BROMLEY AND DERMODY / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE EXPORT OR RE TRANSFER OF ARMS / June 2014 AMMUNITION OF ARMS AND RE-TRANSFER RE-EXPORT OR UNAUTHORIZED ADDRESSING R-E R-T E R mp esilient nations o
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INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / 3 The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) has a mandate from the United Nations Development Programme and the Regional Cooperation Council to support all international and national stakeholders by strengthening national and regional capacity to control and reduce the proliferation and mis- use of small arms and light weapons, and thus contribute to enhanced stability, security and development in South Eastern and Eastern Europe.
For further information contact: SEESAC Coordinator Hadži Melentijeva 30 11000 Belgrade Serbia Tel: (+381) (11) 344 6353; 383 6972; 383 6974 Fax: (+381) (11) 344 6356 www.seesac.org
ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was researched and written by Mark Bromley and Lawrence Dermody. They would like to thank SIPRI interns Lukas Hafner and Nishel Specht for their background research for sections II and III, respectively. They would also like to thank Dr Paul Holtom for his expert review, SIPRI colleagues Ivana Micic and Peter Wezeman for their comments, and Dr David Cruickshank of the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department for his sharp editorial assis- tance.
The report was edited by members of SEESAC team: Dr. Ivan Zveržhanovski, Slobodan Bošković and Iva Savić.
The publication of this report was generously supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway through the Phase II of SEESAC’s Support for an Arms Control Programme in the Western Balkans project.
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© SEESAC 2014 – All rights reserved
ISBN: 978-86-7728-213-4
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Regional Cooper- ation Council or the United Nations Development Programme. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of the Regional Cooperation Council or the United Nations Development Pro- gramme concerning 1) the legal status of any country, territory or area, or of its authorities or armed groups; or 2) the delineation of its frontiers or boundaries. R-E R-T ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION 6
INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / UN UAE SEESAC SECO SALW RIEP OSCE PoA MANPADS ISP IIC GOSS FARC EUC EU DVC COARM CASA ATT ABBREVIATIONS
United Nations United ArabEmirates for theControlofSmallArmsandLightWeapons South EasternandEuropeClearinghouse State SecretariatforEconomicAffairs Small armsandlightweapons Regional InformationExchange Process Organization forSecurityandCo-operationinEurope Programme ofActiononSmallArmsandLightWeapons Man-portable airdefencesystems (Swedish AgencyforNon-proliferationand ExportControls) Inspektionen förstrategiskaprodukter International importcertificate Government ofSouthernSudan (Revolutionary ArmedForcesofColombia) Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias deColombia End-user certificate European Union Delivery verificationcertificate Conventional ArmsExportsWorking Group Coordinating ActiononSmallArms Arms Trade Treaty INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / V. CONCLUSIONS Case 10. UkrainiantanksexportedtoKenya andontoSouthernSudan Case 9. Belarusiancombataircraftandrockets exportedtoSudan Case 8.Belgianriflestransferredto Lebanon in2012 Case 7. Britisharmsidentifiedinthe2003Acehconflict Case 6.Britisharmsidentifiedinthe2008–2009conflictGaza Strip Case 5.Swiss ammunitionidentifiedinLibya Case 4.Swiss handgrenadesidentifiedin Syria Case 3.Swedish recoillessriflesidentifiedin Myanmar Case 2.Swedish recoillessriflesidentifiedin Colombia in the2006conflict Lebanon Case 1.Russiananti-tankguidedmissilesidentified CASE STUDIES OFUNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER IV. Responding toviolationsofre-exportorre-transferrestrictions Enforcing andmonitoringre-exportre-transfercontrols Imposing re-exportandre-transfercontrols NATIONAL POLICIESONRE-EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER CONTROLS III. Responding toviolationsofre-exportorre-transfer restrictions Enforcing andmonitoringre-exportre-transfercontrols Imposing re-exportandre-transfercontrols BEST PRACTICES ONRE-EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONALGUIDELINES II. INTRODUCTION I. Abbreviations 6 CONTENTS National policiesandpractices onre-exportandre-transfercontrols Table 2. on re-exportandre-transfercontrols International andregionalguidelinesbestpractices Table 1. TABLES 40
43-44 41-42 37 20 27 29 22 28 30 32 24 19 13 33 33 34 27 18 31 31 13 17 9 7 8
INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / INTRODUCTION try). or re-transfer(i.e. onwardtransfertoanotherend-userorend-useinthesamecoun- tions ontheirsubsequentre-export (i.e. onwardexporttoanotherdestinationcountry) When arms or ammunition are-exported, the exporting country often imposes restric- be animportanttoolforpreventingillegalorirresponsible armstransfers. Nonetheless, theuseandeffectiveapplicationofre-export andre-transfercontrolscan will incorporate them into a weapon system that will be re-exported to another state. son orcompany or wherecomponents are being supplied toaprivate company who prove particularlychallenging,suchaswhenarmsare being suppliedtoaprivateper- unwilling toapplythemorwouldagreedosoonly partially. Certain casescanalso may regardtheimpositionofsuchcontrolsasaviolation ofitssovereigntyandmaybe porting statecandowiththearmsithasacquired.Incertain cases,theimportingstate they representanattemptbytheexportingstatetoplacerestrictionsonwhatim- The imposition of re-export and re-transfer controls is not without controversy. In effect, Conventional ArmsandDual-useGoodsTechnologies. United Nationsand,inparticular, theWassenaar ArrangementonExportControlsfor an Union(EU),theOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE), of suchcontrolsisrecommendedinthebestpracticesandguidelinesEurope- be deployed to a certain territory or location or used in a certain way. The imposition the armed forces or security services or a commitment that the imported arms will not of acommitmentthattheimportedarmswillremainwithparticularbranchorunit under certainconditions.Inthecaseofre-transfercontrols,restrictionscanconsist country oracommitmenttoonlyexportthearmscertaindestinationcountries restrictions canconsistofasimplebanonsubsequentexportstoanotherdestination arms ortoonlydosoundercertaincircumstances.Inthecaseofre-exportcontrols, ated with an export—that bind the end-user either to not re-export or re-transfer the end-user certificate(EUC),thestatementorcommercialcontractassoci- 1
These re-exportorre-transfercontrolsarecommitments—usually inserted intothe I 2013, notyetinforce,
INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / in relation to re-export and re-transfer controls. Information is presented on the current mendations. SectionIIIpresents informationonstates’ existingpoliciesandpractices highlights the main commonalities and differences in their prescriptions and recom - es onrelevantEU, OSCE,UNandWassenaar Arrangementdocuments(seeBox 1) and tional arms transfers that refer to re-export and re-transfer controls. The section focus- Section IIofthisreportsummarizescurrentguidelines andbestpracticesonconven- manner toreportsandallegationsofunauthorizedre-exports andre-transfers. and re-transfercontrols—particularly how torespond in aneffective andtransparent states in South Eastern Europe with the development and implementation of re-export spond toreportedviolations.Thereportalsoprovides asetofguidelinestoassist - and monitor those controls, and ( c) re re-export and re-transfer controls, (b) enforce comprehensive overviewofthedifferentwaysinwhichstatescananddo(a) impose practices onre-exportandre-transfercontrols.Basedthisanalysis,itpresentsa This reportanalysesregionalandinternationalstandardsnationalpolicies ing andimportingstates. cases ofviolationsre-exportorre-transfercontrolstobejointlydiscussedbyexport- future meetingsoftheATT ConferenceofStates Parties willprovideanewvenuefor that theissuewillbepartoffuturediscussionsonATT implementation.Inparticular, that exportingstatesfrequentlyimposere-exportandre-transfercontrolsmeans