REMAKING ALBANIA: PUBLIC MEMORY OF COMMUNIST PAST
Nina Nazmije Gjoci
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
August 2018
Committee:
Alberto Gonzalez, Advisor
Francisco J. Cabanillas Graduate Faculty Representative
Joshua Atkinson
Lara Martin-Lengel © 2018
Nina Gjoci
All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT
Alberto Gonzalez, Advisor
Public memory research has become increasingly significant in communication research, especially pertaining to national traumatic pasts. Drawing from scholarship on memory-rhetoric interdependence, this study examines the rhetorical construction of the communist past in contemporary Albania. The analysis of national traditional media, places of memory, and official documents and archives reveals the ways that the communist past is contained, controlled, and diffused in response to present national and international interests and agendas. The shared identities narrated through public debates reveal that contestations about the past are first and foremost about cultural and political legitimacy. Throughout the analysis, it is obvious how the discussions about Albania’s communist past shifted to blaming the system, to denying collaboration, and to rationalizing the totalitarian structure. This study highlights the consequences that transnational influences have on redirecting and appropriating public memory and avoiding a genuine confrontation with the past. The past is reconfigured continuously, as the reconciliation reforms, the cold war connections and conflicts, and the totalizing European Union integration discourse influence what is remembered, by whom, where, and when. This study examines the discourses of remaking Albania as a rhetorical tension over meanings of past and future, where the communist past is diffused into collective guilt that haunts the bright EU imagined futures. iv
Për Lisin, Dean, e Anitën. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am in debt to many people for anything that I have ever accomplished: my parents for making me believe that nothing is impossible, my daughters for being the absolute motivation, my husband for always making sure I follow my dreams, my siblings for their unconditional support and inspiration throughout my life, and my friends, old and new, who make my life meaningful.
My deepest gratitude to my committee: Dr. Alberto Gonzalez, thank you for being my advisor, and thank you for your constant guidance and support. I will never be able to thank you enough for all you have done for me from the start of my Ph.D. years to the final stages of the dissertation process. Dr. Lara Lengel and Dr. Joshua Atkinson, thank you for your advice and honesty. I appreciate how the three of you were always ready to listen to my research ideas and answer my unending questions. You have always welcomed my unannounced visits to your offices and you never turned me down for anything. Dr. Francisco Cabanillas, thank you for being so supportive and encouraging from my preliminary exam to the dissertation defense. I was so lucky to have you all in my committee.
My deepest gratitude to Dr. Thomas Mascaro, Dr. Sung-Yeon Park, Dr. Catherine
Cassara, and Dr. Srinivas Melkote: Thank you for your selfless support throughout my Ph.D. program. You are a great asset to my academic progress. Thank you for always believing in me and appreciating my scholarship.
I am forever grateful to Dr. Thomas Endres and Dr. Linda Allen of the University of
Northern Colorado. I have learned so much from you academically and professionally. I will never forget your support and mentorship during my master studies. I am here now because of you. Thank you! vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………….... . 1
CHAPTER I. PUBLIC MEMORY SCHOLARSHIP ………...... ……………… 2
Research question and rationale… ...... ………... ………………………………. 9
Theoretical Framework: Public memory is essentially rhetorical ...... 11
Selected Literature Review ...... …… 13
Previous research on confronting the communist past ...... 13
Previous research on public memory, memory place, and identity ...... 16
Research on place ...... 19
The visual and memory turn in rhetorical criticism ...... 22
Method ……………………….…………………………… ...... 24
Texts ...... 26
Procedures ...... 27
Dissertation chapter content outline ...... 28
References……………………….…………………………… ...... 30
CHAPTER II. PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE COMMUNIST PAST IN TRADITIONAL MEDIA……………………………………………………………………. 35
Introduction ...... 35
1991-1996: Lustration, restitution, and denial……………………………………… 38
1997-2004: The past ignored …………………………………………………… .... 40
2005-2014: The past resurfacing …………………………………………………… 41
2014-present: The public debates…………………………………………………… 42
The Past on Public Trial…………………………………………………… ...... 46 vii
Dealing with the past institutionally vs. public deliberation. .… ...... 46
Tufa-Culi debate ...... 47
Kadare-Lubonja debate ...... 49
Communist productions as propaganda vs. cultural heritage …………… ... 51
Conclusions: Contained Memory ……………………………… ...... 57
References……………….……………………………………………… ..... 61
CHAPTER III. PLACES OF MEMORY… ……..…………. ………………...... 63
The counter-memory………………………………………………………………. . 63
Site of Witness and Memory Museum: The site of witness ...... 64
The Spac Prison: The site of persecution………… .……………………….. 73
Controlled public memory ………………………………………………...... 78
The House of Leaves: The site of perpetrators ………………… ...... 79
Diffusing the blame for communist crime ………………………… 80
The Bunk’Art Center: The touristic site …………………………………... 88
Selling the past …………………………………………...... 90
Conclusions …………………………………………...... 93
References …………………………………………...... 95
CHAPTER IV. ALBANIA and EU: A PLACE PERSPECTIVE …………………………. 97
Albania-EU context…………………………………………………………………... 97
The texts ….…………………………………………………………………………. 101
EU integration from place perspective……………………………………………... 102
Western Balkans—not South East Europe…………………………………. 103
Place for Re-conciliation and Re-construction……………………………… 109 viii
Hot spot for de/stability ………...…………………………… ...... ……. 114
Conclusion: The power of imagined futures ……………………………………….. 119
References ……………………………………………………………… ...... 126
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS: REMAKING ALBANIA ……………………………… 132
Chapter review……………………………………………………………… ...... 133
Theoretical implications: Public memory of national traumatic pasts .....…………. 138
References……………………………………………………………… ...... 145 1
INTRODUCTION
". . . for no one has been able to establish with certainty whether what happens is the future, or just the past moving backward, like a crab."
Kadare, The Pyramid
Kadare’s quote precisely describes the relationship between memory and rhetoric. Lying between literature and politics, rhetoric often relies on memory to shape our identities when telling us who we are or must be, what group we belong to or must belong to, whether we should fight for our group’s interest with all we have, or whether an endeavor is not worth pursuing any longer. From ancient times to the present day, humanity has drawn from its pasts, whether real or imagined, to make sense of the present and to proclaim possible futures. Kadare suggests that the past, present, and future are not easily established and as such, they are not easily distinguishable and surely not easily named. For the past to be “past” it needs to be established. The establishment process is public and rhetorical. Often, in the name of the future, we use our common “knowledge”, our values, and our beliefs to try to silence what we are not sure of and we try to array the future towards a place where we are more certain. There is no other place
(situation) where the need for establishing (naming) what “past(s),” “present(s),” and “future(s)” are more immediate and critical than in a time of change, especially collective change. I embrace the argument that memory and rhetoric need each other to exist. This project is going to rely on the memory-rhetoric interdependence to investigate how memory, specifically public memory, is used to achieve particular ends by defining particular places and identities.
1. Kadare is a contemporary globally celebrated Albanian writer and several time Nobel Nominee 2
CHAPTER I. PUBLIC MEMORY SCHOLARSHIP
Memory, as one of the classical canons of rhetoric (memoria), has been used in the
Western rhetorical tradition as a tool for the specific purpose of recollection and recitation. The rhetor was supposed to link the specific parts of a speech to a certain image and recall each content as it was arbitrarily linked to the specific image, usually like walking through the rooms of a larger imagined house, what Yates (1966, p. 22) called “vast and echoing” architectural memories. The classical tradition linked memory with place and identity. During the
Renaissance, the place, the image used for recollection, came to awaken memories that served to create an individual’s sense of self and cultural belonging (Dickinson, 1997). The connection of memory, place and identity presupposes an interdependence or coexistence of memory and rhetoric. The “past(s),” “present(s),” and “future(s)” could not be named, articulated, discussed, and even less so established without relying on certain memory, place, and identity.
Remembering is a collective activity. The widely accepted definition of memory as a shared understanding of the past as forged by the “father” of collective memory Maurice
Halbwachs (1925) and Michel Foucault’s (1994) definition of counter-memory as resistance against the official versions of historical continuity, are largely articulated among contemporary memory scholarship. The contemporary scholarship agrees on six traits of public memory: (1) memory is brought to life by the interests of the present, (2) memory narrates shared identities,
(3) memory is animated by affect, (4) memory is partial, (5) memory relies on material and symbolic support, and (6) memory itself has a history (Zelizer, 2009). There are four forms of memory: individual, social, public, and collective. However, only public memory creates and needs publics, a process that requires rhetoric. The publicness of memory is clearly articulated by Casey (2004) as a precondition to public memory. He argues that for public memory to occur 3 it must occur in some particular place and requires the following: public space, public presence, public discussion, a common topic, and commemoration in place.
The importance of “place” as a key vehicle for public memory is especially unique when analyzing places of memory. Places of memory are designated sites of memory that require public discussion, public approval and/or disapproval. As Blair, Dickinson, and Ott (2010) suggest, places of memory project certain types of public identities over others - an imagined collective identity that evolves in time. Also, places of memory generate public discussion based on their extreme partiality (that is, selective representation) and power embodied in their design and history. Understanding public memory requires that memory, place, and identity be investigated in connection with each other and within a larger social context.
After this brief intro to public memory scholarship, this chapter continues with research topic, literature review, and method. I describe this projects’ research topic, the research question, and the rationale to establish the need for this study and build a strong preview of the project’s contribution. The literature review includes previous rhetorical public memory studies related to place and communist and other totalitarian past research. The method clearly describes the theoretical basis and procedures that pertain to my research question, the texts, and a dissertation chapter outline.
The six assumptions of public memory imply the significance of public memory, especially during and after major social-economic changes and national events. The boom in memory studies that followed major global wars during the last century reinforce the important role of public memory in the aftermath of historical events. Winter (2000) argues that both major memory booms followed World War I and World War II, and both changed and shaped the understanding of public memory. One such major global event is the breakdown of communism 4 with the end of the Cold War. The Eastern European communist block and the Soviet Union collapsed. In South East Europe, Albania was the last nation to collapse, following Rumania,
Bulgaria, and former Yugoslavia. The breakdown of communism was a global and regional change. The transition of former-communist countries from totalitarianism to democracy generates major discussion of their national past(s) and future(s). The fundamental changes occur in a context that, regardless of the particular local and national versions of the “past(s),” the transnational influences are unavoidable. In this project I will investigate the post-communist transition of Albania placed in the South East European regional and European Union political contexts.
The fundamental changes that took place in former communist countries as they transitioned from a communist totalitarian system to democracy and pluralism are historical events that call for specific attention to public memory. In the aftermath of the collapse of communism, the Albanian society underwent much more than an economic systemic change, deep and complex social and political change occurred as well. The complexity of remembering and forgetting is prevalent in every step of this transition, both in explicit and implicit ways.
Because the present must articulate both the past and the future, this transition period is a
“present” haunted from the traumatic totalitarian communist past while trying to articulate, name, and establish a very differently imagined collective future(s).
During transition selective pasts are chosen and named into public memory and commemoration, while “unsafe” pasts are neglected or left silent. During transition “change” is everywhere, change in itself asks for reevaluation of what “it was” and what “it will be.” This reevaluation invites present interests, constitutes and requires group identities, attracts various affective investments, and requires material and symbolic support. The transition period is 5 marked by discussions of the past(s) and the future(s) and generates discourse of public memory in both commemorative and non-commemorative form.
Albania, with its particular experience of communism and isolation from 1944 to 1990, provides an opportunity to investigate public memory and the dynamics of dealing with the communist national past. Located in the historically important geopolitical region where classical
Greek and Roman civilization crossed, Albania—the ancient Illyria—provides interesting insights on how memory is appropriated to fit the special interests that root back in millennia.
While these far pasts are not the concerns in the region any longer, they are important when analyzing texts, as they appear on publications about culture and history. However, what has influenced the region and ignited continuous conflicts are the events at the beginning of twentieth century, which are not quite settled for Albania and the region. There are three ethnic national groups in the region, Greeks, Albanians, and Slavs (Durham, 1920). While there have been alliances at times, for the most part, these groups have always fought for supremacy and dominance in the region (Elsie, 2016). Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks enjoyed the support and protection of the Great Powers, whereas the Albanians had no support (Elsie, 2016). As the region was freed from Ottoman Empire the political borders of the Balkans were redrawn at the expense of the Albanian territories and left Albanians separated in different states (Durham,
1920). The London Treaty of 1913 divided the region into states that satisfied the interests of major global powers of the time; England, France, and Russia set political borders that ignored the ethnic and national demographics (Elsie, 2016). The consequences of this artificial creation of states are prevalent even today and were the base for the Balkan wars of the late 1990s (Elsie,
2016). The division of Albanians in different states, without their consent, has been referred to as 6 the “Balkan Tangle” (Durham, 1920) and it is now referred to as the “Albanian question” (Elsie,
2016).
These near and far pasts and the unsolved conflicts in the region have influenced not simply the physical space and political borders but the unique sensitivity towards national identity as well. Being Albanian today surpasses borders, and the religious and political affiliations (Elsie, 2016) similar to the beginning of the twentieth century (Durham, 1920).
During communism, the past was appropriated to fit the ideological needs of the regime and to justify international alliances created during communism. This project will investigate the history of the “past(s)” as well as how the national “pasts” have been rhetorically appropriated to fit the interests of different time periods.
The communist regime began after the Second World War and ended in 1990. The Cold
War divided Europe vertically from North to South, from Baltic to Adriatic Sea. While the EU started as an economic collaboration among six Western European countries previously at war, at the same time, the Eastern European countries were also intensively involved in economic, political, and cultural collaborations. Communist regimes in the Eastern Europe came to power after WWII and despite their particularities they had similar agendas for building socialism, such as organized central planned economies and repressive security and surveillance regimes, and party organizations. The transnational approach of the Eastern bloc was to create a non-capitalist form of international organizations and a socialist sphere through “labor campaigns
(Stakhanovism) and friendship societies to cultural diplomacy, technical aid programs, industrial prototypes, and city planning schemes . . . transnational contacts were encouraged a large scale”
(Mehilli, 2017, pp.10). 7
Albania’s position in the international context is explained fully by Elidor Mehilli on
From Stalin to Mao: Albania and the Socialist World published in 2017. The WWII fascist occupation of 1939 to 1944 ended with Albania’s self-liberation by a communist-led-army in
November 28, 1944. From 1944 the country became a Yugoslav satellite which ended in 1948.
In 1948 begins a decade of close alliance with Soviet Union, which included political, economic, educational, and security collaboration. In the early 1960s, Albania sided with China, following the split between the Soviet Union and China, which was the split within the socialist world.
Accusing Moscow as turning its back on Stalinism, Albania embraced the anti-imperialist China, an alliance which would last for two decades. The break up with Moscow was marked by
Albania being the first country to quit the socialist military alliance, namely the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. As Mehilli states, “ From Mussolini to Mao, then, a tiny country found itself swept up in the biggest development of the twentieth century. This turned Albania into a kind of laboratory for transnational collaboration and confrontation during the Cold War, offering an unparalleled view into the profound contradictions of socialist internationalism, as well as unforeseen consequences of ideological and personnel exchanges across Eastern Europe and
Asia” (p. 4).
During this time Albania isolated itself from the rest of the region and especially from
Western Europe. Capitalism and the countries that embraced it were seen as the absolute enemies of the country and of the way of life proclaimed as worthy by the communist party. Being such an extreme case of communism and isolation, Albania was the equivalent of Cuba and North
Korea. The political adaptation of Marxist ideology resulted in an extreme centralized economy and policy. In 1967, the country became the first atheist country in the world – every religion 8 was banned. The regime would eliminate anyone who challenged its ideology and authority, which resulted in thousands of victims and an economy that basically collapsed in the late 1980s.
Albania’s selective isolation played an important role in the European regional and continental relations after the collapse of communism. The country was named as “last communist castle” in the region, which drew particular attention from Western Europe and
United States during transition - attention that was not always favorable to the country’s image.
In 2018, Albania is in post-transition period; it is a candidate member waiting to open the accession negotiation talks with the European Union. Despite the EU’s political and economic crises, Albania remains eager to join the European Union. The memory of isolation surpasses any present interest that could alter the direction and desire to become a full member of the
European Union.
For the last 25 years the country has been immersed into public discussion about the past totalitarian regimes’ crimes and victims. However, Albania is one of the few countries in Eastern
Europe where the secret police files remain closed to the public. As I will describe in chapter two, a law, that allows citizens to request private information on the archives of former regime’s secret files, passed the parliament in 2016 and it is in the process of implementation. No one has been charged with committing crimes, and no one has been publicly named as perpetrator.
Commemoration is one of the few forms of remembering in hopes of reconciliation with the past.
The dynamics of Albania remembering placed in the context of the aspiration to join the
European Union creates an opportunity for public memory research. As Browne argues “memory is more likely to be introduced by contestation, and amnesia is more likely to be induced by the desire for reconciliation.” Dealing with the traumatic communist national past in Albania, with 9 its particular historic and regional context, will contribute to public memory scholarship by analyzing commemorative and non-commemorative text.
Research question and rationale
Albania dealing with the communist and isolationist past provides an excellent opportunity to study how public memory works after major socio-economic change.
The overarching research question for the project is: What are the rhetorical dynamics of
“remembering” in Albania’s post-communist and post-totalitarian society and what do they reveal about the role of public memory in shaping group identities and relations within and across national places?
The sub questions are:
1. What deliberation strategies about the communist past are used in contemporary
traditional media and how do they shape public memory in the current Albanian
national context?
2. How do places of memory materially and symbolically construct the communist past
in today’s Albania?
3. How is Albania redefined as a place in the European Union integration political
discourse and how does Albania affirm and contest this definition?
There are five reasons why this project contributes to the public memory scholarship:
First, as the public memory scholars across disciplines have approached memory (and public memory) from different perspectives, this study adds to rhetorical public memory scholarship in national and transnational contexts. Also, remembering communism in Albania contributes to 10 literature on communist totalitarian pasts and their consequences. Second, the investigation of public memory of Albania’s communist past will contribute to scholarship of space and place, particularly in the rhetorical construction of place. These memory places are uniquely defined from and define two different spaces: Albania (national) and EU (transnational). A specific contribution will be to discover if the power relations influence space and place in the same way.
Third, critique of the hauntings of communist pasts invoked at memory places, within the larger memory infrastructure, and within political discourse will contribute to further understanding of how public memory attempts to re-create and maintain national identity after national traumas.
One specific contribution of this project is the investigation of how national identity evolves through time with a certain “past” appearing at certain times and disappearing at a different time.
With the end of the communist era the interplay of memory, place, and time reconstructs
Albanian national identity. Fourth, this projects investigates public memory of the communist past in two forms of texts: 1) the non-commemorative texts which include speeches, documents, and political discourse that are not commemorative in purpose, but use Albania’s communist past to justify their present actions, claims, policies, and collective future(s), and 2) the commemorative texts of all forms of memory infrastructure, which include places of memory, commemoration speeches, and memory publications. Finally, the fifth contribution of this project is the emphasis on how public national memories are influenced by transnational interests and contexts. The intersection of Albanian national and EU interests of the present, the material and symbolic support needed for remembering, and the implicit and explicit power relations of
EU integration process implicate the public memory process by selecting certain “pasts” that accommodate dual interests. This intersection of interests translates into specific partial
“past(s),” which in turn generate unpredictable claimed future(s). 11
Theoretical Framework: Public memory is essentially rhetorical
Broadly, rhetoric is the use of symbols by humans to communicate (Foss, 2004). How rhetoric works or what rhetoric does is the fundamental question on defining its objectives.
Rhetorical criticism as a research method is a systematic investigation of symbolic artifacts for the purpose of understanding and explaining rhetorical processes (Foss, 2004). As a systematic investigation criticism enables the understanding of symbols, their use, and the people’s response to them. The objects of criticism are symbolic artifacts, which include discourses, objects, events, and practices. Rhetorical discourses are those discourses aimed at influencing people, and understanding and evaluating how these discourses work is the purpose of criticism, the goal of criticism is to understand humanity itself (Black, 1977). The purpose of criticism is to evaluate how the rhetorical process operate, what they tell us about rhetorical theory, and what they tell us about how communication works. The critical process is the evaluation and assessment of rhetorical processes. Engaging in critique of a rhetorical act (object) involves description, interpretation, and evaluation. That is, the rhetorical criticism deals with the questions of what makes the rhetorical acts rhetorical.
Pertaining to public memory, rhetoric is concerned with meaningfulness, legibility, partisanship, consequentiality, and publicity of discourses, objects, events, and practices
(Dickinson, Blair, & Ott, 2010). Public memory is concerned with shared understanding about the past, which is manifested in discourses, objects, events, and practices about the past. The consensual assumptions are that public memory bears a relationship to the present, narrates shared identities, is partial, and has a history. Dickinson and colleagues revised these assumptions and argue that each of them reinforces the rhetorical character of public memory:
Public memory’s relationship with the present is highly variable, dependent upon context, 12 become available through rhetorical recourses, and require representational choices that are framed by various techniques. First, public memory narrates and constructs identities that are embraced and have adherents. This presumes an affective inflection of a memory’s content for particular audiences and contexts, which makes them rhetorical. Second, what affects and what way these affects are activated and selected are of special importance and are rhetorical. Third, the partiality of public memory comes from its symbolic and material nature, which implies rhetoricity. Public memory has its own history, which depends on available cultural resources, infrastructural capacities, mnemonic contexts, and affective deployments.
Fourth, the relationship between memory and place and time and space are inherently rhetorical as well, (place/space: memory/ time). Just like place is defined from and defines space so is memory defined in relationship with time. Place is space that is bordered, specified, and locatable by being named, deployed in and deploying space; it is seen as different from open, undesignated, and undifferentiated space. So, memories are differentiated, named “events” marked for recognition from amid an undifferentiated temporal succession of occurrences
(Dickinson, Blair, & Ott, 2010). Fifth, both memory and place are rhetorical, as they emerge from being “recognizable” as named, bordered, and differentiated by symbolic and material interventions. Their recognizability does not suggest that they are not contestable, because just as there are debates over public memory, there arguments and debates over designations of place.
Rhetoric and memory are indistinguishable because just like memories are constructed by rhetorical means, so are rhetorical acts made possible by shared collective remembrance. Philips and Reyes (2011) extend the memory rhetoric connection in international context with the concept of global memory capes. They suggest that the global memoryscapes operate in three ways: first, the global influences alter national and local memories in order to be more 13 intelligible within a framework of global memory; second, many memories are indeed created by transnational interactions; and third, memories are transported through national borders. The global memoryscapes concept is helpful to understand communist past in its transnational context.
Selected literature review
Previous research on confronting the communist past
Scholars have conducted memory studies on former communist countries that responded to the rise of a national consciousness about the past. In this section, I have included several studies as they relate to post-communist post-totalitarian societies that are confronting the national past through memory-works. They all relate to my project in different levels and all suggest that a time of major changes brings public memory into discussion and is always appropriated to fit interest of the present.
Bruner (2000) analyze and compare the speeches of the president Weizsacker delivered to the West German parliament on May 8th 1985 for the commemoration of end of WWII and the president Jenninger in 1988 addressing the parliament to commemorate the five year anniversary of anti-Jewish pogrom, both of whom articulated national identity in late pre- unification Germany. He argued that identifying codes of what is publicly “unsayable” and
“inappropriate” in a given situation helps differentiate national identity variations in political discourse. He suggested that the narrative absences were used strategically to deflect the attention from the national socialist past. Bruner argues that avoiding what is “inappropriate” and which “could not be said” must be carefully investigated, especially in political speeches about the “nation.” Since public memory is selective in nature, a critic must make sure to distinguish if 14 an absence is necessary or egregious, and point out the absence that is politically motivated. He emphasizes the danger that critical histories could turn into monumental ones, and advises that the critiques must only “unmask” in “such a way, as to preclude reflexive public discussion.”
