E rocket in July 1990. This satellite was formally called the Badr-1 satellite, after the Urdu language word for ‘new moon’. Badr-1 provided Pakistani scientists valuable experience in telemetry, uplink/downlink and other satellite-related technologies. Badr-1 provided the platform for Pakistan to develop satellite technology further.6 The satellite successfully completed its designed life (it weighed 52 kg and had an orbital lifetime of 6 months). The design for this micro-satellite was apparently based on the University of Surrey platform1 [4]. For this mission, Pakistan had very limited objectives like testing the performance of satellite subsystems in space environment and performing experiments in real-time voice and data communications between two user ground stations.7 The success of Badr-1 is largely recognised as a success of the combined efforts of a few Islamic countries. The Inter-Islamic Network on Space Sciences and Technology (ISNET) was founded in 1986, in order to promote the advancement of space sciences and technology in the countries of the Islamic world. The member countries include Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Senegal and Cameroon. It is headed by the chairman of SUPARCO. Headquartered in SUPARCO headquarters, Karachi, it has been responsible directly and indirectly for the fabrication, processing and launch of the Muslim Ummah’s first experimental satellite, Badr-1.8 It was a historical event not only for the people of Pakistan but also for the entire Muslim Ummah as it was the first satellite built by any Islamic country based on indigenous resources and manpower.9 However, SUPARCO could not maintain the pace for further developments because of the sanctions regime. In June 1991, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions on China and SUPARCO for what Washington described as ‘significant transfers of M-11 missile technology and components’. The sanctions were waived in March 1992, when China promised to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. In August 1993, the US again imposed 2-year sanctions on Pakistani and Chinese entities for violations of MTCR guidelines. The sanctions on Pakistan ended with the expiry of the fixed 2-year term. But SUPRACO continued with its clandestine activities. In 1996, shipments of ammonium perchlorate (an oxidiser for solid rocket propellant) destined for SUPARCO were seized in two separate incidents. In March 1996, 200 barrels of ammonium perchlorate shipped from North Korea’s Lyongaksan General Trade Corporation were detained in Taiwan en route to SUPARCO. On April 29, 1996, customs officials in Hong Kong seized enough ammonium perchlorate to fuel about 25 missiles, originating in Xian, China. In September 1996, Pakistan acknowledged that SUPARCO had imported a small quantity of rocket fuel for scientific research

6http://www.paksef.org/suparco.htm, accessed on Jan 23, 2005. 7http://www.suparco.gov.pk/sat badr1.html, accessed on Dec 18, 2004. 8http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index.html, accessed on Dec 24, 2004. 9http://www.angelfire.com/stars/whippee/badranv.htm, accessed on Dec 24, 2004. Space Plan 47 but denied reports about the seizure of massive amounts of fuel. A foreign office spokesman claimed that SUPARCO had imported rocket fuel for research and study. All these activities forced the US Commerce Department to implement the sanctions on Pakistan (June 1998). The sanctions included a licensing policy of denial for export and import of items controlled for nuclear non-proliferation and missile technology. Such developments, directly or indirectly, affected the growth of development of satellite technology in Pakistan. Rising above the difficulties faced due to the sanctions, by the late 1990s, Pakistan undertook a number of steps for consolidating and focussing its space programme in response to national priorities. In late 1999, Dr. Abdul Majid, the then chairman of SUPARCO, announced that Pakistan would develop its own satellite launching vehicle within a period of about 3 years, although no details of this previously undisclosed programme were revealed.10 However, in reality, Pakistan was found depending more on international commercially available space systems for satellite-derived inputs. For this purpose, the existing satellite ground station for reception of NOAA, LANDSAT and SPOT data was upgraded in the late 1990s. A national Geographic Information System (GIS) Committee was constituted to bring about GIS standardisation. Only indigenous activity undertaken was related to the development of the Badr-B multi-mission satellite. Since the early 1990s, Pakistan has made significant investments towards training and educating space application experts. The scientists and technicians are trained in areas like application of satellite remote sensing data for resource and environmental surveying, meteorological and related environmental studies; determination of vertical profiles of atmospheric parameters through satellite radiance; study of the earth’s atmosphere through balloon and rocket soundings; air pollution monitoring; and collection of environmental data from unmanned data collection platforms. Also, full-fledged research activity started during the same period in areas including ionospheric physics and radio wave propagation, satellite tracking by optical and radio techniques, geomagnetism, observational astronomy, communication satellite system design and small ground terminals/receivers. Pakistan’s Remote Sensing Applications Centre (RESACENT) at Karachi has well-equipped laboratory facilities for visual as well as digital interpretation and analysis of remotely sensed data. SUPARCO has established a satellite ground receiving station at Islamabad to acquire LANDSAT, SPOT and NOAA data in real time. This station is one of the most advanced and sophisticated stations in the Asia-Pacific region. It covers, in addition to the whole of Pakistan, a large number of neighbouring countries, wholly or partially. The station has the most modern facilities for processing. SUPARCO has established a sophisticated ground receiving station for acquisition of NOAA APT pictures and facilities for

10http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index.html, accessed on Feb 16, 2005. 48 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities reception of TOVS/HRPT data. Micro computer-based systems are available for the processing of NOAA and TOVS/HRPT data.11 SUPARCO had planned the launch of Badr-II satellite during 1993. However, the target could not be achieved. Subsequently, the launch was planned during 1995/1996. The anticipated launch date subsequently slipped to early 2000. Finally, Pakistan’s second satellite, Badr-B/Badr-II, was launched on December 10, 2001, from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan, on a Zenit-2 rocket. It was launched in a sun-synchronous orbit of 1,050 km altitude. The satellite is tracked from the TT&C Station at Lahore. Badr-II has been launched with the following mission objectives: ¥ Indigenous development of low cost satellites and creation of necessary infrastructure for future development in this field ¥ Acquisition of know-how and technology for earth imaging by the use of CCD sensors ¥ Acquisition of know-how and capability in the field of satellite altitude control and stabilisation ¥ Encouraging and stimulating the interest of the country’s academic and scientific community in the peaceful uses of space12 It has been reported that the Badr series consisted of five satellites, and the Badr- I satellite has successfully completed its designated life. The Badr programme is likely to be decommissioned in 2012 after the Badr-B completes its successful designated life. However, no details of satellites from Badr 3 to 6 are available of the SUPARCO website. These satellites are being controlled by the Saudi Arabia’s Arabsat which owns and operates satellites like Badr-4, Badr-5 and Badr-6.13 SUPARCO established the Satellite Ground Station (SGS) near Islamabad in the year 1989 to ensure regular and timely availability of satellite remote sensing (SRS) data to user agencies for their natural resources and environmental surveying activities. The station has the capability to acquire and process LANDSAT MSS and TM data, SPOT HRV data in both the multispectral (XS) and panchromatic (Pan) modes (under agreements with EOSAT and SPOT IMAGE, the operators of the LANDSAT and SPOT satellite systems, respectively) as well as NOAA AVHRR data in the HRPT mode. This data processing subsystem equipment was upgraded around the year 2000. SUPARCO has modernised the processing systems by installing the latest hardware. This has helped them immensely to enhance the processing speeds.14 Along with NOAA, which essentially caters for Pakistan’s routine meteorological requirements,

11http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index.html, accessed on Nov 27, 2004. 12Details of Badr-II are from http://www.suparco.gov.pk/sat badr1.html and http://www.fas. org/spp/guide/pakistan/earth/, accessed on Dec 5, 2004. 13http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badr (satellite) and http://www.arabsat.com/pages/ InOrbitSatellites.aspx, accessed on Nov 8, 2011. 14http://www.suparco.gov.pk/sgs.html, accessed on Dec 22, 2004. Space Plan 49 they also depend on METEOSAT-5 satellite images for tracing tropical cyclones in the Arabian Sea region.15 During December 2002, Pakistan deployed a communication satellite, PAKSAT-1 (geostationary orbit), as an interim solution to cater for communication needs. The existing PAKSAT-1 satellite is a third-hand satellite bought from Turkey at an initial cost of $ 4.5 million. This satellite was originally developed for Indonesia by Boeing. It was later bought by Turkey, and ﬁnally, Pakistan purchased it and launched it. The decision to acquire this satellite was taken after Pakistan realised that the orbital slot allocated to it by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) along 38ı East would lapse in April 2003 unless it had a satellite in place with transponders switched on, and the ownership of the slot was approved internationally.16 The Pakistani government had earlier sold one of its GEO (geostationary equatorial orbit) slots to Alcatel Escape for a commercial telecommunications satellite. As per some estimates, approximately 70% of Pakistan’s rural and remotely located population lacks good communication services. Pakistan’s TV and telecommunication capacity is leased on ASIASAT-1.17 In order to implement a fully operational communication satellite programme, Pakistan’s SUPARCO conducted a detailed study towards the launch of a national communication satellite, PAKSAT-1R. They took the help of a number of telecom users from both the public and private sectors to identify the current and future requirements of satellite transponder capacity to assist in the design of PAKSAT- 1R.18 This Pakistan’s ﬁrst communication satellite PAKSAT-1R was launched on August 11, 2011 as a part of Pakistan’s Space Programme 2040, on board China’s Satellite Launch Vehicle. It has a total of 30 transponders, 12 in C-band and 18 in Ku-band. The satellite is a replacement to the existing satellite PAKSAT-1 and has a design life of 15 years. It is expected to provide TV broadcasting, Internet and data communication services across South and Central Asia, Eastern Europe, East Africa and the Far East. Most importantly, it enables extending of communication services to all areas of Pakistan.19 Pakistan has announced Space Programme 2040 a satellite development and launch programme with intention to replace the Badr programme with emphasis on development and launching of geostationary communication satellite (e.g. Paksat 1R). Five GEO and six LEO satellites are expected to be launched in between 2011 till 2040 as a part of this programme. This programme has been approved by National Command Authority (NCA) whose chairman is a prime minister. This

15http://www.suparco.gov.pk/cyclon 99.html, accessed on Feb 18, 2004. 16http://www.apnic.net/mailing-lists/s-asia-it/archive/2003/01/msg00031.html and www. pakistaniaviation.com/ and http://www.paksef.org/suparco.htm, accessed on Dec 22, 2004. 17Jane’s Space Directory (2000Ð2001), Surrey, 2000, p.19. 18http://www.suparco.gov.pk/news.html, accessed on Dec 23, 2004. 19http://www.suparco.gov.pk/downloadables/PAKSAT%201R%20Press%20Release.pdf, accessed on Sep 22, 2011. 50 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities is the highest body for the command and control of the country’s nuclear forces, and the Paksat-IR project falls under its purview. In the same meeting on July 14, 2011, NCA has also approved the futuristic, self-sustaining Nuclear Power Programme, 2050 [5]. SUPARCO has various multilateral/bilateral collaborations in the field of space technology and its applications with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. By virtue of an agreement signed between SUPARCO and the Earth Observation Satellite (EOSAT) Company, the latter is SUPARCO’s sales agent outside Pakistan for the sale of LANDSAT data (except data pertaining to Pakistani territory) generated at the Satellite Ground Station, Islamabad.20 There are reports that Pakistan is preparing to launch its own satellite launching system. Pakistan’s first space launch vehicle (SLV) is expected to be available in the near future (timeline not known). However, this news has not been widely reported, and further details are yet awaited. In the IDEAS 2002 exhibition (the second International Defence Exhibition and Seminar, IDEAS 2002, held at Karachi during August/September 2002), a model of Pakistan’s first SLV was displayed.21 In this department of SLV, till date no significant progress has been achieved [6].

Technology Revolution

Post-industrial revolution, the multidisciplinary technology revolution, is changing the thinking of the militaries all over the world, and Pakistan is no exception. In the near future, Pakistan is expected to incorporate much technological advancement into its military hardware. It has already started the incorporation of information technology (IT) into its military systems. The question is, to what extent is this influencing the structure and use of military power? High-performance computing, satellite imagery, crypto technologies and other forms of militarily useful IT-based techniques are in use all over the world. Pakistan is importing a majority of its military equipment from the developed nations. Naturally, most of the recent procurements are state-of-the-art machinery. Pakistan already has large conventional armed forces based overwhelmingly on mechanical and electrical industrial age technologies [7]. In future, it is expected that Pakistan’s existing military hardware will be increasingly augmented by IT- based systems. In South Asia, India has marched ahead in the IT revolution which, in turn, has made a major impact on Indian defence policy. Today, India is in possession of many technologies which seek decisive IT-based battlefield advantages. This, in turn, is going to intensify regional arms race as potential combatants are likely to seek decisive IT-based battlefield advantages.

20http://www.suparco.gov.pk/international.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004. 21http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index.html, accessed on Jan 15, 2005. Technology Revolution 51

Pakistan understands that the astonishing proliferation of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), sophisticated intelligence-gathering capabilities, advanced command and control systems and ingenious information warfare processes is evidence of the RMA’s impact. The RMA’s technological focus is apparent in today’s Pakistani military thinking [8] The RMA, however, is about more than simply grafting the latest technologies onto existing forces. Most analysts insist that for a true RMA to occur, doctrinal and organisational change must accompany the new war-fighting technologies. As of 2010, about 650,000 people were on active duty in the Pakistan military, with an additional 543,000 people in reserves. The total strength of the Pakistan Army is approximately 550,000 personnel. Pakistan is planning to downsize the army [9] with a view to enhancing the combat potential of the army by qualitative upgradation. This appears to be an attempt to re-muster non-combatant personnel for new ‘force multiplier’ units such as electronic warfare, information and cyber warfare, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) and air defence units, all of which Pakistan is known to be raising in its quest to catch up with the RMA [10]. The existing assets of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force which include main battle tanks, attack helicopters, F-16 Falcons, J-10, Mirage-III and Mirage-5 squadrons, A-5 Fantan and naval combat aircraft and submarine22 imply that first phase of the RMA itself would take time and effort. Upgradation of these assets and investments in new technologies is likely to make their RMA more contemporary. Already a debate is on in Pakistan’s defence establishment regarding the need of investment in modern technologies. It is argued that new tools and processes of waging war like information warfare, network-centric warfare (NCW), integrated command and control (C4ISR) and system of systems, all powered by information technology, have led to the RMA, and the Pakistani establishment should take serious note of it. This in turn will also broaden the parameters of Pakistani thinking about national security. The countries of the world are now on the brink of a major revolution (read India). Also, the ramifications of the RMA need to be understood not only by Pakistani military officers but also by strategy planners, both military and civil. The Pakistani military has to contend with the fifth dimension of warfare— information—in addition to land, sea, air and space.23 Pakistan’s direct and indirect dependence on space technologies and information technologies is expected to increase in the future. This becomes evident from its force modernisation plan. The Pakistan Navy has received four P-3C Orions24

22For more details on Pakistan’s military equipment holdings, see http://www.rediff.com/ news/2002/jan/23spec.htm, accessed on Dec 12, 2004 and http://www.defence.pk/gallery/ pakistan-air-force/index501.html, accessed on Feb 6, 2012. 23The argument is based on Sharjeel Rizwan, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” Defence Journal, September. 2000, http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/military.ht, accessed on Dec 12, 2004. 24The Express Tribune, May 23, 2011. 52 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities long-range maritime surveillance aircraft from the US. The US handed two P3C Orion aircraft to Pakistan Navy in late April 2010. This was in addition to the earlier supplied two aircraft. By 2012, Pakistan Navy is expected to take delivery of a total of eight P3C aircraft. Unfortunately, for Pakistan two of its aircraft were destroyed by the Taliban forces when they attacked PNS Mehran base near Karachi on May 22, 2011. It is expected that the US would replace these aircraft. Pakistan has also acquired four F-22P frigates and antisubmarine helicopters from China.25 It has taken a big leap to strengthen its fast-depleting air power by securing an airborne early warning and control system (AEW&CS). This state-of- the-art system has augmented the Pakistan Navy’s existing potential for maritime and tactical surveillance. Pakistan has an ‘eye in the sky’ since 2009 when the first Swedish Saab-2000 ERIEYE AWE&C was delivered to them. In total, PAF has received four AWACS planes from Sweden. China has also provided one ZDK- 03 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWC) plane, and three more are in the pipeline.26 There are also unconfirmed reports that Pakistan is planning to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Turkey. The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), an aircraft manufacturing factory at Kamra, manufactures PAC Ababeel which is a small arms air defence target. PAC had also exhibited a new aerial target called Nishan at the Dubai Air Show in November 1997.27 Pakistan Navy’s first squadron of indigenously developed UAVs has been formally inducted in Pakistan Navy Fleet during July 2011.28 It is believed that Pakistan is manufacturing the UAVs with the support from Turkey and China. The Institute of Optronics (IOP) at Chaklala-Rawalpindi has established state- of-the-art military specifications production and testing facilities of night vision devices, based on image intensifier tubes.29 The night vision systems have vastly improved the ability of the Pakistani armed forces to undertake a number of vital functions related to force effectiveness, command and control and surveillance. These systems have also improved their tactical and logistical movements and have increased the accuracy of firepower. Such modern technologies depend largely on information and satellite technologies for purposes of communication and intelligence reporting. Space capabilities play an important role in network-centric warfare. This type of warfare offers a method to build information superiority, a key factor to success in the modern battle

25“China delivered the third F-22P frigates to the Pakistan army”, Sep 26, 2010, http://www. chinamilitary.net/china-delivered-the-third-f-22p-frigates-to-the-pakistan-army.html and http:// pakmr.blogspot.com/2011/07/pns-aslat-4th-frigate-of-f-22p-zulfiqar.html, accessed on Sep 12, 2011. 26http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2011/05/pakistan-airforce-jammed-off-instead-of. html, accessed on Nov 8, 2011. 27Jane’s Space Directory (2000Ð2001), Surrey, 2000, pp. 13 & 331. 28http://www.aaj.tv/2011/07/navy-pn-inducts-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-in-its-fleet/, accessed on Nov 2, 2011. 29http://www.pakobserver.net/200408/18/view/?pageD1&idD5, accessed on Jan22, 2005. Technology Revolution 53 space. The twenty-first century militaries are greatly dependent on network-centric warfare because it makes possible smooth and accurate information sharing and increases situational awareness amongst the troops and in turn enhances mission effectiveness. The Pakistani armed forces and defence industries are aware of these advantages. The future plans of the Institute of Optronics include the establishment of facilities for night vision devices based on thermal imaging techniques for all types of armoured vehicles and helicopters. The latest batch of Al-Khalid main battle tanks (developed at the Heavy Industries Taxila—HIT) assures greater survivability of the machine in the battleground. The other vital feature of the upgraded Al-Khalid is a data-link system which allows the tanks to exchange data with each other and with the command centre.30 These upgradations have been conducted by the HIT keeping in view the need of modern-day network-centric war strategies. Pakistan’s emphasis on network-centric warfare has made a real-time electronic map display system available to its tank commanders. Other network-centric force multipliers like SQPS (squad personal positioning system31) are being made available to the Pakistani commando units. After a paradrop from an aircraft inside a hostile territory, Pakistani troops can locate their exact positions from the SQPS personnel electronic map positioning system. On a small portable colour screen, troops can view the map of the area, their objective, their own position and that of their entire squad. A miniature GPS (global positioning system) sensor on their shoulder establishes the ground position, which is electronically transmitted to the commander and displayed on a hand computer via the squad radio. The entire mission is programmed in the map on the commander’s hand computer overlaid on the geographic map of the area.32 Pakistan is likely to be in possession of ECOM WISPER WATCH unmanned airborne SIGINT system (it is being marketed by a Pakistani firm named East West Infiniti (EWI) (P) Ltd.,1Ð10, Industrial Area, Islamabad33) which is designed for armed forces like Pakistan that cannot procure and maintain a high-end manned SIGINT aircraft. It provides nearly the same capabilities at a fraction of the cost and is like an electronic ear in the sky to eavesdrop on RF signal emitters up to 250 km away. EWI has used the maturity of unmanned aerial platforms and software controlled radios to produce a new force multiplier. The WISPER WATCH unmanned airborne SIGINT system can be deployed in a small UAV or an AEROSTAT (a deal for the sale of six of these radars was cleared by the US Congress during July 2002

30http://www.pakobserver.net/200408/18/view/?pageD1&idD5, accessed on Jan 25, 2005. 31For more details of the system, refer http://www.eastwestin.com/TAPS milproducts.htm, accessed on Feb 2, 2005. 32http://www.pakistanidefenceforum.com/lofiversion/index.php/t35353.html, accessed on Dec 17, 2004. 33http://www.eastwestin.com/PDF%20Files/ECOM%20Wisper-Watch.pdf, accessed on Dec 16, 2004. 54 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities for the purposes of bolstering Islamabad’s counterterrorism capabilities34)which is operated as a remote-controlled monitoring station. The receivers are positioned in the airborne platform whereas the workstations and operators are positioned in a ground mission control a few kilometres from the flying platform, out of harm’s way.35 Pakistan is also fully aware that technologies like satellite technology make the military establishments more transparent. The nuclear sites of Pakistan are on display on the web. The credit goes to IKONOS, Internet and Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The FAS’ Public Eye project is acquiring imagery of nuclear and missile facilities around the world. The high-resolution images, acquired by the FAS from the space-imaging IKONOS satellite, show details of Pakistan’s weapons facilities previously known only to the secret intelligence world. These imageries on the website (www.fas.org) cover two of Pakistan’s most important special weapon facilities, the plutonium production reactor at Khushab, and the nearby medium-range missile base at Sargodha. Plutonium from the Khushab reactor could probably be used in lightweight nuclear warheads for the M-11 missiles at Sargodha, which Pakistan acquired from China in the early 1990s. The satellite imagery indicates that construction of the Khushab reactor is essentially complete and that Pakistan has built a dozen garages for mobile missile launchers and associated vehicles at Sargodha [11]. Pakistan should not look at these imageries as leakage of a secret but should use them towards formulating confidence building measures (CBMs) with India in the nuclear arena. Such transparency in Pakistan’s defence activities may help in bringing peace in the region.

Assessment

Many universally recognised space-based and satellite systems are inherently dual- use technologies, with both civilian and military applications. Pakistan is yet to have a dedicated ‘military space system’. Hence, Pakistan’s military space capabilities may be inferred from its civilian space programme. Pakistan probably depends on civil communication satellites for military communication requirements and may be using the information provided by navigation and meteorological satellites for planning military manoeuvres. While a detailed investigation of the impact of dual-use space systems on the military preparedness of Pakistan is not the purpose over here, some broad implications can be discerned.

34http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/20710.pdf and Times of India, August 02, 2002, accessed on Dec 15, 2004. 35http://www.eastwestin.com/whisperwatch mp.htm and www.pakistanidefenceforum.com/ loﬁversion/index.php/t35353.htm, accessed on Jan12, 2005. Assessment 55

Pakistan is not even a second-tier space power. (The first tier could be the US, European Union (EU) and Russia, and the second tier could be China, India and Japan). With non-affordable costs, limited domestic expertise availability, restrictions on technology transfer and a spoiled international reputation, Pakistan is likely to remain a peripheral space power, at least in the near future. However, it is important to note their association with China which is likely to assist them for development of their space programme as well as to provide with ready-made satellite-derived information. Despite of SUPARCO’s existence for many years, the process of development in the space arena has been relatively slow. Pakistan is gradually progressing in this field and will take some more time, probably a decade or so, to establish full capability of launching its own satellites into space. SUPARCO’s success, to a large extent, will also depend on the financial backing received from the Pakistani government and the success of the collaborations with international space giants in the near future. All this is not likely to limit their access to space resources or operational capabilities in the present. The easy accessibility of numerous and growing commercial launch services has increased the ability of many states to develop and operate satellite systems for various purposes or purchase ‘reception rights’ from existing commercial satellite constellations. Like many other nation-states, Pakistan also could be a beneficiary of this ‘space reality’. The capabilities of commercial satellites all over the world are getting dramati- cally improved on a regular basis. A few US licensed companies and Israeli firms plan to make 0.5Ð1-m-resolution satellite imagery commercially available in the near future.36 Other developed nations may also join this business of the high- resolution imagery market. Such images are good enough to detect and identify nuclear sites and production facilities, airfields, oil refineries, troop concentrations, etc. Pakistan is expected to derive benefits from such commercial ventures for its intelligence gathering. Currently, Pakistan is using LANDSAT and SPOT images overtly for civilian purposes. The military potential of such commercial satellites mainly depends on factors like optical resolution, spectrum, orbital features, sun angle and return time. For military reconnaissance purposes, satellite ‘resolution’ plays a major role towards providing quality input. Satellites with resolutions of 10Ð15 m can provide useful information for strategic planning. The SPOT system is the primary operational example in this category. Today, Pakistan receives SPOT images with a resolution of 10 m or even less. It is important to note that SPOT has played an important role in revealing details of the situation at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor complex. Most importantly, SPOT and LANDSAT images were embargoed during the 1990Ð1991 Gulf War,

36http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA content/documents/ViennaSATpaper.pdf, accessed on Dec 26, 2004. 56 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities indicating that these images contained militarily useful information.37 Hence to a certain extent, their requirements could be satisfied by ‘purchasing’ the data. At the same time, it should be appreciated that the military utility of systems with resolutions of between 15 and 30 m is limited. Such images do not have much significance at the tactical level. Hence, Pakistan’s dependence on SPOT and LANDSAT may not be of much use during the actual operations phase. This is mainly because very low-resolution images may not be sold during the war period or they may even be totally be blocked by the company. Also, the Badr-II system does not have a good resolution (approximately 250 m).38 Hence, it could be inferred that Pakistan’s ‘military dependence’ on space technologies is mainly peace-time specific, and the satellite inputs could essentially be used only for military planning purposes. In case of an actual war scenario, Pakistan would have to depend on China for supply of tactical information based on satellite imagery. NOAA satellite inputs may not have much military utility other than their use for predicting meteorological conditions on the battlefield. These satellite inputs will come handy, particularly for undertaking aerial operations during the conflict phase. These satellites with a resolution of around 1.1 km39 could in some way be helpful for topography and terrain analysis. Interestingly, nuclear Pakistan does not have robust command, control, communications and intelligence systems (C3I) in place. Given the economic and technological constraints, this is not likely to materialise for some time to come [12]. The PAKSAT-1R would help Pakistan to improve its military communication network. The Pakistani satellite programme has a clear bias towards remote sensing technologies for obvious reasons. It understands the value of remote sensing in the war effort. These techniques are very handy for identifying troop and tank movements as well as activities in underground bunkers. With Chinese help, Pakistan is trying to develop a network to acquire robust and versatile space reconnaissance capability. Pakistani interest (with Chinese help) in the development of a new small, solid-propellant space lifter would provide them an opportunity to hurl small satellites into orbit for broad military, civil and commercial applications. But, being a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty,40 Pakistan cannot plan to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. Pakistan has signed this treaty on ‘Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ (signed on December 9, 1967, and ratified on August 4, 1968). Hence, it is technically (overtly) bound to making use of outer space only for

37http://www.paksef.org/suparco.htm, accessed on Dec 25, 2004. 38http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/grayspc/graysat/surv.htm, accessed on Mar 12, 2005. 39http://www.rrcap.unep.org/lc/cd/html/countryrep/pakistan/introduction.html, accessed on Mar 12, 2005. 40For full text of the treaty, refer http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm, accessed on Dec 6, 2004. Assessment 57 exploration and in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. Post 9/11, the US policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, nuclear stability in South Asia, missile proliferation, growing Asian markets and human rights. Today, the US considers Pakistan as its ‘vital ally’ in its war against terrorism and has nominated it in the category of major non-NATO ally. Hence, in future, USÐPak technology collaboration is expected to be on an upswing. It is important to note that in spite of Osama bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil, the US is not showing any signs of abandoning Pakistan. Hence, some direct and indirect help for the US could help Pakistan to make progress in the areas of RMA and network-centric warfare. Given Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth, it is expected that in the event of an Indian missile strike, Pakistan would have just 3 min warning time. Clearly, this is much less time than the 15 min warning PADS (Pakistan Air Defence System) provides in case of an attack by enemy aircraft.41 Hence, no perfect early warning mechanism exists for Pakistan. This is where Pakistan expects to get help from AWACS and other IT infrastructure in order to device a system for getting adequate early warning. This could be one way to cater for the absence of any space-based warning system. Pakistan has succeeded in putting few indigenously made satellites into orbit, riding on Chinese or Russian launches. It has also managed to form links with commercial ventures of the US, France and the EU. However, Pakistan has still long way to go in the space ﬁeld. Nuclear Pakistan is incapable of starting a space arms race in the subcontinent. However, Pakistan understands the importance of space technologies, and if it plays ‘space politics’ well, then in the near future, it would be able to satisfy many of its strategic needs of satellite data by ‘outsourcing’ the space necessities. It is important to note that Pakistan being missile capable is in position to develop an ASAT system, if need be. As the trend suggests, Pakistan is likely to get onto the Chinese space wagon in the near future. Pakistan may also explore the possibilities of engaging other Muslim countries since the Islamic network in the arena of ‘space collaboration’ already exists. It could look for collaboration with countries like Malaysia which have already started modest investments in these technologies. Pakistan is expected to try for accessing commercial technologies available in the market to get military imageries. Pakistan desires to acquire more RMA capabilities in order to match the Indian force structure. Its Afghanistan border is in a state of ﬂux even after one decade has past post 9/11. Its uneasiness with the ‘rise of India’ and India’s relevance in Afghanistan is well-known. Hence, it is continuing with military transformation aimed at developing basic force projection and more advanced RMA capabilities. It understands that the accurate and timely information is the key for increasing

41http://defencejournal.com/may98/defendingpakistan1.htm, accessed on Dec 1, 2004. 58 4 Pakistan’s Space Capabilities battle-space awareness. On the other hand, the state also desires to use the satellite technology for the purposes of agriculture, commercial communication, disaster management and various other social needs. Hence, in years to come, Pakistan is expected to increase their interest and investment in space arena.

References

1. Singh J, editor. Nuclear India. New Delhi: Knowledge World; 1998. p. 180. 2. Waller D. The secret missile deal. Time. 1997 June 30. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/23/time/missiles.html. Accessed 25 Dec 2004. 3. Proctor P. Pakistan’s space agency building second experimental satellite. Aviat Week Space Technol. 1992;137(6):45. 4. Steinberg GM. Satellite capabilities of emerging space-competent states. http://faculty.biu.ac. il/steing/military/sat.htm. Accessed 24 Jan 2005. 5. Suddle MR. Pakistan’s space programÐopportunities for R&D. http://webcache. googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kyUXbO6sU8YJ:www.uet.edu.pk/export/sites/ UETWebPortal/newsannouncement/newssection/Workshop WC Dec 19 2009/Dr Riaz Suddle.ppt+M+Riaz+Suddle+electrical+engineering&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source= www.google.com and http://www.defence.pk/forums/wmd-missiles/120262-nca-okays- nuclear-power-prog-2050-space-prog-2040-a.html and http://www.asianscientist.com/ topnews/china-pak-paskat-1-launch-2011/. Accessed 2 Nov 2011. 6. Lalitendra K. Militarisation of space. New Delhi: KW Publishers; 2010. p. 164. 7. Goodman SE. Information technologies, and international asymmetries. Commun ACM. December 1996;9(12). et passium. 8. Dunlap CJ. Organizational change and the new technologies of war. http://www.usafa.af.mil/ jscope/JSCOPE98/Dunlap98.HTM. Accessed 24 Dec 2004. 9. Menon R. Follow Pakistan example, cut down. Indian Express. 2004 June 12. http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistani Armed Forces. Accessed 2 Nov 2011. 10. Kanwal G. Pakistan army’s downsizing effort. Indian Express. 2004 May 8. http://www. observerindia.com/strategic/st040503.htm 11. Krishna B. Internet-IKONOS. www.GISdevelopment.net. Accessed 26 Dec 2004. 12. Ramdas AL. Myths and realities of nuclear command and control in India and Pakistan. http:// www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd54/54ramda.htm. Accessed 20 Mar 2005. Chapter 5 India’s Space Programme

In 1963, India’s entry into the space field made a nascent beginning from a small church in Thumba village in the southern parts of India. It started with launching of sounding rockets in 1963. At that time, the purpose behind investing in space technologies was for scientific investigations of the upper atmospheric and ionospheric phenomenon above the geomagnetic equator. In India, the geomagnetic equator passes through Thumba village (Kerala state in India). During 1960s, the only suitable building to start this job was a church in this village [1]. From this village, India launched its first sounding rocket on November 21, 1963.1 Over last four to five decades, India’s space programme has made significant progress and is today globally reorganised as one of the most successful programmes in recent times. India’s initial progress in the space arena was slow in comparison with the progress made by in the later days. Limited technological expertise and being an underdeveloped economy lack of financial resources were probably the key reasons for this slow growth. Initial journey of India in this field was founded restricted to sounding rocket experimentation. Such experiments continued almost for a decade. Subsequently, India placed its first satellite in orbit with the help of the erstwhile USSR on Apr 19, 1975. Aryabhatta was India’s first satellite, named after an ancient Indian mathematician of the fifth century AD. It was launched2 from Kapustin Yar, a rocket launch and development site close to Volgograd in the then USSR. Further, India became a spacefaring nation on July 18, 1980, when it demonstrated that it could send a satellite to orbit by using its own rocket launching system. This was the launch of satellite Rohini 1 with the help of Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) rocket from its own launch site located at Sriharikota in South India.

1Even today, India has a sounding rocket programme. It is aimed for better understanding of middle atmospheric dynamics and behaviour of Indian monsoon over the subcontinent. 2The erstwhile USSR and India negotiated in August 1971 an agreement (signed on May 10, 1972) in regard to a joint effort to launch a satellite.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 5, 59 © Springer India 2013 60 5 India’s Space Programme

Initially, India’s space programme started under the aegis of Department of Atomic Energy3 in 1962 with creation of Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR). The mandate to the committee was to oversee all aspects of space research in the country. Work began on the establishment of the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) in 1962.4 The ﬁrst sounding rocket was launched with the help form National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) which provided Nike-Apache rocket along with other hardware and training aids. India’s former Prime Minister Ms. Indira Gandhi dedicated TERLS to the United Nations on Feb 2, 1968. On that occasion, INCOSPAR Chairman Dr. Vikram Sarabhai articulated India’s aspirations in space programme. He stated that India’s programme is civilian in nature, with focus on the application of space technology as a tool for socioeconomic development of the country. The basic aim of India’s space programme was described as a programme capable of using space technologies in the vital areas of development such as communications, meteorology and natural resource management [2]. It is important to make a mention over here that Dr. Vikram Sarabhai gave the initial vision to the Indian space programme, and it was Prof Satish Dhawan (1972Ð1984) who made this dream a reality. Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was formed under the Department of Atomic Energy in 1969 and was subsequently brought under the Department of Space in 1972. A Space Commission was also setup in the same year which reports directly to the prime minister. The Department of Space along with ISRO operates four independent projects: the Indian National Satellite Space Segment Project, the National Natural Resource Management System (NNRMS), the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) and the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL). The department also sponsors research in various academic and research institutions.5 Presently, the ISRO has various operating divisions all over the country. These divisions deal with space systems, propulsion, communications, telemetry and tracking, research, launches and other facets of the space programme. The major achievements of the space programme have been in the area of the domestic design, production and launching of remote sensing and communications satellites. Over the years, ISRO has established a strong infrastructure for remote sensing and communications satellite systems with launcher autonomy. In 1992, the ISRO established its commercial outlet called the Antrix Corporation (this word is from

3It is important to note that at that point in time, the only technologically sound organisation in India was perhaps the autonomic energy department and as such government had very few independent departments (e.g. in those days India’s Meteorological Department was part of Tourism sector!). Hence, it would be incorrect to link India’s nuclear and space ambitions together. 4http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SPACE/space-history2.html. accessed on Dec 1, 2008. 5“India Space program Research- India Department of Space, Science Advancement”, http://www. indianchild.com/india space research.htm, accessed on July 10, 2008. 5 India’s Space Programme 61 ancient Indian language ‘Sanskrit’—meaning space). This organisation markets space and telecommunications products of ISRO.6 Initially, the Indian Space Programme had focused on mainly experimental, low-capability projects that allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in the construction and operation of satellites and launch vehicles. ISRO built (with some foreign assistance) the Bhaskara Earth observation satellites, a communication satellite (the APPLE satellite), and conducted four flight tests on its SLV-3 satellite launch vehicle between 1979 and 1983 [3]. Subsequently, from mid-1980s, India focused on more capable, mission-specific systems. During this period, ISRO started designing and developing the PSLV (polar orbiting satellite launch vehicle) and its successor the geostationary satellite launch vehicle (GSLV). These vehicles were required to launch the indigenously developed Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite and a meteorology and telecommunications ‘Indian National Satellite’ (INSAT). PSLV commenced its operational launches in 1997 and since then has gained an image of most dependable workhorse with ten consecutive flights till April 2007.7 On September 2, 2007, India successfully launched its INSAT-4CR geostationary satellite with GSLV F04 vehicle. This launch proved India’s capabilities to put satellites weighing around 2,500 kg into the geostationary orbit. First two stages of these GSLV vehicles are derived from PSLV. Further, ISRO has plans of designing and developing the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle mark III (GSLV Mk-III) vehicle which is an entirely new launch vehicle and is not derived from PSLV or GSLV Mk-I/II. In April 2002, Indian government approved Rs. 2,498 crores (US$ 520M) for development of GSLV Mk-83 III, a rocket system capable of launching 4,400 kg satellite to GTO with a designed growth potential towards a 6,000 kg payload capability through minor improvements.8 It may take another 2Ð3 years to make this vehicle operational. India has one of the most robust remote sensing satellite programmes. In the area of satellite-based remote sensing, first-generation satellites called Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites, respectively, named as IRS-1A and 1B were designed, developed and launched successfully during 1988 and 1991 with multispectral cameras which had spatial resolution of 72.5 and 36 m, respectively. Second- generation IRS-1C and 1D were launched during 1995Ð1997. These satellites had improved spatial resolutions of 70 m in multispectral and 5.8 m in panchromatic bands. These satellites have become main components of National Natural Resource Management System, and the data is being used for agriculture, forestry and water resources management. Another type of remote sensing satellite called RESOURCESAT-1 was launched into polar orbit in 2003 with sensors useful for land use and resource studies. The system provides 5-m resolution of terrain features. India’s cartographic series of satellites, namely, CARTOSAT 1, 2, 2A and 2B, are satellites with one of the

6Ibid. 7Ibid. and G.C. Shekar, “ISRO Does an Italian Job”, Hindustan Times, Apr 23, 2007. 8http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SPACE/space-launchers-gslv.html, accessed on Sept 21, 2008. 62 5 India’s Space Programme

finest resolution in the world. They offer stereoscopic imagery and make terrain mapping easier. CARTOSAT-1 was launched in May 2005 into polar orbit with two panchromatic imaging cameras, each with 2.5-m resolution. The stereoscopic imaging by the two cameras facilitates the construction of three-dimensional terrain maps. These systems are meeting the demands of terrain visualisation, updating of topographic maps, generation of national topographic database and other utility planning.9 The resolution of recently launched satellites (2A and 2B launched during 2008 and 2010, respectively) matches the best in the world and offer sub- metric resolution (the American satellite QuickBird is the world’s highest-resolution commercial satellite and offers a resolution of 60 cm).10 Such satellites have significant defence utilities too. Satellite communication is one arena where India has made significant investments since the beginning of its space programme. It is difficult to delineate the exact investments made by India in the satellite communication sector since inception of its space programme because India started with the doctrine of developing multipurpose satellites. While most satellites fulfil a single, well- defined mission, INSAT series satellites were initially developed as multipurpose geostationary satellites. Its peculiar design arose partly from very unusual design constraints placed on it by India’s insistence that the satellite carries at least four different payloads. The most significant of the payloads on INSAT was a package that could receive television programmes. Its importance arose from its special ability to transmit educational television programmes. The second package was designed to provide telephone, facsimile, data, telegraph, videotext and other communication services amongst metropolitan areas. The third was a remote sensing package built to survey the nation’s resources and thus help in its development planning. The last payload was a meteorological system capable of transmitting pictures of cloud-cover imageries and collecting weather information from several thousand unmanned data collection points on the ground; it served to trigger selected disaster- warning sirens in isolated coastal villages under the imminent threat of cyclones (hurricanes) [4]. INSAT-1 series (four satellites) constituted of mixed payloads (communication and meteorology). First two satellites of INSAT-2 series are multipurpose satellites, while 2C and 2D had only communication payloads. The same was the case with the INSAT-3 series in which 3B and 3C were dedicated communication satellites.11 INSAT-4 series of satellites has been initiated. It is proposed to have seven satellites in the series. INSAT-4A, 4B and 4CR satellites of this series are already operational.

9M. Krishnaswamy and S. Kalyanaraman, “Indian Remote Sensing Satellite Cartosat-1: Technical features and data products”, this paper is written by project director Cartosat-1 and programme director IRS. Also refer Randall R. Correll, “US-India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown”, Astropolitics, Vol 4, No 2, pp. 166Ð167. 10http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/AjeyLele300408.htm, (accessed on 02 Jan 2011). 11U. Sankar, n 2, pp. 36Ð40. 5 India’s Space Programme 63

These satellites are essentially meant for communication purposes with C and Ku band transponders.12 India has also launched a satellite called EDUSAT in 2004 in geostationary orbit. This is the first Indian satellite built exclusively for serving the educational sector. Over the years, the multipurpose INSAT satellite series are found carrying instruments for meteorological observation and data relay purposes too. However, in 2002 for the first time, an exclusive meteorological satellite called KALPANA-1 was launched. India has opened a new chapter in its weather forecasting and atmospheric research capabilities by positioning satellite called Megha-Tropiques in an orbit of 867 km during Oct 2011. It is India’s first major joint space project with France. This satellite has been launched to fill the void in regard to the atmospheric data in the equatorial region. This mission is also expected to provide boost for aerospace research in Indian universities. Mini-satellites are more in demand in twenty-first century. Modern-day satellites are coming in various shapes and sizes like micro, nano and pico satellites. ISRO has sensed that investments in this arena have greater commercial viability. With increasing global demand for such satellite systems, ISRO is concentrating on nanosatellite market and has already launched few small satellites for various other countries. On their own, ISRO has launched two small satellites called IMS-1 (previously referred to as TWSat-Third World Satellite weighing around 83 kg) and IMS 1A also known as YouthSat. ISRO is encouraging and helping the educational institutions within and outside the country to design and develop small satellites. Some of the future Indian investments are expected to revolve around development of small satellites and clusters of nano-satellites. India’s space programme has grown significantly mainly during last one or two decades. Presently, after reaching a certain level of proficiency in various areas of space technologies, Indian scientists are looking for fresh challenges. In November 2006, India’s space scientists and technologists held a brainstorming session at Bangalore to explore the viability of undertaking a manned mission to the Moon by the end of the next decade (2020) and were ‘unanimous in suggesting that the time is appropriate for India to undertake a manned mission’. Over the years, India has followed the path envisaged by Prof. Vikram Sarabhai in 1970s of the socioeconomic application-oriented space vision for the country. For all these years, countries’ investments have mainly revolved around remote sensing and multipurpose application satellites and related launcher technologies. However, now the state is looking beyond Prof. Sarabhai’s vision of harnessing ‘space’ for the economic and social development. India’s ‘moon dream-a manned space mission’ is a case in point. During 1970s, Prof. Sarabhai had argued that India does not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the Moon or the planets or manned spaceflight. This change in India’s policy should be viewed as a midcourse correction. It also demonstrates India’s increasing ambitions in this field.

12http://www.indiaconsulate.org.br/comercial/p nao residentes/SatelliteProgram.htm and various reports/statements by ISRO ofﬁcials after September 9, 2007 launch of INSAT-IVCR. 64 5 India’s Space Programme

On Apr 28, 2008, with the success of the PSLV-C9 mission, ISRO succeeded in placing in space ten satellites in the space in single mission. Some of India’s other missions also constituted of multiple satellite launching in a single launch. This indirectly demonstrates the possibility of India’s progress towards to developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) technology.13 Such technology when fully developed could add teeth to India’s nuclear deterrence. This technology has the potential of making any missile defence configuration employed against the incoming nuclear threat meaningless. The year 2008 demonstrated India’s reach into deep space by undertaking its first Moon mission. On Oct 22, 2008, India successfully launched its first satellite probe towards the Moon, named Chandrayaan-1. India’s lunar probe succeeded in finding the presence of water molecules on the surface of the Moon. Even though the mission was able to fulfil all its operational objectives, still it is important to note that this mission could stay on its course only approximately half of its designed lifetime. India is expected to launch its second Moon mission in collaboration with Russia by 2014 when a rover (robotic instrument) is expected to land on the Moon. India also has plans for developing its own regional navigational system by launching satellites in to the geostationary orbit in near future. Apart from deep space missions like the Moon mission, India also has also invested into few other interesting programmes. On Jan 10, 2007, India had successfully launched a recoverable spacecraft into the orbit (mission was known as SRE). This mission was of far greater importance to India because it was for the first time India had tested the reusable launch vehicle technology. The capsule was placed in orbit at an altitude of 625 km and was successfully recovered after 11 days. The last phase of the mission was critical, and the indigenously developed re-entry technology proved its worth. This mission provided precious knowledge about navigation, guidance and control for the re-entry phase (from the outer space to Earth’s atmosphere). Also, this capsule had an indigenously developed thermal protection system essentially in form of silica tiles which proved its worth by withstanding extremely high temperatures during re-entry. This mission could be viewed as a first step towards fulfilling the dream of human space programme. However, India’s plan for a human space flight programme still remains in very early stages of development. Surprisingly, after the success of SRE mission, no other attempts have been made by ISRO to validate this technology by undertaking few more missions. All this clearly demonstrates that human space mission is not on the agenda of the India’s space programme, at least in near future. India plans to launch its first dedicated astronomy satellite called ASTROSAT in near future. This would be a multiwavelength astronomy mission on an IRS-class satellite into a near-Earth, equatorial orbit by the PSLV. This nearly 2-ton satellite will sport three X-ray instruments that can collect hard and soft X-rays. A fourth instrument will be able to catch X-ray bursts coming from incredibly powerful

13It may be noted that ISRO would never develop this technology because of its civilian mandate. However, India’s defence establishment could be interested in developing such technology. 5 India’s Space Programme 65 eruptions, such as those from giant stars. It is expected that the ASTROSAT’s twin ultraviolet (UV) telescopes will be the best instruments available to astronomers for viewing such objects as young galaxies glowing hot with the light of bright new stars.14 Primary emphasis of ASTROSAT would be to conduct studies of X-ray- emitting objects. This would be India’s first observatory wherein X-ray observations can be taken. However, this Indian programme appears to be running much behind the schedule (the planned launch was in 2008). The basic limitation for the Indian space programme comes from the fact that the country is still devoid of cryogenic technology. For launches of heavier satellites, a third stage called the cryogenic stage is required. India has yet to mature this technology. In 1992, the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin was to transfer this technology to India but was pressured by the then US administration not do so, fearing that India could divert this technology for its missile programme. Subsequently, Russia had sold six cryogenic engines to India. It is this cryogenic engine technology required for the GSLV launches that is giving ISRO a few nightmares. The year 2010 witnessed two unfortunate failures for ISRO. On Dec 25, 2010, ISRO’s GSLV-F06 mission with the GSAT-5P satellite onboard failed. The vehicle broke up 53.8 s from liftoff. Surprisingly, the launch failed in the ‘first stage’ of the launch process itself. Earlier on Apr 15, 2010, its first attempt to use an indigenously made cryogenic engine with its GSLV-D3 to launch the GAST-4 satellite had failed. It may take ISRO some more time to test this technology again. Unfortunately, almost for last two decades, India is working towards the development of this technology indigenously; however, the success has still eluded them. Because of these two major failures in 2010 with GSLV system, India’s capacity of having operational satellites in space and also the transponder capability has reduced significantly. Along with this, two of India’s operational satellites in space are found not able to perform to the fullest of their potential. INSAT-4CR (launched on Sep 2, 2007) is facing problems because of the launching glitches. During the launch, the third stage of the carrier rocket had underperformed, resulting in the satellite being placed into a lower than planned orbit. To put the satellite back in the designed (actual) orbit, much of the fuel onboard of the satellite was consumed, and this in turn had probably reduced the designed 10-year life of satellite to almost the half. Also, INSAT 4B which was launched during March 2007 is being reported to have facing problems since July 7, 2010. There appears to be a power- related problem in one of the solar panels resulting into switching off 50% of the transponders onboard the satellite. The positive aspect of ISRO’s space programme is their proficiency in launching satellites in the 1- to 2-ton category. PSLV has launched more than 40 satellites

14“ASTROSAT, an Indian space telescope”, Jan 24, 2007 www.spacenow.org.uk/index.cfm?code= expluni&subcode=article&recID=796 and “India’s ﬁrst multi-wavelength astronomy satellite”, http://meghnad.iucaa.ernet.in/astrosat/, accessed on Dec 12, 2011. 66 5 India’s Space Programme

(more than half of them are for other countries) into a variety of orbits to date. Last 21 consecutive missions by this vehicle have been successful. One important reason behind the significant achievements by the Indian space community is the reasonable budgetary support provided by the government for all these years. ISRO has not faced problems in getting resources and has tended to receive steady governmental support. This is one field where generally bottom-up approach has been found in regard to the growth of overall space programme. It is ISRO which normally decides what projects to undertake and how to proceed. The government has so far been supportive of most of ISRO’s plans. The value of ISRO’s overall assets today is approximately Rs. 100,000 crores ($25 billion) [5]. Since independence, India’s science and technology policies have more or less remained unchanged irrespective of the government in power. India’s space programme is placed directly under the prime minister and hence could be said to be relatively free of major bureaucratic delays. ISRO has immediate plans for the upgradation of various technologies from propulsion to power systems. Like any other spacefaring nation, India is keen to induct lightweight composites and fibre structures into their platform systems which are expected to bring in major revolution towards weight-carrying capacity of the satellites. ISRO has interest in the ongoing research in this field. By 2025Ð2030, India proposes to reach the level of technology that they would be in a position to send a spacecraft to the outer space and recover it like an aircraft (on the same lines like the US sends its ISS missions like Atlantis, Discovery, etc.). The narrative of Indian space programme mostly carried out by developed states (read Western) could be viewed as case of ‘asymmetric ignorance’. Their evalua- tions (particularly during early years of development of India’s space programme) have reflexively been grounded in assumptions about why a poor nation should have a space programme at all. Because the mission of space exploration has been a normatively Western idea, Indian space programme (other Asian programmes too) is understood in relation to aspirations for a Western modernity. Interestingly, the manifestation of Indian space programme does not represent a modernity that is completely Western nor fully postcolonial. It could be viewed as a modernity that is decentred, globalised, constantly transforming and at times even conflicting. India’s scientific and political community links the space programme with the alleviation of poverty, help in education and the requirement for reforms in social sector. Hence, by overcoming any disagreement within the state, India has succeeded in changing the perception from ‘why poor India should not have a space programme?’ to ‘India should have a space programme precisely because it is poor’.15 By the beginning of twenty-first century with the ‘rise of India’ becoming imminent and the significant progress witnessed by India’s space programme, the perceptions are showing change. Also, the West has started realising the broader commercial relevance of space market in Asia context.

15http://etc.technologyandculture.net/2010/06/siddiqi/, accessed on Sept 28, 2011. References 67

The thrust given by India towards expanding its space programme indicates that the state has major exceptions from its space agenda. It appears to be addressing issues related to space by giving due cognizance to geopolitical, technological and economic realities. From geopolitical viewpoint, India’s success with its space programme has boosted its ‘soft power’ status. In near future, dependence of developing nations interested in space activities is going to fall more on India because of its space infrastructure and economical commercial launching facilities. In the imminent future, India is expected to play an important role towards the formulation of a global space regime which would involve not only the disarmament agenda but also formulation of a policy towards international technological collaboration over areas of mutual concern.

References

1. Das SK. Touching lives. New Delhi: Penguin Books; 2007. p. 1. 2. Sankar U. The economics of India’s space programme. New Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2007. p. 1Ð2. 3. Mistry D. India’s emerging space program. Pac Aff. Summer 1998;71(2):153. 4. Srinivasan R. No free launch: designing the Indian National Satellite. In: Butrica AJ, editor. Beyond the ionosphere: ﬁfty years of satellite communication, The NASA history series. Washington, D.C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 1997. 5. Kasturirangan K. The emerging world space order. In: Lele A, Singh G, editors. Space security and global cooperation. New Delhi: Academic Foundation; 2009. p. 33. Chapter 6 East Asia’s Space Agenda

East (Eastern) Asia is an extremely important region of Asia. Almost one fourth of the world’s human population live over here. The world’s second and third largest economies reside over here, and the region comprises of the only Asian state which is the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This chapter and following two chapters discuss the space polices of few important states within the region. This chapter highlights on the space policies of the two Koreas and Taiwan, and subsequent chapters discuss the space policies of China and Japan. The future of two Koreas has great inﬂuence on the security landscape of the East Asian (North-east) region. For many years, the two Korean regimes are found facing both internal and external challenges and opportunities [1]. The future of Korean peninsula mainly depends on the management of internal contradictions within the North Korea and the level of their engagement with the outside world. North Korea’s approach in deciding the future of its nuclear policies would play an important role towards deciding the geopolitical and geostrategic future of the region. In regard to North Korea, only time would tell whether the mercurial and enigmatic North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s death during Dec 2011 could lead to greater instability on the divided Korean peninsula or brighten the prospects of peace in the region. A new era of political rapprochement and economic opening could strengthen and broaden the global development partnership in the region. The growth of science and technology in both the Koreas during last few decades could be viewed as a mixed bag of intense growth as well as stagnation and failures. The strategic requirement of both Koreas appears to have played a signiﬁcant role towards deciding the trajectory for the technology development.

North Korea

North Korea is perhaps the world’s most militarised, isolated and strictly controlled communist state [2]. The state has naturally harsh terrain and experiences various natural disasters frequently. The country’s corrupt political (military) system is

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 6, 69 © Springer India 2013 70 6 East Asia’s Space Agenda unwilling to undertake any major economic reforms, and their entire focus remains to make investments in technologies of strategic significance. Albeit being viewed as an isolationist country, they have (limited) association with states like Russia and China. These states may not be called as North Korea natural allies, but they do have some influence on them. North Korea also has connections with Iran and Pakistan and over the years has looked at these states for a mutual defence technology and hardware business. Being a state driven by military ambitions, their investments in the military hardware are significant in nature. North Korea believes that as a pariah state, they need to arm themselves ‘expansively’ to make their ‘presence’ evident regionally and bring in the element of deterrence upfront. For last two decades, the North Korean government has promoted its nuclear and missile programmes as strong pillars of national defence and prominent symbols of scientific nationalism. This is probably because universally such military technologies are being used for showcasing country’s greater scientific accomplishments. Such technologies along with space technology also become the basis of nationalistic pride. For North Korea investments, such programmes are representative of the national effort to build a ‘strong and prosperous country’ (kangsngdaeguk) under the political and military leadership of the country. The term kangsngdaeguk first appeared in August 1998 in reference to Kim Jong Il having provided ‘on-the- spot guidance’ in Chagang Province in February 1998 and is now established state doctrine.1 Prior to the 1980s, North Korea had a clear military advantage over South Korea, but the balance of conventional forces has turned against Pyongyang, especially after the end of the Cold War. During the famine of the mid-1990s, the North Korean leadership increasingly relied on the military to manage government affairs, and it introduced a ‘military first’ policy in 1998 to coincide with Kim Jong Il’s official rise to power. Since economic woes have made it impossible to compete with neighbours in conventional forces, Pyongyang has had a strong incentive to retain and expand its asymmetric capabilities.2 North Korea’s investment in space arena needs to be viewed at the backdrop of military influence on the policy-making practices of North Korea. As discussed elsewhere in this book, North Korean space programme is generally perceived as an offshoot of its missile programme. There is no clarity yet in regard to the future road map of North Korea’s space programme. Space programme could be useful for North Korea in some sense to expand its missile capability mainly in the medium-range missile arena. However, it could be prudent to study their space programme and missile programme as separate domains in order to have better understanding because few issues beyond missiles also demand attention.

1“North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs”, Asia Report Nı168 ÐJune 18, 2009, p. 14. 2“North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs”, Asia Report Nı168 ÐJune 18, 2009, from the executive summary. North Korea 71

It is important to note that the state has established the Korean Committee of Space Technology (KCST) probably sometime during 1980s and is agency responsible for various activities in space from research to satellite manufacture and launching. The agency also manages the country’s rocket launch sites. On Sept 04, 1998, the Korean Central News Agency broadcasted a report claiming the successful launch of the first North Korean artificial satellite, Kwangmyongsong-1 (Brightstar-1). This very small satellite was launched into the orbit on Aug 31, 1998. The initial claims by Russian military space forces about the success of the launch were very encouraging. On Sept 06, 1998, they confirmed that the satellite was in orbit [3], but these claims were subsequently withdrawn. Various civilian and military agencies in the world (particularly in the US) track various activities in space, and they failed to observe the presence of this satellite into the space. It is generally perceived that this was the test of North Korea’s first medium-range Taepodong 1 ballistic missile. Including the 1998 test, till date (early 2012) North Korea has done three attempts to put satellite in the space, and as per various international assessments, none of them have succeeded. However, North Korea has made certain claims of success particularly with its 2009 test which is found tenuous. In 2000, the North Korean authorities had unilaterally decided to observe a moratorium in missile flight testing. However, on the occasion of the US Independence Day on July 4, 2006, North Korea had undertaken multiple missile tests (probably six in number). It has been identified that one of the liftoff was the first Taepodong- 2 rocket, perhaps topped by a satellite. The rocket was launched on a minimum energy-saving trajectory close to 41ı out of the launch sit heading in a direction of the Pacific Ocean and Hawaii islands. This was a typical satellite launch trajectory. However, the launch failed after around 50 s of flight. The satellite was presumably named Kwangmyongsong-2. On April 5, 2009, North Korea proceeded with its announced satellite launch against the increasing international pressure for not to do so. International community, particularly its neighbours Japan and South Korea along with the USA, was of the opinion that this so-called satellite launch was a facet and North Korea has actual plans of testing the Taepodong-2 ICBM. It was announced by the North Korean government that an Unha-2 rocket had carried the satellite. The launch was a failure, and the rocket had landed into the Pacific Ocean. Interestingly, North Korea had claimed that the three-stage rocket had put a satellite into space, and it was circling the Earth transmitting revolutionary songs. They had reported that their scientists and engineers have succeeded in sending satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 into orbit by way of carrier rocket Unha-2.3 But, various agencies from South Korea, Japan, Russia and the USA declared this test as a failure. The negative impact of this test was that the North Korea withdrew from six-party talks. They cited the criticism by the US President Barack Obama

3The Telegraph, Apr 5, 2009. 72 6 East Asia’s Space Agenda about this test as a reason for their withdrawal. Obama has expressed opinion that test has violated the international norms and action must be taken against North Korea for this violation.4 Politics has always been at the forefront of the North Korea’s space programme. Probably, the origin of the North Korea’s space programme has not been rooted as a need for social reasons but more as a response to the South Korean space programme. Another possibility is that they could have attempted to follow the Iran model to use space agenda as a means to exhibit the missile capabilities. Particularly, during the last decade after undertaking the nuclear tests, probably North Korea appears to have become more ambitious in space arena to use it as an instrument for power projection. Understanding the importance of engaging North Korea constructively in the past, the US administration had attempted to use the space card as one of the option. During 2000, the then President Clinton had offered a satellite launch deal in exchange for terminating their ICBM programme. However, during his first term of presidency, President Bush had dropped the idea due to verification issues [4]. In the year 2009, Russia had also shown readiness to launch North Korean communication satellites and assist its space programme.5 Particularly after the withdrawal of North Korea from the six-party talks, now it looks unlikely that the state would accept any international assistance in this regard. The satellite imagery assessment based on the Feb 2011 images indicates that North Korea has developed a new sophisticated satellite launch side.6 It could serve the double purpose, either for launching a satellite or it could be turned into an ICBM facility. North Korea has also announced its intentions to undertake manned space flight and Moon mission in the future. Nonetheless, the current status of their space programme indicates that they would have to overcome many hurdles to reach that level of technology sophistication. The basic question which arises at this point in time is: ‘Is North Korea’s space agenda a mere propaganda or they have interest in reaching higher heights in space realm’? The answer to this question is probably both.

4Remarks by President Barack Obama, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press ofﬁce/ Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/, accessed on Dec 18, 2011. 5“North Korea’s Impact on Commercial Space”, Jan 6, 2009, http://www.aviationweek. com/aw/blogs/space/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId= blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A04ce340e-4b63-4d23-9695- d49ab661f385Post%3A380bfbe7-63dd-4c53-82c4-0403284c3ef0, accessed on Dec 16, 2011. 6http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/New-North-Korean-Space-Launch-Site-Appears- Completed-116291839.html#comments South Korea 73

South Korea

South Korea is a key US alley in East Asia. This fastest growing country is the fourth largest economy of Asia. South Korea and North Korea could be regarded as states separated at birth. Technically, South Korea is at war with North Korea for the last many years. Since its inception in 1948, North Korea has mostly be a part of the list of countries unfriendly with the USA and its allies. Over the years, North Korea has been called ‘names’ like the State Sponsor of Terrorism, Rogue State, part of Axis of Evil and even at times Outpost of Tyranny. Evaluation of South Korea’s progress or retreat in any field is mostly done by factoring the North Korean angle. Like any other developing state, South Korea is keen to invest in space technologies for its socioeconomic benefits. At the same time, appreciating the typical security circumstances they are embroiled in and the nature of investments they are doing in military hardware, it becomes obvious that space is and would be an important element of their military preparedness particularly since they are a part of a US military alliance.7 The US militaries’ dependence on space technologies is well-known. Presently, ‘South Korea has been caught between political and historical legacies and emerging complex threats, while searching for a new strategic paradigm and operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility and adaptability under conditions of strategic uncertainty. The changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula has arguably decreased the effectiveness of South Korea’s traditional deterrence and defence strategies. In this context, their military has attempted to adapt selected US RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) concepts as a part of broader military modernization to counter the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with US forces, and eventually attain self-reliant defence posture’ [5]. Various Western, South Korean and Japanese spy agencies are using human and technical intelligence as a means to learn more about internal situation and military preparedness of this hermetic country. Today, South Korea suffers from a typical security dilemma, and this makes them to spend approximately 2.5Ð3 % of their GPD for the defence. Any assessment of the South Korean investments in the space technologies needs to be carried out at the backdrop of regional geopolitical realities. Apart from the civilian and commercial benefits of space technologies, its relevance for satisfying South Korean strategic requirements needs to be appreciated. The RMA philosophy of South Korea revolves around making significant investments in the area of command, control and surveillance systems (C4ISR). Importance of space technologies (either developed indigenously or otherwise) to carry this agenda further is obvious.

7In 1953, Washington initiated a bilateral security treaty and established a permanent troop presence in South Korea. 74 6 East Asia’s Space Agenda

In mid-September 2005, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defence announced a Defence Reform Plan designed to modernise ROK military equipment and achieve a higher level of professional military personnel. The most crucial aspect of the plan was the massive investment in battle management assets focusing on C4ISR, all of which are essential for network-centric warfare. This Defence Reform 2020 plan has mandated the acquisition of theatre operational command facilities, communication networks and military communication satellites [6]. South Korea started late in the space arena in comparison with other important space actors in the region. They started with their various activities in space arena in late 1980s. It’s interesting to note that they started ‘thinking big’ in the initial stages of development of their space programme only and announced its ambitions to work in astronautics and other space fields. During Aug 1989, the state established Satellite Technology Research Centre (SaTReC). The centre started with their associate with the Surrey Satellite Technology Limited in area of micro-satellites. Within 3 months after the creation of centre, South Korea established its national space agency called Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) [7]. The first South Korean satellite Kitsat-1 was launched on Aug 10, 1992, onboard an Ariane launcher, and satellite manufacture was facilitated by the Surrey systems. South Korea’s first indigenously produced satellite, KOMPSAT-1, was launched in 1999 aboard a Russian-produced rocket. Since then, the KARI has launched several advanced communications, imaging and weather satellites [8]. The KARI has also been involved in the development its own rockets too. Apart from successful launching of various satellites in space (with outside support), the other notable achievement by South Korea has been to launch its first astronaut into space with Russian assistance in 2008. The biggest limitation of the South Korean space programme so far has been its inability to successfully develop its own satellite launch capability. By the 1990s, South Korea had developed an independent capability to manufacture solid propellant rocket motors of up to 1-ton mass. In 1990, KARI had built the first indigenous sounding rockets, flown as the KSR-I and KSR-II. In December 1997, KARI was planning the development of liquid oxygen/kerosene rocket motor for an orbital launcher, but this idea was discarded because by then the South Korean government had proposed to try to be amongst the top ten spacefaring nations by 2015 and they wanted to leapfrog the technology curve. They decided to follow the route of international collaboration for rapid progress. Hence, they engaged with Russian companies to assist in building a new space launch centre together with a large space launch modular booster. This multibillion dollar programme got underway in 2004.8 The first two attempts by South Korea with its indigenous launching system to launch satellites have failed. South Korea had launched its first space rocket during Aug 2009, but the satellite it was carrying failed to enter into its proper orbit.

