Appendix a Protocol Filters
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 Security Guide
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 Security Guide Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3: Security Guide Copyright © 2003 by Red Hat, Inc. Red Hat, Inc. 1801 Varsity Drive Raleigh NC 27606-2072 USA Phone: +1 919 754 3700 Phone: 888 733 4281 Fax: +1 919 754 3701 PO Box 13588 Research Triangle Park NC 27709 USA rhel-sg(EN)-3-Print-RHI (2003-07-25T17:12) Copyright © 2003 by Red Hat, Inc. This material may be distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Open Publication License, V1.0 or later (the latest version is presently available at http://www.opencontent.org/openpub/). Distribution of substantively modified versions of this document is prohibited without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. Distribution of the work or derivative of the work in any standard (paper) book form for commercial purposes is prohibited unless prior permission is obtained from the copyright holder. Red Hat, Red Hat Network, the Red Hat "Shadow Man" logo, RPM, Maximum RPM, the RPM logo, Linux Library, PowerTools, Linux Undercover, RHmember, RHmember More, Rough Cuts, Rawhide and all Red Hat-based trademarks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Red Hat, Inc. in the United States and other countries. Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Motif and UNIX are registered trademarks of The Open Group. XFree86 is a trademark of The XFree86 Project, Inc, and is pending registration. Intel and Pentium are registered trademarks of Intel Corporation. Itanium and Celeron are trademarks of Intel Corporation. AMD, Opteron, Athlon, Duron, and K6 are registered trademarks of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. -
Porte TCP/IP 19/09/2021
1 MarkOne Tools Porte TCP/IP 19/09/2021 1 PORTS 0F TCP/IP Protocols and Services Introduction The port numbers are divided into three ranges: the Well Known Ports: are those from 0 through 1023. DCCP Well Known ports SHOULD NOT be used without IANA registration. The registration procedure is defined in [RFC4340], Section 19.9. the Registered Ports: are those from 1024 through 49151. DCCP Registered ports SHOULD NOT be used without IANA registration. The registration procedure is defined in [RFC4340], Section 19.9. the Dynamic and/or Private Ports: are those from 49152 through 65535 PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING: 1. UNASSIGNED PORT NUMBERS SHOULD NOT BE USED. THE IANA WILL ASSIGN THE NUMBER FOR THE PORT AFTER YOUR APPLICATION HAS BEEN APPROVED. 2. ASSIGNMENT OF A PORT NUMBER DOES NOT IN ANY WAY IMPLY AN ENDORSEMENT OF AN APPLICATION OR PRODUCT, AND THE FACT THAT NETWORK TRAFFIC IS FLOW- ING TO OR FROM A REGISTERED PORT DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT IS "GOOD" TRAFFIC. FIREWALL AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD CHOOSE HOW TO CONFIGURE THEIR SYSTEMS BASED ON THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRAFFIC IN QUESTION, NOT WHETHER THERE IS A PORT NUMBER REGISTERED OR NOT. Socket: è costituito dal concatenamento di un indirizzo IP con il numero di porta di una specifica applicazione (p.es. 10.65.10.13:2001) TCP/IP protocols Port Name Alias 0 IP IP 1 icmp ICMP 3 ggp GGP 6 tcp TCP 8 egp EGP 12 pup PUP 17 udp UDP 20 hmp HMP 22 xns-idp XNS-IDP 27 rdp RDP 66 rvd RVD 1 last updated 2007-01-24 2 MarkOne Tools Porte TCP/IP 19/09/2021 WELL KNOWN PORT NUMBERS The Well Known Ports are assigned by the IANA and on most systems can only be used by system (or root) processes or by programs executed by privileged users. -
Well-Known TCP Port Numbers Page 1 of 2
Webopedia: Well-Known TCP Port Numbers Page 1 of 2 You are in the: Small Business Channel Jump to Website Enter a keyword... ...or choose a category. Go! choose one... Go! Home Term of the Day Well-Known TCP Port New Terms New Links Quick Reference Numbers Did You Know? Search Tool Tech Support In TCP/IP and UDP networks, a port is an endpoint to a logical connection and the way Webopedia Jobs a client program specifies a specific server program on a computer in a network. Some About Us ports have numbers that are preassigned to them by the IANA, and these are known as Link to Us well-known ports (specified in RFC 1700). Port numbers range from 0 to 65536, but Advertising only ports numbers 0 to 1024 are reserved for privileged services and designated as well-known ports. This list of well-known port numbers specifies the port used by the Compare Prices server process as its contact port. Port Number Description Submit a URL 1 TCP Port Service Multiplexer (TCPMUX) Request a Term Report an Error 5 Remote Job Entry (RJE) 7 ECHO 18 Message Send Protocol (MSP) 20 FTP -- Data 21 FTP -- Control Internet News 22 SSH Remote Login Protocol Internet Investing IT 23 Telnet Windows Technology Linux/Open Source 25 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Developer Interactive Marketing 29 MSG ICP xSP Resources Small Business 37 Time Wireless Internet Downloads 42 Host Name Server (Nameserv) Internet Resources Internet Lists 43 WhoIs International EarthWeb 49 Login Host Protocol (Login) Career Resources 53 Domain Name System (DNS) Search internet.com Advertising -
NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0
NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 Americas Headquarters Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA http://www.cisco.com Tel: 408 526-4000 800 553-NETS (6387) Fax: 408 527-0883 © 2013 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 Release Notes for NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 1 CHAPTER 2 BGP 3 BITTORRENT 6 CITRIX 7 DHCP 8 DIRECTCONNECT 9 DNS 10 EDONKEY 11 EGP 12 EIGRP 13 EXCHANGE 14 FASTTRACK 15 FINGER 16 FTP 17 GNUTELLA 18 GOPHER 19 GRE 20 H323 21 HTTP 22 ICMP 23 IMAP 24 IPINIP 25 IPV6-ICMP 26 IRC 27 KAZAA2 28 KERBEROS 29 L2TP 30 NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 iii Contents LDAP 31 MGCP 32 NETBIOS 33 NETSHOW 34 NFS 35 NNTP 36 NOTES 37 NTP 38 OSPF 39 POP3 40 PPTP 41 PRINTER 42 RIP 43 RTCP 44 RTP 45 RTSP 46 SAP 47 SECURE-FTP 48 SECURE-HTTP 49 SECURE-IMAP 50 SECURE-IRC 51 SECURE-LDAP 52 SECURE-NNTP 53 SECURE-POP3 54 SECURE-TELNET 55 SIP 56 SKINNY 57 SKYPE 58 SMTP 59 SNMP 60 SOCKS 61 SQLNET 62 SQLSERVER 63 SSH 64 STREAMWORK 65 NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 iv Contents SUNRPC 66 SYSLOG 67 TELNET 68 TFTP 69 VDOLIVE 70 WINMX 71 NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 v Contents NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 vi CHAPTER 1 Release Notes for NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 NBAR2 Standard Protocol Pack Overview The Network Based Application Recognition (NBAR2) Standard Protocol Pack 1.0 is provided as the base protocol pack with an unlicensed Cisco image on a device. -
Prosafe Gigabit Quad WAN SSL VPN Firewall SRX5308 CLI Reference Manual
ProSafe Gigabit Quad WAN SSL VPN Firewall SRX5308 CLI Reference Manual 350 East Plumeria Drive San Jose, CA 95134 USA August 2012 202-11138-01 v1.0 ProSafe Gigabit Quad WAN SSL VPN Firewall SRX5308 © 2012 NETGEAR, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into any language in any form or by any means without the written permission of NETGEAR, Inc. NETGEAR, the NETGEAR logo, and Connect with Innovation are trademarks and/or registered trademarks of NETGEAR, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries in the United States and/or other countries. Information is subject to change without notice. Other brand and product names are registered trademarks or trademarks of their respective holders. © 2012 All rights reserved. Technical Support Thank you for choosing NETGEAR. To register your product, get the latest product updates, get support online, or for more information about the topics covered in this manual, visit the Support website at http://support.netgear.com. Phone (US & Canada only): 1-888-NETGEAR Phone (Other Countries): Check the list of phone numbers at http://support.netgear.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/984. Statement of Conditions To improve internal design, operational function, and/or reliability, NETGEAR reserves the right to make changes to the products described in this document without notice. NETGEAR does not assume any liability that may occur due to the use, or application of, the product(s) or circuit layout(s) described herein. Revision History Publication Part Number Version Publish Date Comments 202-11138-01 1.0 August 2012 First publication 2 Contents Chapter 1 Introduction Command Syntax and Conventions. -
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) — Real World Performance and Deployment Issues
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) — Real World Performance and Deployment Issues Stephen Kent, Charles Lynn, Joanne Mikkelson, and Karen Seo BBN Technologies Abstract configuration information, or routing databases may be The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is used to modified or replaced illicitly via unauthorized access to distribute routing information between autonomous a router, or to a server from which router software is systems, is an important component of the Internet's downloaded, or via a spoofed distribution channel, etc. routing infrastructure. Secure BGP (S-BGP) addresses Such attacks could result in transmission of fictitious critical BGP vulnerabilities by providing a scalable BGP messages, modification or replay of valid means of verifying the authenticity and authorization of messages, or suppression of valid messages. If BGP control traffic. To facilitate widespread adoption, cryptographic keying material is used to secure BGP S-BGP must avoid introducing undue overhead control traffic, that too may be compromised. We have (processing, bandwidth, storage) and must be developed security enhancements to BGP that address incrementally deployable, i.e., interoperable with BGP. most of these vulnerabilities by providing a secure, To provide a proof of concept demonstration, we scalable system: Secure-BGP (S-BGP) [1,3]. Better developed a prototype implementation of S-BGP and physical, procedural and basic communication security deployed it in DARPA’s CAIRN testbed. Real Internet for BGP routers could address some of these attacks. BGP traffic was fed to the testbed routers via replay of a However, such measures would not counter any of the recorded BGP peering session with an ISP’s BGP many forms of attacks that compromise routers router. -
Network Working Group Internet Architecture Board Request for Comments: 1720 J
Network Working Group Internet Architecture Board Request for Comments: 1720 J. Postel, Editor Obsoletes: RFCs 1610, 1600, 1540, 1500, November 1994 1410, 1360, 1280, 1250, 1100, 1083, 1130, 1140, 1200 STD: 1 Category: Standards Track INTERNET OFFICIAL PROTOCOL STANDARDS Status of this Memo This memo describes the state of standardization of protocols used in the Internet as determined by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). This memo is an Internet Standard. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Table of Contents Introduction . 2 1. The Standardization Process . 3 2. The Request for Comments Documents . 5 3. Other Reference Documents . 6 3.1. Assigned Numbers . 6 3.2. Gateway Requirements . 6 3.3. Host Requirements . 6 3.4. The MIL-STD Documents . 6 4. Explanation of Terms . 7 4.1. Definitions of Protocol State (Maturity Level) . 8 4.1.1. Standard Protocol . 8 4.1.2. Draft Standard Protocol . 9 4.1.3. Proposed Standard Protocol . 9 4.1.4. Experimental Protocol . 9 4.1.5. Informational Protocol . 9 4.1.6. Historic Protocol . 9 4.2. Definitions of Protocol Status (Requirement Level) . 9 4.2.1. Required Protocol . 10 4.2.2. Recommended Protocol . 10 4.2.3. Elective Protocol . 10 4.2.4. Limited Use Protocol . 10 4.2.5. Not Recommended Protocol . 10 5. The Standards Track . 10 5.1. The RFC Processing Decision Table . 10 5.2. The Standards Track Diagram . 12 6. The Protocols . 14 6.1. Recent Changes . 14 Internet Architecture Board [Page 1] RFC 1720 Internet Standards November 1994 6.1.1. New RFCs . 14 6.1.2. -
Annex Communications Server Network Administrator's Guide 166
1\N"l:X COMMUNICATIONS SERVER Network Administrator's Guide )xy1og1ca] Copyright @ 1990 Xylogics, Inc. 166- 024- 000 Revision E November 1991 1\N-41:X COMMUNICATIONS SERVER Network Administrator's Guide 166-024-000 Revision E November 1991 Notice The information in this manual is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by Xylogics, Inc. Xylogics assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. Annex, Annex II, Annex lie, Annexthree, and Annex 3 are trademarks of Xylogics, Inc. UNIX is a registered trademark of AT&T. Ethernet is a registered trademark of Xerox Corporation. IBM is a registered trademark of the International Business Machines Corporation. XENIX Is a trademark of Microsoft Corporation. LAT is a trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation. Postscript is a registered trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated. Copyright© 1990 Xylogics, Inc. Printed in the USA. Contents Preface .................................................. xiii General . xiii Supported Version . xiv Printing Conventions . xiv Related Documents . xv Book A: Overview Chapter 1: Introduction to the Annex ....................... A-1 General . A-1 Annex Capabilities . A-2 Network Administrator (na) Utility . A-2 Command Line Interpreter (CLI) . A-3 Customizing the User Interface . A-3 Expedited Remote Procedure Call Daemon (erpcd) . A-3 Extensive Security System . A-3 Port Servers and Rotaries . A-4 UNIX Host-originated Connections.................................. A-5 Name Server Support . A-5 Network Management . A-6 Full Routing . A-6 Multi-protocol Support . A-7 Applications for the Annex . A-7 Connecting Terminals . A-7 Connecting Remote Hosts, Networks, and Annexes.................... A-8 Connecting PCs to the Network . -
Protecting the Integrity of Internet Routing: Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Route Origin Validation
NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-14C Protecting the Integrity of Internet Routing: Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Route Origin Validation Volume C: How-To Guides William Haag Applied Cybersecurity Division Information Technology Laboratory Doug Montgomery Advanced Network Technologies Division Information Technology Laboratory Allen Tan The MITRE Corporation McLean, VA William C. Barker Dakota Consulting Silver Spring, MD June 2019 This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-14 The first draft of this publication is available free of charge from: https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/sp1800/sidr-piir-nist-sp1800-14-draft.pdf This publication DISCLAIMER is available Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified by name or company logo or other insignia in order to acknowledge their participation in this collaboration or to describe an free experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply special of status or relationship with NIST or recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE; neither is it charge intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available for the purpose. from: http://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-14. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1800-14C, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 1800-14C, 61 pages, (June 2019), CODEN: NSPUE2 FEEDBACK As a private-public partnership, we are always seeking feedback on our Practice Guides. We are particularly interested in seeing how businesses apply NCCoE reference designs in the real world. If you have implemented the reference design, or have questions about applying it in your environment, please email us at [email protected]. -
Introduction to the Border Gateway Protocol – Case Study Using GNS3
Introduction to The Border Gateway Protocol – Case Study using GNS3 Sreenivasan Narasimhan1, Haniph Latchman2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Florida, Gainesville, USA [email protected], [email protected] Abstract – As the internet evolves to become a vital resource for many organizations, configuring The Border Gateway protocol (BGP) as an exterior gateway protocol in order to connect to the Internet Service Providers (ISP) is crucial. The BGP system exchanges network reachability information with other BGP peers from which Autonomous System-level policy decisions can be made. Hence, BGP can also be described as Inter-Domain Routing (Inter-Autonomous System) Protocol. It guarantees loop-free exchange of information between BGP peers. Enterprises need to connect to two or more ISPs in order to provide redundancy as well as to improve efficiency. This is called Multihoming and is an important feature provided by BGP. In this way, organizations do not have to be constrained by the routing policy decisions of a particular ISP. BGP, unlike many of the other routing protocols is not used to learn about routes but to provide greater flow control between competitive Autonomous Systems. In this paper, we present a study on BGP, use a network simulator to configure BGP and implement its route-manipulation techniques. Index Terms – Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Internet Service Provider (ISP), Autonomous System, Multihoming, GNS3. 1. INTRODUCTION Figure 1. Internet using BGP [2]. Routing protocols are broadly classified into two types – Link State In the figure, AS 65500 learns about the route 172.18.0.0/16 through routing (LSR) protocol and Distance Vector (DV) routing protocol. -
VSI TCP/IP Services for Openvms Concepts and Planning
VSI OpenVMS VSI TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS Concepts and Planning Document Number: DO-TCPCPL-01A Publication Date: October 2020 Revision Update Information: This is a new manual. Operating System and Version: VSI OpenVMS Integrity Version 8.4-2 VSI OpenVMS Alpha Version 8.4-2L1 Software Version: VSI TCP/IP Services Version 5.7 VMS Software, Inc. (VSI) Burlington, Massachusetts, USA VSI TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS Concepts and Planning Copyright © 2020 VMS Software, Inc. (VSI), Burlington, Massachusetts, USA Legal Notice Confidential computer software. Valid license from VSI required for possession, use or copying. Consistent with FAR 12.211 and 12.212, Commercial Computer Software, Computer Software Documentation, and Technical Data for Commercial Items are licensed to the U.S. Government under vendor's standard commercial license. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. The only warranties for VSI products and services are set forth in the express warranty statements accompanying such products and services. Nothing herein should be construed as constituting an additional warranty. VSI shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. HPE, HPE Integrity, HPE Alpha, and HPE Proliant are trademarks or registered trademarks of Hewlett Packard Enterprise. Intel, Itanium and IA-64 are trademarks or registered trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group. The VSI OpenVMS documentation set is available on DVD. ii VSI TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS Concepts and Planning Preface ................................................................................................................................... vii 1. About VSI .................................................................................................................... vii 2. Intended Audience ....................................................................................................... -
Securing the Border Gateway Protocol by Stephen T
September 2003 Volume 6, Number 3 A Quarterly Technical Publication for From The Editor Internet and Intranet Professionals In This Issue The task of adding security to Internet protocols and applications is a large and complex one. From a user’s point of view, the security- enhanced version of any given component should behave just like the From the Editor .......................1 old version, just be “better and more secure.” In some cases this is simple. Many of us now use a Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) client in place of Telnet, and shop online using the secure version of HTTP. But Securing BGP: S-BGP...............2 there is still work to be done to ensure that all of our protocols and associated applications provide security. In this issue we will look at Securing BGP: soBGP ............15 routing, specifically the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and efforts that are underway to provide security for this critical component of the Internet infrastructure. As is often the case with emerging Internet Virus Trends ..........................23 technologies, there exists more than one proposed solution for securing BGP. Two solutions, S-BGP and soBGP, are described by Steve Kent and Russ White, respectively. IPv6 Behind the Wall .............34 The Internet gets attacked by various forms of viruses and worms with Call for Papers .......................40 some regularity. Some of these attacks have been quite sophisticated and have caused a great deal of nuisance in recent months. The effects following the Sobig.F virus are still very much being felt as I write this. Fragments ..............................41 Tom Chen gives us an overview of the trends surrounding viruses and worms.