the reference to ‘unauthorized end use and end users’ is an implicit acknowledgement a documentthatwasjointlynegotiatedbyexporterandimporterstates.Nonetheless, port orre-transfercontrols—suchanissuewouldprobablyhavebeentoosensitivefor states. East andthenre-exportedwithouttheknowledgeorapprovaloforiginalsupplier Syria that had been originally exported by states in Europe to recipients in the Middle ed inrecentyearswiththediscovery of armsbeing used intheconflictsLibyaand en toensurethatsuchcasesdonothappenagain.Thishasbeenclearlydemonstrat- measures weretaken topreventthere-exportorre-transfer, andwhatstepswillbetak In particular, questionscanbeasked aboutwhytheoriginalexportwasapproved,what be asourceofpoliticalembarrassmentforthestatethatoriginallyexportedarms. armed conflicts,ofteninviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw. Suchtransferscan which nonethelessresultedinarmsbeingexportedtodestinationsconflictorused of unauthorizedre-exportsorre-transfersthatdidnotviolateUNarmsembargoesbut trols imposedbytheoriginalexportingstate. Therehavealsobeennumerouscases to thetargetsofUNarmsembargoesincontraventionre-exportorre-transfercon- embargoes havedescribedwell-documented cases ofimportedarmsbeingsupplied trols areignoredbytheimportingstate. UNpanelsofexpertsonSecurityCouncilarms fers ofarmsandammunition—thatis,situationsinwhichre-exportorre-transfercon- In recentyearsalotofattentionhasbeenpaidtounauthorizedre-exportsorre-trans- The 2013ArmsTrade Treaty (ATT) payscloseattentiontotheissueof‘diversion’. recipient hastaken deliveryofthearmsormanyyearslater. export controlsystemsinplace. Moreover, theycantake placesoonaftertheoriginal trols canaffectsmallandlargesuppliersaswellstatesthathavewell-developed or forunauthorizedenduseandusers’. range ofmeasurestoensure that transferredarmsarenotdivertedto‘theillicit market, particular, Article11obligesexport,import,transitandtrans-shipmentstatestotake a 2
As theseparticularcasesunderline, violationsofre-exportandre-transfercon- 4 3 2 ArmsTrade Treaty (note1),preamble. ArmsTrade Treaty (note1). Ontheseexamplesseecases4and5 insectionIVbelow. 4
The ATT doesnotexplicitlymentionre-ex- 3
In - INTRODUCTION
/ ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / › some conclusions. by theoriginalexportingstatetoinvestigateandrespond.SectionVpresents how thesewereviolated,thecasecametolight,andwhatstepstaken that were-exported,whatre-exportorre-transferrestrictionswereinplace, ifand unauthorized re-exportsorre-transfers.Eachcasestudylooksatthetypesofarms and re-transfer. studiesexamining actual or alleged Section IV presents10 case how theyrespondtoreportsandallegationsofcasesunauthorizedre-export ticipating statesforimposingandenforcingre-exportre-transfercontrols Arrangementpar- inSouthEasternEuropeand11 Wassenaar policies of6 states 11 12
INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ard, ISACS/03.21, Version 1.0, June2014,
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / cluded inthemajorityofdocuments,asfollowingtwoexamplesillustrate: The optionofgivingtheimportingstateresponsibilityforre-exportorre-transferisin- ban onre-exporttoanyexportofconventionalarms. The guidelinescallonstatesto 2011 Best Practice Guidelines on Re-export, which require-exporting states to attach a be giventothe importing state. The key exception is the Wassenaar Arrangement’s However, noneofthedocumentsprovide guidance onwhensuch responsibility should imposition ispresentedasanoptionorobligation(seeTable 1): of therestrictionsthattheyadviseexportingstatestoimposeandwhetherornottheir However, asthefollowingexamplesshow, thedocumentsvarysignificantlyinterms ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ porting country’. decides to transferthatauthority to theexportlicensing authorities of theim- permission beforeanyre-exportcantake place‘unlesstheexportingcountry recommends thattheexportingstaterequireimportertorequestwritten The OSCE’s 2004Standard ElementsofEnd-userCertificates,forexample, fied intheEUC. try, andacommitmentthatre-exportscanbemadetocertaincountriesidenti- that any re-export will be subject to the approval of the original exporting coun- authority oftheimportingcountry. vided isplacingcontrolsonre-exportundertheresponsibilityoflicensing and givesdifferentoptionsforitscontent. recommends thattheexportingstateimposessomeformofre-exportrestriction The Wassenaar Arrangement’s 2005End-userAssurancesCommonlyUsedlist re-export orre-transfercontrols. and end-useofinternationallytransferredSALW bothrequiretheimpositionof Action onSmallArms(CASA) Guidelinesonnationalcontrolsovertheend-user The OSCE’s 2011Template forEUCsSALW andthe2014UNCoordinating consider. restrictions ‘at theirdiscretion’ andalsogives a rangeofoptionsforstatesto The EU’s 2009User’s Guidenotesthatstates‘might’wanttoimposere-export location intheimportingstate. control oftheimportingstate, andacommitmenttonotmovetheitemsnew the originalexportingcountry, acommitmentthatanyre-exportwillbeunderthe on re-export, a commitment that any re-export will be subject to the approval of that importingstates‘advise’ itbeforeanyre-exportofSALW takes place. The 2000 OSCE SALW Document encourages the exporting state to require 7 Theseoptionsconsistofaprohibitiononre-export,commitment ard, ISACS/03.21, Version 1.0, June2014,
9 However, inbothcasesoneoftheoptionspro- 6 Theseoptionsconsistofaprohibition - - 5
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / other thanthestatedend-user’. sation to thirdcountries or another legal entity or person in [name of end-user state] ported, sold,leasedortransferredtemporarilypermanentlywithwithoutcompen- Each ofthesespecifiesthattheassurancecoverscaseswhere SALW mightbe‘ex- EUC Template, whichincludeslanguageforfourdifferenttypesofend-useassurance. ate languagethatcouldbeusedinanend-useassurance. Anexception istheOSCE’s or export’. on re-exportshouldbeincludedinboththe‘end-usercertificate’ and‘contractsforsale 2003 BestPracticeGuideonExportControlofSALW, whichrecommends thatclauses cate orend-userstatementthataccompaniesanexport. should beimposedthroughtheinsertionofend-useassurancesinend-usercertifi- The majorityofthedocumentsrecommendthatre-exportandre-transfercontrols ments relatingtore-exportcontrolsforimportingstates. The Wassenaar ArrangementandUNbestpracticedocumentsalsoincludecommit- ‘other thandeclared’. and banning re-transfer to ‘an unauthorized internal end-user’ or for use in purposes ning re-export‘withoutthepriorauthorizationoforiginalexportinggovernment’ include clauses ‘on a case by case basis’ in any end-use or end-user assurance ban- ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ of smallarmsorlightweapons’. porting states‘shall honourallcontractually agreed restrictions on there-export In addition,theUN’s 2014CASA GuidelinesonSALW Transfers notesthatim- of thoseweapons’. cordance with bilateral agreements, will be notified before re-export /re-transfer have previouslyimported,thattheoriginalexportingParticipating State, inac- possible, without prejudicetotherightsofStates tore-exportsALW thatthey SALW includessimilarlanguageunderwhichstates‘agreetoensure, asfar The Wassenaar Arrangement’s 2007BestPracticeGuidelinesforExportsof ons’. accordance withtheirbilateralagreementsbeforethere-transferofthoseweap- to notifytheoriginalexporting State in porting statesto‘make everyeffort. . . The UN’s 2001ProgrammeofActiononSALW (PoA), forexample, requiresim- 12 14 Themajorityofbestpracticedocumentsdonotprovidepreciseappropri-
Standard, ISACS/03.20, Version 1.0, June2014,
15
Best PracticeGuideonExportControlofSmallArmsandLightWeapons , Handbook 13 16 Italsonotesthat,wherenocontractualobli- 11 Oneexception istheOSCE’s 15 16
