Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon

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MYANMAR: STORM CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON

Asia Report N°238 – 12 November 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... i I. A BACKWARD STEP ...... 1 A. INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE ...... 1 B. POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS ...... 2 C. AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM ...... 3 D. A QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP ...... 3 E. MOVING AWAY FROM VIOLENCE ...... 4 F. THE RISKS OF SEGREGATION ...... 5 G. THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE ...... 6 H. A THREAT TO ALL COMMUNITIES ...... 6 II. MUCH POLITICAL PROGRESS ...... 7 A. CONSOLIDATION OF THE REFORM PROCESS ...... 7 B. TENSIONS WITH THE LEGISLATURE ...... 9 C. CONSOLIDATION OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER ...... 11 D. EVOLUTION OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S POLITICAL POSITION ...... 12 E. IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ...... 13 III. SOCIAL TENSIONS ...... 14 A. RISING SOCIAL TENSIONS ...... 14 B. THE MONYWA COPPER MINE ...... 15 IV. PROSPECTS FOR A STABLE TRANSITION ...... 17 A. THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE ...... 17 B. OPTIONS TO MINIMISE THE RISKS ...... 18 V. CONCLUSION ...... 19 APPENDICES A. MAP OF MYANMAR ...... 20 B. MYANMAR CABINET FOLLOWING THE RESHUFFLE ...... 21 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 22 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ...... 23 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...... 26

Asia Report N°238 12 November 2012

MYANMAR: STORM CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Myanmar’s leaders continue to demonstrate that they have rise and old prejudices resurface. The difficulty in reach- the political will and the vision to move the country deci- ing a ceasefire in Kachin State underlines the complexity sively away from its authoritarian past, but the road to of forging a sustainable peace with ethnic armed groups. democracy is proving hard. President Thein Sein has de- There are also rising grassroots tensions over land grab- clared the changes irreversible and worked to build a du- bing and abuses by local authorities, and environmental rable partnership with the opposition. While the process and social concerns over foreign-backed infrastructure remains incomplete, political prisoners have been released, and mining projects. In a context of rising popular expec- blacklists trimmed, freedom of assembly laws implemented, tations, serious unaddressed grievances from the past, and and media censorship abolished. But widespread ethnic new-found freedom to organise and demonstrate, there is violence in Rakhine State, targeting principally the Roh- potential for the emergence of more radical and confron- ingya Muslim minority, has cast a dark cloud over the re- tational social movements. This will represent a major test form process and any further rupturing of intercommunal for the government and security services as they seek to relations could threaten national stability. Elsewhere, so- maintain law and order without rekindling memories of cial tensions are rising as more freedom allows local con- the recent authoritarian past. flicts to resurface. A ceasefire in Kachin State remains elusive. Political leaders have conflicting views about how A key factor in determining the success of Myanmar’s power should be shared under the constitution as well as transition will be macro-political stability. In 2015, Aung after the 2015 election. Moral leadership is required now San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) to calm tensions and new compromises will be needed if will compete for seats across the country for the first time divisive confrontation is to be avoided. since the abortive 1990 elections. Assuming these polls are free and fair, they will herald a radical shift in the bal- The president has moved to consolidate his authority with ance of power away from the old dispensation. But an his first cabinet reshuffle. Ministers regarded as conserva- NLD landslide may not be in the best interests of the party tive or underperforming were moved aside and many new or the country, as it would risk marginalising three im- deputy ministers appointed. There are now more techno- portant constituencies: the old political elite, the ethnic crats in these positions, and the country has its first female political parties and the non-NLD democratic forces. If minister. The president also brought his most trusted cab- the post-2015 legislatures fail to represent the true politi- inet members into his office, creating a group of “super- cal and ethnic diversity of the country, tensions are likely ministers” with authority over broad areas of government to increase and fuel instability. – a move perhaps partially motivated by a desire to strength- en his position vis-à-vis the legislature. A dispute over a The main challenge the NLD faces is not to win the elec- controversial ruling by the presidentially-appointed Con- tion, but to promote inclusiveness and reconciliation. It stitutional Tribunal led to impeachment proceedings and has a number of options to achieve this. It could support a the resignation of the tribunal members, highlighting both more proportional election system that would create more the power of the legislature, and the risks to a political representative legislatures, by removing the current “win- structure in transition as new institutions test the bounda- ner-takes-all” distortion. Alternatively, it could form an al- ries of their authority. liance with other parties, particularly ethnic parties, agree- ing not to compete against them in certain constituencies. The transition has been remarkable for its speed and the Finally, it could support an interim “national unity” can- apparent lack of any major internal resistance, including didate for the post-2015 presidency. This would reassure from the military. It will inevitably face enormous chal- the old guard, easing the transition to an NLD-dominated lenges. The ongoing intercommunal strife in Rakhine State political system. Critically, this option could also build is of grave concern, and there is the potential for similar support for the constitutional change required to allow violence elsewhere, as nationalism and ethno-nationalism Aung San Suu Kyi to become president at a future date, a Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page ii