8http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm#more, accessed on Dec 24, 2011. South Korea 75

South Korea’s two-stage Naro rocket had Russian liquid-fuelled first-stage while the second stage, burning a solid fuel, was produced by South Korean engineers. The rocket could place the satellite into orbit but not followed its intended course. The satellite had reached an altitude of 360 km, rather than separating at the intended 302 km. South Korean agencies had described this as a partial success/half success.9 The second attempt during Jun 2010 was a major failure when the rocket exploded 137 s after the takeoff.10 These two successive launch failures have put South Korea satellite programme under pressure, and they are yet to realise the dream of becoming spacefaring nation. Even though South Korea is not able to successfully develop a launch system, still their success with satellite design and manufacture is noteworthy. Till now, they have launched 12 different satellites. From strategic context, their investments in KoreaSat are significant. This series of satellites are basically for commercial purposes (communication and broadcasting). Amongst the four satellites launches so far, KoreaSat-5 (Aug 2006) has an integrated communication system for military purposes [9]. They also have a KOMPSAT/Arirang series satellite for Earth observation purposes. All these satellites are mainly devised for civilian uses; however, their defence utility could not be ruled out. Their requirements for spy satellites or dedicated military observation satellites are obviously being met by the systems available under the US command. Limited achievements in space arena have not deterred the South Korea from continuing ‘thinking big’. As per their Ministry of Science and Technology, they are proposing to develop a large-sized rocket capable of carrying 300 ton of freight into space by 2017. They also have plans to develop a space shuttle launching system by 2020. The state is keen to undertake missions in the deep space arena and has plans to send an unmanned probe to the Moon’s orbit in 2020 and land a probe on the Moon’s surface in 2025.11 Like any other developing state, South Korea’s space agenda also suffers from the budgetary limitations. They understand that presently there is disconnect between their ambitions and achievements. Exact reasons for their inability to successfully develop launch vehicles are difficult to identify. From the technological perspective in the business of rocket science, two consecutive failures are not desirable but definitely tolerable. For many years, the USA is having concerns about South Korea’s ballistic missile intentions. Probably, that is the reason they could be (secretly) unhappy to the South Korean inroads into rocket technology. This also could have had certain impact on the progress of South Korea in developing launcher technologies. After making years of investments in space arena, now it is unlikely for South Korea to discard its space programme just because of few failures. They

9http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-paciﬁc/8219669.stm, accessed on Dec 24, 2011. 10http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10281073, accessed on Dec 24, 2011. 11“S. Korea outlines space program, Nov 20, 2007”, http://www.physorg.com/news114789828. html, accessed on Dec 12, 2011. 76 6 East Asia’s Space Agenda understand that space is an integral element of a modern international power and has connotations both for national pride as well as international standing. They are also keen to exploit the economic and strategic beneﬁts of this technology. The state is expected to quickly learn for its failures and make rapid progress in near future.

Taiwan

Taiwan has long conducted space-related activities using foreign space data and has developed international partnerships in various fields [10]. Development of rockets for launching satellites had not been their core area of research and investments at least during late 1980s and 1990s. They established the National Space Organization, NSPO, in 2005 (formerly known as the National Space Programme Office established in1991) which is the civilian space agency of Taiwan. It has developed a successful sounding rocket programme and has undertaken few launches of these rockets. Since 1998, the launch of Sounding Rocket No.1, NSPO has launched rockets six times. These launches were meant for the purposes of conducting the physical experiments on atmospheric airglow, ionosphere, etc. They also had relevance for flight validations of technologies such as GPS, magnetometer, etc. NSPO’s second-phased aerospace technology development programme aims at suborbital measurements. Such measurements are also expected to enhance the development of the aerospace technology’s civilian application.12 Taiwan is yet to develop a workable space launch booster (launcher). There are some indications that they have plans of testing its first Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) to put around 50 kg payload into LEO.13 No specific information is available in this regard. Probably, this could take few more years to happen. However, understanding China’s apprehensions about these issues, Taiwan may not be keen to divulge much information in this regard. The first satellite for Taiwan, a low-Earth-orbit scientific experimental satellite called FORMOSAT-1(formerly known as ROCSAT-1), was launched by the USA on January 27, 1999. The first remote sensing satellite developed by National Space Organization (NSPO), FORMOSAT-2, was successfully launched on May 21, 2004. For its ‘FORMOSAT-3 Programme’, Taiwan has collaborated with the USA. This project is aimed at developing advanced technology for the real-time monitoring of the global climate. This project is also known as Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate (COSMIC). For this purpose, six micro-satellites are placed into six different orbits at 700Ð800 Km. These satellites orbit around the Earth and form a low-Earth-orbit constellation to receive signals transmitted by the 24 US GPS satellites. This project was successfully launched

12http://mepopedia.com/blog/index.php?/archives/2010/05/10.html, accessed on Jan 20, 2012. 13C Z Chenge et al., “ARGO Science Mission”, Future Perspectives Of Space Plasma and Particle Instrumentation and International Collaborations: Proceedings of the International Conference,f 1Ð3 November 2006, Tokyo, AIP Conf. Proc. 1144, pp. 196Ð200; doi:10.1063/1.3169288 (5 pages) and http://mepopedia.com/blog/index.php?/archives/2010/05/10.html, accessed on Jan 20, 2012. References 77 during Apr 2006 and with this ended the First Phase Space Programme (1991Ð2006) devised by Taiwan. The Second Phase Space Programme (2004Ð2018) is about the Formosat-5 Programme, the ﬁrst Remote Sensing Programme. Here the aim is on building up the capabilities for independent development of spacecraft and payload instruments.14 For almost two decades, Taiwan is systematically expanding its space programme and space industry. Probably, geopolitical compulsions are responsible for an overall slow growth of the Taiwan’s space agenda. China appears to be not keen for Taiwan to develop its own programme and inﬂuences foreign states not to cooperate with Taiwan on this issue. However, in recent past, NASA is found interacting with Taiwan on various projects. Also, ESA and Japan have interest in collaborating with Taiwan on various issues including disaster warning and management. All this could help the growth of Taiwan’s space programme probably much faster than in the past.

References

1. Han D-h. The future of the two Koreas: how to build peace on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean Rev. 2011;7(1, Spring):50. 2. Jimerson R. North Korea: locked in a space race with the world. www.gwu.edu/spi/assets/ docsnkorea.html. Accessed 17 Dec 2011. 3. Catalinotto J. DPRK launches ﬁrst satellite for National Day. Workers World, 1998 Sept 17. Available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/156.html 4. Cordell B. North Korea’s new space program? http://21stcenturywaves.com/2009/02/08/north- koreas-new-space-program/. Accessed 15 Dec 2011. 5. Raska M. Searching for new security paradigms: South Korea’s RMA strategies and concepts. PhD thesis, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. 6. Moon C-i, Lee J-Y. The revolution in military affairs and the defence industry in South Korea. Secur Chall. 2008;4(4, Summer):123. 7. Harvey B, Smid H, Pirard T. Emerging space powers. Christine: Springer/Praxis; 2010. p. 487Ð91. 8. Lipschutz K. Global insider: South Korea’s space program. 2010 Jun 29. http://www. worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/5924/global-insider-south-koreas-space-program. Accessed 20 Dec 2011. 9. Lalitendra K. Militarisation of space. New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd; 2010. p. 138Ð40. 10. Moltz JC. Asia’s space race. New York: Columbia University Press; 2012. p. 80.

14http://www.nspo.org.tw/en/, accessed on Jan 18, 2012. Chapter 7 China’s Space Programme

China’s space programme has been one of the most debated programmes in the recent past. Various analysts and academicians have written extensively on different aspects of this programme. This chapter offers a broad overview of the China’s space agenda. China being the most significant space player in Asia, various specifics of their space agenda are being discussed in detail in some of the other chapters of this book too. This chapter only makes brief mention of such space activities to avoid duplication. It has become practically a predictable wisdom that China is the post-Cold War world’s emerging great power that poses the most intricate questions for the future of international security [1]. The last decade (2000Ð2010) has shown a substantial growth in China’s global power status. This has essentially happened because of the current and ‘projected’ economic transformation of China. The economic growth in China has accelerated along with increased integration with the global economy [2]. The progression of economic liberalisation has shown the world the magnitude of China’s labour force, creativity, and purchasing power; its commitment to development; and its degree of national cohesion [3]. Today, ‘rise of China’ (the term coined in 2003 by China’s political establishment is peaceful rise of China1) has become a part of a lexicon, and the global community understands that China has ‘arrived’ and will increasingly shape the global future, not just its own. To a large extent, this has become possible because of the correct strategic choices made by China regarding economic liberalisation. A number of factors lie behind this new global perception of China, and Chinese investments in the field of science and technology are one of them. Particularly, China’s various accomplishments in the space technology arena have contributed remarkably towards making ‘rise of China’ a reality.

1Zheng Bijian developed his inﬂuential thesis of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ in 2003. For details please refer Zheng Bijian, China’s Peaceful Rise Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2005).

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 7, 79 © Springer India 2013 80 7 China’s Space Programme

The present Chinese space policy represents long tale of struggle, both domestically and internationally, as a historically great power sought to return to international prominence. Today, China could be viewed to be standing at the pinnacle of international space prestige hierarchy, alongside Russia and the USA [4]. The Chinese struggle is commendable because in limited time it has succeeded in at least selectively closing some gap two ‘space superpowers’. However, China’s space policies have been found bit opaque. Also, there appears to be less clarity about China’s actual intentions in regard to the weaponisation of space. During 2006, China celebrated 50th anniversary of its space evolution. Their space programme is an extensive arrangement for lofting Earth-orbiting satellites for a large number of duties, expanding its human space flight abilities and carrying out a multistep programme of lunar exploration and mission to explore Mars. At this time, five of their different operational systems are in service, namely, telecommunications, meteorological, Earth remote sensing, as well as recoverable satellites and technology demonstration spacecraft.2 China has various other plans in space arena from establishing a space station to having missions to Moon and Mars. The first phases of many of these plans have already been successfully completed. Also, the dual-use nature of space technology is fast influencing the development of their military thinking and China is founding making intelligent investments into technologies having strategic significance. China’s space programme could be said to have began in the late 1950s when the State Council implemented the ‘12 year development plan of science and technology’, which included rocket programming, radio electronics, automatic control and computer and semiconductor technology [5]. Over last five decades, China has established a well-balanced and coordinated infrastructure of space- related institutions, including research and development centres, launching sites, tracking, telemetry and command stations and centres and manufacturing plants. For last decade or so, China is on a fast track into space. The achievements and announcements about launch timetables, space laboratories, shuttles, space stations, lunar bases and Mars mission have swiftly transformed the Chinese space programme [6,p.51]. The China’s space programme initially began with an agenda to promote its Maoist ideology. It has transcended that ideology’s decline to become a major political symbol of Chinese nationalism, an important economic sector, and an effective dual-use technology collaborator with the Chinese military. In twenty-first century, the programme has become more important than ever before to China’s communist regime [7].

2http://www.space.com/news/060405 nss china.html, accessed on Dec 22, 2009. Author has earlier done some work on the Chinese space programme which has been published in few journals. The structure of the work presented over here in regard to China’s space programme is based on some of the author’s earlier published and unpublished works. For the main reference to this chapter, please refer author’s earlier work ‘Future of Asian Space Powers’, The Journal of Defence and Security, Vol 2, No 1, 2011 (publication of Malaysian institute of Defence and Security, MiDAS). 7 China’s Space Programme 81

China’s civilian and military space programmes are tightly interwoven. The China National Space Administration (CNSA-established in June 1993) carries out the management and operation of China’s space activities [8]. The organisational structure and evolution of China’s space programme is complicated and constantly undergoing change. Probably, the dual-use potential of the Chinese space programme dictates such changes. China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) a subordinate to CNSA, this state-owned corporation directs five primary divisions responsible for building military missiles and civilian rockets: the Academy of Launch Vehicles (ALV), which designs and manufactures the Long March rocket series; the Academy of Space Technology, which design and manufactures satellites; the Academy of Solid-Fuel Rockets (ASFR); the Academy of Tactical Missile Technology; and the Academy of Cruise Missile Technology [7]. China’s space programme has withstood stages of rough beginning, reform and revival and untrustworthy international cooperation. Over the years, the Chinese space industry has been developed almost from a non-existent industrial infrastructure and scientific and technological level to a modern business. After a struggle of five decades, China today is ranked amongst the fastest advancing countries in fields such as communication, remote sending, reconnaissance and navigation. They have made considerable progress in arenas like manned spacecraft, satellite recovery, multi-satellite launch by a single rocket, cryogenic propulsion, strap-on boosters, geostationary satellites, satellite tracking and control, remote sensing, communications and navigation satellites and microgravity experiments.3 China’s technological and military leadership, understanding the socioeconomic and strategic relevance of space technologies, and simultaneously appreciating the technological challenges involved, has prepared a roadmap for the future outlining plans for research, investment and development in this field. The dynamic nature of technology and strategic considerations of the nation-state demand the regular updating of such plans. Till date, China has published three White Papers on space issues in 2000, 2006 and 2011. They have been published by the information office of the State Council in order to map the activities in space. They highlight the progress made so far, spell out plans for the following 5 years, discuss developmental policies and measures undertaken till then, proposals for future, and, finally, to underline international exchanges and cooperation. The first official White Paper (2000) primarily describes Chinese achievements in space since 1956, thus filling an information gap regarding the development of the Chinese space programme during these 45 years. Detailing the various technologies and areas in which China has made progress, the paper highlights the fact that the PRC was confident enough about its progress in space to release a White Paper, making public its overall status. The 2006 White Paper also analyses the success of the Chinese space programme. The paper shows that the Chinese government managed to achieve a number of stated goals. It also enumerated the plan for the

3www.astronautix.com/articles/china.htm, accessed on Aug 23, 2009. 82 7 China’s Space Programme

Table 7.1 Projections made in the White Papers White Paper (2000) White Paper (2006) White Paper (2011) Achieve marketisation and Improve the carrier Improving ground facilities for industrialisation of space rockets’ receiving, processing, applications capabilities distributing and applying satellite data Complete manned space flight Develop Earth Expand value-added business in system and scientific research observation satellite communication in the field system Exploration studies in outer space Develop satellite Work on lunar surface landing remote sensing applications Upgrade the level and capacity of Achieve spacecraft Explore the properties of dark the launch vehicles rendezvous and matter particles docking Improving the performance and Achieve lunar Continue work on space debris reliance of the ‘Long March orbiting probe monitoring and mitigation group of rocket launchers and spacecraft protection Realise manned space flight Original and Promote satellite application important industry achievements in space Establish coordinated and Continue with Work on strengthening the complete national remote manned space national space law and sensing applications flight improve related laws Develop the application Continue with lunar Work on space industrial policies technology for satellite explorations guiding and regulating space navigation and positioning activities Space explorations centring on the Moon next 5 years. The third White Paper (2011) highlights the Chinese desire to achieve a Moon landing and establishment of space station. It also sheds light on Chinese ambitions towards a manned mission to the Moon. Table 7.1 shows the projections made by the Chinese government in the three White Papers.4 The White Papers have also been used to list achievements made so far. Table 7.2 offers some details. It is important to appreciate that even though these White Papers communicate that China’s rise as a spacefaring nation has been visible since 2000, but its efforts

4For complete text of the White Papers, see http://www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov. 22.2000.html (2000), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/183588.htm (2006), and http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/29/c 131333479.htm (2011), accessed on January 18, 2012. Also, refer for entire discussion on white papers Ajey Lele and Gunjan Singh, ‘China’s White Papers on Space: An Analysis’, IDSA Issue Brief, Jan 20, 2012, http://www.idsa.in/system/ files/IB ChinasWhitePapersonSpaceAnAnalysis.pdf, accessed on Jan 28, 2012. 7 China’s Space Programme 83 t launchers undertook with 67 successful launches sending 79 spacecraft into planned orbit Ziyuan (resource), Yaogan (remote sensing) and(space Tianhui mapping) satellites observation system services to the Asia-Pacific region and small as well as micro-satellites docking between Shenzhou 8 and Tiangongway 1, for paving the the establishment of thestation space laboratory and space them debris 1. Long March series of rocke 2. Developed the Fengyun (wind and cloud), Haiyang (ocean), 3. Initiated the development of a high-resolution Earth 4. Launched 10 satellites for the Beidou system5. and provided Launched and developed the Shijian (practice) satellites 6. Launched the manned spaceship and also achieved space 8. Building a9. new launch site at Monitored Hainan space debris and provided early warning10. against Removed aging GEO satellites11. out of Working on orbit protecting manned space flight from space (ZY) and navigation and positioningBeidou satellites, satellites successful flights thrust liquid/kerosene engine, while the development of the 50-ton thrust hydrogenÐoxygen engine is in progress Xichang and Taiyuan made progress observation, reduction and forecasting of Space debris; and has developed theto capability forecast the Space environment 1. China added Earth resource satellites, Ziyuan 2. Developed and launched 22 different types of 3. Long March rockets made 24 consecutive 4. Research and development of the 120-ton 5. Construction of three launching sites at Jiquan, 6. Research into space environment and also 7. Launched the first lunar probe Chang’e-2 onsecutive successful flights first unmanned experimental Achievements spacecraft ‘Shenzhou’ in 1999 and balloons from the 1960s foreign telecommunications satellites and developedtechnologies. related It also began usingcountries navigation satellites of other remote sensing satellites Dongfanghong (DFH), telecommunications satellites Fengyun (FY), meteorological satellites, and Shijian (SJ) scientifictechnological research experiments and satellites April 1970 types. conducted 63 launches and 21 c between 1996 and 2000 6. China explored the upper atmosphere with the7. help of rockets By the mid-1980s, China began to utilise domestic and Table 7.2 White Paper (2000)1. China has developed four types of satellites: recoverable, 2. First man-made satellite Dongfanghong I was launched3. in By the year 2000, China had launched4. 47 satellites of Developed various the Long March rockets independently; China 5. Launched and recovered the White Paper (2006) White Paper (2011) 84 7 China’s Space Programme in this direction had began much earlier. Since the 1950s, it has made steady investments in space sciences and technologies. Interestingly, against the popular perception, no blind political support was available to the Chinese technological community and the PLA in space arena. Leaders like Deng Xiaoping had their own views with regard to making investments in the space arena; Deng was not particularly keen to develop the so-called high-profile projects. Unenthusiastic about ideas regarding manned space capsule and the two-stage-to-orbit horizontal takeoff and landing reusable space shuttle, he did not grant permission to develop these programmes. It is only after Deng resigned as the head of the Chinese Military Commission in 1989 that the Chinese military was able to refocus its interest in this area.5 Incidentally, the first Chinese White Paper giving details of the proposals for the manned mission and Moon mission was published in 2000, 3 years after Deng’s demise. Post 2000, China has made considerable (visible) investments in the manned space flight programme. The programme has its roots in an ambitious project that was formulated in early 1992 and initially known under code name 921 [8]. CASC has general authority over manned space flight and Long March series rockets. Ultimately, however, the military (specifically the Second Artillery Corps) controls the Chinese space programme. Although specific efforts have been made towards separating the military aspects from civil/commercial aspects, China like Russia did not initially bifurcate its programme as did the USA [6, p. 60]. CNSA is specifically designated as Chinese counterpart to work with other international space agencies. In reality, CNSA personnel have been dual-hated with the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation [9]. China is capable of launching various types of satellites. China has developed an impressive range of launch rockets to support its military and commercial space assets.6 Launch vehicle technology is one of the foundations of China’s ambitions space programme. With its Long March (LM) series of launchers, it has achieved a great deal of launcher autonomy. Long March series includes 14 kinds of launch vehicles and 12 types of carrier rockets. The first launch (LM-1) vehicle had successfully launched the first Chinese satellite 173-kg Dongfanghong I into orbit in 1970.7 On Feb 25, 2012 China has successfully launched the 11th satellite for its Beidou navigational network, and it was the 158th launch of the Long March carrier rockets. During the year 2011, China has launched 19 rockets and 21 satellites into space indicating that the country’s space exploration is ‘highly intensive’.8 China is

5Encyclopedia Astronautica: China, available at www.astronautix.com/articles/china.htm, accessed on January 10, 2012. 6Main sources for certain information in this portion about China’s space programme are :KK Nair, ‘China’s Space Programme: An Overview’, Air Power, Vol 1, No 1, Monsoon 2004 and Ajey Lele, ‘China as a Space Power’, Strategic Analysis, Apr-Jun 2002. 7http://www.wsichina.org/space/program.cfm?programid=5&charid=1, accessed on Sep22, 2010. 8http://www.space.com/14048-china-satellite-launch-breaks-rocket-record.html and www.wired. com/dangerroom/2012/04/china-rocket-launches/, accessed on Sep 12, 2012. 7 China’s Space Programme 85 developing one of its most powerful rockets to date—Long March-5—that would sport engines with the thrust of 120 ton and is expected to be operational by 2014. When operational, Long March-5 is expected to deliver up to 25 ton of payload, in to the low Earth orbit, and up to 14 ton into the geostationary transfer orbit, where most communications satellites are released after launch [10]. By 2017 China expects to make significant development with its Long March technology. Long March-5, -6 and -7 would be developed as non-toxic, low-cost, highly reliable, adaptable and safe rockets. The Long March-6 would be a high- speed launch vehicle that can put 1 ton into a sun-synchronous orbit, while the Long March-7 would have a maximum low-Earth-orbit payload capacity of 13.5 and 5.5 ton of sun-synchronous orbit payloads.9 Communication satellites are a high priority for China because of its commercial utility. The development of China’s communications satellites started at the beginning of the 1970s. China’s first experimental geostationary orbit communications satellite was launched successfully in 1984.10 China is successfully using such satellites for the purposes of TV transmission, education, long-range telephone and telegraph, data transfer in finance and air and railway traffic. Their communication satellites have been launched our various programmes which include Apstar series, AsiaSat series, SinoSat series and Zhongxing series. One of their most useful programmes in recent times is the SinoSat series satellite. The first satellite in this series is SinoSat-1 which was launched in 1998. The SinoSat-2 satellite was launched in 2006 but malfunctioned because it failed to deploy its solar panels and communication antennae. SinoSat-6 satellite which was launched successfully on Sep 5, 2010 now serves as a substitute for SinoSat-3 launched on June 1, 2007.11 Next-generation communication satellites are expected to carry C, Ku, Ka and L band transponders. Chinese leadership understands the importance of dual-use nature of space technology. Their leader Mr Jiang Zemin on June 7, 1991, issued the instructions that no necessity exists to use separate military systems for civil use and military use. Communication is one such area having dual-use capability. It is obvious that China would have used/would be using its communication-related space assesses for strategic purposes. China launched its first military communication satellite in January 2000. This is supposed to be China’s first advanced technology spy satellite. China uses space technologies for gathering electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Chi- nese military is exploiting the importance of remote sensing technologies towards building information superiority. In these areas of intelligence gathering and

9‘China announces new launch rockets’, Feb 6, 2012 http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China announces new launch rockets 999.html, accessed on Feb 8, 2012. 10http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/comm.htm, accessed on Sept 5, 2010. 11http://www.indiasummary.com/2010/09/06/china-sinosat-6-communication-satellite-launched- successfully-by-chinese/, accessed on Oct 9, 2010. 86 7 China’s Space Programme reconnaissance, China is depending both on indigenous space capabilities as well as on commercially available international space satellite constellations. In regard to signals intelligence (SIGNT) China’s major investments are in modern aircraft platforms and not satellites. It is interesting to note that China started with FSW (Fanhui Shei Weixing, Recoverable Test Satellite) satellite series initially more from the point of view of using it for military reconnaissance purposes. But, in the late 1980s, the design was employed for Earth resource photography and experiments in crystal and protein growth, cell cultivation and crop breeding. These satellites were also used in the role of recoverable satellites. Mastering and testing of this technology during early years of its space journey should have helped China for designing its manned space programme. It may be noted that China is the third country in the world to master the technology of satellite recovery. Between 1974 and 2006, a total of 24 FSW satellites in 6 variants were launched, of which 22 were recovered successfully. The programme ended in 2006 with the introduction of the new-generation data- transmission type remote sensing satellites, but the FSW satellite is still being presented as a platform for commercial and scientific payloads.12 Currently, China is working towards developing new-generation photoreconnaissance satellite FSW series (1 m or less resolution). Building satellites for the purpose of reconnaissance has been a key area of focus for the Chinese establishment particularly post 2000. It appears that the Chinese government has intentionally avoided publicity in this regard. From April 2006 to May 2012, 16 satellites in the remote sensing satellite (Yaogan) series13 were launched by China. Officially, these satellites are meant for scientific, land survey and disaster management purposes. However, it is generally believed that since these satellites have either optical or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors and hence a definite military utility. Some of the previously launched satellites in this series have been retired, and presently operational satellites are known to have a resolution of 1.5Ð1.0 m, almost matching the best in the world. Navigational satellite system is another area where China has major plans for the future both commercial and military purposes. In early 1980s, China began to utilise other countries navigational satellites. It also developed an application technology of satellite navigation and positioning, which is now used for land survey and ship and aircraft navigation. China’s navigational programme has been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book. Micro-satellite is one arena where the Chinese scientific community has got major interests. Since early 2000, China appears to be giving major emphasis to this technology. A Russian booster launched the first satellite in this category, Tsinghua 1, on Jun 28, 2000.14 It was a joint project of Tsinghua University of Beijing and

12http://www.sinodefence.com/space/military/fsw.asp, accessed on Feb 7, 2012. 13http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Space-Systems-and-Industry/Yaogan-series-China.html, accessed on Sep 14, 2012. 14http://www.eoportal.org/directory/pres Tsinghua1.html and http://www.spaceandtech.com/ spacedata/logs/2000/2000-033c tsinghua-1 sumpub.shtml, accessed on Oct 12, 2010. 7 China’s Space Programme 87

Surrey Satellite Technology Limited, UK. It is a 50-kg bird, and its launch put China into the selected bracket of countries, which can design and operate micro and nano sized satellites. This success has implications for both China’s scientific programmes as well as for enhanced military satellite capabilities. It is equipped with CCD camera that can image objects up to 39 m in three spectral bands. It is important to note that small satellites are capable of avoiding detection; they also have the potential to be used as ASAT (antisatellite) space mines. In April 2004, China had launched two new indigenously developed research satellites, including a nano-satellite (Experiment Satellite I and Nanosatellite I) weighing 25 kg. What the capabilities of these satellites are, however, and how much they are constrained by size, remain questions to be answered [9]. It has been reported that Experiment Satellite I transmits remote sensing data for mapping and Nanosatellite I was designed to perform unidentified technology experiments. Such small, cheap satellites could provide China with an easier path to attaining some space capabilities and provide the potential for asymmetric warfare in space. The cost advantage of micro-satellites could, if properly handled, allow China to compete at some levels with larger and more expensive US systems without having to match the US dollar for dollar [11]. China has developed a new generation of small satellite launch vehicles, Explorer I, which uses solid fuel. It has been designed to take small or micro- satellites into space and complement Long March group, the country’s large-scale liquid fuel space launchers. Explorer I will be able to carry loads weighing less than 100 kg. The low costs and high thrusts of solid fuel rockets make them an important factor in the commercialisation of the space industry [12]. China’s successful spacewalk was conducted during the Shenzhou 7 (SH-7) mission launched on 25 September 2008 (it was China’s third human space flight mission). A micro-satellite was released during this mission called the BX-1. This companion sat was a very small cube approximately 40 cm on a side and weighing around 40 kg. Technically, this satellite was to provide images of the Shenzhou seven capsule and demonstrate the ability to inspect the orbital module and conduct some limited proximity operations. It also carried out a data relay experiment. However, some observers have concluded that this satellite was meant to test some of the capabilities required for a co-orbital ASAT attack [13]. China had started preliminary work on advanced manned space flight in July 1985. The decision came against a background of vigorous international space activity the then US President Regean’s pet project ‘Strategic Defense Initiative’. The erstwhile USSR had programmes like Buran shuttle system and Mir and Mir-2 space station. Europe was developing the Hermes spaceplane. All this probably had motivated China to undertake projects like human space mission and building of space station. In early spring 1986, a proposal for seven projects under Project 863 plans to accelerate Chinese technical development was made. Astronautics plan 863-2 included section 863-204 space transportation system, which would service the 863- 205 space station. It was estimated that 2 years would be needed for concept studies. An expert group was established for the 863-204 shuttle. The final 863-204 Expert Commission report in July 1989 advocated building the manned capsule, with a first 88 7 China’s Space Programme

flight date of 2000. However, the report failed to impress the Chinese government. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping rejected this plan. Deng stepped down as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989. In his absence, the Chinese military decided it could safely lend its critical support to a manned space programme. In January 1991, the Air Ministry established a manned space programme office. The final plan was approved on September 21, 1992, and Project 921 to create a Chinese manned space capability began in earnest.15 It took a decade’s preparation for China to realise its dream of Chinese visiting the space. By Oct 2003, China successfully launched and recovered its first manned space mission. China is the only third country in the world to send the man into the space. In its report on China’s military power, the U.S. Department of Defense has stated, ‘While one of the strongest immediate motivations for China’s manned space programme appears to be political prestige, China’s efforts will contribute to improve military space systems in [the] 2010Ð2020 timeframe’ [6, p. 52]. Various details about the Chinese human space programme and space shuttle programme are discussed in detail in another chapter. It is important to note that China has major interest in pursuing manned space technology, and this one arena is expected to remain their principal programme for the future. Because of the closed political system, various actions by China are sometimes viewed with military bias. China’s first manned space flight might have been imaging reconnaissance mission. However, it is important to note that carrying out operations like imaging reconnaissance either by manned or unmanned space, vehicle is not is a good option. Even a simple satellite could do this job in a better fashion. Hence, it could incorrect to assume that such missions are carried out only for the purposes of imaging reconnaissance, and at the same time, indirect military benefits (spin-off technologies) of such programme cannot be ruled out. China’s Shenzhou design is a replica of Russian design (Soyuz) but has some more additional features, which has more military relevance. Chinese craft consists of an orbital module, a re-entry vehicle that carries crew back to Earth, and a service module for propulsion and for performing retrofire sequence. But, unlike Soyuz, the Chinese module could detach from the re-entry capsule and remain in orbit for several months, acting as robotic mini space station, using its solar panels to power instruments and experiments. However, the unit is not a re-entry vehicle and burns up while entering the atmosphere [14]. PLA strictly controls the Shenzhou programme. One indication of Shenzhou military operations was likely electronics carried on nose of the Shenzhou 3 orbital module that functioned autonomously in space for 6 months following the return to Earth of the decent module after 7 days aloft in March 2002. As per few analysts, Shenzhou 3 mission could also have carried a significant electronic intelligence eavesdropping payload. The system could have recorded UHF and radar emissions applicable to a variety of military uses including ocean surveillance [15].

15www.astronautix.com/articles/china.htm, accessed on Jul 23, 2009. 7 China’s Space Programme 89

The extent to which this manned activity will translate into a military advantage for China remains debatable. Most benefits to the military from the manned programme will be indirect or a function of improved Chinese technical abilities, generally in an area such as computational analysis, systems integration, and miniaturisation [10]. It also could be argued that notwithstanding that both the US and Soviet militaries have been unable to identify important advantages of a man in space over unmanned systems, the Chinese seem determined to explore that premise for themselves, likely through the use of orbital module at some later date. It is believed that the ultimate ambition for any nation-state could be to put a human on a different planet. One of the key (undeclared) agenda for China appears to be to challenge the US supremacy of undertaking manned Moon/Mars mission. The USA could be downplaying this idea since, during late 1960s, they have already succeeded in putting man on the Moon. However, the process of putting human on other planet still has significant ‘shocking’ potential, and China believes that this could increase their global status. A single act like this could bring them unparalleled prestige and even raise their stature to a ‘superpower’. Understanding the difficulties (financial as well as economic) involved into embarking on challenging missions like Mars mission, China is looking for international collaboration. On Mar 26, 2007 China and Russia had signed a landmark space cooperation accord, entitled the ‘Cooperative Agreement between the China National Space Administration and the Russian Space Agency on joint Chinese- Russian exploration of Mars’. One stipulation of the agreement was the construction and launch of the Yinghuo probe (a Chinese Mars exploration space probe) and its Russian counterpart, Fobos-Grunt. These probes were launched in space on Nov 8, 2011, by Russia. The 115-kg Chinese probe was to orbit Mars for around 2 years and carry out a study of the planet’s surface, atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetic field. However, this Russia mission failed, and China has decelerated the loss of probe on Nov 18, 2011.16 Overall, China’s Mars plan is not expected to remain restricted to a single probe. The speculations are that the first uncrewed Mars exploration programme could take place around 2015Ð2030 and could be followed by a crewed phase in 2040Ð2060. China has drafted a multistep programme for lunar exploration. By 2013, China space planners will be landing a rover on the Moon surface. In 2017, China’s lunar exploration plans call for robotic lunar sample return missions.17 It is also expected that by 2020Ð2025, China could plan a manned Moon mission. China has successfully completed its first lunar mission which was launched on Oct 24, 2007 (Chang’e-1), and the mission got completed on Mar 1, 2009. On Oct 01, 2010, China has launched of its second lunar probe Chang’e-2. Various details of the Moon programme are discussed elsewhere in the book.

16http://www.planetary.org/blog/article/00002655/ and http://rt.com/news/fhobos-grund-mission- 123/ and http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Yinghuo Was Worth It 999.html, accessed on Nov 12, 2011. 17http://www.space.com/news/060405 nss china.html 90 7 China’s Space Programme

Most of the space missions are dual-use in nature, but there are few missions with only military applicability, and antisatellite (ASAT) mission is one of them. For many years, speculations were ripe in regard to China’s plan for space weaponisation. According to a 2005 Pentagon report, ‘PLA is building lasers to destroy satellites and already has beam weapons capable of damaging sensors on space based reconnaissance and intelligence systems. Consequently, China could blind the US intelligence and military space equipment systems vital for deploying US military forces in current and future warfare’.18 All known and unknown Chinese interests and speculations by many analysts for many years were put to the rest on Jan 11, 2007 when China destroyed its own aging weather satellite (FY-1C) by firing a rocket towards it. The details about this and few other Chinese agendas indirectly implying their interests in space weaponisation are discussed elsewhere in this book. It is important to appreciate China’s ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitude’ in this regard. It is said that China is a keen follower of the President John F. Kennedy view that ‘whoever controls space [the universe] can control the earth’.19 Space operations and warfare in space are important elements of what the PLA warfare strategy. PLA strategists are convinced that space is likely to be one of the natural domains of war and that war in space would become an integral part of other military operations in years to come. They expect that space would become the primary battlefield in future high-technology war. To do this, Chinese research institutes are advocating research into various types of laser weapons, particle beam weapons and other forms of directed energy and electromagnetic systems [16]. Hence, Chinese leadership (military or otherwise) is keen to remain prepared in this field and is making all overt and covert preparations to that effect. Alternatively, China understand that the issues related to security of space assets, freedom of utilisation of space for civilian and military purposes and issues which are rapidly gaining importance like space debris removal constitute an important part of global debate on space security. They are not keen to be treated as an outcast in the emerging global space order. They understand as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, they need to remain engaged. China feels that their active engagement with international space community indirectly reflects their views on outer space issues. They are making efforts to remain engaged with the various UN mechanisms on multiple space-related issues. Their all three space White Papers resonate that they are keen to support multilateral international cooperative mechanisms on the peaceful use of outer space within the framework of the United Nations.

18Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, (Washington, D.C.: Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense, July 2005), p.36 http://www.defenselink. mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf 19This quotation, supposedly made by John F. Kennedy, is widespread among Chinese publications and speeches. Zhao Kejin, “China Does Not Need to Start a “Space Race” with the U.S”, http:// watchingamerica.com/News/53913/china-does-not-need-to-start-a-space-race-with-the-u-s/, accessed on Nov 24, 2011. Assessment 91

China is making all efforts to demonstrate that they are an active member of the international space community. They are participating in various outer space activities and cooperative ventures. In June of 2002, China, together with the Russian Federation, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a working paper entitled ‘Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Objects’ (CD/1679).20 In Feb 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) a draft: Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). In August 2009, China and Russia jointly submitted their working paper responding to the questions and comments raised by the CD members on the draft treaty.21 China is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), an intergovernmental organisation (a non-profit independent) with full international legal status with its headquarter at Beijing. China’s commercial interests in space area are being looked after by China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) which was established in 1980. This company is mandated to provide satellites and offer commercial launch services. It is also expected to carry out international space cooperation and has some responsibility towards developing China’s space industry. CGWIC enjoys good reputation in the international aerospace industry, the financial community and the insurance circle. The company is actively involved in the international marketing of civilian products and services utilising space technology [17].

Assessment

China’s space programme could be viewed as an integral part of its grand strategy. It is an important instrument of their socioeconomic, technological and military planning. Post 1990s and particularly since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has made significant gains in the space arena. Today, they are matching the best in the world predominantly because of their success with their manned space programme and installation of the prototype space station. However, China understands that they are far behind Russia and the USA in this field. In space arena, China is not found attempting to blindly catch up with the Russia and the USA but is following its own pre-planned strategy. The state is concentrating both on the conventional front as well on ‘exotic’ programmes like manned missions and Moon/Mars missions. Its ‘exotic’ programmes are getting more attention for the obvious reasons, but it is also important to take a note of the investments in to

20For the comments and suggestions to the CD Working Paper CD/1679, please refer http://www. reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches03/PAROSwp.htm, accessed on Sept 24, 2011. 21http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1828/1, accessed on Sept 25, 2011. 92 7 China’s Space Programme communication, remote sensing and meteorology22 and disaster management satellites. China has some weakness in building reconnaissance satellites particularly in the sensor department; however, their communication satellite systems are found trustworthy and are also offering them with better business opportunities. Satellite navigation is one area where China is making rapid progress. Their successes with manned space missions and spacewalks have raised their stature tremendously. Today, they are undisputedly the leaders in Asia in space arena. Understanding the importance of dual-use space technologies in serving its own national interests, China is making intelligent investments and trying to get maximum strategic beneﬁts out all their research and development. China understands that like all other spacefaring nations, they also lack expertise in the arena of launch on demand technology. Probably, they are silently building their space industry towards developing this technology for rapid deployment and replacement of small strategic purpose satellites. China’s brazen testing of ASAT technology during 2007 clearly indicates that China would play a major role towards ‘eventual’ weaponisation of space in near or distant future.

References

1. Goldstein A. Great expectations. In: Brown M et al., editors. The rise of China. London: The MIT Press; 2000. p. 3. 2. Munck R. Globalisation and contestation. New York: Routledge; 2007. 3. Zheng Bijian. China’s “Peaceful Rise” to great-power status. Foreign Affairs. September/ October 2005, p. 18Ð9. 4. Handberg R, Li Z. Chinese space policy. New York: Routledge; 2007. p. 1. 5. Hu WR. Space science in China. Australia: Gorden and Breach Science Publishers; 1997. p. 15. 6. Johnson-Freese J. China’s manned space program. Naval War Coll Rev. Summer, 2003;LVI(3):51. 7. Murray III WS, Antonellis R. China’s space program: the dragon eyes the moon (and us). Orbis. fall 2003;47:645. 8. Sigurdson J. Technological superpower China. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2005. p. 194Ð5. 9. Joan J-F. Scorpions in a bottle. The Nonprolif Rev. Summer 2004;11:173. 10. Anatoly Z. China considers big rocket power. 2010 July 26. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ science-environment-10762634. Accessed 24 Jun 2011. 11. Lewis JA. China as a military space competitor. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies; 2004. p. 9. 12. China to launch new solid-fuel rocket. China Daily. 2004 Jan 30. 13. Weeden B. China’s BX-1 microsatellite: a litmus test for space weaponization. 2008 Oct 20. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1. Accessed 24 Jul 2009. 14. Sietzen F Jr. From mercury to CEV. Aerospace America. 2005 Feb, p. 29.

22For details of their metrological space services and information on FY series satellites with the meteorological payloads, please refer http://earth.eo.esa.int/dragon/Opening-L1-ZhangP.pdf, accessed on Jan 26, 2011. References 93

15. Covault C. Chinese milspace ops. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2003 Oct 20, p. 26. 16. Wortzel LM. Chinese people’s liberation army and space warfare. http://www.aei.org/ﬁles/ 2007/10/17/20071017 SpaceWarfare.pdf. Accessed 15 Jun 2011. 17. Barbosa Rui C. Chinese Long March 3B/E launches NigComSat-1R. 2011 Dec 19. http://www. nasaspaceﬂight.com/2011/12/chinese-long-march-3be-launches-nigcomsat-1r/. Accessed 5 Jan 2012. Chapter 8 Japan’s Space Programme

Japan is a wonderfully unique place and could be said to be a realm of contrasts, anomalies and anachronisms. But, at the same time, it is Asia’s first modern and industrialised nation and has been involved deeply in world trade for over four decades [1]. Contemporary Japan is a great success story of twentieth century. In various fields, Japan challenged Western hegemony and succeeded in setting world- beating standards. The world admired, applauded and envied Japan. In fact during 1980s for a short period, it appeared that Japan may even dislodge the United States from global leadership positions in certain areas [2, p. 191]. It had maintained itself as the world’s second largest economy from 1968 until 2010, till the time China overtook it. This probably happened because of the ‘rise of China’ and the change in economic and political circumstances with Japan at the end of twentieth century. Again twenty-first century has arrived with certain positive impetus to take Japan towards a brighter future. It is important to remember that Japan could be viewed as a ‘victim’ of Peace Constitution as opposed to the view that it was not born with a Peace Constitution. The Peace Constitution was thrust upon it post-World War II by the United States [3]. Probably, it is the unique country which was ‘told’ to renounce its right to build and deploy armed forces. Their own constitution does not allow them to have a military force even for self-defence. As per the Article 9 of their constitution, they cannot use war as a sovereign right for settling international disputes and cannot maintain land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential.1 The positive aspect of not investing military could be that it allowed Japan to concentrate on other areas of development. Japan the only country to face the wrath of nuclear weapons emerged like a phoenix from the 1945 defeat and became one of the most powerful economies in the 1980s. One reason for this to happen could be its policy of moving away from labour-intensive textile production to consumer electronics. They created a niche market for their products like television sets, radios and

1The Constitution of Japan, http://www.existenz.co.jp/constitu.htm, accessed on October 23, 2009.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 8, 95 © Springer India 2013 96 8 Japan’s Space Programme hi-fis. During same time, the US industry was concentrating on pioneering large- scale goods for the space programme and military industrial complex [2, pp. 31, 38]. Japanese industry was found focusing more on the audioÐvideo products and concentrating on a market involving customers from middle-class background. On the other hand, the US agencies were investing into technologies which had both economic and military ramifications in the long term. Space technology was one such technology which was attracting the attention of both the civilian and military scientists. For the US industry, also this was a challenging task. Over a period of time, the US industry started adopting technological innovations from other industries and looked for synergistic solutions for the rapid development of their space programme. On the other hand, Japan could be said to be late starter at the global level. However, same was not the case at Asian level. Japan is the first Asian country to send satellite into the space (February 1970). It is the fourth country in space after erstwhile USSR, USA and France. Only two countries were successful in sending a satellite to the geostationary orbit before Japan and also the spacecrafts to Moon and Mars. Japan is an important participant in the International Space Station (ISS), with its own orbiting laboratory, Kibo. Onboard of the American space shuttle few Japanese have gone to the outer space also some have experience of walking in the space (spacewalk). The first media representative into the space was a Japanese journalist who flew to the Mir space station in 1990 [4, p. xii]. He was funded by a commercial enterprise that probably paid approximately $12Ð14 million to the Soviet Union for this launch. Overall, though Japan is a late entrant in this field as per the global standards but has made significant contributions in the space arena. This chapter takes a closer look at the various facets of Japanese space programme inclusive of its purpose, structure, technology, international cooperation, military aspects, economics and commerce.

Organisational Structure

The United States Moon craft Apollo 11 reached the Moon in 1969. In the same year, the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) was started in Japan and work on rockets begun in earnest. But, the work towards entering into space arena could be said to have started much earlier during 1950s. The credit for making Japan ready to entire the space age goes to Professor Hideo Itokawa from Tokyo University. He was instrumental in shaping Japanese governments views in this field. In 1960, he along with his colleague outlined that how a small satellite could be launched into the space. The scientific community under his leadership submitted a report in 1962 titled ‘Tentative plan for a satellite launcher’. The scientific community considered various issues like: Is satellite project feasible? Is there a need for cooperation with the USA? Is it worth making investments despite late start [4, pp. 4Ð11]? Subsequently, by 1965 a conscious decision was taken in 1965 that Japan should go ahead for a scientific satellite Organisational Structure 97 programme. In the year 1970, Japan joined spacefaring nations by successfully launching ‘Ohsumi’, the first indigenous satellite developed by them. During 1955 at the University of Tokyo, the Institute of Industrial Science began work with sounding rockets. In the same university in 1964, Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science (ISAS-the word Aeronautical was replaced by Astronautical in 1981), a lead agency overlooking Japan’s space science programmes was established. Subsequently, in 1969, the formation of National Space Development Agency (NASDA) helped Japan to develop programmes in the areas of remote sensing, communication and meteorology. The same agency was responsible for launching and tracking of satellites [5]. Japan had to face the agony of four successive launch failures (1966Ð1969), and its first successful satellite launch took place only in the fifth attempt. Although NASDA dwelled into various application programmes, one of their main tasks was the development of launch vehicles. Apart from these agencies, other organisations like National Aerospace Labo- ratory of Japan (NALÐestablished in 1955) were involved in research on aircraft, rockets and other aeronautical transportation systems, as well as peripheral technology.2 Almost for three decades, many of the organisations responsible for the developments in space arena were reporting to different ministries in the Japanese government. Naturally, for overall growth of the programme, such diverse reporting channels and different budgeting allocations were hazardous. The period 1996Ð2003 witnessed a major setback to Japan’s space programme because of series of failures. Unfortunately, these failures never remained restricted to any one sector, and Japan faced losses both with its launchers as well as satellite systems. This made Japanese government to bring in significant reforms in its space architecture. On the other hand, Japan could be said to be a country with unique distinction of having developed two parallel space programmes with two main organisations ISAS and NASDA having their own fleet of rockets, launch sites, mission control and tracking systems. The organisations had some amount of internal revelries too [4,p. 19]. The Japanese model demonstrates that the multiplicity of assets and formation of different organisations for similar purpose have limited utility and limited life span. Since October 2003, a single body called Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is responsible for all aerospace activities in the Japan. JAXA is an independent administrative institution which functions as a principal entity responsible for research and development of Japan in aerospace areas. For this purpose NASDA, ISAS and NAL have been merged into one entity to establish JAXA. Now this organisation boasts a unique status in the country.3 JAXA is put under the administrative control of MEXT: Ministry of Edu- cation, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Inter-ministerial decision body for space, Space Activities Committee (SAC), is responsible for supervising the

2http://www.jaxa.jp/about/history/nal/index e.html, accessed on August 4, 2009. 3JAXA Vision, JAXA 2025, p.1 and Steven Berner, Japan’s Space Program, Rand technical Report, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005), p.12. 98 8 Japan’s Space Programme space activities within MEXT and JAXA. The national strategy issues for all areas of science and technology including space is being overseen by the Council of Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) which is chaired by the prime minister [6]. Interestingly, Japan has also appointed its ﬁrst ever minister of space development.4 This appointment needs to be viewed at the backdrop of Japan scrapping its earlier policy of ban on the use of space programmes for defence.

Launch Vehicles

Japan has a history of high level of rocket technology awareness from the time before the end of the Second World War, but it was not put in use by the country after the war. Subsequently, only by 1950s, Japan started taking interest in rocketry technology. A tiny rocket ‘Pencil’ was launched horizontally at Kokubunji near Tokyo in 1955 [7]. This could be said to be the first entry of Japan in the field of rocketry in post-World War II era. Over the years, Japan has been developing its own launch vehicles, mainly based on indigenous research and development. Based on the research and development initiated by Professor Itokawa during 1954Ð1956, the Kappa series of sounding rockets were developed at Tokyo Uni- versity. These rockets were named as Pencil and Baby. The most advanced Kappa rocket (1966) could carry an 18-kg scientific package to a height of 746 km. During 1960s scaled-up versions of the solid-propellant Kappa sounding rockets were put in use called Lambda, or L series rockets. Also, Mu series rockets were developed with an aim of putting first Japanese satellite in place. However, subsequently Lambda series L-4S rocket was used to put the first Japanese satellite (Ohsumi) in orbit on Feb. 11, 1970 [8]. Other developments include the M series, the N series, H series and J-1 series.5 M-V rocket also called as Mu-5 or M-5 was from the Mu family of rockets. This satellite launcher was developed to support Japanese scientific missions beyond late 1990s. It is a three-staged solid-propellant rocket with a 1.8-ton launch capability into 250-km LEO. The first two flights were successfully launched in 1997 and 1998, but the third lunch failed in Feb. 20006. Subsequent three launches were successes, and the last launch was undertaken during 2006. This rocket has potential

4“Japan appoints first space development minister: officials”, June 17, 2008, www.spacedaily.com/ /Japan appoints first space development minister officials 999.html 5http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/J/Japanese launch vehicles.html, accessed on Aug 4, 2009. 6Onoda Junjiro, “Development of M-V rocket”, this paper was published in a Japanese journal in 2004 and its abstract is available at http://sciencelinks.jp/j- east/article/200411/000020041104A0312246.php, accessed on Aug 6, 2009. Launch Vehicles 99 for being converted to ballistic missile applications.7 After six successful launches in a span of 9 years, these launchers retired in 2006. The N series (N-1, N-2) rockets entered in service during mid-1970s and 1980s. The N-2 vehicle was manufactured to place 350 kg load into geostationary orbit. The entire process of development and manufacture of various launchers had US support behind it. Boosters and engines were manufactured in Japan under the US license, and various components and guidance systems were procured from the US firms [9]. Japan’s first remote sensing satellite was launched with the help of the N-2 booster in 1987 which incidentally was the last launch for this series of boosters. The limited payload capability of N-series launch vehicles forced Japan to develop platforms capable of putting higher payload in to the orbit, and thus during 1980s, it started the development of H series launchers. Also, one of the aims was to achieve indigenous launch capability potential. With the help of H-1 launcher by 1986, Japan succeeded in putting 1,110 kg payload into the geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). However, they depended on US technology for this launch too. Subsequently, Japan started the work on H-2 launcher with an aim to put 4,000-kg satellite into GTO. Also, Japan was interested in making its satellite programme commercially viable. Since Japan was concentrating for the production of an indigenous launcher, the project got delayed, and first launch could take place only in 1994. H-2 rocket conducted five successful launches during 1994Ð1997. Subsequently, it faced two failures, and in December 1999, Japan decided to cancel the last remaining launch. The problem was identified with the indigenous development of cryogenic engine. Understanding that H-2 cannot become a commercially viable launcher, Japan shifted its focus towards H-2A launchers [5]. H-2A launcher could be said to have reassured the Japanese scientific community about their capabilities. With its first launch in August 2001, this launcher had done 14 successful launches (out of 15) till 2009. This launcher can be in various configurations and is designed to meet diverse launch demands, at lower cost and with a high degree of reliability.8 The same launcher was used on September 14, 2007, for launching Japan’s Moon orbiter SELENE. The launcher was also put in use to deliver a foreign payload (Australia, 2002). The only setback this launcher had was its failure to put two Japanese spy satellites into the orbit during November 2003. This launcher system has undertaken various successful launches, and in 2010, the Venus Climate Orbiter was also launched using their services. Presently, H-2A launch service operations have been transferred to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Japan has also developed the H-2B launch vehicle. This is an upgraded version of the H-2A launch vehicle. With the help of this launcher, Japan as successfully launched a cargo transporter to the International Space Station during January 2011.9 Now, with two operational launch systems available, it would

7http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/missile/index.html, accessed on Aug 6, 2009. 8http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2a/index e.html, accessed on September 2, 2009. 9http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/htv/index e.html and http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/ h2b/index e.html, accessed on Dec12, 2011. 100 8 Japan’s Space Programme allow Japan to undertake a simultaneous launch of more than one satellite. This would also offer other beneﬁts like reduction in cost and boosting the space industry.

Satellite Systems

Japan has sent various satellites in different categories to the outer space till date, and they have varying roles to play. Information in this regard is available in various sources. The purpose here is not to intend to detail every Japanese satellite that is in orbit but to take a macro view of Japan’s efforts. Like any other spacefaring nation, Japan also has sent satellites basically for the purposes of remote sensing, communication and meteorology. Normally, it has been observed that the Japanese space agencies tend to give two names to their satellites one in Japanese and other in English. The most interesting (or confusing!) part is that mostly these names are unrelated. One agency NASDA had named satellites after flowers, while in other cases, diverse names have been used. The other interesting aspect is that agency like ISAS had a policy of using the English name before launch, and subsequently, it used to switch to Japanese name after launch but only if the launch is successful!10 In view of this, following paragraphs discuss the Japanese investments into satellites only based mainly on the role for which they are launched and names of satellites are used only at few places where it was found essential. The early priority for Japan was development of communication services for telephone and television. Over a period of time, satellite systems were put in place which were capable of providing transmission to the areas where reception of clear signal was problematic. Initially much of work was undertaken to provide high-definition television signals. A dedicated series of communications satellites were also launched to support domestic telecommunications, and this entire process further enabled the process of new technology development. Initially satellite development was carried by buying expertise from abroad. Few launches were also carried out through foreign rockets because of certain limitations of Japanese rockets. Japan being a bit geographically isolated island nation and one periodically affected by typhoons obviously has a need for investments in meteorological satellites. The first meteorological satellite was launched during July 1977 [4, pp. 24Ð29]. The first few Japanese satellites could be categorised as demonstration or scientific satellites. The payloads were designed to measure ambient temperatures and undertake solar and cosmic radifation measurements and ionosphere and solar activity studies. Also, there was a programme constituting of resources satellites to observe the planet from space in an integrated way. Studies in the recent past

10http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/J/Japanese satellite names.html, accessed on Aug 6, 2009. Space Indigenization and the US Policies 101 were undertaken for better understanding of global circulation of energy and water. To promote sustainable development, land observing satellite was launched (2006) which helped towards better understanding of cartography, monitoring of natural disasters and surveying land use and natural resources. A series of astronomical satellites were launched to carry out observations of cosmic sources at various wavelengths.11

Space Indigenization and the US Policies

Japan’s space programme initially revolved around technology imported from the United States [9]. In 1969, Japan and the United States signed an agreement allowing the transfer of unclassified technology for launch vehicles from US firms to Japan (re-exporting of this technology was not permitted) [5]. Dependence on the US firms was found not only with the launcher technology but also in regard to some elements of satellite fabrication. Japan’s dream of indigenous satellite development programme could not be materialised initially because of the US policies. The US administration was of the opinion that the Japanese authorities were following unfair trade practices which is bringing difficulties for the US industry to penetrate Japanese market. The three basic reasons for subsequent Japanese space ‘apartheid’ at the hands of the US could be: First, the trade sense during 1980s—the USA strongly objected to the proposed Japanese government assistance (in form of concessions) to Japanese firms in satellite development. It even threatened ‘Super 301’12 sanctions against Japan if it went ahead with its plans in this area in the 1980s. Japan buckled under to this pressure. Second, the USA got worried that if Japan starts building its own satellites, then one day eventually it could end up developing its own military infrastructure leaving the US alliance framework. Third, the USA feared that the Japanese development of surveillance satellites might compromise the US policy of greater cooperation between Japan and them towards the development of missile defence [10].

11Information on various satellite systems launched by Japan is available at http://www. daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/J/Japan in space.html 12Super 301 (ﬁrst passed by congress in 1988 for two years) is essentially a congressional prod to make the administration use an existing trade law (Section 301) to spur the administration into tougher action against other countries’ allegedly unfair trading practices. While it requires the US trade representative to cite countries in order of priority for US strong-arm action under procedures and deadlines set by Section 301, in practice, it leaves considerable leeway to the administration. How the administration uses that discretion will be the key. Super 301 also carried a great deal of political baggage. It symbolised US exploitation of its superpower status to force other countries to bend to US interests, bypassing agreed international procedures in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Please refer Reginald Dale, ‘Super 301:A Trade “Monster” It Isn’t’, April 9, 1993, The New York Times. 102 8 Japan’s Space Programme

Perhaps, the formulation of USÐJapan satellite procurement agreement where the Japanese Government agreed for procurement procedures for non-R&D satellites that are open, transparent and non-discriminatory has adversely impacted the growth of the Japanese satellite industry.13 But, alternatively, it also created the work for the Japanese satellite industry mainly by offering R & D contracts. Overall, the Japanese response to US pressure was not found very strategic. Under the US pressure, Japan shifted to international cooperation, abandoning the autonomous development policy it had sought for almost 40 years [11]. For a technologically developed state like Japan, such approach has affected adversely in regard to the process of indigenisation. However, the Japanese space programme should not be viewed as a programme fully controlled by the USA. On their own, the Japanese have made attempts to follow their independent path. The USA was almost forced to support publicly the Japan’s surveillance satellites programme when Japan announced autonomously that it would develop such capabilities. Subsequently, the USA took a stand that Japan should purchase satellites from them but later compromised with an agreement that some US-made components would be incorporated in the domestically produced system [10]. The period of 1980s saw Japan looking for more indigenisation of space programme with some dependence on the USA in regard to supply of few components. Japan could indigenously develop its own launcher (H-2) by 1994. In 1996, a new 15-year space plan was published called Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Space Activities. This advocated the requirement for pursuing space policy by encouraging private sector interest in the space. Over the years, Japanese business people are seen interested in development of various space activities. This is demonstrated by the presence of the Federation of the Economic Organizations (Keidanren) on a council for promotion of space activities. Also, traditional strong relations between manufacturers and research institutes and universities which are partly funded by business houses have played a role towards greater coherence. Their space industry is built up upon the experience of big electronic ﬁrms of yesteryears [12].

Change in Space Policy

Since the beginning of its space programme, peaceful utilisation of space has been the Japanese mantra. Japan’s security forces were prohibited from involvement in space development under a strict interpretation of a 1969 parliamentary resolution limiting the use of space to peaceful purposes. However, subsequent to North Korean missile launch in 1998 into Japanese airspace, the country decided to launch few spy satellites (IGSÐIntelligence Gathering Satellites) during 2003Ð2007. Also,

13http://tcc.export.gov/Trade Agreements/All Trade Agreements/Japan satellite AG guide.asp, accessed on Aug 31, 2009. Change in Space Policy 103 it provided the rationale for Tokyo to ramp up its participation in US missile defence [3]. But, the spy satellites have limitations in regard to its resolution in comparison with military satellites operated by other countries.14 These Intelligence Gathering Satellites are controlled by the civilian administration. To conceal the military nature of these satellites, they are put under the control of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) within the Cabinet Intelligence Office (CRIO) [13]. Japanese policymakers started thinking differently from their 1969 spelt position about peaceful use of space by 1980s. In 1980s, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone began to push for constitutional revision calling for a ‘final settlement of accounts for postwar politics’. He also brought in major change in Japan’s space use policy (1985). It was decided that the SDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces or JSDF, also referred to as JSF or SDF) could use the civilian satellites for their requirements, and a decision towards development of Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) system was taken [14]. During 2005, a group of powerful Japanese politicians issued a report on constructing a national space strategy. This report recommended the establishment of a new decision-making structure in regard to space issues. With this came the concept of creation of a new Basic Law of Space Activities. This was born out of the need to shift the focus of space policy from technological development to applications [15]. During June 2007, considering the growing importance of the space sector in terms of industrial and military growth, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito Party submitted a bill of basic space law to the lower house of parliament demanding an amendment of the space law. It was made clear that the new basic space law will adopt the concept of ‘nonaggressiveness’, enabling military purpose applications.15 After few deliberations the bill was finally enacted in May 2008. ‘The law says that the use and development of space should be done in accordance with the pacifist sprit of the Japanese constitution and benefit the security of Japan and the international community’.16 Subsequently, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development was formed within the cabinet. This is aimed at promoting the measures concerning the development and utilisation of space in a comprehensive and systematic manner. On January 15, 2009, a basic policy for space development and utilisation was formulated, and it was announced that space is important for strengthening functions of C4ISR3 in light of the emphasis of building up of defence capabilities.17 Strategic headquarters announced the Basic Plan on Space Security on June 2, 2009. The key

14‘Japan Moves to End Ban on Military Use of Space’, Friday, 2 June 2006, http://www.redorbit. com/news/space/524034/japan moves to end ban on military use of space/index.html 15The bill is available at http://ukinjapan.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/5606907/5633988/The Bill of Basic Space Law.pdf, accessed on Oct 12, 2009. 16‘Japan Passes law to allow military use of space: ofﬁcial’, Space War, May 21, 2008. 17http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2009/07/22/space-in-japans-defense-white-paper/, accessed on Oct 20, 2009. 104 8 Japan’s Space Programme elements of the plan are based on the Basic Space Law and include realising a safe, secure and afﬂuent society. It also proposes to strengthen the national security through the development of space.18

Scientiﬁc Experiments and Interplanetary Missions

Japan is one state which has been involved in undertaking interplanetary missions for many years. These missions involve robotic trips to other planets. So far they have not attempted any manned 3 interplanetary missions.19 Japan entered into the arena of deep space missions in mid-1980s. This was the period after the beginning of space age when for the first time spacefaring nations had an opportunity to study the characteristics of a comet of significant importance which was to make its presence felt in the inner solar system. It was the most famous Halley’s Comet.20 Japan used this opportunity to organise its deep space mission by launching two probes for studying this comet: a path finder and a main probe (MS-T5 and Planet A). Very useful information was provided by this mission; however, these probes received very less publicity at global level. Japan has focused on studying the characteristics of the Sun for the deeper understanding and also that of our planetary system. Studying Sun is technologically challenging and scientifically important endeavour. It is the only fixed star available for any study. The knowledge about its evolution and other properties is essential to know more about the mechanisms of various processes taking place in the universe. Japan puts a major emphasis on solar studies. Till date, they have launched two satellites to unravel some of the mysteries and mechanisms of the activities taking place in the solar corona. The first satellite was launched during end August 1991, and this was followed by second satellite during 2006. The second satellite is approximately at an altitude of 680 km. Countries like the US and UK have also contributed in these missions.21 Japan was the first country to launch a spacecraft towards the Moon since the erstwhile USSR (Luna 24—Aug 1976). Japan’s first Moon probe Muses A22 (the mother craft was called Hiten) was launched on January 24, 1990. This experiment

18‘The Basic of Japan’s Defence Policy and Build-up of Defence Capability’, Defence of Japan, 2009, Part 2. Also, please refer the issues related to Space discussed in Japan’s Defence White Paper available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w paper/2009.html, accessed on Sep 12, 2009. 19The US manned mission to the Moon is within Earth’s planetary system. 20This periodic comet is visible after every 75Ð76 years. In the recent past, it was visible during 1986 and next would be visible during 2061. 21http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/solar b/index e.html, accessed on October 31, 2009. 22The following discussion on the first Moon mission is based on Brian Harvey, The Japanese and Indian Space Programmes, (Springer: Chichester, 2000), pp.42Ð43, http://www.spacetoday.org/ Japan/Japan/MUSES A Hiten.html and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiten, accessed on October 31, 2009. Scientific Experiments and Interplanetary Missions 105 had a major learning value for the Japanese scientists. The basic purpose behind launching this dual satellite was to practise for future interplanetary spaceflights (probes to mars and asteroids). Hiten was the EarthÐMoon-orbiting spacecraft and had released a small orbiter called Hagoromo into lunar orbit. Hiten was not programmed for entering lunar orbit and was to act as a relay for Hagoromo. Both the crafts were not programmed for Moon landing. Unfortunately, Hagoromo developed a technical snag (probably radio failed), and its entry into Moon’s orbit was verified only based on the observations from the optical telescope. Because of this failure, the Japanese scientists along with NASA scientists decided to salvage this mission. It was not possible to change the Hiten’s position form the Earth’s orbit to Moon’s orbit due to fuel shortages. Hence, the route to reach the moon’s orbit was changed, and low-energy lunar transfer was carried out (it took many months). To do this, first ever aerobraking manoeuvre in deep space was carried out. Finally, Hiten was made to hit the moon. The Muses-A23 mission gave Japan precious experience in targeting orbits and in the use of swingbys24 to guide future spacecraft travelling to distant planets. Japan’s Kaguya space mission (2007) has been discussed in detail in another chapter of this book. Japan also had devised an ambitious deep space mission Akatsuki (Dawn/Venus Climate Orbiter) to Venus with the aim to analyse the planet’s atmosphere. This was the first interplanetary weather satellite with a lifetime of 2 years. This 1,058- lb robotic probe was launched aboard an H-2A rocket on May 21, 2010. It was expected to reach Venus by December 2010. It was to enter an equatorial orbit around Venus stretching from just above the planet’s blanketing atmosphere to an altitude of nearly 50,000 miles. Six experiments were planned to peer deep into the planet’s atmosphere and even study surface activity [16]. Unfortunately, this mission failed to reach Venus on December 7, 2010. It was to enter orbit around the planet (an elliptical orbit ranging from 300 to 80,000 km from Venus) but the planned attempt to initiate orbit insertion operations by igniting the orbital manoeuvring engine failed (the engines fired for 3 min only when they were required to fire for 12 min period). Now, JAXA is developing plans to attempt another orbital insertion burn when the probe returns to Venus in 6 years by keeping the probe into hibernation for the time in-between [17, 18]. This was Japan’s second interplanetary mission after the Nozomi spacecraft that twice missed entering orbit around Mars after launching in 1998. Nozomi was launched during 1998 to understand more about the atmosphere around the Mars; however, the mission failed because it could not gain sufficient velocity and achieve the required orbit.