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / man-portable airdefencesystems(MANPADS). oblige states toplace more restrictive re-export and re-transfer controls on exports of The Wassenaar ArrangementandtheOSCEhavealsoadoptedguidelinesthat company forincorporationandre-export. to aprivatepersonorcompanywherecomponentsarebeingsupplied ment end-users.Theydonotmake reference tocaseswherearmsarebeingsupplied The majorityofthedocumentsfocusonsalescompleteweaponsystemstogovern- ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ situations thatcarrya‘potentialriskofillegaldiversion’. writing beforere-exportingsmallarmsorlightweapons’. gations exist,theimportingstateshould‘notifyoriginalexportingState in portance of their defence and security relationship with thatcountry’, and ‘the effectiveness oftheexportcontrolsystemincorporating country’, ‘theim- account anumberofotherfactors,including‘theexport controlpolicesand document also notes that in assessing such licences, states will also take into the goodsaretobeincorporatedintoproductsfor re-export.’ However, the Common Position to licence applications for goods where it is understood that corporation andre-export.Thedocumentnotesthatstatesshall‘fullyapplythe The 2009EU’s User’s Guideistheonlydocumenttoaddressissueofin- end-user statement. ities oftheimportingState, includinganimportlicenceandcertificationofthe recipient hasreceivedthenecessaryauthorizationsfromcompetentauthor- export of SALW to private persons or companies should only be granted if the The 2014UNCASASALW Guidelineson Transfers notethatlicencesforthe er certificate (EUC). ized toactonbehalfofagovernment’, andonlyuponreceiptofavalidend-us- PADS areonlymadeto‘foreigngovernmentsoragentsspecificallyauthor- of Man-Portable AirDefenceSystems (MANPADS) requirethatexportsofMAN- fence Systems (MANPADS) andthe2004OSCEPrinciplesforExportControls The 2003Wassenaar ArrangementforExportControlsofMan-Portable AirDe- EUC. ment issuedbyaprivatecompanycantake theplaceofagovernmentissued The OSCESALW Documentnotesthatin‘exceptional cases’ anend-userstate- of MANPADS material,anddisposalordestructionofexcess stocks’. implement effectivemeasures‘forsecurestorage, handling,transportation,use export, the exportingstate is obligedto ensure that the importing state is able to unauthorized use, loss,ortheftofanyMANPADS material’. Finally, priortoany and thattheimporterwillinformexporterofanyinstance‘compromise, that thegoodswillnotbere-exportedwithoutpriorconsentofexporter 19 Italsonotesthatdeliveriestoprivateindividualsareoneofanumber 21 20 19 systems (MANPADS)’, Agreedatthe2003Plenary,
into force3July2005,
24
26 The 28 17 18
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE EXPORT OR RE TRANSFER OF ARMS / should respondifandwhenre-exportorre-transfercontrolsareignoredviolated. conventional armscontainanyrecommendationorprescriptionconcerninghowstates None oftheguidelinesandbestpracticedocumentsontransfercontrolsSALW and RESPONDING TO VIOLATIONS OFRE-EXPORT ORRE-TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ shipment atthepointofdelivery’. thorities oftheexportingState therightto[conduct]aphysicalinspectionof The OSCEBestPracticeGuidestatesthatimporting‘maygranttheau- shipment ofsmallarmsatthepointdelivery’. dures that would allow the exporting state to carry out ‘a physical check of the The OSCESALW Documentencouragesstatestoestablishappropriateproce- desirable conditions’. tools tohelppreventdiversionwithinthebuyercountryorre-exportunderun- areparticularlyuseful The EU’s User’s Guidenotesthat‘onsiteinspections. . . 31 30 29 OSCE(note12),p. 11. CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(note7), p. 21. OSCE(note5),p. 7. 30 31 29
NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / CONTROLS EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER NATIONAL POLICIESONRE- erlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,Switzerland, Sweden andtheUnitedKingdom). the Wassenaar Arrangement (Austria, Belgium,theCzechRepublic, France, theNeth- Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia,Montenegro, andSerbia)11 states participatingin EastEuropeanstates(Albania,BosniaandHerzegovina,Croatia, theformer 6 South For thepurposesofthisstudy, asurveywasconductedtocollectinformationfrom Goods andTechnology. Exchange ofNationalLegislation onTransfer ofArms,MilitaryEquipmentandDual-use arms exports,(b) states’ submissionstothePoA, and( c) states’ submissions totheUN icies ineachoftheseareascollectedfrom(a)states’ nationallawsandregulations on in thefollowingsubsections.Inaddition,informationis presented belowonstates’ pol- re-transfers. Theresultsofthissurveyarepresentedin aggregated forminTable 2 and toreportsofunauthorizedre-exportsand and re-transfercontrol,(c) responding andenforcingre-export re-exportandre-transfercontrols, (b) monitoring (a) imposing ited relevanceforSouthEastEuropeanstates.Thesurveycoveredstates’ policieson policies on re-export and re-transfer controls meant that their inclusion would be of lim- cluded fromthesurveybecausesizeoftheirexportsandparticularities include amixofsmallandlargearmsexporters.RussiatheUnitedStates wereex- states to include in the survey, the intention was to cover a wide geographic scope and naar Arrangementparticipatingstates.WhenselectingwhichWassenaar Arrangement by thesurvey, theremainingtextoftenrefersto12surveyrespondentsfromWasse- the FlemishandWalloon Regions. Forthisreason,eventhough11 stateswerecovered Belgium provided 2 separate entries forthecompetent export licensing authorities in III tionalReport/NationalReports.aspx> and 32 19 20 NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / and certainend-users. pose restrictionsonre-exportorre-transfer, manydidsoonlyforcertaindestinations Of the10surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangement participatingstatesthatim- by theexportingstateasanattempttoimpose‘re-exportcontrols’. ever, thesedeclarationsareneitherlegallybindingnorenforceableandnotseen In one state surveyed, end-users are required to provide statements of end-use. How- 5 typesofre-exportandre-transfercontrol: states re-transfer respondents inSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatimposerestrictionsonre-exportor naar Arrangementparticipatingstates,theremainingtextoftenrefersto5survey respondents amongSouthEastEuropeanstatesand12surveyinWasse- Arrangement participatingstates.Forthisreason,eventhoughtherewere6survey tions onre-exportsorre-transfers, as do10ofthe12surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Of the6surveyrespondentsamongSouthEastEuropeanstates,5imposerestric- IMPOSING RE-EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER CONTROLS ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ that imposerestrictionsonre-exportorre-transfer.Thesurveyrespondentsuse of thegoodsand theend-useorend-user. Inonestatesurveyed,theimporting fer except iftheexportisdeemed particularlysensitivebecauseofthenature another state, theimportingstateisgiven responsibility for re-exportorre-trans - re-export orre-transferwhen theimportingstateisanEUmemberstate. Inyet USA or Australia. In another state, the importing state is given responsibility for or re-transferwhentheimportingstateisanEUmember state, Switzerland, the In onestatesurveyed,theimportingisgivenresponsibility forre-export except tocertaindestinations. considered tobeallies.Incertaincases,aprohibition on re-exportisimposed, exports ‘to non-government entities such as companies’ in countries that are not side theEU. Inathirdsurveyedstate, aprohibitiononre-exportisimposedfor on re-exportisimposeda‘case-by-casebasis’ andonlyforend-usersout- export tocertain‘sensitive’ destinations.Inanother statesurveyed,aprohibition In onestate surveyed, for example, a prohibitionon re-export is imposedfor the importingstateisgivenresponsibilityforre-exportorre-transfer. re-transfer and6dosoincertaincases.Incaseswhererestrictionsnotapply, re-export incertaincases,4requirepriorauthorizationbeforeanyor that imposerestrictionsonre-exportorre-transfer, 3imposeprohibitionon Of the10surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementparticipatingstates re-export orre-transfer. where restrictionsdonotapply, theimportingstateisgivenresponsibilityfor prior authorizationbeforeanyre-export,and1doessoincertaincases.Incases tions onre-exportorre-transfer, 1requiresnotificationofanyre-export,3require Of the5surveyrespondentsinSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatimposerestric- importing stategivenresponsibilityforre-exportorre-transfer. notification ofanyre-exportorre-transfer;and prior authorizationbeforeanyre-exportorre-transfer; prohibition onre-export,except tocertaindestinations; prohibition onre-exporttoanotherdestination; and the10surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementparticipating NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / ment guidelinesandthe2004OSCE(seeabove). controls forexportsofSALW andMANPADS inlinewiththe 2003Wassenaar Arrange- A numberofstatesemphasizedthattheyimposestrongerre-exportandre-transfer accompanies atransfer. insertion ofend-useassurancesintheend-usercertificateorstatementthat The majorityofstatessurveyedimposere-export and re-transfercontrolsthroughthe ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ tion. Austria imposes restrictions on all exports of SALW, regardless of the destina- as allies’. components tosystemintegratorsincountries[theexportingstate]consider[s] state isgivenresponsibilityforre-exportorre-transferexportsof‘partsand contracts andinternationalimportcertificates(IICs). EUCs. Oneofthesestatesalsousestheinclusionlanguageincommercial restrictions on re-export or re-transfer do so via the inclusion of language in All ofthe5surveyrespondentsamongSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatimpose a directresponsetothe2003Wassenaar Arrangementguidelines. authorize there-exportwithoutconsultingoriginatinggovernment’. Thiswas of ‘anassurancefromthegovernmentrecipientstatethattheywillnot tions werenotapplied—exportsofMANPADS wereonlypermitteduponreceipt One statenotedthat—incontrasttoothermilitarygoods,whichsuchrestric- does notseethisasanattempttoimpose‘re-exportcontrols’ (seeabove). fer wouldbeinbreachofaUN,EUorOSCEarmsembargo’. However, thisstate struction ormissilesfordeliveringsuchweapons;and(ii) the re-export/re-trans- would beusedforthedevelopment,productionoruseofweaponsmassde- knowthattheitem that they‘willnotre-exportorre-transfertheitemif(i) they Another staterequirestheend-userstoprovideend-userstatements,indicating systems orcomponentsdirectlytoarmedforces[defenceministries]’). nies’) andtheinclusionoflanguageincommercialcontracts(‘For thesupplyof ments (‘Forthesupplyofsystemstonon-governmententitiessuchascompa- nents tosystemintegratorsincountriesweconsiderasallies’), end-user state- One state surveyed uses a mixture of IICs (‘For the supply of parts and compo- language inEUCs.Ofthese, 2alsoincludelanguage incommercialcontracts. that imposerestrictionsonre-exportsorre-transfers,9dosoviatheinclusionof Of the10surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementparticipatingstates 34 ing (GroupforResearch andInformation onPeace andSecurity:Brussels,2009). V., Post-Export ControlsonArmsTransfers:DeliveryVerification andEnd-UseMonitor - was dissolvedin1994,manystatescontinue toissueIICs.SeeBerkol, I.andMoreau, the CoordinatingCommitteeforMultilateral ExportControls(CoCom).AlthoughCoCom of importcertificatethatareusedbycertain states.IICswereestablishedinthe1950s by ported withoutthepermissionofauthorities oftheimportingcountry’. IICs are aform without ourpermission’ oranIICthatstates‘thegoodsarenot goingtobere-ex plicant mustsubmitanEUCthatstates that ‘thegoodsarenotgoingtobere-exported 35 the ProgrammeofAction,Austria, 2012, NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / their intendeddestination. ment participatingstatesuseDVCs tohelpensurethatexporteditemshavereached A numberofrespondentsamongSouthEastEuropeanstatesandWassenaar Arrange- re-transfer controls. are asimportantas—ormorethan—anyattempttoimposere-exportor ment participatingstatesemphasizedtheextenttowhichpre-exportriskassessments A numberofrespondentsamongSouthEastEuropeanstatesandWassenaar Arrange- ENFORCING ANDMONITORING RE-EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER CONTROLS supplied forincorporationandre-export. are beingexportedtoaprivatepersonorcompanyandwherecomponents One stateprovidedinformationontheirpoliciesfordealingwithcasesinwhicharms ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ import controlsystemofthe countryofdestinationtheend-user’. Yet another ered to legitimate end-user’ or if there are questions about ‘Thereliability of the DVCs wherethereisasuspicionthat‘theproducts maynotbeproperly deliv- requires DVCs forexportsto‘unstabledestinations’, whileanotheronlyrequires fined theirusetosensitiveend-usersandend-uses.For example, one stateonly Of the states that require DVCs in certain cases, many indicated that they con- list, 2donotand9soincertaincases. always requestsaDVC whenexportinggoodscoveredbytheirnationalcontrol Of the12surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementparticipatingstates, 1 2 dosoincertaincases. DVC whenexportinggoodscoveredbytheirnationalcontrollist,1doesnot and Of the6surveyrespondentsinSouthEastEuropeanstates, 3alwaysrequesta diverted toanunauthorizedend-useorend-user. of abroadrangemilitarygoods’ duetoconcernsthatthegoods mightbe concerns existitisverylikely thatit‘would denylicenceapplicationsforexport a chancethatre-exportorre-transferrestrictionsmightbeviolated,wheresuch Another stateemphasizedthat,whileitseekstomonitorcaseswherethereis re-transfer redtoanundesirableend-useorend-user’. volves a‘fullconsiderationthattheitemsmightsubsequentlybere-exportedor risk assessmentbeforethegoodsareauthorizedforexport’. Thisprocessin- One state noted that its approach to export licensing is based on ‘a thorough importing state. trolling futurere-exportswillbeinthehandsoflicensingauthority licensing authority shouldanyexports occur. Assuch,responsibility for con- importing company will commit to apply for an export licence from their own tional importcertificatesasadequateenduseassurances.’ Insuchcases,the integrators incountriesweconsiderasallieswillveryoftenacceptinterna- thesupplyofpartsandcomponentstosystem The samestatenotedthat‘(f)or lation.’ supervise the ownership, useandpossiblere-saleaccordingtonationallegis- goods in the importing state. If that is assured, ‘it is up to the local authorities to primary concern is determining whether the recipient is allowed to own the The state noted that for sales of arms and ammunition to a private person, the NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / A numberofstatestookstepstoensuretheauthenticityDVCs received. information fromtheexportingcompany. that re-exportorre-transferrestrictionsarebeingapplied. Theseincludedcollecting Questionnaire respondents highlighted a number of other mechanisms for confirming guidelines andbestpracticedocuments. re-transfer controlsareapplied,beyondthosethatrecommendedinthevarious A number of states take a variety of additional measures to ensure that re-export or ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ the apostilleseal’. Convention orhasexpressedreservationstoAlbaniathedocumentmusthave Convention). ‘WhenthecountrythathadissuedDVC isnotamemberofthis the Requirement forLegalisation forForeignPublicDocuments(theApostille the country issuing the DVC is part of the 1961 Hague Convention Abolishing via diplomaticchannels.InAlbania,theDVC mustbenotarizedincaseswhere Ministry ofForeignAffairs andtheintelligence agencies.Onestatechecks DVCs take stepstoverifytheirauthenticity. Inoneofthese, DVCs aresharedwiththe Of the5surveyrespondentsinSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatrequireDVCs, 3 destination’. state surveyed‘requestsDVCs onthebasisofariskanalysiscountries on toanundesirableendrecipient’. verifications (PSV)whenthereisanincreasedriskthat the export‘willbepassed search andothers.Switzerland requeststherighttocarryoutpost-shipment UN sanctions monitoring groups, the Small Arms Survey, Conflict Armament Re- re-exports’. Anotherstateconsultsavariety ofopen-sourcereports,including uation ‘andreporttocapitaliftheyhavedoubtsorknowledgeofunauthorized One stateinformsitsembassyintheimportingcounty, whichwillfollowthesit- certain cases. 9 monitorothersourcesofinformationand3carryoutonsiteinspectionsin are beingapplied.Ofthese, 8useinformationcollectedbynationalembassies, re-export orre-transfercontrols,alltake additionalmeasurestoconfirmthatthey Of the10surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementstatesthatimpose cases. other sources of information and none carry out on-site inspections in certain being applied.Alluseinformationcollectedbynationalembassies,1monitors port orre-transfercontrols,4take additional measurestoconfirmthattheyare Of the5surveyrespondentsinSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatimposere-ex- other, DVCs areverified‘withthesupportofitsforeignrepresentations’. takes stepstoverifytheauthenticityofactualsignatureonDVC. Inan- that requireDVCs, 8take stepstoverifytheirauthenticity. Oneofthesestates Of the10surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementparticipatingstates 37 the ProgrammeofAction,Albania,2012, 37 23 24 NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / that theyhaveestablishedpractices thatcovermostofthesesamesteps. A numberofstatesthatdo not haveactuallegislationorguidelinesinplaceindicated end-user inquestion,and(d) sharingrelevantinformationwithpartnerstates. question, (c) having astrongpresumptionofdenialforanyfuture-exportlicencestothe anyexistinglicencesfor exportstotheend-userin states’ jurisdiction,(b) suspending prosecutinganycompaniesorindividualsinvolvedthatfallundertheexporting (a) re-transfer controls.Wheresuchlegislationorguidelinesexist,themainfocusison 10 surveyrespondentsinWassenaar Arrangementstatesthatimposere-exportor sponse to any alleged violations of re-export and re-transfer controls, as do 7 of the re-transfer restrictions,2havelegislationorguidelinesinplacethatoutlinethere- Of the5surveyrespondentsinSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatimposere-exportor RESPONDING TO VIOLATIONS OFRE-EXPORT ORRE-TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS applied issharinginformationwithotherstates. Another mechanismforconfirmingthatre-exportorre-transferrestrictionsarebeing ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ deliveries’. fect futurelicenseapplicationsandmaybethebasis foradecisiontohaltall recipient hasre-transfered/re-exported without apermissionwillnegativelyaf- In yetanotherstate, theguidelinestolegislationstatethat‘the factthata at theveryleasttherewillbeconsequencesforpossible subsequentdeliveries.’ ‘If theviolatorisoutsideourlegaljurisdictionwewillconsider otheroptions,but In anotherstate, legislationwillapply‘iftheviolatoriswithinourlegal jurisdiction’. be sharedintherelevantEUworkinggroups(COARM)’. tions. If appropriate, informationaboutthe end-user/country of destination may to thereassessmentandsuspension/annulment of ongoingexportauthoriza- denial. Moreover, theviolationsofre-export/re-transferrestrictionsmightlead be thoroughlyassessedonacase-by-casebasiswithstrongpresumptionof In one state, subsequent exports to the country or end-user in question ‘will national intelligenceservices. es of information include national customs authorities, the recipient country and Exports Working Group (COARM) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Other sourc- government officialsinthecontextofmeetingsEU’s ConventionalArms One stateusesinformationgatheredduring exchanges between it isawarethattheyare‘destinedforre-export’toanunauthorizeddestination. exporting goodsunderglobalandgenerallicencesmustnotexporttheif information relatingtothere-exportofexportedgoods.Elsewhere, acompany In yetanotherstate, legislationrequirestheexportingcompanytoreportany compliance withre-exportrestrictions. military goods might be required to report any concerns about the importer’s In anotherstate, companiesthatareinvolvedinthemaintenanceofexported the exportlicensingauthority. port while the export licence is valid is legally obliged to provide information to In onestate, acompanythatobtainsinformationaboutanyunauthorizedre-ex- NATIONAL POLICIES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED-RE EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / shared withotherstates,viaCOARM ortheWassenaar Arrangement. was alsosoughtfromtheexportingcompany. In2states,informationonthecasewas ture-exports to the end-user or destination. In the case of another country, information er, theexportlicencewassuspendedorannulled,andrestrictionswereplacedonfu- controls haveidentifiedcases.Inallcases,informationwasrequestedfromtheend-us- vey respondentsinWassenaar Arrangement states thatimpose re-export or re-transfer re-export or re-transfer restrictions have identified cases of violations, 3 of the 10 sur- While noneofthe5surveyrespondentsinSouthEastEuropeanstatesthatimpose ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ ⊲ assessments’. has been ignored this will be factored in to subsequent export licensing risk In yetanotherstate, ‘iftherearecrediblereportsthatastatementofend-use port orre-transferrestrictionsbasedonthestepstaken inrecentcases. established practices in place concerning how to respond to violations of re-ex- In anotherstate, thereisno‘legislationorguidelines’ inplacebutthereare blacklisted andtheinformationsharedwithinCOARM’. under currentpractices,ifanyviolationtakes place, then‘thedestinationwillbe In oneexportingstate, nolegislationorguidelinesarecurrentlyinplace, but 25 26 CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / $138 million. ti-tank guidedmissilesystemstoSyria undera1997contract reportedtobevaluedat Between 1998and2006Russiaexportedanestimated2000AT14E and9K1152an- LEBANON RUSSIAN ANTI-TANK GUIDEDMISSILESIDENTIFIED INTHE2006CONFLICT CASE 1. to investigateandrespond. how the case came to light, and what steps were taken by the original exporting state what re-export or re-transfer restrictions were in place, if and how these were violated, the goodstransferred. Each casestudylooksatthe types ofarmsthatwere-exported, the typesofchallengethattheseresponses faced, ratherthantheamountorvalueof have been selected to illustrate the widest range of responses by exporting states and with theexception ofBelarus,participatesintheWassenaar Arrangement.Thecases es, the original exporting state was a European state outside South Eastern Europe and, re-transfers tohighlightchallengesandopportunitiesfacingexportingstates.Inallcas- The following10casestudiesexamineactual or alleged unauthorized re-exports or RE-TRANSFER UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND CASE STUDIES OF ported ortransferredtothirdcountrieswithouttheconsent oftheRussianFederation’. can onlytake place if assurancesare provided stating that the arms ‘will notbere-ex- ports toSyria areunknown.However, RussianregulationsstatethatexportsofSALW guided missilesystemsbeingusedextensivelybyHezbollah initsconflictwithIsrael In 2006thereweremediareportsofvariousRussian-made AT14E and9K1152anti-tank KBP InstrumentDesignBureauinTula, Russia,manufacturesbothweaponsystems. IV 38 There-exportorre-transferrestrictionsthatwereplaced ontheseex- tion, 2010, 27 28 CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / transfer. das Revolucionarias deColombia,FARC). bian armed forces from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Arma- In July2009mediareportsidentified AT4s inacacheofarmsseizedbytheColom- Colombia hadoriginallybeendeliveredtoVenezuela beforereachingFARC forces. exported toVenezuela. ThisassistedISPinconcludingthatthearmsdiscovered the investigation,SaabBoforswasrequestedtoprovideserialnumbersforAT4s trols (Inspektionen för strategiska produkter, ISP) launched an investigation. As part of In responsetothereport,Swedish AgencyforNon-proliferationandExportCon- Syrian MinistryofDefenceafterbeingimportedfromRussia. of the Syrian Ministry of Defence, suggesting that they had been re-transfered from the to eitherLebanon orHezbollah.ThecasingsoftheAT14E werestampedwiththename able recoillessriflesto Venezuela. In themid-1980sSweden exportedanundisclosednumberofSaabBoforsAT4 port- SWEDISH RECOILLESSRIFLESIDENTIFIEDINCOLOMBIA CASE 2. and thatitisunwillingtoadmittheymayhavetaken place. carry out an investigation into alleged violations of re-export and re-transfer controls indicates thatasignificantamountofevidenceisrequiredbeforeRussiawillingto that theweaponshadenteredcountryfromVenezuela. in Sweden and under license in the United States. Colombian officials initially claimed Lebanon. abuses duringandinsupportofitsmilitaryoffensive. made deliverytounintendeddestinationsunlikely. Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that adequate Russian oversight of arms transfers fer andrequestedthataninvestigationintothecasebeestablished. In response to the finding, Israel provided evidence to Russia of the possible re-trans- 45 40 NosuchsystemswerethoughttohavebeendirectlyexportedfromRussia 49 show-mediatico-que-armas-de-venezuela-esten-en-las-farc/20090727/nota/851773.aspx>. Radio, 27July2009, - 42 TheRussian - 49 CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / Thailand andIndia. Bofors. At thetimeSweden hadonlyexportedtheM3systemtotwoAsiancountries, mar. The weapons were identified as the M3 variant manufactured in Sweden by Saab of theMyanmarArmyinanoffensiveagainstnon-governmentforcesnorthernMyan- In December2012mediareportedthepossessionofsixrecoillessriflesbymembers on re-exports. India havingfirstbeenimportedfrom Sweden in2003. authorities requestedthroughdiplomaticchannels. Subsequent tothereport,ISPundertookaninvestigationwithcooperationfromIndian been inplacesince1991duetoviolationsofhumanrights. manufacturer SaabBofors. In 2003 India imported a number of M3 Carl Gustav recoilless rifles from the Swedish SWEDISH RECOILLESSRIFLESIDENTIFIEDINMYANMAR CASE 3. ports toVenezuela underexistingcontracts. During theinvestigation,Sweden haltedtheissuanceofnewexportlicencesandex- Swedish exportstoIndiawasaffected during oraftertheinvestigation. cooperation. ation withIndianauthorities,eventhoughneitherpartywasobligedtoprovidesuch by theprovisionofserialnumbersSwedish manufactureraswellcooper- be permitted. closer coordinationbetweenthestateswouldberequiredbeforenewexports Venezuela havetaken placeand,attheconclusionofinvestigation,ISPstatedthat states viaCOARM andtheWassenaar Arrangement. Sweden in1982. nition. TheammunitiondiscoveredwiththeM3sin2012wasoriginallyexportedfrom exported theM2,anearliermodelofCarlGustav, toMyanmaraswellitsammu- 59 51 54 Theinvestigationconfirmedthatthearmshadbeenre-exportedfrom DetailsofthecaseweresubsequentlysharedbySweden withpartner 57 55 60 59 58 artiklar/2012/12/13/svenskt-granatgevar-i-burma-kom-fran-indien/>. anmar camefromIndia],DagensIndustri , 13Dec.2012, CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / remainder oftheinvestigation. and revoked licencesfromcompaniesthathadonlypartiallydeliveredgoodsforthe gation SECO temporarily froze pending licence applications for exports to the UAE civil war. documented thesamemodelofgrenadeinusebyoppositionforcesSyrian In July2012thereweremediareportsthatjournaliststravellinginnorthernSyria had port nordifferentiateditfromloanordonation. non-re-export clause. At thetimeofinitialexport,Swiss EUCsneitherdefinedre-ex- agreement betweenSwitzerland andthe UAE becauseofthelanguageusedin It isunclearwhetherthe2004re-exporttoJordancontravenednon-re-export Affairs (SECO)announcedthataninvestigation wasunderway. Three days after the case was first reported, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic that thearmshadbeenacquiredfromastateotherthanSwitzerland. exports ofthesamegrenadeshadbeenmadetoSyrian armedforces,suggesting re-export. (UAE). Theend-useragreementaccompanyingthetransferincludedaprohibitionon manufactured bytheSwiss state-ownedcompanyRuagtotheUnitedArabEmirates Between 2003and2004Switzerland licensedtheexportofOHG92handgrenades SWISS HANDGRENADESIDENTIFIEDINSYRIA CASE 4. EUCs. from re-export ing, selling, leasing out, lending or donating equipment subject to Swiss forms madein2006thatintroducedaclauseexplicitlypreventingimportingstates with Swiss authorities. UAE toMoroccoasagift despite theUAE having signed anon-re-export agreement from theUAE, when40Swiss HowitzerM109artilleryunitswerere-exportedbythe include aclauseallowingonsitepost-exportinspection bySwiss authorities;areview vent similarre-exports.Theseincludedarequirement that allfuture-exportstotheUAE Syria, theSwiss licensingauthoritystatedthatanumberofstepswouldbetaken topre - Following theinvestigationoforiginOHG92handgrenadesidentifiedin rorism purposes. Jordan in2004ontheassumptionthattheywouldbeusedfordomesticcounterter- the UAE authorities—concludedthatpartoftheconsignmenthadbeenre-exportedto re-export agreementbetweenthetwostates,investigation—withcooperationfrom included inatransfertotheUAE between2003and2004.Althoughsubjecttoanon- 67 Thischangeinlanguagewaspartaresponsetoanothercaseofre-export 62 61 Itwasnotimmediatelyclearhowthefightersobtainedarms.Noknown 65 sion oftheexport warmaterialsintheUnitedArabEmirates (UAE)], 3July2006. fuhr vonKriegsmaterialindieVereinigten ArabischenEmirate(VAE) [Liftingofsuspen- 68 May 2013, 64 Theinvestigationestablishedthatthegrenadeswere 66 Thislanguagewastightenedbyre- 63 Duringtheinvesti- CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / panying exports. signed in2000, ratherthantheinclusionofaclauseinend-useragreementsaccom- relied on anagreement between theIsraeli Defense Force and theBritish Government understanding thattheequipmentwouldnotbeusedinPalestinian territories.This exports. However, BritishpolicyongrantingexportlicencestoIsraelwasbased an tions wouldbeconsideredforinclusioninfutureend-useragreementswithQatar. temporary embargoonexportlicencestothecountry. SECOstatedthaton-siteinspec- concluded thatQatar’s re-exporthadbeencausedbyalogisticserrorandliftedthe its to Qatar determine the circumstances of the re-export. In December 2011 SECO ued forthefollowingfivemonths,duringwhichperiodinvestigatorsconductedvis- halted theissuanceofnewlicencesforexporttoQatar. Thisfreezeonlicencescontin- In responsetothereport,Swiss authoritiesopenedaninvestigationandtemporarily by adiplomaticnote. by ahigh-levelgovernmentrepresentativeand,incertaincases,shouldbeendorsed navy vessels. ufactured intheUK.Theseexportsincludedcomponentsof76mmgunsforcorvette Between 2001 and2009Israel procured anumberofweapon systems thatwereman- BRITISH ARMSIDENTIFIEDINTHE2008–2009CONFLICTGAZA STRIP CASE 6. of theEUC. exported fromSwitzerland toQatarandthenre-exported,incontraventionoftheterms forces in the civil war inLibya. The report suggested that the ammunition had firstbeen In July2011mediareportedthesamemodelofammunitionbeingusedbyopposition In 2009RuagofSwitzerland exported7.62-millimetre M80 ballammunitiontoQatar. SWISS AMMUNITIONIDENTIFIEDINLIBYA CASE 5. review ofSwiss non-re-exportdeclarations. of post-shipmentverificationsattachedtopastarmsexportsvariousstates;anda included intheEUCandsignedbyQatariauthorities. The transferofM80ammunitionwassubjecttoaprohibitiononre-exportswhich 73 75 TheUKplacesnore-exportrestrictionsonrecipientsofBritisharms 76 opment andBusiness, InnovationandSkills,Cm8079(Stationery Office: London,July2011). the SecretariesofState forDefence, ForeignandCommonwealthAffairs, InternationalDevel- 2009, Quarterly Reports for2010, LicensingPolicy andParliamentary Scrutiny—Response of 76 ing Gazaconflict’, TheGuardian,22Apr. 2009. 75 74 getaucht.html>, accessedviaGoogleWebcache, 20Jan.2014. www/de/drs/tagesthema/252042/285281.schweizer-munition-in-libyen-auf etaucht’ [Swiss munitionssurfacedinLibya],21July2011, 31 32 CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / there wasnoneedtoprovidesuchdeploymentnoticesinfuture. violation ofhumanrights.Inresponse, theBritish Government informed Indonesia that assured theBritishGovernment that theequipmentwouldnotbeusedoffensivelyorin intended to deploy the weapons in Aceh. In September the Indonesian Government In August 2002theIndonesianGovernmentnotifiedBritishthatit had beendeclaredandtheconflictisestimatedtohavecaused1600 fatalities. exports toIsrael. been usedintheIsraelioffensive, theBritishGovernmentlaunchedareviewof After itsofficialnotedthatBritishexports,including the military offensive in the Gaza Strip that started in December 2008. In January2009concernwasraisedthatBritishmilitaryequipmenthadbeenusedin tion Departmentclaimedthatthedepartmenthadseennoevidencevehicles In 2004theheadofUK’s ForeignandCommonwealthOffice’s Counter-Prolifera- likely usedintheconflict,itwasnottechnicalviolationofend-userunderstandings. reason tobeconcernedabouttheexportofvehiclesIndonesia. vided bytheBritishGovernment,a2001parliamentarycommitteestatedthatithadno Aceh Movement(GerakinMerdeka,GAM). Citingnon-disclosedinformationpro- in theprovinceofAceh,whichhadexperiencedaprolongedinsurgencybyFree the basisofanunderstandingbetweentwogovernmentsthatitwouldnotbeused from the British manufacturer Alvis to Indonesia. The equipment was transferred on tanks Scorpion 90 In 1996 the UK issued export licences for the transfer of 50 FV101 BRITISH ARMSIDENTIFIEDINTHE2003ACEH CONFLICT CASE 7. loss oflife. conflict hadinvolvedextensiveuseofheavyartilleryandairstrikes causingextensive Israel wererevoked. in aIndonesianmilitaryoffensiveagainst GAM. In July2003IndonesianmediadocumentedtheuseofUK-manufactured Scorpion 90s 78 79 Duringtheinvestigation,fiveexportlicencesfornavyvesselsto 85 84 ‘End-use assurances:Indonesia’, 18May2004. 83 Policy andParliamentary Scrutiny,HC474(Stationery Office, London,6May2003), p.12. Trade andIndustry Committees,Strategic Export ControlsAnnualReport for2001,Licensing 82 ing Policy andReview ofExportControlLegislation (Stationery Office: London,Mar. 2010). (2010): UKStrategic ExportControlsAnnualReport 2008,Quarterly Reports for2009, Licens- 81 eign andCommonwealthAffairs (Stationery Office: London,Oct.2009). Occupied Palestinian Territories, Response oftheSecretaryState forFor- 80 eign ArmsSuppliesTo Israel/Gaza(AI:London, Feb. 2009),p. 30 flict seeAmnestyInternational(AI),Israel-OptFuellingConflict:For- 79 gic Analysis(CSIS:Washington, DC,2009). 78 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jan/07/nick-clegg-israel-gaza-war>. 77 80 BritishParliament, CommitteesonArmsExportControls,ScrutinyofControls Clegg,Nick,‘We muststoparmingIsrael’, TheGuardian,7Jan.2009, the 76mmguns,werelikely tohave 83 82 77 The 22-day 85 81 CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / ceived nore-exportrequestsfromQatar. uncovered. 2011. The Libyan Government neither knew of nor endorsed the transfer when it was from LibyawereatthetimeprohibitedunderUNSecurityCouncilResolution 1970of rifles.Exports military hardware, includinganumberofBelgian-manufacturedFN FAL Qatar, indicatingthatithadbeenre-exportedtoLibya. the transfersweresubjecttoanon-re-exportclause. datory inclusionofnon-re-exportclausesinEUCsacceptedbyBelgianauthorities. transfers hadoccurredpriortoexportcontrolreformsin1993,theypre-datedtheman- included inconsignmentsoriginallyexportedtoQatarandtheUAE. Howeversincethe numbers oftheriflesin2012.Theseeffortsestablishedthatarmshadindeedbeen UN investigationintotheincident.Belgianauthoritiesundertookeffortstotraceserial Lebanese authoritiesin2012appearstohavebeenlimitedcooperation withthe amongtheequipmentseizedby The BelgianresponsetothediscoveryofFN FALs in Libyaforself-defence. 2011 Qatari authorities reported that arms were being transferred to opposition forces Other reports substantiate claims of re-exports of FN FALs from Qatar to Libya. In April Syrian civilwar. board avesselostensiblysailingfromLibyatodeliverarmsoppositionforcesinthe In April2012Lebanese authoritiesinterceptedatransferofmilitaryequipmenton- regarding theirdeploymentoruse. had beenusedincontraventionoftheassurancesbyIndonesianGovernment they wouldnotbeusedincontraventionofUNSecurityCouncilresolutions,one the SudaneseGovernmentbeforefirstdeliveryofaircraft,whichstatedthat suant toacontractsignedin2006.AletterofguaranteewasApril2008by Between 2008and2010Belarusdelivered15Sukhoi25combataircrafttoSudanpur- BELARUSIAN COMBAT AIRCRAFTANDROCKETS EXPORTED TO SUDAN CASE 9. In 1979BelgiumlicensedtheexportofFN FAL riflestoQatar. BELGIAN RIFLESTRANSFERREDTO LEBANONIN2012 CASE 8. fers included FN FAL rifles. fers included FN FAL 90 Subsequent tracing identified atleast oneofthe riflesasoriginatingin 89 Thetransferconsistedofthreeshippingcontainerscontainingmixed w/?MIval=/publications/viewTBlok&DATUM=’01/24/2013 ‘&TYP=handeen> (inFrench). 95 94 end upinSyria?’, At War Blog,NewYork Times,6Apr. 2012. 93 Apr. 2011, 94 88 91 87 Itisnotknownwhether 95 33 34 CASE STUDIES OF UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / prohibition onre-exports. certificate relatingtothetransfers,whichunderUkrainianlawmusthaveincludeda these aircraft were some of those transferred to Sudan between 2008 and 2010. Darfur. vention oftheUNSecurityCouncilbyspecificallymentioningresolutionsconcerning associated withthistransferalsopreventedtherockets frombeingusedincontra- tion. involving Su25sinSudanwasnotsufficientlydocumentedtowarrantaninvestiga- in certaincasesofreportedcontraventionend-useragreements,theparticularcase that, whileitsnationallegislationdoesallowtheformationofaverificationcommission Belarusian authoritiesreportedtotheUNPanel ofExpertsontheembargoDarfur the non-re-transferguaranteesignedbytwogovernmentsin2008. contravention ofUNSecurityCouncilResolution 1591of2011wasthereforeabreach presence oftheseaircraftinusebyforcesoperatingtheDarfurregionandtherein clause necessitatingpriorapprovalfromBelarusbeforeanyfuturere-export. well asinflightDarfur. In 2010, 10Su25swereobservedattheapronsofElFasherandNyalaairportsas the associatedend-userguarantees. region. which explicitlyprohibitedthesupplyofarmstogroupsoperatinginSudan’s Darfur for usewiththeSu25sdeliveredbetweenNovember2010andApril2011. guarantee wasattachedtothetransferof3998S8DMandS8KO air-to-groundrockets rifles, T72tanksand125mmammunition. tiple-launch rocket systems,RPG7rocket-propelled grenadelaunchers,AKMassault These exportsincludedZU232andZPU4anti-aircraftguns,BM21truck-mounted mul- of battletanks,munitionsandlightweaponstoKenya underthreeseparatecontracts. Between September2007andFebruary2009Ukrainetransferredthreeshipments UKRAINIAN TANKS EXPORTED TO KENYA ANDONTO SOUTHERNSUDAN CASE 10. cally documented. an investigationintopossibleviolationsofend-useragreementshasnotbeenpubli- 102 ThequalityorquantityofevidencerequiredbyBelarusianauthoritiestoprompt 99 96 There-transferoftheequipmenttoDarfurregionthereforecontradicted TheEUCaccompanyingthetransferdidnotrefertoDarfurbutincludea of InternationalTransfers ofMilitaryandDual-use Goods(BVR), 2003,N 23,Article148. Ukrainian lawasincludingnon-re-export guarantees.PresidentialDecreeonState Control 2009, 107 Its unclear whether this inspec- 108 Furtherdetailsofthe 105 35 36 CONCLUSIONS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / of anyinvestigations. Thesurveyalsounderlined theimportanceof exportlicensing violations intofuturelicensing decisionsandinformingotherstatesabouttheoutcome panies toassistwiththemonitoring ofre-exportandre-transfercontrols,factoring past formation toassesswhether controlsarebeingimplemented,obligingexportingcom - and torespondsuspected violations.Thisincludestheuseofdifferentsources of in- the stepsthatcanbetaken toenforceandmonitorre-exportre-transfercontrols available’. Thesurveyalsorevealedasignificantamountofgoodpractice intermsof controls arecustomizedtospecificcircumstancesso therearenogeneralanswers can make determinationsonacase-by-casebasis.Onestateemphasizedthat‘Export state tostate, andmanyappearkeen toretainacertainlevelofflexibilitysothatthey responsibility forre-exportandre-transfercontrolsto the importingstatevariesfrom re-exports andre-transferstotheimportingstate. Whenexactlystates choosetogive destinations, manystatesarecontenttogiveresponsibility forcontrollingsubsequent apply re-exportorre-transferrestrictionstoallexports. Forexportstolesssensitive required intheWassenaar Arrangement’s BestPracticesonRe-export —veryfewstates The surveyofnationalpoliciesandpracticesunderlinesthefactthat—despitewhatis be withheld. provide littleinformationonwhenthiscontrolshouldbetransferredandit re-transfer controlstotheimportingstate. However, beyondgeneralprinciplesthey in certain cases states are able to transfer responsibility for enforcing re-export and Wassenaar Arrangement’s BestPracticesonRe-export, alldocumentsmake clearthat content oftheseoptionsvariesfromdocumenttodocument.Withtheexception ofthe for statestoconsiderwhenimposingre-exportandre-transfercontrols,buttheexact imposition is a requirement or an option. Most documents present a range of options form thesere-exportandre-transfercontrolsshouldtake andtheextenttowhichtheir are alsoimportantdifferencesincertain key areas.Thesedifferencesrelatetothe guidelines arebroadlysimilarintermsofwhattheycontainandrecommend,there states shouldrespondincaseswherecontrolsareviolatedorignored.Whilethese enforced bytheexportingstateandnoneispaidtoquestionofhow Comparatively littleattentionispaidtohowthesecontrolsshouldbemonitoredand ticularly theformtheserestrictionsshouldtake andhowtheyshouldbeimplemented. their attention is paid to the issue of imposing re-export and re-transfer controls, par- This surveyofguidelinesandbestpracticedocumentshighlightsthatthemajority CONCLUSIONS V 37 38 CONCLUSIONS / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / the originaldelivery. time since unauthorized re-exports and re-transfers may take place many years after or re-transfercontrols.Suchrecordsalsoneedtobe kept forasubstantiallengthof Belgian casetheyhelpedtodemonstratethatthearms werenotsubjecttore-export essential forestablishingtheoriginalsourceofexported weapons,whileinthe and re-transfer. Inthecaseof theSwedish exportstoVenezuela, suchrecordswere tool foreffectivelyinvestigatingandrespondingtoreports ofunauthorizedre-export ing byboththeexportingstateandcompanies alsoemergesasanessential lighting areaswhere-exportcontrolscouldbedeveloped andimproved.Record-keep- dialogue onsuchissuescanhelptoclearupconfusionswhilepotentiallyhigh- tions ithasagreedtoorlimitationsinitsnationalarmsexportcontrols.Developinga or re-transfers.Suchcasesmayresultfromagenuinelackofawarenesstheobliga- with theoriginalimportingstatewhenrespondingtoreportsofunauthorizedre-exports violations. A number of the case studies also highlight the importance of cooperation which theyhaveagreedandincreatingaclearplatformforinvestigatinganyreportsof this canbeofbenefitinensuringthatimportingstatesunderstandthecommitmentsto years toincorporatemorepreciselanguageonre-exportandre-transfercontrols to preventmisinterpretation by signatories. Many stateshavemadeefforts inrecent Both thesetransfers underscore the need for clarity in any prohibition on re-exports not coveredbythere-exportrestrictionsthatSwitzerland attachedtotheoriginalsales. to JordanandMoroccoappearhavebeenmadeontheassumptionthatgiftswere and re-transfercontrols.Inparticular, the2004donationsofequipmentfromUAE The casestudiesalsohighlighttheimportanceofchoicelanguageinre-export obligations. imposed, theremaybelittlethatcandonetoensureimportingstatesfulfiltheir affairs orarecognitionthateventhoughre-exportre-transfercontrolshavebeen in turn,bebasedonanunwillingnesstointerferetheimportingstates’ sovereign to decideifandhowitshouldabidebyre-exportre-transfercontrols.Thismay, arms exportdeals.Itmayalsoreflectagenuinebeliefthatitisuptotheimportingstate re-transfer, eitherbecauseoftheriskdiplomatictensionsorafearlosingfuture the originalimportingstateandholditaccountableforunauthorizedre-exportor a states’ exportcontrolsystem.Inparticular, theremaybe anunwillingnesstoconfront cal sensitivityofthecaseinquestionoranunwillingnesstoacknowledgeanyfailings that unauthorizedre-exportorre-transferhastaken place, eitherbecauseofthepoliti- have been violated. In the latter cases, there may be an unwillingness to acknowledge despite asignificantbodyofevidenceindicatingthatre-exportorre-transfercontrols the basisofindividual media reports while other cases appearto have beenignored whether topubliclyrespondareport.Someinvestigationshavebeenlaunchedon lar, methods of assessing many states appear to have individual and possibly ad hoc reports andallegationsofviolationsre-exportre-transfercontrols.Inparticu- The casesofreportedviolationssuggestfewcommonalitiesinhowstatesrespondto embargoed destinationoracountryinconflict. export at all than to try and respond after the event when arms have turned up in an and re-transfers.Asseveralstatespointedout,itisfarbettertohavenotlicensedthe risk assessmentsasanessentialtoolforguardingagainstunauthorizedre-exports 39 40 / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR-RE TRANSFER OF ARMS / TABLES 40 / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR-RE TRANSFER OF ARMS / TABLES ‘M’ indicatesamandatoryelementand‘O’ indicatesanoptionalelement. INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONALGUIDELINESBEST PRACTICES ONRE-EXPORT ANDRE-TRANSFER CONTROLS TABLE 1. SALW =smallarmsandlightweapons. EUC =end-usercertificate, OEC =originalexportingcountry, CASA =CoordinatingActiononSmallArms,DVC =deliveryverificationcertificate, any re-exportorre-transfer Prior authorizationbefore re-export orre-transfer notify theOECpriortoany The importingcountrywill to anotherend-use Prohibition onre-transfer use orpointofdelivery) (either atpointofend- Carry outonsiteinspection the importingcountry to anotherlocationin Prohibition onre-transfer confirmation ofdelivery Require DVC orother to anotherdestination Prohibition onre-export Imposing re-exportandre-transfercontrols:inclusionofend-use assurancesintheend-usercertificate, end-userstatementorcommercialcontract the importingcountry to anotherend-userin Prohibition onre-transfer EUC orcontract shipment controlin Include clauseonpost- Enforcing re-exportandre-transfercontrols:post-shipmentcontrols export orre-transfer responsibility forre- Importing stategiven export orre-transfer Notification ofanyre- certain destinations export, except for Prohibition onre- Material coverage O – M O – O O – EU – – – O arms Conventional User’s Guide – – – O – O – – OSCE – – O – SALW SALW Document O – O O – O O – O O – – SALW Best Practice on Export Control of SALW ments, willbenotifiedbeforere-export /re-transferofthoseweapons.’ the originalexportingParticipating State, inaccordancewithbilateral agree- the rightsofStates tore-export SALW thattheyhavepreviouslyimported, b a ‘Participating States agreetoensure, asfarpossible, withoutprejudiceto One offourmandatoryoptions—atleastonetheseoptionsmust be adopted. O – O – – O – – O O – – SALW Decision No. 5/04 O – M O – O O – – O – O SALW a a a a Template EUC for SALW Weapons – O O O O – O – arms Conventional Wassenaar Arrangement O O – O End-user Assurance Commonly Used Consolidated Indicative List O – – – – – – – SALW – – – – b Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of SALW M – – – M – – arms Conventional – M – – – Best Practice Guidelines ance withtheirbilateralagreements beforethere-transferofthoseweapons.’ they havepreviouslyimported,to notify theoriginalexportingState inaccord- prejudice totherightofStates tore-exportsmallarmsandlightweaponsthat c ‘To make everyeffort,inaccordancewithnationallawsand practices,without on Subsequent Transfer (Re-export ) Controls for Conventional Weapon Systems _ – – – – – – SALW United Nations – – – – O c Programme of Action on SALW _ – – – – – O SALW O O O O O CASA National controls over the international transfer of SALW O O O O – – O SALW O O – O O a a a a CASA National controls over the end-user and end-use of internationally transferred SALW 42 TABLE 2. NATIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES ON RE-EXPORT AND RE-TRANSFER CONTROLS Figures are numbers of countries with the respective policy. Figures in parentheses, ‘( )’, are the number countries that apply the policy only in certain cases. South East Wassenaar Arrangement European statesa participating statesb Section 1. Re-export and re-transfer restrictions Restriction on re-export or re-transfer ? Yes 5 10 No 1 2 Type of restriction Prohibition on re-export to another destination – 3 (3) Prior authorization before any re-export or re-transfer 3 (1) 10 (6) Notification of any re-export or re-transfer 1 – Means of applying restrictions Inclusion of language in EUCs 5 9 Inclusion of language in contracts 1 3 Other 1 1 Section 2. Re-export and re-transfer control measures DVC requested Yes 5 (2) 10 (9) Steps to verify the authenticity of DVCs Yes 3 8 Additional measures to confirm that re-export or re-transfer restrictions are being applied Information collected by national embassies 4 8 Monitoring of other sources of information 1 9 On-site inspections in destination – 3 Sections 3. Contravention and enforcement of re-export or re-transfer restrictions Legislation or guidelines in place that outline the response to violations of re-export or re-transfer restrictions Yes 2 7 Cases of violations of re-export or re-transfer restrictions identified Yes – 3 Steps taken in response to these violations Information requested from the end-user – 3 Suspension or annulment of the export licence – 3 Restrictions placed on future-exports to the end-user or destination – 3 Information shared via multilateral export control regimes – 2 Information requested from exporting company – 2 DVC = delivery verification certificate, EUC = end-user certificate. b The surveyed Wassenaar Arrangement participating states were Austria, Belgium a The surveyed states in South Eastern Europe were Bosnia and Herzegovina, (which provided separate entries for the competent export licensing authorities in Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. the Flemish and Walloon Region), the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 43 45 INTRODUCTION / ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED RE-EXPORT OR RE-TRANSFER OF ARMS / COBISS.SR-ID 212744716 a) Оружје-ИзвозЈугоисточнаЕвропа 1. Dermody,Lawrence,1983-[аутор] ISBN 978-86-7728-213-4 Nasl. sanaslovnogekrana.-Tiraž200. -Napomeneibibliografskereferenceuztekst. SEESAC, 2015(Beograd:DMD).-1elektronski optičkidisk(CD-ROM);30cm ektronski izvor]/[MarkBromley,LawrenceDermody].-Belgrade: Addressing UnauthorizedRe-exportorRe-transferofArmsandAmmunition [El BROMLEY, Мark,1977- 339.564:623.44(4-12)(0.034.2) Народна библиотекаСрбије,Београд CIP -Каталогизацијаупубликацији - 47