change that is unlikely prior to 2015 given the opposition of the military bloc, which has a veto over any amendment. Pursuing any of these paths will require that the NLD make sacrifices and put the national interest above party- political considerations. With a national leader of the cal- ibre of Aung San Suu Kyi at the helm, it can certainly rise to this challenge. Jakarta/Brussels, 12 November 2012

Asia Report N°238 12 November 2012

MYANMAR: STORM CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON

grims in Toungup township, who were not Rohingya, I. A BACKWARD STEP came after the distribution of inflammatory leaflets attack- ing followers of their religion. It was a worrying develop- The situation in Myanmar has been evolving rapidly, in a ment as it cast the tensions as Muslim versus Buddhist and mostly positive direction.1 Yet, the flare-up in Rakhine showed how easily the distrust between religions could be State represents a deeply disturbing backward step.2 The manipulated by rising ultra-nationalist sentiments. government has been unable to contain the violence, local authorities and local security forces have in some cases The speed with which clashes in the state led to a protest acted in a partisan manner, and extremist rhetoric has gone outside a prominent mosque in central Yangon, across largely unchallenged by the authorities and the opposition. from the Sule Pagoda, worried authorities. As violence got There are indications that unlike the earlier clashes in June, out of hand in Rakhine, a state of emergency was imposed the latest round of violence consisted largely of attacks there on 10 June and additional troops dispatched to en- 5 against Rohingya and non-Rohingya Muslim communi- force it. This restored order for only a few months, during ties, organised in advance by extremist elements.3 This is which tensions continued to simmer, and small incidents a dangerous situation for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious were reported. country that aspires to be a democracy after decades of isolation and authoritarian rule.4 Widespread violence erupted again on 21 October in new areas of Rakhine State, in the townships of Kyaukpyu, Kyauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Myebon, Pauktaw, Ramree A. INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE and Rathedaung. While Muslim Rohingya did attack Bud- dhist Rakhine communities in June, those displaced at The rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men that time tended to be overwhelmingly from the Rohingya on 28 May 2012 was the trigger that led long-simmering side or Buddhists who had been living in Muslim neigh- tensions between the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim bourhoods that were destroyed.6 In this second wave, the Rohingya communities to flare in Rakhine State in June. attacks appeared to be well-coordinated and directed to- Dozens were killed, hundreds of houses burned, and wards Muslims in general and not just Rohingya, a po- 75,000 mostly Rohingya displaced by subsequent inter- tentially serious escalation. Thus, Muslim ethnic Kaman communal violence in northern Rakhine State and around communities, who are one of Myanmar’s recognised na- the provincial capital of Sittwe. While often cast as a fight tionalities, were also targeted.7 between these two distinct communities with longstand- ing antagonisms, the 3 June murder of ten Muslim pil- Once again, the violence in Rakhine State quickly rever- berated throughout the country. Muslims cancelled public celebrations of Eid Al-Adha on 26 October and on the fol- 1 For earlier Crisis Group reporting on the changes in Myanmar lowing day hand grenades were thrown at two mosques in since the present government took office, see Crisis Group Asia Karen State’s Kawkareik township.8 The president’s of- Briefings N°136, Reform in Myanmar: One Year On, 11 April fice said that between 21 and 30 October 89 people were 2012 and N°127, Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, 22 Sep- tember 2011; and Asia Reports N°231, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, 27 July 2012 and N°214, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, 30 November 2011. 5 See Crisis Group, “Myanmar Conflict Alert: Preventing com- 2 Formerly known as Arakan State, this name is still used by munal bloodshed and building better relations”, 12 June 2012. many. The ethnic Rakhine group is also known as Arakanese. 6 See “Burma: New Violence in Arakan State”, media release, 3 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Yangon, November 2012. Human Rights Watch, 27 October 2012; and Crisis Group in- See also “Announcement regarding conflicts in Rakhine State”, terviews, civil society activist, Yangon, September 2012; civil President Office Announcement No. 2/2012, 31 October 2012. society activist, October 2012. 4 This report does not analyse in detail either ethnic peace ne- 7 “Fleeing Muslims seek food, shelter after Myanmar sectarian gotiations or economic challenges covered in Crisis Group re- chaos”, Reuters, 26 October 2012. ports, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, and Myan- 8 Lawi Weng, “Two mosques attacked in Karen State”, The Ir- mar: A New Peace Initiative, both op. cit. rawaddy, 29 October 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 2