23It may be noted that Japanese system of naming its satellites is so unconventional that Muses B (Haruka) is a radio astronomy mission. While Hayabusa (Muses-C) has been developed to investigate asteroids. 24A swingby is a familiar technique used to boost a satellite’s speed by taking advantage of the force of gravity from planets and the Sun. The USA used it ﬁrst when Mariner 10 ﬂew by Venus in 1973 on its way to Mercury in 1974. 106 8 Japan’s Space Programme

Japan also has a signiﬁcant interest in asteroid mining. They had launched Hayabusa (MUSES-C) capsule on May 9, 2003 which rendezvoused with a near- Earth asteroid25 called 25143 Itokawa in mid-September 2005. Hayabusa surveyed the asteroid surface from a distance of about 20 km. Afterwards this spacecraft moved closer to the asteroid surface and further approached it for a series of soft landings and for the purposes of collection of samples. The capsule re-entered to the Earth’s atmosphere on June 13, 2010. By October 7, 2010, it was announced by JAXA that approximately 100 particles with a size smaller than 0.001 mm were collected by the sample canister, and some of them could even be cosmic materials.26 Presently, scientists are researching on them and have also come out with some of initial ﬁndings.

Assessment

Japan is no longer the world’s second biggest economy. Is this because the state is getting overshadowed by a rising China and India? The answer is probably, both yes and no. Japan’s meteoric economic rise supported by its industrial dominance may be a story of the past but still the country remains relevant globally. In the past, Japan has achieved a remarkable success in various technological arenas both regionally and globally. Space technology was one such arena where Japan was one of the early investor in Asia. Presently, both India and China are found catching up fast. In fact, the Chinese space programme has made remarkable progress in various arenas of space technologies and could be viewed to have overtaken Japan which was the regional leader for few decades. Over the years, Japan has made significant investments in space field. The state had made early progress in this arena with its own share of failures. The central complexity with Japan’s space programme was the presence of multiple agencies made responsible to undertake various activities in space in yearly years. Since 2003, Japan has made JAXA as a single agency to deal with all activities related to space which in turn has helped them to overcome various administrative challenges. Currently, JAXA is experiencing continuous budgetary pressure which is mainly affecting few of the future ambition projects; however, routine activities are happening with the normal pace. It is likely that Japan at least for the present would not make any major transfor- mations in its ongoing Moon programme. Interestingly, the Japanese population is a very keen that the state should continue investing in asteroid mining activities. They are proud of their initial achievements in this field, and even few popular movies

25These are objects normally 50 m or more in diameter in a near-Earth orbit without a tail or coma of a comet. 26http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/missions/musesc.html and http://planetary.org/explore/topics/hayabusa/ accessed on Nov 12, 2011. References 107 have been madex on this issue.27 Unfortunately, Japan’s few collaborations with the USA have not paid much of dividends. The case in point could be the focus on the ISS programme. Japan is the second largest financial backer in this project, however; the future of ISS is currently in jeopardy because the USA has retired the shuttle programme without any replacement vehicle to send the astronauts to the ISS. On the other hand, some of the indigenous investments in space programme are paying dividends to Japan. For instance, missions like Hayabusa mission has significant engineering significance and allows Japan to learn more about low-gravity applications, optical navigation and long-distance communication. Such missions would enhance their knowledge about the minerals and metals available outside the planet Earth and work towards a programme for excavation of such resources from other planets. Japan’s success with the development of launch vehicle H-2B could allow them to develop commercial launch market. The unexpected change in space policy from civilian purposes programme to include security needs allows Japan to make investments in spy satellites. All such investments would add towards the development of independent security architecture by Japan in the long run.

References

1. Louis Perez G. The history of Japan. London: Greenﬁeld Press; 1998. p. 1. 2. McCargo D. Contemporary Japan. London: Macmillan Limited; 2000. 3. Feffer J. Japan: the price of normalcy. 2009 Jan 13. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5780. Accessed 23 Oct 2009. 4. Brian H. The Japanese and Indian space programmes. Chichester: Springer; 2000. p. xii. 5. Berner S. Japan’s space program. Rand technical report. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation; 2005, p. 3. 6. Suzuki K. Administrative reforms and policy logics of Japanese space policy. Space Policy. 2005;21(1):11Ð9. 7. Matogawa Y. Lessons from half a century experience of Japanese solid rocketry since Pencil rocket. Acta Astronautica. 2007;61(11Ð12):1107. 8. Baker D. The rocket. Bethel: Crown; 1978. p. 22Ð4. 9. Shastri R. Japan’s space programme. Strateg Anal. 1986;9(1):1088Ð1107. 10. Oros AL. Explaining Japan’s Tortured Course to Surveillance Satellites. Rev Policy Res. Jan 2007;24(1):29Ð48. 11. Lee S. Autonomy or International Cooperation? The Japanese Space Industry Responds to U.S. Pressure. Bus Polit. 2000;2(2):225Ð50. 12. Verger F, et al. The Cambridge encyclopedia of space missions, applications and exploration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003. p. 95Ð8. 13. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s remilitarization, Adelphi paper 403. Oxon: Routledge; 2009. p. 48. 14. Manriquez M. ‘Japan’s space law revision: the next step toward re-militarization?’ Issue brief, 2008 January. http://www.nti.org/e research/e3 japan remilitarization0108.html. Accessed 23 Oct 2009.

27In conversation with Mr Yukihito Kitazawa, IHI Corporation, Japan. 108 8 Japan’s Space Programme

15. Suzuki K. Transforming Japan’s space policy-making. Space Policy. May 2007;23(2):73Ð802. 16. Clark S. Japan readies ﬁrst mission to Venus for 2010 launch. 2009 Oct 24. http:// spaceﬂightnow.com/news/n0910/24planetc/. Accessed 31 Oct 2009 17. Cyranoski D. Venus miss is a setback for Japanese programme. http://www.nature.com/news/ 2010/101214/full/468882a.html. Accessed 14 Nov 2011. 18. Shiibashi K. Japanese Venus probe misses orbit. 2010 Dec 8. http://www.aviationweek.com/ aw/generic/story channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/awx/2010/12/08/awx 12 08 2010 p0- 275060.xml. Accessed 15 Nov 2011. Chapter 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia a humid tropical region is located around the equator and also has various geographic contrasts too. Since the sixteenth century, the region has been under European and Japanese colonisation for many decades. Various countries in the region regained their independent existence approximately four to five decades ago. The region, in general, has been characterised by high economic growth and closer regional integration. In space arena, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have made important investments. They are mainly focusing towards the communications, control of resources and educational aspects of space technologies. Varying degrees of investments are being made by these and few other states within the region mainly depending on their science and technology support and economic situation. Some of them are just in the process of starting their space programmes, while some have been making investments for long. Various states in the region are fully aware that they being the late starters they should attempt to reinvent the wheel but derive benefits from the already developed technologies. They are found using various commercially available space applications and also making an attempt to obtain dedicated satellites services for themselves by launching their own satellites with the help of other spacefaring nations. States like the USA are found helping many in the region. It has already launched satellites for Vietnam and has sealed deals with Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines backed by loan guarantees. China has promised to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos. India has helped Indonesia to launch their satellite. Various states in the region are found making both bilateral and multilateral agreements in the space arena. Indonesia has signed the APSCO1 (Asia-Pacific

1APSCO has started its operations in Beijing during December 2008, 16 years after the idea was put forward. It has seven member states, China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. Indonesia and Turkey have also signed the APSCO convention. Representatives from Argentina, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia and Sri Lanka also attended the founding ceremony.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 9, 109 © Springer India 2013 110 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia

Space Cooperation Organization) convention. States like Malaysia and the Philippines also have interest in this organisation. Following sections of this chapter offer the present status of the space programmes of the few important states within the region.

Indonesia

The geographical expanse of Indonesian state is unique in the world. Indonesian archipelago is a chain of islands comprising almost 13,000 islands and is the fourth most populous country of the world. On August 17, 1945, independence of the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed just few days after the Japanese surrender to the Allies. Having achieved sovereignty, Indonesians were faced with the mission of nation-building. The state had inherited institutional structures from the colonial past that could be converted to Indonesian needs but had also created enormous disparity and an economic system that exhausted resources and propelled profits overseas [1]. The world’s third largest democracy, Indonesia by the beginning of twenty-first century has emerged as a biggest economy in Southeast Asia. The state aims to become a knowledge economy and puts education as a top priority.2 However, since its inception, the state has not been on the forefront of the technology innovation baring few notable contributions. No significant investments were by the state in early years after the independence in the field of science and technology. Presently, the situation is slowly showing a change, and the investments are found being made by the state to use the process of technology development also with a premise to empower the poor. In 2010, the Indonesian government had allowed approximately US$205 million for research and development which is almost double the 2005 allocation [2]. Unfortunately, the progress of the state has been marred by one of the major wars fought over decades, in this part of the world. Technically the recent phase of the Aceh3 conflict could be said to have began in 1976 when the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), was formed. This was the first time a movement gained strength demanding Aceh’s independence from Indonesia. A significant military involvement was made from the Indonesian side to eliminate the resistance, and also attempts were made to politically resolve this issue particularly

2Speech by Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Republic Of Indonesia, ‘Indonesia and America: a 21st Century Partnership’, at a USINDO Luncheon, Washington DC, 14 Nov 2008. 3Aceh is a region in Indonesia, which incidentally was very close to the epicentre of the infamous Indian Ocean earthquake which triggered 2004 tsunami killing; approximately 170,000 Indonesians were killed. Indonesia 111 post 2000.4 The 2004 tsunami helped trigger a peace agreement between the GAM and the Indonesian government, and peace was achieved with the signing of an agreement on Aug 15, 2005. It is important to appreciate the investments made by the Indonesian state in the space arena at the backdrop of such geographical, strategic and scientific realities. The investments towards space technologies have on the schema of Indonesia’s scientific vision since early years. The state was aware that to manage such amazing maze of islands, they require a technology particularly for the purposes of communication and remote sensing which is reliable and having a wider footprint. Naturally, space technology was the best option. The National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN) is the national space agency of Indonesia. It was established in 1964 and is responsible for various space-related activities. The agency also undertakes research in arena related to space sciences and technologies. LAPAN has launched various satellites to provide telecommunication cover to different islands in Indonesia. Since 1976 Indonesia has operated a national GEO telecommunications network. Palapa (fruits of labour) is a series of communication satellites owned by Indosat, an Indonesian telecommunication company. The programme started in February 1975 with the purpose to unify the telecommunication networks of the nation. Indonesia became the first developing country to operate its own domestic satellite system in the mid-1970s. The state has consistently taken the steps necessary for developing its existing geostationary satellite system for multiple services. The system (Palapa- A) was started with two satellites during mid-1970s. The Palapa-B and Palapa-C series during 1980s and 1990s had five satellite and two satellites, respectively. Palapa-D was launched by a Chinese Long March 3B rocket on Aug 31, 2009.5 However, this satellite owned by Indosat failed to reach the intended orbit initially. Currently, it has been put in the intended orbit and has 40 transponders onboard, but its life is expected to have reduced significantly because of the initial problems. The Palapa-D satellite, owned by Indonesian satellite communications company Indosat, was supposed to provide satellite links and broadcasting services for Indonesia and other Southeastern Asian nations. Historically, Palapa was the second telecommunication system with a regional vocation initially intended to cater for national needs in television and telephone lines. This programme was originally developed by Indonesia. During late 1970s, the Philippines signed an agreement with Indonesia whereby Palapa provides for a part of their national coverage. Thailand and Malaysia followed suit and in their turn became users of space segment. Finally, in 1979, Palapa was officially recognised by

4Edward Aspinall, ‘Aceh/Indonesia: Conﬂict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conﬂict Trans- formation a report prepared for the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support’, August 2005, p.2 and Matthew N. Davies, Indonesia’s War over Ache, Routledge, London, 2006 5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palapa, accessed on Sep 30, 2011. 112 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia

Intelsat6 as a regional system, even though certain characteristics of its use and even its motivation differed fundamentally from those of Eutelsat, the first organisation of its kind. As time went by, Palapa began more and more to resemble a national system capable of providing services to the countries in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).7 It is important to note that Indonesia entered the global space communication era by the inauguration of her international INTELSAT station at Jatiluhur, 60 km south of Jakarta, in 1969. This decision allowed them the availability of reliable international communication for the first time in the Indonesian international communication history. Practically, all international communications in the past were by unreliable HF means. This decision was made during one of the most difficult period, economically and politically for the state. Indonesia was then one of the poorest countries in the world with an average income per capita of less than US$100 per annum. Indosat,8 the Indonesian operating company in charge of international telecommunication services, was wholly owned and operated by a foreign company, a subsidiary of ITT, a US multinational company. It was a historic milestone for Indonesia’s international communications. In the interest of the public, international communication rights using satellites were transferred to ITT for 20 years until 1989: it was a ‘win-win’ deal, also financially [3]. Over the years, Indosat has made various deals in regards to satellite-based platforms and is playing a major role in offering communication facilities to the state. Indonesia’s first micro-satellite was launched during 2007 onboard an Indian rocket. In 2003, Indonesia LAPAN and the Technical University of Berlin (TUB) signed a MoU to develop the first Indonesian micro-satellite, called LAPAN- TuBSat.9 Today, this satellite is able to relay topography images from several regions in Indonesia, and the information gathered from this is finding great utility in various fields. Indonesia is participating in the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) which provides decision-support tools to a wide variety of users by proactively linking together existing and planned observing systems around the

6A global communications leader with more than four decades of experience, Intelsat helps service providers, broadcasters, corporations and governments deliver information and entertainment anywhere in the world, instantly, securely and reliably. 7The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p.311. 8Indosat is a leading telecommunication and information provider in Indonesia that provides cellular, fixed telecommunication and multimedia, data communication and Internet (MIDI). The details are available at http://www.indosat.com/About Indosat/Corporate Profile/History, accessed on Oct 21, 2011. 9Toto Marnanto Kadri and Adi Sadewo Salatun, ‘Indonesian LAPAN-TUBSAT Micro-Satellite Development’, presentation given by these LAPAN officials at Bangalore, India, Nov 2007, http://www.aprsaf.org/data/aprsaf14 data/day2/P07 LAPAN%20APRSAF-14%20Plenary1c.pdf and http://space.skyrocket.de/doc sdat/lapan-tubsat.htm, accessed on Oct 20, 2011. Indonesia 113 world and supports the development of new systems where gaps currently exist. They have interests to use this system for the purposes of tsunami early warning systems, climate and weather monitoring, forest carbon tracking, water resources management and agriculture.10 It is important for Indonesia to use satellite technology for addressing few other important issues. Particularly, the issue related to forest fires is grabbing lot of international attention in recent times because of thick layer of haze it is creating. Since the 1990s, Indonesia has been criticised internationally for the large amount of smoke it generates in the forests of Sumatra and Kalimantan. The resulting haze sometimes spreads to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand and is estimated to cause $9 billion in losses to tourism, transportation and agriculture across the region each year. An agreement amongst Southeast Asian nations was drawn up in 2002 to tackle haze, and Indonesia is the only nation that has not yet ratified it [4]. It is obvious that this issue is not likely to end immediately, and in the larger interest of Indonesia in particular and the region in general it is important to find some solution to this problem. The state could use satellite technology to address some of the issues in this regard. IndoStar-1 (Cakrawarta-1) a commercial communication satellite that was launched on Nov 12, 1997 aboard an Ariane 44L-3 rocket French Guiana, as the first direct broadcast satellite (DBS) in Asia. Particularly, the cable television uses this satellite to relay international programmes and local programmes directly that can be received all over Indonesia. This is the world’s first commercial communications satellite that uses S-band frequency, which is less vulnerable to atmospheric interference than higher and more common frequencies like C-band and Ku-band. This satellite is operated by PT Media Citra Indostar (MCI), which provides a direct broadcast by high-quality digital transmission. The designed 14-year life of this satellite got compromised almost to the half due to a failed power regulator. It has been reported that the insurers paid US$25 million in damages for this mishap.11 Subsequently, on May 16, 2009, Indostar II/Protostar II satellite was launched which replaces the existing Chakarawarta 1. This satellite is basically meant to support direct-to-home TV and radio services for Indovision. The satellite is also offering HDTV multimedia and broadband services throughout the ASEAN region.12

10The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) is being built by the Group on Earth Observations (GEO—constituting various states and organisations) to coordinate international efforts (period 2005Ð2015) in respect of environmental data and decision-support tools. http://www.earthobservations.org/geoss.shtml,andwww.prime-pco.com/geoss/pdf/day1/Country/ 05 Indonesia.pdf, accessed on Dec 2, 2011. 11http://space.skyrocket.de/doc sdat/indostar-1.htm and http://www.lyngsat.com/cw1.html, accessed on Sep 28, 2011. 12‘Indonesian Indostar II Satellite Successfully Launched’, May 19, 2009, http://www.defencetalk. com/indonesian-indostar-ii-satellite-launched-18990/,andhttp://www.space-travel.com/reports/ ILS Proton Launches Indostar II Protostar II Satellite 999.html, accessed on Sep 28, 2011. 114 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia

Indonesia is planning to launch two satellites around 2012, called Lapan-A2 and Lapan-Orari. Both these satellites would weigh around 70 kg each and are designed to support disaster mitigation, earth observation, natural resources and environment monitoring, as well as observation of the Moon. India would be helping Indonesia to place these satellites into the orbit.13 Indonesia has ambitions to join the elite club of spacefaring nations and is working towards developing its own satellite launching capabilities, namely, the SLV (Satellite Launch Vehicle). During July 2009, Indonesia has successfully launched a home-grown rocket RX-420 into space as part of plans to send a satellite into orbit by 2014. Earlier too few tests, mostly stationary in nature, were conducted.14 During 2008, Ukraine and Indonesia have signed a framework agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space. Since 2008, Indonesia has been involved in a joint venture with the Russian Federal Space Agency and companies to offer the commercial launch services for launch of satellites. Together they are developing Biak Spaceport which is ideally suited to commercial launches as it sits near exactly on the Equator- ‘any space vehicle launched at the equator has a greater kinetic energy imparted to it and thus a higher escape velocity, and thus heavier payloads greater other terrestrial locations’.15 LAPAN has had extensive cooperation and skills enhancement with the Technical University Berlin too. Indonesia commenced aeronautics exploration in 1962 almost within 5 years after the launch of Sputnik. But, the progress of the state in the space arena has been much below expectations, and even in 2012, the state is yet to join the club of a spacefaring nations. One good aspect of the state’s space programme has been its participation in the intergovernmental communication systems (Palapa). This allowed the state to cater for its complex communication requirements enthused by geography. Particularly, post 2005, the state has increased its engagement with various space-related activities and is found making some useful investments and making collaborations with other states. The geographical location of the region offers it a unique advantage for establishing satellite launching facility bay with signiﬁcant commercial viability. Coming few years are crucial for the Indonesian space programme, correct investments and collaborations could reward state both from technology enhancement as well as commercial perspective.

13Based on the presentation given by Mr Toto Marnanto Kadri from LAPAN at the 17th Session Asia-Paciﬁc Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-17) during Nov 2010, Melbourne, Australia, available at www.aprsaf.org/data/data/Day2-csa 1200 T Marnanto Kadri.pdf, accessed on Sep 24, 2011. 14http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Indonesia launches rocket into space 999.html, accessed on Sep 24, 2011. 15http://www.elektroindonesia.com/elektro/assi0201.html and http://goodnewsfromindonesia.org/ 2010/01/20/revisiting-biak-spaceport/, accessed on Sept 24, 2011. Malaysia 115

Malaysia

Malaysia is one of the most important states in the Southeast Asian region comprising of 11 states. Malaysia was subject to the British Empire and gained independence on Aug 31, 1957. The Malaysian economy has enjoyed steady growth since independence, and particularly in recent years, the main export earners have been electronics and electrical machinery.16 In 1981, Mahathir Mohamad, a charismatic and outspoken doctor, became prime minister of the country and is recognised as main of architect of Malaysia’s growth story. He played a major towards developing industry and was also instrumental for bringing science and technology in policy focus. In space arena, Malaysia has started making its presence visible in the binging of twenty-first century. Interestingly, country’s foray into this highly specialised field began way back in the 1960s when the plan for the country’s space programme was first put into place. Subsequently, not much of growth was witnessed. Malaysia’s satellite programme officially could be said to have started in the 1990s with the construction of its first communication satellite receiving station. In 1988, the Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing (MACRES)/Remote Sensing Malaysia was established to assume research and development in the field of remote sensing. The development of satellite technology in Malaysia was largely shaped by the country’s National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) which called for Malaysia to have its own satellite and stated that ‘Continued reliance on other countries’ satellites will create future problems in terms of security and balance of payments’.17 The Malaysian policy for last two decades appears to be concentrating on two fronts. They are investing in satellites technologies with socioeconomic relevance and are using space technologies as a tool to undertake symbolic activities and to raise the sense of nationalism amongst its population. The Malaysian National Space Agency (ANGKASA), established in 2002, is officially responsible for all activities in space domain related to strategic planning and policy formulation. It is also expected to provide leadership in the educational aspects and the research of space science. Another agency called Astronautic Technology Sdn Bhd (ATSB) has been established in 1997 which focuses on designing and development of space- qualified systems. Apart from these two, a separate institute of space science is undertaking research work in areas like microgravity experiments, space weather and ionosphere studies. Few years before the formation of this state-owned agency, the first satellite for Malaysia was launched in 1996 under the commercial agreement. The MEASAT-1 (Malaysia East Asia Satellite No. 1) became Malaysia’s first communications satellite when it was launched on Ariane rockets from Europe’s Spaceport in

16Malaysia, Singapore & Brunei, Lonely Planet (this book is available in its electronic version.), 2009, pp. 32Ð49. 17Breaking New Scientiﬁc Frontiers, INSIGHTCS@MASTIC, Volume 7 October 2008 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation Malaysia Publication, p. 6. 116 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia

Kourou, French Guiana. The satellite was followed up with two more launches, MEASAT-2 in 1996 and MEASAT-3 in 2006. MEASAT-1 was a commercial communications satellite that was developed to provide Malaysia with a greater communications infrastructure. These satellites offers communications services that include telephony, television, business networks and data transmission network for the region covering an area spanning from India to Hawaii and from Japan to east Australia.18 In 2000, ANGKASA launched the micro-satellite, TiungSat-1, for Earth observationf imaging. This was a unique mission with satellites orbital inclination being nearly equatorial. This was an exceptional case in regard to the imagery satellites which normally maintain much higher inclinations, often neglecting equatorial regions. However, for Malaysia, its geographical position had different demands hence this particular mission configuration. This satellite was developed through a technology exchange between ANGKASA and the British micro-satellite manufacturer, SSTL, and was launched aboard a Russian Proton rocket from Baikonur. Named after a variety of a singing mynah bird, this satellite operates on amateur radio frequencies and has remote sensing capability. It also carries a cosmic energy deposition experiment. In the summer of 2009, ANGKASA launched another micro-satellite, RazakSat with the South Korean help. It is meant for imaging, and was launched at the Kwajalein Atoll by the Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) launch vehicle, Falcon 1. This satellite covers 51 nations, most of them developing and located near the equator. This launch has helped the state to forge cooperation with some of these countries and help realise the solution to numerous remote sensing problems facing the developing nations especially those in need of appropriate space technology.19 On Oct 10, 2011 Malaysia celebrated its 4th anniversary of sending its first man (they identify astronaut as Angkasawan) into the space. In the recent history of this country, it was a unique movement when the Malaysian man landed on the International Space Station aboard a Soyuz spacecraft. This act has given major moral boost for their space programme and has helped increase in interest in science and technology within Malaysia. Other benefits like increase in the nationalistic feeling were obvious, going by the euphoria it had set in the country during the actual mission.

18Breaking New Scientiﬁc Frontiers, INSIGHTCS@MASTIC, Volume 7 October 2008 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation Malaysia Publication, p.6 and M. Ansdell, L. Delgado, D. Hendrickson, ‘Analyzing the Development Paths of Emerging Spacefaring Nations: Opportunities or Challenges for Space Sustainability?’, April 2011, Capstone Research, pp. 12Ð14. 19Presentation by Mohd. Alauddin Mohd. Ali from the Institute of Space Science, ‘Space Activities in Malaysia’, available at www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/sap/hsti//HSTI.Alauddin.pdf, accessed on Dec 2, 2011 and M. Ansdell, L. Delgado, D. Hendrickson, ‘Analyzing the Development Paths of Emerging Spacefaring Nations: Opportunities or Challenges for Space Sustainability?’, April 2011, Capstone Research, pp. 12Ð14 and Statement by Prof. Datuk Dr. Mazlan Othman Head of the Malaysian Delegation at UNISPACE III conference, www.un.org/events/unispace3/speeches/ 20mal.htm, accessed on Nov 26, 2011 Vietnam 117

As part of the effort to nurture interest in satellite development and space launch vehicle, ANGKASA has initiated the SiswaSAT and water rocket competition.20 All such attempts are aimed at providing platforms for students to enrich knowledge, acquire experience and exchange information in relation to space technology. Such investments needs to be viewed as an attempt of the administration of create interest in rocket science and make the next generation ready to enter in space field. However, it is important to note that Malaysia has much to achieve in the space arena and need to invest in cutting edge technologies for the purposes of indigenous development of satellites and space launch vehicles. For a developing country like Malaysia, their investments in space appear to be directed in correct direction. Understanding its own the technological constraints, the state is engaging other global players mostly under commercial collaborations to gain access to space. One interesting aspect of their space programme is that they fulfilled their ambition of space travel by a Malaysian under an offset policy with the Russians. Because of purchase of their defence equipments from Russia, the state allowed them to send a Malaysian man to the space station free of cost. The country is keen to develop its satellite launching sites to provide facilities for space launches. They understand that the state needs to exploit its geographical position which allows sending satellites to be space in a faster time and at less cost. Presently, Malaysia is trying to fulfil its overall space vision but suffers from financial limitations.

Vietnam

The twenty-first century is witnessing rapid development in various parts of Southeast Asia. However, few states within the region are also struggling to maintain balance between their social obligations and economic reforms. It is their belief that technology could act as a catalyst for successful implementation of their development strategies. During the last few years, Vietnamese government has invested significant resources in the development of its science and technology base keeping in mind the long-term interests of the state. Space technology is one such area identified by the Vietnamese government. It would of interest to note that issues of space technology had been making inroads in Vietnam’s strategic thinking since 1980.21 The beginning was made by the UNDP’s projects to promote utilisation of satellite data for survey purposes

20Malaysian Space Dream: Is it okay with just CANSAT and Water Rocket?, malfly.blogspot.com/ :::/malaysian-space-dream-is-it-okay-with.html, Oct 5, 2011, accessed on Dec 10, 2011. 21Most of the information of Vietnam’s space programme is from Ajey Lele, ‘India- Vietnam Space Cooperation: Looking for New Frontiers’, http://sspconline.org/opinion/ IndiaVietnamSpaceCooperationNewFrontiers 14092011, Sept 14, 2011, accessed on Dec 2, 2011. 118 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia and particularly under the joint Soviet UnionÐVietnam space flight cooperation. Interestingly, the first Asian in the space was a Vietnamese cosmonaut Pham Tuan (now retired lieutenant general) who flew in July 1980 under the Soviet Interkosmos space exploration programme. Vietnam, a state marred by war for decades in yesteryears, is fully aware that they are a part of a region which is extremely prone for various natural disasters too. Hence, international cooperation in space science and technology is very important for Vietnam to address the challenges raised by global warming and climate change.22 The state understands that the real challenge for them is to attain a sustainable development while facing various natural and manmade difficulties. This makes them to depend more on technologies to find both short term and long-term solutions. In 2006, the Vietnamese government announced the ‘Strategy for space technology research and applications until 2020’ that lays down plans to develop communication and Earth observation satellites. In Apr 2008, a 2.6-ton medium- sized satellite Vinasat-1 was put into geostationary orbit using rocket Ariane-5 launcher from French Guiana. It took nearly 13 years for the completion of this project which was approved by the government in 1995 with the focus on providing low-cost communication services. The first satellite has a life span of 15Ð20 years, and the contractor of the project is the US aerospace giant Lockheed Martin. Vietnam also faced difficulties in obtaining the geostationary orbit position because of the concerns of Japan. The Vietnamese satellite is located at longitude 132ı east which is also been used by Japan. They had to undergo intense negations since allowing the usage of slot at global level is governed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Vinasat-1 is a commercial communication satellite; however, the capability of this satellite is not been utilised fully due to the lack of clientele. In 2009, only 30% of its capability was used, but slowly the situation is changing. The initial absence of customers could be mainly attributed to the overall economic slowdown of the global market then. From Vietnam’s point of view, the availability of such satellite is a boon because it would have to otherwise spend ‘almost 15 million US dollars annually to rent satellites of foreign countries as Russia, Australia and Thailand’ [5]. Vietnam has formulated a Vietnam Natural resources environment and disaster monitoring small satellite programme (VNREDSat) under which it is planning to launch two micro-satellites in coming few years. Work is in progress to put first satellite in orbit under this plan (overall second satellite for the state). France is expected to provide the technology and official development assistance (ODA) for this project. This small satellite would cater for natural resources development, environment study and disaster monitoring. This multispectral VNREDSat-1, using the French Myriade bus, is in construction at EADS Astrium, Toulouse, for a planned launch in 2013Ð2014. This satellite is expected to serve 90% of domestic customers

22‘Space Technology in Vietnam: 2010 Country Report’ at Melbourne, Nov 2010, http://www. aprsaf.org/data/aprsaf17 data/D3-1330 N Khoa Son.pdfaccessed on Dec 12, 2011. Vietnam 119 needs and 10% of the foreign customers needs (Thailand, Laos, Singapore and Indonesia).23 The second micro-satellite for Earth observations VNREDSat-1B would be send by taking help from Belgium. Spacebel leading a Belgian consortium of industries specialised in space systems (QinetiQ Space, AMOS, CSL) is doing a feasibility study for the ﬁnal design of the optical payload—for high-resolution and multispectral or hyperspectral images. The contract is expected to be signed in Ho Chi Minh ville by 2012. VNREDSat-1B, planned for launch in 2016, will be combined with VNREDSat-1A, to provide Vietnam with a regular and quick monitoring of the environment in Southeast Asia.24 The lack of rocket science base in Vietnam demands that it looks for partners. Japan is emerging as a major partner in the space arena for them. An ‘in principle agreement’ has been reached between the two countries whereby Japan would provide development assistance to launch satellites. Japan has offer 7 billion yen (90.3 million U.S. dollars) to develop and manufacture two Earth observation satellites for monitoring natural disasters. Japan has signed an agreement with Vietnam offering grants of US$1.2 billion of ODA on Nov 2, 2011.25 This includes promoting policy actions and improving technology to respond to natural disaster and climate change: support programme to respond to climate change; project for disaster and climate change countermeasures using Earth observation satellite. Naturally, the orders for satellite manufacture can be expected to be given to Japanese companies, and Japan is even proposing to launch one satellite. This is one of the biggest ODA plan for Japan and is expected to boost their space industry. The Vietnamese government has assigned the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology to build a national space centre at a cost of about US$600 million with support from Japanese designers and technicians. The centre is expected to be completed by 2018 and will cover an area of 9 ha of Hoa Lac High-tech Park in Hanoi. It will form a hub for research and installation of small satellites to meet demands for weather forecasting, research and disaster management. Once the centre has been built, Vietnam will have the most modern space science facility in Southeast Asia.26

23Presentation by Prof. Doan Minh Chung from the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, ‘Space Technology Development in Vietnam’, at Istanbul during Sep 2010, http://www.tubitak. gov.tr/tubitak content ﬁles//spaceworkshop/presentations/Chung.DoanMinh.pdf, accessed on Nov 30f, 2011. 24‘Vietnam Selecting Belgium For Second EO Satellite’, Jul 29, 2011, http://www.spacemart. com/reports/Vietnam Selecting Belgium For Second EO Satellite 999.html, accessed on Nov 14, 2011. 25‘Japan Grants US$ 1.2 billion of ODA for Vietnam’, Nov 3, 2011, http://www.vccinews.com/ news detail.asp?news id=24651 and ‘Japan to offer ODA for Vietnam’, Aug 14, 2011, http://www. houseofjapan.com/local/japan-to-offer-oda-for-vietnam, accessed on Dec 6, 2011. 26‘Vietnam to build US$ 600 million national space center’, http://www.saigon-gpdaily.com.vn/ Science Technology/2011/11/98324/ accessed on Dec 10, 2011. 120 9 Space Investments: Southeast Asia

Vietnam is the member of the Asia-Paciﬁc Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF).27 It is mainly involved in the SAFE (Space Applications For Environ- ment) programme of this forum which deals with the cooperation and management of environmental issues like use of satellite data and RS and GIS for disaster management. Vietnam’s increasing interests in the satellite ﬁeld are presently tapped by states like Japan and France. Vietnam’s space development policy clearly suggests that there are opportunities for other actors too.

Other States

The three states discussed above are few of the important states in the region and are keen to develop their own space programmes. However, few other states in the region also have interest in this ﬁeld have made some investments or planning to make investments in near future. For various states in the region, the technology is basically important from point of view of environment quality monitoring and sustainable natural resources utilisation. Remote sensing and communication are two basic requirements for these states. The states have also started realising the importance of navigational space systems. Thailand, Philippines and Laos have launched either their own satellites with the outside help or are depending on commercially available global systems to cater for some of their requirements. On Apr 20, 2011, an Indian rocket helped Singapore to launch its ﬁrst national satellite X-SAT. It is an experimental 105-kg micro-satellite with three payloads: an imaging system, an advanced navigation experimental setup and a parallel processing unit for image processing experiments.28 It is designed for the purpose of research and has a mission life of 3 years. Laos, one of SE Asia’s poorest states, is depending on China to build and launch a communications satellite for them. The Dongfanghong (The East is Red) model satellite would be launched by a Long March rocket, but no date has been announced yet for the launch.29 States like Philippines and Laos desire to develop their space programmes mostly by following a model of cooperation with spacefaring nations in the region. Southeast Asian states and their ambitions in space arena provide a geopolitical as well as economic opportunity for the Asian space giants like China, India and Japan.

27It was established in 1993 to enhance space activities in the Asia-Pacific region and presently 269 organisations from 33 countries and region and 22 international organisations are members of this forum and presentation by Prof. Doan Minh Chung from the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, ‘Space Technology Development in Vietnam’, at Istanbul during Sept 2010, http:// www.tubitak.gov.tr/tubitak content files//spaceworkshop/presentations/Chung.DoanMinh.pdf, accessed on Nov 30, 2011. 28http://esciencenews.com/articles/2011/04/20/singapores.first.locally.made.satellite.launched. space, accessed on Sep 26, 2011. 29‘China to build, launch satellite for Laos’, Sep 26, 2009, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/ China to build launch satellite for Laos 999.html, accessed on Jan 12, 2011. References 121

References

1. Vickers A. A history of modern Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005. p. 113. 2. Maulia R. Indonesia to increase R&D budget. The Jakarta Post http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2010/01/22/indonesia-increase-rampd-budget.html. Accessed 1 Sept 2011. 3. Djiwatampu A Ph. Braving the challenge of satellite technologies: national breakthroughs and Indonesia’s Role in International Forums http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue8/his arnold1.html. Accessed 12 July 2011. 4. Satriastanti FE. Hazy solutions in struggle to stop people burning Indonesia’s forests. 2011 Aug 01. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/nvironment/hazy-solutions-in-struggle-to-stop- people-burning-indonesias-forests/456366. Accessed 25 Nov 2011. 5. Thanhvan T. Vietnam’s ﬁrst satellite launched after 13-year preparation. 2008 Apr 21. http:// www.spacemart.com/reports/Vietnam First Satellite Launched After 13 Year Preparation 999.html. Accessed 24 Jul 2011. Part III Strategic Implications of Space Technologies Chapter 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums

Rocket technology is likewise for both civilian and military applications. There are certain fundamental differences in regard to technology appreciation between space launch rockets and ballistic missiles. However, the similarity in basic science and technology makes it impossible to separate them completely or permanently. Scientists in various parts of the world (mainly Germany, erstwhile USSR, the USA and few European Nations) during the early 1920s and 1930s were attracted to the rocket development because of their interests in idea of space travel. In order to continue to develop these ideas, the scientific community engaged military sponsors in those periods. Scientists and military leaders realised that rocket is a dual purpose system. It can launch a scientific payload (satellite) into outer space or can launch a warhead (conventional or nuclear) towards a target at distance of thousands of kilometres. The technology needs minor modifications for such purposes. In short, various civilian rocket programmes raise possibilities for missile development. Almost, every country capable of building large rockets has used their early models interchangeably for civilian and military role. The rocket used for the launch of first satellite Sputnik (1957) was derived from the first ICBM made by the erstwhile USSR (SS-6/R-7). Similar trend was observed with various states like Briton, France, China, India and Israel with the exception of Japan.1 Over a period of time, all these states have started developing specific task-based vehicles, be it space or missiles. It has been always difficult to judge the exact intentions of a country—whether their objective is to launch a satellite or a missile, based on the knowledge of their expertise in rocketry field. It has been always possible for proliferators to conceal their military intentions. Formulations of some of the international arms control and non-proliferation systems did incur debate on such issues. In the event of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTRC) negotiations, the issue was raised ‘whether

1This argument is based on Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation the Politics and Technics, Sipri, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 52Ð56.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 10, 125 © Springer India 2013 126 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums space launch vehicles should be treated differently from offensive missiles in light of their legitimate civilian applications’. The USA was of the view that ‘civilian space launch vehicles had to be viewed as strictly equivalent to military missiles because they were technologically indistinguishable’ [1]. However, subsequently during negotiation phase, the USA was not able to maintain this position due to international pressures. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the politics behind undertaking space launches to actually demonstrate the missile development capabilities. This chapter also examines the interdependence of space regime on nuclear matters. The issues related to missile defence, a system ‘advertised’ as an alternative to nuclear deterrence mechanism or a system to negate the incoming nuclear missile threat, also have certain connotations in regard to space affairs. Various concerns in this regard are also discussed over here.

Nuclear Pierce

Since, the World War II the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology has dominated the global strategic calculus. Various issues related to space regimes and nuclear regimes have mostly been linked (directly or indirectly). More so because the global security discourse has been dominated by nuclear issues for all these years the matters related to space security occasionally get debated under the nuclear shadow. Hence, it is important to examine the interconnection amongst nuclear and space issues. Under the rubric of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China is the only Asian nuclear weapon state (NWS). However, states like India and Pakistan have demonstrated their nuclear weapon potential during 1998. Also, North Korea has tested nuclear weapons during 2006.2 Israel is also known to have developed (but not tested) nuclear weapons during 1970s. However, Israel’s nuclear policy is of nuclear ambiguity/nuclear opacity, total non-acknowledgment and secrecy [2]. Apart from these known nuclear weapon states, few other states in the region have certain (covert) interests in investing into nuclear technology from the point of view of making a weapon. Particularly, Iran’s investments into nuclear technology for the purposes of energy are being viewed with suspect, and also some doubts are being raised about Myanmar’s nuclear intentions. Interestingly, all nuclear weapon states (official or unofficial) are not spacefaring nations. States like Pakistan have made significant investments in the nuclear and missile arena, but in comparison their investments in space field are minimal.

2As per international estimates, North Korea could have exploded a half kiloton device (Hiroshima was 12 kiloton). This test is regarded as a partial failure. Nuclear Pierce 127

North Korea has made certain claims in regard to successful launch of satellite, but their claims have been disputed. The other nuclear weapon states from the region, namely, China, India and Israel are established spacefaring nations. Few states within the region (with no nuclear weapon aspirations) also aspire to become spacefaring nations. For understanding this interdependence in Asian context, it is important to reason it under the global settings. This is mainly because disarmament and arms control issues both in nuclear and space arena have certain commonalities, and any Asia- specific discussion needs to have the global backdrop. Various treaties in space field actually have ‘nuclear’ origins. Majority of analyst and policy maker community since the 1940s generally never have viewed space as an ‘independent’ entity. Particularly, during Cold War period, the NWSs mostly looked for the ‘nuclear’ relevance of space technology—meaning how satellites and launch vehicles could be used effectively to carry forward the nuclear agenda. They realised that space technology could help the process of putting weapons of mass destruction in space and also testing of nuclear weapons could be undertaken in outer space. This made arms control and disarmament lobbies to work towards stopping/restricting likely ‘nuclearisation’ of outer space. Hence, various space security agendas got formulated mainly under nuclear settings. The most prominent space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967), is more about restricting the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space than addressing the issues related to space. The UN Moon Treaty (1979) also emphasises that the state parties shall not put nuclear weapons on or around the trajectory of the moon. Various debates and discussion in the UN bodies like Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS-set up by the General Assembly in 1959) and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) highlight that space issues are difficult to bifurcate from nuclear issues. Another area where space regime is being held hostage to the nuclear issues is negotiations on the FMCT (fissile material cut-off treaty). China is linking the issue of negotiations on FMCT with the PAROS [3]. China wants the conference on disarmament (CD) to negotiate both FMCT and PAROS concurrently. However, the USA opposes this idea [4]. This has prevented the CD from undertaking any serious negotiations on space issues. Overall, the Chinese position is having a bearing on the various international negotiations in space domain. The nuclear policies of non-NPT signatory states have put them under international sanctions regime. Imposition of sanctions has denied them export of space technology too. States like India suffered technological isolation because of their nuclear policies and the nuclear testing undertaken by them during 1974 and 1998. The state had to suffer of technology apartheid, and space technology was a prominent element of such embargo. Space technology was not traded with India for many years. A particular case in point is the transfer of cryogenic technology by Russia to India. During 1992, Russia was pressurised by the then US administration in this regard because it was felt that India would use this technology for its missile programme in violation to MTCR requirements. Indian space programme has suffered significantly because of this and is yet to indigenise the cryogenic 128 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums technology. Space agenda of India has been always held hostage for nuclear matters. Only after the successful negotiation of the IndoÐUS nuclear deal (2005) by the year 2010/2011, the USA had removed various embargos put against India’s space agency.

Concealed Missile Ambitions

In Asian context, some states could be viewed to have taken the path of space launches to showcase their capabilities in missile arena. The missile systems particularly the ballistic missile systems are an important element of military hardware for NWSs or states with interest in developing one. Possession of a nuclear-capable missile advances the deterrence potential of the NWSs. At times, few Asian states are found undertaking space launches as a roundabout way to announce to the rest of the world about their missile capabilities. Analogous efforts undertaken in regard to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile development are considered as a major dilemma towards judging the intensions of a state. ‘SLVs and ballistic missiles are derived from virtually identical and interchangeable technologies, and the similarities between SLVs and ballistic missiles extend from subcomponents to production facilities. SLV programmes can allow a country to test propulsion systems, stage separation, and some guidance and control technology, and provide a path to gain access to controlled, missile-related technologies and materials under the guise of peaceful space ambitions’.3 By 2010/2011, missile capabilities of various Asian states particularly those who are spacefaring nations have expanded significantly. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed account about the missile capabilities of various states in the region. In fact, as mentioned earlier, it really does not matter if states are using their space launcher knowledge to develop missiles because they are technically not violating any space treaty regime (since none exists!). Still the discussion on this subject merits attention because of the investments in space launch vehicles indirectly demonstrate the ability to field long-range ballistic missiles. There is a significant amount of technology commonalty in both the systems. For scientists and engineers working on either of the systems, shifting focus from space to missiles to missile to space becomes possible. This allows the state to use the expertise generated in one field to the development of other. It is also important to note that because of the apprehensions about the objectives of ballistic missile programme of few states, international sanctions have been put on them on specific occasions. The overall politics behind missile issues has been more intriguing. Both the parties—the NPT group and the anti-NPT states—have their individual (but differing) assessments about the missile subject. The development of missile technology has mostly remained a complex task for many states mainly due to

3http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STATE98749, accessed on May 22, 2011. Concealed Missile Ambitions 129 geopolitical, technological and logistical reasons. It is important to note that foreign technology has remained an important factor for various regional actors in regard to the development of their operational ballistic missile or space launch vehicle programmes [5, p. 19]. Particularly, various third-world missile or space launch vehicle programmes are mostly found developed mainly based on technology transfer or hidden purchase/ theft of technology from other states or agencies. A basic problem in the missile field is that no comprehensive and widely agreed norms have been established which defines what is ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ in this arena. The international community is found criticising specific activities by individual countries on a case-by-case basis without any official multilateral instrument [6]. The MTCR (1987) is an informal and voluntary export control regime to limit the proliferation of missile platforms, UAVs and rocket systems. It is about controlling the design, development and testing of missiles that can deliver a payload of 500 kg or more to a range of 300 km or more. The scope of MTRC was extended in 1993 to include missiles capable of delivering WMDs. However, no restrictions on national space programme could be put as long as they do not add to the development of the delivery systems for WMDs [7] MTRC has no universal acceptability. In Asia, only Japan is a member of MTRC. States like India consider MTRC mechanism as discriminatory. Apart from MTCR, another multilateral arms control mechanism (not under the UN authorization) is in vogue called International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)/The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC). This agreement also highlights the issue of SLV versus missiles. It demands ‘necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to SLV programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes’.4 It also outlines few transparency measures in this connection. Universally, there always has been assistance from the space programmes of the state to further its missile programmes (taken either overtly or covertly) and vice a versa. However, any direct evidence to link space vehicles and missiles would be hard to come in various cases, and there is a need to ‘read between the lines’ to appreciate how missile technology could have got developed in certain cases. Several states have supplemented their missile programmes by diverting knowledge and paraphernalia from the space programme. Technically, space launch vehicles (SLVs) are actually ballistic missiles used in surface to space mode. Satellites are nothing but the payloads delivered by missiles from the surface to Earth orbit. Such SLVs could be converted into ballistic missiles by adding re-entry vehicles and suitable guidance and control packages. In Asian context, such similarities could be viewed in the programmes of Israel and India during the 1960s. In 1961, Israel launched the Shavit II multistage rocket 50 miles into the ionosphere for metrological measurement purposes. Almost, within a gap of few years, Israel was simultaneously working in space launch field

4http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/icoc, accessed on Jun 12, 2011. 130 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums as well as on its project Jericho a designation given to the Israeli short-range ballistic missiles programme. Probably, Shavit was a derivative of Jericho. India is known as the first developing country (sixth in the world) to orbit a satellite using indigenously developed rocket SLV-3 during 1980. Roughly around the same time, India started the development of Agni IRBM. Few analysts are of the opinion that this missile’s propulsion system was based on SLV-3. In regard to China, analysts note that they were successful in putting their first satellite into orbit during the 1970s and within a decade’s time possessed an ICBM capability [5, pp. 24Ð25]. It is also important to note that in certain cases, missile systems have been modified into space launchers (probably, Iran modified its missile Shahab-3 to blast a satellite). In Asia, nuclear and space policies of North Korea and Iran have always been a suspect. The USA and its allies are of a firm convection that satellite launches by these states actually establish their expertise to develop long-range ballistic missile systems. There also has been a past history of technology transfer in the missile arena between North Korea and Iran. Space programmes of North Korea and Iran are being looked with suspicion for their demonstrative missile designs. However, it is important to note that both these states had entered into the missile arena much before conceptualisation of their space programmes. Hence, it could be incorrect to believe that space launches is the only option for them to display their missile prowess. North Korea has developed a significant amount of nuclear and missile arsenal. ‘Possibly, it has deployed over 600 short-range Scud variants that can strike South Korea, and as many as 320 medium-range Nodong missiles that can strike Japan. Long-range missiles with the potential to hit the continental United States are still under development. It probably, has somewhere between 6 and 12 nuclear weapons, or at least explosive devices’.5 Over the years, North Korea has used missile technology for the purposes of economic gains too. It has sold this technology to few states and has also cooperated with Iran to develop long-range missiles and SLVs. It has been reported that North Korea had supplied an estimated 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is also known to have exported a smaller quantity of Scuds or Scud components such as engines to Egypt, Syria, Yemen and possibly Libya. What is important from the perspective of this chapter is the sale of Nodong missiles or components to Iran and Pakistan [8]. On Aug 31, 1998, North Korea tested Taepodong space launch vehicle flying a ballistic missile trajectory (rocket meant for intercontinental ranges). It was claimed that Kwangmyngsng-1 satellite was launched by using this launcher. However, experts were of the opinion that the satellite had failed to achieve the orbit and out of three stages of the SLV only two worked. The partial success of this launch was enough to demonstrate the technical capabilities of North Korea in both

5Asia Report Nı168, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear And Missile Programs’, 18 June 2009, http:// www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/168-north-koreas-nuclear-and- missile-programs.aspx, accessed on July 30, 2011. Concealed Missile Ambitions 131 space rocket and missile arena. For North Korean state, their missile programme became a national priority at par with the nuclear programme during the late 1970s. Their programme has witnessed a speedy growth particularly during the initial decade. The country initiated a multifaceted ballistic missile programme in 1975 [9]. Taepodong-1 is expected to have a range in excess of 2,000 km. North Korea has achieve partial success in respect of Taepodong-2. This missile was first tested in July 2006, and it has been reported that the missile failed in mid-flight, 35Ð40 s after launch.6 However, during the second test (April 2009), the missile is reported to have travelled about 3,200 km before landing in the Pacific Ocean east of Japan. This test was declared as an SLV test by the North Korean authorities.7 The purpose behind this could have been to tell the world (mainly the USA, Japan and South Korea) that it was not a provocative act but an attempt to launch satellites. There is no authentic information about the exact range of this missile. Theoretically, such missiles could have a range of around 10,000 km [10, pp. 179Ð80]. However, North Korea is yet to prove the capability of reaching such distances. Since July 8, 1994, till very recently, Kim Jong-II was heading North Korea. He had selectively used missile issues as a bargaining strategy with international community. In the beginning of the twenty-first century (July 2000), he had offered to give up the missile programme in exchange for satellite launch services. It is understood that the symbolic importance of missiles and space launch vehicles would dissuade North Korea from abandoning its programme unconditionally. It was argued that the international community could provide data, satellite launch services or opportunities to participate in other peaceful space programmes as an alternative to the North Korea’s current missile programme.8 However, such ideas were not taken to any logical conclusions probably because of geopolitical compulsions. Almost for a decade, the concept of limiting the North Korea’s missile programme by providing them assistance in space arena has faded away. Interestingly, missiles have not been on the agenda in the famous six-party talks mechanism9 to engage North Korea. In 1999, ‘North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s pledge to lift certain economic sanctions. The deal was later abandoned during the Bush Administration. In 2006, the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 barred North Korea from conducting missile-related activities. North Korea flouted this resolution

6‘U.S. officials: North Korea tests long-range missile’ July 04, 2006, http://articles.cnn.com/2006-07-04/world/korea.missile 1 long-range-missile- long-range-test-taepodong-1? s=PM:WORLD, accessed Feb 12, 2011. 7Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 50, ed. Duncan Lennox, (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2009), 102Ð103 as mentioned in http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/ id.166/missile detail.asp, accessed Feb 12, 2011. 8Asia Report Nı168, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear And Missile Programs’, 18 June 2009, p.25, http:// www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/168-north-koreas-nuclear-and- missile-programs.aspx, accessed on July 30, 2011. 9The six-party talks began as an aftermath of North Korean nuclear programme in 2003. The states involved are both the Koreas, China, Japan, the USA and Russia. 132 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums with its April 2009 test of the long-range Taepodong II’ [11]. It is more or less confirmed that North Korea’s missiles could reach Japan and the surrounding US military bases. Also, the targets on the west coast of the continental USA are likely to be in the range of North Korean missiles in near future. It appears that primarily to work around the UN restrictions, North Korea is keen to undertake satellite launching. The US administration is of the opinion that their strategy with North Korea of strategic patience has failed. This was elucidated by the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates during his Jan 2011 Asia visit (including South Korea). However, diplomacy being the best answer, it is important for the USA to take the path of negotiations to its logical conclusion. There is a need to engage North Korea and emphasise to them that states like Vietnam and Sri Lanka are in the process to develop their indigenous and peaceful space programmes and are being helped by other powers in their endeavour, and similar policy could be adopted with them also [12]. In order to resolve the North Korean impasse, one element for negotiations could be to make a satellite counteroffer (space diplomacy). Such action could help preventing a genuine nuclear threat in the future [13]. North Korea could be engaged by offering help in space arena with launch facilities and other related assistance. Russia could offer such assistance and prevail on them to give up their long-range missile programme. China has shown keenness to help North Korea to structure their economy. Knowing the strength of the Chinese space programme and the nature of influence it commands over North Korea, it could be prudent for them to engage them on space front too. North Korea’s space ambitions conceal military aims, and same could be said about Iran too. More importantly, there exists an umbilical relationship between these two states in missile arena. North Korea has been the big brother to Iran in missile field. It has helped Iran with missiles and missile know-how and also with the supply of related hardware. Knowing the nature of relationship and commonality in the technologies, it is obvious that some interaction in space field too must have happened. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons, but Iran is (probably) sometime away from making nuclear weapons. However, it is important to note that particularly in the satellite arena, Iran has overtaken North Korea. Albeit the country is in denial mode, still Iran’s nuclear ambitions are well- known. Particularly, the US and Israeli intelligence sources are continuously claiming that the various actions by Iran in their so-called quest for producing nuclear energy are actually leading them towards making a nuclear bomb. To carry forward this hidden agenda to a logical conclusion, it has become important for Iran to make investments in the missile field too. This Iran’s quest for missiles also indirectly supports the assessment in regard to their nuclear agenda. Iran is in possession of missiles which could reach Israel, Turkey, the Arab Gulf States and parts of southern Russia and south-eastern Europe. In November 2008, Iran tested a solid-fuelled Sajjil missile. This system is capable of delivering a 750- kg nuclear payload over 2,500 km distance. Within a span of 1 year, two more Concealed Missile Ambitions 133 successful Sajjil tests were carried out. During Feb 2009, Iran successfully launched a communications satellite, Omid, into orbit by using a long-range missile (Safir rocket10). Iran has proved its expertise in developing liquid-filled missiles such as the Shahab-3 and the Ghadr-1.11 Overall, Iran has succeeded in establishing the industrial infrastructure and technological foundations in missile and space field [14]. Iran’s ballistic missile Ghadr-110 which has better manoeuvrability is said to have a range of 2,000 km [10, p. 178] (few reports in indicate it to be 2,500Ð 3,000 km). On Jun 15, 2011, Iran has launched a satellite named Rassad-1 by using Safir rocket. Safir-B1 rocket can carry a satellite weighing 50 kg into an elliptical orbit of 300Ð450 km.12 Iran’s SLVs would be justifiably seen as an indication of potential to develop ICBMs. On the other hand, Iran would not actually need to develop an ICBM. By launching a satellite which could pass above US territory would help them to remind Washington that Iran has come of age and now has a truly global reach [15]. Iran’s efforts in this field indicate that it has successfully established an SLV programme which complements its missile development. For many years, Iran’s MTCR Category I ballistic missile programmes13 helped it to establish a technology base which must have assessed its development of an SLV programme Safir. Currently, the Safir system is restricted to very small payloads into the orbit but has demonstrated several technical capabilities applicable to longer-range ballistic missile systems, including staging, clustering small engines and using gimballed

10For a detail study for the Iran’s Safir rocket please refer Rajaram Nagappa et al., Iran’s Safir launch Vehicle, NIAS Study 2009, NIAS Pulbication, Bangalore, 2009. 11The Shahab 3 is a medium-range, liquid-propellant ballistic missile. Ghadr-1 is believed to be a more accurate version of Shahab 3. Iran has developed a number of variants to the original Shahab 3 missile. These have been referred to by various intelligence and media sources as the Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Shahab 3D, Shahab 3 M, Ghadr-1, and Qadr-1. The Shahab 3 has also been used as the basis for an Iranian space program, and these rockets have been called Kavoshgar-1, IRIS, and Safir. Please refer http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.190/missile detail.asp, accessed on Aug 1, 2011. 12http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran successfully launches satellite into space Al- Alam TV 999.html, accessed Jul 17, 2011. 13The regime comprises ‘Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers’ and an annex of controlled equipment and technologies. The annex of controlled equipment and technology is divided into ‘Category I’ and ‘Category II’ items. It includes equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, that are relevant to missile development, production and operation. According to the Guidelines, export of Category I items is subject to a presumption of denial. Category I includes complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets); unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones; specially designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems such as rocket engines or stages, re-entry vehicles, guidance sets, thrust-vector controls and warhead safing, arming, fuzing and firing mechanisms. The transfer of Category I production equipment will not be authorised. Please refer http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/missiles/mtcr. html, accessed on Aug 4, 2011. 134 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums engines14 for control of the Safir’s second stage. It is important to note that various technologies, required to undertake such launches, have been ‘managed’ by Iran by involving multiple layers of intermediaries and frontend companies (deceive export control officials). Probably, they are using the automotive industry as a procurement cover for the missile programmes. Another Asian country, Malaysia is feared to be serving as a procurement hub for missile-related goods and technology. ‘Companies in Malaysia repeatedly have attempted to procure a variety of aerospace-qualified electronics from the US and other MTCR Partner countries on behalf of military- and missile-related end-users in Iran’.15 Iran could be said to have become a prime target for MTCR regime. In 2003, restriction was put on its members in regard to the export of items supposed to be used for missile proliferation programmes, such as those at the Iranian facility producing Shahab-3 missiles. China not being a signatory to the MTCR had continued with its business with Iran. However, this became the ground for rejecting the Chinese application of joining MTRC in 2004. On its part, Iran also has obstructed every multilateral arrangement dealing with missile issues. It is the only country to have voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions in 2005 and 2008, endorsing HCoC [14]. On the 23 Dec 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 173716 (for failure to halt uranium enrichment), prohibiting the transit of missile technology to Iran. Other nuclear states in the region like China, India, Pakistan and Israel have well- established missile programmes. Amongst this, Pakistan not being a spacefaring nation generally does not become a part of any space-nuclear linkages debate. Israel is known to have most advanced ballistic missile programme, but there is much secrecy surrounding it. It possesses a robust medium-range missile programme and a space launch vehicle that essentially gives it ICBM capability, if it chooses to pursue that option.17 India is developing most advanced space launch vehicle, the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), capable of putting a 5,500-lb satellite into geostationary orbit. The British Centre for Defence and International Security Studies estimates that if the GSLV were used as a ballistic missile it would be a major ICBM, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 14,000 km. The first flight of GSLV was successfully flight tested on April 18, 2001 [16]. However, India’s GSLV programme had received setback with two failures in 2010. India is yet to become self-sufficient in regard to the production of cryogenic rocket engine; hence, the exact future of GSLV is difficult to predict.

14The theoretical meaning of the word gimbal is the pivoted support that allows the rotation of an object about a single axis. In rocket science, this term is used to describe the swinging movement of a rocket engine. 15http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STATE98749, accessed on Jun 15, 2011. 16http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm, accessed on Jun 26, 2011. 17http://www.nti.org/e research/proﬁles/Israel/Missile/index.html, accessed on Jul 24, 2011. Missile Defence 135

Missile Defence

Missile defence systems are emerging as technologies that could change the nuclear deterrence calculus. Theoretically, this system engages the incoming ballistic missile before it reaches the target. Ballistic missiles usually have a ballistic trajectory over most of its ﬂight path. The missile (with payload) traverses a path through the upper atmosphere or into the space. Missile defence architecture is expected to destroy this ballistic missile much before it reaches the target. The major part of this system involves interceptors and radars. The interceptors usually engage the target in the re-entry phase.18 The fundamental aim of missile defence system is to hit the target into the outer space. This challenges the global norms of keeping the space free from any military intervention. The space security policies which many states in the world are keen to develop are about preventing the weaponisation of space, and missile defence systems actually challenge this notion. It is important to appreciate that missile defence is much beyond undertaking space launches to demonstrate the missile advancements made by the state. It amounts to the weaponisation of outer space (if the engagement of incoming missiles is done in space19). This technology also demonstrates (in a limited way) the ASAT capabilities of the state. Origins of the concept of missile defence could be traced back to conceptualisation of Star Wars (Strategic Defence Initiative-SDI) programme by the then US President Roland Ragan in 1983. Over the years, the nomenclature of missile defence idea has witnessed certain changes mostly based on its categorisation. However, at places, names like national missile defence (NMD), theatre missile defence (TMD), ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) and strategic missile defence are found being used interchangeably. Missile defence has been a top priority for various successive US adminis- trations.20 Apart from the existing radar and interceptor structure, the USA is also working on futuristic technologies like the space-based lasers and kinetic kill (so-called hit-to-kill) vehicles for intercepting enemy missiles in their ‘boost-phase’, immediately after the launch.21 The USA is aware that any treaty mechanism related

18Re-entry phase is a portion of the trajectory of a ballistic missile or space vehicle where there is a significant interaction of the vehicle and the Earth’s atmosphere. 19Intercept of incoming missile can take place either inside (endoatmospheric) or outside (exoat- mospheric) the Earth’s atmosphere. The trajectory of most ballistic missiles travels both the regions—inside as well as outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The engagement with the target can take place in either of these regions, and they can be intercepted either place. 20Over the years, they have tested various technologies associated with this system. In spite of many years of research and development, missile defence is yet to emerge as a fully successful and functional system. However, the system is operational in parts, and the ground-based interceptors have been deployed since 2004. 21Theresa Hitchens, ‘US Space Policy: Time to Stop and Think’, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 67, Oct-Nov 2002. For more information, please refer Lt Col Lorinda A. Frederick, ‘Deterrence and Space-Based Missile Defence’ Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2009. 136 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums to space would curtail their freedom in space. This fear lead them to discredit the very own agreement signed by them few years back. The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty (a bilateral agreement signed amongst the USA and erstwhile USSR in 1972) was always under threat because it was challenging the concept of ASAT. Missile interceptors threatened to erode the ABM treaty regime because of the similarities in ASAT and missile defence technologies [17]. During June 2002, the USA did the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, an act carried out to protect the US interests in the arena of missile defence. Over the years, the USA has been unwilling to be a part of any bilateral or multilateral arms control or disarmament mechanism which could limit their options both from missile defence and ASAT angle. In missile defence, context most important Asian angle is the US notion of perceived threat from Iran. Israel also considers missile defence system as necessity in view of the threat from Iran. Israel has successfully tested its Arrow system by doing intercepts of a ballistic target missile.22 India has also conducted a successful ballistic missile defence test during March 2011 (so far India has conducted six tests out of which four were successful). Indian ballistic missile defence programme involves of long-range tracking radar, command and control system and the interceptor.23 It is implicit that for the purposes of nuclear dominance in the region and for achieving technological edge over the adversary, nuclear- capable states from the region would opt for missile defence systems. Also, states like India (and even China) which has a no-first-use policy (NFU) could justify investments into missile defence as a necessity to absorb the first strike. China has been conducting on-and-off research into missile defence systems since the 1960s; however, it appears that they are increasing their emphasis now. On Jan 11, 2011, China had announced that it had successfully tested a land-based missile defence system. This test made China the only country after the USA to use a missile to destroy another in space. During the same period, the US agencies had also detected that two missiles had collided outside the Earth’s atmosphere. China’s investments in this arena basically emerge out of their Taiwan fears. They have concerns about the US sale of advanced Patriot missile defence systems to Taiwan.24 On the other hand, they also understand that the USA will take the implicit message that such technology also could be modified to be used to attack the US space assets. Probably, India is also looking at developing its ASAT architecture as a part of missile defence programme. India could develop their high-altitude interceptors into ASAT to damage low orbit satellites [18]. India’s future plans in regard to missile defence and ASAT capabilities were highlighted by Mr V K Saraswat, director

22http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-successfully-tests-arrow-theater-missile-defense- 01571/ 23http://intelligencesinfo.wordpress.com/2011/03/31/indian-pursuit-of-ballistic-missile-defence- program-%E2%80%93-analysis/, accessed on July 16, 2011. 24‘Chinese missile defence’, The Economist, Jan 14, 2010. MIRV 137 general of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at the sidelines of 97th Indian Science Congress (2010). In regard to Pakistan, it has been reported that the state may seek the help from China and could get the interceptor missile defence system by 2012. Pakistan is particularly looking to purchase a high-altitude missile air defence system. China could part with HQ-9/FD2000 system developed by the China Academy of Defence Technology. This system is claimed to be capable of hitting aircraft out to 125 km, air-launched cruise missiles out to 50 km and ballistic missiles out to 25 km— representing ABM capability equivalent to the Indian AAD and American PAC-3.25 Japan has been following a pacifist security policy post-World War II. However, their engagement with the USA to provide a missile defence cover to their state brings out the assertive aspect of this security policy. The USÐJapanese cooperation in this field dates back to the 1980s since the period of Reagan initiative on SDI. But, Japan’s participation was more symbolic in nature then. The actual security efficacy of this system emerged to them after the Aug 1998 testing of Taepodong-1 ballistic missile by North Korea. The North Korean interests in developing nuclear weapons and their withdrawal from NPT in 2003 also made Japan more cautious. By end of 2003, Japanese cabinet took decision to introduce missile defence system as a part of its security architecture. It was argued that ‘BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defence-oriented national defence policy’.26 Presently, Japan has deployed a multilayered missile defence system having sea-based midcourse missile defence (the Aegis ballistic missile defence system) and ground-based terminal phase missile defence (Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3, or PAC-3) [19].

MIRV

A multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology is a set of nuclear weapons carried on a single missile (intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missile). MIRV or multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV)27 allow striking several targets in a single launch. This system is designed in such a fashion that the damage caused by several small warheads amounts much more than the damage caused by a single warhead. During the launch, the main rocket of this system pushes the set

25http://www.defence.pk/forums/wmd-missiles/24457-pakistan-may-seek-chinese-interceptor- missile-defense-2012-a.html, accessed on July 23, 2011. 26Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Dec 19, 2003, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ tyokan/2003/1219danwa e.html, accessed on May 15, 2011. 27The discussion in first two paragraphs of this section is based on Ajey Lele, ‘India Investing in MIRV Technology’, Oct 22, 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-investing-in-mirv- technology-2987.html, accessed on Jul 30, 2011. 138 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums of warheads up in the atmosphere at different intervals. Each warhead can engage a separate target. Such missiles are multistage missiles where during its ballistic path every stage gets separated at a predetermined time after the launch. Along with every stage, one or more warheads get fired. A four-stage missile could fire eight to ten warheads on the targets. The post-boost vehicle which separates from the missile prepares for re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere. During all these manoeuvres, warheads get fired after a gap of few seconds at pre-identified targets. The exact technology of firing sequence and how it actually happens has, for obvious reasons, always been kept a secret by states possessing this technology. MIRV technology is not a new technology. Rather it is a technology of the 1960s and was first developed by the USA, followed by the USSR. It is not the purpose over here to discuss the details of MRIV technology. The idea is to bring to the fore its impact on the space domain. Here, parallels could be drawn with the technology developed and demonstrated by few Asian states when a single SLV is used for undertaking multiple satellite launches. There have been cases where a state has launched around eight to ten satellites in one go. The satellites launched by single SLV are positioned in different orbits in space, while in case of MIRV, the warheads re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere and fire on the target. The other major difference is that a missile requires far greater accuracy. An SLV could afford putting a satellite into the orbit a kilometre higher or lower than planned. However, each warhead in MIRV should impact within 40 m of its target [20]. Hence, in overall analysis, the capability to undertake multiple satellite launches with a single rocket indirectly demonstrates a partial MIRV capabilities. In Asia, China is believed to have achieved significant MIRV connected capabilities. In an attempt to safeguard its second strike capability, China is expected to have a programme to develop MRV/MIRV technology. China has probably started its work towards development of MRV/MIRV technology in the early 1980s. During Sep 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle: two satellites were delivered in the nose cone and one was delivered during stage separation. This event may have been China’s first foray into the area of MRV/MIRV development. China’s MIRV development is further supported by a classified 1996 Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) report which states that China has designed an upper rocket stage called the ‘Smart Dispenser’ (SD) for a new space launch vehicle ‘for the purpose of accurate and simultaneous deployment in orbit of two US-made iridium mobile telecommunications satellites’. The report concluded that ‘a minimally modified SD stage could be used to deploy multiple re-entry vehicles (RVs)’ and that ‘the SD stage can be considered a ‘technology bridge’ to a viable post-boost vehicle (PBV)’. The SD could be modified for use on DF-4 and DF-5.28 They are known to have tested this technology during Dec 2002. However, it may be noted that China need not take a satellite launch route to test and demonstrated its MIRV capabilities.

28Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Washington DC: Regnery Publishers, 1999, p.251Ð254 as quoted in http://www.nti.org/db/china/wwhmdat.htm Assessment 139

Some unconfirmed reports have stated that as per a Japanese source probably China has successfully conducted the MIRV test on December 2002 using Dong-Feng 31 missile. This is apparently the first Chinese success of the MIRV missile test. India appears to have interest in MIRV technology too. There have been statements from the DRDO during 2008 to that effect. Agni-III and its future variants, with a diameter of 2 m, will be the first Indian missiles having the potential to be equipped with MIRV.29 Over the last few years, India has also undertaken few single SLV multiple satellite launches. One such significant launch was carried out by the four-stage vehicle PSLV-C9 on Apr 28, 2008. In this single launch, total ten satellites were successfully released. The total weight was about 820 kg with two main satellites weighing 690 and 83 kg, respectively. Rest eight were nano satellites.30 Japan also has launch vehicles like H-II (a two-stage rocket) which could launch simultaneously two geostationary satellites weighing about 1 ton each.31 However, since the state has no interests in the nuclear arena (till date!), developing such launch vehicle technologies could not be viewed as counterfeit to MIRV intentions.

Assessment

Reaching outer space by launching satellites has got direct military connotations because the launch technology in regard to satellites could be easily translated into ballistic missile technology. And this is one of the reasons for limited international cooperation in this ﬁeld. Various arms control regimes and other legal structures like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in regard to transfer of technology have inﬂuenced the international space technology cooperation for many years. The concerns in regard to the attempts of satellite launch by Iran and North Korea have originated because of the ‘ballistic missile DNA’ of the satellite launch technology. SLVs have linkages with missile delivery systems which are natural extensions of nuclear weapon programmes. All NWSs outside NPT are from Asia. For many years, this region has been the centre of gravity of global nuclear discourse. For all these years, issues related to space security have mostly remained subservient to nuclear policies. Few states in Asia are using space activities as a cover to demonstrate their nuclear/missile intentions. All such activities make nuclear and missile issues play a central role in various multilateral space deliberations. Unfortunately, there is no globally accepted multilateral regime in missiles arena; hence, missile testing could go unchallenged if a state decides to do so. MTCR has been not able to prevent covert missile trade. In the past, big powers were successful

29‘India’s latest strategic weapon’, The Hindu, May 8, 2008. 30http://www.space-travel.com/reports/PSLV Launches Ten Satellites 999.html, accessed on Mar 12, 2011. 31http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2/index e.html, accessed Mar 08, 2011. 140 10 Missile and Nuclear Conundrums to stall the genuine space aspirations of state like India by denying the cryogenic technologies by using the MTCR boggy, while on the other hand, the proliferation did take place in case of Pakistan and North Korea. Space also plays a fundamental role in the multilateral missile defence debate because of its unique legal status. Missile defence capability also allows the state to develop/strengthen their ASAT capability. The Indian investments in this field and their goal to accommodate ASAT under this architecture will have regional implications. Also, various claims made by states like North Korea and Iran should be checked for authenticity, and cases of self-glorification needs be verified. At the same time, missile development should not be viewed as the only reason for states like North Korea and Iran to invest in space technologies. Doing a satellite launch would help them to expand their scientific trajectory, bring socioeconomic advantages and enhance prestige. Particularly, Iran’s space programme demonstrates a will to do more in this field and hence should not be bracketed as a rouge programme. In years to come, the process of establishment of any international space regime would have to muddle through the nuclear and missile realities. The real challenge would be to establish a balance and realise strong and globally accepted space security architecture.

References

1. Cooper DA. The US and the evolution of International Supply-Side Missile Non-Proliferation Controls. In: Missile proliferation and defences: problems and prospects. Occasional Paper No.7. Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, UK, May 2001, p. 16. 2. Cohen A. Israel. In: Born H, Gill B, Hanggi H, editors. Governing the bomb. New York: Sipri/Oxford University Press; 2010. p. 152Ð3. 3. Jing-dong Yuan. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. ifri proliferation papers. Spring 2010, p. 23. 4. Hui Zhang. China and a ﬁssile material cutoff treaty. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ﬁles/ inmm2002 zhang.pdf. Accessed 26 July 2011. 5. Bowen WQ. The politics of Ballistic Missile nonproliferation. London: Macmillan Press; 2000. p. 19. 6. McDougall R. New approaches to combating missile proliferation. In: Missile proliferation and defences: problems and prospects, Occasional paper no.7. Southampton: Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton; May 2001. p. 28. 7. Jayantha Dhanapala. DDA occasional papers no.2, Sept 1997. New York: UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, p. 2Ð3. 8. Mistry D. Beyond the MTCR. Int Secur. Spring 2003;27(4):121. 9. Bermudez JS Jr. A history of ballistic missile development in the DPRK. Occasional paper no.2. 1999. California: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, p ii, 1Ð4 10. Norris P. Spies in the sky. New York: Praxis-Springer; 2008. 11. Emma Chanlett-Avery. North Korea: U.S. relations, nuclear diplomacy, and internal situation. 2011 June 17. Congressional Research Service, p. 17. References 141

12. Wit J. Kim Jong-II’s missiles. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/20/kim jong ils missiles?page=0,0. Accessed 31 July 2011. 13. Feffer J. Negotiating space with North Korea. International Herald Tribune, 2006 July 7. 14. Roy S. Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities-a real threat or lots of hot air? 2010 Aug 6. http://amec.org.za/articles-presentations/iran/139-irans-ballistic-missile-capabilities- a-real-threat-or-lots-of-hot-air. Accessed 24 Jul 2011. 15. Uzi Rubin. The global reach of Iran’s ballistic missiles. http://www.inss.org.il/upload/ (FILE)1188302022.pdf. Accessed 1 Aug 2011. 16. Majid A. Nuclear risk reduction in South Asia. IPRI Paper 4. 2002 Dec. http://ipripak.org/ papers/nuclearrisk.shtml. Accessed 12 Jul 2011. 17. Lin H. New weapon technologies and the ABM treaty. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s; 1998. p. xiv. 18. Brown PJ. India targets China’s satellites. 2010 Jan 22. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South Asia/LA22Df01.html. Accessed 30 Jun 2011. 19. Toki M. Missile defense in Japan. Bull At Sci. 2009 Jan 16. http://www.thebulletin.org/web- edition/features/missile-defense-japan. Accessed 1 Jun 2011. 20. Shukla A. What makes 5,000 km range Agni-5 missile deadlier. 2009 Oct 12. http://news. rediff.com/report/2009/oct/12/what-makes-5000-km-range-agni-5-missile-deadlier.htm.Ac- cessed 24 Jul 2011. Chapter 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia

Bartholomaeus Pitiscus (1561Ð1613) was a Polish theologian who first coined the term ‘trigonometry’ which is a branch of mathematics that deals with the relationship between the angles and sides of triangles. This aspect of geometry is of wide-ranging utility to various fields of science and technology. Trigonometry has various applications for measurement of distances. The techniques based on trigonometry are used in astronomy and for navigational systems which use the triangulation method to identify the position of an object. Navigation is important for the armed forces for various reasons. It helps in locating ground and air targets and aids reconnaissance missions. It can be used in weapon systems like missiles and artillery and aerial platforms like manned and unmanned aircrafts. Such navigation systems have various civilian application uses too. Navigational systems are assuming increasing importance because of its strategic applications and commercial utility. This chapter analyses the relevance of the Asian investments in navigational systems. There are certain complexities associated with navigational systems. The entire notion of navigation by using satellite means has evolved over decades. Asia is relatively a new entrant in this field. In order to evolve the context of navigation, this chapter begins with a brief overview of the history of navigation and elucidates current global investments in this field. The basic purpose of a navigation system is the identification of location which requires a minimum of three satellites. A system is employed to calculate its position (basically in terms of distance) by measuring the distance between itself and the three satellites. The distance to each satellite is calculated by measuring the time lag between the transmission and reception of each microwave signal (which travels at a speed of light). Other information like location of the satellites is also necessary. Position identification is done by the technique of triangulation. Essentially, navigational systems are based on two basic satellite-based positioning systems: the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and the Regional Navigation Satellite Systems (RNSS). Global systems normally consist

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 11, 143 © Springer India 2013 144 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia of a constellation of satellites (minimum of 24Ð26 satellites) and ground stations required to control them. The RNSSs also have similar infrastructure may be lesser in quantum. These networks can be termed broadly as GNSS augmentation systems.

History

The predecessors for satellite navigation can be identified from the non-satellite era. Ground-based LORAN (LOng-RAnge Navigation) and Omega systems were used for terrestrial long-wave radio transmitters instead of satellites. The Russian system on lines of the LORAN is the Chayka. The LORAN system became operational in 1958 and was extensively used by the maritime community. The LORAN-C system came to be used for aerial navigation quite widely and during trials in 1963.1 It had its limitations in respect of some aviation requirements particularly with regard to precision approaches.2 This system also served as a backup for the US global positioning system (GPS). This system was ceased to be used from October 1, 2010. OMEGA was another navigation system developed by the USA with six partner nations for the purposes of military aviation. It was approved for development in 1968 and became operational in 1971 and had 6 km accuracy when fixing a position. With the success of GPS, its usage declined, and it was permanently terminated by September 30, 1997.3 The first satellite-based navigation system was Transit a naval navigation satellite system, deployed by the US military in the 1960s and was operational till December 31, 1996. The Transit’s operation was based on the Doppler effect in which the satellites passed through well-known paths and broadcast their signals on a well- known frequency. The frequency shifted between the received frequency and the broadcast frequency because of the movement of the satellite with respect to the receiver. By monitoring this frequency shift over a period of time, it was possible to identify the location. A minimum of four operational satellites were required for this job. The constellation consisted of six satellites in a polar orbit.4 The first satellite- based radio navigation system developed by the erstwhile USSR was the Tsiklon.5 Thirty-one satellites were launched for this purpose during 1967 to 1978. Its basic aim was to provide positioning facilities to the ballistic missile submarines. The Tsiklon series was followed by the fully operational ‘Tsyklon-B’ or ‘Parus’ system. This system was formally inducted into service in 1976, but the full 22 satellite constellation did not become operational until 1980. Parus satellites

1http://www.insidegnss.com/node/1806, accessed on May 28, 2011. 2http://waas.stanford.edu/research/loran.htm, accessed on Mar 28, 2011. 3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omega (navigation system), accessed on Mar 28, 2011. 4http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/nav/transit.htm and http://www.experiencefestival.com/ a/Satellite navigation system - History and theory/id/1793498, accessed on Mar 23, 2011. 5http://www.astronautix.com/craft/tsiklon.htm, accessed on Mar 28, 2011. Present Generation Systems 145 continue to be launched till April 2010, and it is believed that it is now exclusively used for military communications. The Parus was followed by the Tsikada—a simpliﬁed system for civilian use. In fact, the Parus is sometimes referred to as the ‘Tsikada Military’ or ‘Tsikada-M’. The Tsikada system was put into service in 1979 and acquired its full complement of satellites in 1986. The Tsikada was largely used by the Soviet merchant marine.6

Present Generation Systems

The present generation satellite navigational systems are more direct. The satellite broadcasts a signal with exact time of transmission and the position of the satellite. ‘The receiver compares the time of broadcast encoded in the transmission with the time of reception measured by an internal clock, thereby measuring the time-of- flight to the satellite. Several such measurements can be made at the same time to different satellites, allowing a continual fix to be generated in real time’.7 The system overcomes various technical limitations like cases of fast-moving receivers. Errors are reduced by the various filtering techniques. Globally, the best known satellite navigational system is the GPS (global positioning system). This US system has almost become synonymous with satellite navigation. Built under the US NAVSTAR programme in 1973, the GPS satellite constellation began with the launch of its first four satellites in 1978. It has brought about significant changes in military tactics and has also created new applications for the civilian use with a significant economic dimension. The GPS can be viewed as an application that covers almost every discipline of modern technology. It is said that GPS could be the next utility, like electricity, running water and the telephone, and could become a part of everyone’s daily life. The applications of this new high-tech capability are limited only by our imagination. GPS-based products will likely fuel the next economic expansion of the free world [1]. In 1983, the then US president, Roland Reagan offered the GPS civil services to the world, free of direct charges in the aftermath of the loss of the KAL 007.8 The two other systems apart from the GPS are the two major constellations, namely, the Russian GLONASS and the European Union’s (EU) GALILEO. The GLONASS went on to the drawing board in the mid-1970s while the launching of satellites began in the 1980s. There were 12 functional satellites when the USSR

6www.vectorsite.net/ttgps 2.html, accessed on Apr 15, 2011. 7http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Satellite navigation system - History and theory/id/ 1793498, accessed on Feb 18, 2011. 8Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by Soviet interceptors on September 1, 1983, killing 269 passengers. The aircraft was shot when it strayed into prohibited Soviet airspace around the time of a planned missile test. Subsequently, it was decided that the US military would make the GPS available for civilian use so as to avoid any further navigational in the future. 146 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia disintegrated in 1991. This constellation has witnessed various ups and downs mainly because of the Russian financial constraints. However, with improvement in its economic condition post 2000, Russia’s investments in its space programme in general and GLONASS in particular started increasing. Presently, the third- generation GLONASS-K programme is underway and is nearing global coverage. Russia currently has 22 fully operational GLONASS satellites in orbit. The complete GLONASS grouping must have 24 operational and 2Ð3 reserve satellites for it to have global coverage.9 GALILEO is the global navigational satellite system being developed by the EU and European Space Agency (ESA). This twenty-first century system expected to the best in world is hampered by financial problems and has missed various deadlines till date. This system is mainly meant for civilian purposes and was initiated in 2003. On Oct 21, 2011 the first two European Galileo satellites intended to form part of the future 30-satellite navigation constellation were launched to validate the system and the next pair would be launched during Oct 2012.10 Galileo may be able to offer an initial set of services by 2014; the system is unlikely to be fully operational before 2016 to 2019. Given its budget, Galileo is expected to provide the 4 IOV (in-orbit validation) and 14 FOC (full operational capability) satellites by 2014, which is 60% of its capacity.11 The United Nations General Assembly in 2006 set up an International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems as an informal body to promote cooperation on the matters of mutual interest related to civilian satellite-based positioning, navigation, timing and value-added services. The committee would also address the issues related to the compatibility and interoperability of global navigation satellite systems. One of the main purposes of this forum is to promote the use of this system to support sustainable development, particularly in developing countries.12 Asian states are found taking keen interest in this programme, and the second meeting of the ICG Global Navigation Committee was held at Bangaluru, India, in 2007.

Asian Navigational Systems

Various Asian states are facing signiﬁcant social challenges. Management of available resources is an important issue for these states while devising various growth models. They understand the importance for undertaking development which could meet the requirements of the present without harming the interests of future generations. For undertaking ‘sustainable development’, Asian states are acquiring and developing various technologies, and satellite navigation is one amongst them.

9http://www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia To Start Operating New Glonass K Satellite By Year End 999.html 10http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/satnav/galileo/satellite-launches/index en.htm, accessed on Sep 17, 2012. 11http://www.spacenews.com/civil/100310-initial-galileo-validation-satellites-delayed.html 12www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/c1/AC105 C1 L287E.pdf Asian Navigational Systems 147

In particular, combination of the GPS and the geographic information system (GIS) is being used for geospatial analysis in a variety of contexts ranging from agriculture and environment to resource management and medicine. Satellite navigation has significant security significance too. As in other fields, in the arena of satellite navigation too, the maximum investments are being made mainly by China, Japan and India. In view of the fact that satellite navigation is a costly technology, these states are making careful investments. Both Indian and Japan are developing the regional navigation satellite system (RNSS), while only China is investing in a global navigation satellite system (GNSS). When viewed under larger geostrategic settings, this indirectly matches with the ambitions of these states indicating that China has global interests and even their investments in satellite navigation clearly implies this. Following paragraphs discuss the specific navigational programmes for three Asian powers.

Japan

Japan has a two-pronged approach to satellite navigation. First, to make use of the globally available US GPS System by incorporating additional features to make it more accurate and applicable for their area of interest and secondly, to develop a regional network of own satellites. The topography and terrain of Japan does not permit the GPS signals to penetrate every portion of the country, resulting in the underperforming of the GPS system. In this nation of mountains and skyscrapers, at times the strength of signals gets depleted, and navigation systems particularly those used on the ground in various types of vehicles are found ineffective. To augment the strength of GPS, Japan has developed the MSAS (MTSAT13 Satellite-based Augmentation System). It is essentially an overlay system for increasing the accuracy of the GPS navigation by transmitting differential information.14 This system was conceived during the 1990s, and the first satellite MTSAT-1 was launched in 1999; however, there was a launch failure of H2 launch vehicle. The MTSAT system is designed to consist of one or two satellites, depending on the time frame and two Ground Earth Stations (GES) per MTSAT. Finally, the first satellite in the MSAS space segment, MTSAT-1R, went into orbit in 2005. Japan launched its second Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT-2) on February 18, 2006, thus opening a new phase of precision air navigation and air traffic control (ATC) over the western Pacific Ocean. This five-ton satellite is the

13MTSAT is the Multifunctional Transport Satellite with a dual function of air traffic control (ATC) and navigation and meteorology. Various agencies like Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Japan Meteorological Agency have stakes in this. 14http://dret.net/glossary/msas, accessed on Apr 15, 2011, various technical details are available at Atsushi Shimamura, ‘MSAS (MTSAT Satellite-based Augmentation System) Project Status’, Air and Space Europe, Vol. I, No: 2 1999, pp.63Ð67. 148 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia heaviest ever launched by Japan and is operating in a circular geostationary orbit. The on-board transponders of this satellite offer another link for Japan’s MSAS, relaying differential GPS corrections and integrity messages to suitably equipped users. One interesting feature of this satellite is that being a multifunction satellite, first the meteorological payload of MTSAR-1R was operational for five years, and later during July 2010 meteorological payload of MTSAT-2 became prime which was earlier placed into standby mode (summer of 2006) until the end of 5 years. The system is supposed to seize off in 2015/2016. The major beneficiaries of the MSAS are the aircraft operating on routes across the Pacific. The improved navigation accuracy and associated communication links allow the planes to operate close together along the most travelled routes. In addition to the GPS navigation data, MSAS provides data links to and from ATC control centres and facilitates the automatic transmission of aircraft locations to controllers when they are out of the range of ground-based ATC radars. In addition to the L-band GPS broadcasts, MTSAT provides voice and data communications over Ku- and Ka-band frequencies. This satellite also provides weather-related inputs.15 In 2000, Japanese Regional Navigation Satellite System (JRANS) concept was developed by the Japanese industry and was discussed and debated with the government representatives as well as the US government and industry personnel. Its purpose was to satisfy current and future operational requirements and assure full compatibility and interoperability with GPS. After much deliberation during 2003, Japan has started a new project of Quasi- Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). This system consists of three satellites meant to provide a regional satellite positioning service as well as communication and broadcasting services. The configuration is such that each satellite is in three different orbit planes, which are obtained by inclining the geostationary orbit (GEO) by about 45ı. At least one satellite is expected to stay around the zenith for about eight hours and would be visible with a higher elevation angle in mid-latitude area (e.g. at least 80ı in Tokyo) than in case of using a satellite in GEO. This characteristic would be beneficial for large cities with several tall buildings which block the signal from satellites in GEO. This would vastly improve the satellite positioning and mobile communication services.16 The project is devised as a publicÐprivate partnership. The proposal is to develop a programme in a two-phase build-up of quasi-zenith (QZO), then another quasi- zenith and geostationary orbiting satellites (QZO and GEO). Phase one will have three satellites in quasi-zenith orbit, and Phase two will have four satellites in QZO and GEO [2]. Currently, Phase one of this project is underway. In QZSS, satellites are meant to orbit in a figure of eight patterns over Japan and the East Asian region. They would

15All the inputs on MSAS are based on http://www.insidegnss.com/node/107 and http://www. eurocontrol.int/nexsat/gallery/content/public/Steering%20Group/Meeting10/MTSAT 2009. 324NextSAT MTSAT Status ver.2.pdf, accessed on May 9, 2011. 16http://www.bipm.org/cc/CCTF/Allowed/16/cctf04-11.pdf, accessed on Feb 10, 2012. Asian Navigational Systems 149 be at a high elevation angle over Japan. This would make extra positioning signals available in urban Japan. The first of the QZSS satellites (known as Michibiki) was successfully launched in September 2010. The full operational status is expected by 2013.17 Michibiki (a name that means ‘guidance’ in Japanese) operates from an altitude of about 40,000 km. Japan has developed this satellite as a multipurpose satellite for aircraft, tsunami detection and ground traffic management. But the Michibiki alone cannot be the solution. As mentioned earlier, each satellite would be above Japan for about 8 h each day; hence, all three satellites are required for 24-h coverage. Japan has a cooperative agreement with the USA since 1998 for use of GPS for civilian purposes. This was reviewed on January 13, 2011. During this meeting, the extent of cooperation was extended to include Japan’s Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT), Satellite-based Augmentation System (MSAS) and Quasi- Zenith Satellite Systems (QZSS).18 Japan’s policy appears to be to develop its own regional system and also have maximum benefits from the GPS.

China

China’s interest in satellite navigation technology dates back to the late 1960s. It was not able to overcome the various technical difficulties in this field for many years. Also, lack of funding could have added to their difficulties. However, all this is history now. China is found systematically developing their navigational architecture in planned phases. Their approach is to possess both a regional as well as global navigational system. As of 2011, China has fully operationalised their regional system and is rapidly progressing towards building a global system. Chinese scientists developed the ‘Twin-Star’ regional navigation theory in the mid-1980s. It was tested on two DFH-2A communications satellites in 1989. This test showed that the precision of the Twin-Star system was comparable to the publicly available signals of the United States Global Positioning System (GPS).19 The government approval for the development satellite navigational system was granted during 1993Ð1994 period. China’s first regional navigational system was called Beidou or Beidou-1.

17http://www.bipm.org/cc/CCTF/Allowed/16/cctf04-11.pdfSAS and http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/ sat/qzss/index e.html, accessed on May 10, 2011and http://www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/the- system-November-2007-4187, accessed on Feb 10, 2012. 18Joint announcement on United StatesÐJapan GPS Cooperation, Washington, DC, January 14, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154688.htm and http://www.panorientnews.com/ en/news.php?k=670 19‘Beidou-1 Experimental Satellite Navigation System’ Dec 14, 2010, http://sinodefence. wordpress.com/2010/12/14/beidou-1-experimental-satellite-navigation-system/, accessed on Jun 30, 2011. 150 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia

The China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) was instrumental in developing the Beidou system. The system is capable of providing all-weather, two-dimensional positioning data for both military and civilian purposes. It can also undertake communication functions. The first two satellites for this system were launched during 2000, and in late 2001 the system began providing navigational support. The third satellite (backup) was launched during 2003, and the network covers a major portion of East Asia region (between longitude 70ıÐ140ı Eand latitude 5ıÐ55ı N) and has been made available to civilian users since April 2004. China is only the third country in world to possess an operational space-based navigational network. The fourth satellite in this constellation was launched during 2007, and the system works at with 20 m accuracy.20 After successfully operationalising the Beidou system for the Chinese region (by 2007), the state began working on its more ambitious project of developing the navigational system with a global footprint. This system is known as Compass (Beidou-2) and has 35 satellites—of which five are proposed to be placed in geostationary orbit and 30 in medium Earth orbit (MEO). On Sep 19, 2012, China has launched 14th and 15th satellites for the Beidou/Compass system.21 So far, out of these fifteen satellites, one was launched for the purposes of testing, and one satellite has drifted off its track.22 The entire system is expected to become operational by 2020. Initially, there were some apprehensions regarding China’s Compass system, but the programme is in a good shape and making significant progress. By Dec 2011, China has launched (declared operational) a limited positioning service of Beidou for providing services for China and ‘surrounding areas’. The system has begun providing initial positioning, navigation and timing operational services. Beijing would launch another six satellites in 2012 to expand it to most of the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the system offers its civilian users positioning information correct to the nearest 10 m, measure speeds within 0.2 m per second and provide clock synchronisation signals accurate to 0.02 millionths of a second. The Chinese military is expected to obtain more accurate data. Experts are of the opinion that Beidou could be used to target cruise missiles against Taiwan in case of requirement. It could also be used to guide drones to destroy foreign naval forces.23 On commercial front, this system is expected offer reach dividends to China. The annual output value of China’s satellite navigation industry is estimated to reach

20http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/beidou.htm (Accessed June 12, 2007) and http://www.astronautix.com/craft/beidou.htm (Accessed April 22, 2008) and ibid and g Yuankai, ‘Your Place in the World’, Beijing Review, 2009, Issue 27, pp. 16Ð19. 21http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2012-09/19/c 131859942.htm, accessed on Sep 19, 2012. 22http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beidou navigation system, accessed on Dec 24, 2011. 23http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648?print=true, accessed on Jan 12, 2012. Asian Navigational Systems 151 more than 35 billion US dollars in 2015. Already, more than 5,000 Chinese firms and organisations are involved in the application and services of satellite.24 Interestingly, apart from its RNSS and GNSS programme (Beidou-1 & 2), China has also developed another less known regional navigation satellite system called CAPS (Chinese Area Positioning System). This project was initiated in 2002. It is a passive one-way system in which satellites broadcast the navigation messages and receivers are the ‘listeners’.25 This concept is different from conventional navigational systems. Here, all the navigation-related facilities are all located on the ground from where the messages are generated. These messages are sent to the communication satellites which only act as a transponder. The CAPS constellation is not specifically launched for navigational purposes but works on bandwidth rented on commercial communications satellites. It consists of commercial geostationary (GEO) communication satellites and inclined geosynchronous orbit (IGSO) communication satellites. China took three years to develop a validation system for CAPS and uses four commercial GEO communication satellites.26 Such constellation cannot provide 3D positioning because all satellites are located in orbit over the equator. The height estimate can be provided by incorporating a barometer into the receivers [3]. The Beidou-1 system became operational during 2003, however; probably, China also continues to use the GPS and GLONASS signals both for commercial and military purposes. China is also a member of the Europe’s Galileo system which unfortunately is running much behind schedule and has not lived up to its expected potential because of financial constraints [4]. Sensing an opportunity, China decided to join this programme in 2003 and committed AC230 million to the project. However, the ESA made it clear that China would not get any preferential rights in this system for using it for the military purposes. It was feared that irrespective of this, China could factor Galileo in its military doctrines. Today, with China being an ‘ASAT weapon state’ it is possible to believe that it could effectively neutralise American GPS signals over the theatre of operation (say ChinaÐTaiwanÐ India region) while using the Galileo system. Initially, the Galileo system was envisaged without any military role. However, during 2006, the European Union Commission articulated the importance of Galileo system (with a promised accuracy of less than a metre) for military purposes.27 China’s intentions in space navigation from a weaponisation point of view were

24http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China satellite navigation sector annual output predicted to reach 35 bln USD in 2015 999.html, accessed on Jan 25, 2012. 25Even though Beidou-1 is recognised as a first-generation system like most other navigational systems, it is not a passive system. This constellation is a two-way system capable of sending messages to the control centre through satellites. 26Three satellite-receiver ranges are needed for a position fix; a fourth satellite could increase the area of coverage and provide redundant measurements. 27‘EU Admits Military Use for Galileo’, http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/space-defense- technology/eu-admits-military-use-galileo-5409/, assessed on Jul 1, 2011. 152 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia discussed immediately after it joined Galileo [5]. However, it appears that China has moved beyond Galileo. There could be various reasons for this. First, the project is unduly delayed, and the financial investments in this system are worthless when a cost-benefit analysis is made. Third, the USA would continue putting pressure on the EU to minimise China’s role in this system. Fourth, China’s Compass navigational system has reduced the importance of Galileo for it. A decade later, it appears that Chinese involvement in Galileo is more embarrass- ing than rewarding. China’s interests in Galileo had political, military and economic dimensions. Maybe China was aiming to get launch contracts (Long March booster) for launching Galileo satellites. Also, being part of the project, they expected to get a technological and scientific insight into navigational system [6]. But, with the EU deciding that China cannot be given full membership in their programme, China’s interest in the programme dwindled. Moreover, frequency overlay issues are also expected arise from time to time. Since China is developing its own Compass system, a clash of interest with the EU constellation is inevitable. As per the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) database, 36 satellite slots have been registered for Compass: 14 in geosynchronous orbits and 22 in the medium orbits traditionally used for navigation systems. Generally, there is a tendency to register for more slots with the ITU.28 Under ITU policy, the first country to start broadcasting in a specific frequency has priority to that frequency.29 Naturally, Compass has the advantage because of the delays in the Galileo programme. With China making rapid progress in launching satellites for Compass constellation, it is not expected to face in problems in this regard. Apart from Compass emerging as a competitor to Galileo, it is possible that it would serve a purpose beyond navigation. It could be used for detecting nuclear explosions or for electronic or signals intelligence. It has been argued by some that the Compass satellites will have so much extra power on board that they could be used as space-based jammers and could even target Galileo apart from GPS [7]. For China, the military utility of Compass is undisputed. Initially, China’s joining of Galileo was a winÐwin for both parties. It allowed the EU to snub the USA and get economic backing for the project. It was important for China too because it demonstrated the acceptance of China’s geopolitical, technological and economic might by the international community. However, the delay in the Galileo programme has changed the situation.

28http://defensetech.org/2006/08/03/compass-chinese-satnav-or-galileo-bluff/ 29‘Will China disrupt Europe’s global navigation satellite system?’ http://gpssystems.net/china- disrupt-europes-global-navigation-satellite-system/,accessed on Jun 18, 2011. Asian Navigational Systems 153

India

India has designed an Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) to provide itself and neighbouring countries with the position navigation and timing (PNT) service. This project has been approved by the government and may become operational by 2014. Initially, the system will have seven satellites, and the number will later go up to 11 [8]. It would be an independent seven satellite constellation built and operated by India with indigenous capability—three in GSO and four in non-GSO (inclined 29ı with equatorial plane) [9]. India was expected to start launching satellites by end of 2011 with a frequency of one satellite every six months; however, it appears that some delay in happening. The IRNSS would provide an absolute position accuracy of approximately 20 m throughout India and within a 2,000-km region around it.30 India is developing the GPS-aided geo augmented navigation (GAGAN) system. GAGAN will be interoperable with GPS and provide greater reliability than GPS alone. GAGAN has been designed primarily for civil aviation over India and is expected to be completed in 2013. GAGAN would especially be useful in aircraft landing where a 6-m accuracy is desirable.31 GPS services have some limitations in this regard which forced India to develop GAGAN. The IRNSS is expected to cater for the presence of GAGAN. It would be designed to maintain interoperability between GAGAN and other regional augmentations to the GPS for global navigation [9]. India had some setbacks because of the failure to launch the GSAT-4 satellite. The first GAGAN transmitter was integrated into the GSAT-4, which was part of the launch mission that failed on April 15, 2010.32 Subsequently, the first GAGAN navigation payload was launched on May 21, 2011, on board the GSAT- 8 communications satellite. With this satellite in position now, the process of certification has begun for India’s Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and is expected to get over by June 2013.33 Like many other states, India is also using GPS for various operations. India had taken a keen interest in the Galileo programme too. However, after an initial commitment for investing in the programme, India appears to have dissociated itself. The EU wanted to renegotiate with India in 2007,34 but nothing significant appears

30http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-defence/68197-indian-regional-navigational-satellite- system-irnss.html 31www.derm.qld.gov.au/gnss/systems.html, accessed on Apr 24, 2011. 32http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Success of GSAT 8 and Future of India Space Progra mme 999.html, accessed on Jun 15, 2011. 33http://www.insidegnss.com/node/2665, accessed on Apr 15, 2011. 34‘EC to restart negotiations with India on Galileo project: ESA chief’, Sep 25, 2007. http:// news.oneindia.in/2007/09/25/ec-to-restart-negotiations-with-india-on-galileo-projectesa-chief- 1190736192.html, accessed on Feb 18, 2011. 154 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia to have emerged from the deliberations. On the other hand, India’s engagement with GLONASS appears to be progressing well. Under various pacts signed in December 2004, and subsequently, India and Russia have agreed to closely cooperate in the development of new-generation GLONASS-K navigation satellites and launch them from the Indian space centre to speed up the completion of the GLONASS system amid growing competition.35 On Feb 26, 2011, the ﬁrst GLONASS-K satellite was launched by Russia but not with India’s help. India has its own pressing needs to launch its satellites, and hence it looks unlikely that any future GLONASS satellites would be launched by India. India and Russia also signed an agreement (Dec 2010) to share high-precision signals from the GLONASS for defence as well as civilian use. As per the agreement, Russia will provide access to the GLONASS high-precision navigation signals to India. In 2010, India has also signed deal to set up a joint venture for providing navigation and information services on the GLONASS platform.36 During Indian prime minister’s Dec 2011 Russia visit, both the sides have expressed mutual interest in the use of Russia’s global satellite navigation system GLONASS and have also expressed the intentions to promote cooperation in this area, including joint production of satellite navigation equipment and services to civilian users.37 However, overall there is a less amount of clarity with regard to how India intends to beneﬁt from both IRNSS and GLONASS when both the systems will be available at the same time and capable of doing almost the same job.

United Nations, Asia and Navigational Network

The third UN conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in 1999. During this conference, it was asserted that ‘there is a need to improve the efﬁciency and security of transport, search and rescue, geodesy and other activities by promoting the enhancement of, universal access to and compatibility of, space-based navigation and positioning systems’. As a reaction to this, in 2001 the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) established the Action Team on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) under the chairmanship of Italy and the USA. India, China, Japan and Malaysia were the action member states in this team (38 member states and 15 intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations).38 Subsequently, the UN

35‘Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) and Indian Agreement’ http://wordinfo.info/ unit/3935?letter=G&spage=3, accessed on Jun 22, 2011. 36The Hindu, Dec 22, 2010. 37‘Russia, India to cooperate in production of satellite navigation equipment’, http://www.gpsdaily. com/reports/Russia India to cooperate in production of satellite navigation equipment 999. html, Dec 29, 2011, accessed on Dec 29, 2011. 38http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/es/SAP/gnss/icg.html, accessed on Apr 05, 2011. Appraisal 155 along with the USA organised an international meeting on the use and applications of global navigation satellites in Vienna in December 2004. Here, West Asian states like Egypt, Syria and Turkey were also present. The meeting addressed various issues relating to the institutional framework with relating to service providers and made recommendations regarding speciﬁc global navigation satellite systems applications. The chief recommendation was for the creation of an international committee on global navigation satellite systems (ICG).39 This committee was formed in Vienna in December 2005, and its members work on voluntary basis as part of an informal body for the purpose of promoting and cooperating on matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based navigation and value-added services, as well as compatibility and interoperability among the GNSS systems, while increasing their use to support sustainable development, particularly in developing countries.40 Various meetings of ICG have been held till date—India hosted the second meeting (2007). The navigational systems of India, China and Japan are part of these arrangements. Asian states are playing their role to enhance compatibility and interoperability among current and future system providers.41

Appraisal

Mainly owing to the almost global spread of information and communication technologies, the concept of GPS navigation is no longer a novelty. Many Asian states are using such technologies. However, in Asia—being an uneven grouping of failed, developing and successful states—the usage of such technologies is uneven. Three major spacefaring nations in the region, namely, China, Japan and India, have significant stakes in the satellite navigation. All these three states have been significant users of GPS technology for many years. In regard to managing the navigational services, the approach of Japan and India looks almost similar. They want to augment the strength of GPS signals reaching their regions by creating boosting mechanisms and are also keen to develop a separate system catering to their specific regional requirements. China has successfully developed a regional system and is in the process of developing a global navigational system. These states are keen to have independent space and ground segment and user receivers. In the twenty-first century, the relevance of global navigational networks for civilian uses is undisputed. At the same time, the strategic relevance of such systems for nuclear weapon states like India and China is undisputed. Satellite navigation is an important constituent of ‘network-centric warfare’. Modern-day military power

39Report on the United Nations/United States of America International Meeting on the Use and Applications of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, (Vienna, 13Ð17 December 2004), available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105 846E.pdf, accessed on Jun10, 2011. 40http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/es/SAP/gnss/icg.html, accessed on Mar 10, 2011. 41http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/icg book01E.pdf, accessed on Jun 19, 2011. 156 11 Satellite Navigation and Asia is dependent on access to satellite navigation. Understanding the dual-use nature of this technology, all three states are not only making their individual investments but are also factoring other global navigational constellations in their security calculus. Israel being an advanced military power is expected to a major user of this technology, and their dependence on the US system is obvious. As the US GPS was an early starter in this arena, various Asian states have derived lessons from the US experience and have the advantage of late starters. Some Asian states are also found making investments in new ideas, and innovative experimentation is under way. India, for instance, is putting a few of its navigational satellites in geostationary orbit when conventional navigational systems station their satellites in medium Earth orbit (MEO). Also, these states are making their navigational satellites multipurpose for other inputs like weather. Asian states are expected to derive the maximum economic benefit from the systems developed by them. On the other hand, participation in a particular global navigational network could also dictate the pattern of future military procurements in the region, owing to compatibility factor. India will benefit from investing in the GLONASS with regard to its SU-30MKI fighter jets, its Brahmos cruise missile systems, the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, the co-development and co- production of a military multirole transport aircraft (MTA) and a fifth-generation fighter plane. In short, the GLONASS system would play a crucial role in supporting India’s aerospace power in the twenty-first century. The economic interests of China, Japan and India are global in nature. The strategic interests of Japan and India are more regional in nature, but the same is not the case with China. China understands the role of GPS in US economy as well as in its strategic preparedness. It also understands the vulnerability of the US GPS and the likely damage it could cause if blocked. For China, global positioning is not only an instrument for location identification but a means of gaining a tactical as well as strategic advantage over its adversary in case of a conflict situation arising in the Taiwan theatre. The completion of Compass project would give China a significant strategic advantage and also would enhance the commercial utility of its space programme.

References

1. Kumar S, Moore KB. The evolution of global positioning system (GPS) technology. J Sci Educ Technol. March 2002;11(1):79Ð89. 2. Takahashi H(D). Japanese regional navigation satellite system the JRANS concept. J Glob Position Syst. 2004;3(1Ð2):259Ð64. 3. Li Binghao, Dempster AG. CAPS—China’s Regional Navigation Satellite System. Jun 2010, p. 59Ð63. http://www.insidegnss.com/node/2090 4. Forden G. The military capabilities and implications of China’s indigenous satellite-based navigation system. Sci Glob Secur. 2004;12:219Ð50. 5. North R. Galileo: the military and political dimensions. 2004 Jul 5. http://www.brugesgroup. com/mediacentre/index.live?article=221#china. Accessed 2 July 2011. References 157

6. Dinerman T. Galileo gets a Chinese overlay. 2006 July 31. http://www.thespacereview.com/ article/668/1. Accessed 28 Jun 2011. 7. Dinerman T. China and Galileo, continued. 2006 Aug 21. http://www.thespacereview.com/ article/685/1. Accessed 20 Jun 2011. 8. Ramakrishnan T. ISRO to implement regional navigation satellite system. The Hindu. 2011 Jan 5. 9. Gowrisankar D, Kibe SV. who is the Director Satellite Navigation, ISRO titled ‘India’s Satellite Navigation Programme, at Hanoi, Vietnam, 2008 Dec 10 and available at www.aprsaf.org/data/ aprsaf15 data/csawg/CSAWG 6b.pdf. Accessed 15 Apr 2011. Chapter 12 Deep Space Agenda

Any satellite (or a probe) which travels to a distance of 100,000 km or more from the Earth’s surface is known to have entered the region which is normally depicted as deep space.1 Earth’s Moon is approximately at the distance of 400,000 km; hence, Moon missions are generally termed as deep space missions. Various other activities to reach planets like Mars, Venous or far-distance asteroid would be viewed also as part of deep space schema of the states. This chapter discusses the Asia’s agenda into deep space region. This chapter restricts itself to discuss Moon and Mars missions. One of the primary activities the global space community pursued in the year 2006 was to answer the questions, ‘Why should we return to the Moon?’ and ‘What do we hope to accomplish through lunar exploration?’ NASA was instrumental in posing these questions and was looking for answers from the global space community. Almost 200 lunar exploration objectives resulted from this quest. These objectives could be fitted under six major lunar exploration themes. These themes are (1) human civilisation: to extend human presence to the Moon to enable eventual settlement; (2) scientific knowledge; (3) exploration preparation: test technologies, systems, flight operations and exploration techniques; (4) global partnerships; (5) economic expansion; and (6) public engagement.2 The extent of these categories identified (is based on only one dataset) indicates that the expectations from the Moon are far too many and demand substantial technological and economic investments on part of the state. It could take few decades to accomplish a substantial number of the things the global space community

Part of this chapter draws from the author’s earlier work An Asian Moon Race?, Space Policy,26 (2010), pp. 222Ð228 1The regions beyond the gravitational inﬂuence of Earth encompassing interplanetary, interstellar, and intergalactic space. This deﬁnition is available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deep+ space, accessed on March 31, 2009. 2www.spacedaily.com/reports/Why The Moon 999.html Ð 25k, accessed on March 30, 2009 and http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/home/why moon.html, accessed on Feb 13, 2012.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 12, 159 © Springer India 2013 160 12 Deep Space Agenda envisages. It may not be possible for only one state to achieve this on its own strength, and success could be achieved in lesser time if states cooperate with each other and undertake joint missions. The current trend indicates that few states have already launched the first phase of their Moon programmes and have well- articulated roadmaps for the future. Some of these programmes have some element of international cooperation, but no policy exists for global cooperative efforts to ‘conquer’ the Moon. This signifies that the states are basically interested in finishing their groundwork for advanced space voyages on their own. States understand that the enormity of the overall task (like establishing human colonies over Moon and Mars) demands international cooperation but at the same time do probably weigh the options for such arrangement based on their own understanding about the ‘strategic relevance’ of the Moon. Apart from the USA, Russia and Europe, few Asian states are very keen to invest towards mapping and mining the Moon and also have plans for Mars missions. These states are Japan, China and India. These three states have already finished their first Moon missions and have a blueprint ready for the future. It is argued over here that their overall deep space mission aspirations have strategic ambitions attached to it.

Walking the Moon Since the 1960s

Within 12 years after the launch of the first satellite Sputnik, in 1969, the Americans succeeded in putting human on the Moon’s surface. The famous quote of the first visitor to the Moon Neil Armstrong was ‘one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind’. However, the American Apollo programme was the outcome of the ‘Sputnik shock’. This shock was traumatic to the Americans who believed that if the Soviets could put a satellite into orbit, then they could do same with nuclear weapons. They wanted to disprove the perception that the Americans were technically inferior and hence potentially weaker than the Soviets. Apollo demonstrated the technological supremacy of the Americans to the world. Interestingly, further to initial few flights of Apollo, nothing much happened, and in fact last three Apollo flights were cancelled. This mainly happened because there was no clarity of agenda. The financial costs involved were sky-scraping. ‘The lesson of Apollo is simple: without a strategic purpose, manned space flight is not deemed sufficiently important to warrant the kind of government resource investment necessary for success’ [1]. Apollo programme carried Americans to the Moon in 1969Ð1972. Also, few unmanned probes visited the Moon during the same time period. All these manned and unmanned visits collected significant scientific data but not sufficient enough to answer many questions starting from the evolution of the Moon, the possibility of availability of the water over the Moon and about the nature and quantum of mineral deposits over the Moon. The challenge of reaching the Moon (either manned visit or otherwise) was itself so immense that studying the Moon became part II of the story. Asian Moon Missions 161

Now, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, Moon has regained the attention of space scientists, rocket engineers and policymakers. Mankind has realised that the natural resources on the surface of the Earth are ﬁnite in nature and hence has started tapping at other planets for the same. Naturally, Moon becomes the best option being the closest satellite of the Earth, and it has been visited by humans in the past. However, the knowledge, expertise and capabilities in regard to basic space technologies to send a satellite into the space is available with very few states, and to reach the Moon requires much better understanding of rocket science and resources. Hence, only the big three from Asia are actually found attempting to conquer the Moon, while few others have expressed ambitions to do so. Modern-day space exploration could be broadly divided into two major segments: one, putting the satellites either in low, medium or geostationary (36,000 km above Earth’s surface) orbits and two, reaching to the planets, what is commonly known as the ‘deep space missions’. Moon the nearest satellite to the Earth is 387 400 km away from the Earth. Amongst the space players, there is a sharp contrast in terms of capabilities. The Iranians can reach the low Earth orbit now, while the Americans had reached the Moon four decades back. In deep space arena, Japan, China and India are relatively late bloomers, but during last few years, they have shown remarkable growth.

Asian Moon Missions

China

In China, scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences are looked upon as the nation’s pre-eminent scientific community and are also respected in society. They play a major role in deciding country’s strategic investments. They have influenced the Chinese leadership thinking towards development of its nuclear and space programme. In recent past, a core group of scientists have played a major role towards convening the military and political leadership in the country to make significant investments in satellite navigation system (Compass) and Moon programme [2]. China has successfully completed its first lunar mission and has launched its second robotic mission, Chang’e-2 on October 1, 2010, to celebrate 61 years of communist rule. China has devised its lunar exploration project—known as Project Chang’e as three-stage project [3]. These states are: Stage One—The work began on March 1, 2003. This stage was aimed at building and launch of Moon probe satellite. This satellite was launched on Oct 24, 2007 (Chang’e-1), and the mission was scheduled to continue for a year. The mission was extended for some more time. Stage Two—Here, China is expected to launch a Moon car and make a successful soft landing, patrol and explore the Moon and lay the groundwork for further Moon research. Chang’e-2 is scheduled to be launched in 2011 (actually the launch was done 1 year in advance). 162 12 Deep Space Agenda

Stage Three—China would be launching a small module and Moon robot to collect necessary samples, return safely, research the samples, provide data for a manned Moon landing and choose a location for China’s Moon base. The Chinese conceptualisation regarding the Moon mission has the following broad objectives3: ¥ Three-dimensional survey of the Moon’s surface and analysis of the distribution of elements on lunar surface: This would be done by undertaking detection and analyses of the content and distribution of useful elements and types of materials on the lunar surface. ¥ Investigation of the characteristics of lunar regolith and calculation of the depth of lunar soil on the surface. ¥ Exploration of the circumstance between the Earth and the Moon: Aim is to explore the space environment between the Earth and the Moon and to record initial solar wind data and study the effect of solar activities on EarthÐMoon space environment. China has successfully completed the stage one of its Moon mission. Cheng’e-1 fully completed its mission on March 1, 2009. This spacecraft was de-orbited, and it impacted the Moon.

Japan

Japan had its eyes fixed at Moon more than two decades earlier than its Asian neighbours, China and India. Japan became only the third country in history to reach Earth’s closest neighbour, the Moon, with the launch of its unmanned MUSES-A probe on Jan 24, 1990. This was the first lunar mission since the Soviets’ Luna 24 in 1976 [4]. On 10 April 1993, MUSES-A (HITEN) satellite ceased its mission by hard landing on the Moon’s surface. After its launch, HITEN successfully carried out every planned mission. This included various lunar orbital manoeuvres, insertion of a subsatellite into an orbit around the Moon and landing on the Moon surface [5]. Naturally, backed by this experience, in the twenty-first century Asian quest for the Moon, it was Japan which took the lead. It launched a lunar probe shortly before China. During September 2007, Japan with H-2A rocket launched ‘Kaguya lunar orbiter’ (a satellite orbiting 100 km above the Moon). Formally known as SELENE, short for SELenological and ENgineering Explorer, Kaguya carried 14 science instruments and two small micro-satellites to make detailed maps of the Moon’s surface, probe its interior and study the lunar gravitational field [6]. Japan has developed a clear-cut roadmap for future Moon explorations. It is also interested in human exploration of the Moon but could look for an international partner for

3http://www.cctv.com/english/20071102/100731.shtml and Chris Bergin, “China enters the new moon race with Chang’e-1 launch”, October 24, 2007, available at http://www.nasaspaceflight. com/2007/10/china-enters-the-new-moon-race-with-change-1-launch/ accessed on Jan 14, 2009. Asian Moon Missions 163 such venture. A SELENE-B mission is on the books too. Probably, this mission was for the 2009Ð2010 time frame, involving a lunar lander and rover mission, telescope and ground-based network of scientific devices.4 However, this programme has not been much discussed during recent past. Now this programme finds reference as SELENE-25 and is known as a follow-on mission of Kaguya (SELENE). The Japanese Moon mission Kaguya-1 had following broad objectives6: ¥ To understand Moon’s origin and evolution: Aim is to gather information on the characterisation of the lunar surface and detailed gravimetry. The mission to cover data collection on element abundance, mineral assemblage, surface topography, subsurface structure, magnetic and gravity fields and precession ¥ To develop technology for future lunar explorations ¥ To consider the possible future utilisations of the Moon. Collect the information on lunar environment. Gather information form point of view of planning future facilities of manned base/astronomical observatory On October 2008, the nominal operation period of Kaguya-1 was successfully completed, and it was announced that the extended operation will proceed until summer 2009. During the extended operation period, Kaguya-1 had changed its altitude from 100 to 50 km (as planned) [7]. The satellite was lowered to a 50-m orbit on Feb 1, 2012, and it finally impacted on the Moon on Jun 10, 2012. This controlled impact was to take place by Aug 2012, but some technical flaws forced slight change.

India

India’s inclination for pushing the envelope—especially in the area of space science—is one of the reasons why India’s Moon mission got conceptualised. India’s stated objectives for reaching the Moon are to expand scientiﬁc knowledge, upgrade India’s technological capabilities and provide challenging opportunities to young scientists working in planetary sciences [8]. India’s intention to look towards lunar orbit was articulated by the Indian Prime Minister Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee during his Independent Day speech on Aug 15, 2003 when he declared ‘India plans to reach the moon’. On October 22, 2008, India successfully launched its ﬁrst satellite probe towards the Moon called Chandrayaan-1. The mission was aborted after 9 months during Aug 2009 due to loss of signal. However, as per the Indian space community, by that time India had already achieved 95% of

4www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3688344/, accessed on Apr 1, 2009 and http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/ 2003AdSpR..31.2363S, accessed on Feb 12, 2012. 5http://www.jspec.jaxa.jp/e/activity/selene2.html, accessed on Feb 12, 2012 and Satoshi Tanaka, Hiroaki Shiraishi, Manabu Kato, Tatsuaki Okada, ‘The science objectives of the SELENE-2 mission as the post SELENE mission’, Advances in Space Research 42 (2008) 394Ð401. 6http://www.planetary.org/explore/topics/kaguya/objectives.html, accessed on Jan 12, 2009. 164 12 Deep Space Agenda

Table 12.1 Moon missions: at a glance Planned Actual Cost US mission cessation of $in Country Name of probe Launch date duration mission Location millions Japan Kaguya-1 14 Sept 2007 One year (to 10 Jun 2012 100 km above 279 continue Moon till surface summer 2009) China Chang’e-1 24 Oct 2007 One year (was 1 Mar 2009 Polar orbit 187 extended) 200 km above Moon surface India Chandrayaan-1 22 Oct 2008 Two years 29 August 100 km above 78 (extend- 2009 Moon able) surface its mission objectives. This satellite had carried sensors from India, the USA, Canada and Bulgaria. For its second probe (Chandrayan-2), India has signed an agreement with Russia’s Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos, for a joint lunar research and exploration mission. This mission is expected to take place during 2014. Chandrayan-2 mission will consist of the spacecraft and a landing platform with the Moon rover. The platform with the rover will detach itself after the spacecraft reaches its orbit above the Moon and would land on lunar soil. India will be responsible for the orbiter and Russia for the Moon rover [9]. The Indian objectives regarding its second Moon mission are as follows7: ¥ To conduct mineralogical and chemical mapping of the lunar surface. This would also help towards unravelling the mystery of evolution of the Moon and solar system. The Moon surface would be searched for surface or subsurface water ice. ¥ To study the Moon from the perspective of future landing missions. ¥ To upgrade the technological base in the country.

Comparing Missions of Big Three

Table 12.1 summarises few details of the ﬁrst Moon missions of Japan, China and India.

7http://www.isro.gov.in/pressrelease/Oct22 2008.htm, accessed on Dec 11, 2008, and informal conversation with few ISRO scientists. Asian Moon Missions 165

Table 12.2 Important payloads Japan China India Terrain camera, multiband Stereo camera/ Terrain mapping camera imager and spectral spectrometer imager proﬁler Hyperspectral imager Laser altimeter Laser altimeter Lunar laser ranging instrument X-ray spectrometer X-ray spectrometer High-energy X-ray spectrometer Gamma-ray spectrometer Gamma-ray spectrometer Smart near-infrared spectrometer Atom reﬂecting analyser Solar wind detectors Radiation dose monitor Mini synthetic aperture radar Moon mineralogy mapper Lunar magnetometer Charged particle High-energy particle spectrometer detector Plasma imager Relay satellite

Table 12.2 lists important sensors which are part of the Moon missions of the three Asian countries. Here, an attempt has been made to present them in a comparative fashion (as far as possible) in regard to their functions. However, it may be noted that the design approaches and designing agencies for all these sensors are different. Also, the characteristics of some sensors vary. Hence, only a partial comparison is possible.

Mission Instruments

The mission proﬁle for all the three states involved launching of a satellite which would enter into a lunar orbit and position itself approximately around 100 km/200 km over the Moon’s surface. The sensors onboard of these satellites took various observations. The attempt was to analyse the composition of materials on and below the surface of the Moon. Idea was to know the physical properties of the Moon. Scientists wanted to know more about the terrain characteristics from the point of view of selecting future landing area for unmanned and manned missions. All this information was gathered without landing on the Moon, and the satellites were essentially used as remote sensing systems. Japan’s Kaguya-1 mission had groupings of sensors meant for elemental distribution, mineral distribution, surface and subsurface structure feature analyses, gaining environment knowledge and understanding gravitational ﬁeld distribution.8 China’s Chang’e-1 mission instruments could be roughly divided into mission groupings

8http://www.kaguya.jaxa.jp/en/about/about sat e.htm, accessed on Dec 14, 2008. 166 12 Deep Space Agenda like mineral distribution, Moon topography assessment and solar wind understanding, while India’s Chandrayaan-1 mission sensors were tasked to undertake terrain and mineralogy mapping of the Moon’s surface, look for availability of water on the Moon and understand more about lunar gravity. In a broader sense, there was much commonality in the missions of all the three states. In the case of Kaguya-1 mission, the overall mission configuration was somewhat different from others. This Japanese mission constitutes not only of the orbiter but also two 50-kg small satellites (relay satellite and VRAD satellite: The relay satellite is known as Okina9 and the other is Ouna) which were released by the main orbiter after it had reached lunar orbit. Relay satellite plays a role towards understanding the gravity field. Knowledge of gravity filed is essential to study the evolution of Moon. Here, four-way Doppler measurements of main orbiter by using relay satellite for far-side gravity field are taken.10 The other VRAD satellite (VLBI RADio source) contributes towards measurements transmission of radio waves which in turn contribute to the accuracy of the gravity field, especially on the lunar limb areas. The ground stations involved towards monitoring and processing the data received from the satellite include National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ) and few others.11 The missions were also tasked to photograph the Earth form their position. It is expected that these missions would gather unknown information in regard to ionosphere and aurora.

Deep Space Networks

Sending a satellite to the Moon is only one part of the story, and the other part is to establish a deep space network for tracking and communicating with the satellite when it is in lunar orbit. China does not have an exclusive network to cater for their Moon mission. There are few networks available globally like the US network—consisting of sites in California, Australia and Spain. However, geopolitics plays a dominant role in this, and in case of China, this network is off limits for political reasons. So the mission relied on a combination of Chinese and European assets. European Space Agency (ESA) has offered China assistance with communications and tracking relays to

9The relay satellite ‘OKINA (RSTAR)’ made an impact on the lunar surface on February 12, 2009 (JST), and the four-way Doppler measurement mission was successfully completed. 10In Japan, the Usuda Deep Space Center was established in Usuda Town (new name—Saku City from Apr. 2005) to conduct command operations and receive data from deep space probes. The uplinked radio wave from Usuda is relayed to main orbiter, which is returned to Usuda via relay satellite again, and Doppler frequency is measured at Usuda. This information is available at official JAXA website, and also please refer the succeeding note. 11http://www.selene.jaxa.jp/en/equipment/rsat e.htm, http://www.jaxa.jp/about/centers/udsc/ index e.html, http://www.kaguya.jaxa.jp/en/profile/index.htm, accessed on Dec 15, 2008. Asian Moon Missions 167 and from the probe using its deep space network ESTRACK. This support was mainly because the Chinese had promised to share the data gathered from the Chang’e-1 mission in return [10]. China has wisely avoided any overdependence on such agencies. For purpose of the Moon mission, they have modified their S-band aerospace Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT & C) network designed earlier for their manned space programme. The largest antennas for this network have an aperture of only 12 m. A series of technical measures were taken to ensure that such antennas could communicate with their Moon probe too [11]. India has installed a pair of giant antennas to monitor its Moon mission. The facility known as Indian Deep Space Network (IDSN) consists of two powerful dish antennas, 32 and 18 m in diameter. This network will serve as the base station for future planetary missions like to Mars and would also be used to track the proposed space telescope, the astronomical satellite (Astrosat).12 Apart from this, various ground stations within and outside India are available under the ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC) for providing ground support to Moon missions. As per JAXA official website for the purposes of Kaguya mission, Japan is making use of the terrestrial station which is present at many places of the world, with Sagamihara in Japan as a centre. The deep space centre at Usuda and Uchinoura Space Center that operates two large antennas (20- and 34-m dishes) also form part of this telemetry tracking and command network.