The speeches and other discourses geared at constructing national identifies could turn into monumental history, as it did with Weizsacker’s speech. Weizsacker constructed the West
German public as victims not as perpetrators, which worked to shape a national socialist public memory that misplaced serious public discussion about the past.
The ethno-geographer Karen Till (2005) in The New Berlin focuses on the dynamics of memory place-making when dealing with the national traumatic past. She unveils the symbiosis of place, memory, and politics. She captures the two moments of memory-work in the city of
Berlin after German reunification and organically places them as they emerge from larger and more complex efforts of a divided nation to become one again. The city of Berlin comes to us in this book as a place that embodies the imagined pasts and futures combined. Till acknowledges that absences constitute our national histories. These absences are the reason why people feel haunted in the present and explain the multiple ways that they struggle when confronting, denying, and celebrating the past worlds. Place-making, especially memory place-making, is offered as a collective and social effort to deal with ghosts and hauntings of a violent national past. Till brings theoretical concepts and details from every day to explain how places of memory were constructed in Berlin. These places of memory resulted from citizens’ initiative and public debates in a time of political, social, and economic transition.
James (2005) conducts a visual analysis of monuments of post-communist Hungary as commemorative sites. She suggests that these monuments are used to make and remake history to serve the ideological purposes of the present by decentering, repurposing, and moving 15
communist visual culture. Drzewicka (2014) examines the media debates surrounding the
publication of Neighbors in remembrance of the WWII pogrom of Jewish Poles by gentile Poles, which “captured the gentile Poles desire and anxiety in a post-communist order” (p. 363). Her psychoanalytic readings shows that by not recognizing the pogrom the media commentators were trying to protect the Polish Gentile Self. She argues that the aphasic mechanisms of misrecognition and metonymy shapes memory and responses about the event.
Atkinson (2016) investigates the exhibits of the DDR museum in Germany as a memory place that functions to shape public memory of East Germany’s past. He argues that the museums exhibits position the East German citizens as hedonistic and juvenile and invite visitors to act in ways that reinforce these positions. Both sections of the museum suggest to the visitors that East Germans were “dupes who acted out of hedonism” and as “Soviet puppets.” He suggests that the DDR as memory place bring to the surface the unsolved Stasi issues, the former secret police files, as well. This examination of the DDR revealed how the practice of participatory camouflage contained manifest and latent meanings that shaped the public memory of East German past in the current cityscape of Berlin.
Barney (2009) examines how nostalgia can help to understand the transition from totalitarian regime to democracy. He analyzes the film Good Bye Lenin and argues that looking closer at the everyday life of the communist fall might serve as an indication that an East
German identity may still exist. Barney’s (2009) rhetorical examination on cartography post- cold-war maps argues that the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe of early
1990s are being re-mapped on “paper and in the imaginations of their leaders.” He draws attention to how maps determine a regions future, especially in Eastern Europe where borders are contested and redrawn in a post-communist climate. Barney examined the atlases produced by 16 the Pluto Project and warns mapmakers, cultural geographers, and political theorists that
‘‘space’’ in the post-Cold War world is heavily challenged be ideology and activist mapping.
Previous research on public memory, memory place, and identity
There is a significant amount of rhetorical scholarship surrounding this research area. In this section, I have selected a few that pertain specifically to how places invoke identity through memory and that will closely inform this project. Dickinson (1997) traces the relationship between rhetoric, memory, place, and identity from classical theories to contemporary spaces.
The contemporary identities are performances that utilize memory resources and are structured and occur in the landscape of consumption. Dickinson argues that the connection of rhetoric, memory, place, and identity prompt memory to shaping personal identity. Just like in the classical tradition, the orator utilized memory places to recall particular ideas or arguments, or as the renaissance citizen turned to the garden as a guide to virtuous behavior, the contemporary individual visits a memory place like Pasadena in an attempt to recall or recover a stabilized identity. He posits that within postmodernity it is the connection between memory and per- formative/ personal identity that motivates a reevaluation of memories position in rhetorical theory and criticism. Memory provides both the resources and the structure for enacting the appropriate (decorous) performances.
Dickinson argues that memory serves as a resource or grammar for the rhetorical performance of the self. In postmodernity where identities and selves are reflexively organized, rhetorical invention must expand to include not just the linguistic arguments but the stylized invention of the self: the rhetorical “subject” is not an abstract argument but instead an inventor of him/herself to a localized politics of conflicting and ever-changing identities. By linking memory, invention, and identity, Dickinson localizes invention temporally - through 17 contingently held beliefs secured for the time being by argument, and spatially - through contingently held identities, enacted in a moment, in a particular place and by a particular bond.
This localization of invention turns attention to how places invoke memories and invent selves.
Another study by Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki (2005) outlines the material and symbolic ways that history museums function as rhetorical invitations to collective memory and national identity. They investigated the Buffalo Bill Historical Center (BBHC) located in Cody Wyoming to discover the ways how these museums create structured invitations to meaning about the
American Old West. The results for the Buffalo Bill Museum, one of the five museums of the center, show that the four “independent” exhibits work to tell a coherent well-ordered story; a story that suggests that Buffalo Bill’s story is not simply a history, but the history of the West.
The relegation of the Native Americans to the wild west Room only, and their representation of the white/native violence as peripheral and primarily as objects places them as exoticized ethnic
Other. The multiplying levels of authenticity cover profound absences and carnivalizing the conquest colonization of the West. Representing Buffalo Bill and cowboys as “heroes” who civilized the land, the museum celebrates the white, male, civilizing colonizer to an untamed land. The museum neutralizes the Euro American colonization of the West by coming as a story about a story, as an image about an image – a full simulacrum, the death–making acts constitutive of “winning” the West become the death-defying tricks of the Wild West.
The Ott, Aoki, and Dickinson’s (2011) study of the Cody Fire Museum, which is part of
BBHC, focuses specifically on practices of looking and space creation of museums as both selective and biased. The authors argue that the Cody Fire Museum mobilizes a Western
(Occidental) gaze, which is to engage in surveillance, to see in distanced, “objective”, and timeless gaze. The central question here is to investigate how visual practices invite the 18 audiences to “look” in specific ways and the rhetorical function of these specific ways of looking. They argue that the western gaze is built upon the structured ways of looking: visual practice of the museum significantly delimits the intertextual association and functions as a desensitizing and decontextualizing effect through rhetorical domestication (guns as sportsmanship, as industrial, and hunting) and the intricacies and practices of display work towards sterilization of guns through promoting particular regimes of looking (CFM as clear exercise of taxonomy, absents sensory experiences, the artistic array display, and the symbolic cleaning as the people who used the guns are invisible). The second important examination here is how CFM is beyond display that is contingent to historic and cultural contexts. The authors argue that, because the visitors bring their experiences and cultural context with them, the CFM requires an examination elicited by absence, what is lacking and concealed. First, they rely on the dialectics of presence and absence perspective. Presence as concrete, definite, and material, while the absence more than just the opposite of presence – more than symbolic, but rather as presence’s barred Other. Second, on is the psychoanalytic perspective on looking awry, which is the contrast of looking straightforward. Looking awry (Zizek, 2007) is to follow the desire, which in Lacanian terms, desire arises from lack; it does not “objectively” exists, thus it is articulated by fantasy. The results from this examination show how the CFM setting is a scene of desiring with two primal fantasies restaged, that of abjection as colonial nation building and that of castration as ideal masculinity. The authors advance a critical praxis that promotes a multiple way of seeing, not simply on what is displayed, rather they suggest a way of looking off-center.
Another study examined the Plain Indian Museum (PIM) in this case, as key component/s in the construction of collective memory and national identity (Dickinson et al, 2006). The museum is not simply an exemplar of technological museum practices, it strives also to be a 19 leader of educating the public about the Native peoples as the interactive sites are an effort to let the “voices of natives” guide the interpretation. The purpose here is to identify the implications of activating memory in such a memory space. Relying on the idea that memory spaces are best viewed as diffused texts (rather than as concrete), that they are part of a larger cognitive landscape (not just part of a physical landscape), and that they invite visitors to assume particular subject positions (which in turn shape perceptions, they entail certain ways of looking and exclude others). The PIM is located in the larger experimental memory landscape of immensity and sublimity positions the visitor to look in particular ways – they construct a reverent eye/I, to look with respect from a distance. While the PIM recounts the rich pre-modern Plains Indians, it absolves Euro-Americans of the violence of conquest. The reverent eye/I is only achieved because the PIM is meaningful as constitutive element of a larger landscape. The authors suggest that our PIM and other visual/material rhetorical sites depend on our localizing of analysis in the particularities of landscapes.
Research on place
Scholars in various disciplines have defined and studied place. The purpose of this project is to investigate how places are constructed rhetorically and knowing how place is defined from interdisciplinary literature helps to ground the quest on how places come to acquire the meaning they do. Heidegger (1971) has significantly influenced contemporary thought on place. In Being and Time he defines place as more than a location; first place is created, then the location and space are created by place - the act of place creation produces space. He also introduces the idea of how place invokes dwelling -a sense of nearness and care. However, Yi-Fu
Tuan (1974b, 1977) offers one of the most comprehensive and holistic definitions of place by explaining the affective bond between people and places, because people get to know the world 20
through places. He defines place in comparison to space. Space as an open arena of action and
movement, while place is about stopping and resting and becoming involved. Place is a “pause.”
While space is amenable to the abstraction of spatial science and economic rationality, place is
amenable to discussions of things such as “value” and “belongings.” The primacy of place has
been one of Casey’s contributions as well. He suggests that “to live is to live locally, and to
know is first of all to know the place one is in” (1998). He argues that place precedes space and
location. Creswell has investigated place in detail. He argues that place could be used in a myriad
of ways, which reveals the complicated relations among place, meaning, and power (2015). In In
Place/Out Place Cresswell finds that “people, things, and practices are strongly linked to particular places, and that when this link was broken - when people acted “out of place”- they were deemed to have committed a “transgression.” He argues that place does not have meaning that is natural and obvious but ones that are created by some people with more power than others to define what is and is not appropriate.”
Places of memory are of special importance. Blair, Dickinson, and Ott (2010) identify the ways in which place, particularly places of memory, are important to memory. First, place is a symbolic/material vehicle of memory. Because place cannot be transported, read as a narrative, or like a photograph, place affects memory in very special ways. As it is important to identify the various means that memory is parsed, represented, shared, and embraced, places are such means, probably the most powerful, that have survived as recognizable memory apparatus from ancient times (places as memory prompts). Second, special kinds of places are particularly associated with public memory, the “memory places.” There are at least six characteristics about “memory
places” that sets them apart from the rest and that are based on their place-ness, their memory
formation, and their rhetoricity: (1) for memory places, the signifier – the place - carries a special 21 importance as a place of attention and desire, which comes from its status as a differentiated space and as a self-nominated special site of memory, (2) memory places construct preferred public identities for visitors, a specific relationship between past and present, a cross-temporal experience, (3) memory places are characterized by extreme partiality, this extraordinary partiality is responsible in part for deeply political character of memory places and how they represent a view of who belongs and on what terms, (4) because of their place-ness memory places mobilize power in ways not available to other memory techne, which has two aspects; they are located and they are implacably material. Memory places engage the whole sensorium, sight, smell, and touch, which has its own power dimension that becomes part of the experience,
(5) they almost always incorporate the products of various memory techne like words, videos, graphs, and other mediated means, and (6) memory places themselves have histories - they do not just represent the past, they accrete their own past. James Loewen (2000) suggests three temporal moments that mark memory places: the manifest narrative, the story of its preservation, and the visitors’ own era.
Till (2005) in her investigation of memory places in Berlin argues that places of memory are created to give shape of felt absences, fears, and desires. Ghosts of the socially repressed pasts are evoked and are given a spatial form through the landscape of these places of memory.
She suggests a specific meaning of the past is uncovered and made visible by these places: Just like the past has no underlying essence and is never settled in neat horizontal layers, a place does not have a set of essential qualities. For Till, the place is unique “due to lingering imprints of particular interactions that only place can transpire . . . The same imprints and social, spatial, and temporal interactions result in new, often unexpected effects”. Memory comes alive through the self-reflexive act of contextualizing and ongoing search for the past through place. This makes 22 memory and its outcomes fluid. These outcomes change with the needs of the present by continually remaking and remembering the past in the present, as the past is organized and constituted symbolically.
The visual and memory turn in rhetorical criticism
Scholarship surrounding this project’s topic has been concerned with how commemorative sites shape public memory and identities. My project will have a twofold contribution on critical scholarship: in addition to contributing further on how places of memory are used to shape public memory, my research quest will differ from previous research as it focusses on the rhetorical construction of places, that is how rhetoric is used to create and maintain meaning and define place. The third sub-question of this project investigates how
Albania as place is defined in the EU integration discursive space. Places are rhetorically constructed because meaning about places is established through memory in response to present and particular interests.
One of Dickinson’s works published in 2015, Suburban Dream is a model contribution on how space is constructed rhetorically. He identifies how the “suburban space” is rhetorically constructed through the interplay of three rhetorical spatialities. He argues that the building of the good life as a material and symbolic project is an enactment that is built of enabling and structuring rhetorical resources. The built environment of suburbs is made and remade by architects using materialized rhetorical possibilities. The residents and visitors use these symbolic and material resources to enact and perform the particular versions of the good life.
Just like topoi that built rhetorical resources, the symbolic-material and the temporal-spatial built the rhetorical consequences of suburbs. Rhetorical spatialities connect the recent attention to space with the ancient understanding of topoi. He suggests three broad intersecting rhetorical 23 spatialities: memory, locality, and safety. These spatialities are at once resources for compelling rhetoric and are themselves rhetorical effects. Suburbs as material and discursive landscapes are
“meaningful, legible, partisan, and consequential,” characteristics which render them as rhetorical. Memory, locality, and safety are spatialities - they shape space even as they are apprehended and performed spatially. Rhetorical spatialities focus on how landscapes, together with the people who inhabit and thus make and remake them, embody, enact and urge values, beliefs, and actions.
The boundaries of the field have been broadened by including images, places, landscapes, and videos as text –that is, rhetorical acts. The visual approach, just like the traditional classical rhetoric, is instrumental and operates in its immediate context. Helmers and Hill (2003) recognized how the ubiquity of images and their importance in conveying ideas and opinions make them essentially rhetorical acts. They suggest that by looking at the images from the communicative perspective, it allows for a series of meanings built by blocks of text, through subjectivity, voice and contingency: Audiences can project “altered ends” of the images they see.
As visuals represent what has happened, they also represent the future as “the moment of possibility.” The ‘possibility’ is more powerful because it involves the spectators’ ability to create contingencies in their efforts to create meaning (Helmers & Hill, 2003).
Visual rhetoric has included museums, memorials, and other sites as rhetorical acts to better understand social influence, persuasion, and identity formation. Visual rhetoric is often being studied along with collective memory. Collective memory exists on images, videos, television, memorial sites, and museums; thus, it is inherently a mediated phenomenon. Our history will remain, in part, a story of what media has chosen and we repeatedly are reminded of it through visual rhetoric (Neiger, Meyer & Zandberg, 2011). Postmodern theory challenges the 24
previous ideas of what constitutes a text, by questioning who claims the meaning of the text and
if the text is free of politics (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991). From the analysis of the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial, they argue that the memorial is a “postmodern commemorative text” that
embodies political character through its “multivocal rhetoric.”
Method
What distinguishes the rhetorical criticism approaches are the standards used for evaluation and assessment. These standards (grounds for judgment) depend on the purposes of rhetorical acts and shapes the systematic evaluation. One way to go about this is to classify these standards based on their specific purpose, whether they aim to understand how a rhetorical text works or to understand the role of that text in the society. As explained in the last section of literature review, methods of criticism have evolved and are shaped by what is deemed more important at judging the purposes of rhetorical discourses. The main approaches to criticism as it has evolved are the traditional (neo-Aristotelian), the conventional (symbolic and constitutive), the ideological, and the postmodern.
The conventional perspective on criticism evolved as a response to limitations of traditional criticism, which was prevalent for about a forty-year period. Traditional criticism is also known as the instrumentalist approach, as it focused on evaluation the ways how the rhetor adapts the speech to effect particular audiences. Edwin Black in his Rhetorical Criticism: A
Study in Method, published in 1965, opens the method to new innovative approaches. He argues
that the traditional method, the “neo-Aristotelian,” is formulaic, unimaginative, and unnecessary
restrictive, and as such is inadequate to analyze the text (1965). Black rejects the strict methods
of criticism, “an orientation, together with taste and intelligence, it’s all that a critic needs. If his 25 criticism is fruitful, he may end up with a system, but he should not, in our state of knowledge begin with one” (p.177).
The symbolic and constitutive approach goes beyond the instrumental view of rhetorical processes. Here the concern is to discover how rhetoric works to create identities and society at large. The advancement of language as “symbolic action” theory brought into being other new approaches to studying what rhetoric does. Kenneth Burke’s theory of “language as symbolic action” places rhetoric at the center of what makes us human. The reality we know has been constructed by us using symbols, and humans are ‘symbol using - symbol misusing’ animals
(Burke, 1996).
The ideological approach came as an advancement of the symbolic and constitutive approach. It asks not only how rhetoric creates beliefs and social relationships, but also, what particular interests these constructs serve, which powerful domination group is reinforced, and which is excluded and silenced. Critical rhetoric was introduced by McKerrow (1989) as the critique of the power of “domination” and “freedom.” Here, the purpose of criticism is to reveal how discourses oppress and silence, and the critic must explore discursive avenues for change to power relationships. Intercultural rhetoric as the mixing of rhetorical tradition was introduced in the 1980s and 1990s as influenced by cultural studies. Starosta (1984) brought attention to implications of multicultural settings for rhetorical criticism and proposed a six-stage critical method when investigating intercultural rhetoric and urged considering culture as central in rhetorical criticism. Gonzalez and Cheng (2004) identify four main instances/contexts for intercultural rhetoric: a) when rhetoric crosses two or more cultures, b) rhetorical traditions from two distinct rhetorical traditions collide over common topics, c) the rhetor is from one culture 26 and the primary audience is from another, and d) the critic select tools from one rhetorical tradition and applies them to rhetorical acts of another tradition.
The latest examinations of rhetoric have involved images and places as rhetorical acts as well. The majority of studies in this project fall into this later mode of rhetoric. The studies of memory places fall into this category as well. The approach to public memory as rhetorical draws from all modes of rhetoric but the attention to image, place, and space make this orientation unique. Scholars that follow this mode take rhetoric to be “a set of theoretical stances and critical tactics that offer ways of understanding, evaluating, and intervening in a broad range of human activities” (Blair, et al, 2010).
This project’s research method will be an overlapping of conventional and postmodern approaches to evaluate how public memory functions rhetorically in political discursive, non- commemorative and commemorative speeches. Being Albanian, the analysis is informed by my own experience of growing up during communism and its aftermath. It will be a rhetorical textual analysis of several memory infrastructure texts. Informed by Blair, Dickinson, and Ott’s
(2011) approach, my method will consist of a systematic investigation of what makes these texts meaningful, legible, partial, consequential, and public. Specifically, I will investigate the ways in which memory texts (1) render themselves meaningful through affective investments, (2) are legible on particular times and for particular audiences, (3) are consequential of what they do and generate, and (4) are made public by investigating what is addressed, where, to who, and how.
Texts
I analyze both non-commemorative and commemorative texts. There is a distinction between commemorative and non-commemorative memory, which pertains to explicit and 27 conscious commemoration of past events by audiences in the present. The non-commemorative memory pertains to the many ways and manners that the past “lives” in the present through cultural verbal and nonverbal means. The non-commemorative texts that will be analyzed for this project consist of the EU enlargement documents on Albania and press releases, Albanian integration documents on the EU and press releases, and the immediate media coverage following documents publication and public release in Albania and the European Union. The commemorative texts include memory places of communist past and public discourse about the past. Places of memory include: a) the Site of Witness and memory museum, b) the infamous
Spac Prison memorial site, The House of leaves museum, and c) the Bunkart Center museum.
The commemorative discourse consists of a) speeches delivered in commemorative events from either state leaders, survivors, and citizens, b) authors or artist publication events about the communist past, and 3) key books and documentaries about the communist past.
Procedures
I accessed the documents and press releases described above from the official websites of the Albanian Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the European Union. I visited the places of memory during summer of 2017 to examine their structure and display I gathered supporting materials available to the public such as handouts, brochures, photos, and videos offered to visitors. I observed what is made available to visitors of the site and what is routinely and publicly expressed at and about the site. I visited the Institute of Study of Communist Crimes and Consequences in Tirana several times and I was assisted with books and materials from their publication library and archives. I was also assisted with publication and documents from the
OSCE office in Tirana, the Albanian Institute for Democracy Media and Culture, and the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation Albania branch. The press coverage of the events was accessed from the 28 newspapers official website. The materials available in Albanian language were translated in
English.
Dissertation chapter content outline
This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter one includes the introduction, literature review, and method. The introduction describes the research topic, the research question, and the rationale to establish the need for this study and build a strong preview of the projects contribution. The literature review includes previous rhetorical public memory studies related to place and communist and other totalitarian past research. The method clearly describes the theoretical basis and procedures that pertain to my research question. Chapter two consists of the results of how public debates about communist past construct the public memory, the first sub-question. It includes an introduction of different periods of dealing with the past, an analysis of contemporary public debates, and an evaluation of how they construct the public memory.
Chapter three includes the results of how four places of memory shape and construct the communist past by material and symbolic means, the first sub-question. The places of memory are described in detail, with the rationale on why their selection is significant, and followed by the rhetorical analysis and critical conclusion. Chapter four consists of the results of examining the rhetorical construction and contestation of Albania as place within the EU context, the third sub-question. It includes an introduction of the context on Albania –EU relation and context, a rationale why the texts selected for examination are significant, the findings from the rhetorical analysis, and a critical conclusion. Chapter five consists of conclusions. A review of the three previous chapters and explains how the findings work together to explain how dealing with the past functions rhetorically to construct meanings and define places as called in the present. I put 29 the findings from this study into public memory scholarship framework, explain the contribution, address the limitations, and offer suggestion for future research. 30
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CHAPTER II. PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE COMMUNIST PAST IN
TRADITIONAL MEDIA
Introduction
The public debate over how to deal with Albania’s communist past has included traditional and social media, political debates on legislation, cultural and social institutional initiatives, nongovernmental organizations, and historical and religious institutions. These debates have spanned through the last 27 years of democracy and their nature and intensity has been determined by the larger socio-political context in the country. In this chapter, I analyze the contemporary public discourse about the communist past guided by the second sub question:
What are the deliberation strategies about the communist past and how do they shape public memory in the current national context? In what follows, I first identify and describe four periods that dealt with the communist past in Albania; second, I define and interpret two rhetorical deliberation strategies of the public discourse; and third, I evaluate how these strategies work to construct the public memory of the communist past.
Based on the institutional (systemic) efforts and the intensity of public debates I identified four periods that dealt with the communist past in Albania: the early post-communist period of 1991-1996, the past ignored of 1997 to 2004, the past resurfaced through 2004 to 2014, and the public debates of 2015 to the present. This classification is based on a) the intensity and nature of the public debates about the communism in traditional media, and on b) the legal, institutional, legislative, and administrative policies related to communist past. After a brief summary on various ways that different countries of the world have dealt with the traumatic pasts of repressive regimes, I describe the first three periods how Albania handled its communist 36 past, then I focus on the contemporary (2015-2017) public debates, which are the focus of this analysis.