killed, 136 wounded, and 5,351 homes burned down, agreement to allow the establishment of the mission.14 making 32,231 people homeless.9 Figures from the border Many of those outside the region are under the mistaken affairs ministry indicate that the impact was overwhelm- impression that Buddhist monks and their religion are in- ingly on Muslim communities, with the Rakhine losing herently non-violent, whereas in South East Asia violence some 160 houses, making around 800 homeless.10 has been regularly led by monks and perpetrated by Bud- dhists.15 New freedoms have given militant monks the ability to organise and protest; the Rakhine State events OLITICAL NDERPINNINGS B. P U has given them a powerful cause. In Rakhine State, they have been present during riots as well as organised block- This second wave of clashes took place amid rising local ades and boycotts of Muslim communities.16 political tensions. The senior army officer with authority for the region, Lieutenant-General Hla Min, conceded 11 But this militancy was already on the rise. In April, monks there might be political aims behind the riots. There are carried out attacks on mosques and Muslim businesses in vague rumours of involvement of those opposed to the Kachin State.17 Given their revered position in society and national reforms. However, local dynamics demonstrate growing politicisation, the quick concession on the OIC the violence was not spontaneous and suggest that it has office raised concerns.18 Some fear it will encourage fur- taken place not in defiance of reforms but because of ther religious militancy.19 Perhaps recognising this, the them. The transition has opened up unprecedented space president called on monks to obey the law for the sake of to organise that has been denied for decades, including the country’s international image.20 A number of senior for long-suppressed nationalist causes. It has allowed sub- monks in Rakhine State and nationally have also spoken national groups to air bitter grievances and issue a call to out against violence and intervened locally to try to stop it arms without moderation or censorship. Access to the in- – but these voices of moderation have been in the minority. ternet has only aided the spread of these ideas. There have been expectations that Aung San Suu Kyi would In late September 2012 in Sittwe, in what was billed as take a clearer stand on the violence and human rights vio- the biggest ever public meeting of ethnic Rakhine, dele- lations. She recently told the media that “people want me gates laid out an ultra-nationalist manifesto approving, to take one side or the other so both sides are displeased among other things, resolutions supporting the formation because I will not take a stand with them”.21 She later issued of armed local militias, enforcement of citizenship laws, a joint statement with lawmakers from ethnic minority removal of Rohingya villages, and the reclamation of land parties calling for more security forces to be deployed to that had been “lost” to them. The conference objected to Rakhine State and called on the government to address the plans to reunite communities, issue national identity the concerns of both communities.22 However, her unique cards to Rohingya, and the establishment of a liaison office of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Yangon.12 14 “Buddhist monks march in Myanmar to thwart Islamic office plan”, Reuters, 15 October 2012. Monks, women’s groups and youth organisations in early 15 October organised demonstrations in Sittwe against the Ian Baird, “Buddhist Monks and Militant Violence in Laos”, Asia Pacific Memo, University of British Columbia, 30 Octo- proposed OIC mission.13 These protests were part of a na- ber 2012. tional movement against the OIC led by prominent monks, 16 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Yangon, Sep- with thousands protesting in Yangon and Mandalay. In tember 2012. response, the national government reneged on a signed 17 “Myanmar Muslims’ properties and houses are being arbi- trarily destroyed”, http://kyawkyawoo.wordpress.com/2012/ 04/24/attacks-and-distruction-of-myanmar-muslims-masjids- and-properties/, 17 April 2012. 18 Crisis Group interview, local political analyst, Yangon, Oc- 9 See paragraph 2, “Announcement regarding conflicts in Ra- tober 2012; Lawi Weng, “OIC blasts government”, The Irra- khine State”, President Office Announcement No. 2/2012, 31 waddy, 16 October 2012. October 2012. 19 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, 30 October 2012. 10 Border affairs ministry, summary document covering the pe- 20 See paragraph 5, “Announcement regarding conflicts in Ra- riod 22-30 October. khine State”, op. cit. 11 “Authority, resident representatives of UN agencies look into 21 “Suu Kyi says cannot back Myanmar’s Rohingya: BBC”, situation in Yanbye [Ramree], Kyaukpyu”, The New Light of Agence France-Presse (AFP), 4 November 2012; Statement of Myanmar, 29 October 2012. Ethnic Representatives and Chairperson, Daw Aung San Suu 12 “Arakan public meeting successfully concludes in Rathe- Kyi, of the Parliamentary Committee on Law and Order and daung”, Narinjara Independent Arakanese News Agency, 29 Tranquillity with Regard to the Ongoing Conflicts in Rakhine September 2012. State, Naypyitaw, 7 November 2012. 13 “Myanmar: Displacement in Rakhine State”, Situation Re- 22 “Suu Kyi calls for troops to tackle Arakan unrest”, The As- port No. 10, OCHA, 28 October 2012. sociated Press, 8 November 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 3

position in the country means that the expectation will volved in a recently broken up alleged terrorist ring in continue for her to break through partisanship and speak Central and West Java were reported by police to have much more strongly and clearly against extremist rhetoric been considering targeting Buddhists as a way to protest and violence, and in support of the fundamental rights of against the treatment of Rohingya.27 There have already all people in Rakhine State. been attacks on Buddhist temples by Muslims in Bangla- desh stirred up by local politicians.28

C. AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM ASEAN’s Surin predicted the issue could radicalise the region and destabilise even the Malacca Straits.29 While Myanmar regards the violence in Rakhine as an internal local factors are most important for radicalisation, reli- problem, but it has long had an international dimension. giously-inspired violence in Rakhine State could encour- The Rohingya, as they call themselves, are not recognised age such “revenge” attacks elsewhere in the region. The as one of the official ethnic groups by the government, greatest threat remains to Myanmar’s own internal stabil- who refer to them as Bengalis. Bangladesh challenges this ity. All the large cities have significant Muslim minori- term and says that they are not its citizens because they ties, and if the violence in Rakhine State evolves into a have lived within the borders of Myanmar since colonial 23 broader religious conflict, with communities turning on times, even before Bangladesh itself existed as a nation. each other across the country, it could be a source of ma- In recent decades, operations against what the Myanmar jor instability and a serious threat to the reform process. government called “illegal immigrants” led to tens of thousands fleeing to neighbouring Bangladesh as refugees or migrating to countries like Malaysia to work illegally.24 D. A QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP From there, others have sought refuge in third countries. While ready to receive humanitarian aid from the UN and Despite the fact that most Rohingya have lived in the area bilateral donors, Myanmar has rebuffed outside political for generations, it has often been hard for them to obtain assistance, including from the Association of Southeast proper documents such as birth certificates, marriage rec- Asian Nations (ASEAN). “Myanmar believes it is their ords, and therefore citizenship papers. The UN refugee internal matter, but your internal matter could be ours the agency (UNHCR) estimates the number of stateless Roh- next day if you are not careful”, warned outgoing ASEAN ingya at more than 808,000.30 Officially, under the 1982 Secretary-General Surin Pituswan on a recent visit to Citizenship Law, people born of descendants who were in Kuala Lumpur.25 the country before independence in 1948 should become citizens within three generations as successive genera- The violence has drawn much attention and condemna- tions move from being associate or naturalised citizens to tion in the Muslim world – including from Iran, Indonesia, full citizens.31 If the 1982 law had been applied without Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Malaysia and the Organi- active discrimination by local officials against Rohingya, sation for Islamic Cooperation. There have been some the majority of them would have long ago achieved full fears that the problems in Rakhine State could spread vio- citizenship. lence throughout the region. In July, convicted Indone- sian terrorist and radical leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, in an In practice, local regulations that restrict marriage make it open letter from his Jakarta prison cell to President Thein difficult, time-consuming and costly, especially for the Sein, threatened to conduct jihad against Myanmar if the poor, to fulfil the requirements and obtain key documents killing of Muslims did not stop.26 In September, those in- such as birth certificates.32 Restricting access to birth cer-

23 Comments by Anup Kumar Chakma, Ambassador of Bang- 27 Farouk Arnaz, “Depok-Solo terror group gets creative with ladesh to Myanmar, Workshop on Rehabilitation, Resettlement, bomb-assembly”, The Jakarta Globe, 24 September 2012. Rule of Law and Sustainable Development in Rakhine State, 28 “Rioters torch Buddhist temples, homes in Bangladesh”, Naypyitaw, 22 September 2012. AFP, 1 October 2012. 24 There is an annual exodus of Rohingya each dry season on 29 “Myanmar unrest could destabilise wider region: ASEAN”, boats leaving from both the Bangladesh and Myanmar sides of AFP, 30 October 2012. the border. Many of these boats are not seaworthy, are over- 30 The number includes both persons inside and outside north- crowded, and do not have navigation equipment. Most head for ern Rakhine State. UNHCR Fact Sheet September 2012. The Malaysia or the far south of Thailand. If intercepted by either of total population of Rakhine State is over 3 million. these countries, they often face harsh treatment, and there have 31 Presentation by U Maung Maun Than, Director-General, Im- been regular allegations of abuses. migration and National Registration Department, Workshop on 25 “Myanmar declined talks offer on violence: ASEAN”, AFP, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, Rule of Law and Sustainable De- 30 October 2012. velopment in Rakhine State, Naypyitaw, 22 September 2012. 26 Letter from Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to President Thein Sein, 22 32 See “Fatal policy: How the Rohingya suffer the consequenc- July 2012. es of statelessness”, document prepared by an international Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 4

tificates violates Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights that the performance of parts of the security forces has been of the Child, which Myanmar ratified in 1991.33 Prejudice biased and woefully inadequate. Local police and riot po- against Muslims and those with dark skin runs deep in lice are overwhelmingly made up of Rakhine Buddhists Myanmar, which, despite its multi-ethnic and multi-reli- who are at best unsympathetic to Muslim victims and at gious nature, has long had a Burman-Buddhist identity worst allegedly complicit in the violence. The army, re- imposed on it by successive Burman elites. cruited nationally and rotated into the region, has been better at maintaining security, for example preventing attacks The question of citizenship is a complicated one. Many against the majority Muslim residents of Buthidaung Rohingya have temporary (non-citizen) registration cer- township, which has a large army presence, and guarding tificates that under the election laws have allowed them to the last Muslim-majority neighbourhood in downtown vote and form and join political parties, but they have been Sittwe.39 denied full citizenship and are thus ineligible – at least in principle – to stand for elected office. Some Rohingya do In the latest wave of violence, the army was posted to have full citizenship and have been elected to the local guard Muslim villages and neighbourhoods, and its role and national legislatures. Tens of thousands of otherwise has been generally seen as positive by these communities.40 poorly documented minorities, including Rohingya, were Some soldiers have reportedly been attacked by Rakhine registered to vote for the 2010 election in an effort by the mobs and shot rioters in order to prevent attacks on the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to mar- areas they were defending. Border affairs ministry offi- ginalise local ethnic parties.34 Hopes were raised that the cials say criminal law is being applied fairly, but this is undocumented status of the Rohingya might soon end, disputed by those who have visited the area.41 Until central which only stoked paranoia among the Rakhine fearing authority can be reestablished, people treated equally and marginalisation in their own state.35 A pilot survey in criminal law applied fairly, experience from elsewhere May 2012 was said to have found that some 70 per cent of suggests it will be hard to resolve the root causes of this Rohingya had sufficient proof of descent to be eligible for conflict.42 some form of national identity documents. Fears that this election promise might be fulfilled are thought by some Local government and the local security forces (the police observers to have fuelled recent Rakhine militancy.36 and the paramilitary border force known as the “Nasaka”), which are dominated by Rakhine Buddhists, often have a strongly anti-Rohingya agenda.43 Disbanding the Nasaka, E. MOVING AWAY FROM VIOLENCE which is seen as the most corrupt and abusive government agency in the area, would address both Rohingya con- Many have argued that the government had the ability to 37 cerns of abusive practices and go some way to addressing stop this violence. In public discussions in the capital, Rakhine concerns of lax or corrupt border security. officials agree that in a democracy the government should be guided by human rights principles and prioritise the protection of communities.38 The reality on the ground is

NGO working in Rakhine State, whose name is withheld for tion, Resettlement, Rule of Law and Sustainable Development security reasons. in Rakhine State, Naypyitaw, 22 September 2012. 33 According to Article 7 of the convention: 1. The child shall 39 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, 30 October 2012. be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 40 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya political representative, from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as Yangon, November 2012; member of investigation commission, far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her October 2012. parents. 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of 41 Crisis Group interviews, border affairs official, ASEAN dip- these rights in accordance with their national law and their ob- lomat, Naypyitaw, 23 September 2012. ligations under the relevant international instruments in this 42 Jim Della-Giacoma, “What could Myanmar learn from Indo- field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. nesia? The Malino Accord”, Crisis Group blog “Resolving con- 34 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°105, The Myanmar Elec- flict in South East Asia” (www.crisisgroupblogs.org/resolving tions, 27 May 2010, Section II.A.3. conflict), 4 September 2012. 35 In part to appease secessionist sentiments among ethnic Ra- 43 Crisis Group interviews with a range of individuals, both khine, General Ne Win created Rakhine State from the Arakan Myanmar and international, having detailed knowledge of the Division in 1974. situation, Yangon and Naypyitaw, September 2012. The army, 36 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, 30 October 2012. which has been charged with restoring security since the decla- 37 See for example “‘The Government Could Have Stopped ration of a state of emergency in the area, is made up predomi- This’: Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Ara- nantly of people from other parts of the country, and – although kan State”, Human Rights Watch, August 2012. there have been credible allegations of incidents of violence 38 Police Lieutenant-Colonel Kyaw Win Thein, “Security, Rule and abuse – it has been generally seen as less partisan in its ap- of Law, and Stability”, presentation, Workshop on Rehabilita- proach. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 5

F. THE RISKS OF SEGREGATION worker put it, “there is nothing more permanent than a temporary shelter”.46 The violence has led to a separation of Muslims and Bud- dhists in two ways. First, because communities have moved At the same time, any return of people to their original or fled from areas where they are in a minority and there- areas has to be voluntary, and cannot happen until they feel fore feel vulnerable – particularly Rohingya, but also Ra- secure in doing so. As a priority, it is incumbent on the khine. Secondly, because the security forces have in some donor community to provide adequate humanitarian sup- 47 cases enforced the separation of communities to contain port, which is not yet forthcoming; and on the govern- the violence – for example, preventing Rakhine people ment to ensure free unfettered access to the area, including from entering the principal remaining Rohingya quarter for the resumption of pre-existing programs for vulnerable of Sittwe, and restricting access to the main market by communities, which it has not yet done. Rohingya. Any increased segregation of communities, particularly if The majority of the displaced people are Muslim Rohingya accompanied by the denial of other fundamental rights to from urban and peri-urban Sittwe, who have been moved the Rohingya population, would make it exceedingly hard to camps outside the city, as well as Rohingya newly- to address the underlying tensions and promote commu- displaced in other parts of the state in the most recent nal harmony. Without such progress, the violence is likely wave of violence. The Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya to reignite in the future, which would be to the detriment communities have been essentially segregated, including of both communities, and of the country as a whole. It will with separate displacement camps. Unlike the Rakhine also make it much harder to address the fundamental is- camps, which are open, the Rohingya camps around Sittwe sues: the Rohingya’s basic rights and citizenship status and are de facto closed, with the population unable or unwilling the Rakhine’s sense of fear about demographic pressures. to travel into the city for work or go to the market. Most The strength of these fears among mainstream Rakhine of the Rohingya neighbourhoods of Sittwe were bull- society should not be underestimated or ignored. dozed in the days following the violence, including structures that had been damaged or destroyed by fire, but also The end of military rule has altered some of the dynamics some structures that were still sound. There have been in- at play. Both communities have been victims of central dications that the local authorities may not allow the orig- government repression or neglect over decades. The mili- inal Rohingya residents to return to these areas, and that tary regime was particularly fearful of the emergence of they might invoke colonial-era legislation that empowers ethno-nationalist movements that could challenge its au- them to reclaim areas damaged by fire as state-owned thority over the ethnically diverse country. Over succes- land.44 sive decades it pursued a centralisation strategy that con- centrated political power in the hands of a Burman elite and 48 Thus, though there is no official policy of long-term seg- imposed a Burman-Buddhist identity on the country. regation, some of the actions of the local authorities raise Now, as Myanmar emerges from decades of authoritarian serious concerns. The more extreme voices in the Rakhine rule, nationalism is on the rise. This includes aspects of community are calling for segregation or even the expul- ethno-nationalism, as ethnic communities find their voice, sion of the Rohingya. An important test of the direction in organise, and identity politics starts to take root – some- which the situation is evolving will be if some reintegra- thing that has contributed to rising tensions in Rakhine tion – or at least, a degree of intercommunal interaction – State. can take place, but current indications are worrying. Al- though the central government has stated that camps for internally displaced communities should be temporary 46 Comment by a senior official from the UN Office for the Co- and that people should have the possibility to return to ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the Workshop their former neighbourhoods, the reality on the ground on Rehabilitation, Resettlement, Rule of Law and Sustainable looks very different.45 As an experienced humanitarian Development in Rakhine State, Naypyitaw, 22 September 2012. 47 A “Rakhine Response Plan” drawn up by international humanitarian agencies called for $32.5 million to address urgent humanitarian needs for the period July to December 2012, which does not take account of additional needs created by the latest 44 Ibid. round of violence and displacement. As of 5 November, less 45 For example, the opening remarks of Vice President Sai Mauk than half of this amount had been covered, with $11 million Kham at the Workshop on Rehabilitation, Resettlement, Rule disbursed or pledged by donors, with another $4.9 million allo- of Law and Sustainable Development in Rakhine State, Nay- cated by the UN’s own Central Emergency Response Fund. See pyitaw, 22-23 September 2012 (reported in summary form in “Myanmar: Displacement in Rakhine State”, Situation Report “Complex rehabilitation tasks for restoring normal socio-eco- No. 12, OCHA, 6 November 2012. nomic lives of victims in Rakhine State will take time”, New 48 See Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, Light of Myanmar, 23 September 2012, p. 2. op. cit. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 6

Thus, in the lead-up to the 2010 elections, the USDP and ne issue – with Buddhist monks and a segment of the the regime wanted to prevent the Rakhine Nationalities Burman elite demonstrating in support of Rakhine Bud- Development Party from gaining a majority in the state dhists51 – does not augur well for the development of a legislature. They therefore courted the Rohingya by issu- more open society that is accepting of the diversity of the ing them with voter registration cards and making prom- country. ises of citizenship. Rakhine politicians saw this as a direct challenge, and combined with a resurgent Rakhine nation- THREAT TO LL OMMUNITIES alism and pre-existing anti-Rohingya sentiments, this con- H. A A C tributed to rising tensions and an increase in individual This also raises the question of whether intercommunal incidents of provocation or violence between the commu- tensions elsewhere in the country could turn violent. My- nities over the last two years.49 anmar has a history of intercommunal strife, particularly vis-à-vis the Indian community (Muslim and non-Muslim) G. THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE and the Chinese community. The most serious incidents have occurred in the context of particular situations, such It is in this very complex environment that the “investiga- as in the 1930s during the global depression and amid an- tion commission” on Rakhine State – established on 17 ger over unchecked migration from British India, or in the August 2012 by President Thein Sein to look into the 1960s amid efforts by China to radicalise the Chinese pop- clashes – will have to carry out its work. The commission ulation in Myanmar at the time of the Cultural Revolu- has a broad mandate, covering the causes of the violence, tion.52 In 2001, anti-Muslim violence broke out in central the official response, how to resolve the situation, and Myanmar, triggered in part by the destruction of the Bam- suggestions for reconciliation and socio-economic devel- iyan Buddhas in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and Buddhist opment of the area. It also has a very broad composition, monks in the central Myanmar town of Taungoo called including Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist religious for the destruction of mosques in retaliation.53 In general, leaders, academics, civil society leaders, lawyers and pol- though, Myanmar’s populations of Chinese and Indian de- iticians – although none of the Muslim members specifi- scent are well-integrated and intercommunal tensions or cally represent the Rohingya community. The commission violence of the level seen in Rakhine State seem unlikely. also comprises a number of former dissidents, including 88 Generation student leader Ko Ko Gyi and the comedi- The possible exception would be tensions with recently- an and social critic Zarganar. The commission was given arrived Chinese migrants in Mandalay and the north. Over three months to complete its work, although it is likely to the last twenty years, many people from south-west China need more time, and may not submit its final report until have come to Myanmar to pursue business opportunities. the end of 2012.50 Their access to credit and business networks in China has put them at an advantage over local businesses, many of The commission’s work could be very important, not only which have been displaced as a result. This more recent as it attempts to define a constructive broad-based approach Chinese population, unlike older Chinese communities, for Rakhine State, but also potentially in catalysing a na- has generally not integrated well, leading to tensions with tional reflection on some of the broader issues of identity locals. Also, many of the recent Chinese migrants have and diversity that the intercommunal violence raises. bribed government officials to obtain citizenship papers, Whether it will succeed in achieving either of these goals while those who have lived in the country for decades is far from clear. With the exception of the lack of Roh- still have only temporary identification that does not give ingya members, the commission is fairly representative of them the same rights and access to services as citizens.54 the diversity of the country, including several Muslim There is clearly a risk of intercommunal violence, some- members, which gives it some legitimacy. This diversity thing that the Chinese government has long been con- will also make it a huge challenge to reach consensus on cerned about.55 There are no current indications of tensions the difficult issues. The report could end up being a lowest- common-denominator text that avoids controversial issues; or it may end up reflecting a majority view that is seen as 51 The demonstrations against the opening of an OIC liaison partisan and is not conducive to reconciliation. The emer- office in Yangon, when some protesters referred to the need to gence of a “Buddhist solidarity” lobby around the Rakhi- “safeguard Buddhism”, are an example of this. See Section I.B and “Myanmar won’t allow OIC to open liaison office”, Asso- ciated Press, 15 October 2012. 52 See Robert Taylor, The State in Myanmar, 2009, p. 198. 49 Crisis Group interview, head of an organisation that monitors 53 See Human Rights Watch, “Crackdown on Burmese Mus- the human rights situation in Rakhine State, Yangon, Septem- lims”, July 2002. ber 2012. 54 Crisis Group interview, Myanmar academic, Yangon, Sep- 50 Crisis Group interviews, several members of the commission, tember 2012. Yangon and Naypyitaw, September 2012. 55 Crisis Group interview, Yangon, September 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 7

being higher than in the past, however, and it seems that II. MUCH POLITICAL PROGRESS the violence in Rakhine State may have taken some of the focus of discontent away from the Chinese community.56 The president and the legislatures are pushing forward But Myanmar should not be complacent. The experience with wide ranging reforms of politics and the economy. of others in the region and the country’s own past suggest The reforms are being consolidated from the top down as that communal tensions can be exploited and inflamed for the political landscape becomes more complex, with grow- political gain. In particular, there is a real risk that the ing tensions between the executive and the legislature, violence in Rakhine State will take on a more explicitly President Thein Sein working to consolidate his position, Buddhist-Muslim character, with the possibility of clash- Aung San Suu Kyi growing into her new role, and West- es spreading to the many other areas where there are mi- ern governments re-engaging after decades of keeping nority Muslim populations. This would have very serious their distance due to sanctions policies. consequences for stability and reform. A. CONSOLIDATION OF THE REFORM PROCESS

In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 27 Septem- ber 2012, President Thein Sein reaffirmed his commitment to pursuing further democratic reform. The speech was carried live on Myanmar state television and radio, allowing the people of Myanmar to hear the president’s message and indicating that his words were not merely for international consumption.57

It was a stark contrast to the manner in which Myanmar has been governed for decades. The president made clear that he and his government were working in the service of the people, saying that he felt “greatly privileged and honoured to dutifully serve the people as their president at this crucial time in the history of our nation”. Describ- ing the changes as “tangible and irreversible”, he stated that the country was “leaving behind the system of authoritarian government” and “fostering a new political culture of patience and dialogue”. He stressed the need to ensure that economic development did not widen the gap between rich and poor. He envisaged a country where citizens’ rights were protected, the environment was pre- served, international labour standards were respected, and investments in energy and the extractive sector were transparent.

The very positive way in which he spoke of Aung San Suu Kyi indicates a further warming of relations between the two. He referred to her as a “Nobel laureate” and congratulated her “for the honours she has received in this country in recognition for her efforts for democracy” – a reference to the Congressional Gold Medal and other awards that she collected during her visit to the U.S.

The president indicated that he placed “a high priority on achieving a lasting peace in the country”, noting that “the cessation of all armed conflicts is a prerequisite for the

57 The full text of the speech in English was published in New 56 Crisis Group interviews, Mandalay, September 2012. Light of Myanmar, 28 September 2012, p. 1. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 8

building of genuine democracy”. He gave a commitment such legal protest to be held in the country since the that the ceasefire agreements and confidence-building 1962 military coup.60 measures would be followed by “national level peace negotiations”. