ISSUE BRIEF No. 3661 | JULY 11, 2012

BioWatch: Enhancing Biological Threat Detection Steven P. Bucci, PhD

n 2001, just one week after 9/11, DHS should better address these con- distinguish between dangerous Iletters laced with were tinued challenges. pathogens and related yet non-lethal found in the U.S. mail system Current BioWatch Limitations. agents. As the National Academy of addressed to offices on Capitol Hill Deployed in more than 30 metro- Sciences explains, “Several agents and major media outlets. In response, politan areas, BioWatch uses air of concern, and their close genetic the newly formed Department of sampling equipment and program relatives, exist naturally in water or Homeland Security (DHS) deployed stations to collect samples over a soil. … Distinguishing natural back- the BioWatch program, which seeks 24-hour collection period. The sam- ground levels of endemic agents from to detect the release of dangerous ples are then taken to a lab for analy- a threat and separat- pathogens into the air, providing sis in hopes of early detection of aero- ing genetic ‘near neighbors’ from early warning to government and solized pathogens. While BioWatch the target agent present technical public health officials on the threat of has generated dozens of BioWatch challenges.”1 a biological attack. Actionable Results, none has been The problem is that BioWatch In the nearly 10 years since connected with evidence of bioter- systems must be sensitive enough so BioWatch’s deployment, however, rorism or cases of human illness. as not to miss traces of potentially perceived false alarms and program BioWatch is intended to provide deadly pathogens dispersed over a shortfalls have led some to question rapid and early warning of a biologi- large area yet discriminating enough continued investments in the next cal threat, but the current process of not to set off continual false alarms, generation of the program. While the removing, transporting, and analyz- a balance that is very difficult to continued threat of bioterrorism— ing the samples detracts greatly from achieve. Repeated false alarms run and even the recent H1N1 outbreaks— the early detection desires of DHS the risk of increasing complacency in prove enough of a threat to justify Office of Health Affairs. One of the the risk of a true bioterrorist attack. further spending, in moving forward, main reasons for this is the 24-hour Program Realities. To date, collection period. BioWatch has cost the U.S. taxpayers Current manpower and the need approximately $1 billion, and the lat-

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at to remotely test the samples does not est iteration of the program, known http://report.heritage.org/ib3661 allow for a shorter collection period. as Generation 3, is expected to cost Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison The complete process, therefore, can approximately $3.1 billion over the Center for Foreign Policy Studies take anywhere between 10 and 36 next five years. These costs, along The Heritage Foundation hours, allowing for potential wide- with perceived false alarms, have led 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 spread of a pathogen before its detec- many to question whether the pro- (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org tion while also inhibiting situational gram is a potential waste of funding Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily awareness and efforts at interdiction. or research. reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill Another challenge has seemed Thankfully, no bioterrorism before Congress. to be the ability of the system to events have tested the capabilities ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3661 JULY 11, 2012

of the current BioWatch system. Yet (Franscisella tularensis, the rodent development for the BioWatch with currently biological advances spread cause of , or rabbit program. and the amount of information avail- fever). However, the environmental In developing the next genera- able to the general public, biologi- levels were not high enough to pres- tion of BioWatch, DHS should also cal attacks have been given a high ent an actual threat to humans. work to enhance collaboration with priority as a potential threat. While Planning for the Future. The the Environmental Protection greater refinement is needed in the world is too mobile and major cit- Agency, Centers for Disease Control, BioWatch system, early detection is ies are too populated to rely on the National Science Foundation, and the best way to prevent widespread detection of bio-threats by the rev- the Departments of Health and illness and loss of life. elation of medical staff as symptoms Human Services and Defense. Dual- With this in mind, BioWatch pile up. By the time that a virus is use opportunities for the system Generation 3 will replace existing detected through normal medical might also be sought, such as moni- equipment with fully automated intervention, countless damage and toring pollution levels as well as sampling and analysis devices. By spread may have already occurred. pathogens, to enhance the system’s eliminating the need for collection The National Bio-surveillance effectiveness. and transport to a remote lab, the Integration System looks to medical, Detecting and Countering process is expected to take approxi- veterinary, agricultural and water Bio-Threats. Terrorist interests mately four to six hours, drastically systems monitoring alongside the in biological weapons and natu- improving the response time to any BioWatch program to provide the ral outbreaks, such as H1N1, pose biological event. This benefit will greatest amount of surveillance for a threat to the well-being of the also be compounded by the decrease potential disease spread. Both pro- American people. While more work in required manpower that con- grams, however, are behind schedule is needed to augment and refine the sumes a great deal of the BioWatch and require greater development and BioWatch system, early detection funding and increases in the number refinement. holds the key to preventing wide- of jurisdictions participating in the Yet in the event of a release of a spread illness and loss of life from program. bio-pathogen, early detection can the release and occurrence of bio- Further, while the majority of mean the difference between life and pathogens. Congress, DHS, and other current sampling sites are outdoors, death. While greater work is needed federal actors should work together the third iteration of BioWatch will to refine both systems and ensure to enhance BioWatch to ensure that also look to advance indoor detection, the timely and accurate detection the country can detect and counter as well as greater outdoor detection of potentially hazardous pathogens, future biological threats. in major cities. This will allow for BioWatch is far from an “unneces- —Steven P. Bucci, PhD, is Senior enhanced detection of bio-pathogens. sary expenditure.” Research Fellow for Defense and At the same time, is Congress should thus continue to Homeland Security in the Douglas not the only enemy BioWatch is fund the program, while also calling and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign attempting to uncover. The current upon DHS’s Science and Technology Policy Studies, a division of the generation of BioWatch has already Directorate and the Office of Health Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis seen some success with monitoring Affairs to better work together to Institute for International Studies, at pathogens previously not detectable promote enhanced research and The Heritage Foundation.

1. National Research Council, BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the Early Detection of Biological Threats: Abbreviated Version (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12688 (accessed July 9, 2012).

2