Dealing with the repressive regimes has had different outcomes in different countries and situations. There is no single nor universal strategy, but research has shown patterns and similarities in the way difficult pasts caused by oppressive regimes have been addressed. Adam
(2003) conducted an empirical exploration of how democracies have managed the former state- sponsored crimes and categorized six strategies: amnesia, trials and justice, lustration, negotiated restitution, political reeducation, and truth commissions. These strategies are used at different times and simultaneously depending on the historical context. Amnesia has been the case in post- cold war Germany, Spain, Japan, and Russia. Trials and justice has been demonstrated in the
Nuremburg Trials and Proposed International Court, while Lustration has been the case for
Eastern Europe after communism. Negotiated reinstitution has been applied to the case of
Germany and its reparations and compensations to Israel, as well as in the negotiations of land rights to indigenous groups in Canada and Australia. Political reeducation has been used during the decommunization in Eastern Europe. Truth commissions were applied in the cases of South
Africa and Latin America (Adam, 2003).
The totalitarian communist past is specific to central and Eastern Europe, and different countries of the Eastern European bloc vary on the level and length of the communist repression
(Balas, 2010). Various approaches to dealing with the past include “decommunization’ measures and lustration laws, which have taken form throughout Central and Eastern Europe. It is important to distinguish between “lustration” and “decommunization”, especially in this chapter, since I focus on public discussions of the communist past. Lustration laws are designed to restore confidence in justice and law and promote democratic values; lustration laws are not “retroactive 37 justice,” as they do not punish those involved nor those who assisted in committing atrocities
(Balas, 2011). The strength of the lustration laws and decommunization procedures must match the level of communist repression, and the means on dealing with the totalitarian past is determined by local conditions (Balas, 2010).
Albania as a member of European Council embraced the Resolution 1096 (1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems. The resolution explains the problem in its first paragraph:
On an institutional level this heritage includes over-centralization, the militarization of
civilian institutions, bureaucratization, monopolization, and over-regulation; on the level
of society, it reaches from collectivism and conformism to blind obedience and other
totalitarian thought patterns. To reestablish a civilized, liberal state under the rule of law
on this basis is difficult- this is why the old structures and thought patterns have to be
dismantled and overcome. (Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 1996)
Albania’s communist regime was one of the strongest in the region and the fallout of dealing with the past had its specifics and trajectories. The institutional legislative way to dealing with the past has not always agreed with the public discussions. The early post-communism years included restitution and some trial and justice strategies from the institutional level. The public discussions in the media all acknowledged communism as a national and economic catastrophe, and at a private level people denied collaboration or remained silent. The colapse of communism meant that the isolation was over, and during the early years of the 90s there was a massive emigration to neighboring countries, especially to Italy and Greece. The total economic destruction of the country from the communist era and the opening of borders left basically no room for any single admiration for the past. There was no justification for the total failure of the 38 past regime, and there was a total private denial of having collaborated with the regime (Biberaj,
1998).
1991-1996: Lustration, restitution, and denial
The immediate post-communist years included both political camps, democrats and former communists, although at various levels, groups tried to put a thick line between them and the past. The first pluralist elections resulted with the first pluralist parliament assembly in the country since before WWII. The first law that dealt with the former state crimes was passed by this parliament, where the Labor Party (former Communist Party) had the majority. In September
1991, the parliament passed Law No. 7514 and “apologized to all the people who were accused, tried, sentenced and imprisoned, interned or persecuted during 45 years for violations of a political nature, in the violence to their civil, social, moral, and economic rights” (1991). This law began by proclaiming that all these people, including those who fled Albania during communism, as innocents and granting them or their heirs a long list of rights including returned pensions, property, and compensation for their years of punishment. This law is still in effect and it has been amended regularly. This law was the first form of restitution for the victims and persecuted, and the fact that it was put into place while the former communists were still in power made it a successful attempt to a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.
The major post-communism event was the March 1992 election, when a democratic government was elected for the first time since WWII. Sali Berisha became the first elected president of the Democratic Party, which emerged from the anti-communist movement. In his presidential inaugural address, Berisha proclaimed a new democratic start for Albania and declared a communist past where “we are all jointly guilty, we have jointly suffered.” This statement became one of the most famous statements in Albania and abroad, especially in the 39 post-communist eastern bloc, which was at the same time dealing with the consequences of the communist past. The declaration was a cry for peace and new beginning, where the new democratic state would be the antithesis of communism.
In the early years of post-communism, there were few trials and justice strategies. Several criminal persecutions of senior communist elites and close collaborators took place, however there were minimal or no convictions as there was no evidence of crime (Impholtz, 2005). Also, the initial laws regarding property reinstitutions took place, and the amendment 24/1 to the Labor
Code reformed the state jobs with the rationale to cleanse the state administration from those who served communism. These first trials and justice strategies were followed by lustration laws and attempts.
The first lustration law, no. 7666, dated January 26, 1993, established a state commission to remove the law licenses to those who had been officers of or collaborators with the former secret service. The legal profession did not exist from 1967 to 1990 and the lawyers that were fired from state jobs were working privately. This law was returned by the Constitutional Court and the licenses were returned. Regardless of this difficulty, for the first time after 50 years the justice system included four hundred judges and attorneys that were not appointed by the communist regime.
In 1995, there were two parliamentary laws on lustration, with a change in terminology from “genocide” law to “moral figure” law: The first, Law No. 8001 enacted on September 22, was "On Genocide and Crimes against Humanity Committed in Albania during the Communist
Regime for Political, Ideological and Religious Motives." The second was enacted after only three months, in December of 1995, the Law no. 8043 “On the Control of the Moral Figure of
Officials and Other Persons Connected with the Protection of the Democratic State.” This law 40 prohibited former communist collaborators from running for office until 2001 and provided that the files of the former state-secret service would remain closed until 2025. The law had major criticisms and was amended four times, but remained in effect until 2001, when it expired by its own terms (CDRSEE, 2005). Public debates during the early period were about the quality of the lustration laws and how to rebuild a new state and democracy. The communist past was totally
“suppressed,” and people were still coming to grips with how such a state control and crime could have happened. With the pluralism, there were new private newspapers, national and local, and radio and television channels, that covered extensively what the rest of Europe was doing and what Albania had missed during the communist regime.
1997-2004: The past ignored
The public debates about the communist past remained low after the state of emergency of 1996, where national protests after the collapse of financial pyramids, which caused Sali
Berisha’s first democratic government to fall (Biberaj, 1998). The socialist party, the reformed communist party, came to power in 1997, and stopped all forms of restitution, so the victims and persecuted stopped receiving compensation after 1997 (Impholtz, 2005). The 1997 state of emergency put the country into added shock, and with the former communist coming back to power, there was not much debate surrounding the past until 2004.
A public debate concerning the past took place in 2004, as the country was preparing for political parliamentary election of 2005. Protests against the parliament from the former politically persecuted became frequent. In 2004, a draft proposed for a new lustration law by a small opposition party was introduced, but did not pass. The public discussions about the past focus more on the political debates, with main parties blaming each other for either being collaborators of the communist regime or for using the persecuted and crimes as a political 41
weapons. Public discussion was sparse, as the past was only discussed in political debates among parties, with democrats blaming socialists for neglecting the past to protect themselves from guilt and socialists blaming democrats for using it for political gain. The public discussion about the past started developing at the end of this period.
2005-2014: The past resurfaces
There had been a combination of institutional efforts to address the past as well as a steady increase in public discussions regarding Albania’s communist history. The debate about the opening of secret files began in 2004, which was generated from the protests and the political debates on compensations of the former persecuted. This debate was ignited by the public appeal by Kadare, the prominent writer, to urge the government to open the former communist state secret service files. Other human rights activists and victims of communist organizations favored opening the files. There were also concerns on the way how the secret files were both created and manipulated. For example, Lubonja, another writer and a former political prisoner, declared that the opening of the files would not provide much evidence on collaborators, as “the service of the writers to communist regime has been multi-faceted” (Lubonja, 2004).
In 2008, a controversial Lustration Act (Act. No. 10034, December 22, 2008) was adapted from a similar act in Czechoslovakia (411/1991). Based on the Albanian constitution, this law required lustration of members of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It was declared unconstitutional and it never was implemented, even though it conformed to international and national legal requirements (Balas, 2010). The public debate on this law was immersed into larger political debates with the parliamentary elections of 2009 and other social and economic issues. I identify the years 2005-2014 as the period of preparing to shift from mainly political and institutional strategies to media and cultural public debates. 42
During this time, the Institute for the Study of Communist Crimes (ISCC) was established, and it has been instrumental in all subsequent developments of dealing with the communist past. It has conducted extensive research, as well as published and gathered data on crimes and human rights abuses during communism. Its publications include the Encyclopedia of Communist Crimes (the first of this kind) published in 2017, which documents the work camps, torture and abuse of children and women on these camps, the unlawful expropriation, and the former secret service surveillance and accusations. It serves as an archive for researchers who study the communist regime. The ISCC has published books and audios, organized activities of remembrance, and serves as a center of research and archives to assist research on the communist era. The organization collaborates with similar institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the
United Nations. I find that the ISCC was instrumental to bringing the debates about the past into the social and cultural sphere. All the previously explained developments prepared the ground for the public debates that followed from 2014 to the present. The next section describes the public debates of this period, the largest and most intense public debates about the past in the media.
2014-present: The public debates
The public debates surrounding the communist past have increased significantly since
2015. I identify the strategies dealing with the past during this period as a form of public lustration beyond the political and institutional spectrum, as well as decommunization. After
Albania became a candidate member of the European Union in 2014, the efforts to address the human rights violations during communist regime were intensified. The public debates were mainly focused on the treatment of the victims of communism, the lack of a lustration law that would do justice, and especially the publication in the media of secret service files by various 43 and often anonymous sources. Both right and left political parties have suggested that the communist crimes must be dealt with caution and that the opening of the former secret service files could bring civil unrest in the country.
Three major public debates about the communist past occurred during this period: the law on the right to be informed about the secret service files, the publication of a national survey on the attitudes towards communism and the communist dictator, and the debate on the ban on the films produced for propaganda during the communist regime. In 2015, the Law No.45/2015 was created, discussing “the right to information on documents of the former State Security of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania”, and it determined the rules, regulations, and procedures to make possible for anyone to have the right to information about the former Secret
Service files through a democratic and transparent process, in protection of individual and personality, and for national unity and reconciliation. The law applies to all the documents of the former Secret Service, dated from November 29, 1944 to July 2, 1991. The archive materials of the former Secret Service previously held at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, The Ministry of
Defense, The State Intelligence Service, and any other public and private entity were transferred to the Authority for Information on the Documents of Former State Security.
The public debate following the law was primarily on the nature of the law. Accusations that the law was enforced to protect the communist collaborators rather than providing justice and relief for the thousands of victims were made public by individuals, groups, political parties, and organizations that represent victims and the persecuted during the past regime.
In early December 2016, the results of a national survey on the attitudes toward communism were published. The publication title is the “Citizens understanding and perceptions of the communist past in Albania and expectations for the future.” The survey was conducted in 44
September 2015 by the Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA), a claimed independent think-tank, and the project was part of the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) Presence in Albania’s project “Supporting a platform for national dialogue about the human rights violations of Albania’s former Communist regime.” The OSCE permanent Council has been present in Albania since March 1997, and they updated the mandate in 2003 to “match the development and the good role that the country has played for positive regional and international development” (OSCE, 2003). The OSCE main areas of assistance and advice focus on democratization, the media, human rights, and election preparation and monitoring and cooperates with the Council of Europe. The OSCE officially distanced itself from interpreting the results; instead it only expressed the need for a public discussion of the past as “a healthy way to deal with communist atrocities” (OSCE, December 5, 2016).
The results of the survey were complex, and their publication spurred a wave of public debate not simply on the survey and its methodology but surely on the possibility of its use as a political instrument. Regardless of the limitations claimed on the survey’s methodology, the results were alarming enough for a fierce public discussion with groups suggesting the need for more aggressive decommunization strategies at regional and local level.
In early 2017, another wave of public discourse concerning the communist past filled the public discussion. This time, the Institute for the Study of Communist Crimes (ISCC), in response to concerns from former persecuted by communist regime, presented the official institutional appeal to the Parliament of Albania for a ban on the broadcasting on national and public media of films and movies produced by Kinostudio “Shqiperia e Re” as part of communist propaganda in the past regime. The appeal states that the members of the ISCC
“express the deep concern how the content on these documentary films and artistic movies 45 denigrate, discriminate, and harass the people who were persecuted by the regime, and manipulates and deform the historical truth” (ISCC, March 30 2017). The film and literary productions in the past were controlled strictly by the laws of agitation and propaganda, where with the direct supervision of the Politburo of the Communist Party, every production had to contribute to the war of classes, the creation of a hero that served the party, the state security, and creation of a “new individual.” The ISCC argued that the uncontrolled broadcasting of communist-era productions had become a threat to audiences, especially the younger generation on being influenced by the same communist propaganda that was actively generated by the past regime in efforts for ideological education and indoctrination of the mases. The ISCC appealed that the discrimination, denigration, and persecution based on political ideology, religion, and class were a propaganda weapon during communism, and so they cannot continue to do the same in democracy.
The public debate on the broadcasting ban of films and other forms of communist propaganda focused on the way the content of these films legitimized the expropriation, the legitimization of the “class” war, the manipulation of the national history, the creation of
“communist and socialist heroes” and “capitalist and revisionist traitors,” and the role that producers, screen writers, and directors had in this process. The debate involved former producers, actors, audiences, researchers, media commentators, and journalists. The debate expanded in social media, which is not investigated in this study. In what follows, I present the analysis of the public discussions on two main national television channels, Klan TV and Top
Channel, and the subsequent coverage on the three national newspapers Gazeta Mapo, Gazeta
Shqiptare, and Panorama. The two national TV channels were the ones where the main debates developed and the three newspapers were the main traditional press outlet for those involved to 46 write and respond to the issues. The two TV channels and the three national newspapers will be referred to as traditional national media.
The Past on Public Trial
The debates on television and subsequent commentaries in two main daily national newspapers about how to deal with the communist past generated two main deliberative strategies: a) dealing with the past institutionally vs. publicly, and b) the communist past as propaganda vs. cultural heritage. The deliberations about the past had a trial nature, as there were two positions, often oppositional, regarding the way they framed the past and the approach they suggested to deal with it.
Dealing with the past institutionally vs. public deliberation
There were two main arguments to the debates: those who were accused or perceived as collaborating with the regime supported that the past must be handled institutionally, and that the past and the relationship people had with it must be discussed freely in public debates and not be left to governmental institutions to control it. The national media labeled these debates as Tufa-
Culi and Kadare-Lubonja debates, as they publicly initiated or responded to direct accusations of being communist collaborators. Tufa is a prominent writer, persecuted by the communist regime, and the Director of the Institute of the Study of Communist Crimes and Consequences. Culi is a well-published writer, publicly celebrated especially during communism, and continues to be published and involved in literature related public events. Kadare is the prominent internationally known writer from the communist era, who defected from communist Albania one year before the collapse and has become known for his literary works on totalitarian and controlled societies 47 and regimes since 1970s. Lubonja is a writer and media analyst who was a political prisoner for
17 years during communism.
Tufa-Culi debate. This was the case of debates about whether writers who collaborated with former communist secret service agents should continue to be public figures. The case of
Tufa vs. Culi and the Kadare vs. Lubonja debate demonstrate this pattern of dealing with the past. The Tufa-Culi debate started after media published the documents from the secret service files of two young poets executed by the communist regime under agitation and propaganda charges. Under the Agitation and Propaganda law, the communist regime persecuted anyone whose ideas, actions, and works, including art and literature, was perceived as not in line with the communist ideology. Culi’s interpretation of the poems of the two young poets as
“ideologically confused” was used as evidence in their trial, which resulted in their later execution. The published critique that Culi had written for the former secret service was discussed in a televised debate, and commentaries continued in the printed and social media.
Tufa’s public accusations were initially presented on social media: “the past can’t be forgotten”, and “those who collaborated with the communist regime to persecute other intellectuals, must not continue to be revered in the public sphere. Culi has collaborated with the former secret service to bring the two poets to trial and consequently killed” (Tufa, 2016). The accusations were made on a call for a public reading, as a form of protest, at the same location as Culi was scheduled to speak to a television program. Tufa writes “come and listen to the poems of the two victims of communism at the same room with their killer,” and “public funds must not be used to promote criminals that never apologized for their crime” (Tufa, 2017).
The debate about public figures followed for months after the publication of the poets’ files and involved current writers, literary and media critics, and history and social scholars. Culi 48 defended herself in the television debate as she was the chief editor of Drita, the main literary magazine published during communism:
I had to serve the regime to save my job, if I did not do it the state would have had
someone else write it for them . . . I do not feel responsible for their death. The reason I
have not apologized to Leka and Blloshmi families is to respect their pain with silence.
The judging of these matters should be left to the institutions and not to the media critics.
(Culi, 2017)
The commentators that were perceived as involved with the past regime blamed it on the system, and wanted institutions and the government to deal with any claims related to the past.
These commentators blamed the communist system for the crimes and suggested not dealing with particular names, as this might be used for political interests. The more moderate commentators argued that a reflection from the writers, who were promoted by the former communist regime, and that continue to be part of the public sphere, should be expected. The past must not be left to public discussions and personal initiatives, instead the “institutional venues are the best way to deal with the past and keep the social peace” (Mustafa, 2017). Some writers who were involved with the communist regime used the example that other in communist countries, intellectuals had collaborated with the regime, as there was no other alternative.
The proponents for the idea that dealing with the past must be a public discussion argue that public intellectuals who were involved with the secret service need to now be out of the public influence. They suggested that the past must be publicly and freely discussed by every group and society, not just institutions that could easily be controlled by the governments or the more powerful. There is evidence that individuals who collaborated with former state secret service continue to be part of public sphere without publicly recognizing and apologizing for 49 their crimes. Some commentators publicly acknowledged that “Culi’s critique made for secret service, it’ was not neutral, instead it was harsh” (Marku, 2017) and it was “focused to denigrate the victims and support the communist ideology” (Tufa, 2017). The debate on public intellectuals’ possible collaboration with the former communist regime, no matter its particular outcome, served to take the memory beyond political facet.
Kadare-Lubonja debate. The institutional vs. public deliberation about the communist past was demonstrated during debates on television and media, which became known as Kadare-
Lubonja case. This time involved the publication of a book from UET Press. Kadare in the
Documents of the Palace of Dreams is a collection of original former-state secret service files and surveillance activity on Kadare, one of the most renowned Albanian writers, nationally and internationally. Included in these files were documents that described former political prisoners interrogated about what they thought of Kadare’s books at the time. One such file ignited public debate, and this is known as Kadare-Lubonja case. The secret service document described
Lubonja as testifying against his own father, as they were both political prisoners during communism. Lubonja argued that files were corrupted, that “the document was taken out of context” and that “secret service files were orchestrated to persecute people, and none should be judged with documents from these files, which continue to be used to hurt people” (Lubonja,
2017).
Participating in this debate were the former Head of the State Archives from 1992-1997, who publicly declared that Kadare had been followed by the communist regime, and his secret service file “is one of the longest and it has been moved and changed and destroyed often, as the communist regime was planning to imprison him as pro-western and pro-liberal” (Dervishi,
2017). Dervishi’s statements were reinforced by the declaration of the former Head of the State 50
Security, who stated that Kadare has been watched and surveilled carefully through his life during communism. There were plans to arrest Kadare in 1981 after the publishing of The Great
Winter, but it was the French president’s involvement that prevented Kadare from being arrested, because the book brought international fame to the dictator’s story (Lame, 2017). The former head of the State-Secret Service wrote extensively on how the decision for arrests were based on what went on in the country and outside, so arresting Kadare was not a safe move at the time, given the international fame he garnered from his book.
The commentators are split on the issue of whether the last Law on the Secret Files is helpful in understanding the past, and especially in discovering who collaborated with the past regime. The proponents of institutionally dealing with the past argue for controlling the public discussions, and suggest that the Law No.45/2015, or “the right to information on documents of the former State Security of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania,” is appropriate for handling the past. The law is not for the public, it is only for personal use, and so anyone who wishes to get his own file can apply for access. It is their choice whether to make the information public or not.
The proponents of handling the past publicly argue that the law no.45/2015 is not appropriate to handle the past. The law does not provide a lustration clause and it is helpful only for those individuals named on the files. It is more helpful to locate missing people and graves than to prohibit former state secret service collaborators from public office (Tufa, 2017). Some commentators argued that secret service files are not helpful for understanding who was responsible for the crimes committed. The opening of files is not being used to uncover how crimes were committed; instead the files are contributing to a culture of manipulation of people and creating false heroes, just like during the communist regime. The call for a public opening of 51 the secret files is considered unnecessary and misleading at the same time. The secret service files were destroyed systematically with official orders, for example, starting in July 1990 for all the Communist Party members, and then in September 1990 with the files of secret service collaborators” (Dervishi, April 8, 2017).
Communist productions as propaganda vs. cultural heritage
After the publications of the survey results, a new wave of public discussions emerged in traditional and social media. The participants in discussions found the survey results to be troubling, and were trying to explain what could keep that level of support for the communist regime and the dictator as high as it was. The striking results of what youth thought of the communist past, a time that they had not experienced directly, were that about half did not think the dictator was bad for the country, nor the communist system: “It was bad because it was not implemented right“ (OSCE, December 5, 2016). The survey results suggest that people do not see the communist legacy as a current issue, especially regarding the economy, corruption, and bad governance. Young people know much less about the communist regime, and they learn what they do know through family or television, not from school.
The survey results, despite its methodological shortcomings, had a public effect, especially on the former persecuted victims of communism. Activists from the former persecuted groups demanded that movies produced during the communist regime must be banned from public and national media, as they discriminate against the persecuted (Kola, 2017). The Institute for the Study of Communist Crimes (ISCC) proposed to the parliament to initiate a media law that screens the communist era productions and puts a ban on the ones that discriminate, manipulate, and perpetuate clear communist propaganda. ISCC and one of the members of AMA 52
initiated a media law that requires the screening of films and movies produced during communist
regime and classifies them based on their discriminatory language and propaganda.
The films and movies that “pass the screening, must have a mandatory pre-show
explanation of the theme, production, topic, and content, so the audiences have all the
necessary information to judge these productions in their historical production. (ISCC
Proposal, March 30, 2017)
The public debate took place on television, press, and social media. The essence of the
debate asked questions like: what must be done with artistic productions of that communist
regime, should artists reflect on their productions, and could propaganda be labeled art and
culture? There are two main responses by the commentators: some think that there should be a
ban on the broadcast and view the movies as communist propaganda, and others are focused on
preserving the communist movies as cultural heritage.
The commentators in favor of screening and banning the communist era production
argued that the artistic production discriminates and manipulates with their “values and anti-
values” of communist propaganda, and are a serious threat to current audiences. The films
produced by the Kinostudio “Shqiperia e Re” were aggressive propaganda during communism
produced for the purpose of “reeducation and indoctrination of the masses” and that “movies try
to rehabilitate that terrible regime and create a nostalgia about that regime in the defenseless generations” (ISCC, 2017). There were public declarations and calls in several newspapers: “It is not ethical to show movies that portray entire groups, like bourgeois, religious clerics, and all persecuted by the regime as enemies, manipulate national history, discriminate particular historical figures, and even portray children as spies to the regime. It is intolerable, and unethical that these are still being broadcasted” (Kadare, 2017). The broadcasting of these movies puts the 53 younger generation under the same propaganda influences of the “class war” and political persecution. Movies that portray the “class war,” “dictatorship of proletariat,” “unlawful expropriation,” “groups and communities as reactionary,” “the heroes and traitor,” and “religion as harmful” manipulate the audiences, especially those who have not experienced it, about what really happened during communism and compromise the historical truth. These movies are a disgrace to the people who want a free, open, and democratic Albania. Movies were one of the strongest and most powerful propaganda engines during communism, and are a clear deformation of history. They are divisive, and are discriminating to entire groups of people, especially those who stood up to the communist dictatorship (Gjika; Kumbaro; Godole; & Kapri,
2017).
The film researchers were involved in the debate and argued for films to be screened based on the way how they distorted the history or discriminated against certain groups of people. Film researcher Varvarica-Kuka (2017) felt that these films were embedded into the communist propaganda and they were heavily influenced by the developments in the eastern
European communist bloc. However, the pioneers of the Albanian cinematography started in the beginning of 1900s with Marubi and Indromeno, which had a western influence and entertainment purpose. The history of the film did not start with the communist era, and a
Museum of the Albanian Cinematography and Film could display all the development periods of
Albanian film, and a selection of communist era productions based on their artistic quality could be shown and explained without being problematic.
The commentators who argued for the communist era production as cultural heritage were at a majority the screenwriters, producers, actors, and people involved in the production of these movies. They acknowledge that the communist ideology was priority for their production, 54 but say that “we had to follow the ideological framework, otherwise they would not be produced” (Cashku, 2017). Some former producers suggest that movies should continue to be broadcasted and must be regarded separate from the ideology they convey and focus on their artistic and historical media production technology. Some commentators even praise the way the actors and producers were selected to participate through state institution procedures, as the movie productions were all state productions.
The proponents of cultural heritage and their traditional media supporters used “banning” and dismissed “screening” in their debates in efforts to make the request appear more aggressive to the public, although the ISCC initiative called for the ban on the films after screening and classification. Activists in the protection of these movies called for international support, particularly the Albanian Cinema Project efforts to preserve the movies as cultural artifacts. The
BBC, who covered this project claims for treating these films as cultural artifacts despite their troublesome propaganda and content of these movies.
Some of the proponents on cultural heritage approach dismissed the discrimination, manipulation of history, and propaganda threat completely. They blamed the current economic and political system as the cause for people to watch movies from the past as a way to escape from current reality. They argue that the debates on the movies are being used for present interests. The debate about the movies emboldened former communist producers to fiercely defend the communist past. The attack on the proponents of the screen and ban initiatives were explicit in the debates and threats were even issued to them afterward. Even the language used in their discussions resembles the communist era, like “stopping the movies would be ultra- reactionary,” “these movies are needed to preserve our identity” (Top Show, March 26, 2017). 55
Some commentators starting using censure instead of screening and banning and argued
that any censure would turn us back to the dictatorship. There were even claims that people
watching the communist productions are signs of the nostalgia for the communist past, and so
films are a bridge to that past. These commentators suggested that censuring the communist
production would be repeating the same censure of the communist regime and that the debate
was being used for political interests before the election.
While the discussion of the movies was not initiated against film producers, but against the films’ content, there were some producers who stood out more to protect these movies. The cultural heritage protagonists shifted the focus from the content of the movies to the producers and their identities. One of the former actors argued that the debate is being used for personal attacks. She suggests that the focus should be on what happened and find the responsible people:
“communism was terrible, and it was not the artists that orchestrated it” (Diamanti, 2017). Other producers suggested that new films and movies that tell the truth should be made.
The proponents of the screening and banning of the communist productions and the commentators that supported them argued that classification of the communist production era is essential. They suggest that the screening must be based on the way they distorted the history or discriminated against certain groups of people. The movies function to “rehabilitate that terrible regime and create misperception about that regime in the defenseless generations” (Tufa, 2017).
The proponents of the propaganda approach argued that it is not ethical to show movies that portray entire groups, like bourgeois, religious clerics, and all persecuted by the regime as enemies, manipulate national history, discriminate particular historical figures, and even portray children as spies to the regime. It is intolerable and unethical that these films are still being broadcasted (Kadare, 2017). In these movies, “the farmers and merchants willingly gave their 56
property and possessions to the communist state, or their property was taken by the state and
they were imprisoned, or the child listened better and respected more the leader than their own
parents” (Godole, 2017).
The proponents of banning explain that because of the heavy state restrictions, many
movies were completely ideological. They suggest that productions on which national historical
figures have been discriminated against, people who were against the regime were portrayed as
enemies of the country, and families and regions were labeled as “reactionary,’ and where the
“hero” was the new communist person, must be banned from broadcasting. However, they
recognize movies that have great historical and cultural significance like Skanderbeg, Nentori i
Dyte, and Balle per Balle, and Albanian movies with great success in the international socialist
world, which they urge to be preserved with care There are suggestions that since the movies
have already been broadcasted for so long, it might be too late to ban them now; however these
movies could be used to illustrate ideological brainwashing and political and contextual
influences on film and movie productions. The proponents of banning the movies as propaganda
used the international examples to strengthen the argument, like some of the banned Nazi and holocaust movies and the Rumanian example, where communist productions have the stamp of the former communist party during the broadcasting.
The religious leaders in Albania were asked to publicly declare their position on the communist production broadcasting. Religion was banned completely during the communist regime, and hundreds of clerics and their supporters were persecuted. The communist productions denigrate religious figures in their content. However, the religious clerics suggested not to focus on the movies, instead the focus must be on recognizing the communist past as a dark era that must not be repeated. One of the Catholic priests wrote 57
These movies spread hate but must not be banned. Communism is dead as an ideology,
it only exists in parts of the media and in people who still want to present a shameful past
as a glorious one. . . These are people who still have within themselves problems with the
past. Many people who were protagonist of the past are projecting their feeling of guilt to
protecting the communist ideology and propaganda. They have not managed to accept
that the investment they made in communism was the wrong one, and that their
communism experiment was a total failure. (Meta, March 20, 2017)
The request from the ISCC and AMA did not get the required attention at the parliament.
Currently, there is no law for screening nor broadcasting communist production. As I explain below, the public deliberations about the communist past worked to shape a contained public memory.
Conclusions: Contained Memory
The public trial described above construct a contained version of public memory. The public deliberation on press and television debates followed a trial approach with the following dividing lines when negotiating the communist past: if the past should be left to official institutions or be deliberated socially and publicly, and if the cultural productions of communist propaganda must be reevaluated and screened before broadcasting. The consequences of these deliberative strategies are a contained version of public memory, where the efforts for an open and public recognition of traumatic and criminal pasts are meet with aggressive attempts to control what about the past is “safe” for public deliberation.
The contained public memory had the following consequences: the victims of communism are framed as minorities, the debates became a battle for legitimacy, the contrast 58 between traditional and alternative media demonstrated the contained version of the past, and the international contextual forces required a certain past. First, the combination of institutional and political efforts to deal with the past, like various lustration and restitution policies, have formally defined the persecuted groups and victims of communism as minority. The public debates isolated the persecuted as minority in the efforts to control the version of communist past that could safely be articulated in today’s media. The debates took the form of a public trial, where the former persecuted groups and victims of communism made public appeal to act on the past at a cultural and social level. However, only few of them were invited to speak in the television debates. The debate was about them, but they were not included. This is another manifestation of a contained public memory, as to who has the assess to remember publicly, and whose remembering counts.
Second consequence, the debates shifted from the original focus on recognizing the past for what it was to who is to blame for the regime. Debates generated from the publishing of secret files became a public discussion on how to deal with the past, but the traditional media framed it as personal attack. However, the recent debates which I analyzed above as public trials, are the most open and public that they have ever been since the fall of communism. The fiercest discussion was on movies, which put the part of communist cultural heritage at risk of losing any remaining legitimacy. The commentators’ position varied from those who want to remember and reflect, to those who want to preserve, to those that do support the past by ignoring completely its effects, and some that frame the ban on movies as erasing history and identity (cultural heritage). As described previously in this chapter, the tendency in the public trials was to cast a collective blame on the criminal activity of the communist past (blaming the system), but claim personal absolution when accused of collaboration with the regime. The debate about the past 59 became essentially about the legitimacy to be revered in the public, social, and cultural sphere.
How could communist propaganda be labeled art and culture, when it denigrates, lies, manipulates, and divides? The discussions about the past proved that institutional and legislative efforts, despite their known flaws in this case, cannot control how the past is framed. It is the social and cultural forces of the past fighting for legitimacy at the present that shapes the public memory of the communist past.
Third, the contrast between traditional and alternative media framing of the debates demonstrates a construction of a contained version of memory. While the public television debates contained the memory of communist past, the discussion on social media had a different outcome:
The debate on banning communist films was largely disproportionally, on the one hand
the aggressive positioning of the so-called proponents of ‘historical and cultural heritage’
that relied largely on the traditional media, and on the other hand tens of thousands of
victims and their descendants, whose opinion was not heard in these media platforms,
suggest that the totalitarian system with its persecution propaganda as its characteristic
may recur at any time. Therefore, this debate should develop, broaden and deepen beyond
Kinostudio. (Godole, March 24, 2017)
Studies done in Albania and other post-communist bloc countries suggest problems with traditional media being instruments for the governments. Researchers have addressed the perceived lack of media freedom and independence, especially in the Western Balkans. “Media is in the grip of ‘soft-censorship,’ unable to break free for a democratic future. Milan and Zajazi write that “citizens no longer view their news media as independent. Media subsidies and advertising placements represent major leverage to serve those in power, promote positive 60 coverage and/or to conduct smear campaigns against critics and any independent intellectuals and professionals who dare to challenge the most powerful forces” (2017).
Fourth, the transnational context contributes to contain the public memory of the communist past. This is especially significant for the timing of public discussions. The debates about the past are intensified before parliamentary elections and international organizations interest to understand the communist past in Albania. With the socialists winning in the parliamentary election of 2013, there came accusations that former communists were heavily involved in the structures of the governing party and the government itself. The socialist party is the former communist party, and there were parliamentary members and cabinet members that were directly implicated with the former regime. The survey that was conducted in September
2015 by the Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA), a claimed independent think-tank. The project was part of the OSCE Presence in Albania’s project “Supporting a platform for national dialogue about the human rights violations of Albania’s former Communist regime”, implemented with support from the Federal Republic of Germany.
The reference to how the rest of former communist countries have dealt with the communist productions is used by all the commentators to strengthen their argument. This demonstrates that dealing with the communist past is not simply a national issue, instead there are patterns on public discussions about the past that cross the national boundaries. European
Union aspirations are used to escape and justify; each lustration law has had some reference to the similar laws in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany. Those who were accused as collaborators referred each time to a similar situation abroad. The call for screening and ban on the movies asked for more interference from OSCE as the European authority on media laws and democracy. 61
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63
CHAPTER III. PLACES OF MEMORY
This chapter examines how places of memory shape and construct the communist past in
Albania by material and symbolic means, which answers the first sub-question: how do places of memory materially and symbolically construct the communist “the past” in today’s Albania? I analyze four places of memory: the Site of Witness and Memory (SWM) museum of Shkodra, the Spac Prison Memorial (SPM) site in Miredite, the House of Leaves (HL) museum in Tirana, and the Bunkart Center (BC) museum in Tirana. I visited three memory places several times during the summers of 2016 and 2017. An exception to this is the House of Leaves museum, which I visited only in 2017 as it was not yet open the previous summer. Places of memory shape the communist past in contemporary Albania based on what is addressed and by whom and where, their partiality and legibility to particular audiences, how they address the past based on display and content, their history of becoming, and the public debates that they have generated. My analysis suggests that the best way to understand how these places of memory shape and construct the public memory of the communist past in Albania is when they are read as a site of witness, site of persecution, site of perpetrators, and site for tourism. The first two sites serve as counter-memory of the communist past. I will describe each of the memory places, interpret their rhetoric, and evaluate how it works to shape the communist past in the country.
The counter-memory
The Site of Witness and Memory museum (SWM) in Shkoder and the Spac Prison Memorial site (SPM) in Mirdite were built by the citizens’ initiative. The SWM museum was inaugurated in 2014 and has become one of the most visited museums in the city of Shkoder. The Spac
Prison was designated as a memorial site in 2007 after civil initiatives requested governmental intervention to preserve the former political prison camp and prevent its deterioration from 64 environmental factors. Currently, the witnesses of persecution and civil society organizations have joined efforts to restore the prison camp into a museum. In addition to being the voice of the victims and witnesses, these two memory places are located in Shkoder and Mirdite, regions where the communist regime was particularly oppressive (Butka, 2012).
I argue that the SWM museum in Shkoder and the SPM site serve as a counter-memory within Albania’s communist memory infrastructure. The past that they tell is the story of the victims and the places of their persecution.
Site of Witness and Memory Museum: The site of witness
The Site of Witness and Memory (SWM) in Shkoder officially opened in 2014. The
SWM museum is the first in the country to commemorate the victims of communism and is also the only regional museum. It was an initiative of the people of Shkoder and the civil society to convert a place of suffering and torture into a site of memory. The building was originally constructed during the 19th century as a family home; then in the 1930s, it was bought and used by the Franciscan Church. In 1946, it was confiscated by the communist regime, which turned the building into the Shkoder Branch of the Ministry of Interior and the main district jail, a function it served until 1990. After the communist regime ended, it was returned to the church, which in 2012 offered the building to the citizens to be turned into a museum. The museum is on one of the main busy streets of the city, a short walk from the downtown cultural centers.
Shkoder is one of the most ancient cities in the country and is especially well-known for its contribution to culture and art. The SWM is designed as an educational institution, which is reflected in its mission statement written in Albanian and English and hangs in the entrance hall.
The mission statement is also printed in flyers passed out to visitors when they arrive: “The Site 65 of Witness and Memory museum’s mission is to bring the first-hand witnesses story to the new generation, so the troubled painful communist past is never repeated”.
When placed into the country’s communist memory infrastructure, the SWM museum, as a site of witnesses located in the heart of Shkoder, functions as a counter-memory site of Albania’s communist past by transcending from a regional to a national focus, from victim to martyr, and from personal to historical. In the following analysis, I illustrate how the SWM museum tells the story of suffering, at the same time fosters a spirit of resilience, hope, and freedom in ways that represent national values.
The first way that the SWM operates as counter-memory is that the regional story becomes national. The Site of Witness and Memory museum functions as a counter-memory by narrating a regional story as a national story. The city takes pride in its museums and cultural heritage sites, and the SWM museum is another historical and cultural landmark for all visitors. The
SWM museum, together with the other museums of national significance, turn this region’s resistance to the communist regime into a national symbol. The Site of Witness and Memory is the first place to commemorate the victims of communism in the country and was the first to be established from the remains of a former detention site. The museum’s display of the regional victims and persecution serves as a template for visitors to imagine what the regime was like all over the country. A small part represents the whole.
The museum has two main parts: the museum hall with the exhibition, library, and media room, and the prison section. The long corridor that connects the museum with the prison cells is designed as red gates with art works displayed on the both sides. It is called The Purgatory, the gate to the prison cells anticipating the experience of hell. The entrance hall displays facts about the communist persecution in the region. The entrance wall quantifies persecution in the city: 66
2890 prisoned, 1924 exiled and send to internment camps, 601 executed, 61 religious clerics, and
136 deaths from torture. There is also a map of the city that pinpoints the city’s 23 communist prison locations and photos of the prisons. The map is displayed on a tall, wall-sized stand and is mounted on a box of barbed wire. The detailed description states that these buildings were family-owned houses and religious institutions, all confiscated by the regime to be turned into houses of torture. The history of the building’s use is described chronologically, from its original building as a family home during the 19th century, to a religious institution during the Albanian
Kingdom, to the Central Regional Authority Branch of the Internal Affairs during the communist regime, from 1946-1991.
The descriptions of the victims, the prisons, and the building’s history are regional data that get their significance when placed into the national context. The intensity of the discrimination and the higher number of prisons in the region resulted from the entire city’s resistance to the regime (Bushati, 1999). Immediately after the communist state started its operations on December 13, 1944, only two weeks after the fascist liberation, the whole city of
Shkodra was under a state of emergency (Qazimi, 2012). The museum’s display describes the number of buildings turned into detention centers and prisons that mimicked the overall centralized structure of the regime. These places of torture and control were established throughout the country to control, persecute, and oppress any kind of opposition to the communist ideology; however, in Shkoder they were a direct response to the open anti- communist movement. It is this region’s collective resistance to the oppression that made
Shkoder a symbol of anti-communism. The regime had specific directives that the State Security
“must increase the number of people in prison” (Dervishi, 2015, p. 77). One of the stories displayed before the interrogation rooms read, “For the prisoner under investigation, the calling 67 up to the office of the investigator would mean a real torture. Prisoners were usually called to be interrogated twice a day. The investigator would insist that the prisoner assert the charges that interested the purpose of the specific process, which the prisoner would sit and think about in the cell, formulating answers to potential investigator’s questions. Many prisoners could not resist the tortures and accepted false charges and accusations for themselves and other friends.” In many ways, the communist repression started in Shkoder. Names of victims displayed on the museum include nationally recognized intellectuals, writers, priests, scientists, doctors and teachers. At ’Zef Pellumbi, a priest who survived communist persecution, was interrogated at this exact prison before his long imprisonment of 27 years. He wrote the trilogy Rrno per me
Tregue (Live to Tell), which has become a legend of communist terror and survival since its publication.
The museum’s library has an impressive press archive of news articles published in
Shkoder during the pre-communist era and during WWII, until it was closed by the regime in
1945. The press section reopens the whole national drama of communist oppression and censure.
The articles displayed cover national and international topics to provide evidence of the scope of the Shkoder press before communism. Some of this press restarted in 1992 in an effort to bring back the original editorial and national inspiration as it had in the 1930s (Skanjeti, 1994).
However, the library’s archive provides visitors with first-hand experience of what could be published during communist regime. All the democratic reporting of political, cultural, and regional nature was suspended first in Shkodra, as the communist regime was prepared to prevent any form of communication, media, or art that could interfere with the ideological brain washing strategy of building communist ideology (Qazimi, 2012). The closing of democratic 68
media in Shkoder by the regime from its beginning transcends the regional; it becomes part of
the national story.
The second way that the SWM operates as counter-memory is that the victims are
considered martyrs. The second way the SWM museum works as counter-memory is that it turns
the victims into martyrs. Starting with the entrance hall and continuing with the exhibits, the
visitors are presented with the numbers, facts, photos, dates, places, locations, and descriptions
about the victims of communism in Shkoder. The display is not crowded and has room for
explanation of more than just the names: it includes the time, the location, and the reason for
arrest, imprisonment, or execution. The following displays grab the attention of the visitors as
they proceed through the museum. The display on the January-February 1946 Postriba revolt,
which had an open anti-communist purpose for a free and democratic country, is detailed: it
includes the dates and names of the organizers, how they were confronted by the military and
how they were executed in groups, their families were sent to internment camps and their houses
and properties were confiscated.
Next are the displays about various communist trials. The names of the persecuted and the reasons for their arrest invite visitors to imagine the consequences of expressing democratic ideals and aspirations. Another significant display shows the first anti-communist revolt in the country. In 1946, the Albanian Union groups were charged with treason for propaganda. The organization was created by Catholic priests to work with young people of different religious views for religious freedom. The Union’s vision was based on the values of love for the country, nation, and religious freedom. The descriptions provide details on how the Union was confronted with arrests, persecution, and executions. Another display shows photos and describes the arrest and persecution process of three teenage boys in 1961 who were accused of treason. The 69 description explains how they were arrested for trying to leave the country to visit the forbidden outside world.
These displays are representations of the basic freedoms people were fighting for then and the price they had to pay for resisting the regime. By displaying and describing what the victims were persecuted for, the museum functions to highlight the victims’ sacrifices. The museum’s display invites visitors to have a sense of gratitude and respect towards the victims’ resistance and ultimate sacrifice. The victims at the SWM museum are now depicted as martyrs.
As the visitors read the documents about the victims and their corresponding descriptions, they feel a sense of appreciation and approval for the victims’ actions. At the SWM museum, the victims are not doomed, the communist regime is.
The visual display of the documents contributes to viewing the victims as martyrs. The color, spatial arrangement, and artwork show the painful past, but imply the spirit of survival and hope. The colors of the display and the walls are light; the display-background ratio invites visitors to appreciate the artifact displayed while highlighting it and prioritizing the people’s story. The official documents displayed, the facts and orders of executions, imprisonments, and internments are clearly presented to act as evidence and describe the events. However, when these documents are juxtaposed with the victims’ stories, they are not as significant as the displayed facts about how the victims responded to the persecutions. The descriptions of what the victims stated at trials, their letters to the family, their public statements on how they survived interrogation, and their photos invite the visitors to construct a past that focuses on overcoming repression. The story is transformed into being about the oppressed people and not the regime, no matter how horrible it was, and those who resisted it are remembered as martyrs. 70
One piece of artwork displayed in the museum is the sculpture of the young man chained into a barbed five-point star, the symbol of communism. The sculpture exemplifies the victims of communist repression. As Burke states, “martyrdom is the idea of total voluntary self-sacrifice enacted in a grave cause before a perfect witness” (Burke, 1970, p. 248). Just like Christ was executed on the Cross for preaching against the church at the time, so this artwork represents the people of Shkoder executed for speaking against the communist ideology. The sculpture symbolizes hope and return as well. This artwork represents the victims of communism turning into martyrs of freedom. The young man of the sculpture exemplifies a martyr who by refusing and resisting the communist regime payed the highest price of self-sacrifice to redeem freedom and democracy.
The third way that SWM operates as counter-memory is that personal stories becomes historical. The third way the SWM museum functions as counter memory is how the victims’ personal stories become historical. The witnesses telling their story allow the visitors to imagine the painful past and create a perception about the context when it all happened as a distinct historical period where the described events could make sense. The consequences of the communist regime are personal and historical. A displayed letter sent home from a prisoner is more than personal; it becomes a historical event when visitors read it. The personal story of the victim becomes concrete—a way for the visitors to experience the past. The exhibition hall offers objects used and manufactured in prison, manuscripts, and personal letters of prisoners sent to the families. The displayed stories about the communist trials and the internment camps become a historical illustration in the museum. The letters from the prisoners to their family offer another way to demonstrate how victims become martyrs at the SWM in Shkoder. The displayed 71 letter from Arshi Pipa sent to his family states, “Physically I have become a corpse, but my thoughts and reasoning are free”.
The glass panel, on the next section of the museum, shows original documents of orders given by the regime to punish, torture, and discriminate against the citizens of this region. The execution orders given and signed by the dictator are of special importance. The displayed official order from the military court states the names of the people to be executed and the request to report their last words. The audiovisual room provides videos and short films from the communist time. The personal stories, the official copies of documents related to their cases, and objects and artifacts invite visitors to view the display as historical evidence. Some letters of prisoners displayed were sent home to ask that families send them clothes and shoes, while others want to know why they never received a letter from their family, and still others are mere pieces of paper passed in secret during visits that say things like, “I am being accused of propaganda,” or “they think I am a spy,” or “please do not worry about me, I will survive.”