Mission Output

All these three states have already finished their first phase of experimentation, and few results are available in public domain. Japan has released a global lunar topographic map with a spatial resolution finer than 0.5ı derived using data from the laser altimeter (LALT) onboard the Japanese lunar explorer Kaguya. India has also released many pictures taken by its craft of the surface of the Moon from various angles. All these images indicate that in comparison with the previous information available, this new set of information reveals unbiased lunar topography for scales finer than a few hundred kilometres. Also, the Japanese mission has revealed few interesting details about the volcanic activity on the Moon and new revelations about the far-side gravity field of the Moon.13

12During informal conversation with S.K. Shivakumar, director of the ISRO’s Telemetry Tracking and Command Network. 13At 40th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference (2009), on March 24, 2009, ‘Lunar Missions: Results from Kaguya, Chang’e-1 and Chandrayan 1’ were presented, and the details are available at http://www.lpi.usra.edu/meetings/lpsc2009/pdf/sess301.pdf, accessed on Apr 14, 2009. This information is technical in nature and discusses mainly the performance of the sensors and method to decipher data from the data obtained from these missions. Also, please refer, Science 13 February 168 12 Deep Space Agenda

One of the greatest contributions of Chandrayaan-1 mission was the role it played towards discovering the water signature on the Moon surface in collaboration with NASA. Chandrayaan-1 also confirmed presence of iron in the lunar soil. The mission has successfully gathered data for a total of 30 solar flares apart from helping the manning of three-dimensional topography of the Moon.14 These three states have perhaps released the selective information to the outside world so far. Also, it would take some time to decipher the data received. In certain cases, they are also probably waiting for the confirmation of their assessment from the experts. It is difficult to judge at this point in time as to how much information would be made available for public consumption by these three states.

China’s Second Moon Mission

The Chang’e-2 mission was launched on Oct 1, 2010, and has ﬁnished its all pre-set goals within its designed life span of 6 months by April 1, 2011. This mission is designed to get as close as 15 km above the Moon’s surface and take high- resolution imagery. The basic aim behind this mission was to test key technologies and collect data for future landings. Chang’e-2 has provided close-up pictures of Moon’s Sinus Iridum (Bay of Rainbows15), the proposed landing site for Chang’e-3 planned for 2013.16 This satellite has been set off from the Moon in remote outer space. Moon exploration involves travelling a distance of about 400,000 km away from the Earth. But, the outer space exploration involves a travel of 1.5 million km. After a travel of approximately 80 days from the region close to the Moon, this craft has arrived at a Lagrangian point (L2)17 where it is expected to stay till the end of 2012 to conduct scientiﬁc observations and test deep space tracking and control capability for future possible explorations of Jupiter and the poles of the Sun. The satellite is also expected to monitor in 2012 the testing of two large antennas being built for

2009, Vol. 323. No. 5916, this issue has articles analysing the details based on the data made available by the Japanese Moon mission. 14‘Chandrayaan’s Moon ﬁndings: Water, rocks and traces of Apollo’, Oct 22, 2009, http://news.in. msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3303481&page=0, accessed on Jun 12, 2011, and Ninad Bondre, ‘Planetary science: Wet moon dry Earth’, Nature Geoscience 2, 746 (2009). 15Geographical feature on the Moon. 16‘China’s second lunar probe completes 6 months’, Sept 6, 2011, http://lunarscience.nasa.gov/ articles/chinas-second-lunar-probe-completes-6-months, accessed on Sept 7, 2011. 17It is a point where gravitational forces and the orbital motion of a body balance each other. There are ﬁve Lagrangian points in the SunÐEarth system, and the Chang’e-2 has reached one of those nearest to Earth. Lying in the Earth’s shadow, this Lagrangian point is exposed to less radiation from the sun than other Lagrangian points, and it is an ideal place for scientists to put space telescopes when they want to observe the universe. ‘China’s second lunar probe reaches deep space’, China Daily, Aug 31, 2011, available at http://www.ecns.cn/2011/08-31/2048.shtml, accessed on Sept 2, 2011. Moon for What? 169 deep space exploration.18 On Feb 6, 2012, China has released a very detailed map of the Moon, marking the best view yet of the lunar surface as seen by a Chinese spacecraft. This map is based on the inputs received from the Chang’e-2 mission.

Moon for What?

Moon was conquered four decades back. Then it was an event of the political one-upmanship. For scientists, it was an act of scientific adventurism, and the major challenge was to take the man to the Moon and bring him back safely to the Earth. The efforts were concentrated towards reaching the Moon than actually studying what is there on the surface of the Moon. Subsequently, also very few unmanned missions took off. Hence, even today, the Moon remains to be the least accurately measured surface for its topography for lack of accurate instrumentation. In short, the information collected during Apollo era was of little significance for understanding the structural characteristics of the Moon. All this prompted to study the Moon afresh in the twenty-first century. There is very little knowledge about the atmospheric conditions over and around the Moon. Also, no seismic data is available in the post-Apollo era. Probably, the USA was lucky during Apollo era when their human missions had not encountered any significant hazards like solar flares or did not land on an unfriendly surface. In reality, the missions were undertaken with limited knowledge about the Moon’s atmosphere and surface. In fact, much more information is required even to undertake a robotic mission to the Moon. Mapping of Moon’s gravity particularly from the farside, knowledge about its magnetic field and presence of hydrogen in its soil (an indirect method to find the presence of ice/water on the Moon) are important from point of view of planning future human missions. There is a need to develop new data set to navigate on the Moon comfortably [12]. The basic purpose behind these three missions was to fill this data void. Their missions had various state- of-the-art equipment onboard. They undertook the three-dimensional analysis of Moon’s entire surface in real sense for the first time. Since the basic purpose behind studying the Moon for these three states is similar, there were commonalities in their scientific objectives too. In general, there has been a commonality in the philosophy behind the Moon mission and the benefits it could achieve thereof. Beyond knowledge, the Moon missions also have far-reaching influence on pattern of international relations, economic competition and technological cooperation. As per a Chinese scholar, the exploration of space resources

18‘China’s second moon orbiter Chang’e-2 goes to outer space’, Jun 10, 2011. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China second moon orbiter Change 2 goes to outer space 999.html, accessed on Sept 7, 2011 and ‘China’s second lunar probe reaches deep space’, China Daily, Aug 31, 2011, available at http://www.ecns.cn/2011/08-31/2048.shtml, accessed on Sept 2, 2011. 170 12 Deep Space Agenda would help in (1) development of the aerospace industry and demonstrate China’s strength in this field; (2) China will be able to actively participate in competition and collaboration, solving problems concerning lunar resources, domain division and sharing of benefits among different nations; (3) growth of science/manpower within the country; (4) China could become a founding member of an international Moon colonisation club; (5) the manned spaceflight project could help the strategists and policymakers recognise the strategic importance of outer space security to the nations security; and (6) manned Moon landing would help country to reclaim its glory and splendour [13]. More or less the same is true in case of Japan and India also. Such missions would also bring-in direct and indirect economic benefits in the long run mainly because of the technological spin-offs from the entire exercise. States like India have considerable interests in fields like astronomy, and their dedicated satellite for this purpose called Astrosat is scheduled for launch in near future. To continue with further research in this field, India would like to have its own telescope on the surface of the Moon. This is because this would give astronomers an enormously improved view of the universe. There are some significant advantages for placing telescope on the Moon.19 First, the Moon has negligible atmosphere. Second, the nights there last for approximately 14 days and lastly the farside of the Moon is the only radio-quiet area in the inner solar system, providing the perfect platform for radio astronomy. It is also possible that the telescope could be built on the Moon itself by using lunar dust (regolith) for manufacture of mirrors. Experts in composite materials regard lunar dust as a prized composite material. A composite using lunar dust could offer an ultra-lightweight material with extraordinary strength [14]. Possibility of building a space platform which can be used for generating power and then beaming it back to the Earth is being debated. As per Mr Madhavan Nair, the then chairman ISRO, India is keen to work on such projects.20 Moon is considered as the best place to build such platforms. Chinese scientists also believe that the Moon could serve as a new supplier of energy and resources for humankind. For them, lunar development is crucial to sustainable development of human beings on Earth. As per Ouyang Ziyuan, principal scientist of China’s lunar project, ‘Whoever first conquers the Moon will benefit first’ [15]. Apart from space sector, these states are developing various other important sectors of technology too, and biotechnology is one of them. Moon’s surface offers an opportunity to conduct research in this field. Biological experiments could be carried out on plants and animals over here under reduced gravity conditions. It is likely that these states could use the Moon surface for conducting advanced research in newer areas of biotechnology. Their pharmaceutical industry also may benefit from such research.

19Moon is seismically stable and has no winds hence offers a stable platform for observation, would allow scientists to extend the energy range of solar spectra below the energy cutoffs imposed by Earth’s atmosphere, observations would be free of complicating geomagnetic effects. 20Interview with ISRO Chairman M. Nair in Pallava Bagla and Subhadra Menon, n-21, p.137Ð138. Asian Mars Missions 171

Overall, the Moon mission offers these states opportunity to develop space- related industries like satellite manufacturing, remote sensing and navigation. It would also indirectly further help them to develop their IT sector, materials industry and Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) research and development. All these efforts are also expected to further boost their science and technology missions and also would bring economic beneﬁts.

Asian Mars Missions

Alike Moon, Mars also has been a part of agenda for spacefaring almost since beginning. The first mission towards Mars was undertaken by the erstwhile USSR in 1960. However, Mars been one arena which has mostly alluded success particularly during early years to the major spacefaring nations. Almost, two thirds of all spacecraft destined for Mars have failed to achieve desired results. Till mid of 2011, only one Asian country (Japan) had attempted a Mars mission, and that too was a failure. The first successful fly-by mission to Mars was NASA’s Mariner 4, launched in 1964. NASA’s Viking programme during mid-1970s could be viewed as one of the most successful programme where two landers had touched the Mars surface and had remained operational for 3Ð6 years.21 All these years, the primary objectives of various missions have been basically to understand the evolution and present- day geophysical, chemical, geological and atmospheric states of the planet and its interaction with the interplanetary environment.22 The interests of Asian states in Mars are somewhat limited. Limitations of technology and the financial concerns appear to be the main reasons behind this. However, with increase in space activities and understanding the importance of Mars, the big three Asian space powers are expected to improve their investments in near future. The distance between the Moon and the Earth varies from around 356,400Ð406,700 km. In case of Mars, the distance increased multifold and varies from around 56,000,000Ð399,000,000 km. It is important to note that even though reaching the Moon allows the state to exhibit its deep space mission capabilities, the real deep space achievement is to reach the Mars. In post Cold War era, the first Asian sate to launch a Mars mission is Japan; mission was launched on July 4, 1998. This was Japan’s first interplanetary mission and was called NOZOMI (PLANET-B) meaning Hope. The aim of this mission

21“Missions to Mars Past Present and Future” http://www.disabled-world.com/entertainment/ hobby/astronomy/mars-missions.php, accessed on Aug 20, 2011. 22The Mars-94 and Mars-96 Missions [and Discussion] Author(s): Alexander V. Zakharov and H. Fechtig Source: Philosophical Transactions: Physical Sciences and Engineering, Vol. 349, No. 1690, The Solar-System: A Review of Results from Space Missions (Nov. 15, 1994), pp. 295Ð307 Published by: The Royal Society. 172 12 Deep Space Agenda was to orbit Mars at an altitude 130Ð150, 5,000 km and to transmit data for one Martian year. It had 14 instruments onboard including sensors from EU, Canada and the USA. Initially, the performance of the craft was found normal in the ErathÐ Moon system. On the way to Mars, however, troubles occurred, and substantial orbit changes were made. Thus, it took 4 years more than the original plan and the mission approached closely towards Mars by December 2003; however, Mars orbit insertion could not be achieved, and the craft was lost [16]. Subsequently, Japan has not announced any other major plans for visiting Mars even though they are having an agenda of visiting other planets. Japan unsuccessfully attempted a mission to Venus during Dec 2010. Japan’s spacecraft Akatsuki (‘dawn’ in Japanese) failed to inject the orbiter into the planned orbit as a result of incorrect orbit estimation. They propose to undertake a renewed attempt to get it into orbit around Venus in 2015 [17]. China and India are the late starters as compared to Japan. China has clearly articulated a Mars roadmap; however, India’s attempts still appear to be in nascent state. China’s first planetary mission Yinghuo-1 Mars orbiter failed due to the launcher failure. It was a ChineseÐRussian exploration of Mars. Yinghuo-1 was launched along with the Russian craft called Fobos-Grunt to Mars by a Ukrainian rocket. This small probe was weighing 115 kg and had a designed for a 2-year mission. The main goal of this mission was to search for the signs of liquid water on the Mars surface. The other scientific objectives of this mission include an investigation of the plasma environment and magnetic field study of Martian ion escape processes and possible mechanisms. This probe had five payloads onboard. In the vicinity of Mars, Yinghuo-1 was to be inserted into a near-equatorial, elliptical orbit. The spacecraft was to approach within 400Ð1,000 km of Mars’ surface at closest approach. The mission was tasked to undertake various measurements. Fobos-Grunt and Yinghuo-1 were expected to work in tandem to measure the structure of Mars’ ionosphere.23 The Ukrainian Zenit rocket was launched on Nov 8, 2011, with Yinghuo-1 and the Russian Fobos-Grunt spacecraft onboard. Fobos-Grunt was to perform two burns, an orbit-raising manoeuvre, two and a half hours after launch [18]. This was meant to depart Earth orbit and begin its journey to Mars. However, these burns did not take place. Further efforts to retrieve the situation failed, and on Nov 17, 2011, China formally declared the loss of Yinghuo-1 probe. The next ‘launch window’ will open around Nov 2013 when Mars and Earth would be closest to each other. Subsequent opportunity would be available only in 2016. China is presently working towards catching the earliest possible launch date. In 2013, China is expected to launch its solo Mars mission by using China-

23‘China’s Yinghuo-1 Mars’, Sept 9, 2010, Orbiter http://www.planetary.org/blog/ article/00002655/linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/ S0275106210000172, accessed on Sept 9, 2011. The information in this blog is based on two different papers written by Chinese scientists in Chinese journals. There are some variations (mostly minor) in the information provided in these papers. Asian Mars Missions 173 made rockets (best option is probably Long March 3B), observation device and detector. This Mars probe is expected to be an updated and modified version of lunar probe.24 China appears to have long-term interest to study Mars seriously; they were part of the Mars-500 experiment (2007Ð2011).25 This experiment was jointly conducted by Russia, Europe and China. The project was aimed to obtain experimental data on the health of astronauts and their ability for work in situation of prolonged isolation. For this purpose, a 520-day manned Mars mission was simulated where six astronauts were kept in isolation for all these days. This group had one astronaut from China. This experiment would have yielded valuable psychological and medical data which would help China in regard to their planned manned Moon/Mars mission. Manned Mars exploration could be viewed as an ultimate dream for major space powers. The Bush administration in 2004 has identified such mission as one of the long-term goals for the USA. Interestingly, President Barack Obama views China as a potential partner for an eventual human mission to Mars.26 It is generally felt that such mission would be difficult for any single nation to undertake such a mission due to financial and technological challenges. There are chances of resistance with the USA for such potential tie-up. It would be of interest to know how Chinese leadership views such offer. India has begun preparations for a Mars mission; and has rescheduled its earlier plan of launching the mission during the 2016/2018 window. Now, it would be launching its Mars mission on Nov 27, 2013 when the red planet will be closer to the earth for injecting the spacecraft into its elliptical orbit. India’s Mars mission was announced by the Indian Prime Minister on during his Independence Day speech on Aug 15, 2012. As per Chairman ISRO Mr K Radhakrishnan this US$80 million mission would attempt to look for life-sustaining elements 500 km away from the Martian surface. India would use PSLV-XL rocket to launch this mission which would have nine instruments to study various aspects of the red planet. Launching of this mission would allow India to join the elite club of five top nations comprising the US, Russia, Europe, China and Japan, with indigenous technology for a 300- day space voyage from the launch date. India expects to undertake this mission as one of the low-cost missions like its other deep space missions, namely, the Moon mission.27

24‘China Likely to Launch First Probe To Explore Mars’ Surface In 2013’, Mar 03, 2011, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/02/c 13757750.htm, and Morris Jones, ‘China Goes To Mars’, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China Goes To Mars 999.html accessed on May 15, 2011. 25Details of this experiment are available on http://mars500.imbp.ru/en/index e.html, accessed on Jan 2, 2012. 26White House science adviser John Holdren before testifying May 4 before the House Appropriations subcommittee on commerce, justice and science. ‘Obama sees China as a partner in Mars mission’, Jun 5, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42934529/ns/technology and science- space/t/obama-sees-china-partner-mars-mission/#, accessed on Sept 6, 2011. 27http://www.ﬁrstpost.com/tech/indias-mars-mission-to-begin-november-2013-459232.html, accessed on Sep 19, 2012. 174 12 Deep Space Agenda

Strategic Signiﬁcance of Deep Space Agenda

Taken as a whole, the Moon agenda of these three states portrays a continuing deep space policy. All these years, the space agendas of these three states have largely been application-driven programmes. The major thrust was found towards usage of space technologies for the overall growth. In regard to states like China, the covert agenda of using space technologies as a tool for security has also been obvious. Now, with investments in deep space missions, these states have succeeded in articulating their long-term ambitions for space exploration for strategic purposes. Here, the term strategic should not be viewed with narrow military vision. It could also mean long term too. In the twenty-first century, the term ‘strategic’ has additional meanings associated with diplomacy/international relations as well as economic propositions. Human exploration of solar system, starting with the Moon could be said to be a definitive open-ended programme. It is often opinioned that the MoonÐMars exploration could be viewed as a long-term, say, 30-year effort, but in reality it should be viewed as an open-ended project [19]. For these three states, it looks that they have clear-cut roadmaps developed at least for their Moon programmes. These states missed the first round of lunar exploration (Apollo era) but with their successful launches have given them a lead (in global context) in the second round of lunar exploration. Competition could be said to be the part of this new Moon race, although it lacks the drama of first Cold War fueled context [20, p. 727]. Overall, the ‘strategic’ interests need to be viewed from the technological, military, international cooperation/competition and economic point of view. The Moon mission which is considered as a major technological marvel will always have the subtext of ‘nationalism’ at the backdrop, and states would exploit it both for tactical as well as strategic political benefits. It is premature to look for direct military applicability of this mission when the overall Moon programme is still in initial stage. Also, to argue that Moon missions of these states are with hidden military agenda would also be incorrect. What is important is that space technology is inherently dual-use technology and Moon missions also need to be analysed from that perspective. Hence, broadly the growth of technology itself could be viewed from a point of view that there could be direct or indirect benefits for military too. Moon Missions have purposes beyond scientific explorations too. The basic advantage with such ambitious projects is that they help in the development of frontier technologies. Such technologies could in turn find applicability in various other facets of life too including the armed forces. One major aspect for research and development in regard to Moon mission is the development of Deep Space Networks (DSN). Most of the scientific developments undertaken for this are expected to find major applicability in regard to various aspects of data handling. Additional investments in regard to development of DSN technology would be essential to enable and enhance the next wave of space exploration. This is expected to lead towards development of new types of high-level information services, Strategic Significance of Deep Space Agenda 175 enabled by high-capacity connectivity [21]. DSN developments are also expected to lead towards increased emphasis on data networking and data processing applications. First and foremost, the ongoing missions are going to help to increase the world’s digital knowledge about the Moon manifold. It is expected that the state-of-the-art sensors onboard of these three crafts would help to generate huge data sets giving new knowledge about the Moon’s surface (stored in digitised form). This knowledge is going to be of immense importance for further research. Moon missions at this point in time could be said to have undertaken for two primary reasons. One, to check the viability of access to helium-328 that is available in abundance over Moon. Here the purpose is not only restricted to helium-3 but to recognise the overall mineral resources availability on the Moon. Second, to make a permanent base over the Moon.29 The strategic issues related to Moon and Mars surface bases will be centred on development of enabling technologies, cost of missions and international cooperation. The obvious path for tackling such issues will be through innovative and new means of international cooperation [22]. However, these three missions do not give any indication that a substantial international cooperation is being envisaged. Chandrayan-1 mission could be said to be a mission with some amount of international cooperation. In this mission, half of the sensors onboard Indian craft are from other states. Now the issue is ‘is the lack of Asian cooperation in this field by default or by design?’ Observers feel that largely the technical and political motivations behind most of the planned missions leave little room for the international scientific community to team up on joint projects [20, p. 724]. It is also important to factor in the dynamics of overall IndiaÐChina and ChinaÐJapan relationship too. It could be too naive to expect these states to shed the histological baggage and join hands in this field when otherwise the relationship is not so harmonious. Interestingly, this may not be the case in regard to missions on Mars. There are indications that the states are interested in bilateral or multilateral collaboration in regard to missions to Mars, but not within the region. There are proposals like China collaborating with Russia for the Mars mission. States may have their own rationale behind this. It could be that states feel that ‘race for resources’ in regard to Mars is not a financially and technologically viable proposal. Also, Moon is being viewed as a gateway to Mars, so if Moon is within a reach, then activities for Mars could be controlled. On the other hand, joint collaborations for Mars missions could help transfer of technology which could be used for Moon missions.

28Helium-3 is expected to help greatly towards resolving the energy crisis on the Earth. 29States are looking at Antarctica model for Moon—the earlier you reach you are suitably positioned to grab the peace of ‘Earth’ for your state. A permanent base has a major military relevance too. Also, such a (zero gravity) base can help signiﬁcantly research and development activities. 176 12 Deep Space Agenda

Most of the solar system is inhospitable to humans. States will probably never attempt to visit Mercury and Venus or venture to Jupiter and beyond. The ‘welcome mat’ is out only with Moon, Mars and the asteroids [23]. If mankind has to choose another planet to live on, the best choice is Mars because of its natural environment, which is similar to that of Earth [3]. Hence, at some point of time, states are likely to factor in the Mars missions in their overall security calculus. It needs to be remembered that having human colonies on Mars may take another 100Ð200 years, and hence presently states are not in a hurry to contextualise Mars in their strategic planning. Since reaching Moon is viewed as the first step for the Mars, probably at this point of time, states are self-centred in their Moon agenda but are keeping an openmindinregardtoMars. Currently, the major military benefits states could get from the deep space agenda are expected to come from the DSN technology and the robotic technology. The composition of future missions depicts that states would be operating robots on the Moon’s surface for the purpose of mineral analysis. The entire mission would be controlled from the Earth. Already, missions on similar lines have been undertaken successfully particularly over the Mars by the USA. The military logic emerging from experimentation is simple—if you can operate a robot on the Moon, you can always operate it in the enemy state or on the battlefield. The issue could only be that of the size and role of the robot. Future warfare is expected to see significant usage of robotic technology in various forms, and the robots developed for Moon mission could get modified for the purposes of military usage. The radar networks developed for Moon/Mars missions could help the states in their intelligence gathering mechanisms. C4ISR capabilities of the states could undergo a revolution with the availability of high-speed data networking and data processing facilities. The strategic materials being developed for these missions could change the face of platform technology and future military platforms like aircrafts, tanks, ships and submarines are expected to be more robust but extremely lightweight. Once the Moon is conquered and the resources fall in the hands of these limited few states, then the world could get divided into two groups: one the state with Moon presence and other without. At that point of time, these three states would be approached by the have-nots for getting an access to the Moon’s wealth. This could bestow on them international collaborations on their terms and larger economic benefits would follow. Also, the technological leadership of the world (in few areas) could go in the hands of these states. Asia’s overall considered judgment for deep space should not be viewed in isolation. It is also important to factor in the USA’s position in this discussion, it being the only state to have successfully undertaken manned Moon flights, have programmes for Mars and have various plans for future in deep space region. Space exploration in the twenty-first century may not hold the same strategic logic of the 1960s, but this does not mean that the strategic significance evaporates totally. However, the USA probably is trying to downplay the strategic significance of Moon/Mars in the present era. In 1961, the then defence secretary had mentioned that the Apollo programme was ‘part of the battle along the fluid front of the Cold Strategic Significance of Deep Space Agenda 177

War’. But, now in his January 14, 2004, speech the then President George Bush argued that the current Moon exploration initiative should be seen as a ‘part of a journey and not a race’.30 The USA is generally of the view that they have already achieved much in this field almost four decades back and the new players are just trying to imitate them only now. But, this appears to be their official position. They fully understand that the purpose behind their Moon missions during the 1960s and the missions of the day are entirely different. Few in the USA view that their state cannot lag behind in this new Moon race. As per NASA’s Chief Mr Michael Griffin (Apr 2005 to Jan 2009), ‘If China were to achieve this before the return of a manned American spacecraft to the Moon for the first time since 1972, the bare fact of accomplishment will have enormous, and not fully predictable, effects on global perceptions on the US leadership in the world’. As per Washington Post, this comment was part of the draft of the statement prepared by Mr Griffin to submit to congress but was subsequently deleted.31 Generally, it has been observed that NASA’s opinion on Moon and Mars programme does have a nationalistic character. The October 2006 announcement of the new national US space policy and the USAF’s ‘Strategic Master Plan for FY 2006 and Beyond’ designates space as an ‘ultimate high ground of US Military operations’.32 The overall US policies all these years indicate that they give substantial importance to space technologies in their strategic planning and same would be the case with their deep space thinking. Moon has potential to various ‘utilities’: a base for geological study, a platform for astronomy, a laboratory to study the long-term effects of reduced gravity on humans, a test bed for future manned missions to Mars, or even a launch pad for unmanned craft on their way to the outer reaches of solar system [24]. More importantly, Moon offers achievable options in regard to energy security and replenishment of minerals on the Earth’s surface. Naturally, the USA would not like to miss the Moon bus and would make all efforts to be the first in every related field. Japan, China and India understand the US dilemma in regard to the Moon. Japan and India may engage them in their Moon journey, at least in token form. On the other hand, China feels that they should catch the opportunity before the global programme of returning to the Moon take-offs in full swing [20, p. 726]. The USA was part of India’s first Moon mission and credit for finding the water on the Moon’s surface goes jointly to the IndoÐUS team. States like the USA and Russia could take advantage of the Asian states developing the platforms to reach to the Moon/Mars. They could simply cooperate with them and send their sensors on such platforms to gather the information for future use.

30J Vedda, n-4, p. 24. 31‘Shooting the Moon’, The Economist, Sept 27, 2008, p.40. 32Richard C Cook Militarisation and the Moon-Mars Programme: Another Wrong Turn in Space?, Jan 22, 2007,www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4554, accessed on Apr 6, 2009. 178 12 Deep Space Agenda

Assessment

Japan, China and India’s drive to explore the Moon (and to a certain extent Mars) depicts the case of deep space ambition supported by sound technological investments. These states are no novice in the space field, and their entry into the deep space area looks a logical progression of their space agenda. They all have successfully finished their first Moon missions, and their overall planning for the future demonstrates that the construction of lunar base is probably not too far (may be another two to three decades) beyond their technological capabilities. Today, they have successfully put together strategic, technological and commercial aspects of their space agenda in furthering their deep space agenda. Their Moon and other deep space ambitions signify that they propose to transform the unipolar world with multiple power centres and are using space technology (particularly deep space missions) as one of the components to do so. In the post Cold War era, national security is seen more in terms of technological and economic strengths. Military capability in many cases is a by-product of technological and economic strengths of a state. For rapidly growing economies like India and China, access to cheap energy is vital. Strategically, it’s incorrect to depend on any single source of energy, and also the energy sources are finite. Hence, these states are looking for multiple answers to resolve the issue of energy security, and one of the basic purposes behind Moon mission is to examine the possibility of the usage of helium-3 as an energy source. The end of Cold War and particularly after September 11, 2001, WTC attacks, it is articulated that conflicts amongst nation-states are on decline and in future interstate wars would be a rarity. However, the geostrategic realities of the region indicate that India would continue to face threat from Pakistan (both overt and covert). China and India have fought a war just four decades back, and Japan is concerned about the activities of North Korea which has also tactic support of China in some respect. Also, JapanÐChina relationship is less than cordial. Naturally, the security apprehensions with South Asia and East Asia will keep these states involved towards continuously upgrading their defence infrastructure (may not be true in real sense in respect of Japan). Moon mission could allow them to enhance their overall power status. The resources on Earth are insufficient, and Moon could become a source for their accumulation in future. Today, these states are investing in the Moon with full understanding that the Moon has merits beyond scientific realm. They understand that the development of frontier technologies for their Moon missions will lead to huge developments in science, and these developments would have significant strategic utility. The world is gaining considerably through its multinational internationalf space station project. These states understand the value of such joint collaborations but at least for now are going ‘solo’. Probably, they are attempting to evaluate the exact strategic relevance of such missions and think that international collaborations can always wait. References 179

Conversely, these states cannot remain divorced from the effects of global events. In this era of global economic recession, it may be difficult for them to sustain funding for such high-value projects. But, looking at the long-term benefits of such missions and the status associated, it looks unlikely that the rulers from these states would meddle with such missions. They would attempt to develop various mechanisms for fund raising. Prevailing economic conditions could delay few projects but in totality the political support from the projects is not expected to diminish. Presently, the USA is developing an agenda of leaving the Moon mission completely to the privet industry. President Obama is not keen to continue to support the US Mars mission. As per his plans revealed during Feb 2012, his government is expected to reduce the funding to NASA. This in turn could hamper the deal between the USA and ESA to cooperate on Mars robotic rover missions in 2016 and 2018. Asian states could sense an opportunity over here and may decide to cooperate with the ESA to carry forward their Mars agenda. Overall, the debate on Mars appears to be bit ambiguous. In somewhat contrast to the Moon, the approach towards conquering Mars appears to be somewhat diffused at present, both in global context and to certain extend in Asian context with probably the exception of China. Both technological challenges and financial challenges could be the key impediment towards this. Also, there is less amount of clarity about exactly what the expectations from Mars should be. In general, apart from scientific achievements, the states understand the importance of Mars mission for the development of space industrial base and capabilities. Also, various new technologies developed for the purposes of Mars mission could become part of revolution in military affairs (RMA) architecture. Based on the current trend, there is a general global perception about manned missions to Mars becoming a reality by 2030/2040. In Asia, the current trends denote that China could achieve such feet provided various other related issues working in its favour. It is expected that the geopolitical discourse of tomorrow would involve ‘mission to Mars’ as major component to judge the national prestige as well as a paradigm for international collaboration. The investments made by Japan, China and India towards Moon programme have also raised global interests in the Moon. It is likely that in future, the Americans and the European Union could also make significant investments towards exploring Moon and Mars, and already some of their plans have started taking shape. In short, Asia would compel the West to revive the deep space agenda.

References

1. Johnson-Freese J. Space as a strategic asset. New York: Columbia University Press; 2007. p. 55Ð7. 2. Besha P. Policy making in China’s space program: a history and analysis of the Chang’e lunar orbiter project. Space Policy. 2010;26:214Ð6. 180 12 Deep Space Agenda

3. Jifang Z. A man in space, a race for the moon. Beijing Rev. 2003;1(8):23. 4. Lemonick MD. Japan goes to the moon. Time. 1990 Feb 05. 5. Uesugi K. Results of the MUSES-A “HITEN” mission. Adv Space Res. 1996;18(11):69Ð72. 6. Malik T. Japan launches Kaguya probe on moon mission. www.space.com/missionlaunches/ 070913 kaguya launchday.html. Accessed 19 Feb 2008. 7. Shin-ichi Sobue et al. The project highlight of Japan’s Lunar Explorer Kaguya (SELENE). 40th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference, The Woodlands, Texas; 2009, p. 1224. 8. Bagla P, Menon S. Destination moon. New Delhi: HarperCollins; 2008. p. 81. 9. Lele A. A piece of the moon. Indian Express, New Delhi, 2007 Nov 24. 10. DiGregorio BE. Chinese satellite arrives at moon. http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/nov07/5688. Accessed 2 Jan 2009. 11. Zhi-Jian Y, et al. Space operation system for Chang’E program and its capability evaluation. J Earth Syst Sci. Dec 2005;114(6):795. 12. Iannotta B. Japan’s Kaguya probes moon’s mysteries. Aerospace America, 2008 June, p. 42Ð5. 13. Zhongwei L. China shoots for the moon. Beijing Rev. 2003;18:24Ð6. 14. Flinn ED. Mirrors of moondust. Aerosp Am. 2008 Sept, p. 20. 15. Sibing He. China (CNSA) views of the moon. www.moonmarsworkshop.com/downloads/ index.php?dir=2006MMW%2F&download=China+Views+of+the+Moon.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan 2009, p. 2. 16. Harvey B. Smid H. Pirard T. Emerging space powers. Christine: Springer/Praxis; 2010, p. 54Ð57 and http://www.stp.isas.jaxa.jp/nozomi/index-e.html 17. Than K. Japan probe missed venus—will try again in six years. 2010 Dec 8. http://news. nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/12/101208-japan-venus-spacecraft-akatsuki-missed- orbit-science-space/. Accessed 24 July 2011. 18. Bergin C. Fobos-Grunt ends its misery via re-entry. 2012 Jan 15. http://www.nasaspaceﬂight. com/2012/01/fobus-grunt-ends-its-misery-via-re-entry/. Accessed 14 Feb 2012. 19. Vedda JA. Challenges to the sustainability of space exploration. Astropolitics. 2008;6(1):23. 20. Lawler A, et al. The new race to the moon. Science. 2003;300:727. 21. Cesarone RJ, Abraham DS. Long-range planning for deep space network. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 23Ð25 Sept 2003. p. 1. 22. Madhavan Nair G, et al. Strategic, technological and ethical aspects of establishing colonies on moon and mars. Acta Astronautica. 2008;63:1337. 23. McDonald FB. Space research: at a crossroads. Science. 1987;235:754. 24. Dunkin SK, Heather DJ. Unveiling the face of the Moon: new views and future prospects. Philos Trans Math Phys Eng Sci. 1999;357(1763):3319Ð33. Chapter 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation

Space is playing a growing role in military activities across the globe. The 1991 Gulf War has played a significant role towards showcasing and popularising the relevance of space technologies in the military campaigns. Amongst the various satellites orbiting the Earth, some are being used for specific military purposes. However, almost all satellites have certain capabilities which could be exploited for security purposes in some form or other. This is possible because of the dual- use nature of technologies. Hence, civilian satellites could be optimally utilised for enhancing the war-fighting capability of the armed forces. Various spacefaring nations from Asia have demonstrated their abilities in regard to communications, remote sensing, weather monitoring, navigation and reconnaissance. Many satellites belonging to Asian states are operational in space and are carrying out such tasks essentially for civilian purposes. All these activities could also find their place in security domain too. The various military campaigns in the twenty-first century be it Afghanistan (2001) or Iraq (2003) have suitably demonstrated the advantage the space assets offer both in tactical as well as strategic phases of war. States have used remote sensing satellite systems mainly for reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering purposes. While navigational satellites could be used for guiding weapons systems for accurate engagement of targets. Communication satellites could be effectively used for military communication purposes with due diligence. Hence, satellite systems are found getting key focus for military activities both globally and to a certain extant in Asia too. On the other hand, the antisatellite (ASAT) systems and jamming technologies are also being tested by few states (overtly and covertly), raising fears about the likely weaponisation of the space. This chapter outlines some of the investments made of Asian states towards militarisation of space. This chapter also debates the issues related to and weaponisation of space.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 13, 181 © Springer India 2013 182 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation

Prelude

It is important to recognise the fine distinction between the terminologies militarisation and weaponisation of space before beginning any further discussion. Identifying this difference is more important because at times it has been observed that some use the word militarisation interchangeably with weaponisation. It is also viewed by few that ‘militarisation’ of space is an imprecise phrase. This is because space has been militarised for decades. For many years, satellites have been used for intelligence gathering, and ballistic missiles are flying through space. Some bracket these issues and issues like killing satellites by using kinetic weapons together as the militarisation of space. At times, this also involves putting weapons in space which could be used for targets on Earth [1]. There are few nonlethal ways of targeting satellites by using jamming techniques. Also, it is very difficult to really define the space weapons. No universally accepted definition is available in this regard. Generally, it is perceived that space weapons are the devices which could damage or obstruct the functioning of any space system. However, the dynamic nature of technology and rapid developments happening in space realm are making it difficult to define the space weapons. Various technologies used for civilian purposes could be misused as weapons too. For example, a micro- or a nano-satellite could be converted into a space mine. The systems developed for the purposes of missile defence could be reconfigured for attacking satellites. All this clearly indicates that the term militarisation of the space, if made all inclusive, will have limitations in regard to clearly confirming the actual purpose behind any act. This demands a nuanced distinction to recognise the intent. The term militarisation of space means ‘the use of assets based in space to enhance the military effectiveness of conventional forces or the use of space assets for military purposes. The military purposes of space expected to include communications, electronic intelligence, photoreconnaissance, meteorology, early warning, navigation and weapons guidance. The militarization of space is distinct from the weaponisation of space. It is defined as either weapons based in space or weapons based on ground with their intended targets being located in space’ [2]. Various other chapters in this part of the book have mostly followed the structure which essentially revolves around discussing the country-specific investments in various arenas of space technologies. However, it is important to appreciate while discussing the military utility of space assets that, for the purposes of military use, it is not necessary to own satellite systems in space and/or on ground. A state could acquire the required inputs either by purchasing data from the commercial satellite agencies or under bilateral/multilateral agreement a spacefaring nation could share it with them. Also, it is important to appreciate that the information gathered by using satellite technologies for peaceful purposes or for defensive purposes could also find utility for the military purposes depending upon the nature of data gathered and type of military requirement. It is obvious that the satellites meant for communication, remote sensing and navigation will have certain military usages. These are essentially dual-use systems. No detail discussion of such systems is done Asia’s Security Milieu 183 in this chapter. The basic intend of this chapter is to identify the space systems which are predominantly designed for the military usages. However, certain overlap with the civilian systems looks obvious because few states in the region are not open about identifying certain satellite systems in their possession as military-specific systems. They are designating them as civilian systems but their military-specific utility is becoming far too obvious. As mentioned frequently in this book there are three major space powers in Asia having significant investments made in civilian space sector. Few other powers in the region could be termed as promising players with major futuristic plans. For states like Israel which is not a part of big three troika also uses satellite technology for military purposes. Few non-spacefaring states with the region also use satellite technology of strategic purposes. For few states in the region security threats are so overarching that they are not left with any option but to depend of multiple methods for handling these threats and space technologies become one of the sought-after option. Hence, before deliberating the militarisation and weaponisation policies of the states in the region, it is important to contextualise the threat perceptions of the states within the region and the dependence and requirement of space technologies for this purpose.

Asia’s Security Milieu

Today, the contemporary Asia’s security environment is essentially different from that of the Cold War era when Asia was considered basically a mediocre security region dominated by the influence of either the US or the erstwhile Soviet Union. In twenty-first century Asia has emerged as a hub for various global activities. The dynamics of security in Asia is more dependent on the interaction of interests and priorities of states in the region than getting dominated by the interests of major powers [3]. Asia is encountering various security challenges which fall in realm of both military and non-military threats. The direction of any regional conflict and the process of conflict resolution are having their moorings largely in regional and local dynamics. Simultaneously, most extra-regional actors are found attempting to influence the conflicts in Asia. In various cases such powers are found unable to manage the conflict but at the same time are found continuing with their efforts and not ready to surrender their interests. Because of their bilateral and multilateral relationships with some Asian states, their position to influence the conflict and dependence of few Asian states on their military strengths is not allowing their influence to wither. Also, their interests in Asian affairs to support the sustenance and growth of defence industry back home should not be disregarded. However, over last few years with overall economic growth witnessed by Asia and with the rising power status of few states in Asia their relevance in conflict resolution is getting limited. Also, in certain cases their manipulative behavior to suit their interests is becoming too obvious, making Asian states to distance themselves. 184 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation

The impact of globalisation on Asia’s security calculus has been noteworthy. The nature of this impact is complex. Few parts in the region have acquired immense benefits from this process and economic development has lessened the reasons for conflict. It has been observed that the interdependence enforced by globalisation compels states to cooperate with each other. Hence, globalisation has potential to bring in the shift in the balance of power. However, it is important to note that the conflicts in the region are for varying reasons from territory to governance. Also, there are certain interstate and intrastate conflicts. Communal violence and terrorism are the major threats the region is encountering for the last few years. The region also suffers widespread environmental degradation and resource scarcity. Other security challenges from human security, food security to energy security are dominating the existing security concerns. Hence, only economic prosperity is not the solution for conflict resolution in Asia. Security dynamics of the region is significantly influenced by the nuclear realities. Existing nuclear powers like China, Israel, India, and Pakistan; a dwarf nuclear power like North Korea; a prospective nuclear power like Iran; and a state hinted to be interested to become a nuclear power like Myanmar (Burma) reside in Asia. Also, Japan is one country in the region probably with a ‘wild card’ credentials in nuclear weapons arena. Nuclear deterrence dictates the security scenario of certain parts in the region. Also, presence or likely presence of nuclear weapons with certain states in the region is dominating the global security discourse. Asia has witnessed some of the significant revolutions of the twenty-first century. Such revolutions have occurred, owing to various reasons—autocratic leadership, military regimes, corruption, patronage, nepotism, etc. The Jasmine Revolution during 2010Ð2011 started outside Asia in Tunisia but ended up playing a ‘motivating’ role in altering the political landscape of West Asia (Middle East). A major upheaval beginning in Egypt on January 25, 2011 successfully uprooted the government in power for more than 30 years. The cries for democracy become dominant in the region after the uprising in Egypt. Presently, the entire region is witnessing the agitations against mostly the autocratic regimes in the power. Part of the region is witnessing leadership vacuum, and the lack of alternative political structures is a major cause of concern. Few military leaderships of the region had shown considerable amount of restrain during the phase of uprising. However, it cannot be guaranteed that few states in the near future would not witness the re- emergence of military rule. The major security worry of Asia attracting global attention is the IsraelÐ Palestine conflict. This conflict could be traced back to many years in the history. This essentially a Zionist versus Arab conflict is about the claims to the area called Palestine by two parties, the Palestinians and Israel. This is more of a unique conflict which could be viewed through the prisms of interstate or intrastate conflict. There are non-state actors involved in the conflict, and various acts carried out during the conflict have been viewed as acts of terrorism. Part of Asia has been under intense global scrutiny post the September 11, 2001 attack on the might of the sole superpower in the world. Parts of West Asia and South Asia have been at the centre of the US global war on terror. Osama bin Laden, the Asia’s Security Milieu 185 most wanted fugitive of the century, was found and killed in South Asia. Asia has witnessed/is witnessing one of the major military campaigns in the recent history. The 2001 and 2003 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are (were) being fought by the extra-regional powers, mainly by invading these countries. Almost one decade has gone by since the beginning of these military campaigns, but the security situation of this region has only shown only marginal improvements. The rise of the Taliban has not remained restricted to Afghanistan alone, and Pakistan also has a Taliban operative from their soil. These forces are found fighting intense and bloody battles. India has fought four wars since its independence in 1947. The most recent war fought by India was the Kargil conflict (May to July 1999)—it was a full- scale war. Actually, it was the battle fought to stall the infiltration of militants and Pakistani soldiers acting as militias on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC-a de facto border in India and Pakistan in the Jammu and Kashmir region). Unresolved border disputes have been the main reason for the continuation of tension between IndiaÐPakistan and IndiaÐChina. There are few other issues of differences involved amongst these states like unresolved water dispute, etc. It is important to remember that all these three powers are nuclear powers. Both India and Pakistan are found to be the victims of terrorism. However, unfortunately, Pakistan itself is using terrorism as a covert state policy to wedge a war against India. Korean peninsula is another region of active conflict volcano. One of the major conflicts fought during the early years of the Cold War was the 1950Ð1953 war which divided North and South Korea near the 38th parallel. This war actually ended with an armistice rather than any official formal peace treaty agreement. For many years, a number of skirmishes are happening; however, in recent past, acts of provocation against South Korea have increased significantly. Both the Koreas were and are supported by external powers. Unfortunately, while helping the process of conflict management and conflict resolution, these powers are found using this opportunity to gain geostrategic advantage for themselves too. No solution to the problem appears to be in site. In parts of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South China Sea region, certain old disputes are continuing. A century-old border dispute between the CambodianÐ Thai people has resurfaced again since June 2008. Indonesia is fighting terrorism while the US forces are involved in assisting Philippines to tackle insurgency and terrorism. China, Vietnam and few other states are yet to resolve their disputes over a number of small islets and reefs in the South China Sea. China is witnessing unrest in the region dominated by the Uighur Muslims and also in part of Tibet Autonomous Region. The major flashpoint in the region could be the issue of Taiwan. Currently, this issue is in the semi-dormant state. This one issue has potential to affect the SinoÐUS security dynamics totally. Asian states are also facing various nontraditional security challenges. Cyber warfare is one area making states in the region more responsive. Certain parts of Asia are facing ever-increasing threats from transnational crime, money laundering, fake currency business and drug trafficking. Natural disasters associated with the issues related to climate change, and public health epidemics have potential to challenge the security apparatus of the states. 186 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation

For centuries many Asian states have followed a tradition of non-interventionist and non-interfering powers. The present threat matrix of Asia could alter its security environment over the next few decades. The possibility of any full-scale war amongst the powers within the region is unlikely. However, maintaining and increasing the status of military preparedness by states would remain an important instrument of policy. To maintain regional stability, militaries will play an important role, and hence, their growing importance is eminent. The dependence of these militaries on technologies is obvious. The purpose behind analysing the security milieu over Asia over here is not to get into the micro details of Asia’s security challenges but just to undertake delineation in order to contextualise the relevance of militarisation and weaponisation of space. This becomes important mainly because the European discourse of security including space security at times takes a very idealistic position without appreciating the differences between the European and Asian security milieu. Any form of military expansion and participation in arms race by a state is essentially its response to the security environment and the same could be true in respect of space. Hence, it is essential to appreciate the security connotations of the region before contextualising space in the military realm. The states in the region are probably looking at space at two levels: one, as an instrument for intelligence collection and an aid in communication and navigation and two, a tool for political bargain brinkmanship. The challenges for Asian states particularly in geopolitical and geo-economic theatres are different than many other regions of the world. The overall military investments made by states in Asia are based on their own threat perceptions. It is important to appreciate that space assets are viewed (also) as an instrument to enhance the military potential of a state. Space technology is all pervasive, and its dual-use nature makes it more attractive for the militaries. This technology has potential to challenge the existing notion of deterrence. Hence, investment in space for military should not be viewed with a narrow prism only as additional equipment for the armed forces, but it has a potential to bring in a modern security paradigm. Space weaponisation could also lead to the space arms race. Asian ‘military’ investments in space need to be looked at the backdrop of various above discussed realities.

Space Militarisation

For more than five decades, space technologies are being used for the purposes of earth observation, remote sensing, space photography, surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation, communication, broadcasting, meteorology, education, astronomy and scientific experimentation. Such usage falls in the realm of ‘civilian uses of space technologies’. All such activities have become possible because of the rapid growth in the technology. The nature of data collected in twenty-first century is far more accurate than the earlier period because of the progress made in satellite resolution and contrast-matching technologies. Also, improvements in Space Militarisation 187 various sensor technologies have taken place over the last few years. This more accurate data availability has widened the client base. The dual-use nature of these technologies is allowing nation-states to consume them for military purposes too. Along with the rocket science and sensor technologies, the simultaneous progress made in information technologies and information sciences has significantly helped the satellites to improve their performance. Along with this, the process of data management and interpretation has improved largely, owing to the developments in information technology. With the advent in revolution in military affairs (RMA), the importance of technologies has increased multifold for the militaries. Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveil- lance (C4ISR) systems have become central to various armed forces and have brought in various doctrinal changes. The C4ISR strategies and policies are heavily technology dependent. Such command and control systems operate on various transformative principles essentially focusing on the use of space technology for communication services and military information networking and for purposes of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Major technology development programmes for various nation-states would mostly have a military DNA, and the same should be the case with space programmes. However, normally it has been observed that like nuclear weapons programme, the (military) space programmes are also developed typically away from public eye. In recent years, few states are found openly discussing about the military utility of the space assets. In Asian context, various states are dependent on the major powers outside the region for technology assistance. Most of them are found abiding by various international regimes in regard to technology acquisition and transfer. They are found cooperating with the major powers in respect to the international arms control or disarmament provisions. In regard to the strategic utilisation of the space assets, various non-spacefaring states from Asia are found noncommittal. They fully understand the importance of space utilisation for influencing the warfare on earth but, because of their technological and geopolitical limitations, are not found taking any hard positions. Also, since the space security domain is still in an embryonic stage, these states are probably reluctant to take any firm positions. By doing this, they are also keeping their potential enemies guessing. South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are found investing in satellite resources for the purposes of communication services, television broadcasting, resource management and education. Other small states in the region also have more or less similar interests. All these states are depending on spacefaring nations to help them to provide technological assistance to manufacture satellites and also to launch them. Some of them are not making any significant investments in satellite technology but probably are directly depending on outside agencies for supply of information based on various satellite-derived products. Under such circumstances, a significant reliance of these powers on space inputs for the purposes of military use looks distant. They could receive the inputs which are openly available in the market for the military purposes. Their dependence on their own assets could be minimal mainly because their systems have been manufactured by outside powers for specific civilian purposes. They could 188 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation exploit the duel-use nature of this technology like others. The threat index to these regions and investments made by them into state-of-art military hardware which is mostly dependent on satellite technology indicates that particularly states like South Korea and Pakistan must be feeling the pinch of non-availably of indigenous space architecture to operate such systems to their fullest potential.

India

India has no political ambitions beyond its own borders. Nevertheless, Indian troops operate in different theatres all over the world due to India’s contribution to various UN missions. Some of India’s oil assets are spread in other parts of the world. Indian companies have succeeded in getting a significant foothold globally and are currently operating in 14 countries.1 Geographically, India’s location at the base of continental Asia astride the Indian Ocean places it at a vantage point in maritime trade. India has a strong stake in the security and stability of these waters since a large proportion of Asian oil and gas supplies is shipped through the Indian Ocean.2 Therefore, this entire area is of considerable importance to India. Theoretically, this entire area becomes an area of interest to India from a wider strategic sense. The knowledge of various happenings in this area is important for India to secure its energy interests. Technically, space technologies could offer a significant advantage in monitoring such a vast region. Indian Armed Forces like any other developed armies in the world are expected to depend on space technologies for communication, navigation and surveillance purposes.3 Communication satellites form an important component of India’s space infrastructure. India has a large network of optical fibre cables, digital microwave and satellite communication systems.4 Theoretically, India could use all civilian space assets in some form or other to cater for its strategic requirements. However, there are indications that India is probably making a transition from dual-use satellite technology to dedicated defence satellites. The Indian Air Force (IAF), the Indian Navy and the Indian Army have been expressing their interest in acquiring dedicated satellites in the last couple of years. The Indian Navy is poised to become the first service amongst the Indian Armed Forces to get a dedicated satellite to facilitate its communication- and network-centric warfare requirements. This satellite is expected to be launched into geostationary orbit by ISRO around

1‘India’s Quest for Energy Security: The Oil and Gas Perspective’, Speech delivered by Murli Deora, India’s Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, at Rice University on March 31, 2006; available at www.bakerinstitute.org. 2From the lecture delivered by M.M. Pallaum Raju, India’s Minister of State for Defence, in the “P.C. Lal Memorial Lecture” organised by the Air Force Association on March 19, 2007, at New Delhi. 3Various retired armed forces ofﬁcials have expressed this opinion. 4www.fas.org. Space Militarisation 189

2013. With a dedicated satellite at its command, the Indian Navy, like other major naval powers, will be in a position to network all its warships, submarines and aircraft with each other and operational centres on shore with the help of high- speed data links, allowing for maritime threat detection and sharing of real-time data to enable swift reaction. The Indian Navy’s primary area of strategic interest is from the Persian Gulf to Malacca Straits. A dedicated satellite is expected to make available dedicated sensors to offer a clear picture of all actors in the constantly changing maritime environment. The Indian Navy is to induct eight P-8i long-range maritime patrol aircraft between 2013 and 2017 from the United States. This satellite will guarantee the availability of state-of-the-art C4ISR capabilities for these aircrafts.5 A dedicated satellite for the IAF is also likely to be launched in the near future.6 The IAF is planning to integrate space-based applications extensively into conventional strategies and operations. It is already using space for telecommunications, reconnaissance, navigation targeting and many other operations. The IAF is adopting a focused and fast track approach to harness space effectively to provide synergy with all facets of its operational roles [4]. The Indian Remote Sensing satellites (IRS) are a series of Earth observation satellites built, launched and maintained by ISRO since the 1980s. The Indian capabilities in this field match the best in the world. A few of the IRSs launched since 2000 have significant dual-use utility. Technology Experimental Satellite (TES), launched in 2001, was described by the then ISRO chief Dr. K. Kasturirangan as a satellite meant for ‘civilian use consistent with state’s security concerns’ [5]. Subsequently, India has launched the Cartosat (Cartographic satellite) series. These are believed to have significant military utility. The then Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee had told the Indian Parliament in August 2005 that India was assembling a military surveillance and reconnaissance system that was planned to be operational by 2007.7 Cartosat 1 and Cartosat 2 high-resolution satellites, with 2.5 and 1-m resolution, respectively, were launched in 2005 and 2007, respectively. These satellites are useful for urban and rural development. Cartosat 2A was launched in April 2008 and has a resolution of 0.8 m. Carosat-2B was put into orbit on July 12, 2010. All these satellites together allow India round the clock capability to monitor its region and the surroundings. During April 2009, India has launched an Israeli-built RISAT-2 satellite. This radar-imaging satellite is part of India’s attempts towards mapping its rice crop coverage. However, it is generally perceived that this is primarily meant to keep a continuous eye on India’s borders and aid in anti-infiltration and anti-terrorist

5Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and Confederation of Indian Industry, Building India’s Navy: Requirements and Indigenous Capability, 2010, available at http://www.ciidefence.com/ 6The Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major made an announcement to this effect at Aero India, Bangalore in February 2009. 7“India Building a Military Satellite Reconnaissance System,” Defense Industry Daily, August 10, 2005, available at www.defenseindustrydaily.com 190 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation operations.8 This satellite uses synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and its launch needs to be viewed at the backdrop of terrorist attacks on Mumbai (commonly known as 26/11). India has delayed its earlier plan of launching indigenously built RISAT-1 and went ahead with the plan of launching Israeli-built satellite, giving indications that increasing security threats forced India to opt for such launch. India also has plans to launch a series of defence-dedicated satellites in the near future. According to V.K. Saraswat, director general of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India could launch one or two satellites every year to boost its capability to scan multiple activities on and across its borders. Also, India is expected to send data and commands through such satellites to its cruise missiles [6]. ELINT (electronic intelligence) satellite is another arena where the Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL), a unit of DRDO, is developing a dedicated network-centric communication intelligence satellite for detecting conversations and espionage activities in the region. This programme was announced in February 2010 by DLRL director G. Bhoopathy. DRDL is in the process of designing and developing a spacecraft ﬁtted with an intelligent sensor that will pick up conversations and communications across the borders. The spacecraft is expected to be ready for launch by 2014. For satellite navigation, which would have both civilian and military utility, ISRO is developing a system called the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS). This would be a constellation of seven satellites—three in GEO (geosynchronous Earth orbit) and four in GSO (geostationary Earth orbit). This system would provide position accuracies similar to the global positioning system (GPS) (10 m over the Indian landmass and 20 m over the Indian Ocean) in a region centred on the country, with coverage extending up to 1,500 km from India.9 IRNSS is expected to be optimally functional by 2014Ð2015. India is also a part of Russia’s global navigation satellite system (GLONASS).

China

Like many others, the 1991 Gulf War taught China the importance of space of the militaries. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the NATO forces came as a rude shock to China. Later it was claimed that this happened accidently. However, the bombing was conducted by using error-free Joint Direct

8“India’s spy satellite RISAT placed in orbit”, Apr 20, 2009, http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/ apr/20/indias-spy-satellite-risat-placed-in-orbit.htm, accessed on Jul 12, 2011and MR Venkatesh, “RISAT-2 not a spy satellite, says ISRO chief”, Hindustan Times, April 20, 2009. 9Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, Report of the Working Group on “Space” on the Eleventh Five Year Plan Proposals 2007–2012 for Indian Space Programme, 2006, available at http://dst.gov.in/ Space Militarisation 191

Attack Munitions (JADMs) which are GPS-guided munitions. Naturally, there are very few buyers for the theory of accidental bombing. This incidence also appears to have played a major role in stressing the importance of space assets for modern- day war fighting. Over the years, China has observed that the world (read USA) has started viewing space as the future battleground. Chinese investments in military space programme have this background. For all these years, China is found open about space agendas like the manned space missions, etc. Officially, the information in regard to such programmes is being found shared freely. However, in regard to expanding its military space capabilities, there is far less clarity. This China’s silence is at times being found equated with ‘dishonest intent’ [7]. The lack of clarity about China’s activities in military space domain makes it difficult to understand the actual non-civilian purpose behind it. All this raises a basic question that ‘are various investments being done in support of security structures or for the purposes leading to space weaponization’? The current Chinese war-fighting doctrine is about shorter wars in the future which are more destructive and decisive. China expects to fight a technologically sophisticated opponent, and to fight such wars, it wants to be an effective space power. China proposes to thwart the fighting potential of the enemy by various means including a soft kill activity that is interfering with information systems and ground stations by using various means, including electromagnetic pulses [7]. On April 24, 1970, China became the fifth spacefaring nation in the world. Within less than a year’s time, China had launched its second satellite called Shi Jian 1. Subsequently, four launches (one of this was a failure) took place during 1973 to 1976. This was done under Project 701, and satellites were Ji Shu Shiyan series of satellites. No specific information is available about this programme except the official mention made during initial phase of this programme that satellites were the instruments for ‘perpetration for war’. Analysts were of the opinion that these satellites were meant for electronic intelligence-gathering purposes. Another project called 911 (Fanhui Shi Weixing, commonly known as FSW series of satellites, with the first successful launch during November 1975) was a recoverable satellite programme. This programme was modelled on the US programme meant for military reconnaissance. It is expected that China also would have had the similar expectations from this programme. Over a period of time, the improvised version of these satellites since 1982 included charge-coupled device (CCD) technology. China’s communication satellite series is known as Dong Fang Hong series and is operational since 1984 and has obvious military roles too. They have also developed ground infrastructure for the purposes of C3I. In the 1980s, China has developed a satellite communication signals intelligence capacity for monitoring international satellite communications, along with associated deception ability [2, pp. 87Ð89]. The most important satellite series launched by China in the first decade of the twenty-first century is the Yaogan series. During 2006 to 2010, 11 remote sensing satellites have been launched in quick succession. Latest in this series were Yaogan X, launched on August 12, 2010, and Yaogan XI during September 2010, meant for scientific experiments and helped in disaster prevention methods. Subsequently, 192 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation on Nov 9, 2011 Yaogan XII a ‘spy satellite’ has also been launched. Yaogan series is a fleet of high-resolution optical and radar reconnaissance satellites. One version of this spacecraft is a synthetic aperture radar-imaging series, and another is an electro-optical observation series. Officially, this series has been developed for scientific experiments, land survey, crop yield assessment and disaster prevention and reduction. However, experts believe that these satellites, offering very low- resolution imagery with the best being 0.65 m, have a major defence angle.10 These satellites could be used for various purposes and obviously would have both civilian and military utility. They would help various arms of Chinese military mainly for surveillance purposes. The satellite network could help anti-ship missiles to engage targets on land and sea and also moving targets. It could also help them in developments of networks like Ocean Surveillance System and border surveillance systems and even for intelligence gathering in regions like Tibet, Uyghur and few areas. China is also investing micro- and small satellites. Specialists view these investments being done for twenty-first-century military development [8] Micro-satellites have various advantages being low cost. They could be launched frequently and, if launched in a group, could also carry out functions of a conventional military satellite. Also, such satellites could have relevance for an antisatellite programme. China’s micro-satellite programme is in collaboration with Surrey Satellite Tech- nology Ltd from the United Kingdom. Interestingly, to build some of its military space architecture, China has followed the path of espionage/reverse-engineering/covert technology assistance. In this regard, few US aerospace companies have been blamed and punished for their dubious linkages. In China, aerospace and communications companies have close links with the army and government; hence, any contract with them could have a PLA angle too. Also, there exists a possibility that China could have successfully ‘exploited’ the export control mechanisms in their favour for technology/hardware assimilation. The dual-use utility of communications satellites is known. In the mid-1990s, with China’s own communications satellites wearing out, military leaders set out to find foreign-built replacements. In mid-1990s, the Clinton administration had loosened the rules on satellite sales. It appears that China took advantage of this situation. Subsequently, the USA had gathered evidence that the Chinese army was exploiting flawed American export controls mechanisms to acquire sophisticated satellite communications technology for military and intelligence use.11 The US administration was forced to rethink its own initially approved decision of allowing

10Stephen Clark, “China Launches New Spy Satellite”, Aug 10, 2010, http://www.space.com/ 8923-china-launches-spy-satellite.html and Rui C. Barbosa, “China completes 2009 schedule by launching another spy satellite”, Dec 15, 2009, http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/12/ china-completes-2009-schedule-by-launching-another-spy-satellite/ and “China launches new Yaogan XI ‘remote sensing’ satellite”, Sept 22, 2010 http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/ china-launches-new-yaogan-xi-remote-sensing-satellite.html, accessed on Sept 18, 2011. 11“Selling Spy Satellites to China”, The New York Times, Jun 19, 1998. Space Militarisation 193 the Hughes corporation sale of space technology to China. The issue was dual- use nature of the satellite and antenna technology sold for purpose of mobile communications. The satellite manufacturer Loral Space and Communications Corporation was asked to pay $20 million in fines to settle a federal investigation into charges that it passed sensitive materials to China after an abortive satellite launching there in 1996. The company was accused of providing Chinese officials with confidential materials from the US panel that investigated the February 1996 crash of a Loral satellite, which was built for Intelset and launched by a Chinese Long March rocket. In the year 2000, the Lockheed Martin Corporation was asked to pay $13 million in fines for its role in a providing technical aid to a Hong Kong-based company with ties to Beijing.12 During 2005, the Bush administration had imposed sanctions against a US company Hughes Network Systems trading high-tech satellite technology to China. The same company had previously violated International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) export control laws too. The company was selling lightweight small satellite terminals or Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Network technology to China. These man-portable satellite uplink terminals definitely had wider applicability for the military too. Hughes system (subsequently taken over by Bowing and ended up paying for all such liabilities) had many customers inside China too. One was China Electronic System Engineering Company which was a subsidiary of the PLA. Then Chinasat which had purchased two satellites from Hughes during the 1990s was a front company for PLA and currently provides space communications for the PLA [9]. There were few more like this. All these cases indicate that for many years the US administration ended up compromising the security interests at the cost of commercial interests probably unknowingly. All these cases point out that China’s growth in the space field has a ‘backdrop’ of espionage.

Japan

Japan viewed space as a domain for peaceful utilisation of satellite technologies for the betterment of the society almost since beginning of their space programme. Japan’s armed forces were prohibited from involvement in space development under a strict interpretation of a 1969 parliamentary resolution, limiting the use of space to peaceful purposes. However, changing security realities has compelled Japan to change its stance. The threat from North Korea particularly their frequent strategic posturing by carrying out missile launches, the nuclear realities of the region and the likely presence of a military space race in Asia could be the reasons for Japan to change its space policies. Also, continuing territorial and maritime disagreements

12Christopher Marquis “Satellite Maker Fined $20 Million in China Trade Secrets Case”, The New York Times, Jan 10, 2002. 194 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation in Asia and China’s growing assertiveness in the region may have impacted Japan’s thinking. Another important reason could be the Japanese participation in the US sponsored ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme.13 Subsequent to North Korean missile launch in 1998 into Japanese airspace, the state decided to develop and launch spy satellites (IGS—intelligence-gathering satellites) during 2003Ð2007.14 These intelligence-gathering satellites are controlled by the civilian administration. To conceal the military nature of these satellites, they are put under the control of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) within the Cabinet Intelligence Office (CRIO) [10]. However, these spy satellites have certain limitations in regard to its resolution in comparison with military satellites operated by other few countries.15 The debate amongst the Japanese policymakers commenced during the 1980s in regard to need to change the 1969 spelt position about peaceful use of space. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone began to push for constitutional revision calling for a ‘final settlement of accounts for postwar politics’. He also brought in a major change in Japan’s space use policy (1985). It was decided that the SDF could use the civilian satellites for their requirements, and also a decision towards development of IGS system was taken [11]. During 2005, a group of powerful Japanese politicians issued a report on constructing a national space strategy. This report recommended the establishment of a new decision-making structure in regard to space issues. With this came the concept of creation of a new basic law of space activities. This was born out of the need to shift the focus of space policy from technological development to applications [12]. During June 2007, considering the growing importance of the space sector in terms of industrial and military growth, the Japanese LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and New Komeito Party submitted a bill of basic space law to the lower house of parliament, demanding amendment of the space law. It was made clear that the new basic space law will adopt the concept of ‘nonaggressiveness’, enabling military purpose applications.16 After few deliberations, the bill was finally enacted in May 2008. ‘The law says that the use and development of space should be done in accordance with the pacifist sprit of the Japanese constitution and benefit the security of Japan and the international community’.17

13Kate Wilkinson in an interview with Saadia Pekkanen on Sept 9, 2011, http://www.nbr.org/ research/activity.aspx?id=173 assessed on Aug 20, 2011, Saadia M. Pekkanen is the joint author (along with Paul Kallender-Umezu) of the book tilted In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Stanford University Press, 2010. 14John Feffer, “Japan: The Price of Normalcy”, January 13, 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5780 15“Japan Moves to End Ban on Military Use of Space”, Friday, 2 June 2006, http://www.redorbit. com/news/space/524034/japan moves to end ban on military use of space/index.html, accessed on Oct 20, 2009. 16The bill is available at http://ukinjapan.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/5606907/5633988/The Bill of Basic Space Law.pdf, accessed on Oct 12, 2009. 17“Japan Passes law to allow military use of space: ofﬁcial”, Space War, May 21, 2008. Space Militarisation 195

Subsequently, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development was formed within the cabinet. This is aimed at promoting the measures concerning the development and utilisation of space in a comprehensive and systematic manner. On January 15, 2009, a basic policy for space development and utilisation was formulated, and it was announced that space is important for strengthening functions of C4ISR in light of the emphasis of building up of defence capabilities.18 Strategic Headquarters announced the Basic Plan on Space Security on June 2, 2009. The key elements of the plan are based on the basic space law and include realising a safe, secure and affluent society. It also proposes to strengthen the national security through the development of space.19 The Japanese Ministry of Defence’s annual white paper on defence released on July 17, 2009, clearly identifies the need to develop space-based systems exclusively for military purposes. In March 2003, Japan launched its first two spy satellites in polar orbit at altitudes of 400Ð600 km. Each pair of satellites included: ¥ One satellite with a visible light camera to see objects on Earth as small as approximately one metre in length ¥ One satellite with a radar to see through poor weather and at night Normally, all these spy satellites have been built with a 5-year life period. In February 2007, the 4th spy satellite was launched, giving its satellite system full global coverage. In November 2009, a fifth spy satellite was launched with a primary mission to keep an eye on military installations and other facilities in North Korea. This satellite has a resolution of 60 cm. Japan has plans to have 16Ð20 spy satellites orbiting the earth. The aim is essentially to create a surveillance network for monitoring the movements of the armed forces in North Korea. Unfortunately, Japan’s spy satellite programme had to witness few failures too. The launch of a second set spy satellite during November 2003 was a failure. Subsequently, one more satellite has failed. The satellites and rockets were destroyed because one of the two boosters failed to separate. Launch of its third satellite was also delayed due to hardware-related problems. The fourth spy satellite has also gone unserviceable.20 This satellite failed in 2010 which actually should have remained functional till 2012. During December 2011, Japan successfully launched a new spy satellite. No details about this radar-equipped satellite’s capabilities are available, but it is expected to have a resolution of 1 m or less. This satellite is an addition to the

18http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2009/07/22/space-in-japans-defense-white-paper/, accessed on Oct 20, 2009. 19“The Basic of Japan’s Defence Policy and Build-up of Defence Capability”, Defence of Japan, 2009, Part 2. Also, please refer the issues related to Space discussed in Japan’s Defence White Paper available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w paper/2009.html, accessed on Sept 12, 2009. 20http://factsanddetails.com/japan.php?itemid=819&catid=22&subcatid=148 and James Dunni- gan, “Japan Loses 25 Percent of Their Spy Satellites” Sept 17, 2010, http://www.strategypage.com/ dls/articles/Japan-Loses-25-Percent-Of-Their-Spy-Satellites-9-17-2010.asp, accessed on Sept 20, 2011. 196 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation network of optical and radar reconnaissance satellites. Another radar-equipped satellite is expected to be launched by 2013. Japan has developed a mix of optical and radar satellite with purpose. The optical satellites are able to provide inputs during daytime under fair weather conditions, and the radar satellites are best suited for observations during night time and are expected to perform well even during bad weather conditions.

Israel

Israel’s security complexities have been instrumental for the development of their spy satellite programme. As of mid-2012, they have three of their Ofeq military optical imaging satellites in orbit. The latest in the series Ofek 9 was launched during June 2010. In fact in 1996, it was recommended to the Israeli Defence Ministry that a four-satellite constellation to achieve full monitoring of missile or nuclear sites in the Middle East is required. The ﬁrst effort by Israel to develop a small-satellite constellation was unsuccessful due to the failure of September 2004 launch which failed to place into orbit the Ofeq 6. India was instrumental in launching a spy satellite called Tecsar (Polaris) for Israel during 2008 capable of taking pictures even under adverse weather conditions.21 Billed as the largest and most capable of Israel’s electro-optical imaging satellites, the newest Ofeq is being developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). This Ofeq 10 could be a 400-kg satellite with a multimode camera payload called Jupiter, offering black-and-white imagery with 0.5-m resolution or better and 2-m colour images. The camera features a 15-km swath width at an altitude of roughly 600 km. This satellite is likely to be launched by early 2013 [13]. Israel also has AMOS series of communications satellites which is expected to have some military utility too. Overall, both military and dual-use satellites have signiﬁcant relevance for Israel in regard to its nuclear agenda. Such satellites are of importance to carry out intelligence gathering in regard to Iranian nuclear programme, and they also have an important role to play towards maintaining the system architecture in their own nuclear weapons programme.

21“Development in the high resolution imaging satellites for the military”, Space policy 27 (2011) p.46 and “Israel launches spy satellite”, Jun 23, 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/ 2010/06/20106239424671297.html, accessed on Jun 24, 2011 and “Russian rocket launches Israeli dual-use spy satellite over Iran”, Apr 27, 2006, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/ front2453852.238888889.html, accessed on Jun 24, 2011. Space Weaponisation 197

Other States

South Korea’s Arirang-2, a multipurpose satellite launched in 2006, is believed to have military utility too. However, South Korea authorities claim that it is unsuitable for military use since it was designed and developed for a private sector. Also, other multipurpose satellites available with them or the one in the pipeline have less defence utility. Hence, the state has plans to purchase four-spy satellites in the near future.22 There are two other Asian states which are believed to have spy satellites: Egypt with its Egypt Satellite-1 (the communication with this satellite has been lost since July 2010), a 100-kg earth remote sounding satellite, and Iran’s ﬁrst and second satellites, namely, Sinah1 and Omid launched during February 2009. The designs of such satellite are expected to be rudimentary in nature and are not estimated to have major intelligence-gathering abilities. There are reports that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is likely to offer a major military contract to France for a surveillance satellite to be built by Astrium. Such systems could boost UAE’s military capability to counter Iran’s expansionist policy and nuclear ambitions. Over the years, the UAE has established itself as the space technology hub in the region and has had dealings with foreign companies that specialise in military satellites.23

Space Weaponisation

Is weaponising a space a legitimate option for any state? The outer space treaty (OST) emphasises that ‘peaceful usages’ of space is important. But, at the same time, there is no common understanding on what should constitute a space weapon. Damage to satellite in space could be carried out by firing a missile from the ground to the space, by using a space-based weapon or by using ground and/or space-based jammers. Presently, only a theoretical possibility exists in regard to putting weapons in space to engage a ground-based target. On the other hand, various treaties and norms do exist in the space arena, which could be interpreted to conclude that space weaponisation is incorrect. However, mostly the selective and inferred interpretations of law would have limitations. Hence, there is no direct answer to the question regarding the legitimacy of space weaponisaton. Also, it is argued that if the USA, the sole superpower in space and even otherwise, escalates the process of militarisation and weaponisation of space, then other states would try to follow them. This would lead to a destabilising effect on global community [14]. In contrast, five decades since the launching of the first

22“South Korea to purchase four spy satellites by 2020”, Oct 21, 2009, http://theasiandefence. blogspot.com/2009/10/south-korea-to-purchase-four-spy.html, accessed on Aug 21, 2011. 23“Emirates close to French satellite buy”, Dec 23, 2011, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/ Emirates close to French satellite buy 999.html, accessed on Dec 26, 2011. 198 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation satellite barring few cases of ASAT demonstration, no actual ASAT attack has ever happened. This is a good omen, but absence of any attack on the adversaries’ satellite infrastructure till date does not guaranty that it would not happen in future. Understanding such realities, few Asian states have probably started making investments in the ASAT technologies. The aim could to be to develop and test them to demonstrate the capabilities. However, there appears to be much ambiguity in regard to the ASAT policies of various Asian states (same is true globally too). None of the Asian states are found taking clear positions of this issue. It appears that every state is waiting for others to make the first ‘move’! Contradicting its own stated goal of a ‘peaceful rise’ on January 11, 2007, China carried out an ASAT test by destroying its own ageing weather satellite (Y-1C) by using a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) technology. This act involved mounting a metal piece on the top of the missile KT-2 which destroyed its target simply by colliding with it. Beijing demonstrated the dramatic technological advances made by China through this test. It conducted this test on a spacecraft flying as fast as an intercontinental ballistic missile, re-entering the atmosphere. The satellite’s destruction was carried out by a unitary hit-to-kill payload—a technique far superior than what was used by the erstwhile Soviet Union. Since this satellite intercept occurred along the ascent trajectory of the offensive missiles’ flight, it could be concluded that the overall guidance and control systems as well as the KKV’s own sensors were so accurate that the Chinese engineers never took the option of exploiting the booster’s descent trajectory to give the kill vehicle more time, both to observe the target satellite and to manoeuvre as necessary [15]. During this test, China destroyed a 750-kg satellite orbiting at an altitude of 850 km. This in turn has created significant amount of debris in space almost to the tune of 300,000 big and small pieces of debris. Apart from the ASAT weapons, China’s counter-space efforts also include satellite jamming technologies. China has probably made substantial investments in the field of ground-based lasers to destroy/damage satellites. In fact, China has pursued a variety of space warfare programmes particularly over the last decade. China has also invested in direct-attack and directed-energy weapons [16]. As per the Pentagon’s 1998 report to the Congress, ‘China already may possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers’, and that ‘given China’s current interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future’.24 In 2006, US government officials had accused China of using lasers against their reconnaissance satellites on a number of occasions [17]. According to one Pentagon report a year before, ‘PLA is building lasers to destroy satellites and already has beam weapons capable of damaging

24Department of Defense, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, November 1998. The report is available at http:// www.fas.org/news/china/1998/981100-prcdod.htm (Accessed January 20, 2007). Space Weaponisation 199 sensors on space based reconnaissance and intelligence systems. Consequently, China could blind the US intelligence and military space equipment systems vital for deploying US military forces in current and future warfare’.25 For the last couple of years, the Chinese interests in developing and testing various methodologies for carrying out antisatellite operations are being debated. There are reports that China has completed ground tests of an advanced antisatellite weapon called ‘parasitic satellite’. It is likely to be deployed on an experimental basis and enters the phase of space test in the near future. These satellite systems are probably already ground tested. This ASAT system can be used against various types of satellites such as communication satellites, navigational satellites and early warning satellites in different orbits. The cost of building this satellite system is 0.1Ð1% of typical satellite [18]. References to Parasite satellite are also found in 2003 and 2004 annual reports on the military power of China of the department of defence. Few scholars are of the opinion that even though China is working on small satellites, the idea of a Parasite satellite may not be true [7, p. 217]. Probably, arguments negating the likely ASAT potential of China were mostly made before the 2007 tests. Theoretically, apart from China, India is another country in the region capable of developing and demonstrating ASAT capability. It is planning to build up its ‘potential’ for delivering an antisatellite weapon (ASAT). It appears that India has both technological wherewithal and political determination to undertake such test. At the same time, it has the maturity to understand the geopolitical implications for such testing and hence it likely to undertake the test only after undertaking a detailed cost benefits analysis. India’s premier Defence Research and Development Organizations (DRDO) Director General VK Saraswat has claimed that ‘India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites’, while speaking to media on the sidelines of the 97th Indian Science Congress.26 This announcement has significant strategic significance and could have wider global ramifications in regard to India’s strategic calculus. Hence, it is vital to view this ‘statement of intent’ in a correct perspective. India’s any probable ASAT programme could emerge as a part of its ballistic missile development programme. This indicates that ISRO, the India’s only space agency, would not have any mandate for such a programme. ISRO is expected to continue to perform various civilian and commercial mandates, and ASAT policies could be decided by other agencies. Geo-strategically, India could be viewed caught in an unusual situation. Its adversaries (which are also its neighbours) are nuclear weapon states out of which

25Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2005), p.36, http://www.defenselink. mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf. 26“India readying weapon to destroy enemy satellites: Saraswat” Jan 03, 2010, http:// www.indianexpress.com/news/india-readying-weapon-to-destroy-enemy-satel/562776/, accessed on Mar 12, 2011. 200 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation one is a communist state with a burning ambition to become a global superpower, and the other is a failing democracy where the safety of nuclear weapons is always a suspect. This indicates that India’s basic interest would lay with the development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) architecture. ASAT technology could emerge as an offshoot of such development. In regard to ASAT testing, India has not taken any official position yet. To develop indigenous BMD capability, India proposes to develop two systems: Prithvi Air Defence Exercise (PADE) and Advanced Air Defence System (AAD) by 2015. This entire project has begun few years back. The first interception test was successfully conducted during November 2006 at a 50-km range. India proposes to develop a two intercept mode system to hit a target at both exo- atmospheric and endo-atmospheric levels [19]. DRDO is building an advanced version of its interceptor missile with a range of 120Ð140 km. All such technological developments could allow India to develop its own ASAT capability. Engaging any satellite at the height 250 km or even less is advantageous to avoid creation of debris. If India wants to demonstrate any capability, then it should avoid creation of any debris, and their progress in BMD technology development arena could allow them that option. In Asia, apart from India, China and Japan are also investing in missile interception technology. In the case of China which has already demonstrated ASAT capability, a reverse (in contrast to India) inference could be drawn. China’s ASAT indicative of direct-ascent or ‘direct-kill’ capability signifies that China has developed most of the technologies needed to bring together a modern anti-ballistic missile defence [20]. Japan’s interests in BMD are known, but their entire BMD architecture is in collaboration with the USA. Hypothetically, developing ASAT should not be problematic for them. Israel has also achieved success in interception technologies, and they have also made some of these technologies commercially available. This state also have technological base available to undertake ASAT. Pakistan has a successful missile programme but would have to make additional effort to develop ASAT capability. They could expect some help from China if they decide to do so. Not much of information is available in regard to these states about their interests in satellite jamming technologies. It appears that in the region, China would remain in the forefront in this field.

Assessment

Satellites have emerged as a main focus of military activities for the last two decades, particularly post 1991 Gulf War. Since then various other military campaigns have demonstrated to the world the relevance of space technology in modern-day conflict and their capability to provide direct support for ground, air and water/underwater operations. Space technologies have brought in the transformation in warfare which is ultimately leading towards the revolution in warfare, particularly Assessment 201 for the defence forces in developing countries. By the beginning of the twenty- first century, the nature of the battlefield has undergone a transformation. Space is being recognised as the fourth dimension of warfare. Robotic equipments are slowly becoming the inessential part of the modern-day battlefield, and they also would operate in space. Fully automated warfare may be technologically feasible in the next 20 years, and space technology would play an extremely significant role in this. Realising the importance of militarisation of space, few Asian states have started making specific investments into military-specific satellite technologies. The significant investments are being made by China, Japan and India. Particularly, these three states have developed high-resolution imaging satellites. Israel also has made investments into this field. All these states have launched satellites, offering them imagery with sub metre resolution (70Ð80 cm, in certain cases, approximately 1 m). Such imageries are also available commercially (with certain restrictions). Since various Asian states are not having direct accessibility for such information, they would depend on commercially available inputs, and India, China and Japan could offer such services to their friends and could also engage in imagery diplomacy. Communication is another arena where investments form military points of view are being made. India is planning for dedicated satellite services for their armed forces. Space technology is expected to help India, China and Israel to enhance the efficiency of their nuclear setup too. Satellite navigation is one area where China is making rapid progress and has already declared their Biduo system operational regionally during Dec 2011. India is expected to take few more years before their indigenous navigational system becomes operational. Till that time, their dependence on GPS and GLONASS is expected to continue. For the armed forces of other states like South Korea, Malaysia, etc., GPS continues to remain the best option. Amongst the major spacefaring nations in the region, Japan’s military space programme displays transparency. India has few dual-use systems and has already announced their plans in regard to military satellites. China is unlikely to get out of its ambiguity cover. The need of the hour is for these states to become proactive towards the formulation of a space regime. There are major concerns about space weaponisation leading to arms race in space. Asia has a very critical role to play in this regard. Already, China has vitiated the atmosphere by undertaking the ASAT in 2007. This has put India in an extremely precarious situation. Till date much before China, only the USA and Russia had demonstrated their ASAT capabilities. Owing to its BMD compulsions, the USA is not seen interested in developing any global space regime banning weaponisation of space. Also, the efforts made by China and Russia by jointly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) the draft Treaty on February 12, 2008 on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) are found inadequate. This draft suffers from various lacunas, and the intentions of China and Russia in regard to space weaponisation remain doubtful. Various opinions are being expressed in regard to the EU’s space code of conduct. All these happenings indicate 202 13 Militarisation and Weaponisation that many states in the world have at least started debating space security issues which is a positive change, and Asian states should not miss this opportunity to put their points of view across. It is important for powers like India to learn from the past experiences of NPT. This treaty regime canvassed as one of the most successful UN regime is actually one of the most unfair UN document on arms control and disarmament. It allows five states in the world to keep their nuclear weapons stockpile while depriving others. It is important for India to learn lessons from this to decide their ASAT policy. For other smaller Asian powers, it is also important to remain connected with these issues and need to have a stake in the system for obvious resigns. It is important to note that vulnerabilities do not necessarily result into threats. Currently, there are very few states having technological capabilities in ASAT arena. Most importantly, the ‘deterrence’ potential of space weapons is yet to be clearly established by the scientific, political and academic community. Hence, states are not looking at the space weaponisation as an immediate policy option. In Asia too, the process of militarisation of space is far more rapid than the weaponisation. Simultaneously, the armed forces from various Asian states lobbying for satellite technologies need to realise that, although the space technologies assisting the modern state-of-art military hardware has capabilities to neutralise the threats in a significantly reduced amount of time, there also exists a danger that such technologies have potential to escalate the conflict.

References

1. Cronin PM. Global strategic assessment. New Delhi: Manas; 2011. p. 159. 2. Mowthorpe M. The militarization and weaponization of space. Oxford: Lexington Books; 2004. p. 3. 3. Alagappa M. In: Alagappa M, editor. Asia’s security environment in the long shadow. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 2008. p. 37Ð77. 4. Kumaria DC. Leveraging space capabilities for India’s defence. Air Power J. Winter 2006;1(2):86Ð7. 5. Katzman J. India’s emerging military satellite system. 2005 August 10. www.windsofchange. net 6. Khattak Masood-Ur-Rehman. Indian military’s space programme: implications for Pakistan- Analysis. Eurasia Rev. 2011 June 10. Availabe at http://www.eurasiareview.com/ 7. Johnson-Freese J. Space as a strategic asset. New York: Columbia University Press;x 2007. p. 222. 8. Covault Craig. Size doesn’t matter-China is developing big military space capabilities using small satellite payloads. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2008 Dec 22/29, p. 22Ð24. 9. Smith CR. Chinese space espionage. 2005 Jun 20. http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/ articles/2005/6/19/180118.shtml 10. Hughes CW. Japan’s remilitarization, Adelphi Paper 403. Oxon: Routledge; 2009. p. 48. 11. Manriquez M. Japan’s space law revision: the next step toward re-militarization? Issue Brief, 2008 Jan. http://www.nti.org/e research/e3 japan remilitarization0108.html. Accessed 23 Oct 2009 12. Suzuki K. Transforming Japan’s space policy-making. Space Policy. 2007;23(2):73Ð80. References 203

13. Opall-Rome B. Israel eyes overseas launch of next ofeq spy satellite. 2011 May 9. http:// www.spacenews.com/military/110509-israel-eyes-overseas-launch-ofeq.html. Accessed 23 Feb 2012. 14. Klein JJ. Space warfare: strategy, principles and policy. London: Routledge; 2006. p. 141. 15. Tellis AJ. China’s military space strategy. Survival. 2007;49(3):41Ð2. 16. Tellis A. China’s space weapons. The Wall Street Journal. 2007 July 23. 17. Lieggi S, Quam E. China’s ASAT test and the strategic implications of the Beijing’s military space policy. Korean J Def Anal. 2007;19(1):18. 18. Ball D. Assessing China’s ASAT program. Austral special report 07-14S. 2007 June 14. http:// nautilus.rmit.edu.au/forum-reports/0714s-ball/ and http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china- 01c.html. Accessed 15 Oct 2009. 19. Vinod Kumar A. In: Ajey L, Namrata G, Rumel D, editors. Asia 2030: the unfolding future. New Delhi: Lancers; 2011. p. 32. 20. Fisher Jr RD. China’s military modernization. London: Praeger Security International; 2008. p. 131. Chapter 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station

For mankind, space exploration has always been a mix of curiosity, utility and profitability. Any ambitious space plan mostly becomes successful provided trained manpower, technology support and adequate funding is available. Societal, scientific and educational requirements have been the key focus for the Asian investments in space arena. They seek space capabilities mainly to achieve developmental goals. At the same time, since the involution of their space programmes, few Asian states have dreamed big like sending manned missions to space. Asian states are aware of the fact that their achievements in space arena indirectly boost up their global status. Simultaneously, these states also realise the correlation of their achievements to nationalism. Asian spacefaring states understand the significance of Sputnik launch and the success of Apollo missions. Over the years, the space investments of these states have also helped them to expand their technology trajectory. These states have ambitions in space arena which are beyond the conventional uses of satellite technology like remote sensing, communication and navigation. They dream to have human space flights, build space stations and undertake missions to Moon and Mars. This chapter limits itself towards discussing the Asian interests in human space flights, development of space shuttles and establishing space stations.

Background

The most fascinating aspect of space rendezvous is the human space ﬂight. More glamour gets added in such missions is when the astronauts undertake a spacewalk. Undertaking such extravehicular activity (EVA—commonly known as spacewalk) is an extremely challenging task. Till date many astronauts particularly from the states like the USA and Russia have undertaken spacewalks. For developed spacefaring states after mastering the technology of human space ﬂights and EVAs, the next logical step is to bring more purpose to such visits beyond technology demonstration. With a view to undertake experiments in space and create an

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 14, 205 © Springer India 2013 206 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station arrangement for longer duration and for more comfortable stay for the astronauts, few states have developed space stations and established space laboratories. Such arrangements allow them to undertake various scientific experimentations under microgravity conductions. Mankind has ambitions to establish human settlements in the space. Various concepts from low-Earth-orbit hotels to the settlements on the Moon and Mars are being discussed and debated for last couple of years. In this context development of space shuttles, undertaking human space visits, carrying out space walks and establishing space laboratories and space stations are imperative. For the fulfilment of the long-term ambition like colonising the Moon, the developments of space stations are going to be the first baby steps. Realising the long-term importance of such activities, the major spacefaring Asian states have started making investments in such activities. These states also factor in scientific, social and foreign policy relevance of human missions in their thinking. It is a common knowledge that the USA and the erstwhile USSR (Russia) are the pioneers in undertaking human space visits and spacewalks. However, Asian states do also have certain linkages to the initial human space flights. The first manned mission to orbit the Moon, Apollo 8, included American William Anders who incidentally was born in Hong Kong, so he is referred as the first Asian-born astronaut in 1968. Similarly, in April 1985, Taylor Wand visited space as crew of STS-51B Challenger (April 29ÐMay 6, 1985). He becomes the first ethnic Chinese person in space.1 Sultan bin Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud from Saudi Arabia was the first Arab and Muslim to visit the space. In 1985, he flew as a payload specialist on STS-51G Discovery (June 17Ð24, 1985).2 A Japanese television journalist named Toyohiro Akiyama was the first Japanese to visit space on Soyuz craft to the Mir space station.3 Incidentally, this 1990 visit is also known as the first space visit undertaken as a part of a commercial agreement. Six years before this, an Indian Air Force Officer Rakesh Sharma had visited space as a part of a joint IndoÐSoviet space mission. In an unfortunate incidence on Feb 1, 2003, Kalpana Chawla, the US astronaut of Indian origin (born and studied in India—the first Indian woman in space) died in Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. This ill-fated shuttle also had Ilan Ramon, the first Israeli astronaut on board. The first Chinese in space onboard the Chinese craft was Yang Liwei (October 2003/Shenzhou 5). Malaysia’s first astronaut, Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor, was part of the Russian Soyuz rocket mission during Oct 2007. The first South Korean in space was a woman named Yi So-yeon on the Soyuz TMA-12 spacecraft during April 2008 mission.4 South Korea was the sixth Asian country to put an astronaut in space. However, only China has succeeded so far in sending humans to space with

1http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/wang-t.html, accessed on Aug 7, 2011. 2http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/al-saud.html, accessed on Aug 7, 2011. 3http://www.astronomytoday.com/astronomy/interview10.html, accessed on Aug 7, 2011. 4http://www.spacefacts.de/bios/international/english/muszaphar sheikh.htm and http://www. spacefacts.de/bios/international/english/lee so-hyun.htm, accessed on Aug 1, 2011. Background 207 the help of their own spacecraft. Rest all Asians to visit space were either a part of a bilateral agreement or space travel undertaken as a part of commercial agreement. The accomplishment of the human visits to the space needs to be judged at two different levels. As per the universally accepted norm, an individual qualifies to become an astronaut when he/she travels to a minimum distance of 90 km above the Earth’s surface out into the space. So far multiple such visits have taken place. The ISS is approximately located at a height of 400 km above the earth’s surface. Many human visits to the ISS have taken place till date. Humans have stayed there for a longer duration and have successfully undertaken EVAs. All this indicates that few states have succeeded in visiting the space, however; their visits have remained restricted to the LEO only. The next step in the human dream of space exploration includes human travel to the deep space region and development of human colonies on Moon and Mars. The USA is the only country which has till date been successful with human visits to the deep space region too. In this context, Asia has much to achieve. Only one Asian state so far has succeeded with human visits to the LEO, and the Moon visit is still a distant dream. Planning of any human visits to space involves a process of an orderly development, testing and maturating of various technologies. The first step in that direction involves sending satellites/capsules to the space and receiving them back to the Earth. This essentially means mastering the re-entry technology. The second stage could involve undertaking developments of space shuttle and first testing technologies with the robotic missions. It is also important to develop technologies in regard to the substance of the human beings in the inhospitable atmosphere out in the space. Also, various challenges are involved in developing the technologies for the purpose of EVAs and building space stations. Varying degrees of investments are being found made by few Asian states in this regard. Following paragraphs analyses such investments. Design and development of space vehicles is a costly, time-consuming and technologically challenging task. The greatest challenge is to develop a system which can withstand extreme environmental conductions including intense heat which it would have to survive while entering the Earth’s atmosphere on an inbound journey from space to Earth. The task becomes more critical for designing a space shuttle with human passengers onboard. Asian spacefaring nations always had a dream of indigenous space shuttle to carry humans to space. Some of them have made a modest beginning to fulfil this aspiration but are still much away from achieving the final aim. China is the only Asian state to launch the first human space flight. Other states like India and Japan have interest in this area too but still have much to achieve.

Japan

Japan a major contributor to the ISS has been working on the development of space shuttle almost for three decades and has achieved partial success in this ﬁeld. 208 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station

Japan has been a long-standing economic and scientific partner of the USA. Japan has a well-matured space programme and has been partnering with the USA in this field. The success achieved by the USA in this field has been the motivator for Japanese to do well, and also they have the national ambition to development their own systems. But, at the same time, it appears that being a long-standing partner in the US space programme to a certain extent, they have also developed a dependence on the USA which at times prevents them from following the path of an independent developer. Particularly, in the human space programme, this dependence is bit evident. The US space shuttle offered the chance to the Japanese5 scientists to visit space. During early 1980s, space shuttle used to carry a spacelab (a laboratory in the payload bay of space shuttle) along with it to undertake experiments. The USA had a policy to engage international partners to share the cost of building such laboratory and as a quid pro quo, the astronauts of that country used to be accommodated onboard of the shuttle. In case of Japan, a Spacelab J mission was planned for a Feb 1988 takeoff as a part of such arrangement onboard. Challenger shuttle and various experiments were designed to be carried out by Japanese astronauts. But, unfortunately, the shuttle was lost during an accident in Jan 1986, and hence this mission was cancelled. Subsequently, as mentioned in earlier, Japan’s first astronaut flew onboard a Russian craft. He was a journalist sponsored by a Japanese media house. Finally, Spacelab J mission (called Fuwatto) materialised in Sep 1992 as a part of second flight of Space Shuttle Endeavour with one Japanese astronaut on board. Japan got its second seat on Shuttle Columbia during 1994 as a part of International Microgravity Experiment (IML-2). Japan had designed total 12 experiments on board for this mission out of 80. Subsequently, few more Japanese visited space. During 1997, the fifth Japanese in space went onboard Shuttle Columbia and also conducted a spacewalk. Japan has made significant contributions towards the construction of internationally developed space station and the research facility, the ISS, both technically and financially. This US-initiated multilateral project was earlier known as Freedom (the name during the Ronald Reagan period). In 1985, Japan was invited to partner this project. They were expected to contribute a laboratory to undertake experiments in scientific, microgravity and material processing research. A MoU was signed between Japan and the USA during 1989 for their participation in the Freedom. Japan finished its work successfully towards developing Japanese Experimental Module (JEM) by 1995. However, unfortunately by that time, the USA was not able to put the structure for the ISS in place. During 1993, the then President Clinton had take a serious view about the huge financial investment in the project without any success. During the same time, the Russian Mir-2 space station was getting delayed because of the Russian financial difficulties. Hence, both the

5The significant portion of information mentioned in these four paragraphs about Japan is based on Brian Harvey, Henk Smid, Theo Pirard, Emerging Space Powers, Springer/Praxis, Christine, 2010, pp.101Ð129. Background 209 states merged their programmes together. Under these changed circumstances, a fresh JapanÐUS treaty was signed during 1998 (around the same time name Freedom was dropped for ISS). JEM was called Kibo (‘HOPE’ in Japanese—a US$1 billion lab). Kibo has two facilities for conducting experiments: an air-pressurised module for experiments in microgravity environment and an external experiment platform for observation of Earth.6 The experimentation facilities have a major emphasis on space medicine, biology and material production.7 It has various experiments ranging from astronomy to cell biology. NASA’s Space Shuttle Discovery carried Japan’s Kibo lab module for the ISS on May 31, 2008. Japan has developed an unmanned spacecraft intended to resupply the Kibo and ISS. Till 2011 two flights of this ship HTV-1 (HOPE Transfer Vehicle) had taken place with the inaugural flight being taken off during Sep 2009 (the first HTV launch was to take place in 2001) [1]. Five more flights are planned till 2015. Interestingly, the Project HTV was not the part of Japan’s initial vision. During 1987, a proposal was put forwarded in Japan for the indigenous development of a manned space shuttle. This entire project is referred as HOPE.8 Japan had made significant investments into their project related to development of manned space shuttle. The journey towards this ambition was to pass through serious of unmanned tests. The process of developing various stages of this entire project was marred by certain failures. In 1998, the H- 2 launcher suffered from a string of failures. Subsequently, re-evaluation of the entire project was done, and it was found that development of full-scale HOPE system was technologically difficult and financially challenging project. The decision was taken to opt for an intermediate programme called HOPE-X. This programme also suffered from the delay in its timeline and had to witness few test failures. Subsequently, the entire programme was modified into development of an unmanned cargo craft. With this programme becoming successful, now it appears that Japan is not keen to continue with the manned space shuttle programme.

China

In October 2003 (Shenzhou 5 mission), China became the only third country after the United States and the erstwhile USSR to put a man in space in an indigenously developed spacecraft. This success has put China much ahead to other Asian players. The journey towards achieving this success was full of challenges. The development of Shenzhou programme could be said to have began way back in 1992 as a Project

6“Japan’s Hope in Space”, Highlighting Japan through articles, pp.8Ð9, http://www.gov-online. go.jp/pdf/hlj ar/vol 0027e/08-09.pdf, accessed on Aug 9, 2011. 7http://www.nasa.gov/mission pages/station/structure/elements/jem.html, accessed on Aug 4, 2011. 8Incidentally, the space laboratory on ISS known as Kibo also means HOPE. 210 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station

921Ð1. At that time, China had an ambitious plan of putting man in space by 1999, a feat probably it wanted to achieve by the end of the twentieth century. But financial and technological difficulties kept China far away from realising this dream in time [2]. It took them four additional years to make this dream a reality. Such delay could be considered normal in comparison with the degree of difficulty of the entire project. Globally, delays are routinely observed in regard to space programmes of various states. Manned space mission has been China’s ambition for many years. The 1992 attempt was actually not the first attempt of the Chinese in this direction. They had visualised and started working towards the development of manned programme in the 1970s but had to stop their work with an effort lasting for almost a decade (in 1980) [3]. Shortage of funds and technological limitations was the main reason to stop this programme. Also, it was thought prudent to concentrate more on applications satellites than to run after such fanciful ideas then. During this period of one decade (1970sÐ1980s), two development plans were undertaken: (a) Shuguang-1 (Project 714): Launch planned from Xichang Satellite Launch Center; land-based recovery; terminated in 1975 (b) Shuguang-2: Launch planned from Dongfeng Space Center; sea-based recovery; terminated in 1980 Scanty information is available regarding above plans. In regard to the development of the spacecraft, some Western sources (based on analysis of certain photographs) claim that the spacecraft model was similar to the US Gemini design.9 Also, there are certain speculations about the Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) satellites. This recoverable series of remote sensing satellites was launched and operated by China between 1974 and 2006 with a significant success rate. A possibility exists that China had plans to develop a manned variant of the FSW satellite.10 The success of Shenzhou 5 manned space mission is the result of a carefully drawn roadmap—a programme with three major phases. The first manned mission was preceded by the first four unmanned test flights in 1999, 2001 and 2002. The first phase of China’s manned space programme could be said to have got over with the successful completion of the first Chinese manned space flight in 2003. The second phase with a proposed time schedule for 5 years included a series of flights to prove the technology, conduct rendezvous and docking operations in orbit, and operate an 8-ton spacelab using the basic spacecraft technology. The last

9http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=26143.0, Project Gemini was the second human space flight programme of NASA. This programme was an intermediate step between Mercury and Apollo programme. During mid-1960s, it carried out ten successful manned space missions. http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/history/gemini/gemini-overview.htm 10http://www.sinodefence.com/space/military/fsw.asp and http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index. php?topic=26143.0 Background 211 phase involves orbiting of a 20-ton space station in the 2010Ð2015, with crews being shuttled to it by using an 8-ton manned spacecraft. 11 In 2005, China successfully launched and recovered its second manned space missions (Shenzhou 6). Its third manned spacecraft Shenzhou 7 with 3 astronauts (taikonauts in Chinese language) mission took off after the Beijing Olympics on Sept 25, 2008. This mission demonstrated the capability of the Shenzhou spacecraft to carry its full complement of three crew members for the first time. A Chinese- developed Feitian space suit was tested during this mission. The most important aspect of this mission is the conduct of EVA—the spacewalk undertaken by the Chinese taikonauts for the first time. The event was carried live on the television. Also, a subsatellite weighing 40 kg was released after the EVA. The orbital module of this mission has been kept back in the space to conduct space network experiments with the subsatellite. A solid lubricant exposure experiment was carried out during this mission. All these experimentations have long-term implications for future missions [4]. On Sept 29, 2011, China launched the first module for its space station Tiangong (‘Heavenly Palace’)—creating a major milestone in the history of China’s space programme.12 This 8-ton experimental prototype would serve as a test bed for testing the technologies required for the future space station programme. This experiment could be viewed as a pilot project for China’s proposed (2020/22) space station programme. Three more Shenzhou missions have been planned in near future to complete this preliminary space station programme.13 China has announced the details of their space station planning. The station is likely to be completed by 2020Ð2022 and is likely to have a 10-year life span. The station would have a core module with two laboratory units for undertaking experiments that would support three astronauts for long-term habitation. They have plans to undertake experiments on microgravity, space radiation biology and astronomy. They also propose undertake the testing of a deployable antenna. Tiangong-1 module could be viewed as first step of their multistage programme leading to the building a space station [5]. This proposed 60-ton space station is much smaller in comparison with other experiments in the world14;however,itis important to note that this world’s third multi-module space station could involve use of much more complicated technology than a single-module spacelab. China is

11Pan Zhenqiang, ‘Shenzhou VI and China’s Space Flight’, Foreign Affairs Journal (78), 2005, pp. 53Ð54 and http://www.astronautix.com/craft/shenzhou.htm. However, there appears to be certain delay in this regard. 12‘The Significance and Implications of Tiangong I’, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ TheSignificanceandImplicationsofTiangong alele 071011, accessed on Nov 22, 2011. 13http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=chinas-first-space-lab-ti&print=true 14The 8-ton China space station is very small in size in comparison earlier attempts by few other states. In 1973, the US Skylab was launched weighing 80 tons. Russia’s Mir space station (1986Ð 2001) was a 22-ton core module. The ISS is 450 ton. However, it is important to note that Tiangong- 1is more of an excremental station, and China’s proposed station is likely to weigh 60Ð70 ton. 212 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station also developing a cargo spaceship to transport supplies and equipment to the space station. The unmanned Shenzhou 8 was launched on Nov 01, 2011, and had a 17-day journey in space and has returned to Earth, marking the successful conclusion of China’s first docking mission. The main activity undertaken was docking and disen- gaged and redocked with the unmanned Tiangong-1 spacelab module about 340 km above Earth’s surface.15 This has allowed China to master docking technology particularly from the point of view of future human missions. During June 2012 China has successfully completed it Shenzhou 9 mission and Shenzhou 10 mission would also be launched shortly. Shenzhou 9 mission had the first Chinese women aboard. This three-member team onboard Shenzhou 9 had successfully conducted both automatic and manual space docking maneuvers with Tiangong-1. Also, during their stay on Tiangong-1the team performed few scientific experiments.16 The second step of ‘Heavenly Palace’ idea is a space laboratory phase. Two space laboratories, namely, Tiangong-2 and the Tiangong-3, would be developed and placed into orbit around by 2013 and 2015. The basic aim would be to use, test and research on key technologies needed to build a larger space station that provides long-term living conditions for astronauts. Taikonauts visiting Tiangong-2 should be able to stay for about 20 days in space and at Tiangong-3 for about 40 days.17 During July 2011, China had launched its second tracking and data relay satellite, Tian Lian-1B (TL-1B), by employing a Long March 3C launch vehicle. This was an important step for the next phase of their manned space programme. The satellite probably supported near-real-time communications between orbiting spacecraft and the ground control. In 2008, China had launched the first satellite in the same family called Tian Lian-1A. The designed lifetime of such satellites is approximately 8 years. Such systems could also complement the ground-based space tracking and telemetry stations [6]. All this clearly demonstrates the systematic planning carried out by China in regard to its manned programme and space shuttle.

India

India also has ambitions of owning an indigenously developed space shuttle for many years. In the beginning, India had an ambitious plan of designing a reusable space vehicle (RLV).18 By end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s, India decided to

15http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-11/18/content 14115516.htm, accessed on Nov 22, 2011. 16http://www.space.com/16170-china-launches-1st-female-astronaut-shenzhou-9.html, accessed on Sep 20, 2012. 17http://www.space.com/11048-china-space-station-plans-details.html 18RLV is about developing a launch system which can visit space many times. Space shuttle comes close to this concept. Background 213 develop small space shuttle (hyperplane19) that would to be orbited by nonreusable launchers. India had another plan of development of a vehicle Avatar RLV (Aerobic Vehicle for Hypersonic Aerospace TrAnspoRtation) as a single state system.20 Interestingly, not many have taken a note of India’s efforts in the field of hyperplane. At places, it is mentioned in passing that apart from few developed countries, it is India [7] which has researched on this subject extensively. In 1987, India’s defence research organisation DRDO had established a group to study the feasibility of direct flight into space in hydrogen-fuelled spaceplane. India’s hyperplane design project had run off and on for many years. It still continues to be advocated in certain quarters. The basic philosophy behind this entire idea has been to develop a low-cost approach to spaceplane development and operations.21 However, it is not known why this programme had not continued. Is it because of lack of resources or government support? There also exists a possibility of lack of coordination amongst the two government agencies, namely, the DRDO and ISRO. In India, ISRO is mandated with the space agenda. However, this programme was getting developed under the DRDO banner. It appears that India has moved away from this programme and is investing into different set of ideas chiefly approaching in realm of using nonreusable conventional spacecraft. India’s first attempt to demonstrate the capability to recover an orbiting space capsule was a success. On Jan 10, 2007, ISRO’s PSLV C7 rocket launched a Space Capsule Recovery Experiment (SRE or SRE-1) into the space along with few other satellites. The capsule was recovered successfully after 12 days. This 555-kg capsule was placed in orbit at an approximate altitude of 640 km. This entire experiment was aimed at testing reusable thermal protection system, navigation, guidance and control, hypersonic aerothermodynamics, management of communication blackout, deceleration and floatation system and recovery operations.22 This approximately US$5 million to US$6 million SRE experiment comprised an aero-thermo structure, spacecraft platform, deceleration and flotation system and two microgravity payloads.23 With this, India has demonstrated its ability to recover a satellite back to the Earth by withstanding significantly high temperatures during its re-entry phase. India’s indigenously developed thermal protection system had proved its worth. This

19These hypersonic aircrafts are designed to achieve orbital height and velocity in a single stage from a runway takeoff. 20This is being developed by India’s defence research organisation DRDO jointly with ISRO. One vehicle is expected to last for 100 launches and should carry a payload of 50Ð1,000 kg. For more, please visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian Space Shuttle Program, accessed on Jul 12, 2011. 21From the unpublished work by Keith Gottschalk and Raghavan Gopalaswami titled ‘Even India’: The Birth of Tomorrow’s RLV. It may be noted that Air Commodore (Retd) Raghavan Gopalaswami was the project leader of Avatar project and is also created to have coined the name. Also, refer author’s discussions with Raghavan Gopalaswami. 22http://space.skyrocket.de/doc sdat/sre-1.htm, accessed on Jul 12, 2011. 23http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Space-Systems-and-Industry/Space-Recovery- Experiment-SRE-India.html 214 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station mission could be seen as India’s first step towards progressing to realise the final goal of human space flight. The exact date for the launch of SREII is not yet announced. The main objective of this mission would be to realise a fully recoverable capsule and provide a platform to conduct microgravity experiments on microbiology, agriculture and powder metallurgy. The mission would also carry out electron flux density measurements during re-entry.24 However, there is not much information available in this regard to the future of India’s SRE programme. The official sanction for the development of a scramjet-powered winged Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD) was given to ISRO by the Indian government in 2004. This project is a first step towards realising a two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) fully reusable launch vehicle. This project is aimed to evaluate technologies like hypersonic flight, autonomous landing, powered cruise flight and hypersonic flight using air-breathing propulsion. Also, Hypersonic Flight Experiment (HEX) would be undertaken as a part of this technology development mission. The US model of a space shuttle powers itself into the orbit and lands back as an aircraft. The ISRO’s model proposes to recover the RLV and the rocket booster separately. The RLV would make a conventional landing on a runway, and booster would do a parachute landing. RLV is not designed to enter orbit. It is a pure launcher. Not a spacecraft cum launcher. It will loft a satellite into orbit and immediately re-enter the atmosphere and glide back for a conventional landing. The RLV will possess wings and tail fins and will be launched atop a 9-ton solid booster called S-9, similar to the ones on the PSLV. ISRO plans to achieve RLV capability in three phases. The first phase is re-entry technology development which is currently underway. The second phase is RLV runway recovery, and the last phase is the scramjet power. In the second phase, RLV will be tested without its scramjet engine. After burnout, the booster will separate and fall away, and the RLV will go on to make an unpowered ascent. The RLV will then re-enter the atmosphere at hypersonic speed and use aerodynamic breaking to decelerate. It will be brought to a gliding, unpowered cruise speed of about 0.8 mach, and slowed down further to make a horizontal landing. The last phase will involve powering the RLV by an air-breathing scramjet which is being developed under a separate project called advanced technology vehicle (ATV). The first flight of RLV could take place in 2012Ð2013.25 ISRO has initiated preliminary work on its most ambitious project yet—sending a human mission into space. A study in this regard to carry human beings to low Earth orbit has begun. The government has approved research and development

24http://www.isro.org/scripts/futureprogramme.aspx 25The entire above information on RLV-TD project is based on “Reusable Launch Vehicle - Tech- nology Demonstrator (RLV-TD)”, http://knol.google.com/k/reusable-launch-vehicle-technology- demonstrator-rlv-td#, accessed on Aug 27, 2011 and http://www.isro.org/scripts/futureprogramme. aspx, accessed on Aug 16, 2011. Background 215 work relating to the manned space mission and also made some initial budgetary provisions.26 ISRO has initiated pre-project activities to study technical and man- agerial issues. The aim is to develop a fully autonomous orbital vehicle carrying two or three crew members to about 300 km low Earth orbit.27 In this connection, testing out other key systems for life support, rescue and recovery has started. Work towards new mission management and control systems for the programme has started. An astronaut training centre and a new launch pad for the manned mission are also being built. The other aspects of this programme like the development of space suit have begun at the Defence Bioengineering and Electromedical Laboratory (DEBEL) which is a unit of DRDO [8]. The first human mission to space is expected to take place after 2017. As per Dr K. Radhakrishnan, Chairman, ISRO ‘India has dreams of developing a fully reusable vehicle, there are several elements we need to understand as of now we have a technology demonstrator’. He further mentions that ‘the unmanned Indian space shuttle will be initially launched vertically like a rocket and in the first few flights it will be dropped back into the sea, but later it will make a landing like any other aircraft’.28 It is expected that the eventual development of a fully reusable vehicle would make the process of launching satellites into space cost- effective. However, it is important to note that human mission is not the programme of immediate importance to ISRO. They understand that they have a long distance to cover in this regard. They are yet to master the technology to launch heavy satellites (say 4 tones plus category in GTO) into the space, and this remains the main focus of their space agenda.

Assessment

Space shuttle programme demonstrates the state’s interests in exploring the outer space with a sense of adventure and courage. It demonstrates the state’s ability in undertaking both unmanned and manned missions successfully. Over the years, the sphere of space shuttle, manned missions and space station has been dominated by the USA and Russia. With the US space shuttle finishing its last flight on July 21, 2011, a new era of Russian domination has begun. None of the Asian states are in a position to immediately fill the void created by the US space shuttle retirement. The ISS experiment has been viewed as one the most successful manifestations of the multilateral effort in space arena. Japan is the only Asian country participating in this project. The principal drawback of this programme has been the lack of joint transportation policy. Unfortunately, Japan’s one-sided and continual dependence

26“ISRO starts work on man mission”, Mar 1, 2010, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/ISRO+ starts+work+on+’man+mission’/1/86202.html, accessed on Aug 14, 2011. 27http://www.isro.org/scripts/futureprogramme.aspx, accessed on Aug 14, 2011. 28http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/soon-india-to-have-its-own-space-shuttle-123239&cp 216 14 Space Shuttle and Space Station on the USA appears to have played a role towards limiting its judgment in regard to the indigenous development of a space shuttle for manned missions. With the retirement of the US shuttle programme, Russia holds the monopoly in regard to the future of ISS. Now only Soyuz spacecraft is available to undertake manned missions to ISS. However, the fate of ISS is becoming unclear because of the crash of the Russian supply rocket.29 Japan could play an important role in deciding the future of ISS because they possess a proven technology to launch robotic missions to ISS. With the fate of ISS in jeopardy, now the Chinese programme gains significant importance. In comparison with the USA and Russia, China is the late starter in this field. Knowing the Chinese track record in this field and their well-articulated roadmap for the future, the state is predicated to dominate the space arena for next one or two decades in the areas of human space missions and orbiting space station/laboratory. India appears to have failed to appreciate the importance of continuing its Avatar RLV programme. Any success in the development of this vehicle could have emerged as a game changer. Would China derive any military advantages from this programme? So far there is no indication of China having specific plans to carry out any military tasks. Various technologies developed during the entire process of designing a space station could have direct or indirect strategic benefits. The overall investments of all the Asian states in sending robotic/manned missions to space and undertaking zero gravity experimentation could help them in scientific exploration and also would to increase their overall technology development abilities and innovation capabilities. Various activities in connection with these programmes are expected to help the growth of space industry in the region. The quantum of technological and financial challenges for undertaking and sustaining space station programme demonstrates the need for these three space powers working collectively. Other interested Asian states could also join them. Learning from the strengths and limitations of the ISS programme various Asian states could join hand together to develop an Asian space station.

References

1. Malik T. Space station crew welcomes Japan’s ﬁrst cargo ship. 2009 Sept 17. http://www.space. com/7305-space-station-crew-welcomes-japan-cargo-ship.html. Accessed 2 Aug 2011. 2. Johnson-Freese J. China’s manned space program. Harv Asia Pac Rev. 2002;6(2):29. 3. Johnson-Freese J. China’s manned space program: Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux? Naval War Coll Rev. 2003;LVI(3):59.

29An unmanned Russian cargo ship (Progress 44) carrying tons of supplies for astronauts on the International Space Station crashed back to Earth on Aug 24, 2011. This could even lead to the astronauts temporarily abandoning the ISS in future. References 217

4. Jessa T. ‘Shenzhou 7’. 2011 July 2. http://www.universetoday.com/87899/shenzhou-7/ and http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/26/content 10112553.htm,andhttp://www. astronautix.com/craft/shenzhou.htm. Accessed 15 July 2011. 5. Branigan T, Sample I. China unveils rival to International Space Station. The Guardian. 2011 Apr 26. 6. Barbosa RC. China launches Tian Lian-1B to bolster manned space program network. 2011 July 11. http://www.nasaspaceﬂight.com/2011/07/china-launches-tian-lian-1b-bolster- manned-space-network/. Accessed 10 Aug 2011. 7. Vandenkererckhove J, Czysz P. SSTO performance assessment with In-Flight Lox collection. Acta Astronautica. 1995;37:167Ð78. 8. ISRO starts building Space Capsule for manned Space Mission. 2010 Mar 24. http://spaceyuga. com/isro-start-building-space-capsule-manned-space-mission/. Accessed 24 Aug 2011. Chapter 15 Space Power Soft Power

Water is ﬂuid, soft, and yielding. But water will wear away rock, which is rigid and cannot yield. As a rule, whatever is ﬂuid, soft, and yielding will overcome whatever is rigid and hard. This is another paradox: what is soft is strong. Lao Tzu Chinese philosopher (604 BCÐ531 BC)

The term soft power has become a part of popular security discourse since 1990, when it was ﬁrst used by Prof. Joseph Nye in his book titled Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power [1]. Prof. Nye has developed this concept further in some of this subsequent works. This chapter is in three parts. The ﬁrst part outlines the theory, the concept, the notion as well as the critic of soft power in broad terms. The second part analyses the geopolitics of space technologies as a source of soft power. The third part explores the meaning of soft power in context of China’s space programme.

Soft Power: A New Dimension of Power Dynamics

The civilisation has mostly equated power with strength. Power could be viewed as their ability to inﬂuence the behaviour of others to get the desired outcomes. This shaping the behaviour of others could be carried out by using different instruments. It could be done by economic engagement or by attraction or by coercion. Usually, nation-states are found using carrot and stick policy to retain or increase their authority. It would be incorrect to believe that only the conventional instruments like military or economic might be useful to acquire power. There exists a possibility that at times using these instruments could even prove counterproductive. It is possible in certain cases to get the desired outcome without tangible threats or payoffs. This process of achieving results could also be referred as ‘the second face of power’. This allows a state to achieve the desired outcomes because other states respect its

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 15, 219 © Springer India 2013 220 15 Space Power Soft Power values, follow its model and aim to reach its level of prosperity and openness. This is what the soft power is all about. It involves attracting others to crave for the results that you desire. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. However, it involves much more than mere inﬂuencing others. It is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It involves the ability to attract, and this attraction could lead to acquiescence [2]. Soft power resources are the possessions that could create such attractions. Apart from state actors, the soft power could also be put into effect by non-state actors like major NGOs (nongovernmental organisations), MNCs (multinational corporations), various subnational entities and global institutions. It is important to appreciate that there are various conﬁnes of the soft power. It does not allow you to take any active control of the other state or a group. It is not about ‘owning’ everything. The reasons for ‘attraction’ could vary from situation to situation and target to target. The eagerness of the recipient and his/her zeal to ‘comply’ plays an important role in this power dynamics. There is an opinion that the concept of soft power is more theoretical in nature. It could also be argued that power is ultimately a power, and there is nothing hard or soft about it. A former New York Times columnist Leslie H. Gelb argues that there are no examples found in recent history where leaders of a country have changed their position on a major interest to them because they were persuaded to such an extent that they realised that the pursuing power had understood their interest better than they did. In reality such things just don’t happen.1 The soft power argument based on the ‘mechanism of attraction’ looks problematic for some. There is an opinion that the concept of attraction does not form a suitable foundation upon which to base a category of analysis [3]. It is also argued that to presume attraction as a natural force feasible or logical in the context of world politics may not be correct. Rather in the ‘context of world politics it makes far more sense to model attraction as a relationship that is constructed through representational force—a nonphysical but nevertheless coercive form of power that is exercised through language. Insofar as attraction is sociolinguistically constructed through representational force, soft power should not be understood in juxtaposition to hard power but as a continuation of it by different means’ [4]. Such critical reviews about Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power are necessary to take the debate further. It is important to note that Nye is not discussing about the attraction in isolation. His argument is that soft power is about the capacity to change what other countries want, and it could be connected with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. He also argues that the soft power of a country has three primary sources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policies [5, 6]. Soft power also includes the capacity to shape

1Leslie H. Gelb, author of “Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy” (HarperCollins 2009), a book that explains how to think about and use power in the twenty- ﬁrst century. Soft Power Relevance of Space Technology 221 international organisations and agendas. It’s not always the state, but any major industrial house or even great philosophers or actors who wield inﬂuence on the polity and population of other states could also be recognised as sources of soft power. For any nation-state, the various foreign policy initiatives are mostly undertaken to address various foreign policy challenges. These initiatives are mainly diplomatic and economic in nature. In certain situations, states are found using military diplomacy as an instrument of policy initiative. The concept of soft power when viewed under such settings demands a nuanced debate and discussion on one of the most important but often less discussed tenets of soft power that is the role of science and technology (S&T). Limited attempts [7] have been made either by Nye’s supporters or critics to contextualise the importance of science and technology as an element of soft power projection. In general, there is an absence of debate either for or against the relevance of S&T in wielding the soft power. The criticism to Nye’s postulation has emerged mainly from the community of social scientists who have different yardsticks to judge the effect of attraction. Nye’s hypothesis of attraction argues well when looked at the backdrop of S&T as a key instrument of soft power.

Soft Power Relevance of Space Technology

Science diplomacy could be viewed as an important tool to engage states constructively. Science diplomacy is about the use of scientific collaborations amongst the nation-states to deal with the common problems faced and to build constructive international partnerships [8]. State’s interests in various issues related to S&T impact policy planning at the uppermost levels. The S&T issues usually dictate the strategic considerations of the state and vice versa. These issues significantly impact the socioeconomic development of the state. Naturally, they influence state’s domestic and international policies and impact budgetary provisions. More importantly ‘barter’ of technology amongst nation-states is found being used as a means for international power politics for many years. Various technology denial regimes have played an important role in shaping the geopolitics of the world over the years. In Asia, the growth trajectory of states like India was dwarfed due to the technological apartheid for many years in the past. Appreciating the role played by S&T in the overall development of major powers over the years, various developing states are found keen to acquire technology both for civil and strategic purposes. This demonstrates the ‘mechanism of attraction’ in regard to S&T. Asian states are making important investments in the field of S&T for last few decades. Understanding the limitations of dependence on other states in regard to acquisition of new technologies, some of them have initiated the process of indigenisation. Significant investments are being made by them in research and development (R&D) fields for various technologies. Level of Asian investments in R&D is found almost at par with that of North America. China and Japan take the second and the third spot globally in their national S&T investments with only the 222 15 Space Power Soft Power

US being ahead of them. China has developed one of the best technological facilities in the world. They are notably making investments in the fields like nanotechnology, catalysis and cognitive sciences [9]. India has earned global reputation for its development of information technology sector, and it is now establishing itself in biotechnology field. In South Korea, the government has elevated the stature of S&T minister to the level of deputy prime minister clearly giving an indication about the importance the state is giving to S&T development. India has launched a massive programme to expand its higher education base keeping long-term requirements in mind. Indonesia had held its first National Innovation Summit in the summer of 2006 obliquely to project its S&T ambitions. Singapore continues to advance as the world-class biotech hub in Asia. Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam have devised policies to advance S&T and are welcoming new ventures [9]. All this indicates that various developing states from Asia are having sufficient interests in matters related to S&T. The overall interests shown by developing states to connect with the ‘have’ states of technology for the transfer/purchase of technology indicate its importance to them. The ‘have’ states are found using this opportunity to realise their geopolitical and geo-economical aims. It is important to note that there are few developed technological powers in Asia too, which are engaging various developing states within and outside the region. As mentioned earlier, the soft power could be put into effect by non-state actors like major industrial house too. The success achieved by an industrial house may create its admirers both at intra- and interstate levels. Some of such admirers would also like to emulate the business model developed by these industrial houses. While speaking at the 2008 Davos World Economic Forum, Mr. Bill Gates of Microsoft had argued that ‘there is a need to develop a new business model that would allow a combination of the motivation to help humanity and the profit motive to drive development. He called it “creative capitalism,” the capitalism leavened by a pinch of idealism and altruistic desire to better the lot of others’ [10]. Various actions taken by state and non-state actors like helping humanity to progress, offering developmental assistance, fulfilling social obligations, investing towards development of entrepreneurship, etc. are directly or indirectly, knowingly or unknowingly helping to place the soft power in effect. One specific area of S&T which has shown ability to shape the global opinion in such a fashion that the states genuinely aspire to possess this technology, probably even envy the states possessing this technology and wish to conquer the high ground, is space technology. This technology has been viewed as symbol of power. If possession of nuclear technology is viewed as a symbol of hard power, then it could be argued that the possession space technology could be viewed as symbol of soft power. This technology has affected the formulation of socioeconomic agendas of various nation-states and that of some international institutions. It has also made a significant impact on the most important traditional component of hard power, namely, the military. This technology has played the key role of connecting continents and people. From education to meteorology to military to disaster management, the footprint of this technology is all pervasive. Soft Power Relevance of Space Technology 223

In order to contextualise the relevance of space technologies from the soft power, perspective ex-NASA administrator Mike Griffin offers an interesting argument. Naturally, his argument would have a US bias, but the overall context could be appreciated under the global settings too. In specific terms, the USA is far ahead of any other state in regard to assets, investments and technological expertise in space realm. Hence, Griffin’s argument may not have the universality; however, still the basic spirit behind his argument needs to be noted. Mike Griffin develops his argument at the backdrop of national security. He raises few basic questions in order to reach his analysis. He asks, ‘What is the value to the US of being involved in enterprises which lift up human hearts everywhere when we do them? What is the value to the US of being engaged in such projects, doing the kinds of things that other people want to do with us, as partners? What is the value to the US of being a leader in such efforts, in projects in which every nation capable of doing so wants to take part? I would submit that the highest possible form of national security, well above having better guns and bombs than everyone else, well above being so strong that no one wants to fight with us, is the security which comes from being a nation which does the kinds of things that make others want to work with us to do them. What security could we ever ask that would be better than that, and what give[s] more of it to us than the space programme?’ [11]. It is important to note the context against which Mike Griffin was making his argument. The US space shuttle Atlantis took its last flight during July 2011. Unfortunately, presently the USA has no platform available to undertake any manned space mission. NASA administrators were aware few years back that such situation would arise in near future if they do not react in time. Hence in 2007, while highlighting the need to continue working on an alternative to the space shuttle, he had argued that human ‘spaceflight is an instrument of soft power: a way of demonstrating US leadership not just in space, but on Earth as well’ [11]. It is important to note that space shuttle could be only one of the instruments to depict the relevance of soft power status; there are various other vital instruments available in the space arena having potential to display the soft power status. The abrupt shutting down of the space shuttle programme has considerably dented the US space dominance, indirectly affecting its soft power status in the outer space arena. The phenomenal success achieved by the USA in space arena over the years has helped them significantly towards retaining the technological leadership of the world. Particularly, its achievement with its civilian space programme has allowed it to boost its soft power status. It is also important to analyse in detail whether the concentration by the USA towards developing more space technologies for strategic purposes in space has undermined its soft power status. In the twenty- first century, with the increasing global influence from its strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China in the space field, the US influence is showing certain signs of withdrawal. It may not happen immediately but eventually it could happen. The argument put forth by Joseph Nye in his 2004 article [12] is found becoming more relevant in 2011Ð2012. He had said that the USA should appreciate that the soft power is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity. It should allow the USA to obtain the outcomes it desires. If the USA becomes very unpopular that being pro- 224 15 Space Power Soft Power

USA is considered as a kiss of death, then it means the state is losing its legitimacy in the eyes of others. Unfortunately, the USA is becoming unpopular because of its global policies. The post 9/11 US policies have not been appreciated by many (individuals and states) and have ended up in making the USA unpopular in the world. Apart from fighting the so-called global war against terrorism, the USA is also concerned about threats emerging from few state actors. The role of the US administration during the Arab Spring (2011Ð2012) and its approach towards the Libya uprising has added to its unpopularity. The US ‘fervour’ to undertake global policing and their ‘selective’ usage of policies in regard to democracy and human rights has not been appreciated by many. To address the likely threats emerging from the states like Iran and North Korea, the USA is developing and simultaneously deploying the architecture for the ballistic missile defence systems. Establishing such system has direct impact on the matters related to space weaponisation. This is leading the USA to distance itself from participating towards development of any global arms control and disarmament agenda in space arena. Also, their resolve to preserve dominance in military space is consuming its resources. On the other hand, new competitors are entering in the sectors dominated by the USA for many years like global satellite navigation. On the whole, the USA appears to have started losing some ground in commercial space area and also in the field space exploration. This could lead eventually towards the USA losing its leadership in space field and indirectly affect its soft power standing. This may not happen in near future; however, such possibility in the longer run could not be ruled out. The ‘field of space’ is rapidly becoming globally active with few Asian states realising impressive achievements. ‘Technonationalism’ has been the impetus for their space programmes [13]. Various spacefaring Asian states are found successfully using their expertise for the purposes of commercial activates. Witnessing their impressive success, many states within and outside the region are getting attracted towards their capability and expertise. Space technology savvy Asian states are found using this opportunity to focus for commercial proposals from such states. They are also found helping few states financially to develop their space programmes. There is a geopolitical significance behind such engagements. In short, they are found using competitive socioeconomic, scientific and strategic pursuits for such engagements. The following section of this chapter examines the space policies of China from the point of view of understanding their relevance to exert soft power influence.

China’s Soft (Space) Power Persuade

State’s interests are normally shaped by its power calculus. China is a rising power both economically and militarily. To a great extent, the much debated ‘rise of China’ has already taken place. At the same time, China suffers from an ‘image deficit’. The reasons for this could be many, from communism to human rights violations China’s Soft (Space) Power Persuade 225 to supporting states with dubious records to dismal arms control, disarmament policies, etc. In the arena of technology development, China is normally blamed for their covert policies of reverse engineering. However, since the last few years, China is gaining acceptance as a major, respected and even at times an envied actor in international arena. It is actively pursuing multilateral approaches for trade and investments. It is building up new security relationships. China as a state and society is in a position to influence foreign investments. China’s charm offensive in Asia, Africa and Latin America has resulted in providing major benefits to the state. At the same time, concerns have been expressed by few about the nature and manner in which China’s developmental plans are progressing. In general, various surveys conducted in many countries particularly after 2000 suggest that majority in most countries seem to have favourable view of growing China [14]. Such surveys are found offering similar results both in the Western world and amongst Asian states. Analysts and thinker communities have provided various arguments (differing at times) about the future of the rising power. China is viewed by some as a threat to status quo power and regional peace and stability. It is important to note that just because the rise of China is a reality (peaceful or otherwise?), it does not qualify to emerge as a threat to international system. Any perception-based analysis in this regard could offer erroneous conclusions. China’s official stance about its developmental policies is that of a peaceful growth and to avoid confrontation. However, Robert Kagan an American historian and foreign policy commentator argues that China will become a threat to the West because it is positioning itself as a ‘political power’ in the international arena. Such actions follow a pattern established by other states who have sought to challenge global powers throughout modern history [15]. Mostly, the rising powers have traditionally been considered as revisionist powers in realist international relations theories. However, it is not necessary that rising China’s foreign policy should hold such conventional wisdom [16]. For China to achieve the great power status, it is important to look beyond undertaking military modernisation and conducting economic offensive. If they have to ‘manage’ the maximum redistribution of power presently concentrated in the hands of few developed powers, then they have to make themselves more relevant globally. They will have to attempt for a new order by engaging various states. It could be done by engaging such powers on diplomatic, cultural and science and technology front. This is what soft power is all about. The idea of soft power is not new to China; maybe the expressions used to describe it in the past were a bit different. Since the era of Sun Zi (544Ð496 BC) and Mo Zi (470Ð390 BC), idealism has provided a counterpoint to realism. Confucianism advocates that a state should obtain its leadership status by setting an example and by opposing imposition of one’s values on others. The idea of ‘culture winning over enemy’ and ‘winning a battle before it is fought’ does find references in ancient China’s strategic culture. In recent times after 1990s, with Joseph Nye’s formulation of soft power formulation and possibility at the backdrop of the global reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown 1989, Chinese scholars and policymakers are found engaged in studying the concept of soft power and identifying its relevance for the state [16, pp. 262Ð264] . Slowly, political and military leadership is found 226 15 Space Power Soft Power contextualising this concept under the Chinese settings. In his speech at the 17th CPC Congress (2007), President Hu Jintao called for enhancing culture as part of soft power [17]. While formulating the China’s International Status Report 2005, for the first time, the strengthening of soft power was used as one of the criteria to estimate China’s national power. It was observed that in the year 2004 China’s soft power had increased because of the new attempts at institutional building. The Chinese could be viewed to have started appreciating the importance of soft power theory in their framework particularly after the induction of the peaceful rise theory in 2003 and the Beijing Consensus in 2004.2 It’s important to note that at international level, there has been significant amount of debate in regard to China’s soft power potential. The 2007 World Economic Forum held in Dalian, a coastal city in China’s Liaoning Province, addressed the issue of China’s soft power. The then Australian Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd presented Joshua Kurlantzick’s book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World to the US President George W. Bush to remind him ‘why the US has been losing influence.’ The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) had conducted two comprehensive studies on China’s soft power influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the first half of 2008 [18]. The increasing Chinese influence in the region and also in various others of the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century is indicative of the fact that the Chinese policies have grown beyond coercion. Today, China is a state with considerable soft power resources. Its soft power is increasing in respect of its resources in areas of culture, political value and diplomacy. China is yet to fully translate these resources successfully in desired foreign-policy outcomes. Nevertheless, such resources are also growing simultaneously [19]. Technology is one such area. Interestingly, in the Chinese understating the realm of S&T is not strictly compartmentalised as soft power. Party Chief and President Hu Jintao, for instance, noted at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on Jan 4, 2006, that the increase of China’s international status and influence depends both on hard power, such as the economy, S&T and defence, and on soft power, such as culture [18]. However, science and technology as a source could be viewed to have different tenets. When viewed with the prism of its importance of defence, it could be argued to have the shades of hard power, but when approach is to contrast

2Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power”, Asian Survey, Vol XLVIII, No. 3, May/Jun 2008, pp. 456Ð461. In November 2003, Zheng Bijian proposed China’s ‘peaceful rise theory’ at the Boao Asia Forum, stressing the need for China to advocate power transition while developing its own peaceful international influence. Beijing consensus: ‘Since China began undertaking economic reforms in 1978, its economy has grown at a rate of nearly ten percent a year, and its per-capita GDP is now twelve times greater than it was three decades ago. Many analysts attribute the country’s economic success to its unconventional approach to economic policy Ð a combination of mixed ownership, basic property rights, and heavy government intervention. Time magazine’s former foreign editor, Joshua Cooper Ramo, has even given it a name: the Beijing consensus.’ Please refer Yang Yao, “The End of the Beijing Consensus”, Feb 2, 2010, http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus, accessed on Jun 28, 2011. China’s Soft (Space) Power Persuade 227 its importance as a tool in socioeconomic development, it could be viewed as an element of soft power, for example, any technological pursuit undertaken in the field of green technologies or disaster management technologies. Post 2008, there has been a debate in regard to China’s hosting of Beijing Olympic Games as a strategy to increase its soft power status. This single event has contributed significantly towards the world forming a positive opinion about the contemporary China. Similarly, China’s investments in space arena and the significant success achieved by them particularly post 2000 have contributed significantly towards enhancing its prestige in the world. Olympic was the singular event while space is an area for continuous progression. Since the beginning of the space era in 1957, the USA and the erstwhile USSR (now Russia) have been viewed as the space superpowers. Now, China is making its presence felt in this field. Achievements like sending human missions to space, astronauts undertaking spacewalk and launching of a space station are unique acts only performed by the USA and Russia in the past but not any longer with China doing the same. Recently, China has also undertaken two Moon missions and has major plans of undertaking first unmanned and later manned Moon landings and also a mission to Mars. All these activities put China in a coveted category in space field. China has identified investments in space technologies as one of the key areas of its focus. For China, such investment is important for various reasons in addition to technological and socioeconomical benefits. It offers strategic advantages and binds the people with the sense of nationalism. Over the years, China has earned a reputation of supplier of cheap technology lacking in quality and with a limited life span. A notion has emerged that they are the producers of low-technology and low-value items. It is important for China to change this image and make the correct projection of their success by displaying their space achievements. Such ‘image makeover’ is essential to attract business. Largely, it would also help them to ascertain their soft power credentials. To contextualise the significance of space technologies from a soft power perspective, it’s important to identify the overall Chinese interests in various regions of the world. Knowledge of such interests could help appreciate the need for adopting soft power approach by China. This could further help for realising why space is being used as one of the sources for soft power wielding. Chinese soft power is a relatively new concept in Chinese foreign policy [20]. Beijing has been promoting this idea at various levels and attempting to create an atmosphere to exhibit their interest in varying fields from culture, development and trade to energy and sports. As a key player on the world geopolitical vista, China is developing its ‘soft’ credentials in various parts of the world. Chinese presence in Africa is illustrative of Beijing’s efforts to create a paradigm of globalisation in their favour. China’s political-economic bilateral goals and relations in Africa are enumerated in an official 2006 document titled China’s African Policy.3 China proposes to develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa. It

3This document is available on http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm, accessed on Feb 22, 2012. 228 15 Space Power Soft Power outlines need for high-level reciprocal leadership visits and economic collaboration. Economic assistant, technological cooperation and supporting agriculture are the key features of this relationship. Apart from various other issues like culture and health assistance, the document also seeks increased science and technology cooperation.4 On geopolitical front, China has undertaken a diplomatic offensive to peruse one China policy and deny Taiwan any international recognition. Their international assistance and aid policies have a subtext of their Taiwan policies. For example, China’s deployment of 90 peacekeepers to Liberia in Dec 2003 occurred 2 months after Liberia switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. It is important to note that Chinese technical aid to Africa is becoming increasingly important in building China’s influence in the region. Beijing prefers technical support over financial aid because such support has a chance at providing returns (saleÐpurchase of technology) than direct aid and loan programmes [21]. Latin America is another geographical region where China is found making investments. In recent past, China began the engagement policy with the Apr 2001 President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day tour of Latin America. Here the strategies are twofold: first is economic, to secure access to the primary materials that are required for its economic growth and to find a market for its manufactured goods. The second is a political strategy: to obtain diplomatic recognition from those countries still recognising Taiwan as the government of China. This region is important for China to gain greater access to resources—like various ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel and oil—through increased trade and investment.5 The most successful Chinese investment in Latin America has been that of Brazil. Their engagement with Brazil has withstood the test of time. In 1988, the ChinaÐ Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS) programme was conceptualised. Under this programme, three CBERS multispectral, high-resolution satellites have been launched from China. Here sensors are specifically designed from the point of view of gaining inputs for the management of the Earth resources, forests, geology and hydrology. The cooperation between the two countries has showed an authentic effort, from both sides, to break down the developed countries’ prejudice against advanced technology transfer [22]. China is also engaging states much closer to home. East Asia and North-east and Southeast Asia are the regions of (major) interest to China. China is employing a broadly peaceful strategy motivated by the domestic concerns and with a desire to project soft power characterised by a vague, subconscious, Confucian conception of

4“China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, And Africa”, A study prepared for the committee on foreign relations united states senate by the congressional research service, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2008, pp. 107Ð108. 5“China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, And Africa”, A study prepared for the committee on foreign relations united states senate by the congressional research service, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2008, p.16 and Virginia de la Siega, “What is China’s interest in Latin America?”, Online magazine : IV425 Ð Jun 2010, http://www. internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?page=print article&id article=1883, accessed Oct 4, 2011. China’s Soft (Space) Power Persuade 229 a Chinese world order. It has sought to project soft power by offering economic assistance to developing countries [23]. China’s growing influence (soft power) in Southeast Asia is largely economic (China is a major source of foreign aid), trade and investment.6 It is also important to note that the region also constitutes of developed states like Japan and South Korea. Here economic assistance could not become a Chinese soft power trump card, and diplomacy has a larger role to play. Japan is a state which China has to deal more cautiously due to certain geopolitical compulsions. Also, in regard to technology transfer, not much of scope exits with Japan. Here S&T may not become a major factor for development of relationship, but initiatives like joint collaborations could help the improvement of relationship. In all the regions discussed above, China is found making significant investments in space arena. The purpose over here is not to discuss the micro details of such investments but to flag them in order to make the larger point that space has become an instrument for China’s soft power projections. Presently, China is positioning itself as a space patron to the developing world—the same countries in some cases, whose natural resources China covets. China is helping Nigeria and Venezuela with their satellite programme. It is also developing an earth observation satellite system with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand [24, 25]. Chinese investments in Nigeria’s space programme need critical analysis. During May 2007, China launched a US$300 million communications satellite for Nigeria called the NigComStat-1. This launch is an expression of how China is establishing itself as a space benefactor to the developing world. It is intelligently using outer space as an arena for spreading its influence. This satellite was designed and constructed by Chinese engineers. A space industry from China is monitoring the satellite from China and also training Nigerian engineers to operate a tracking station in Nigeria. Above all to help pay for the satellite, China has loaned Nigeria US$200 million in preferential buyer’s credits. It is important to note that China provides Africa with economic and financial assistance. It is involved in building of roads, hospitals and airports, and in return, Africa is happy to sell oil and other commodities to China. China is using space also as a component to enhance this assistance.7 Unfortunately, the NigComStat-1 project has not progressed as planned. China had to face a failure with the NigComStat-1 within 1 year after its launch. During Nov 2008, this satellite was switched off since it lost both of its solar arrays [26]. This satellite was meant to function of a minimum of 15 years. In order to keep its ongoing partnership with Nigeria intact, China had promised to

6“China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, And Africa”, A study prepared for the committee on foreign relations united states senate by the congressional research service, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2008, pp. 88Ð89. 7“China Launches Satellite for Nigeria”, May 29, 2007, http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=3698. 1982.0.0, accessed on Sept 20 2011. 230 15 Space Power Soft Power launch a replacement satellite.8 China fulfilled its promise by launching Nigerian Communication Satellite-1R during Dec 2011. This is bound to strengthen the relationship between both the countries further. This would also help to project China as a reliable partner and also keep their space prestige intact. Under an agreement signed in Nov 2005, a Chinese industry was to design, manufacture, test and put into orbit the VENESAT-1 (DFH-4 satellite) for Venezuela. This satellite having utility for telecommunication and education needs was launched by China in 2008 and is reported to be in good health.9 The exact pattern of investment is not known; however, the investment is expected to be around US$400 m. China has also agreed to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos and to build a satellite control centre. An agreement to this effect was signed during Sep 2009. The Dongfang Hong (The East is Red) model satellite would be launched by a Long March rocket. No date for this launch has been finalised yet.10 To improve communication in rural areas and boost indigenous pride, Bolivia has decided to take help from China for its first satellite launch, expected to take place by 2013. Bolivia hopes China will cover most of the estimated $300 m costs. It will also seek donations and loans from other countries [27]. Apart from such investments far away from the Chinese mainland, the state is also engaging island nations like Sri Lanka closer home. Sri Lanka is trying to put communications satellite in space since 2007 and now has finalised its plan for launching two satellites with the help from a British company. China has agreed to provide financial and technical assistance to Sri Lanka with their space ambitions [28]. The Chinese assistance to the space programmes of various states helps them to extend their technological footprint globally. This also enables them to establish intergovernmental cooperation in different regions of the world. Beijing’s space programme is found serving various practical interests like raising cash and making alliances. As per Mr. Dean Cheng of The Heritage Foundation, ‘it’s no accident that Venezuela and Nigeria ::: of course, both have oil. And Bolivia, interestingly, is one of the world’s largest sources of lithium, which if you think we’re all going to drive electric cars, is going to be a vital source’ [29]. China is found making an interesting mix of investments in various regions of the world in space arena. Every investment made by China should be viewed not only from a soft power perspective but also from a strategic angle. China’s assistance to the North Korean efforts for launcher development is known [30]. Similarly, China’s assistance to Pakistan in satellite technology arena has shades of commercial and strategic dimensions. On Aug 12, 2011, China launched Pakistan’s first communications satellite (PAKSAT-1R) on a Long March-3B carrier rocket. This event demonstrates the deepening technological cooperation between these two

8“China to replace Nigerian satellite”, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/25/content 7612718.htm, accessed on Jan 14, 2011. accessed on Aug 22, 2011. 9http://space.skyrocket.de/doc sdat/venesat-1.htm, accessed on Aug 22, 2011. 10“China to build, launch satellite for Laos”, Sept 26, 2009, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/ China to build launch satellite for Laos 999.html, accessed on Oct 4, 2011. Assessment 231 states. Pakistan’s inadequacy in the space ﬁeld offers China an opportunity to take their strategic partnership to a higher plane and also simultaneously maintain its own commercial interests [31]. China’s satellite navigation programme may also assist Pakistan in military realm.

Assessment

In the overall global discourse on soft power, the focus of debate essentially revolves around the relevance of cultural, political and economic features. However, in the twenty-first century, the role of S&T is also gaining prominence as an additional basis for generating soft power influence. S&T is increasingly being viewed as a key instrument of soft power. States understand that the leadership in technology adds to their global prestige. Amongst the various stems of technologies, space technology emerges central to bestow the soft power status. This is not to argue that no other technology has similar capabilities. However, space technology could be viewed to have a greater say in this regard for various reasons. First, the enormity and visual manifestation (say human landing on moon) is almost unmatched. Second, expertise in rocket science puts the state at higher pedestal in comparison with others, and expertise in this science has significant strategic implications too. Third, the technology if viewed in isolation is more of an exclusive and costly technology; however, the output delivered by this technology has significant social relevance. Fourth, the economic relevance and significant growth potential of this technology is gargantuan. Fifth, it is a strategic technology with dual-use ability. Many smaller states in the world are found rushing to develop space capabilities. Major spacefaring states in Asia have fastened the pace of their development with a view to capture the rapidly emerging space market. Asian spacefaring states have understood that space is a socioeconomic enabler and could also act as a catalyst for advancing state’s foreign policy vision in the digital age. They understand that a vast gap exists amongst space-haves and space have-nots. This gap is both economical and technological. They have sensed an opportunity over here which could offer them multiple benefits both in short and long term. This chapter has analysed one such ‘power’ for its space credentials to acquire soft power status. China’s policies are found distinctly showcasing their space endeavours to realise soft power. China is found strategically locating itself as a focal point for various activities, from providing financial assistance to manufacturing of satellites, to helping in infrastructure development and training and to providing launching facilities for states in Asia, Africa and South America. This approach has multiple benefits including amassing soft power status. They are found developing a ‘web of space help’ to garner various economic, political and strategic advantages. It is important to note that there are some limits to exercise this soft power. Particularly, for the state like China which suffers from ‘image deficit’, impressing other states is a challenging proposal. China’s inter- and intracontinental outreach is not believed by many as an entirely benign exercise. Also, China’s political system, 232 15 Space Power Soft Power their relationship with states having dubious image, opaque economical system, quality of technology and human rights record are problematic for many. Apart from such China-centric issues, there are certain general issues which highlight the limitations of soft power. Mainly the quantitative measurement of the sources of soft power is a difficult task, and understanding the actual effect of soft power would always remain in the realm of subjective assessment. Economic assistance made to other states does not guarantee their continuous support to the donor’s political actions. No effective deterrence mechanism exists with soft power to engage/dominate other powers. Most importantly, soft power is not an alternative to hard power. In Asia, apart from China, space achievements of India and Japan are also noteworthy. These two states could also use their expertise in the field as a source for their soft power policies. In the case of Japan, most of their geopolitical policies have ‘invisible’ US bias. They could use their space pre-eminence as an instrument to engage friends in the region either alone or in collaboration with the USA. India could take a leaf out of Chinese experience to expand its ‘soft power’ by using space technology as an instrument. India could be viewed to have already made humble beginning in this (soft) power projection game. However, there appears to be less hype about India’s efforts to engage other states in space diplomacy. India’s Antrix Corp, the commercial arm of the Indian space agency ISRO, has made modest forays in the global space market for launch services, sale of satellite resources data and spacecraft hardware and components in addition to mission support service. So far, India has launched satellites for few states under a commercial arrangement. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has offered to make available Indian satellite resources data to Southeast Asian countries for managing natural disasters. He has also offered Indian help in launching small satellites built by them. India has developed a global market for sale of Indian remote sensing satellite (IRS) imageries [32]. But definitely India has to do much more to generate geopolitical returns from its space achievements. The human quest for exploring the universe is unending. Space technologies have their own glamour. These technologies are frontier technologies and have also been responsible for development of various other technology sectors too. They have wider applicability and global acceptability. ‘Rocket science’ being a niche field, very few states in the world are in a position to exploit its fullest potential. Many states in the world are attracted towards these technologies because of their social, commercial and strategic utilities. All this offers the states in possession of these technologies a special status. Various possessors of space technologies are found shearing and selling these technologies to other states. The discussions in this chapter clearly elucidates that the space technology has a soft power potential. Various developing (Asian or otherwise) states are getting attracted towards the space technologies for their socioeconomic utilities. The case study (China) undertaken in this chapter suggests that space technologies have remarkable soft power potential. What is important is to correctly exploit this expertise to realise the state’s aims. The ‘soft power repute’ would come automatically. References 233

References

1. Nye Jr JS. Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power. New York: Basic Books; 1990. 2. Nye JS Jr. The benefits of soft power. 2004 Feb 8. http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html. Accessed 21 Jan 2011. 3. Hall T. An unclear attraction: a critical examination of soft power as an analytical category. Chin J Int Polic. 2010;3:211. 4. Mattern JB. Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft: representational force and the sociolinguistic construction of attraction in world politics. Millenn J Int Stud. 2005;33:583. 5. Nye JS. Soft power. Foreign Policy. 1990;80:153Ð71. 6. Nye JS. Soft power: the means to success in world politics. Cambridge: Perseus Books Group; 2004. p. 11. 7. Krige J. Technological leadership and American soft power. In: Inderjeet P, Cox M, editors. Soft power and the US foreign policy. New York: Routledge; 2010. p. 121Ð36. 8. Fedoroff NV. Science diplomacy in the 21st century. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/116385.pdf. Accessed 28 Sept 2011. 9. Hane G. Science, technology, and global reengagement. http://www.issues.org/25.1/hane.html. Accessed 15 Aug 2011. 10. Nina V. Fedoroff “Science Diplomacy in the 21st Century”, http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/116385.pdf. Accessed on Sept 28, 2011. 11. Foust J. Soft power and soft logic. 2007 Apr 23. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/855/1. Accessed 15 Jun 2011. 12. Nye Jr JS. The decline of America’s soft power. Foreign Aff. 2004;83(3):1. 13. Brown T. Soft power and space weaponization. Air Space Power J. 2009;23:1. 14. Zhu Z. US-China relations in the 21st century: power transition & peace. London: Routledge; 2006. p. 174. 15. Kagan R, Crossick S. China’s global rise: a threat to the U.S. balance of power? 2007 Oct 23. http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/10/23/china-s-global-rise-threat-to-u.s.-balance- of-power/641. Accessed 12 Jul 2011. 16. Ding S. Analysing rising power from the perspective of soft power: a new look at China’s rise to the status quo power. J Contemp China. 2010;19:255. 17. Hu Jintao calls for enhancing “soft power” of Chinese culture. 2007 Oct 15. http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content 6883748.htm. Accessed 10 Jan 2010. 18. Li M, editor. Soft power: China’s emerging strategy in international politics. Lanham: Lexington Books; 2009. p. 1. 19. Gill B, Huang Y. Sources and limits of Chinese soft power. Survival. 2006;248(2):17. 20. Suzuki S. The myth and reality of China’s soft power. In: Parmar I, Cox M, editors. Soft power and the US foreign policy. New York: Routledge; 2010. p. 210. 21. Thompson D. Economic growth and soft power: China’s Africa strategy. China Brief. 1969; 4(24). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=3699 22. Sausen TM. The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). http://www.isprs.org/ publications/highlights/highlights0602/27-28 HL 06 01 CBERS.pdf. Accessed 14 Oct 2011. 23. Amako S. China as a ‘Great Power’ and East Asian integration. 2010 Apr 4. http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/04/china-as-a-great-power-and-east-asian-integration/. Accessed 30 Sept 2011. 24. Yardley J. China uses space technology as diplomatic trump card. International Herald Tribune. 2007 May 24. 25. Raghavan VR. Soft power in the Asia Pacific. www.delhipolicygroup.com/pdf/soft power in asia pacific.pdf. Accessed 12 Sept 2011. 26. Covault C. Nigerian Sat Fails. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story channel.jsp? channel=space&id=news/Nigeria111308.xml&headline=Nigerian%20Sat%20Fails. Accessed 15 Jan 2011. 234 15 Space Power Soft Power

27. Carroll R. Bolivia to launch satellite into space. 2010 Feb 12. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2010/feb/12/bolivia-launch-satellite-space. Accessed 12 Feb 2011. 28. Daniel D. China to help Lanka launch satellite. http://www.island.lk/2009/09/26/business1. html. Accessed 26 July 2011. 29. Woodsome K. Analysts say China poised to become leader in space. 2010 Apr 21. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/science-technology/Analysts-Say-China-Poised- to-Become-Leader-in-Space-91720434.html. Accessed 5 Oct 2011. 30. Harvey B, Smid H, Pirard T. Emerging space powers. Chichester: Praxis; 2010. p. 450. 31. Lele A. China launches a communications satellite for Pakistan. 2011 Aug 24. http://www.idsa. in/idsacomments/ChinalaunchesacommunicationssatelliteforPakistan alele 240811. Accessed 25 Aug 2011. 32. Rao R. Space technology and soft power. 2009 Dec 10. http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/space- technology-and-soft-power-3025.html. Accessed 24 Jan 2011. Part IV Conclusion Chapter 16 Future of Asian Space Powers

The future imaginative exercise is especially critical in areas of security studies, international politics and for judging advancements in technology trajectory. This is because in all such arenas, the states have to grapple with the fast-paced nature of the winds of change. For states, it is important to invest in the process of long- term perspective planning. This allows them to plan for their future. Such planning is an extremely challenging task, and various scientiﬁc techniques could be used for this purpose. Such process for predicting the future could play a useful role towards developing basic appreciation of the immediate and the long-term futures. This chapter endeavours to look at the future of space programmes of few important Asian states. It identiﬁes and examines major drivers in connection with growth of space programme and develops futuristic scenarios.

Foretelling the Future

Prognostication of the future is normally done based on the knowledge of the present. This does not mean that the future will always evolve based on present events. Foretelling the future is an intricate activity even for creative thinkers, and in the past, many of them have gone wrong. Mr. Andrew W. Marshall is one who has few correct predictions to his credit. He is Pentagon’s futurist-in-chief who has been the Director of the Ofﬁce of Net Assessment since the time of the Nixon Administration and had successfully predicted the end of the Cold War. Mr. Andrew Marshall has once articulated that ‘when it comes to predicting the future, it is better to err on the side of being unimaginative’.1

This chapter draws from the author’s earlier work “Future of Asian Space Powers” from Ajey Lele and Namrata Goswami (ed) Imagining Asia in 2030: Trends, Scenarios and Alternatives, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 243Ð268. 1http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Andrew Marshall, accessed on Jan 15, 2010.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 16, 237 © Springer India 2013 238 16 Future of Asian Space Powers

The biggest obstacle for any predictive exercise is to avoid getting trapped into individual biases. Many a times it has been observed that the prevailing circumstances could render the judgment irrelevant. This mostly depends on the choice of variables for the analysis. At times, slight changes in input parameters make the predictive analysis look totally different. This particularly happens in case of statistical analysis because it relies heavily on arresting the connections between the explanatory variables and the predicted variables from past events. Predictions based on regression techniques also take into account relationships between dependent and independent variables. Such techniques play a major role towards finding solutions to scientific or economic problems. There are certain mathematical models and statistical techniques available even for finding solutions to complex problems in social science sphere. However, such techniques have limitations particularly in respect of quantifying certain variables mainly influenced by human behaviour. Hence, forecasting events related to geopolitics wars, political power shifts, community behaviour, failing states, poverty, social unrest, etc. are difficult, if not impossible, to predict entirely based on mathematical formulation. In order to make some sense of such a complex reality, the method of scenario building is perhaps one of the best research techniques available to us to enable the crafting of plausible futures in the realm of policy-making. As a research technique, scenario building was pioneered by Herman Kahn in the 1950s while working at RAND, the renowned US-based research institution (think tank) on policy matters. This work was followed by Ted Newland, Pierre Wack and also by Jay Ogilvy, Paul Hawken and Peter Schwartz [1]. From a purely definitional point of view, Kahn and Weiner defined scenarios ‘as hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points’ [2]. Scenarios are not so much about predicting the future based on a short-term analysis. Rather, they are about ‘perceiving’ the future based on long-term analyses of an issue with a particular purpose/goal in mind. According to Peter Schwartz, ‘Scenarios provide a context for thinking clearly about the otherwise complex array of factors that affect any decision; give a common language to decision makers for talking about these factors, and encourage them to think about a series of “what if” stories; help lift the “blinkers” that limit creativity and resourcefulness; and lead to organizations thinking strategically and continuously learning about key decisions and priorities’.2 The method of scenario building is one of the most accepted techniques of making some sense of an ever dynamic and complex future. It helps to grasp a whole range of forces, factors and possibilities that are important while planning for the future. It is important to note that scenarios do have a high degree of uncertainty tagged to them. Therefore, studying the future based on the scenario- building method is at times viewed as an activity based on conjectures.

2Peter Schwartz as quoted in John C. Ratcliffe, “Scenario-building: A Suitable Method for Strategic Construction Industry Planning?”, Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland, 2006, p. 3. Drivers of Space Programme 239

Drivers of Space Programme

It is important to identify the key drivers that will inﬂuence space agendas of the states. In principle, various drivers would have sociopolitical, economical, technological and environmental inﬂuences on the issue under consideration. These drivers could vary from state to state. Broadly, they could be analysed at structural and domestic levels. At the structural level, they could relate to the changing global balance of power and growing competition and cooperation amongst spacefaring nations. While at the domestic level, the internal political dynamics, the economic factors as well as the technological development aspects would be more relevant. Following paragraphs discuss some of the key drivers in regard to developments and investments in space arena by Asia states.

Power Dynamics

Space technology is critical for progress, and space systems are strategic assets for a state. For more than half a century, this technology has been effectively used for socioeconomic development by its possessors. It still remains more of an exclusivist technology, and due to its dual-use nature, the possessor of this technology views it as a symbol of national power. The concept of power could have different connotations for different states depending on the circumstances. Quantification of national power and finding its correlation in regard to success achieved by that particular state in space arena could be a laborious but worthwhile exercise.3 For the purpose of macro analysis, four commonly accepted instruments of national power: political, economic, informational and military,4 could be used. The political instrument of national power allows the execution of a nation’s foreign policy through diplomatic means. The economic instrument is the leveraging of a nation’s wealth to influence the behaviour of others. The informational tool provides the ability to disseminate (or withhold) information collected with the help of space assets. The military instrument essentially shows the capability of a state to influence the outcome of any war. For states like JapanÐChinaÐIndia, these four instruments of national power have significance with varying shades of importance. In context of India, the economic instrument was not of major significance till recently, because its space industry is still in its formative years. However, current trends indicate that India is keen to develop the commercial aspects of its space programme and has started working towards it. Japan is found making investments both at commercial level as well as

3Rand has published a report authored by Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in Post Industrial Age, 2005. Such methods of quantification could be used for measuring national power. 4http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA363499, accessed on Dec 1, 2009. 240 16 Future of Asian Space Powers at state level. Japan is in a position to influence the fate of major global projects like the international space station (ISS) because of their scientific and financial commitments to this project.5 China is found making significant commercial investments. Presently, there are found committing financial resources more to make friends than to earn profits. They expect the business to grow in long term. For all these years, it was becoming difficult for India to attract customers because of the restrictions imposed on them as a response to its nuclear policies. Almost for two to three decades, India was a pariah state for any global engagement in the high-technology arena. Now, the successful culmination of the IndoÐUS nuclear deal in 2005 and participation of the states like the USA and Russia in India’s Moon mission clearly demonstrate the emergence of a strong international collaboration and cooperative component. Various subsidiaries of ISRO were put under export control ‘Entity List’ by the USA for long. Post-2005 IndoÐUS nuclear deal, in an attempt to expand high-technology trade and strategic cooperation with India, the USA has removed all restrictions on ISRO by Jan 2011. All this would help India to further develop the commercial aspects of its space programme. The satellite services of these three states play an important role towards communications, broadcasting, tele-education and tele-medicine services and weather forecasting services. They are sharing this information with other states as well depending on their individual arrangements. This real-time information accessibility demonstrates the potency of informational superiority these states possess. The innate dual-use nature of space technology and particularly of the availability of remote sensing satellites with sub-metre resolution capability, clearly demonstrates their relevance for the militaries of these states. China has already conducted a successful ASAT test and is reported to have developed satellite jamming technologies. This directly portrays their military space potential. Theoretically, India is in a position to develop ASAT technology if it chooses to do so. These three states have already published their vision documents giving their plans for coming few decades.6 These plans demonstrate that for them, the relevance of space has grown much beyond a mere tool for socioeconomic development. Economics and security have emerged as other important pillars for their future space architecture. They view space technology as a symbol of national power. Amongst these three states, China appears to be more focused towards identifying their space programme as a tool for raising nationalism. It has already succeeded in sending the human to the space and has also successfully demonstrated their spacewalk capability. They are also developing an independent space station and

5It is difficult to indicate the exact financial commitments done by Japan for this project. However, it is estimated that the overall project cost could be US$ 100 billion and Japan could be a major contributor. The Japanese science module-Kibo is the largest science module of the ISS. 6They are available in form of roadmaps for coming two decades-like vision documents, policy statements, white papers etc. Drivers of Space Programme 241 have successfully tested space-docking technology. India has articulated its vision for human space flight programme but is expected to take many more years to fulfil this dream. There is a strong possibility that the first human to put its foot on the Moon in the twenty-first century could be the Chinese.7 If China succeeds in doing this before the USA, then it could be a significant act of power expression. Apart from JapanÐ ChinaÐIndia, the states in the region with interest in space are still in the process of evolution in space arena and hence are unlikely to reach the level of placing their space accomplishments as a symbol of national power in the coming two to three decades. This is not to argue that their space achievements would not demonstrate some correlation with any of the above-stated commonly accepted instruments of national power. But, in overall analysis, they are likely to remain as tier three or tier four space powers.8

International Cooperation

International collaboration has been the key for the initial success in space field for Asian states, and even today, it plays an important role. During initial years, Japan was helped by the USA, and China was helped by USSR/Russia towards development of their space programmes. For India, the help came from different quarters—France, USA to erstwhile USSR. Other countries in the region are being helped by countries within and outside the region. Presently, all major space players in Asia are having collaborations with Russia, USA and the EU. China and EU have developed significant cooperation. On May 24, 2007, both sides signed China–EU Space Cooperation Actuality and Cooperative Plan Protocol, which stipulates distinctly the fields and direction of cooperation. They have established four work groups, that is, Science and Exploration Work Group, Microgravity Work Group, Education Work Group and Earth Observation Work Group. They have various other arrangements too.9 However, it is also important to note that some of the very important collaborative ventures like the China’s collaboration with EU’s global navigational project Galileo have not worked in spite of the bests of efforts and commitments. With the success of IndoÐUS nuclear deal, collaborations between India and USA are expected to increase multifold in space arena. Human space flights, deep space missions and asteroid studies are expected to be the future areas of collaborations. During October 2011, India has launched a satellite called Megha-Tropiques in collaboration with France.

7‘A wary respect’, The Economist, October 22, 2009. 8Literature normally refers United States, Russia and European Space Agency (ESA) as tier one and Japan, China and India as tier two space powers. 9http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620682/n639462/102448.html, accessed on Dec 6, 2009. 242 16 Future of Asian Space Powers

Russia is already collaborating with India and China for the Moon and Mars missions. Success of such missions and the importance of information gathered could decide the nature of further collaborations. The case in point is that the success achieved by Indian Chandrayaan-1 mission in finding water on the Moon’s surface in collaboration with NASA. Initially, NASA was not interested in India’s second Moon mission, but now, they are keen to get associated to further their research in this arena. Other Asian states which have started late are keen to get outside assistance to develop their own space programmes. Iran is receiving tactic support from China and Russia. Pakistan is relatively a weak player in space arena and is dependent on support mainly from China. In SE Asia, aggressive investments are being made by the USA and China. As per industry estimates, by 2011Ð2012, over US$2 billion worth of new satellites may be launched over Asian region. SE Asia is expected to offer a major portion of this business. The USA has already launched satellites for Vietnam and has sealed deals with Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines backed by loan guarantees. China has promised to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos. In 2009, it signed an agreement with Pakistan, granting a $200 million loan for satellite construction. It would also be establishing ground control segments for them at Lahore and Karachi.10 During August 2011, China has launched the Pakistan’s first communications satellite. Appreciating the requirement of multilateral engagement, few Asian states have joined together to form Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). This organisation has started its operations in Beijing during December 2008, 16 years after the idea was put forward. It has seven member states, China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. Indonesia and Turkey have also signed the APSCO convention. Representatives from Argentina, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia and Sri Lanka also attended the founding ceremony. The organisation aims to promote the multilateral cooperation in space science and technology. Its members will work together in development and research, space technology application and training of space experts.11 Such multilateral cooperation could help the members from SE Asian region in getting a greater access to technology allowing them to exploit natural resources and help in disaster reduction. Such grouping has a potential to develop into a major pressure group. States like India and Japan are having few collaborative projects with states in the region but are still far away from using satellite technology as a tool for increasing their regional influence. A state like India appears to be a slow starter in regard to using their space expertise for the purposes of political engagement. A case in point could be the case of Sri Lanka. This India’s neighbour is taking the help of a private company in UK to design and build its first satellite. This agreement was signed during November 2009 [3]. The current trend indicates that the USA and China could play a major

10‘Ready for lift-off’, Indian Express, Oct 30, 2009. 11Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization starts operation, December 17, 2008 http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6554845.html, accessed on Dec 18, 2009. Drivers of Space Programme 243 role in the region at least for next few decades and would garner both economic and geopolitical benefits. In contrast, the development of space technology in Asia during the 1970s to the 1990s remained restricted because of the policies of the USA. It had used economic and technological disability of Asian states to its advantage. As mentioned earlier, states like India faced technological apartheid because of sanctions regime. Japan also received a raw deal from its ally, the USA [4]. Japan’s dream of indigenous satellite development programme did not materialise initially because of the US policies. There was a dispute between the US administration and Japan regarding the so-called unfair trade practices followed by Japan which in turn was bringing difficulties for the US industry to penetrate Japanese market [5]. The USA was not keen to allow Japan to develop their indigenous capabilities at the cost of the US industry interests. However, in the twenty-first century, it is unlikely that major space powers would hold themselves back from cooperating with Asian countries anymore. There could be various reasons for it. First, financial constraints, with the decline in the economy of the West, for NASA or ESA, it may not be possible to fund major independent space projects. Hence, they could engage states like India and Japan for collaborative ventures. In fact, the abrupt end of US space shuttle programme without an alternative has made analysts to suggest that they could take help from China in future for space visits of their astronauts [6]. This could allow them to reduce the dependence on Russia in regard to ISS programme. However, the real challenge in this case would be of geopolitical arithmetic. Second, access to key global natural resources and commodities on other planets is likely to be the one of the important future space agendas. Apart from having requisite ‘hardware’ in place to do so, a need could arise to have some global consciences on this issue, and having ‘dependent’ space powers could become an advantage. Third, for economic reasons, Asian market offers good business opportunities. The uncertainty factor in the likely engagements of Asian states could emerge from scenarios like Iran or Japan conducting nuclear tests or India undertaking an ASAT creating huge space debris.

Tool for Socioeconomic Development

One of the major foci of Asian states is to develop space programmes for the purposes of socioeconomic development. Their requirements have been in areas of meteorology, communication, disaster management and remote sensing. This technology becomes a powerful tool for resources management, food security, fisheries, rural development, health care and education. JapanÐChinaÐIndia have achieved much of the success in all these fields and are expected to make further improvements in their existing sensor technologies. They are likely to own enhanced imaging capability in near future. With issues related to climate change taking a centre stage, the future satellites would be launched for continuous observation to 244 16 Future of Asian Space Powers monitor global warming and climate change. In 2009, Japan launched a satellite (‘Ibuki’) for monitoring greenhouse gases around the world. India is also planning to launch by 2012 a satellite to monitor greenhouse gas emissions.12 States like China and India which have become global ‘punching bags’ on the subject of climate change would require to have own systems in space for monitoring climate change. This may also allow them to challenge false claims (if any) against them by the western world. It is important to note that space technology could help in to bring transparency in the system. The states in Asia are presently at varying levels of proficiency regarding the use of space for broadcasting, communications, meteorology and mapping. They are found using either their homebuilt or other foreign satellites in conjunction with their own ground stations [7]. In near future, space novice Asian states would mostly depend on powers like USA, Russia, EU and China for their requirements. On the whole, for all states in Asia, satellite technology is expected to continue to play an important role as a tool for socioeconomic development. Role of technology is expected to increase significantly in the field of data monitoring for weather observations, climate change and for the purposes of disaster management.

Ballistic Missile Capability

Missiles and space launch vehicles belong to the family of basic rocket technologies. In yesteryears, the US space launchers were developed from missiles. The basic difference between these two different genre of missiles arise from the goal of placing a nuclear weapon payload in a ballistic (i.e. reentering) trajectory, versus placing a satellite payload in orbit. Launch trajectory, size and number of stages all have a role in distinguishing the two different uses [8]. The capability to launch a satellite indirectly demonstrates the potential of a state to develop a missile. Certain states that are under constant international scanner due to their defiance of certain global nonproliferation/arms control norms find it difficult to conduct missile testing to prove their prowess and hence follow a ‘satellite launching’ route. A detailed discussion regarding this issue has been done elsewhere in this book. Today, almost half of global nuclear weapon powers (within and outside NPT) are from Asia. Suitable delivery platform for launching of a nuclear weapon is a prerequisite for establishment of any nuclear force. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is an important component of any nuclear weapon architecture, globally. In Asia, nuclear-capable countries like China, India and Pakistan already have a reasonably well-developed missile infrastructure. Amongst them, China has proven ICBM capability (Dong Feng). There have been unconfirmed reports that India plans to develop the 8,000-km range ICBM called Surya. India has successfully tested 5,000-km range Agni-V (the strike envelope is whole of Asia, 70% of Europe

12India environment minister Mr Jairam Ramesh had made an announcement to this effect during Mar 2010. Please refer The Times of India, Mar 13, 2010. Drivers of Space Programme 245 and other regions) missile during April 2012. North Korea has unsuccessfully test fired a missile called Taepodong-2 in 2006 with a range of around 4Ð4,500 kms. States like Japan have an active commercial space launch programme and hence have technology ‘available’ which could provide the basis for a long-range ballistic missile programme. Currently, Iran and North Korea are being viewed as states using satellite programme as a frontage for their missile ambitions. North Korea has already conducted nuclear tests, and Iran could be on its way. Hence, the space programmes of these states are being viewed with suspicion. However, it could be inaccurate to dismiss their space programme only as a front end for missile testing. In 1959, Tehran became a founding member of the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). In initial years, Iranian political leadership viewed space technology as a tool to improve their political, social and economic standing. Leaders like Rafsanjani and Khatami wanted to modernise the country. Khatami issued various reforms to modernise the country to include reinvigorating efforts for the nation to become more active in space. He gave the country a vision of becoming a space power as a vehicle for modernity [9]. Its space programme began in 1998 [10] with a stated aim to use this technology for socioeconomic development. During February 2009, Iran successfully launched its first domestically produced satellite using indigenously built rocket launcher. They have also another satellite during February 2012. North Korea did a launch during April 2009. However, in spite their claims of success, there is no evidence available to corroborate their claim. Indonesia is also interested in launching its own satellite with own launcher. Its space agency Lapan, set up in 1964, is collaborating with the military to develop more efficient rockets. Few years back, they have inked a formal technology transfer agreement with China (2005) for the development of missiles [7]. Space programmes of these states are being viewed with some suspicion for their missile ambitions. Another reason to doubt the intentions of Iran and North Korea is because undertaking unimpeded space launch is possible only if the state’s geography offers it that luxury and that is not the case with these states. Geography puts major compulsions on Iran to undertake any launches. It is surrounded by states both on its western and eastern border which are unlikely to grant over flight permissions to their launches. Even with friendly states in north, Iran cannot evade the issues of liability and public and environmental safety. Only possibility of undertaking safe launches (not 100%) could be from region close to Chah Bahar [11]. If this be the case then why is Iran interested in developing launch vehicle technology? Is it in support of their increasing nuclear ambitions? North Korea also faces similar challenges. The best option for both of them could be to have cordial relations with other states that can provide them launching facilities. By and large, Iran and North Korea needs ‘fake’ satellite launches to develop their own missile programme. On the other hand, both the states understand that satellite technology in itself is important for socioeconomic development and also has military utility. Hence, these states are likely to continue investing in both satellite manufacturing as well as launcher technologies with more bias towards missile-specific technologies. China and Russia could help North Korea to satisfy its 246 16 Future of Asian Space Powers genuine requirement of having access to space. North Korea’s space ambitions could be used as a tool to engage that state in the post-Kim Jong-il era. A regime change in Iran could bring a possibility of third party interlocutors-under such scenario India could play a role towards helping Iran to launch its satellites (presently India is avoiding such requests from Iran).

Deep Space Missions

Only three Asian states (JapanÐChinaÐIndia) have so far attempted deep space missions, and they have been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book. All these states have a definitive roadmap regarding their future Moon missions. They are preparing themselves for robotic and human landings on Moon/Mars. The USA and Russia are associating themselves with the deep space mission programmes of these states. However, the present approach of these states indicates that they are likely to pursue mostly an independent path for their Moon programme but are keen to undertake collaborative programmes for Mars missions. The interests of these states regarding Moon range from pursuit of scientific activities, exploration of resources to establishment of human colonies. Moon missions offer them opportunities to test various technologies which could have strategic, technological and commercial relevance. Any significant success in the field of deep space could even play some role (in whatever limited form it may be) in changing the present unipolar world into one with multiple power centres. South Korea also has plans to land a probe on Moon by 2025. However, the present scale of growth of their space programme does not offer much of confidence. By 2030, China may succeed in putting human on the Moon. Japan has plans of developing a Moon base for further planetary exploration missions. Any mission failures in this arena during next two decades could bring a significant technological setback to these states.

Economics

The overall gamut of space technology could be viewed under two categories, one, technologies like communication or imaging technologies and two, technologies required for space experimentation, planetary research, etc. The technology output is visible and quantifiable in regard to ChinaÐJapanÐIndia, but as for other states in the region, research is an evolving process and would require special efforts to convince their politicians and citizens for sustained monitory investments. For China and India, budgetary constraints have not been an issue for the last couple of years. The success of Chinese space programme in various fields during the last two decades clearly demonstrates the state support. China’s space budget remains relatively opaque. Various estimates put China’s spending around US$2 billion to 3 billion. Out of this, significant amount is spent on ambitious Drivers of Space Programme 247 space missions like manned space programme, lunar mission and space station. The case is reversed in the case of India. The pattern of spending is more on projects of socioeconomic relevance. At present, the value of ISRO’s overall assets is approximately US$25 billion [12]. Over a period of last 10 years, ISRO’s budget has shown steady increase and has almost doubled from 1999 to 2009. It is important to note that the ISRO spends more than 85% of its US$1 billion budget on development-related missions and only remaining 10Ð15% on advanced research and development, and on missions like Moon mission. Japan’s space programme never started under any unified body. Almost for three decades, many of the organisations responsible for the developments in space arena were reporting to different ministries in the Japanese government. Naturally, for overall growth of the programme, such diverse reporting channels and different budgeting allocations were hazardous. The period 1996Ð2003 witnessed a major setback to Japan’s space programme because of series of failures. This had adverse impact on budgetary allotment too. Presently, Japan also spends around US$2.5 billion on space ambitions. However, in the past, their space programme witnessed some budget cuts. Now, after the establishment of a unified body called Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in October 2003, Japan’s space programme has stabilised. They have made significant investments in ISS too. South Korea spends around US$250 million, Iran around US$100 million per year and Pakistan US$10 million. Most of the other Asian states being the beginners in this field, no authentic information about their budgetary provisions are available. The overall trend indicates that states would continue to provide necessary economic support for their space programmes and their investments are going to increase multifold in coming years. The big three from Asia have a very clear- cut roadmap for the next two decades, and no extravagant budgetary requirements are being envisaged. Their space agencies have already started earning revenue, and their space industry is expected to grow in years to come. Malaysian and South Korean ambitions are not being matched on ground with respect to their accomplishments. Therefore, political leadership in these states may not provide the requisite support for highly ambitious and long-term projects. Apart from its nuclear and missile ambitions, Iran wants to grow as a technologically advanced country, and hence, it will continue supporting its space programme. Uncertainties can take the form of significant unmanageable economic crises. Under such circumstances, states would mainly cap funding of ambitious programmes like colonisation of Moon and human space flights, but other programmes of socioeconomic importance will continue to grow or at least status quo would be maintained.

Strategic Factors

JapanÐChinaÐIndia are found being more ambitious in defining their priorities in space than ever been in the past. Their space policies are responding not only to their own aspirations of emerging as a major global actor but also to the space 248 16 Future of Asian Space Powers efforts of other powers.13 Apart from civilian benefits, they have also witnessed the advantages the US forces have received during all these years from their military space assets. Even a state like Japan has passed a law during 2008/2009 to allow military use of space and proposes to strengthen the national security through the development of space. In particular, post-1991 Gulf War, the concept of militarisation of space is not being viewed as a taboo globally. Japan has launched spy satellites to address the North Korean threat, and states like India and China have dual-purpose remote sensing satellites. India proposes to launch communication satellites for its armed forces in near future. India and China have plans for independent regional/global navigational systems. Smaller states within the region like Pakistan, Indonesia and Iran may get support from China to develop their own military-related space assets. The future emphasis for all these states could be towards development of small satellites which are cheap, relatively easy to launch and offer almost the same utilities as normal satellites. China appears to be viewing war in space as an integral part of future military operations. Chinese test of its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007 has reinforced China’s status as a true military space power, equal to the USA and Russia. This puts the US space systems at risk in any future conflict with China [13]. It is also likely that China has developed satellite jamming capabilities too. Naturally, this puts the satellite systems of not only the USA but also that of other states within the region at risk. Many western analysts feel that there is ‘suggestiveness’ in Chinese actions regarding the weaponisation of space. General Xu Qiliang, commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Air Force, was interviewed on November 1, 2009 by China’s PLA Daily, and he has articulated the importance of space for the military. According to him, military competition has shifted towards space, and it is a historical inevitability [14]. At the beginning of 2010, a senior US defence official argued that ‘the Chinese have stated that they oppose the weaponisation of space but their actions seem to indicate the contrary intention’.14 India has also pronounced its plan to develop anti-satellite technologies (not test). States within the region which do not have indigenous satellite manufacturing and launch capabilities can still possess anti-satellite capabilities with reasonable knowledge of missile technology or even with expertise in developing satellite jamming capabilities. Future Chinese actions would largely depend on how international community (read the USA) succeeds towards establishing a globally acceptable space regime. The USA has already withdrawn from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty with Russia. It is strongly pushing its missile defence programme by trying to overcome technological limitations. The US approach of all these years indicates that it has no intentions in getting trapped under any treaty mechanism that could harm its interests in space. In view of this, it is unlikely that any globally acceptable space treaty mechanism would emerge in coming few decades.

13For a detailed analysis of this please refer ‘Space Security: need for a proactive approach’, IDSA- Pugwash Working Group Report, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2009. 14‘US ofﬁcial questions China space intentions’, Space Daily, Jan 13, 2010. Drivers of Space Programme 249

Other Important Drivers

Race for Resources

China’s ‘Lunar Probe Project’ has explored that there is about 1 million tons of helium-3 on the Moon’s surface that could meet mankind’s energy demand (only a little more than 10 tons of helium-3 is available on the Earth). Meeting China’s power demand needs consumption of only 8 tons of helium-3, equivalent to 220 million tons of oil or about 1 billion tons of coal.15 The Moon programme of Asian states has a bias towards resources mining including helium-3. Also, based on the samples received from various Apollo missions, it has been found that various platinum group metals (PGMs), indispensable for efﬁcient fuel cell operation, exist on the Moon in diffuse quantities.16 Based on various direct and indirect evidences, various studies have reached a conclusion that the Moon is an alluring mining site, ripe for the picking of rare elements of strategic and national security importance.17 It appears that the Asian states have started the process of indentifying, experimenting and analysing the efﬁcacy of Moon for resources mining. It may take another three to four decades to actually transport the resources from Moon to Earth (if any). The process for undertaking this task has already begun. Probably, it is the beginning of the currently ‘invisible’ race for resources on the Moon.

Space Tourism

The commercial space market is in existence since 1970. At present, the world market for satellite-based services—including telecommunications, television, global positioning systems and Earth observation (weather, environmental, search and rescue)—is valued at nearly US$90 billion. The problem with the commercial space market is that it has not been large enough to attract private investment in the technologies needed to lower the cost of access to space. Space tourism holds great promise as an economic ‘driver’, leading to market competition to lower launch costs and space travel and stay costs which could in turn attract other customers to the space market.18 All these years, sending a human to the space has remained a costly affair, and it costs around US$ 25Ð30 million per trip. Countries in the region have depended on the USA and Russia to send their astronauts to the space. In the recent past,

15“Change-2 Satellite’s Camera Resolution Reaches One Meter”, Space Daily, Jan 14, 2010. 16The six platinum group metals are ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, osmium and platinum. Also refer http://www.space.com/816-resources-moon.html, accessed on Dec 29, 2011. 17http://www.space.com/9250-mining-rare-minerals-moon-vital-national-security.html, accessed on Dec 29, 2011. 18‘Space Tourism: Opening the Space Economy’, NSS Position Paper on Space Tourism, 2008, http://www.nss.org/tourism/position.html, accessed on Jan 2, 2010. 250 16 Future of Asian Space Powers

Malaysia and South Korea had sent their astronauts via this mechanism. India also has inked deal with Russia in this regard, and as a commercial activity, two Indian space travellers would be flying the non-reusable ‘Soyuz TMA’ ship to be piloted by a Russian cosmonaut.19 However, all these efforts should be viewed form a point of view of using space travel as a tool to enhance country’s international image, popularise space science and generate feeling of nationalism amongst its population. Couple of years ago, China succeeded in sending men to the space using its own spacecraft. However, coming years may witness a significant change in attitude towards space travel in form of a shift from state sponsored to private activity. Burt Rutan’s SpaceShipOne, the winner of the Ansari X-Prize, is helping open a new frontier of economic development. In cooperation with Richard Branson and other entrepreneurs, a new space market is likely to emerge. Few Japanese companies and individuals are keen to invest in this industry and have already made business plans to that effect.20 Various new ideas are being discussed, and even businessmen from states like Singapore are working towards possessing next-generation space vehicles which could offer a 5-min trip to fly 100 km above Earth surface. Space Tourism Society in Malaysia feels that building space tourism vehicle would be more expensive, and Third World countries should enter this business as administrative supporters in the space tourism activities and organisations. They may also invest in programmes like training astronauts and so on [15]. Abu Dhabi is also likely to emerge as a major commercial centre and could materialise as a hub for commercial space activities. Asia may not take a lead in space tourism in the next couple of decades, but a few private entities from Asia may join the global bandwagon. The major uncertainty in this field could be the approach of governments. Different governments would try to regulate the industry based on their perceptions about passenger safety standards offered by private companies and the overall impact of having private spacecrafts on national security.

Innovative Experiments

Asian states are working on various areas of technology from astronomical satellites to heavy lift launchers to space food and space clothing (for Moon travel) to asteroid mining. Any signiﬁcant developments in ﬁelds like smart materials, robotics, communication systems and power and energy devices are expected to bring in

19‘ISRO seeks Russian spaceship for manned flight’, Business Standard, October 05, 2009. 20Ms Misuzu Onuki has published probably the first Japanese language book about NewSpace in Japan. This 203-page book, titled I Will Go to Space Next Week (2009), is a comprehensive round- up of commercial space activities being undertaken around the world. Topics include suborbital and orbital vacation options, marketing and branding opportunities and commercial projects such as zero gravity manufacturing and commercial lunar development. Scenarios 251 revolution in various aspects of space research. Japan is working on ambitious projects like space solar power with an intention of collecting solar power in space and zapping it down to Earth, using laser beams or microwaves. They propose to achieve this within the next two decades but will need a strong economical and technological support. Japanese scientists are working on innovative concepts like space elevator. Significant breakthroughs in carbon nanotech technology are expected to boost this project. India has a major interest in reusable launch technologies. During the next two to three decades, states in the region are expected to enhance their expertise in such fields by using ‘step by step’ approach. Development of the technology leading to ‘launch on demand’ has significant strategic relevance, and various developed Asian states also would have interest in that arena.

Scenarios

As the above discussion underlines, there are various drivers which could decide the future of space programmes of Asian states. Each driver could have different connotation towards shaping the trajectory of individual state’s space programme. Also, relative importance of these drivers vis-a-vis` each other will play a role towards determining the future direction of each country’s space programme.

Space Power as Soft Power

In 2030/2040, Asia will continue to exhibit a rapid growth of development in the ﬁeld of space. Japan, China and India will continue to be the leading Asian space powers. At global level, they would remain as tier two space powers. However, China would succeed in putting the human on Moon. India would overtake China and Japan in Mars missions. China and India would have their own global/regional navigational systems operational. ChinaÐJapanÐIndia would have much improvised remote sensing systems with state-of-the-art sensors giving day/night and all weather and all terrain imageries with resolutions in few centimetres. Their astronomical and environmental satellites would be fully operational. India would have fully developed the capability to put 6Ð8 ton satellites in the space and would be having fully matured cryogenic technology. Iran’s space programme (as missile programme) would grow further and would limit itself to use their satellite launches to demonstrate their missile capabilities. Many rich Asians would visit space. Japan/Singapore/South Korea would have major stakes in global space tourism business, while India would be a major player in transponders. Indian satellite launching facilities would offer best economical options but would face competition from China. South Korea would be a beginner in this ﬁeld. 252 16 Future of Asian Space Powers

China’s military space station would have lived its life, and based on this experience, they would have launched one more such station. China’s international space station would be under construction with participation from APSCO members as junior partners. Indian and Japanese satellites would face temporary blackouts because of jamming from unknown sources (la 2009-10 cyber attacks). Non-nuclear Iran would make a slow but steady progress in space ﬁeld and would have positioned its own satellites mainly in LEO. South Korea and Indonesia would have independent launch facilities. Many of the SE Asian states would remain dependent on regional and global powers for support of their space ambitions and would have numerically more satellites in space. Many Asian states would have more number of small (mini/micro/nano/piceo) satellites. Space would play a prominent role towards enhancing the soft power status of Japan, China and India.

Moon Still Not in Reach

Space programmes of Japan, China and India would continue to grow as planned in all ﬁelds but for deep space missions. Japan and India overtake China in this ﬁeld. They develop a healthy collaboration with USA, and their robotic missions successfully bring samples of helium-3 and other minerals back to the Earth. In deep space arena, China receives technical setbacks and human mission to Moon fails to take-off. However, China’s space station is fully operational. China and Russia starts helping Iran to take its space programme to greater heights. At international forums, USA starts using every opportunity to make noise about the Chinese military space stations and claims that their entire space programme has strong military bias. Globally acceptable space regime is still elusive.

Wild Card: Star Wars

Iran goes nuclear. Few other states within the region start showing signals that they have nuclear intentions (say Japan, Saudi Arabia). India successfully develops missile defence shield. Nuclear weapons lose their shine as weapons of deterrence. China claims that ultimate high ground is space and best deterrence is space weapons. It proposes a programme for space-based weapons and successfully demonstrates few weapons by testing. India and Japan demonstrates their capabilities in regard to satellite jamming technologies. Space becomes a vital factor in global military power balance. References 253

Appraisal

This chapter carried out a short appraisal about few of the important drivers in regard to various spacefaring nations in Asia. For these nations, space has become a vital element for growth. Some parts of Asia have already witnessed the impact of space technology on the society. They have experienced its utility in various facets of life from weather forecasting to education to navigation to intelligence gathering. Both ‘space’ haves and have-nots in the region consider this technology as an instrument of change. For them, this technology also has a major military relevance. However, even after two to three decades, many Asian states are predicted to remain earthbound. They would try to get maximum beneﬁts of space technology by engaging spacefaring nations. Given the steady growth of various existing and emerging space programmes in the region, it is expected that coming years would witness a profound impact of this technology on Asia’s culture and commerce on one hand and society and security on other.

References

1. Schwartz P. The art of the long view: planning for the future in an uncertain world. New York: Doubleday; 1996. 2. Kahn H, Weiner A. The year 2000 a framework for speculation on the next thirty three years. New York: Macmillan; 1967. p. 12. 3. Taverna MA. Snowing Smallsats. Aviation Week & Space Technologies. 2009 Nov 30. 4. Shastri R. Japan’s space programme. Strategic Analysis; 1986, p. 1107. 5. Oros AL. Explaining Japan’s tortured course to surveillance satellites. Res Rev Policy. Jan 2007;24(1):29Ð48. 6. Dean Cheng. US-China space cooperation: more costs than beneﬁts. Web Memo No. 2670, 2009 Oct 30. The Heritage Foundation. 7. Southeast Asia reaches towards space. Aerospace America. October 2009, p. 9. 8. Samson V. North Korea’s launch. 2009 Apr 13. http://www.secureworldfoundation.org/blog/ 2009/04/north-koreas-recent-launch.html. Accessed 16 Dec 2009. 9. Kass L. Iran’s space program: the next genie in the bottle? Middle East Rev Int Aff. September 2006;10(3):16. 10. Bharath G, Pant H. The strategic dimensions of Iran’s leap into space. J Def Stud. 2007;2(1):122. 11. Sheldon JB. Iranian space ambitions and US engagement. Astropolitics. 2006;4:239. 12. Kasturirangan K. The emerging world space order. In: Lele A, Singh G, editors. Space security and global cooperation. New Delhi: Academic Foundation; 2009. 13. Tellis A. Punching the U. S. Military’s “soft ribs”: China’s anti-satellite weapon test in strategic perspective. Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief No. 51; June 2007. 14. Brown PJ. Space is suddenly on the agenda. Asia Times; 2009 Nov 12. 15. Zakaria NR et al. The symbiotic relationship between astronaut program and space tourism development-A third world perspective. Paper presented at second IAASS Conference, Chicago, 2007 May 14. Chapter 17 Scrutinising the Race

Race is essentially a contest of speed. It is about one-upmanship, it is about beating the opponent/s, and it is about demonstrating that you are better than others. Race is all about dominating, winning and signifying ‘power’. From sociology to sports and science to security, the connotation of the word ‘race’ remains the same, but only the context changes. In the realm of international politics, the race is essentially viewed as a competition amongst nation-states. Essentially, technology plays a dominating role in this race and helps to prove the superiority of the state. Particularly, the military technologies play a major role in deciding the power equations. The arms race is about the build-up of military hardware leading to the competition amongst the states to demonstrate their strength. ‘The term arms race has been used since the 1850s to describe periodic competitions between states to shift (or preserve) the balance of power between them by modernizing their weaponry and increasing the magnitude of various arms stocks. However, it was not until the end of World War I that arms races were viewed as a special pathology of interstate behavior that required explanation. At a loss to account for a war whose duration and horror seemed inexplicable by the logics of political or strategic calculation, both politicians and the public seized upon the idea that arms competitions could assume a deterministic dynamic that made war inevitable. It followed that the best way for states to ensure that conﬂicts of this sort would not occur in the future was to regulate the building of armaments or, as it is known today, to practice arms control’.1 During the twentieth century, the term arms race was mainly referred to the build-up of military weapons by the then two superpowers, the erstwhile USSR and the USA. It was mainly discussed from the standpoint of their nuclear arms race. In early days, the concept of arms race was more about the navel supremacy. With the advent of airpower, the focus widened mainly during the twentieth century. The idea of nuclear deterrence could be viewed as the ‘game changer’ and has brought the level of competition to a new height. All such investments into military

1http://www.answers.com/topic/arms-race-overview#ixzz1i5wFjLQt, accessed on Jan 1, 2012.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7 17, 255 © Springer India 2013 256 17 Scrutinising the Race hardware helped the states to achieve better sense of security over their opponents leading to a ‘security dilemma’. Particularly, over a period of the last two centuries, a pattern could be indentified indicating how the developments in technologies have impacted the nature of arms race. The race probably started with naval technologies and the growth of sea power. In fact, land forces have been the part of combat almost since the evolution of the warfare. However, tank battle and artillery took some time to gain a global focus. For the last couple of years, various additional military platforms are also being viewed as an instrument to induce the opponent. Aerial platforms and the conception of airpower were followed by ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons boosting the race further to incredible levels. The flexible and versatile nature of airpower and missiles allowed the states to increase their strategic reach making nuclear weapons more relevant. The states understood that the increase in the inventory of aerial platforms particularly the combat aircrafts allows them different benefits including deterrence. Simultaneously, the nature of warfare has also altered significantly over the years with aerial warfare gaining prominence. Presently, the twenty-first century is witnessing an additional dimension of warfare called the fourth dimension of warfare which is all about the space warfare. Along with this, cyber warfare has also been viewed as a new dimension of warfare. Hence, the issue is ‘if the military warfare has evolved from land and sea warfare to aerospace warfare would it be prudent to assume that the arms race would enter or has already entered into the space domain too’? The concept Space Race is not new and was even a reality during the Cold War era. In fact, it could be said to have started with the launch of the first satellite on October 4, 1957, by the erstwhile USSR. The USA had responded within a year with the launch of its first satellite Explorer I. The real race could be said to have begun when Yuri Gagarin (1961) visited the space. Within few years (1969), the USA achieved a major success with the manned visit to Moon, and the rest is history. For more than three decades, both the superpowers were involved to outclass each other in various actions in space. It was seen as a very closely fought race with the USA having a slender lead particularly in the post-1970s period. The question is why the then superpowers were keen to engage into the space race? There could be various motives behind this, and prestige could be the main reason. Space also could have given them the opening to invent new technologies which has both civilian and military utility. Visual manifestations of various feats achieved in the space arena are extremely overpowering. This also could have forced these states to accord a special status to the efforts in space. On the other hand, the concept of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) could also be indirectly linked to the notion of space race. MAD is about any military conflict amongst the nuclear weapon states escalating to a nuclear war leading to the obliteration of various warring sides. For a state, all this required making significant increase in the number of nuclear weapons and to keep on matching the opponent by entering into the numbers game. But, the sense of just competing with each other by increasing the number of nuclear weapons was probably getting monotonous! Recognising that such investments are infertile beyond a point, the then superpowers could have 17 Scrutinising the Race 257 started to look for alternatives to keep the animosity alive during the Cold War era and probably found the rivalry in space as one of the means to demonstrate the primacy. High expectations from the future (in space territory) could have been one more reason for many to believe that race amongst spacefaring nations is possible and essential. Over the years, many space ‘beliefs’ have gained weight which actually does not depict reality. The overall initial achievements in space arena by the then superpowers have fashioned great expectations for the future. Such expectations have been extrapolated to a soaring level without giving due cognisance to technological realities and challenges. This has made many believe that creation of Moon bases, Martian colonies, easy space travel, asteroid mining, building of solar power stations in orbit, etc. is easily achievable and states could attain great power status by building space empires. Naturally, the thought of building space empires is leading to a quest for race. To analyse the nature of space race in Asia, it is important to value some of the above-mentioned global dimensions in regard to postulation of the space race. The relevance of dual-use utility of space technologies is not hidden. Particularly, post-1991 Gulf War various states have started using space as an instrument while deciding on their strategic priorities and interests. Naturally, this opens a window for the states to use space race as an instrument for power portrayal. Before analysing the space race ‘formulation’ in Asian context, it is important to appreciate certain ground realities. It is important to appreciate that the notion of ‘race’ has evolved over the years. In any form of a space race, the game of one-upmanship develops a tendency to interpret the opponent’s behaviour as a demonstration of growing hostility. This leads to actionÐreaction pattern of behaviour and fails to take into account the implications of one’s own behaviour. Over a period of time, various states in general have understood the perpetuity of their actions and various multilateral arms reduction treaties. Today, certain amount of rational strategic calculations have been made by nation-states before blindly aping the opponent. Particularly, the reasons of the end of Cold War have taught the nation-states to contextualise economical realities before entering to any arms race or for that matter the space race. One basic question which is more theoretical in nature but demands attention is to appreciate the coloration between the concept of space power and space race. What could be basic purpose behind this race? Is the race for demonstration of the ‘ownership of the space power’ or power is just a subset of the race (or race is the subset of power) or is it incorrect to simultaneously confer these issues? From shear academic perspective, such various possibilities could be argued for or against. What is important to note is that the general theory of space power is yet to fully evolve. A blunt question has been asked by Collin Grey2 in this regard: ‘Where is the

2British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. 258 17 Scrutinising the Race

Mahan3 for space power?’ Interestingly, the argument put forth by Gray is somewhat deficient in taking into account the strategic significance of space. During the late 1990s, he argued that space has attracted attention: ¥ As a realm wherein national scientific and engineering prowess could be showcased ¥ As a sentimentalised zone that should not be polluted by terrestrial nastiness ¥ As a geographical medium whose exploitation is potentially vital for the effectiveness of multilayered ballistic missile defences4 Now, the question is ‘are these statements still completely valid in the twenty-first century’? Should the absence of terrestrial nastiness be taken for granted? In Asian context, such enquiry becomes more important particularly at the backdrop of the 2007 ASAT test conducted by China. It is also important to factor in some of the opinions of Colin Gray: he argues that ‘there has never been an aggressive weapon, only aggressive owners and operators of weapon’. On the other hand, it is important to appreciate that space is not ‘just another’ geographical environment. It is not only about military and weapons alone. In fact, in overall context, it has a larger socioeconomic dimension. Space-based weapons and other issues associated with ASAT (most of which are mainly theoretical postulations) have limited relevance. Hence, space race should not be viewed from a narrow ‘arms race’ perspective. 1950sÐ1970s was a different era when the launch of Sputnik and the space visit by Gagarin had created hysteria in the USA. The erstwhile USSR’s accomplishments were (in)directly linked to the advantages their military could get from such successes. Also, provocative opinions like the possibility ‘communist Moon’ (if the USA fails to reach there before the Soviets!) were being expressed to increase the ante then. Conversely, the situation in Asia presently is far different than the Cold War era. In Asian context, the initial media observation of an Asian Space Race probably emerged only as late as 2003 with the success of China’s manned space mission. This could have happened because along with China, other two states from the region, namely, Japan and India, also have successful space programmes with well-articulated roadmap for the future. Particularly, the interest of these three states (almost simultaneously) in development of Moon missions helped fuelling these speculations further. In short, it was realised that in Asia, China was not the only country having a capability to sit on the high table, and this could have helped to fuel the talk of Asian Space Race further. It is important to note that the concept of race is not being formulated only based on the achievements of these states in the space area but also because of the overall development shown by these three states in various other fields. Hence, any assessment of the notion of space race in Asia needs to be carried out as an offshoot of the overall growth trajectory of these states.

3Mahan is famous for his masterwork on sea power (The Inﬂuence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 [1890]). 4Introduction by Collin Gray for: Jim Oberg, Space Power Theory, Publication by National Space Studies Center Air University Maxell, US Air Force Academy, 1999, pp. xiiiÐxv. 17 Scrutinising the Race 259

In comparison with the USA and Russia (USSR earlier), various Asian states could be viewed as late starters in design, manufacture and launch of satellites. However, these states have also got certain advantages of being the late starters. They have the background knowledge of requirements for planning and technical developments. Also, they have a higher level of trust in starting various space programmes because in most of the cases, they are not the beginners and are not ‘bestowed with the responsibility of inventing the wheel’. Their initial investments are found more based on the nature of support they got from the developed nations than as a result of any rivalry with their neighbours. Most of the literature on this subject mainly takes into account the possibility of race amongst only these big three in Asia. However, race is a relative concept. Few other states in the region with less-developed space programmes may not be compared with these giants, but they could be compared amongst themselves. This becomes important because geopolitical realities in certain parts of Asia could make a case for the chances of existence of such a race. In case of Koreas, the peninsular prestige could force them to engage in space race. Similarly, a possibility exists for the IsraelÐIran race. Also, even if Pakistan cannot match India in space arena they could attempt to outmanoeuvre India in missile defence and ASAT fields giving rise to a different kind of competition. Nevertheless, it is also important to raise the question: ‘are such mostly Cold War era centric formulations like the “arms race” and “space race” valid in the twenty- first century world any more’? Most traditional perceptions of warfare catering for conventional threats by conventional means have changed over the years. Issues involving globalisation, terrorism, economic challenges, energy, poverty, natural disasters and climate change are changing the nature of overall threat dynamics. Are states willing to undertake blind investments in strategic assets only for the sake of nationalism or one-upmanship? Is the notion of nationalism true for the twenty- first-century world mainly driven by economic factors? Does nationalism has same meaning for communist, autocratic and democratic regimes? Would coming decades of twenty-first century witness commencement of post-nationalism era? Under these circumstances, ‘is there a need to reformulate the space race question’? Asia is fast becoming the pivot of global geopolitical change. When the world is going through the crucial phase of shifts in global economic and political power structures, the Asian region is offering new opportunities as well as posing certain uncertainties. The three major players of Asia are holding the key to a cooperative security environment. Asia’s changing power dynamics are reflected in ‘rise’ of China and India, increasingly assertive foreign policy posturing of China and Japan’s reluctance to remain in synch with the USA on every issue. Never before in history have there been a strong China, a strong India and a strong Japan at the same time. At the same time, it is also believed that the rivalry between China and Japan and underlying dissonance between China and India can hardly contribute to the building of a stable and secure Asia. Unfortunately, China’s ascent is not found instrumental in bringing Asian states closure [1] In space field too, it has 260 17 Scrutinising the Race been observed that these three powers are at the centre of ‘action’. Unfortunately, the geopolitical challenges faced by them are not probably allowing them to work together in this space arena. It is also important to note that interests in space technologies for various Asian states are far and varied. Smaller and less-developed states like Laos, Bangladesh and few others have only recently began to realise the relevance of this technology in the process of state building, while for a state like China, space is probably an instrument for maintaining strategic balance of power in the region. For major players within the region, issues related to space also have wider arms control and disarmament connotations at the global level. They understand that space technologies are not only about development but have large-scale geopolitical connotations too. Also, various powers in the region have different concerns about the weaponisation of space. Asia’s geopolitical landscape has shown major undulations in the last few decades. Various global events have brought significant changes in the policy perspectives of the states in the region. The end of Cold War has affected the political dynamics of the region. In physical sense, 9/11 did not happen on the Asian soil, but the region suffered maximum in the USA-led war on terror. Asian tsunami, Fukushima nuclear disaster and the 2011 Arab uprising are proving to be game changer for the region. On the other hand, the economic predictions for the region’s future are very bright. By 2010, China has emerged as the second largest economy in the world surpassing Japan, which is now in third position. India is expected to emerge as the third largest economic power in the world within couple of years. During global financial crises of 2008/2011, big three states from Asia along with states like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and few others succeeded in avoiding any major economic downturns. In the field of science and technology, the progress made of Asian states is remarkable and the future appears to be bright. It is important to factor all these reasons while making any assessment of Asia’s space ambitions. Also, it is important to note that most of the spacefaring states in the region have already articulated their roadmaps for the future. In Dec 2011, China has published their third White Paper giving details of plans for next 5 years. All this offers some basis for a futuristic assessment. Most the writings in support of the notion of Asian Space Race essentially revolve their argument based on the ambitions of big three in undertaking manned space missions and deep-space missions. Since most of the programmes of these three states in these fields have started almost simultaneously, a general conclusion has been drawn about the existence of space race amongst them. However, it could be incorrect to make any comprehensive assessment based on few variables. It is also important to factor in their capabilities in various other fields from launch vehicles to communication and remote sensing satellites to navigational constellation to making commercial exploitation of space technologies. It is also important to study the strategic relevance of their space programmes as well as the impact of regional institutional mechanisms. The Part III of this book provides detail discussion about various strategic aspects of the Asian space programmes. In regard to JapanÐChinaÐIndia, there exists a 17 Scrutinising the Race 261 commonality in various aspects of their space programme. All three have ambitions in respect of human space flights. Though, their journey so far is not indicative of any burning ambition to outmanoeuvre each other. Japan has been in the business of human space flight since 1992, and many of their astronauts have visited the International Space Station. They have achieved this feat only with the help of Russia and the USA. They have not developed any own vehicle for space travel. Few decades back with the help of Russia, India was able to send its first (and the only so far) astronaut to the space. It has been reported that during 2009, India’s Planning Commission has signed off on a proposed two-person manned spaceship to be launched by 2015 on an existing satellite launcher.5 Subsequently, not much of a progress has been made towards converting this idea into a reality. The only bright spot so far visible, with their ambitions of reaching outer space, was the 2007 successful experiment of the Space Recovery Capsule Experiment (SRE). But, this was just one of the nascent attempts towards developing a transport vehicle which could eventually carry a human to the space. Currently, there appears to be no plans to validate this technology further and proceed to the next step of undertaking robotic missions. Indian administration has made certain announcements in regard their ambitions to undertake a human space flight. Nevertheless, actually on ground, the situation looks entirely different, and India looks still far away from having an indigenous programme for the human space flight, while China has already undertaken its first manned mission in 2003 and has followed it up by few more missions and have also successfully undertaken a spacewalk. Hence, it could be incorrect to conclude that these three states are in competition in regard to human space mission. Japan has been one of the active members of the International Space Station (ISS) programme since its inception. In Oct 2011, China has launched the Tiangong-1, an orbital test module for a planned 2020 space station. They have also undertaken successful space docking experimentation, while India is neither the part of ISS nor it has announced any proposal for the development of a space station. Hence, even if India undertakes any human space mission, the purpose behind it could be just a technology demonstration and is unlikely to feed into any long-term programme. There are no visible military advantages of human space mission or a development of the space station. Also, the years of experimentation carried out by major space players in the zero gravity atmosphere so far has not yielded any path-breaking results. Hence, states like India understand that there are very limited benefits (at this point in time) of undertaking such missions. Probably, the best option could be to device a multilateral mechanism for all such activities. If the state has to go solo, then they could invest more in robotic missions than human missions. This could allow the state to concentrate more on developmental, strategic and commercial programmes. All this indicates that technologically or otherwise the chances of Asian Space Race in human space flights and space station arena are minimal. Amongst these three states, China could value nationalism more (could be more

5http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/4307281, accessed on Jan 8, 2011. 262 17 Scrutinising the Race of a compulsion to keep the communism intact!) and would continue to invest in such ‘exotic’ programmes, while other two democratic states appear to be more pragmatic. Moon missions undertaken by these three states have many similarities including the timing of the missions. Japan and China had launched their missions during Sept/Oct 2007, while India had launched 1 year later. The nature of sensors onboard of these crafts and the type of information gathered by all three are comparable in some respects. These missions have helped these states to boost their national pride and have also raised their stature internationally. These states have succeed in bringing the focus back to the Moon some 40 years after the USA landed a man on the Moon. However, they are well aware that from the scientific point of view, the US success was of extremely limited value, and the excitement of their achievement had dissipated relatively quickly.6 It could be incorrect to view Asia’s interest in the Moon only for the purpose of scientific hype. They understand the relevance of the Moon from the point of view of minerals. They are also trying to judge the feasibility of helium-3 on the surface of the Moon offering a solution to energy security. These states understand the importance of the technological spin-offs from such missions. Particularly, developments in technologies like Deep Space Networks (DSN) and robotics (rovers, landers, etc.) would provide them with strategic edge. They have well-articulated plans for coming missions. These are early times, and the exact nature of output from such missions is difficult to predict. India has involved (in limited capacity) few other states mainly the USA and Russia in regard to their Moon programme. However, mostly all these states are working without any outside cooperation and more importantly no cooperation amongst themselves. The investments by the big three in the Moon mission could be viewed as a race for resources. China appears to be looking at the Moon not only as backyard for mining the minerals but have larger ambitions. They desire to undertake a human mission to the Moon as a first country in the twenty-first century. They view this mission as a ‘contrivance’ to achieve the great power status. In military arena, it is a bit difficult to exactly pinpoint whether it is a race amongst them or they are using this technology to address their individual security concerns. It is a known fact that all of their security concerns are not independent of each other, and particularly in the case of China, both Japan and India fall in their security calculus. In Asian theatre, there are various well-entrenched geopolitical rivalries. They revolve around Taiwan, Pakistan, Vietnam, North Korea and the USA. For the region, it is very difficult to judge the exact nature of investments in military space hardware. This is mainly because various states draw little distinction between their civilian and military programmes. Luckily, states like Japan and India are becoming increasingly transparent in regard to their military space investments. But in regard to China, the ambiguity persists. China’s ASAT test has both global as well as regional connotations. China’s test has strategic implications and holds a ‘potential’ for imitation by other states

6Dark side of the moon”, Socialist Review, July/August 1999, Issue 232. 17 Scrutinising the Race 263 mainly from the region. The current trend in the region indicates that the concept of weaponisation of space is likely to remain restricted to mostly debating, developing and in rare cases testing the ASAT technologies. Not much of efforts (at least overt) are visible in respect of developing and positioning weapons in space. Mostly, the states in the region understand that any significant investments in this field could cause another costly arms race similar to that during the Cold War. Perhaps, this could be one the reasons for no serious attempts being done so far to develop such weapons. However, the decision not to deploy any space weapons does not guaranty any permanent commitment to keep space forever free from weaponry. In all likelihood to keep various options open, no significant efforts are being made to develop any globally acceptable treaty mechanism. In the twenty-first century, states are concentrating significantly on the economic development. Particularly, the Cold War period has taught states the limitations of ‘blind’ arms race. States have understood the importance of economic security for the growth of the country. Space technologies have significant potential for economic engagement of the state. The increasing global demand in satellite technologies makes space as a lucrative business ground. The big three spacefaring states in Asia are keen to enter in this market both for economic as well as geopolitical benefits. To decipher the nature of regional space race, it is important to broadly understand the economic and commercial aspects of the various space programmes. One limitation of this book is that space economics of Asians states has not been discussed. There are two main reasons for this. First, since the main focus of this book has been to study the strategic aspects of Asia’s space agenda, no discussions on the space commerce have been undertaken; also very less authentic (or even otherwise) and detailed information is available in this regard. Second, economic assessment is a specialised subject, and particularly, space assessment would require separate analysis for various sectors like communication and navigation. In regard to India, an Oxford publication (2007) titled The Economics of India’s Space Programme by U. Sankar highlighting and analysing various budgetary aspects is available, but for comparative analysis, little information is available for other states particularly for state like China. On an average, India’s space budget is approximately 2Ð2.5 times less than Japan and China. Space commerce mainly revolves around three different areas: satellite manufacturing facilities, launching facilities for the satellites and the sale of satellite products (raw or processed data, satellite imagery, etc.). One of the areas where spacefaring nations in the region have business interest is the area of satellite- launching facilities. The big three in the region are in a position to launch satellites of almost all types in almost all orbits. They have well-developed launching facilities and have a good success rate with their launching systems. Also, these states are known to offer commercially economical launch rates in compression with other spacefaring states. In 2011, China undertook 19 satellites blastoffs (18 successful). It was much higher than the previous high for Chinese launches in a year set in 2010 with 15 264 17 Scrutinising the Race

flights.7 During Dec 2011, China launched a communication satellite for Nigeria and had a lift-off mass of 5,100 kg. China is set to make five commercial launches for foreign customers in 2012 (they had three commercial launches in 2011). On Jan 9, 2012, Chinese Long March 4B rocket launched a 2,650-kg Ziyuan III satellite. In the same mission, China has also carried a satellite from Luxembourg. Normally, 20Ð30 commercial launches happen in the world each year. Most of such launches are carried out by Russia and European countries. In the year 2012, China would approximately undertake 15 % of probable global commercial launches. So far, China has conducted 33 commercial launches for international customers, putting 39 satellites into orbit. China has ambitions of achieving a target of a 15 % share of the commercial launch market and a 10 % share of the satellite export market by 2015.8 India also demonstrates a good record in regard to launching of satellites for other states on commercial basis. This has become possible because of the success of its PSLV launcher, the most successful workhorse of ISRO. Till the end of September 2012, this system has proved its reliability and versatility by launching 55 satellites/spacecrafts (26 Indian and 29 foreign satellites) into a variety of orbits.9 However, it is important to note that most the satellites launched for the foreign states were small sized, and actually, only five to six large satellites were launched from pure commercial point of view. It is important for India to expand this business with more vigour. Currently, India has two satellite launch pads and looking at the growth potential is planning to develop one more pad. India has limitations in regard to launching of heavy satellites. China’s Long March series of satellites are capable of carrying the maximum payload of 12,000 kg for LEO and 5,500 kg for GTO. They are developing next-generation rockets capable of carrying more load. India’s GSLV Mark I&II launchers are capable of launching satellites in the range of 2,000Ð2,500 kg payload. However, India is still not in a position to launch satellites which weigh 4,500Ð5,000 kg. Because India is yet to indigenise the cryogenic technology, the state is still far away from developing a self-sufficiency to launch heavier satellites. In respect of China and India, the overall successes with their space programmes have helped them to raise their stature internationally, and this has indirectly helped them commercially. The case of Japan is a bit different. They are yet to make a mark in commercial sector. Japan’s National Space Development Agency, JAXA’s predecessor, had developed the H-IIA rocket, and the first H-IIA blasted off in 2001. During Dec 2011, this rocket has successfully launched Japan’s spy satellite. A few years back,

7For the first time since the dawn of the space age, China’s Long March rocket family eclipsed the annual flight rate of the US fleet of space launchers, http://www.space.com/14048-china-satellite- launch-breaks-rocket-record.html, accessed on Jan 9, 2011. 8http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-12/21/content 14296838.htm, accessed on Jan 4, 2012 and Economic Times, Jan 9, 2012. 9http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/PSLV/pslv.aspx, accessed on Sep 16, 2012. 17 Scrutinising the Race 265 the H-IIA project was taken over by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. Japan is keen to develop its satellite launch business along with this agency. On its next mission, an H-IIA will carry a South Korean satellite, representing the first launch deal with a foreign country. The present success rate of this rocket is 95 %.10 However, the company is depending only on government contracts. Since till date Japan has never launched a commercial satellite using its indigenous H-IIA rocket, it’s too premature to predict the future of its launch business particularly with expected global slowdown of launch market due to economic crisis. Asian states are also aware about the soft power significance of this technology. Naturally, there is a competition to attract clients. All these three states have achieved certain amount of expertise to manufacture custom-made satellites and have sold few units too. They also understand that even non-spacefaring states like South Korea could give them competition in this field. Presently, China and India are finding a place as the most preferred destination for various satellite-related services including ground developing facilities like Earth stations. Understanding the business potential of this sector, states like South Korea and Malaysia are also keen to develop a niche in this field. In overall context, it could be said that like any other business, space is one sector where states are in competition. However, geopolitical significance of such business deals cannot be overlooked. In the future, a possibility exists that some of such services would be handled by private players. Already, particularly in the arena of small and micro-satellites, private industry is playing a significant role. The industry needs to learn from examples like Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, UK, which have succeeded in developing a niche in the field of small satellites. Following table [2] gives few important details about the major programmes in the region.

Space budget Civilian space Country (yearly US$) personnel Launches per year Japan $ 3.8 billion 8,300 2Ð3 China $ 2.2 billion (estimated) 80,000 (estimated) 10Ð15 India $ 1.3 billion 32,000 (estimated) 2Ð3 South Korea $ 220 million 2,500 (estimated) 0Ð1

Above information indicates that China offers the best turnaround time in respect of launching capabilities (they have plans to launch 21 rockets and 30 satellites in 2012), and they have invested signiﬁcantly in developing human resources in this ﬁeld. Presently, there are some Asian states keen to exploit the commercial component of space technologies; however, there appears to be a mismatch in respect of enthusiasm and actual ground realities. Hence, only in an imitated scene,

10‘Satellite launch business faces cloudy future’, Dec. 28, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ nb20111228a1.html, accessed on Jan 9, 2012. 266 17 Scrutinising the Race it could be argued that the race exists to grab the commercial market. China is much ahead of others in this field too. China is also found intelligently using space industry as an important means for extending its soft power standing. They are found engaging states in Africa, Latin America and also few Asian states to spread their political influence and probably with a hidden agenda of bartering this technology for energy sources, minerals and natural resources. China’s attempts look well organised with clarity of motive. India appears to have realised the soft power potential of this technology, but no concentrated efforts are visible to that effect. Both China and Japan are found using multilateral mechanisms11 as a method to win friends and establishment. China is hosting Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), while Japan is instrumental in establishing the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). APSCO is without India and Japan clearly indicating that China is basically interested to engage less-developed states in the region and keep the competitors away. In its part, India hosts the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP), affiliated to UN. It was established in Nov 1995 with various organisations and countries as members. Such framework offers India to undertake multilateral scientific engagement; however, from the point of view of ‘influence’, it has limited relevance. The general tendency of the big three Asian states appears to be to go alone in space arena. Particularly, their deep-space agendas have various commonalties, but no effort is seen to joint undertake any projects. These states could have developed an Asian space station on the lines of ISS. Pulling together of scientific, technological and economic resources could have assured a faster growth and avoided scientific duplication. However, the geopolitical divide is keeping the states away from each other. Even for many other states in the region, harmonious relations do not exist (like amongst few South East Asian neighbours, in Korean peninsula, Vietnam and China). It appears that mainly due to strategic considerations, these states are not keen to develop any joint programmes. It is argued that ‘Asian trends stand in sharp contrast to space developments in Europe, where the leading nations cooperate extensively. By contrast, Asian space powers are highly isolated from one another, do not share information and display tremendous divergence of perspective’ [3].Thebasiclogicoverhereisthatsince Asian states are not keen to cooperate with each other, it indicates that there is a ‘race’ amongst them. It is important to examine such logic: but not purely in isolation or by using European standards to judge Asian realities. The notion of collective security could vary from Europe to Asia. The Asian region’s history indicates a lack of inclination to provide any collective response in case of an attack on any country in the region. Also, there is an absence of regionally accepted multilateral security group involved in addressing security concerns of the

11For details on this please refer Asif A. Siddiqi, ‘An Asian Space Race: Hype or Reality?’ In Subrata Ghoshroy and Gotz Neuneck (eds), South Asia at a Crossroads, Nomos, Hamburg, 2010, pp.184Ð198. 17 Scrutinising the Race 267 region. Organisations like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have limited relevance. But non-existence of any forum in context of security or for the purposes of development of science and technology does not automatically imply that the states are in competition with each other. Probably, no such culture exists. Maybe since the states within the region are not pushing for any ‘new world order’ and hence are not found keen to develop and display any inter-state mechanisms of cooperation which also includes cooperation in space. Essentially, states have a policy of neutrality in favour of collective security, and this could be one of reasons for states to opt for state-specific space programmes. Normally, the notion of space race is being debated only in regard to be JapanÐ ChinaÐIndia. However, theoretically, the possibility of the race in few other regions of Asia also exits. Hence, for a wider scrutiny (in broad sense, the race is amongst the equals), it is important to study the interests of few states in the region whose space programmes are broadly comparable. South Korea and North Korea are the latecomers to the space field, and their investments have obvious missile bias. But, South Korea’s interests are beyond missiles too. They have major ambitions in space arena. Unfortunately, their actual achievements do not match with their ambitions. It is unlikely that in the coming few decades, they would be able to challenge the supremacy of the big three. Presently, states like Russia are assisting them to develop their programme. It is expected that in the coming few years, they would be in a position to attend the status of spacefaring nation. They are keen to develop infrastructure for satellite-launching capabilities mainly with commercial interests in mind. However, it is important to note that South Korea’s military is keen to replace some of its ageing spy planes. Hence, they are planning to buy two advanced reconnaissance planes from France by 2015, to allow its military to intercept radio messages from North Korea. The timing of the delivery of the aircrafts is significant because by Dec 2015, South Korea is scheduled to retake wartime operational control over its troops from the USA.12 All such strategic needs of South Korea clearly indicate that they would also attempt to develop and launch spy satellites once they develop the expertise. Over a period of time, North Korea is also expected to develop reasonable launch capabilities. North Korea would have concerns about the existing spy satellite network of Japan. Hence, in the coming few years, Korean Peninsula could witness space race mainly arising out of strategic considerations. Israel is a spacefaring state with reasonably developed capabilities. Iran is also found making rapid progress. Saudi Arabia is also making significant investments to have independent assets in space. The geopolitical landscape of this part of Asia is extremely complicated, and any cooperation in space arena is unlikely. States in the region are prone to abuse space issues for their political rivalry. Iran is likely to continue to use space launches to demonstrate their missile capabilities. But, at the same time, they are expected to take their space programme out of the limited mandate of using it as a ‘cover’ for their missile ambitions and would use it to

12http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/12/26/34/0301000000AEN20111226001800315F. HTML, accessed on Jan 10, 2012. 268 17 Scrutinising the Race demonstrate the level of their scientific expertise. With Iran furthering its space agenda, Israel is likely to invest in ASAT technologies. To date, Israel has not conducted any test of nuclear weapons to demonstrate its ability; however, this does not guarantee that they would follow the same policy in the ASAT field. Smaller states in Asian region, like Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan, are also growing their own space infrastructure. They are being supported in this endeavour by few states from Asia and abroad. These states individually may be keen to be a part of any ‘politics of space’; however, the increasing interests shown by few other major spacefaring states from and outside the region could end up increasing the competition amongst the patron states. The post-Cold War era is witnessing several major changes in the nature of the space race. The end of the US space shuttle programme in 2010 without presenting any other alternative proposals to continue with the human space flight programme is indicative of the fact that the USA no longer associates ‘prestige’ as the most important issue in regard to developments in space. Today, they are depending on Russia, its one time rival to send its astronauts to the ISS. The USA understands that irrespective of stopping one of the prestigious programmes like this, their leadership in space would continue to exist. However, the US action highlights that in a broader sense: (1) Economical viability would govern the future of many space programmes, and (2) Space projects have long gestation periods. Short political life of decision- makers mainly in democratic dispensations (politicians are normally keen to have results of any project, say, within a life span of 4Ð5-year election cycle) could end up stalling very long-term investments. Mostly the technologies which prove their scientific, commercial or strategic relevance in reasonable time frame get political patronage. (3) The twenty-first-century world is probably entering an era of post- nationalism. National identities are getting somewhat blurred, and the perception about the so-called prestige of a state is not remaining limited to some isolated achievements. States are found undertaking cost-benefit analysis (benefits have both economic and strategic conations) before making any big investments. All this have Asian relevance too. In Asia, the space race is being mostly discussed amongst the trio JapanÐChinaÐ India. It is important to note that China and Japan are the second and third ranked economies of the world, while Indian economy is still in the process of development. China follows a communist form of government, while the remaining two are vibrant democracies. It is important to appreciate that the economic condition of a state, the political model followed by the state, the social and security challenges faced by the state, the level of growth of science and technology in the state and few other factors play their roles either directly or indirectly in deciding the space policies of a state. All such factors should be mulled over while theorising the conception of space race in Asia. Asia’s space story is mostly being viewed as a story of competition. The inquest is ‘has the notion of competition become prevalent just because there is no cooperation’? It is understood that the main reason for lack of cooperation is the strategic compulsions particularly in respect of IndiaÐChina and ChinaÐJapan. It is also important to note that for many years because of its nuclear policies, 17 Scrutinising the Race 269

India was the victim of technological apartheid. Some agencies under ISRO were under international sections for many years. In certain cases, India was facing certain difficulties in regard to technology transfer and other issues. Only after the successful culmination of the IndoÐUS nuclear deal (2005) by 2011 that various agencies of ISRO have been taken out from the list of banned companies. On the other hand, Japan is having collaboration with the USA for many years, and naturally, they had no significant interest to look for partners within the region. Hence, the argument of competition leading to space race may not be fully true. Another important aspect is the case of military concerns. Are the defence-related investments in space arena by Asian states are entirely Asia centric? The answer is no. Particularly, in the case of China, the investments are mainly US centric. When viewed holistically at the backdrop of geopolitical realities, it appears that even though the space race is getting discussed more in Asian region, but in real sense, the race is taking place amongst the USA and China. In Asian context after analysing the various space programmes, a question arises: ‘is the Cold War era analogy of space race is being used too naively in Asian theatre’? Is there any Western agenda behind propagating this theory? Is China’s growing assertiveness and the rising power status of India being feared internationally and hence attempts are being made to keep them engaged in the region and also with each other? Is the Western notion in regard to the precarious nature of various long-standing geopolitical feuds in Asia leading to a conflicting and volatile situation real or exaggerated? Is it a ploy to discredit the actual technological achievements of the Asian states by diverting the attention by stressing about space race? Is bracketing Asian space programme into the category of race is actually defaming it probably to guard the business interests? All in all, has any objective analysis of Asian Space Race been carried out based on geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economical realities? Is the experts community within and outside Asia shying away to reason out non-existence of any Asian Space Race just because it could be unfashionable to say so? Is Asian region the only region in the world where signs of space race are visible? For long, competition and cooperation are found coexisting in regard to space agenda of the USA and the European Union. In the recent years, the biggest shock for the USA was the conception of the idea of separate global navigational setup (Galileo) by the EU challenging the supremacy of the GPS. Europe has very strong space capabilities and considers space as a part of the EU political project. Commercial interest of the USA as well as EU in space arena is well known. Officially from Brussels, nothing much is spoken about the relevance of space technologies for the security purposes. However, this does not indicate zero interest. France, Germany, UK, Italy, etc. would definitely have some strategic expectations from the space programme. Within the EU grouping, the states like Germany, UK, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway have varying degree of investments made in the satellite technologies and their applications. Canada is also a part of ESA and has made reasonable investments in the space arena. Mostly, the European states have no major security challenges within the region but they do compete for geopolitical, economic and technological leadership both at regional and global 270 17 Scrutinising the Race level. However, not many attempts have been made to understand space agendas of these regions and compare and contract them from point of view of understanding the possibility of any race. It appears that JapanÐChinaÐIndia to a great extent have succeeded in leaving peacefully with their respective differences for long, and probably this fact is not getting factored in various assessments of arms race and space race in Asian context. More importantly for the last four to five decades, these states have been found involved mainly with the activities involving non-military use of space. Early history of their space programmes suggests that their investments were not made as reactions to each other’s programmes but more as a part of their scientific and social agenda. The Asian security milieu has nuclear weapons at its cornerstone. However, the nuclear weapon states form the region are not found (at least overtly) linking military space power and strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. Hypothetically, if China has to engage someone in a joint space and nuclear weapons game, then they could look at the USA as a competitor and not at India. This volume has sought to understand the purpose behind the investments by Asian states in the space area with a key focus on their strategic significance. It has been found that the major spacefaring Asian states are making considerate investments in the space arena. Time and again, they have proved their indigenous capabilities to build and operate world-class satellites. There is clarity of vision amongst them. For them, investments in space are not about romanticism or fighting any abstract space race. They are fully aware about the scientific and strategic significance of their doings. They understand and appreciate the dangers of weaponisation of space and lack of transparent space security regime. However, they are determined to play the game of space politics, if needed, keeping their individual national interests paramount. The ambitions of various Asian nations to use space technologies for the purpose of the declaration of their economic and technological arrival are obvious. In recent times, the talk of Asian Space Race probably has its roots in the commonality and the timing of the Moon programmes of JapanÐChinaÐIndia. The Moon missions by these states were launched during 2007Ð2008 period, and they had almost similar mandate. It is being mostly argued that currently no strategic imperatives exist for human space flight, and space exploration does not hold the same strategic importance and priority on national agenda as it did four decades ago [4]. Asian states have not created any significant international architecture for their deep- space missions particularly in regard to Moon. Maybe these are early days, and space players are yet to fully understand the military applicability (if any) in regard to deep-space missions and hence are moving cautiously. On the whole, Asian states are found duplicating their efforts in the deep-space arena. Is this a sheer coincidence or is there something more to it? One of the most likely reason could be that it is not about the race in space, but actually about the energy security compulsions (presence of helium 3 on the Moon surface) and the race for resources (mining of minerals from the Moon’s surface). The Moon is just incidental; if such resources would have been available under the ocean, the states would have attempted to reach there! 17 Scrutinising the Race 271

The major share of debate in regard to the Asian Space Race is found revolving around the possibility of race amongst China and India. However, such possibility should not be presumed only based on the assessment of strategic factors. It is important to factor in the actual technological capabilities and aspirations of the state too. China’s technological progress (both in space arena or otherwise) clearly places them much ahead of other Asian space powers. They have expressed their desire to achieve greater heights in space arena and have made superior plans than others. Their track record so far clearly indicates that they have the capability to fulfil their space dreams mostly within the time frame envisaged. It appears that even in the twenty-first century, China is unable to get over the (probably) dated notion of the so-called national pride. However, this could make them focus and invest more on their space agenda. On the other hand, India and Japan have their priorities fixed. India realises the relevance of Chinese achievements in space technologies but is not found getting into the competitive mode and trying to imitate China. Indian investments are found being made based on cost and benefit analysis. In most fields, they are found making incremental developmental efforts based on their own assessment of socioeconomic and technological advantages of such investments. It is not making investments into the technologies which have no social, scientific or strategic significance. It appears that India could go slow with its human space programme, and their top priority could be to undertake robotic missions as a starting point. In general, various states in Asia are found making investments in space technologies which could offer social, technological, commercial and strategic benefits for their country. The issue is would the Asian space investments pose a major threat to stability in the post-Cold War world? The answer is probably no, at least not in the near future. However, there are certain valid concerns about China’s intent. The world has learnt many lessons from the Chinese 2007 ASAT. Probably, China also would have learnt some lessons from the global backlash to this test. It is important to note that any eventual weaponisation of space would weaken the global economy and could convert the space race into space arms race. On the other hand, there is a sense that China has a desire to achieve great power status. They feel that an achievement in space offers them an opportunity to do so. From that point of view, they could invest more into iconic programmes like human Moon mission that could add up to their reputation than odious missions like ASAT. They are targeting to match and outdo the best in the world. Naturally, their race is not with India or Japan, but they are to outperform the USA. Overall, China has succeeded in strategically positioning itself well and has made appropriate use of their space programme to do so. The major portion of the global space discourse since the beginning of the twenty-first century has been revolving around the theme of Asian Space Race, and to a certain extent, an impression has been created that such race exists and is brewing. Nonetheless, the issue appears to be far from settled. There are certain commonalities in the existing and the proposed space agendas of ChinaÐJapanÐ India. Though, the achievements of China are found far superior than other states 272 17 Scrutinising the Race in the region. Also, China has far greater ambitions than other Asian states in space field (too). The overall technological appreciations of various space programmes in the region clearly enunciate China as a winner. However, when viewed at a backdrop of geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economical settings, different sensitivities emerge. States also have their complimentary space narratives, and for some of them, multiple narratives exist. Few states are found intelligently using space technologies to realise their soft power aspirations. Simultaneously, the hard power relevance of space technologies is mostly being underplayed but still refuses to lay low. States are found using a blend of both soft power and hard power called a smart power strategy. The (empirical) space balance sheet and strategic realities in regard to various Asian states demonstrate that it is difficult to conclude with certitude about the existence or absence of Asian Space Race. The current trends indicate no definitive but only somewhat suggestive space race in Asia.

References

1. Chellaney B. Asian juggernaut. New Delhi: HarperCollins; 2006, pp. vi, vii, 222, 223. 2. Moltz JC. Asia’s space race. Nature. 2011;480:172. 3. James Clay M. Asia’s space race. New York: Columbia University Press; 2012. p. 1Ð3. 4. Vedda JA. Challenges to the sustainability of space exploration. Astropolitics. 2008;6(1):24. Index

A B Aerodynamics, 18, 214 Ballistic, 21, 33, 45, 71, 75, 99, 125, 128Ð131, Aerospace, 17, 30, 37, 38, 63, 74, 76, 81, 84, 133Ð139, 144, 182, 194, 198Ð200, 224, 91, 97, 118, 134, 156, 167, 170, 192, 244Ð246, 248, 256, 258 196, 213, 247, 256 Bangladesh, 9, 24, 31, 46, 109, 229, 242, 260 AEW&CS. See Airborne early warning and Biotechnology, 10, 16, 17, 170, 222 control system (AEW&CS) Booster, 74, 76, 81, 86, 99, 152, 195, 198, 214 Afghanistan, 10, 19, 45, 57, 181, 185 Brazil, 228 Africa, 10, 36, 39, 49, 225Ð229, 231, 266 Budget, 12, 24, 37, 66, 75, 97, 106, 146, 215, Airborne early warning and control system 221, 246, 247, 263, 265 (AEW&CS), 52 Altitude, 34, 45, 48, 64, 72, 104, 105, 136, 137, C 149, 163, 172, 195, 196, 198, 213 Camera, 32, 41, 61, 62, 87, 165, 195, 196, 249 Anti-satellite test (ASAT), 5, 57, 87, 89, 92, CASC. See China Aerospace Corporation 135, 136, 140, 151, 181, 198Ð202, 240, (CASC) 243, 248, 258, 259, 263, 268, 271 CCD. See Charged couple device (CCD) Apollo, 12, 96, 160, 168, 169, 174, 176, 205, Cell cultivation, 86 210, 249 Chandrayan, 164, 167, 175 APSCO. See Asia-Paciﬁc Space Cooperation Charged couple device (CCD), 48, 87, 191 Organization (APSCO) China, 3, 9, 31, 43, 69, 79Ð92, 95, 109, 125, Arms control, 30, 125, 127, 129, 136, 139, 147, 160, 184, 206, 219, 239, 258 187, 202, 224, 225, 244, 255, 260 China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), 81, 84 Arms race, 3, 50, 127, 186, 201, 255Ð259, 263, China National Space Administration (CNSA), 270, 271 81, 84 Asian, 3Ð5, 7Ð11, 13Ð21, 23, 24, 31, 42, 57, Civilian, 4, 16Ð18, 22, 32Ð35, 40, 41, 54, 55, 66, 69, 80, 96, 111Ð113, 115, 118, 60, 64, 71, 73, 75, 76, 81, 90, 91, 96, 120, 126Ð129, 132, 134, 136, 138, 143, 103, 107, 125, 126, 143, 145, 146, 149, 146Ð148, 155, 156, 159Ð169, 171Ð173, 150, 154, 155, 181Ð183, 186Ð192, 194, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 185Ð188, 197, 199, 223, 248, 256, 262, 265 198, 201, 202, 205Ð207, 209, 216, 221, Climate Change, 10, 11, 19, 118, 119, 185, 224Ð226, 231, 232, 237Ð253, 257Ð263, 243, 244, 259 265, 266, 268Ð272 CNSA. See China National Space Asia-Paciﬁc Space Cooperation Organization Administration (CNSA) (APSCO), 91, 109, 242, 252, 266 Cognitive sciences, 222 Asteroid, 106, 159, 241, 250, 257 Cold War, 9, 12, 13, 19, 20, 43, 70, 79, 127, Astronaut, 36, 74, 116, 173, 206Ð208, 212, 171, 174, 178, 183, 185, 237, 256, 257, 215, 261 259, 260, 263, 268, 269, 271

COMINT. See Communications intelligence Drug trafﬁcking, 10, 185 (COMINT) DSN. See Deep Space Networks (DSN) Command, 49Ð53, 56, 73Ð75, 80, 132, 136, Dust, 170 166, 167, 187, 189, 190, 248 Commerce, 47, 96, 173, 253, 263 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer E Space (COPUOS), 30, 31, 127, 154, East Asia, 9, 15, 19, 69Ð77, 115, 150, 178, 185, 245 229 Communication, 18, 19, 22, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, Economics, 8, 18, 24, 96, 240, 246Ð247, 263 47, 49, 52, 54, 56, 58, 61Ð63, 72, 74, 75, Electronics, 10, 11, 15Ð19, 44, 80, 88, 115, 81, 82, 85, 92, 97, 100, 107, 111Ð115, 134, 190 118, 120, 148, 150, 151, 155, 181, 182, Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), 85, 190 186Ð188, 190, 191, 197, 199, 201, 205, Environmental, 19, 47, 48, 113, 120, 184, 207, 213, 230, 243, 246, 248, 250, 260, 263, 239, 245, 249, 251 264 European Space Agency (ESA), 37, 77, 146, Communications intelligence (COMINT), 85 151, 166, 179, 241, 243, 269 Compass (Beidou), 150 European Union (EU), 20, 21, 37, 55, 57, 145, Computer, 16, 18, 48, 53, 80, 187 146, 151Ð153, 172, 179, 201, 241, 244, Conference on Disarmament (CD), 91, 201 269 Control, 11, 14, 17, 19, 23, 30, 32, 41, 46Ð48, Extravehicular Activity (EVA), 205, 211 50Ð52, 54, 56, 64, 69, 73, 80, 81, 84, 88, 90, 97, 102, 103, 109, 125, 127Ð129, F 133, 134, 136, 139, 144, 147, 148, 151, Fiber, 66, 188 163, 168, 175, 176, 185, 187, 192Ð194, Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), 127 198, 202, 212, 213, 215, 220, 224, 225, France, 33, 57, 63, 96, 118, 120, 125, 197, 241, 230, 240, 242, 244, 255, 260, 267 267, 269 COPUOS. See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) Crop breeding, 86 G Cruise missile, 81, 133, 137, 150, 156, 190 Gagarin, 12, 256, 258 Cryogenic, 65, 81, 99, 127, 134, 140, 251, 264 Galileo, 37, 145, 146, 151Ð153, 241, 269 Crystal and protein growth, 86 GEO. See Geostationary orbit (GEO) Geo economics, 5, 186, 222, 269, 272 Geographic Information System (GIS), 47, D 120, 146 Deep space missions, 22, 64, 104, 105, Geopolitics, 4, 8, 24, 34, 166, 219, 221, 238 159Ð161, 171, 173, 174, 241, 246, 252, Geospatial, 147 260, 270 Geostationary orbit (GEO), 49, 61, 63, 64, 85, Deep Space Networks (DSN), 166Ð167, 174 96, 99, 118, 134, 148, 150, 156, 188 Defence, 16Ð18, 23, 34, 41, 44, 45, 50Ð54, 57, Geostationary satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), 62, 64, 70, 73Ð75, 80, 95, 103, 104, 61, 65, 134, 264 117, 126, 132, 134Ð137, 140, 154, 176, Geostrategic, 3, 5, 20, 22, 24, 29, 69, 147, 178, 178, 182, 183, 188, 190, 192, 194Ð197, 185, 269, 272 199, 200, 213, 215, 224, 226, 227, 248, Geosynchronous, 61, 99, 134, 151, 152, 190 252, 258, 259, 269 Geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), 61, 99, Degree, 43, 44, 79, 99, 109, 207, 210, 238, 269 215, 264 Development, 7, 30, 44, 59, 69, 79, 95, 110, GIS. See Geographic Information System 125, 144, 161, 182, 205, 221, 239, 256 (GIS) Direction, 13, 35, 36, 38, 71, 82, 117, 183, 207, Globalisation, 11, 184, 227, 259 210, 241, 251 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Disarmament, 67, 91, 127, 136, 187, 201, 202, 143, 144, 147, 151, 154, 155 224, 225, 260 Global Positioning System (GPS), 53, 76, Distance, 12, 106, 107, 125, 131, 132, 143, 144Ð149, 151Ð153, 155, 156, 190, 191, 159, 168, 171, 183, 207, 215, 224 201, 269 Index 275

Glonass, 145, 146, 151, 154, 156, 190, 201 IRNSS. See Indian Regional Navigation GPS-Aided Geo Augmented Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) (GAGAN), 153 IRS. See Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) GSLV. See Geostationary satellite launch ISA. See Iranian Space Agency (ISA) vehicle (GSLV) ISNET. See Inter-Islamic Network on Space GTO. See Geosynchronous transfer orbit Sciences and Technology (ISNET) (GTO) Israel, 3, 5, 9, 13, 20, 21, 23, 33Ð38, 41, 55, Gulf War, 5, 19, 55, 181, 190, 200, 248, 257 125Ð127, 129, 132, 134, 136, 156, 183, 184, 189, 190, 196, 200, 201, 206, 259, 267, 268 H Israel Space Agency (ISA), 34 Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), 129, 130 ISRO. See Indian Space research Organization Hard Power, 220, 222, 226, 227, 232, 272 (ISRO) Helium 3, 175, 178, 249, 252, 262, 270 ISS. See International Space Station (ISS) ITC. See Information and Communication technology (ITC) I ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) J Imagery intelligence (IMINT), 85 Jamming, 181, 182, 198, 200, 240, 248, 252 India, 3, 9, 33, 43, 59Ð67, 106, 109, 125, 146, Japan, 3, 9, 40, 55, 69, 95Ð107, 109, 125, 147, 160, 184, 206, 221, 239, 258 160, 184, 206, 222, 239, 258 Indian National Satellite (INSAT), 60Ð63, 65 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System 97, 98, 167, 247, 264 (IRNSS), 153, 154, 190 Jordan, 9, 46 Indian Remote Sensing (IRS), 61, 62, 64, 189, 232 Indian Space research Organization (ISRO), K 40, 60, 61, 63Ð66, 164, 167, 170, 173, KARI. See Korean Aerospace Research 188Ð190, 199, 213Ð215, 232, 240, 247, Institute (KARI) 250, 264, 269 Kazakhstan, 9, 21, 39, 48 Indonesia, 9, 21, 46, 49, 109Ð114, 119, 185, KCST. See Korean Committee of Space 187, 222, 229, 242, 245, 248, 252, 268 Technology (KCST) Information and Communication technology Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV), 198 (ITC), 155 Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), Information gathering, 34, 103 74 Information technology (IT), 10, 15, 17, 187, Korean Committee of Space Technology 222 (KCST), 71 INSAT. See Indian National Satellite (INSAT) Intelligence, 30, 37, 38, 41, 45, 51, 52, 54Ð56, 73, 85, 86, 88, 90, 102, 103, 132, 133, L 138, 152, 176, 181, 182, 186, 187, Laos, 109, 119, 120, 230, 242, 260 190Ð192, 194, 196, 197, 199, 253 Laser, 35, 90, 135, 165, 167, 198, 251 Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 71, Latin America, 10, 225, 226, 228, 266 72, 125, 130, 133, 134, 244 Latitude, 148, 150 Inter-Islamic Network on Space Sciences and Launcher, 20, 30, 33Ð36, 39, 54, 60, 61, 63, Technology (ISNET), 46 74Ð76, 82Ð84, 87, 96Ð99, 101, 102, International Space Station (ISS), 36, 66, 96, 118, 128, 130, 172, 209, 213, 214, 230, 99, 107, 116, 207Ð209, 211, 216, 240, 244, 245, 250, 261, 264 243, 247, 261, 266, 268 Launch Vehicle, 35, 40, 49, 50, 59, 61, 64, 75, Internet, 18, 49, 54, 112 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 97Ð101, 107, 114, Iran, 3, 9, 29Ð34, 70, 109, 126, 184, 224, 242, 116, 117, 126Ð131, 133, 134, 138, 139, 259 147, 212, 214, 215, 244, 245, 260 Iranian Space Agency (ISA), 31, 34 Longitude, 118, 150 276 Index

Long March (LM), 46, 81Ð85, 87, 111, 120, National Institute of Aeronautics and Space 152, 173, 193, 212, 230, 231, 264 (LAPAN), 111 Low Earth Orbit (LEO), 45, 76, 85, 161, 206, Nationalism, 4, 70, 80, 115, 174, 205, 227, 215 240, 250, 259, 262, 268 Natural disasters, 10, 32, 41, 69, 118, 119, 185, 232 M Navigation, 22, 37, 54, 64, 81Ð84, 86, 92, 107, Malaysia, 3, 9, 10, 21, 46, 57, 109, 111, 113, 120, 143Ð156, 161, 171, 181, 182, 186, 115Ð117, 134, 154, 187, 201, 206, 222, 188Ð190, 201, 205, 213, 224, 231, 253, 242, 250, 265 263 Malaysian national space agency Near space, 92 (ANGKASA), 115Ð117 Network-centric warfare, 51Ð53, 57, 74, 155, Mars, 22, 80, 89, 91, 96, 105, 159, 160, 167, 188 171Ð179, 205Ð207, 227, 242, 246, 251 Nigeria, 229, 230, 264 Material sciences, 18 North and South Korea, 9, 185 Mathematics, 15, 18, 143 Nuclear, 11, 14, 16, 20, 29, 30, 33, 34, 43, Medium earth orbit (MEO), 150, 156 44, 47, 50, 54Ð57, 60, 64, 69, 70, 72, MEMS. See Micro-electro-mechanical systems 95, 125Ð140, 152, 155, 160, 161, 184, (MEMS) 185, 187, 193, 196, 197, 199Ð202, 240, MEO. See Medium earth orbit (MEO) 241, 243Ð245, 247, 252, 255, 256, 260, Metallurgy, 17, 214 268Ð270 Meteorology, 18, 19, 37, 60Ð62, 76, 92, 97, Nuclear technology, 10, 126, 222 100, 147, 182, 186, 243, 244 Micro, 5, 33, 37, 39, 46, 48, 63, 74, 76, 83, 86, 87, 112, 116, 118Ð120, 162, 182, 186, O 192, 229, 252, 265 Optical, 35, 36, 41, 47, 55, 86, 105, 107, 119, Micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), 188, 192, 196, 198 171 Militarization, 182 Military, 3, 7, 30, 43, 69, 80, 95, 110, 125, 144, P 161, 181, 216, 219, 239, 255 Pakistan, 9, 31, 43, 70, 109, 126, 178, 184, Minerals, 107, 160, 163, 165, 166, 175Ð177, 229, 242, 259 252, 262, 266, 270 Palestine, 184 Missile defence, 64, 103, 126, 135Ð137, 140, PAROS. See Preventing an arms race in outer 200, 248, 252, 258, 259 space (PAROS) Missiles, 18, 31, 45, 70, 81, 125, 143, 182, Payload, 21, 45, 61, 62, 76, 77, 85, 86, 88, 99, 244, 256 100, 114, 119, 120, 125, 129, 132, 133, Missile technology control regime (MTCR), 135, 148, 153, 165, 172, 196, 198, 206, 46, 127, 129, 133, 134, 139, 140 208, 213, 214, 244, 264 Moon, 12, 33, 46, 63, 72, 80, 96, 114, 127, Philippines, 9, 13, 21, 109Ð111, 120, 185, 187, 159, 205, 227, 240, 256 242 MTCR. See Missile technology control regime Physical sciences, 18, 171 (MTCR) Physics, 15, 18, 30, 47 Multiple independently targetable re-entry Piracy, 10 vehicle (MIRV), 64, 137Ð139 Platform, 39, 46, 47, 53, 54, 66, 86, 99, 112, Myanmar, 9, 126, 184 117, 129, 143, 154, 164, 170, 176, 177, 209, 214, 223, 244, 256 Polar orbiting satellite launch vehicle (PSLV), N 36, 61, 64, 65, 139, 213, 214, 264 Nanotechnology, 222 PPWT. See Prevention of the placement of National Aeronautics and Space weapons in outer space and the threat or Administration (NASA), 12, 37, use of force against outer space objects 38, 60, 77, 105, 159, 168, 171, 177, (PPWT) 179, 209, 210, 223, 242, 243 Precision-guided munitions (PGM), 51, 249 Index 277

Preventing an arms race in outer space S (PAROS), 127 SAFE. See Space applications for environment Prevention of the placement of weapons in (SAFE) outer space and the threat or use of force SAR. See Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) against outer space objects (PPWT), 91, Satellite, 4, 12, 18, 20, 21, 24, 30Ð41, 44Ð50, 201 52, 54Ð65, 71, 72, 74Ð76, 81Ð88, 90, PSLV. See Polar orbiting satellite launch 92, 96Ð105, 109, 111Ð120, 125, 127, vehicle (PSLV) 130Ð134, 138Ð140, 143Ð156, 159Ð168, 170, 171, 181Ð183, 186Ð202, 205, 210, 212, 214, 224, 229Ð232, 240Ð245, 248, R 249, 251, 252, 256, 261, 263Ð265, 267, Race, 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, 20, 23, 50, 57, 127, 269 174, 175, 177, 186, 193, 201, 249, Satellite launch vehicle (SLV), 49, 50, 59, 61, 255Ð272 76, 87, 114, 128Ð131, 133, 138, 139 Radar, 36, 40, 53, 88, 135, 136, 148, 165, 176, Saudi Arabia, 9, 21, 39, 40, 48, 206, 252, 267 189, 192, 195, 196 Science, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12Ð19, 22, 29, 30, 32Ð35, Range, 24, 31, 32, 37, 39, 45, 52, 54, 57, 70, 38, 39, 44Ð46, 66, 69, 75, 79, 80, 84, 71, 84, 85, 128Ð134, 136, 144, 148, 97, 98, 109Ð111, 115Ð119, 125, 137, 170, 189, 200, 238, 244Ð246, 264 143, 161Ð163, 170, 171, 178, 187, 199, Reality, 11, 15, 19, 47, 55, 79, 84, 169, 174, 221, 222, 225, 227, 228, 231, 232, 238, 179, 210, 220, 225, 238, 256, 257, 261, 240Ð243, 250, 255, 260, 266Ð268 266 Scramjet, 214 Reconnaissance, 22, 33Ð36, 51, 55, 56, 81, 85, SDI. See Strategic defence initiative (SDI) 86, 88, 90, 92, 133, 143, 181, 186, 187, Sensors, 35, 41, 48, 53, 61, 86, 90, 92, 189, 191, 192, 196, 198, 199, 267 164Ð167, 172, 175, 177, 187, 189, 190, Regional navigation satellite system (RNSS), 198, 199, 228, 243, 251, 262 143, 147, 148, 151, 153 Shenzhou, 83, 87, 88, 206, 209Ð212 Remote sensing, 18, 31, 32, 38, 44, 47, 48, 56, Signals intelligence (SIGNT), 86, 152, 191 60Ð63, 76, 77, 80Ð83, 85Ð87, 92, 99, Singapore, 9, 13, 15, 21, 109, 113, 115, 119, 100, 111, 115, 116, 120, 165, 171, 181, 120, 187, 222, 250, 251, 260 182, 186, 189, 191, 205, 210, 240, 243, SLV. See Satellite launch vehicle (SLV) 251, 260 Small, 30Ð32, 35, 37, 40, 41, 45Ð47, 52, 53, Research, 4, 7, 11Ð19, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 56, 59, 63, 71, 83, 87, 92, 96, 105, 106, 40, 44Ð47, 60, 63, 66, 71, 76, 80Ð83, 118, 119, 130, 133, 137, 160, 162, 166, 87, 90, 92, 97, 98, 102, 106, 110, 111, 172, 185, 187, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198, 115, 116, 118Ð120, 135Ð137, 161, 162, 199, 202, 211Ð213, 231, 232, 248, 252, 164, 170, 171, 174, 175, 208, 212, 215, 260, 264, 265, 268 221, 228, 229, 238, 242, 246, 247, 251 Smart power, 272 Revolution in military affairs (RMA), 43, 51, Socioeconomic, 3, 7, 11, 13, 24, 31, 42, 60, 57, 73, 179, 187, 200 63, 73, 81, 91, 115, 140, 221, 222, 224, Rhetoric, 3, 238 227, 231, 233, 239, 240, 243Ð245, 247, RNSS. See Regional navigation satellite 258, 271 system (RNSS) Soft Power, 67, 219Ð233, 251Ð252, 265, 266, Robotics, 64, 88, 89, 105, 161, 169, 176, 179, 272 201, 207, 216, 246, 250, 252, 261, 262, South Asia, 9, 15, 23, 43, 50, 57, 73, 178, 185, 271 266 Rocket, 7, 30, 48, 59, 71, 80, 96, 111, 125, 161, South East Asia, 8, 9, 109Ð120, 185, 229 187, 206, 227, 244, 264 Soviet, 12, 20, 89, 96, 118, 145, 160, 162, 183, Russia, 8, 9, 20, 30, 33, 55, 64, 65, 70Ð72, 80, 198, 206, 258 84, 89, 91, 109, 117, 118, 127, 132, 146, Space 154, 160, 164, 173, 175, 177, 190, 201, mines, 87, 182 205, 206, 211, 216, 223, 227, 240Ð246, power, 4, 8, 22Ð24, 31, 33, 55, 80, 84, 135, 248Ð250, 252, 259, 261, 262, 264, 156, 171, 183, 208, 219Ð233, 237Ð253, 267, 268 257, 258, 270, 271 278 Index

Space (cont.) 112, 113, 117, 125, 128, 130, 135, 138, race, 3, 5, 7, 12, 20, 23, 90, 256Ð260, 262, 140, 143Ð145, 147, 152, 154, 155, 160, 263, 266Ð272, 293 161, 163, 168, 169, 175Ð177, 182, 183, station, 22, 34, 36, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 91, 186, 189, 191, 196Ð199, 201, 202, 205, 96, 99, 116, 117, 178, 205Ð216, 227, 207Ð213, 219, 220, 223, 225, 226, 228, 240, 247, 252, 261, 262, 266 237, 238, 240, 244, 256, 257, 259, tourism, 11, 249Ð251 261Ð265, 267, 268, 270, 271 weapons, 182, 197, 202, 263 Topography, 56, 112, 147, 163, 166Ð169 Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Tracking and Command (TT & C), 167 Commission (SUPARCO), 44Ð50, 55 Transponders, 49, 63, 65, 85, 111, 148, 151, Space applications for environment (SAFE), 251 120 Turkey, 9, 21, 30, 40, 41, 49, 52, 109, 132, 155, Space-faring nations, 4, 8, 19, 20, 30, 33, 34, 242 43, 59, 66, 74, 75, 82, 92, 97, 104, 109, 20th century, 11, 29, 43, 95, 210, 255 114, 116, 120, 127, 128, 155, 171, 181, 21st century, 8Ð10, 13, 15, 24, 29, 30, 43, 53, 182, 187, 191, 201, 207, 253, 257, 263, 63, 66, 80, 91, 95, 110, 115, 117, 131, 267 146, 155, 156, 161, 162, 169, 174, 176, Sputnik, 4, 12, 114, 125, 160, 205, 258 181, 183Ð186, 191, 192, 200, 220, 221, Sri Lanka, 9, 24, 109, 132, 230, 242 223, 226, 231, 241, 243, 256, 258, 259, Star Wars, 135, 252 262, 263, 268, 271 Strategic, 3Ð5, 8Ð10, 12, 13, 16, 20, 22Ð24, 29, 34, 40, 43, 55, 57, 69, 70, 73, 75, U 76, 79Ð81, 84, 85, 87, 92, 102, 103, UAV. See Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 111, 115, 117, 126, 132, 135, 143, 155, Ultraviolet (UV), 35, 65 156, 160, 161, 170, 174Ð178, 181, 183, United Arab Emirates (UAE), 21, 38, 197 185, 187Ð189, 193, 195, 199, 216, 221, United Kingdom (UK), 33, 34, 86, 104, 192, 223Ð225, 227, 228, 230Ð232, 238Ð240, 242, 265, 269 246Ð249, 251, 255Ð263, 266Ð272 United States (US), 9, 12, 14, 17, 24, 36Ð38, Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), 135, 137 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 55, 57, 61, Surveillance, 38, 51, 52, 73, 88, 101, 102, 186, 62, 65, 66, 71Ð73, 75, 76, 87, 89, 90, 95, 188, 189, 192, 195, 197 96, 99, 101Ð104, 110, 112, 113, 118, Synthetic aperture radar (SAR), 36, 86, 165, 119, 127, 128, 130, 132Ð138, 144, 145, 190, 192 147Ð149, 151, 155, 156, 164, 166, 177, Syria, 9, 39, 46, 130, 155 179, 183Ð185, 189, 191Ð194, 198, 199, 206, 208Ð211, 214, 216, 222Ð224, 226, 228Ð230, 232, 238, 240Ð244, 246Ð249, T 258, 262, 264, 265, 268, 269 Taikonauts, 211, 212 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 34, 52, 53, Taiwan, 9, 13, 21, 23, 46, 69, 76Ð77, 136, 150, 129 151, 156, 185, 228, 260, 262, 268 USSR, 12, 20, 59, 87, 96, 104, 125, 136, 138, Technology, 4, 7, 29, 43, 60, 69, 79, 96, 109, 144, 145, 171, 206, 209, 227, 241, 255, 125, 143, 163, 182, 205, 221, 237, 255 256, 258, 259 Techno-nationalism, 224 Telemetry, 46, 60, 80, 167, 212 V Terrain, 29, 56, 61, 62, 69, 147, 165, 166, 251 Venus climate orbiter, 99, 105 Terrorism, 10, 43, 44, 57, 73, 184, 185, 224, Very small aperture terminal (VSAT), 193 259 Vietnam, 9, 21, 109, 117Ð120, 132, 185, 187, Thailand, 9, 21, 31, 32, 109, 111, 113, 222, 242, 262, 266, 268 118Ð120, 187, 229, 242, 268 Tiangong, 83, 211, 212, 261 Time, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11Ð13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 30, W 33, 35, 42, 43, 45Ð47, 51, 53, 55Ð57, Water, 64, 101, 117, 145, 160, 164, 166, 168, 59, 60, 63Ð66, 69, 72, 73, 76, 80, 85, 169, 172, 177, 185, 188, 200, 219, 242 88, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 110, Water resources, 61, 113 Index 279

Weaponisation, 22, 80, 90, 92, 135, 151, West Asia, 9, 15, 29Ð42, 184 181Ð202, 224, 248, 260, 263, 270, 271 World War II, 12, 18, 95, 98, 126, 137 Weapons, 33, 43, 54, 126, 127, 139, 143, 151, 155, 197Ð199, 244, 248, 256, 258, 270 Weather, 32, 37, 40, 62, 63, 74, 90, 105, 113, 115, 119, 148, 150, 156, 181, 195, 196, X 198, 240, 244, 249, 251, 253 X-ray, 64, 65, 165