Another piece of artwork, displayed in the Shkodra Remembers section, is a coin. The artist’s explanation is next to the artifact and reads “when I asked S. Jera he told me a guard said to him
‘we will give you the 70 Albanian Lek too.’ It was a well-known expression, used by police officers in the prisons of the regime, which meant the prisoner was to be shot. The 70 Albanian
Lek was not a real piece of currency in the monetary system. I have tried to create it here as a symbol of the devaluation of human life during the communist era and the cynical disregard with which prisoners were treated in that period.”
The museum’s architecture and spatial organization materially and symbolically contribute to turning the personal story into a historical experience. After the exhibition hall, the corridor that connects the entrance with the prison cells is curated as an art gallery. The gallery is 72 designed as a passage under red circled gates, which symbolize the way to a biblical hell: the way to the jail cells. The gallery contains art work that symbolizes torture. The passage, by giving the torture a nuance of holy sacrifice, prepares the visitors to reinterpret the past into a different historical context where what they see now can be imagined and make sense. The descriptions on entrance’s displays state that the building’s design is kept original. The actual jail and torture cells are called biruce (holes), as they are extremely small with very little light. The two-level cells are kept as they were when in use; the lower level was reserved for political prisoners. At the end of the jail corridor are the torture/investigation rooms, including the equipment of torture. As the visitors walk through the narrow corridors of jail cells where the curators have displayed objects and information about the people who suffered here, they are positioned to experience these cells as more than personal stories.
The visitors are invited to step into a historical perspective especially when they visit the cells dedicated to the total control of the media and propaganda. The descriptions in these cells explain that these walls are covered in newspapers from the communist period in remembrance of the journalists detained here. Another biruce is dedicated to women detained and tortured in these cells. The communist propaganda slogans were used to justify and motivate censorship, surveillance, control, oppression, and isolation. Some of the slogans painted on the wall are:
“Religion is opium for the masses,” “The Party and the People are one,” and “The Proletarian
Dictatorship is the only way toward progress.” These slogans place visitors into a different historical time’s perspective, as it is difficult to imagine or make sense of any of them at present.
Along with the witnesses’ displays, these slogans serve to place the communist past into its political and ideological madness. 73
I have explained how the Site of Witness and memory museum in Shkoder functions as public counter-memory of communist past in three significant ways: the regional story becomes national, the victims become martyrs, and the personal stories become historical. This memory place is initiated and established by the people of community and civil society with the mission to serve as an education site for young generations to understand the communist totalitarian past.
In what follows, I explain my analysis of the infamous Spac Prison as another memory site that function as counter-memory.
The Spac Prison: The site of persecution
The infamous Spac Prison was the largest political prison and slave labor camp during the communist regime in Albania. The Spac Prison Memory is situated in the mountains of
Mirdita region; it is a less than a two-hour drive from the capital city. This former prison is isolated from any city but is connected to the mine where the political prisoners were forced to work. At present, there are only ruined structures and tables placed around the site to orient and inform visitors about the site’s history as former communist camp, as well as other useful information. There are mostly ruins, but the previous structures can easily be seen, giving a clear perception of the infrastructure of the former political prison camp. Both the entrance display, and flyers/booklet express the memorial site’s motto explicitly—“The past is waiting to be discovered.”
The rhetorical reading of the Spac Prison Memory (SPM) site suggests that this site of persecution constructs an unsettling past, and as such, functions as counter-memory. This is manifested in three main ways: the SP site constructs a communist past that is real and unbelievable at the same time, the SP as a persecution site reveals the present political in action and debate about the communist past, and the site literally represents an unsettled past. 74
The first way how the SPM site operates as unsettling is that it constructs an unbelievable past. As the largest political prison and a labor camp during the communist regime, the Spac
Prison site invites visitors to a communist past that is real and horrible and yet unbelievable. This sense of unbelievable reality manifests itself in at least two ways. The memory site offers detailed descriptions of each of the former buildings, roads, passageways, the barbed wired fences, the cemetery, and the road to the mine’s gates. The facts displayed about the number of prisoners through years and the details on the former camp’s organization and infrastructure fill in what is not physically present any longer. However, the details and display enables visitors to recreate a complete picture of the former prison camp. The Spac Prison memorial site allows visitors to imagine what the camp looked like and what happened in it. The absence of the completed buildings, the isolated scenery, the foundation of the prison structures right above the rocky cliff, the cemetery, and the silence (environmental) work together to create a sense of unbelievably. The past becomes real at the SPM site, and yet, the past seems distant and unbelievable at the same time. The SP site’s geographic location/isolation creates a sense of un- believability. The past is shocking and leaves visitors speechless; it is there to be discovered and yet it feels almost unreal.
The Spac Prison became a metaphor of communist persecution for the large number of the prisoners, tortures, and forced labor. The prison cemetery with anonymous, unmarked graves shocks visitors and ads to the sense of the un-believability. The past is so horrible that it is beyond any expectation. The Spac Prison as memory site, with its location and ruins, positions visitors to imagine what happened and fill in (complete) what is not there any longer, but obviously was there once. The visitors understand the pain and suffering from the communist past and yet the site’s ruins remain unbelievable and create a sense of distance. The SPM site is 75 one of the several former prison and labor camps in the country. It is difficult to imagine a regime who put more than 100,000 people in internment camps and forced them to “work for free for the construction of socialism” and labeled the prisons as “reeducation centers” (Dervishi,
2015.31).
This unbelievability contributes to an unsettling sense about dealing with the past. The public debate about the Spac Prison and Labor camp is currently intensified. The civil society and the survivors and the witnesses are actively contributing to preserve and maintain the site.
The Spac Prison Project is one of the initiatives being organized to bring together different actors and move toward the completion of the Spac Prison memory site as a full-fledged museum.
The second way how the SPM site operates as unsettling is through the political in/action regardless of its public debate. The SP as a site of persecution reveals the political in/sensitivity of communist public memory. The Spac debate is more political in many ways. This was a prison and labor camp designed and built by the communist government for political persecution.
It was first opened in 1968 as a “re-education unit.” The description of each of the camp’s buildings shows the continued changes on infrastructure and additional buildings to accommodate the growing number of political prisoners. The Spac revolt of 1973 was the first publicly known revolt in the country that was organized by prisoners against the communist dictatorship and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The flyer that describes the revolt’s two main actions: the rising of the national flag without the communist star and the first public articulation of “We want Albania to join the rest of Europe” moto. The revolt lasted three days and it was suppressed when the military executed four of its organizers. From that time on, the Spac prison became the site of death, suffering, and slave labor. The last political prisoners were released in 76
1989. The prison stopped functioning in 1995 and it was mostly destroyed by weather factors and vandalism.
The former prison camp was designated as a memorial site in 2007 in response to activist and public efforts (photo 6145). Not much has changed from that time and the debate on Spac
Prison’s restoration is a manifestation of the political implications of the public memory of the prison camp. The neglect of this former communist persecution site hurts today as much as it did when it functioned as a prison camp. The lack of infrastructure, the five miles of dirty road after visitors exit the highway, and the introductory photo of the prison prepares visitors to experience a site of memory that is painful. The signs and labels that describe every part of the former camp serve as a display of what this site is today. As visitors move from the entrance of the prison camp marked with the sign and description of the former border with double barbed wires, the handcrafts photo (6210), the ruins marked according to their prison function, and the pathway to the mine work together to create a presence of terror and collective regret. The silence of the camp’s ruins serves as a cry for help and invites visitors for citizenship to act and preserve this communist persecution site.
The third way that the SPM site operates as unsettling is through the display of unsolved cases. A powerful way the SPM site is unsettling is that the mass persecution cases are de facto un/solved. The Spac Prison site not only commemorates the victims of communist persecution, it also recognizes the atrocities committed by that regime. The SP as unsolved public memory is manifested in the current public debate about the site’s restoration. This is directly addressed at the SPM site in a large table with the title, “Spac Prison - A place for dialogue.” The detailed explanations on the importance of the site’s preservation positions visitors to be highly sensitive toward the site. The descriptions follow with more details about how to approach the debate 77 about SPM site as “highly important for the persecuted communities” and as “an imperative need for methodology when dealing with the past”. Further, the need for methodology and for a comprehensive and neutral position about the communist past is emphasized “because of the delicacy of working with complexity of communist past and the political sensitivity of persecution.” The visitors are invited to participate in a focus group discussion about the future of the site, with people who used the site (worked at the prison), the persecuted, the witnesses, local people, history teachers, tourist agencies, diplomats, students, journalists, and museum researchers. The call for dialogue invites visitors to be involved and set “the foundation for creating the concept that would really commemorate the victims of the communism and this prison.” (6145). These careful labels of “persecuted communities” and “methodology” and the broad call for inclusion on the debate is a manifestation of the communist past that is unsolved and a past that is not yet dealt with. Dealing with the site of persecution is dealing with the state/regime persecution.
The activists of the Spac Prison project have the support of international organizations and initiatives in Albania. The World Monument Fund included Spac Prison site on its “Watch”
List 2016 as an effort to preserve the site as a historical and cultural heritage site (CHWB,
October 20, 2015). However, the Albanian socialist government has been hesitant to fund and support the project, which has drawn an aggressive response from the persecuted. The articles in the media and public declaration have claimed that the Spac Prison remains a site of persecution today because of governmental reluctance to fully support its restoration (Sine, October 21,
2015). The lives lost and the human suffering that endured must be recognized and “remembered so it does not happen again, but because if forgetting Spac means legitimizing the communist state persecution” (Kola, April 23, 2016). 78
Through my rhetorical reading of the SPM as a site of persecution, I illustrated how the communist past is an unsettled past that still haunts the Albania’s public consciousness. The past is live at the former political prison camp and functions as counter-memory where public debate, public efforts, and governmental neglect make the Spac Prison Memorial site an important medium on the construction of public memory of communist past.
The two sites of counter memory, the Site of Witness and Memory museum in Shkoder and the Spac Prison Memory site in Mirdite are particularly important in Albania’s communist memory infrastructure. As I explained through my analysis, their location outside of Tirana and their function as sites of witness and persecution turn the visits to these memory places into public statements against the communist crimes. Especially, the Spac Prison Memorial site requires agency and special efforts to travel and visit the site. The call for action is explicitly stated on SPM site and the visitors are given information on how they can get involved. The victims, witnesses, and the persecuted participated in the design and curation of the SWM museum. The SWM museum and SPM site are memory places created and called for by the victims, the persecuted, and the witnesses. These two memory places commemorate their sacrifices and serve as witness to the history of a regime that oppressed its own people. The following section illustrates how the House of Leaves museum functions as the site of perpetrators and the Bunkart museums function as communist touristic sites.
Controlled Public Memory
Within the national memorial infrastructure two sites serve to produce a controlled version of communist past: the recently opened House of Leaves museum and the Bunkart
Center Museum. These museums are both located in Tirana and are supported and managed by the government. In local and national news they are often labeled as “museums of doom” 79
(Vokshi, February 2, 2015). The following analysis illustrates how these museums function to neutralize/shift the blame for the communist crimes and construct a controlled version of the public memory of the communist past for national and international audiences. The House of
Leaves museum of the infamous communist Secret State Service is fully initiated, designed, and curated under the official supervision of socialist government, which is the reformed communist party. The analysis shows that the House of Leaves museum is the memorial site of perpetrators and functions to control the public memory of the past and shift the blame from state oppression.
The Bunkart Center is both government and privately supported and functions as touristic and communist past hospitality sites. The analysis shows that the past as touristic site constructs an exotic and distant communist past, which functions to respond to international interest on communist past and at the national scale it serves political interest to control the past.
The House of Leaves: The site of perpetrators
The House of Leaves Museum (HLM) opened in May 2007. It is located near the center and in one of the busiest roads of Tirana, behind the Post Office and the National Bank and across from the Orthodox Cathedral. However, the two-story house does not draw much attention from the road. The red brick walls are typical of early 20th century buildings in Tirana.
It was first built as a house for a doctor, then he turned it into a maternity hospital. After WWII, the house was confiscated by the communist regime and used for the secret service called State
Security Center. From the outside, the building walls were all covered on ivy tree leaves and was perfectly protected from the public eye, hence the name “the house of leaves.” There has been a public debate to whether or not the House of Leaves will and should be open to the public. There have been public accusations in the media about the governmental corruption of funds used to turn this building into a memory site. The public debate centers on the fact that the designer of 80 the site is the son of the communist prime minister who designed and built the secret service
(needs cite). In addition, the debate about the House of Leaves has been concurrent with the larger debate on the opening of the communist secret service files.
As it is now, the wall that separates the building’s yard with the street is all covered in a plain metric design that announces the House of Leaves museum. There is only a small door that visitors need to get through which takes them directly to the ticket booth and the security guard is on the other side of the room separated by a glass wall. It is a quiet place with a clean yard, and preserved as it was during the era of communism. Across from the building’s main entrance is a metal horizontal door to an underground tunnel with the description of the interrogation cells. There are two giant binoculars directed at the road, an artistic work symbolizing the surveillance goal of this place during communism.
The central aim of the HLM is stated at the entrance: “this museum is dedicated to all the innocent people who were spied on, surveilled on, arrested, persecuted, convicted, and executed during the communist regime,” written in Albanian and in English. At the entrance, there is the prologue to the museum’s sections and the dedication to the history of the building, which was transformed from a maternity house to a surveillance and communist control center. The sections are organized as follows: bugs, live microphones, the internal and external enemy, private and everyday life, voices of the past, and the panopticon illustration. The visitors come to this museum with curiosity, sensitivity, and expectations to visit the place where the communist crimes were designed, initiated, and orchestrated.
Diffusing the blame for communist crime 81
The following analysis illustrates how this museum functions to neutralize and diffuse the blame for the communist crimes and construct a controlled version of the public memory that is
“safe” for perpetrators. The extended coverage on how the secret service functioned, the curators enforced interpretations on all the display’s content, and the carefully selected facts about the communist regime turns the HL museum into a distorted anatomy of a crime scene. The museum functions not just as a perpetrators’ site, but as a perpetrator’s story. This sense of diffusion operates in the following three ways: 1) The display and the museum’s content is about the system, 2) the visitors are positioned as students and the designers as masters, and 3) the selective and factual display approach focuses the attention to former regime’s structure.
The first way how the HLM operates to diffuse the blame is through its focus on the system. The museums’ main approach is the focus on the Security State Service system. The museum’s eight sessions all explain how the system functioned. The first section explains how the surveillance system was organized to establish total control. The museum’s display invites visitors from the start to focus on the organizational structure of the former State Security
Service system. The large displays of the SSS structure, the diagram, and the bug on room-sized black walls with bright white labels invite visitors to concentrate on understanding the structure/system of surveillance control. The branches of secret service are explained in detail how they covered every aspect and department of the government, with intelligence and counterintelligence in twelve main district branches. In addition to the diagram of the surveillance system, their spying is displayed again with the bug as the structure of total surveillance, with the bug’s head as the State Security Center, the two main subdivisions as antennae, and the branches as its legs. Both the diagram and the bug are taller than a normal person’s height, and this positions visitors as small and vulnerable before the large and solid 82 structure. The display is drawn on the wall of the room on a black background with white lighting, and very precise boxes and lines.
The following section’s display continues with the explanation of how the secret service functioned and how it recruited people. The visitors are invited to focus on the hierarchy within the system, the flow of information and orders from the center, and their execution on the field, back and forth. The first section displays the scheme of how the secret service files were initiated and planned, and how the surveillance and spying were orchestrated. The section continues with displays and content about how the SSS system operated from “live –microphones,” i.e. “secret agents among the masses,” to e-bugs, i.e. the surveillance microphones designed and produced in the State Security laboratory. The description of the communist agitations and propaganda law and the slogan of SSS, which is “for the people by the people,” the museum’s explanations on how collaborators were recruited invites visitors to perceive the recruiting as inevitable deflecting attention from the perpetrators. The museum display and descriptions position visitors to perceive the SSS regime as one that implicates everybody. In addition, the interpretation on the labels states, “everyone could be a target of secret service . . . whether to be spied on or to be recruited for spying.” In this way, the perpetrators are neutralized, as they “could be anyone.”
The next section continues with displays on how the enemy was created in multiple ways.
It was constructed in the movies as well, as part of a state propaganda. Photos from newspapers and films of that time reinforce attention to a system of control and surveillance, demanding that the structure be perceived as the core of the system. The last section of the museum focuses on the symbolism of the regime as the panoptikon, where everything was surveilled and listen to, a complete rigid and closed structure. As the visitors start with the structure of the system and the 83 bug, the visitors leave the museum with the panoptical visual, reinforcing how the museum reduces the communist past into system and structure.
The second way how the HLM operates to diffuse the blame is through its positioning of the museum designers as masters and the visitors as students. The second key theme evoked at the House of Leaves museum is the positioning of the visitor as student and the museum designers as masters of explaining and interpreting the totalitarian regime. The visitors are provided with interpretation of every section of the museum from the entrance table. The entrance includes a table that introduces each section and it has an interpretation for each, such as how the dictatorships occur, as if they are introducing a work of art about control and totalitarianism. The museum’s interpretations attempt to direct visitors to view the museum as a lecture where the designers explain the communist structure and why it functioned the way it did.
The displayed interpretation of surveillance accessories and bugs state “the technique is neutral only when it is not used yet. . . . Each regime uses it differently. It serves the particular needs of the regime, any regime.” The displayed interpretation on enemy states “the perception over the enemy determines the way for repression and control, ways which in turn reinforced who the enemy was, as a vicious cycle of the totalitarian regimes.” there is the interpretation on isolation as well, “Self-isolation had the purpose to complete and total control. Claiming to be the only socialist country in the world, all were enemies.” The museum designers position themselves as masters of explaining the process of enemy creation in a totalitarian regime. The displayed interpretations on artifacts and objects focus the visitors’ attention to the “masters” explanation, and creates the perception that the designers are telling it all. This interpretation is presented,
“the perception over the enemy determines the way for repression and control, ways which in turn reinforced who the enemy was, - as a vicious cycle of the totalitarian regimes.” The 84 rationale of enemy creation continues with the section on surveillance of foreigners as an extension of internal enemies.
Again, the visitors are positioned as students of totalitarian regimes in the sections of the museum that display the everyday social and private life of citizens living during the communist era. The description reads “surveillance was done on all . . . with more intensification on certain groups that were deemed threatening for the party’s agenda. Anything any behavior could be labeled/named as enemy action.” These sections are authentic displays of artifacts from homes and other private spaces, with the surveillance tools implemented in display as they were used during the communist era. The museum designers’ interpretation is that “the communist ideology had a collectivist character and the party-state was ominous and ubiquitous.” The displayed interpretations explain how the system comes as justifications of the structure and the system and are another attempt to distort the past and distance the perpetrators from the crime scene. The museum’s interpretation that “the communist ideology had a collectivist character and the party- state was ominous and ubiquitous” invites visitors to see the total surveillance structures supported by communist ideology as so complex that the perpetrators were just the tool it used to function. The interpretation on the panoptikon section reads “the communist did not believe in a perfect society . . . so to achieve that, they used absolute control, like the Bentham prison.” Also, when visiting the video section, the interpretation suggests to watch the selected videos and reflect on the past.
The third way how the HLM operates to diffuse the blame is through its cold selective and factual display. Central to House of Leaves rhetoric is its factual approach and authenticity appeal. The HL museum is built in the former communist secret service center building. The objects displayed are also the original ones used for surveillance, including the secret service 85 files. The visitors are allowed to see but not to touch, which gives the objects the added meaning that they are real, very important, and must be preserved. As Ott, Aoki, and Dickinson (2011) suggest, the contemporary museums emphasize the displayed objects themselves and “operate according to this logic of radical systematization, in which vision is detached from the other senses and visitors’ practices of looking are governed by a rationally ordered system of labels”
(p. 223-4).
The House of Leaves is a typical exercise of classification and rationality, which primes visitors to see the museum as an objective description of totalitarianism, surveillance, and control, which in turn, functions to construct a communist past apart from its consequences. The sections are organized to show the structure of surveillance and control. The HL museum displays are clean, sharp, and are carefully classified into categories and subcategories on each of the museum’s sections. Cold facts, graphs, statistics, lighted frames, and labs serve to distance the communist past with its consequences.
In addition to the sophisticated drawings of the State Security Service structure on the backlighted walls and screens, a sense of high importance and worthiness is conveyed by the presentation of the spying and surveillance technology and technique. One large hall is dedicated to communication devices used for secret service, video tapes, computers, printers, radios, microphones on tables and walls, mounted communication cabins in the wall, and a screen that shows pictures and videos from that time. There is much to see in this section, and the technology is classified based on its use and time introduced. The large number of objects and the details provided position visitors to see the museum as a technological development.
Actually, the visitor is prepared to focus on the Surveillance Bug sections from the first section where the display of the SSS control structure is showed on a form of a bug with branches all 86 over the country. The bug displayed on the operational room techniques shows this photo of a bug with the description “it sucks the blood while people sleep.” The emphases on the bug is especially on the surveillance device that was created in Albania with details on its development and use in everything and everywhere. It was called cimka (bug) and was developed to counteract surveillance and spying from abroad. Albanian produced spy equipment gives the museum interesting factual and authentic appeal to domestic and foreign visitors and draws attention to technology. This is reinforced further when visitors check the room where the laboratory of surveillance equipment and spying activity are displayed. The laboratory was used to fabricate photos and to duplicate documents for spying purposes and fabricate evidence for the
“internal enemies, and to check for biological weapons on mail coming to communist leadership from abroad.”
The visitors are invited to focus on selected facts about how the surveillance arsenal was administered and protocolled. The original agreements and former state directives are displayed on lighted frames. The wires that connect these agreements displayed on the walls show structure as well. Everything is clean, well kept, well organized, and connected. The visitor can’t help but feel overwhelmed with important objects and clear structure. Also included in this section are the
“operational techniques,” where documents from that time that show protocol agreements for the purchase of the surveillance equipment from the Soviet Union until 1961, an agreement with
China’s government until late 1970, other eastern countries, and even with the western countries afterwards. The focus on internal operational techniques and foreign collaboration on equipment adds to the factual appeal of the surveillance technology. While the museum approach to cold facts works in all the sections, from structure of SSS, to enemy creating philosophy and 87 propaganda, to everyday life, the display of the technology of the surveillance conveys and shifts the attention to facts in a more direct way.
The fourth way how the HLM operates to diffuse the blame is through its downplay on the consequences of the communist crimes. The House of Leaves museum heavily focuses on display and facts about the structure of SSS and surveillance techniques, and operations are an attempt to absolve the former Security State Service from the consequences of their activity. The consequences of the SSS are only mentioned near the exit, with one room all painted in black and with the names of the victims who lost their lives because of the SSS activity. The names are written in white small print and are not easily readable, and on the exit stairs there are falling leaves painted on the walls. The initial dedication to the victims at the entrance and the exit room with names on the wall are the only mentions of consequences. Dark, sharp, and clean are the murderer’s display of his own crimes, while the names of victims on one room are some of many
– each one is one more. The museum curators dedicated more space to displaying debatable public surveys on perceptions about spying in communism than to the victims of the regime.
The House of Leaves museum focuses on structure and technology and could not absolve the SSS from the crimes despite the focus on display, facts, and authenticity of the building and the artifacts. The “multiplying levels of authenticity and simulacra cover profound absences”
(Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki, 2005, pp. 101) and the “absent history is crucial to the museum’s rhetoric” (Stolkin, 1992, p. 13-14). In addition to reduced physical space on the consequences from the SSS activity, the interpretations of introductions to the sections and the on the labels of artifacts displayed the HL museum attempt to re-contextualize the SSS activity and absolve it from its crimes. The interpretation on the technique of surveillance serves to contextualize surveillance anywhere and anytime, as “the technique is neutral only when it is not used yet. . . . 88
The bugs were used for surveillance. Each regime uses it differently and it serves the particular needs of the regime, any regime.” Also, the contextualization occurs when the displays describe what was counted as crime and punishable during the era of communism, where more room is given to explain ordinary crimes than to political and ideological crimes. The operational techniques are re-contextualized when details concerning international protocol and agreements about equipment are described in detail. Attempts to provide a context that would shift the focus from the SSS activity are present in every section. One of the descriptions reads “the tortures were recognized by the regime as a way to keep the enemies in check.” Sometimes the re- contextualization is done by providing meticulous information on surveillance fieldwork from
“live microphone” to “e-spying” and bugs used to create the secret files. Original files are displayed with names erased for the purpose of understanding the administrative process of the
SSS.
The House of Leaves museum is the original SSS building, where the surveillance and control was designed and executed, and the authentic surveillance artifacts are carefully displayed and presented. This makes the site as a legitimate crime scene. However, the museum, by positioning visitors to focus on facts in isolation from their consequences, serves as a distortion of the past. The emphasis on structure, facts, original artifact functions, and selective data are “multiplying levels of authenticity” that “cover profound absences” (Dickinson et al,
2005). The memory of the communist crimes is transformed into a lecture on the communist regime structure, the surveillance technology of the era, and an ideological rational for justifying the SSS activity. The museum’s claimed dedication to the victims of state surveillance is anything but that; instead the House of Leaves museum serves as the story of perpetrators, whom by attempting to free themselves from guilt offer a distorted version of the communist past. 89
The Bunkart Center: The touristic site
The Bunkart Center is a multimedia exhibition designed, built, and managed by private enterprise with partial support from the government. It is located in the former underground military and security bunkers. The analysis shows that the Bunkart Center museum constructs a communist past that is marketable and attractive to visitors that have not experienced the regime, especially international visitors. The visitors are positioned to see the past as exotic and distant.
Bunkart Center was established in 2016 as a historical and artistic center that represents the communist era. The museum constructs an exotic and distant past by positioning the visitors to view these exhibitions as different form other sites of memory in location and in time. From the start, the visitors are positioned to see the museum differently based on its military location and being an underground structure. It is built inside the anti-nuclear bunker of the cold war near the military base in the outskirt of Tirana at the foothills of Dajti Mountain. A five-story underground palace with 106 rooms was inaugurated in 1978 for protection of the communist dictator and the communist elite in the event of a proclaimed nuclear attack in the country. The entrance to the Bunkart One museum is next to a current military base, as the Bunker was part of the military base during the communist era as well. To get there, visitors need to go through a check point, even though it is informal, as they only need to report where they are going and are asked to refrain from taking photos while passing through the parking and courtyard up to the entrance of the Bunkart One.
The visitors are prepared to see something out of the ordinary even before they enter the museum structure. The entrance to the center is like a garden door which stretches through a five-minute walk on an unpaved road, as it was during the communist regime, which ends at a bigger yard with tables and chairs and a green area for relaxation. It looks more like the entrance 90 to a vacation home than to a cold war Bunker. The entrance to the bunker can only be seen when visitors are near it. The visitors’ expectations for something that is out of the ordinary are met from the start. As a visitor enters the bunker, the doors and the information provided shows the two layered walls, an outside “cupola”, and the inner layer that separates the rooms and other interior structures.
Being in this massive Bunker primes the visitor to see the museum as an exotic experience. Immediately after the entrance comes the decontamination room, with the necessary description of how and why it was used. The Bunker has five entry/exits which correspond to the five levels of the underground structure. The museum has five levels: the first level is the dictators’ apartment, with fully immersive living and working spaces. The second level is the largest, with exhibitions that start with WWII and end with the 1990s. The third level shows the war echo art and the history of bunkerization. The fourth level is the Cafeteria and Assembly
Hall. The fifth level is the Biodiversity room. By the time the visitors exit the fifth level, they find themselves in the courtyard/parking lot right behind the ticketing kiosk where they started.
Selling the past
The museum constructs the past as exotic and distant through the multi-media display. In all this massive structure there are objects, video and audio presentations, posters and wall size displays, real life immersing spaces, art work, and live unique species of bats. The introductory frames on the corridors announces what is displayed in the exhibition rooms. The visitors are positioned to see beyond the military as the exhibition includes information and displays about education, media, communist propaganda, music, movies, health systems, art, agriculture, diplomacy, and biology. The visitors continue to experience the museum bunker with the history 91 of bunkerization itself. The display shows photos of bunkers, artwork, and the two bunker-roofs painted with art.
The way this museum constructs a distant communist past is manifested through chronological display and cultural description. The only thread that connects the exhibitions is the timeline on the Albanian Armed Forces history from 1912 to WWI, the Albanian kingdom between the wars, WWII, the communist era, and ends with the present as a member of the
NATO alliance. The rest of the exhibition is then a generalized presentation of the political and cultural development during communism. The museum’s display is organized by topic, and within each exhibition topic there is an amalgam of objects, poster information, wall-sized screens, audio and video presentations, and authentic immersive living and working spaces with variations of light intensity from one room to another. The visitors are positioned as shoppers in a mall of communist memory prompts. The combination of light and sound serves to engage visitors to pay attention to particular exhibition rooms and objects. Some rooms are completely dark, the only lightning comes from the electronic screens which constantly present videos and photos of the time.
Similar to a commercial market, the designers of the museum have included any object that they could adapt to be displayed, which serves to market the communist memory to those who did not live it, especially for tourists from abroad. This is clear to the visitors from Albania that experienced communism. The throwing-in-together of any possible object is particularly visible to the Albanian visitors that have experience communism. The second level has the largest exhibition and displays just about anything that related to the topic, such as life-sized manikins of soldiers, miners, and railroad workers. The pieces of information are too general for an Albanian audience; they live out important events and developments that makes the story the 92 museum tries to tell incomplete, despite its exercise objects displayed. The visitor’s book has comments from domestic and foreign visitors. The majority of comments from Albanians state that they come out of curiosity about the Bunker structure alone.
However, the museum remains very attractive to foreign visitors. According to the museum’s booklet, eighty percent of the visitors are foreigners. The comments from the visitors show excitement about visiting and learning about communist Albania and culture, and especially to visit a cold-war bunker. The first time I visited the museum, I was surprised to find that among the souvenirs, there were T-shirts with the former dictator’s photo and captioning, “I was at this bunker before you.” As an Albanian, I asked the clerk if anyone buys these shirts. He said, “Majority of foreigners buy them, they seem fascinated with the communism.”
The museum content is designed for an international audience. The generalized and partial information provided on the picture frames and posters are satisfactory for a foreigner to get pieces of what the communist era looked like. While the information provided is similar to travel guides covering different aspects of life under communism, information on Albania’s diplomatic relations are always addressed, and references to concurrent international events are used in the posters. The focus on bunkerization is more appealing to international audiences, as it is unique to Albania. The program of bunkerization display of photos of remaining bunkers now, has information tables, artwork, and the two bunker-roofs painted with art. The visitors are further engaged in bunkerization history when introduced the scientific claims on biodiversity that the bunkers created a special type of bat. In the last level of the bunker before the exit, there is one room dedicated to explaining this special animal’s cycle/activity.
The visitors are positioned to see the museum as a cultural artifact. In addition to the military and cold war appeal, the museum covers the life under communism in all its political 93 and cultural aspects. There are exhibition rooms and halls about the house, schools, media, propaganda, religion, restaurants, and grocery stores. The socialist home is a typical display of a home during communist era, demonstrating the interior design and furniture produced in the country during that era, from bufe (the typical entertainment centers) to kitchen tables and chairs, plates, pitchers, couch, coffee tables, rugs, art walls, and lighting. The specific furniture used was only produced at that time and everything was produced within the country’s borders. Another section of the Albanian life in communism is the destruction of the religious buildings and icons.
Next is the exhibition of a typical Albanian bar during communism, with its high tables, chairs, and the window to the kitchen or bar. The former assembly hall of the Bunker is now turned into exhibition on communist propaganda. The titles and honors awarded in the past are displayed on both sides of the room as well as statements about how media was considered dangerous for the masses. The museum’s attempt at a cultural approach is manifested in the exhibition room dedicated to the victims of prison miners and soldiers. Within the display of mine tunnel are mining tools, topographic instruments, engineer maps, and orientation tables as they were posted in the mines, and the only lights are the ones in the displayed mining tunnel. This causes the room to be like a real mine tunnel. The visitors are engaged in a cultural experience as they hear the typical Albanian vajtim, an equivalent of a eulogy song, as it is played continuously in the background.
The Bunker Center offers a story about the past from the outside by collecting pieces of the past and displaying them in an attractive way for people who did not experience the past. The past constructed in this museum are communist memory prompts displayed for sale to curious visitors. Given the museum’s military location and underground structure, the visitors are prepared to see the communist past as exotic and distant at the same time. The attempted display 94 of all aspects of life in communism is done in the bunker, a symbol of cold war paranoia, isolation, and fear. The museum displays objects, facts, tables, and movies that attempt to show life at home, work, media, education, film, sport, religion, and of course bunkerization. This mix of multiple display approaches with the topical organization and excessive objects make this museum look similar to a shopping mall. The memory of communist past produced is a superficial overview that can be marketed to the international tourists; however, it is questionable for the Albanian visitor.
Conclusion The analysis is based on Blair’s (2010) recommendations on investigating how places of memory (1) render themselves meaningful through affective investments, (2) are legible on particular times and for particular audiences, (3) are consequential of what they do and generate, and (4) are made public by investigating what is addressed, where, to who, and how. Places of memory construct and shape communist past in variation depending on who builds it and for what purpose. The four places of memory I investigated are best understood as site of witnesses, site of persecution, site of perpetrators, and as touristic sites. The Site of Witness and Memory as site of witnesses is demonstrated through transcending the communist past story from a regional to national focus, from victim to martyr, and from personal to historical. The Spac Prison as the site of persecution site of persecution is manifested in three main ways; the SP site constructs a communist past that is real and unbelievable at the same time, the SP as a persecution site reveals the present political in/action and debate about the communist past, and the SP site literally represents an unsettled past. Both the SWM and SP serve as counter-memory in the larger national memory infrastructure. 95
The House of Leaves museum functions as the site of perpetrators that serve to control the public memory of communist past in three ways: it focuses on the system, the designers as masters, and the selective and factual display approach. The touristic Bunkart Center museum constructs a communist past that is marketable and attractive to visitors that have not experienced the regime, especially international visitors, through positioning visitors to see the past as exotic and distant. A past as a touristic site is more of a story that is heard but not lived.
The overwhelming mix of various displays and the excessive number of objects make the Bunker
Center museum feel like a shopping mall of communist memory prompts.
96
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CHAPTER IV. ALBANIA and EU: A PLACE PERSPECTIVE
This chapter examines the rhetorical construction and contestation of Albania as place within/out of the European Union (EU) context, the third sub question: how is Albania redefined as a place in the European Union integration political discourse and how does Albania affirm and contest this definition? I investigate how the material and symbolic aspects of EU discourse work to define Albania as a place. This provides the transnational context in which remembering occurs. The texts I analyze include the political leaders’ speeches of Albania and EU, the EU enlargement reports, the Albania’s EU integration reports, press conferences, and news articles surrounding the Albania-EU relations. I begin with an introduction of Albania and the EU’s brief history and the current political context. Second, I introduce the texts used for analysis with a rationale for their selection for examination. Third, I explain three ways that construct Albania as a place in the EU integration discourse: the Western Balkans, a Place for Re-conciliation and Re- construction, and a hot spot for de/stability. Last, I conclude with the consequences of such definitions.
Albania-EU context
In order to understand the later section of this chapter, I will explain briefly what the EU is and how the enlargement process functions. The European Union was founded primarily as an inter-governmental economic collaboration emerging from reconciliation efforts after WWII among neighbor nations that were historically at war. In brief, from its inception the EU landmark enlargements have been as follow: In 1951, the six founding member countries,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steal Community; in 1957, The European Economic Community (EEC) was created by the
Treaty of Rome, which consolidated a European common market; in 1973, the first EU 99
enlargement occurred with Denmark, Ireland, and United Kingdom; in 1981, Greece joined the
EU; in 1986 Spain and Portugal joined; and in 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU.
Through 1995 and the fourth EU enlargement, there were only Western European nations in the
Union (excluding former East Germany); none of the EU members were part of the former
communist bloc. The fifth and largest enlargement included countries from the eastern bloc; in
2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia joined the union. Three years later in 2007, the sixth EU enlargement included
Bulgaria and Romania. The seventh enlargement happened in 2013, with Croatia becoming the
newest member country of the EU.
Because of the fall of communism in Europe in the 1990s, Europeans were closer
together than ever, at least from the economic and political perspectives. In efforts to adapt to the
new Europe, in 1993 the “Maastricht Treaty” established norms and standards for new member
countries to join. The treaty states that any European country can apply for membership and be
admitted if “complying with all the EU standards and rules, having the consent of all EU
institutions and EU member states, and having the consent of their citizens – expressed through
approval in their national parliament or by referendum” (EC, 2018/1993).
The criteria for accession, known as the “Copenhagen Criteria,” were defined by the
1993 meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen. For a country to join the following
criteria must be met: 1) “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) a functioning market economy and the
capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and 3) the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union” (EC, 1993/2018). The EU timing and conditions for the 100 adaptation and enforcement of all the EU current standards are negotiated into 35 specific policy areas, known as the “acquis.” The process of negotiations is closely monitored and assisted by the Enlargement Commission, which keeps the EU Council and EU parliament informed through periodic reports and strategy papers.
There are three main institutions responsible for producing laws and policies applicable throughout the EU. One is the European Parliament, which is directly elected by and represents the EU citizens. Another, the Council of the EU, represents the national governments of each of the member countries, which adapt laws and implement policies. Its presidency is shared in rotated among the member states in six months lengths. The European Commission (EC) is the executive branch of the EU and is responsible for drawing new legislative proposals and for implementing the European Parliament and the Council of the EU decisions. The European
Commission is designed to be politically independent and to represent the interests of the Union as whole. The European Council is one of the seven official institutions established officially in
2009, which sets the EU’s political agenda and represents the highest level of political cooperation between the EU countries and sets the common foreign policy agenda. The
European Council does not pass laws. However, it functions in regular meetings (EU summits), and its members are the heads of governments of the members states, the European Council
President, and the President of the European Commission. The EU efforts to democratize itself and brake away from being just an inter-governmental organization started early, addressing the regional collaboration and citizens’ participation, with the purpose of ensuring that EU decisions are not only made by political elites. The Committee of the Regions and the Amsterdam Treaty are results of this democratization efforts to give voice to regions and people at regional and local level. For this reason, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) was established in 101
1994 and serves as an advisory body of local and regional elected representatives from all member states. The legislative institutions of EU must consult CoR for laws and policies on local government. In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam came as an effort to amend the Union’s lack of citizenship participation and expended the common area of economic integration with freedom, security, and justice. One of the outcomes of this treaty was the beginning of an institutionalized foreign policy approach within and outside the EU.
Currently, joining the European Union, or “EU integration” has been Albania’s main national goal since the end of communism in 1990 and it remains the second country, after
Kosovo, to have the strongest citizen’s support for becoming a member of the EU. The integration reforms have become essential to all of the governments for the last 27 years, and their successes have been measured on landmark achievements towards the EU process of integration. Albania holds the status of “candidate country” and has requested opening accession negotiations with the Union. There have been many landmark events in the process to join the
EU since 1990. The Trade and Co-operation Agreement in 1992 between Albania and EU was the first. In 1999, the Stabilization and Association Agreement was initiated, a process that took seven years to conclude. From 2006 and onwards the National Plan for Implementation of EU
Integration reforms began, a process that is reviewed regularly. Reforms have included changes such as in the judiciary system, the legislative framework, public administration reform, the local government reform, reforms on strengthening the economic and fantastical legislation, and the rule of law. In 2010, the visa liberalization for Albanian citizens traveling within the Schengen
Zone occurred. After intensive institutional reforms in 2014, Albania was granted EU candidate member status. In November of 2016, the European Commission (EC hereafter) for Enlargement recommended opening accession negotiations with Albania, a recommendation that as of 2018 102 has not been ratified by the all EU members and EU Parliament (Ministry for Europe and
Foreign Affairs, 2018).
The texts
The texts I analyze are Albanian integration reports, press releases, news articles, and EU enlargement reports, strategies, press releases, and news articles. More specifically, the Albanian texts include the integration yearly reports from 2014 to 2017 presented by the Albanian government to the parliament as part of national plan for EU integration, the official press releases, and news articles related to the reports of EU integration in the national newspapers
Panorama and Mapo. The EU texts are the yearly enlargement reports from 2014 to 2017, press releases and speeches related to EU and EU enlargement, and relevant news articles related to the specific reports in the EU countries. The EU enlargement reports are published by the
European Commission after careful monitoring of the reform implementation in Albania and each of the candidate countries. These reports serve as recommendations to the European parliament and the European Council for further steps towards integration. The recommendations are approved or postponed based on the decisions of the Council (governments of all the member countries) and the EU parliament.
The significance of these reports rests on the fact that they evaluate the progress toward
EU integration, identify any problems, propose strategies for the future, and attempt to institutionalize Albania-EU integration. The EU integration efforts are materialized in these policies and are the products of multiple political, economic, national, and international actors.
The EU enlargement reports are written in a very technical and administrative style. They only focus on the outcome, not the effort or the social and public intensity and sacrifice that goes with reform implementations. The political speeches, official press releases, and news articles, on the 103
other hand, are complementary to the official reports. They offer more than summaries on these
reports and strategies; they provide commentary on why the EU process matters and why EU
membership should happen. Public commentaries attempt to shape perceptions about Albania
and the EU.
EU integration from a place perspective
In this section, I describe three ways in which the EU integration discourse constructs
Albania as a place. Place is understood in relationship to space. Dickinson, Blair, & Ott (2011) define place as space which is bordered, specified, and locatable by being named, deployed in, and deploying space; place is different from open, undesignated, and undifferentiated space. For
Endres and Senda-Cook (2011), the relationship between place and space “can be described as one of particular to the general” (p.261). A similar understanding of place in relation to space is forged by Tuan (1977), with space as a movement and place as a pause; and by Creswell (2015), with space being amenable to the abstraction of science and rationality, while place fits into discussions of things such as “value” and “belongings.” Place is essentially rhetorical, as it emerges from being “recognizable” as named, bordered, and differentiated. As such, places are contestable. In order to understand the rhetorical construction of Albania as a place in the
European Union integration discourse, I investigate ways in which the discourses, events, and practices “recognize” Albania as place within the European Union discursive space. The results of this investigation suggest that there are three ways that re/define Albania as place in the EU integration process; 1) Western Balkans—not yet South East Europe, 2) place for re-conciliation and re-construction, and 3) a hot spot for de/stability. These three ways of naming reveal how the
EU integration works and its discursive consequences in the national, regional, and global context. 104
Western Balkans—not South East Europe
In the EU enlargement reports and strategies, Albania is defined within and in relation to
Western Balkan countries. While this is geographically and physically correct, placing Albania in the Balkan States policies complicates and impedes the fulfillment of the requirements towards EU accession process. Addressing the EU enlargement in regions has been the strategy of the EU from the beginning. The enlargement of the EU, as I described above, has happened periodically with seven rounds, and two significant enlargements have occurred in specific regions. Addressing the EU enlargement in regions is a form of administrative approach to control the enlargement process by defining the requirements for the EU integration process. As
Paasi suggests, “regions have been particularly significant in the EU where both the making of the Union itself and the ‘Europe of regions’ are concrete manifestations of the rescaling of the state spaces and the assignment of new meanings to territory” (2009, p. 121). The regions are scaled down to regions within the EU; for example, the EU is a region in the world scale, the
Central East European countries are a region within EU that joined in 2004, and so are the
Eastern Balkan countries, a region within the EU that joined in 2007. The EU strategy is to complete EU enlargements by region, so Albania’s progress toward EU accession is conditioned by what happens at regional context.
However, the regional approach is not simply administrative and neutral, as the EU policies by bordering regions are actually patrolling what belongs in the EU. As Timothy Barney
(2009) suggests the following about the mapping of political post-Cold-war Europe:
It embodies the tension between rhetoric of change and control . . . For the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, much still needs to be mapped both in paper and in the
imagination of their leaders. In places where borders and identities still are contested and 105
redrawn, and where the spectral memory of communism still shrouds their advancement,
maps will be integral in determining regions future. (p.427)
Also, the EU official enlargement reports consistently addressing the region as the Western
Balkans adds to the implications because “this region, in fact the whole Balkan Peninsula has been historically stigmatized as denied the ‘honor’ of being called ‘European’” (Bogdani &
Loughlin, 2007; p.87). However, the reports and media coverage on EU integration in the region use the term South East Europe in response, and articulate the completion of the EU map, with the region in it, as a historical dimension on reshaping Europe.
The Western Balkan region includes Albania, Montenegro, Kosova, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
FYR of Macedonia, and Serbia, four countries are already EU candidate members, with Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina being potential candidates. The EU is the biggest investor in the region and the largest trading partner. The potential of the region lies in fast-growing economies with high domestic demand. The EU funding, through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
(IPA,) remains the main source of financial and technical support for reforms toward EU integration. Albania, and other countries aspiring to join the EU, have the specific requirements to complete before accession talks can began. However, the EU, particularly with the new strategy announced on February 6th, 2018 is addressing the integration process as a regional effort. The EU Commission adapted the new strategy for “A credible enlargement perspective for an enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans.” Announced by the European
Commission President Juncker during 2017 State of the Union address, this strategy is a major enlargement initiative. The rationale for taking this important effort to enlargement is clear from
Juncker’s speech: “Investing in the stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans means investing in the security and future of the Union . . . With strong political will, real and sustained 106 reforms, and definitive solutions to disputes with neighbors, the Western Balkans can move forward on their respective European paths” (EC, 2018e).
Despite its good will, the regional conditioned strategy has additional risks, as it functions to redefine the region based on more than physical borders. The new requirements are, in fact, an effort to institutionalize the Western Balkans on dimensions of economic, political, and social collaboration. Under the umbrella of the Western Balkans there are many disadvantages, as the specific national and regional issues are being forced to be reconfigured regionally in order to progress towards EU integration.
I suggest that the first problem is that the push for a multi-dimensional cohesion in the region is not internally inspired; instead it is being initiated from the outside of the Western
Balkans, the EU, and other international factors. The 2018 Western Balkans strategy is a
“scaling-down” approach from the EU, to the Western Balkans, to the individual countries. The
Western Balkans strategy is defining a diverse region from the outside by at least one clear common attribute, which is that the countries in the region do not yet belong to the EU. The press in general has supported the new integration strategy; however, there are concerns about ambiguity of the requirements. The new strategy requires that regional disputes to be resolved before countries can join the Union. Every country in the region has regional disputes expect
Albania. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has disputes with Greece over its name.
Kosovo and Serbia have still conflict, as Serbia has not yet recognized Kosovo’s independence.
The strategy has explicitly stated that Kosovo and Serbia normalize relations before any progress towards integration occurs. Kosovo’s president, Hashim Thaci, declared that “the strategy has failed to offer clarity on Kosovo’s membership to EU”. There are also concerns that the strategy is not specific and leaves room for various interpretations, which could compromise the 107 outcome. Even pro EU news platforms, like the European Western Balkans news platform, express concern:
The wording of the possible solutions remains vague and generalized, where it should
clearly avoid making past mistakes. Most notably, there is no plan to hold Member States
accountable even though the future of the Western Balkans is very much dependent on its
neighbors’ actions and the European institutions. (Djolal, 2018.)
The second issue that comes with regional approach to integration is that the EU is
“opening the door,” but not letting the new members in until a desired outcome is achieved, which I suggest is also one strategy to keep the aspiring to join EU countries on a leash. The EU enlargement reports consistently state both the open-door policy and requirements to be met as well. While the EU integration process symbolically started in early 1990s, the integration has been extremely slow. The enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans started in 2003 with the
Thessaloniki Treaty. The 2007 EU enlargement that included Bulgaria and Romania (the Eastern
Balkans) was soon claimed as premature by the older EU member states over concern of migration and government corruption, which dampened the EU enlargement attitudes
(Sedelmeier, 2014). The 2010 start of the Eurozone financial crisis caused tension within the
Union itself with “Southern European countries opposing economic austerity measures”
(Bulmer, 2016) and caused more reluctance regarding enlargement, leaving the Western Balkan in an integration limbo. The Eurozone includes 19 out of 27 EU members that use the Euro as their single currency, and since 2010 (who?) has been undergoing a financial debt crisis
(Capolevich, 2016).
In 2014, the European Commission announced a five-year moratorium on EU enlargement. In order to keep the Western Balkan focused towards EU integration, the “Berlin 108
Process” was launched. The initiative consists of yearly high-level meetings between the six- states for better cooperation and economic stability (EP, 2016). The initiative had the support of the region and the EU member countries, which were directly involved, especially Germany. The
European Parliament declaration states that “creating high-level political connections, reconciling societies by stimulating youth exchange and education projects, and resolving outstanding bilateral disputes, while ensuring civil society participation in the whole process, are other significant aspects of this initiative” (EP, 2016, p. if there is one). However, the “Berlin process” was too slow to be implemented and the bureaucracy prevents the redirecting of funds in timely manner. Trying to make amends of this initiative on May 31, 2017, the German government organized the “Berlin Process Plus” agenda for the Western Balkans. This was another effort to keep the region on the EU path. The new strategy announced on February 6,
2018 is the EU enlargement recipe for the Western Balkans claimed as “an unprecedented support to the EU integration goal” (EC, 2018a). However, additional requirements could be set up for the Western Balkans, particularly concerning neighborly relations.
The third problem with including Albania under a regional umbrella is a manifestation of where the EU priorities lie. The EU enlargement requirements serve first and foremost the
Union’s needs, which result in the EU becoming a moving target. A comparison of the EU enlargement periodic reports on Albania shows progress on reforms, but the progress is always followed by more recommendations. The Albanian governmental integration yearly reports to the Parliament address each requirement and provide details on how each recommendation is addressed, especially the pre-screening on the Judiciary, Human Rights, Justice, Freedom, and
Security negotiation chapters. While the EU has provided support continuously to Albania and the region, this support has varied significantly in crisis contexts. The internal EU crisis make 109
EU membership an unpredictable goal for Albania. The requirements to be met have changed
based on previous accession experiences. The border issues between Slovenia and Croatia have
caused the requirement that the border-related disputes to be solved to be put on the agenda for
the Western Balkans. With EU being a moving target, and the EU regional approach, the chances
for Albania, and of each individual country wanting to join the EU, are complicated further.
Addressing the EU integration under a regional umbrella is a manifestation of the power
that EU has over the aspiring countries. The past is being repeated after 100 years. The conflicts
in the Balkans originate with the great powers of WWI deciding on the borders to serve interests
of the time. The borders were defined by the outside then as well, during the London Treaty of
1913, which put Albanian territories under Serbian rule (Malcolm, 1998). Naming the region for
EU rescaling purposes carries the added meaning of the early 20th century’s past. So, the Western
Balkans continues to be hot, fragile, sensitive, and unsettled. There have been efforts to achieve a coherent region, and these efforts for the most part have been led by Albania. The attempts to normalize relations between Tirana and Belgrade are a new development for the region.
However, the name “Western Balkans” carries more the meaning for conflict and division than a region that is so intensely trying to move in a new direction, namely, toward the EU. The
Albanian minster of Europe and foreign affairs, Ditmir Bushati, discussed this in an interview:
The countries in the Western Balkans have moved from being enemies into neighbors,
[however] a lot of energy is wasted on how we sit around the table and how [they] call
each other. These transformation among the relations countries and people have in the
Western Balkans can be attributed to the ‘clear perspective’ of European integration and
the political will of the leadership, to get ahead in the EU integration process. (Bushi,
2017) 110
Place for Re-conciliation and Re-construction
Albania is defined as a place in need of re-conciliation and re-construction. These two terms are the most used in the EU related political and public discourse from the enlargement reports of 2011 to the newly announced strategy for the Western Balkans. The press release on the new strategy’s first recommendation is to focus on convincing reforms and reconciliation:
All countries must unequivocally commit, in both word and deed, to overcome the legacy
of the past, by achieving reconciliation and solving open issues, in particular border
disputes, well before accession to the European Union. There needs to be a
comprehensive, legally-binding normalization agreement between Serbia and Kosovo so
that they can advance on their respective European paths. (EC, 2018a)
Reconciliation is the main legacy of the EU. In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace
Prize for reconciliation and peace, mainly between France and Germany, of a region that had been at war for nearly a century. The former EU president at the time, Herman Van Rompuy, gave a speech entitled “From war to peace: A European tale”, which declared reconciliation as the achievement of the Union: “To me, what makes it so special, is reconciliation. In politics as in life, reconciliation is a difficult thing. It goes beyond forgiving and forgetting, or simply turning the page” (Van Rompuy, December 10, 2012).
If there is one primary symbolic import to the world from the EU, that is reconciliation.
However, reconciliation is intricate, and it matters what, when, and from where it comes. The EU integration efforts are a further reconciliation between East and West Europe. Reconstruction is also the focus of integration materially and symbolically. Reconstructing new democratic institutions is the focus of the reforms and the reason why it matters. It is a major focus of the 111
Albanian integration reports to the parliament as it is the justification of all the reforms undertaken. Reconstruction presumes reconciliation and gives hope for better futures. However, while reconstruction is not controversial in Albania, reconciliation is an issue that raises debates.
Reconciliation could not be claimed by one side only; it has to come from a larger base. In the
Albanian reports, reconciliation is more implied than addressed, especially when about the communist past or regional ethnic conflicts in the region. Reconciliation is the focus of EU enlargement reports and press releases. In Albania, reconciliation means reconciliation with the communist past. However, the EU has not addressed explicitly the communist past in the reports.
The enlargement reports on Albania have recommended solutions to the conflict in the parliament between majority and minority. The parties in Albania, as in the region, are defined not by clear ideology on economic and political policy, but instead are defined by the relationship that they have with the recent past (Stojarova, 2013). There are two main parties in
Albania: the Socialist party, which is the former communist party reformed, and the Democratic
Party, which emerged in the 1990 from the anticommunist movement. The relationship with the communist past is a deep division that underlies the internal politics in Albania. While not explicitly a requirement, the 2015 EU enlargement reports do acknowledge that “Albania has taken measures to address the restitution of or compensation for property confiscated during the communist era” (EC, 2015).
The EU checks for the outcomes of attempts to meet their recommendations. They need to see that the product reforms that are passed in the parliament and implemented without internal political conflicts. The judicial reform has been the largest political debate in Albania for the last two years, and it has been the main requirement from the EU under the Rule of Law and
Judiciary acquis. The reform was blocked initially be the opposition, the Democratic Party, 112 which was against a clause that allowed foreigners to approve magistrates. The reform was framed as the reform needed to open the membership talks, and it had an unusual support from the U.S. embassy in Tirana and the Council of Europe. The 2016 EU enlargement report on
Albania recognized this assistance with the judiciary reform by stating, “The law, prepared with help from EU and US experts and reviewed by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, allows authorities to check the incomes and property holdings of judges and prosecutors and their professional backgrounds” (CoE, 2016). The Albanian parliament passed the key judiciary reform unanimously as a condition for starting membership talks. The EU praised the vote as an
"accountable, independent and transparent judiciary which will help fight organized crime and corruption” (EC, July 22, 2016).
However, the 2016 decision of the EU was to not start the accession process with
Albania. The debates regarding the judiciary have continued into spring 2018 with issues concerning implementing the reform. The public discourse on judiciary reform surpassed the internal national debates, and it has become a diplomatic matter at times because of the involvement of the international factors in the process. The current government blamed the opposition for blocking the reform, and consequently the EU integration. The reforms became a political game between parties and international actors involved, and the debate has monopolized not just the public discussions, but the institutions that carry them as well. A joint statement between EU and Albania in Brussels declared that the judicial reform "could be transformative for other reforms" and the fight against corruption and organized crime. Judicial reforms have sparked hot political debates and internal conflicts in other countries, especially those from the
East. Judicial reforms have caused protests and EU concerns in Poland (Whiteside, 2017) and
Romania (Reuters, 2018) as well. Other reforms have been required by the EU. In 2014, EU 113 enlargement report specified the Media Law and Freedom reform, which was then recognized as a success by later reports. One recommendation that has not been fully, but satisfactory, is the achievement of a constructive and sustainable political dialogue between government and opposition.
Reconciliation and reconstruction have a regional layer as well. The new strategy for the
Western Balkans, which I explained above, is an extension of reconciling and reconstructing the region. EU president Junker, during his visit to Albania in December 2017, declared the following six months as decisive for opening the accession talks. The new strategy for the
Western Balkans came as a response to increasingly aggressive warnings by the Albania that “if
EU does not act, the Balkan countries will pursue other alternatives” (December 5. 2017). The new strategy for the region declared by Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief, is that of “a clear path for the Western Balkans to finally join the European Union” (EC, 2018e). A special Balkan summit is scheduled for May 2018 in Sofia. Two are the main requirements for enlargement countries are irreversible reforms, especially regarding the rule of law, and reconciliation and solving open issues, especially including the normalization of Pristine-Belgrade relations and the border disputes in the region.
The strategy laid down six flagship initiatives that will start being implemented from
2018 to 2020 and call for the current EU members to prepare institutionally and financially for the enlargement. The initiatives are to strengthen the rule of law, security and migration, support for socio-economic development, transport and energy connectivity, digital agenda, and reconciliation and good neighborly relations. The declaration clearly states that “all countries must unequivocally commit, in both word and deed, to overcoming the legacy of the past, by 114 achieving reconciliation and solving open issues well before their accession to the EU, in particular border disputes” (EC, 2018a). The sixth initiative on regional reconciliation states:
This will include support to transitional justice, missing persons and increased
cooperation in education, culture, youth and sport, and expanding the scope of the
Regional Youth Cooperation Office. The Western Balkans will be fully associated to the
European Year of Cultural Heritage; the EU - Western Balkans Heritage Route will be
launched. (EC, 2018a)
Reconciliation and reconstruction have the Union layer as well. The EU integration is in and of itself a process of reconciliation and reconstruction of the EU and the aspiring countries.
In the press, the new strategy was criticized. The renewed EU agenda for the Western Balkans was called an “arranged marriage” because it was done out of threat. Even though the enthusiasm of the EU officials to announce the new Western Balkan strategy as a renewed hope for the region, the Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations,
Johannes Hahn, sounded less like a celebrant and more like a commander in his comments:
Today we confirm that the door of our Union is open for the Western Balkans which is
already an enclave surrounded by the EU, and that our offer is sincere. With the new
approach, underpinned by concrete measures, we are strengthening the enlargement
process which requires credible efforts and reforms in return in particular to strengthen
the rule of law. We have to work for the benefit of the citizens. (EC Press Release, 2018)
The headlines on the Albanian press following the announcement varied from “an unprecedented chance,” to “false hopes,” and “EU lists more requirements than offerings”. 115
Critical voices of EU addressed the reasons behind this EU strategy. For example, the Reuters
explained the new strategy as follows:
Seeking to breathe fresh life into the EU with Britain set to leave, the European
Commission laid out a strategy to bring Western Balkan nations into the fold if they
achieve required reforms, marking a change after years of fading interest. Brussels has
been growing worried about Russia’s assertiveness on its borders since Moscow’s
annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014 - concerns exacerbated in the Balkans
after Montenegro accused Russia of supporting a failed coup in 2016. Meanwhile,
Chinese investment in the region, though welcomed by governments, is seen as
undermining EU standards because it does not come with the same stringent requirements
as EU aid. (Bartunek and Emmott, February 6, 2018)
Hot spot for de/stability
The EU enlargement reports and political discourse name Albania as a place of stability with potential for de-stability. The potential for destabilization stems from the fact that the Albanian territory stretches beyond its physical political borders. As I explained earlier, the political borders of Albania do not represent all Albanian territories. Albania is surrounded by Albanian territories, from Northern Greece, to the FYR of Macedonia, Kosovo, Southern Serbia, and southern Montenegro. This is considered a chance for de/stability if nationalist unification aspirations dominate. The tension is on the re-construction of territory. The EU efforts to keep
Albania, and the Western Balkans oriented to the EU integration process is in fact one way to claim that territory, and consequently construct a place that “belongs” in the EU. The EU integration reforms and political discourse are concerted efforts to reconstruct the region and make it more EU place-like. 116
However, the stagnation of the EU integration process, mainly due to the EU internal
crisis, has created uncertainty in the region. The interests of other international factors in the
region are competing for relevance beyond the economic reasons. Being left on the EU waiting
list for so long, with renewed and continuous requirements, has left Albania feeling out of the
EU’s place. In November 2016, the Albanian Premier, Edi Rama, warned the EU to renew their
attention to the Balkan region since creating a “vacuum” in the middle of Europe is attractive to
Russian and radical Islamist influence. Rama raised concerns about the EU’s status and how a
disturbed South East Europe poses a threat to the entire continent: “It’s not about how long we still need, it’s about how the European Union will continue to develop. In the meantime, we are politically in fairly good form, while the European Union is not at present” (Rama, 2016). Rama again articulated Albania’s response to the stalled EU accession process in a later speech: “There is a lack of understanding, or a lack of vision, in not realizing that this region needs EU, but EU needs this region too, for a secure and safe Europe” (2017).
The consequence of the neglect from EU, the increased pressure in Albania for progress towards the EU accession (especially before parliamentary elections), and the political crisis in neighboring countries generated aggressive responses by the Albanian prime minister. Edi Rama discussed this issue in an interview with Politico:
A ‘little union’ with Kosovo is possible if Brussels turns its back on the region. Europe
would face “a nightmare” if the Balkans ‘go crazy’ because EU accession is off the
agenda, with the region becoming a ‘gray zone in which other actors have more influence
than the European Union. (Macdowall, April 18, 2017)
The “emergency politics” that has defined the EU since 2010 (Bulmer, 2016) has reduced the EU enlargement policy to stability. The stability requirements, while functioning to 117 preserve the EU as a place, create displacement for aspiring countries. Stability often means to neutralize and silence democratic developments and public discussions, especially when related to traumatic national pasts and ethnic conflicts. The new strategy for the Western Balkans is a manifestation of the EU responding to stability threats as the international actors try to reclaim and/or maintain their territories.
There are two main territorial influences in the Western Balkans that define the dynamics in the region and influence Albania’s place in the EU: First, the unsettled past from, WWI which divided the Albanian territories to satisfy the former great power interests, known in the diplomatic scholarship as the Albanian question; second, the Russian influence and close ties with Serbia and other Slavic nations. Omitting the EU integration aspirations, the region is defined by means of ethnic territories. The political and public discourse has addressed these concerns in particular over the last two years. These two territorial influences are a manifestation of Cold War influences as well. The Albanians in the region are heavily and historically allied with the USA and Western European countries, while the Slavic communities have historic and ethnic ties with Russia. Any pause on EU and U.S. interests in the region inspires old connections with Russia. While this is not the purpose of this study, it is important to consider its influence in the EU integration process and regional developments.
2017 has been marked by increased conflicts in the region, which were obvious threats to stability in the region and consequently for the EU. Macdowell discusses this idea extensively in
Politico-Europe:
Recent signs of instability in the Balkans include bellicose rhetoric between leaders of
Kosovo and Serbia, allegations of a Russian-backed coup attempt in Montenegro, threats 118
by Bosnia’s autonomous Serb Republic to secede and a protracted political crisis in
FYRM, which has left the country without a government. (Macdowall, 2017)
The developments in the region raised concern of renewed ethnic and national conflicts, and subsequently a threat to the region’s stability. The situation was particularly threatening in early
2017. Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, admonished the EU for neglecting the situation:
“The silence coming out of Brussels is alarming. Similar things happened in the 1990s in
Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. We saw what the consequences were. That's why the EU
must remember Belgrade's previous patterns of behavior, which are no different from
those of today. (Thaci, 2017)
Albania is seen as stabilizing force in the region; this is explicit in the EU enlargement reports.
The good neighborly relations are requirements for all aspiring countries; however, it is especially important for Albania to not aspire for unification with Kosovo and/or other Albanian territories, as this would be considered a threat for new conflicts in the region. This idea is used by the EU to address any potential issues through policy making and reforms, and it is used in the public discourse as a threat to neighboring countries of Serbia and some Slavic Macedonian parties. The threat of the “natural Albania” is used by Russian-backed stories in the media to fuel ethnic conflicts in the region, in the efforts to divert the EU integration reforms. The Balkan region is marked as a region of secession, as “there are few places in Europe where the struggle for Catalonia is being followed with such close attention than in this ‘region of secessions,’ still scarred by the Balkan wars of the 1990s” (Flessenkemper, 2017).
The Russian influence in the region has been significantly increased last two years. In general, Russian efforts and news have consistently counteracted the West’s efforts to stabilize 119 the region. Albania and Kosovo are the two non-Slavic countries in the region, and Russian- backed news nurtures ethnic conflicts in the region and uses the threat of a “greater Albania.”
The influence has been profound in Slavic governments, as Russia “is trying to sell an image of
Moscow listening to and respecting as equals to the Slavic governments in Belgrade, Serbia;
Skopje, Macedonia; and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (Wiśniewski, 2016).
This news is reprinted in the nationalist press in Serbia and through RT network that frame the
Russian interference as a historical association between Russia and the Slavic communities in the
Balkans.
The Western Balkans are symbolically important in Putin’s foreign policy. Many in
Russia viewed the fall of Yugoslavia as an example of humiliation, where the West
ignored Moscow’s views – and the post-Soviet world first saw the blueprint for “color
revolutions. Putin has never shaken off his dismay at how Russia lost influence in
Kosovo as it became autonomous, if not recognized as an independent state. He has used
that territory’s upheaval and independence as his justification for asserting Russia’s
power by fighting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014. . .. At
the same time the West is portrayed as culturally different and (unlike Moscow) unable to
understand Slavic exceptionality. (Wiśniewski, September 19, 2016)
Sputnik is the news agency formerly known as Voice of Russia, and it is geared towards non-Russian audiences. Russian influence in the region has increased especially the last four years: The U.S. has declared the risk of such influence for the democracy of the region. In May
2018, the U.S. State Department warned about “malignant” Russian political and economic influence in the Balkans, especially with its special status humanitarian center in Nis, Serbia, but many western groups consider it as a disguised military Russian base (Djurdjic, June 15, 2017). 120
The concerns were addressed by high U.S. officials during a special visit in the region. Hoyt
Brian Yee, deputy assistant secretary for Europe and Eurasia, visited in the region in July of
2017 and emphasized that the U.S. policy aimed at promoting peace and stability in the region.
Threats of Russian influence in the region were addressed during Montenegro’s NATO-joining
ceremony as well, with the Montenegrin government accusing Russia of an attempted coup in
2016 in order to prevent the country’s membership to NATO. After the new Balkan EU strategy,
the Russian response has intensified, as the “Kremlin is so concerned about losing Serbia to EU
that the Russian foreign minister Lavrov in Belgrade discouraged the EU membership is not
good” (Stojanovic, February 24, 2018). Another country, China, increasingly has been present in
the region, especially with the initiative of the “Belt and Road”. China’s strategy was to ensure
greater access to Western Europe and to use the Balkans as a speedy distribution network. China
views Serbia as a strategic partner in the region with planned long-term investment projects and
the financing of the high-speed highway between Belgrade and Budapest. The port of Piraeus in
Greece has become the main entry point for Chinese goods in Europe (Zeneli, 2014).
Conclusion: The power of imagined futures
Albania, in relation to EU integration discursive space, is defined as a place of Western
Balkans, a place for reconciliation and reconstruction, and a hot spot for (de)stability. These definitions are not all favorable for Albania and are contested regularly. Albania contests these definitions as a place that belongs to the EU along with other South East European countries, and that Albania’s reconciliation and reconstruction process is better to immerse with the EU’s same process, and that Albania and Albanians have been a factor of stability in the region and in
Europe. However, the EU integration of Albania, and other aspiring to join the Union states in the region, is exclusively decided by the EU member states. There is a large disproportionality of 121 influences in the Albania-EU relationship. The EU candidate countries produce laws and policies in the process of adaptation and implementation of the acquis, the EU requirement chapters, but they have no power over the EU policies. EU integration relegates these countries into simple followers. The EU, through reports, strategies, and regular summits on enlargements, names what needs to be attained by aspiring to join countries, which are left in to follow endless cycles of reforms.
However, despite the EU ever-boundless requirements towards accepting new full members, Albania and the region still hold strong to the EU integration agenda. The disproportionality of the influences in the political and public discourse is best described as place space relationship. As I described earlier, place is space that is specified, named, deployed in and deploys space (Dickinson, Blair, Ott, 2011). Albania is specified, named, and deployed in the EU integration discursive space, and Albania deploys EU integration discursive space. EU integration discursive space would not exist if there was no country striving to be part of the
Union. It is the connection place/space, Albania/EU, which explains how this disproportionality of influences is maintained. While the EU power rests on the requirements for reform, policies, and responses to threats and logical decisions, because space is amenable to the abstraction of science and rationality, Albania’s power rests on the discourse over the meaning of what the EU is and its ideals, because place is amenable to the discussion over values and belonging. Every time EU enlargement decisions are made and explained the meaning of the EU is redefined and articulated. The EU meaning rests on these enlargement decisions. While the EU has the institutional power to accept new members, Albania and other candidate countries have the discursive power over the meaning of the EU. 122
I argue that this strong place-space discursive connection is generated from the EU
imagined futures of Albania and other countries. The power of imagined futures renders a EU
discourse that is totalizing in Albania, as it leaves no room for any other alternative imagined
future. The EU proclaimed ideals are the imagined future of Albania, and other states of the
region. The totalizing effect of the imagined futures are manifested in the following ways.
First, the EU founding principles presume a united and peaceful Europe, the imagined
future. The EU treaties are the fundamental binding agreements between the EU member states,
which are equivalent of a constitution:
They set out EU objectives, rules for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the
relationship between the EU and its member countries. Every action taken by the EU is
founded on treaties. Treaties are amended to make the EU more efficient and transparent,
prepare for new member countries and introduce new areas of cooperation. (TEU, 2016)
Two articles from the Treaty of the European Union, are especially significant for the enlargement process: articles 2 and 49. Article 2 states, “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States” (EC, 2015). Article 49 states, “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union” (EC, 2015). These two articles could be considered foundational stipulations that define the EU, as more than an intergovernmental cooperation and single free market, as a place that receives its meaning by promoting unity and respect among nations and states involved. 123
Second, the current enlargement strategy rekindles the EU imagined futures. A complete and united Europe is the imagined dream for the current EU members as well. The new strategy for the Western Balkan and is an example of hopes revived for a joined future in Europe. The
High Representative/Vice-President of the EU Federica Mogherini commented on the day that the strategy was approved and announced by the European Commission:
The Western Balkans are part of Europe: we share the same history, the same geography,
the same cultural heritage and the same opportunities and challenges today and in the
future. We have a common interest in working more and more closely together to
guarantee to our people economic and social development, and security. This strategy
shows the path that we have ahead of us: for all our six partners to overcome once and for
all the past, for all of us together to make the process of the Western Balkans towards the
European Union irreversible and keep reuniting the Continent. This Strategy gives all of
us a shared, clear, unequivocal, credible and concrete perspective for each and every one
of our six partners' EU integration. The next months will be not only intense but also
crucial to make sure that this historic and unique opportunity is seized. (Strasbourg,
2018)
The EU announcement of the new strategy for the Balkans is promoted as “in principle open door with a 2025 perspective” and that “our six partners in the region are already part of
Europe. They are surrounded by EU Member States. The European peace project would not be complete without them. We have a common heritage and history, and a common future defined by shared opportunities and challenges. The migration crisis, for example, has shown that very clearly” (EC, 2018e). The current Western Balkan initiative rekindles the imagined future of a united Europe. The press in Albania and EU countries view this strategy as a concrete step 124 towards materializing that future. The Albanian Minister for Europe praised the EU’s new initiative and stated that “the EU is a much more attractive for political as well as economic reasons . . . People who lived under Communist dictatorship are drawn by EU values” (Bushati,
2018).
Third, the totalizing effect of the imagined futures explains Albania’s perseverance towards integration. In the public discourse that follows issuance of EU reports and enlargement decisions the countries aspiring to join the EU are not completely powerless. They influence on defining the EU as a place of imagined futures symbolically by wanting to join. The EU becomes an important place for the outsiders, and it gives the EU the meaning of a place of destination.
When considering the intense reforms that are being implemented by Albania and other aspiring countries, as well as the heated public debates on EU integration, the aspiring countries have major influence. EU integration monopolizes not only institutional reforms but the news front pages and political and public discussions.
EU membership as an imagined future for Albania and the Western Balkan region is the vehicle that carries the implementation of reforms. The Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has articulated this vision directed at the EU officials:
The support to EU integration is strong in the region, and especially among Albanians.
The founding ideals of the EU, in the aftermath of WWII, resonate with the Balkan
region now, in the aftermath of the Balkan wars. The EU retains a kind of ‘magic’ for the
Western Balkans, just as it did for its founding member countries in the wake of World
War II and had encouraged regional leaders to work more closely together. (Rama, 2017) 125
The Albanian press responses to EU enlargement reports express concern of a fading EU accession perspective for the country. The EU has weakened after several crises engulfed the
Union, starting with the financial crisis that followed the Eurozone, the refugee crisis stemming from the war in Syria, and recently with Brexit, or the decision that England will exit the EU.
The EU ideals are stronger among candidate and aspiring nations than within the EU itself. The
EU remains the destination place for these countries; however, the Union has failed continually to match that enthusiasm.
The imagined futures totalizing effect is manifested on Albania support during EU crisis.
The support for EU from Albania was apparent during Brexit vote as well. Albania’s free trade arrangements with European Union was suggested as a model for post-Brexit during the UK in- or-out EU referendum campaign, and as a country that Britain could align with after Brexit, by the UK Justice Minister Michael Gove. Gove’s remarks were generated massive response during the Brexit referendum by the “remain in EU” campaign (Tanner, April 21, 2016). The Albanian
Prime minister, Edi Rama, wrote in The Times UK an article defending the EU and its ideal as the best option for Europe, Albania, and UK. In support of EU Rama writes,
I would not make a claim that we have either the political or the economic muscle to see
ourselves as a rival to the EU, which has helped deliver peace and prosperity to so many,
for so long. A bloc whose single market is one of the most remarkable trade arrangements
anywhere in the world — and in any period of history. I am not convinced that it would
suit either our or Britain’s 21st-century needs to create this new BBC, the British-Balkan
Confederation. Or that it is right for Britain to look at Albania as a model of a
relationship with the EU. Indeed, I am convinced it would be wrong for Britain to do so.
(Rama, April 25, 2016) 126
Places are produced at national and international levels. The EU itself is a place produced by the ideals of belonging and citizenship that incorporate different countries. The EU guards its constructed place with policies and requirements that are always changing to adapt to new developments. In this way, the EU place is dynamic and fluid. Albania, and other aspiring countries, are constantly producing and implementing new laws and policies in a dynamic context within their respective countries as well. The EU is idealized by the outsiders and guarded by the insiders. The EU integration process is totalizing the reconciliation and democratization efforts in Albania and the Western Balkans region.
The EU-claimed ideals not only give meaning to EU as place, but they are the ideals that resonate with the Albanian and the Western Balkans as well. The EU as a place involves more than treaties, laws, and negotiations; it involves peace, hope, and opportunities. Countries that aspire to join believe in the Union and see it as the way to escape the troubled past. In another way, the EU has claimed the European dream. The globalization forces, international influences, and EU integration have left no room for any other alternative to the European dream that emerged in the 1990s, especially in Eastern Europe. Albania, the Western Balkans, and the
European Union are all moving targets in the globalized system. For all to become one place, more than reforms and policies needs to be done; it needs to organically align the meaning of what the EU should be. 127
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS: REMAKING ALBANIA
The dynamics of remembering the communist past in Albania affords an ideal opportunity to understand how public memory of national traumatic pasts is created and appropriated to fit present national and international political agenda. The investigation of memory places, recent public debates, official documents, and political speeches suggest that the public memory of the communist past is immersed into the reconstructions and reconciliation process of Albania’s EU integration process. Transitioning to democracy and EU aspirations requires more than institutional building and reconstructing, it requires deep political and social change. The combination of systemic and social change constitutes a process of remaking, where the discourses about the past are fundamental. In this study, remaking Albania comes as a rhetorical tension over meaning of the pasts and futures.
Grounded on the assumption that public memory is essentially rhetorical (Blair et al,
2011) I investigated how commemorative and non-commemorative texts attempt to construct a shared understanding about the past, based on their meaningfulness, legibility, consequentiality, and publicity. Previous research on post-communist and other post-totalitarian pasts have suggested that major transitional times bring public memory into the forefront of public discourse. I investigated how public debates about the past constructed a contained public memory which works to maintain the legitimacy of particular groups in Albania and satisfy the
EU integration criteria required for starting the accession negotiations. The rhetorical reading of places of memory suggested that communist past is unsettled and fluid as it is constructed through sites of witnesses, persecution, perpetrators, and tourism. The investigation of political texts on Albania-EU relations defined Albania as place for reconciliation and reconstruction and a hot/spot for de/stability. Based on the rhetorical place-space relationship I argue that is the 134
totalizing power of imagined futures that maintains the Albania –EU relationship. In the
following section, I review three chapters of analysis and explain how they work together to
answer the overarching research question on how do the rhetorical dynamics of “remembering”
shape the communist past in Albania and what do they reveal about the role of public memory in
constructing group identities and relations within and across national places.
Chapter review
Chapter two focused on the public discussions about the communist past in traditional media. The intensity of public discussions varied during the post-communist period based on governmental, institutional, and civil society’s initiatives. The immediate post-communist years,
1991-1996, included lustration and restitution laws from the government and legislative institutions, and a complete denial and cautious public and private discussions about the communist past. From 1997 to 2003, the public discussions were almost inexistent due to national economic crisis and institutional neglect. From 2004 to 2014, the public discussions about the past started to emerge as a result of civil societies’ initiatives, governmental efforts, and EU integration reforms. From 2015 to the present the public discussions about the past have intensified, commemoration activities and institutional efforts have become frequent. I analyzed three major public debates surrounding the 2015 law on the right to be informed about the secret service files, the 2016 publication of the national survey on the attitudes towards communism and the communist dictator, and the 2017 debate on the ban on films produced for propaganda during communism era.
I argue that the public debates became a public trial on communist past. The first trial developed on two opposing arguments on ways of deliberating about the communist past: the accused or perceived as collaborating with the regime argued that the past must be handled 135 institutionally, while the accusers argued that the past and the relationship people had with it must be discussed freely in public debates and not be left to governmental institutions to control it. The second trial was ignited by the national survey on citizens’ attitudes towards communism developed on two main arguments on the proposed screening of the communist era film productions. Those who requested the screening argued that communist propaganda films and movies must be banned from broadcasting as they manipulate the national history and discriminate the people who opposed communism. Those who were part of these communist productions took the role of the accusers in public debates and argued that these movies must be treated as cultural heritage.
The communist past in public trials demonstrated that “remembering” the traumatic national past is primarily shaped rhetorically. The public debates reflected the dynamics of “what from” and “how” the past should be remembered. The debates shifted from the original focus on what the past was, to what about the past is “safe” for public deliberation. The debate on secret files and past regimes’ collaborators was framed as personal attacks. The proposal on the screening of the communist production propaganda films was framed as “banning” and as a threat to culture and heritage. I argued that these debates constructed a contained version of public memory, the past is not safe to be left to public deliberation and it must not be a threat to present interest.
I explained the consequences of the contained version of public memory on shaping group identities and relations in national and international context. First, the victims and the persecuted of the communist regime are framed as a minority. The debates were initiated by the organizations and individuals representing the victims and the persecuted, but they were isolated in numbers and in their story. The collective blame and personal absolution from proponents of 136 intuitional approach framed the persecuted as minority in the past and in the present. Second, the debate about the past became essentially about the legitimacy to be revered in the public, social, and cultural sphere. The contradiction of the dominant media frame, that, the discussions about the past must be institutionally controlled and not left to public deliberation, but the propaganda productions must be freely aired in public broadcasting, suggest that the discussions about the past are more about the legitimacy and present interest, than to genuinely confront the past.
Third, the contrast between the traditional and social media demonstrated the attempts to construct a contained public memory. Last, the contained public memory is also shaped by international developments. The reference to how other former communist regimes of the
Eastern Europe have addressed the past are used to justify arguments during debates. Also, many commemoration activities are initiated as part of international organizations, or as obligations that Albania has as part of EU, UN, and NATO memberships. However these organizations are not concerned with how the past is constructed, only that the past is addressed.
Chapter three focused on the how places of memory shape and construct the communist past in Albania. I investigated four different places of memory, the Site of Witness and Memory
(SWM) museum of Shkodra, the Spac Prison Memorial (SPM) site in Mirdite, the House of
Leaves (HL) museum, and the Bunkart Center (BC) museum. My rhetorical reading consisted of investigating the material and symbolic means of what is addressed, by whom, where, how the places become legible to audiences, how their display and content primes visitors to particular subject positions, and what public debates they generate. I argued that the best way to explain how these commemoration sites shape the public memory of communist past is to classify them into two categories: the counter-memory and the controlled official version of memory. The 137 specific memory places come as site of witnesses, site of persecution, site of perpetrators, and site of tourism.
When placed in the context of the memory infrastructure, the SWM museum in Shkoder arises as a site of witnesses and functions to counter the official version of the communist past.
This is manifested in three ways: the regional story of Shkodra’s communist persecution becomes the national story, the victims of communism turn into martyrs of national and democratic values, and the personal stories become historical. The SPM site in Mirdite arises as site of persecution and constructs a counter memory version of the communist past. This is manifested in the following three ways: the SPM site renders the communist past as unbelievable and real at the same time, it reveals the present political in/action to fully confront the former criminal regime, and it represents the unsettled and unsolved cases of the communist persecution at this very prison camp.
The HL and the BC museum offer an official version of public memory. The communist past constructed in these two museums is a controlled version as it responds to present political national interests and satisfies the international curiosity on Albania’s communist past. The HL museum serves as the site of perpetrators, not only because it is in the original former State
Security Service building, because the display and content of the museum tell a perpetrators’ story. I argue that the HS museum functions as a distorted anatomy of a crime scene by neutralizing the state crime of the former communist regime and shifting the blame from the perpetrators. This distortion operates in three clear ways; the museum’s display and content is exclusively focused on the system and structure, the visitors are positioned as students and the designers as masters, and selective and factual display of objects and artifacts prime visitors to see the past as apart from its consequences. The Bunkart Center museum constructs a controlled 138 version of communist past as marketable to the tourist, by telling a story for and by those who have not experienced it. I argue that the BC museum primes visitors to see the past as distant and exotic and offers communist memory prompts for sale.
The various ways of how these four places of memory contract and shape the communist past depends on who is telling the story. The consequences of these remembering dynamics are a fragmented public memory, that when taken into consideration simultaneously demonstrate the complexities of remembering the traumatic national pasts. The four places of memory I investigated are meaningful when considered in the larger national memory infrastructure. These places draw their particular meanings as sites of witnesses, persecution, perpetrators, and tourism separately based on their symbolic and material display. However, their rhetorical force is drawn when they are seen in comparison in the larger communist past memory infrastructure. When placed in the larger memory infrastructure they demonstrate the complexity of remembering criminal regimes’ pasts and how public memory is controlled by political national and international interests.
Chapter four focused on the rhetorical construction of Albania as a place within the EU integration discursive space. The enlargement reports and political speeches from the EU are analyzed and compared with the Albanian EU integration, political speeches, and news articles related to them. I argue that there are three main ways that define Albania as place in the EU integration discursive space, a place of the Western Balkans, a place for re-conciliation and re- construction, and a hot spot for de/stability. These definitions are a demonstration of the disproportionality of influences in the EU integration process and the totalizing effect that EU has on Albania political and public discourse. Based on the dynamics of the place- space relationship, I propose that it is the imagined future of a joint Europe that maintains the totalizing 139 effect of EU integration discourse, regardless of the disproportionality of influences in Albania -
EU relationship and international alliances attractions other than EU.
In chapter four, I explain how the totalizing effect of the EU integration discourse is a manifestation of the power Albania and the region has in constructing the meaning of a joint and complete Europe. Anytime that the EU makes enlargement decisions, the meaning of the EU is redefined, maintained, or threatened because such decisions state what and who belongs in the
Union. I argue that the totalizing effect of imagined futures operates in three ways; it is stated as the founding principle of the Union, it is reclaimed by EU at the present through the 2018
Western Balkan strategy, and it is the engine behind Albania’s perseverance towards EU integration. Throughout chapter four, the analyses demonstrates that the communist past comes to determine the reconciliation and reconstruction reforms, the cold war connections and conflicts, and how the totalizing discourse of EU integration serves the political agenda, which in turn influences what is remembered, by whom, where, and when. In the same way that EU integration reforms serve to initiate deliberation about the past, they also serve as an escape for genuinely accepting and confronting the criminal communist past.
Theoretical implications: Public memory of traumatic pasts
The examination of public memory of communist past in Albania is intended to highlight how the dynamics of “remembering” the national traumatic pasts is rhetorically constructed to achieve ends. Grounded on the assumption that public memory is essentially rhetorical, this study highlights the following theoretical implications: First, places of memory invoke particular pasts based on who tells the story, where, and why. Second, public deliberation about traumatic national past reveal the role of public memory at legitimizing particular group identities and interests. Third, public memory is produced, adapted, and appropriated to simultaneously fit 140 transnational influences and interests. Fourth, the rhetorical construction of Albania as a place defined in the EU integration discursive space offers prospect to observe how place-space relationship works rhetorically into transnational context. Fifth, public memory of traumatic national pasts, especially of former state criminal regimes, is hardly ever settled. In what follows
I elaborate each of these implications.
First, places of memory invoke particular pasts based on who tells the story, where, and why. The places of memory investigated in this study serve as powerful vehicles of memory of communist past. The rhetorical reading of the memory places suggests that who remembers is the key to shape the communist past. These places of memory construct a particular story of the communist past based on their specific location. They engage visitors in particular and powerful ways based on their mission. The SWM museum in Shkoder and SPM in Mirdite, as sites of witness and persecution serve as counter memory and construct preferred identities for visitors who want to see the atrocities committed by the former regime and the resistance and sacrifice made by those who opposed communism. The HL museum and Bunkart center construct a different past, also based on who, where and, why. The story of HL is of the perpetrators, at the location where crimes were planned and executed, and the preferred identities of visitors are of those of students who want to learn how the totalitarian regimes functioned. The Bunkart Center offers communist memory prompts to sooth international and touristic curiosity, so the past that
BC constructs is marketable and satisfactory to visitors that have heard but not lived the communist past. The places of memory separately construct various versions of communist past, however when placed in the larger memory infrastructure this variation demonstrates the nature of public memory to respond to various interests and contexts. 141
Second, public deliberation about traumatic national past reveals the role of public memory at legitimizing particular group identities and interests. The shared identities narrated by public memory necessitate reevaluation of present social and public identities. The public debates on communist past revealed that the contestations about the public memory are first and foremost about legitimacy. The contained past suggested by the analysis of the public debates reinforce the consequentiality of public memory. Naming the past, in one way or the other, means associating it with the present. In this study, it meant that leaving the communist past for public deliberation and screening the film productions from the communist era questioned the legitimacy of those involved with the former communist regime. The contained public memory of communist past constructed from the public debates in the traditional media treated the former persecuted community as a minority in order to protect present interests of politically favorable groups. Framing the persecuted as a minority serves to legitimize the past as traumatic for only a minority and simplify the present by addressing the past institutionally. Leaving the past to open public deliberation threatens the legitimacy of politically favored groups, while locating the past to a minority status accommodates their interests, and at the same time is counted as reformation towards EU integration reforms.
Public memory is used to re-create and maintain particular different pasts in time. The public debates on communist past articulated how the Albanian national history was cleaned and manipulated during communism to fit the ideological and political interests of the time. The public debates analyzed in this study involved this manipulation of history. The debates on communist era film productions revealed this contestation and division on shared understandings of previous periods of Albanian history, especially on national past before WWII. The public memory of different national historical events and their leaders is constructed and reconstructed 142 continuously. The public memory of communist past embedded the reconstruction of earlier national pasts. Each construction of public memory of any past initiates a reconfiguration of different associated pasts of historical periods and events.
Third, public memory is produced, adapted, and appropriated to fit transnational influences and interests. These transnational influences are both explicit, as in the case of places of memory and public discussion, and implicit in the case of Albania’s EU integration process.
The public memory versions constructed by the places of memory and public discussions had transnational influence at various degrees. Further transnational influences are evident in the discussions and debates about memorial sites, whether they are referred to as an example or used as evidence to support an argument. The major transnational influence to initiate laws and policies comes from the EU integration process of reforms, particularly under the human right and justice chapters. However, the most significant transnational influences on constructing public memory come from the EU integration process being used to escape from a genuine confrontation with the communist past. The public debates proved how the EU integration aspiration is used to shift the attention to the future and neglect the past.
Communism is a transnational event, so I suggest that remembering the communist past is especially transnational. Any time a particular communist past is constructed, the transnational influences and historical context of that past is reconfigured as well. In this study, the public memory produced is result of transnational influences as well, whether when it serves to hush the debates about the past, or to initiate laws, policies, and commemoration activities. The communist era was a production of transnational socialist network, where Albania had a particular influence (Mehilli, 2017). This is one of the reasons that public memory of the communist past has become an attraction for tourism and hospitality in Albania. 143
Fourth, the rhetorical construction of Albania as a place defined in the EU integration discursive space offers prospect to observe how place-space relationship works rhetorically into transnational context. Space and place coexist, by place being deployed in and deploying space.
Albania as a place is deployed in and deploys the EU integration discursive space. However, as I explained in chapter four, the relationship is threatened by disproportionality of influences and is retained by the power of the imagined futures. This renders place as vulnerable to space, regardless of the fact that they need each other to coexist. Albania as a national place is vulnerable to EU transnational space. The ongoing re-conciliation and re-construction reforms, just like place and space relationship, are dynamic and ever-changing. The dynamism of place- space explains how much needs to be reconfigured in Albania and EU in order for the EU integration to occur. Public memory is reconfigured in this process as well.
Fifth, Public memory of traumatic national pasts, especially of former state criminal regimes, is hardly ever settled. Throughout the analysis it is obvious how the discussions about communist past shifted to blaming the system, to denying collaboration, and to rationalizing the totalitarian structure. Remembering the communist pasts means constructing the shared understanding of former state crimes that are passed on as collective guilt. As Stephane Courtois writes on The Black Book of Communism published in 1999, remembering communism is particularly complicated because of its “incomparable propaganda strengths grounded in the subversion of language successfully turned the tables on the criticisms leveled against their terrorist tactics, . . . the West has long labored under an extraordinary self-deception . . . by the communism claim to be an emissary of the Enlightenment and paradoxically, it was this image of “enlightenment” that helped keep the true nature of its evil almost entirely concealed.” (p.21). 144
Courtois argues that there is a scholarly neglect about the communist crimes regardless of its horrific records of 100 million people killed and the widespread “effect on one third of humanity on four continents, during a period spanning eighty years” (p.17). He lists the reasons that have prevented making the mass crime a central factor in the analysis of communism: first, the communist dictators systematically erased their crimes and justified the ones they could not hide as a necessary aspect of revolution. Second, the victory over Nazism was institutionalized as an article of faith for communists. Third, the Holocaust genocide became the “epitome” of mass terror and prevented attention to other forms of genocide, and it made it less plausible to understand the paradox of how “ those who were known for helping to bring about the destruction of genocidal apparatus (Nazism) might themselves have put the same method into practice” (p.23).
This study contributes toward better understanding of how remembering such state crime unfolds. Communism’s strongest instrument was propaganda at national and international level.
This makes remembering the crimes committed by communist regime even more complicated.
However, this brings communication research at the forefront of studying not only how these crimes were justified when committed, but how these crimes are being re/framed for remembering and public memory purposes. Further studies are needed to examine communication patterns of remembrance throughout the former communist world. Also, exploring patterns of responses to a communist past could highlight the role of communication in the transitional process.
Further studies are needed to understand how transnational influences shape public memory of communist past in different countries. It is crucial to explore how terms about communism vary in different international context, and especially how they vary in comparison 145 between the Eastern European former communist bloc and the Western Europe and the USA.
The complications and implications of these differences must be addressed when evaluating research and policies on public memory in transnational context. Also, interdisciplinary research is necessary to examine the transition from communism, as a totalitarian system, to democracy and capitalism. Further research is needed to investigate how culture and religion was used rhetorically during the Cold War and how it is used today to construct and deconstruct international alliances and initiatives.
For Albania, it is painful to see how the communist state committed crime on its own people. As At Zef Pellumbi writes on his memorial trilogy Rrno per me Tregue published in 1998, in the communist Albania “it seemed that the ground had turned into an abys that pulled in anyone who was trying to run away from it” (p.323). I understand what the abys means for At Zef
Pellumbi, it is the collective fear and hopelessness that the regime had instilled in the country, and the terror applied on those who had the courage to reject it. As an Albanian grown up under the communist regime, I know that there were a small group of people who were involved into committing crimes during the former regime. For this reason, it is important to observe how public memory of such state crimes is carefully constructed to reframe what happened in the interest of the perpetrators. The perpetrators were a small minority, and the victims were the majority (the masses in the communist propaganda). However, the public memory of communist past is being framed in the reverse order, with victims as minority and perpetrators as majority. This reverse story, while satisfies the present political interest at national and transnational level, it is a perfect example of how the past is never really gone, nor really settled. Instead it is always being made as needed in the present. A story heard and not lived adapts as it travels through time and space. 146
References
Courtois, S. (1999). The Black book of communism: Crimes, terror, repression. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Blair, C., Dickinson, G., & Ott, B. L. (2010). Introduction: Rhetoric, memory, and place. In
Dickinson, G., Blair, C. & Ott, B. L. (Eds). Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of
Museums and Memorials. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.
Mehilli, E. (2017). From Stalin to Mao: Albania and the Socialist World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
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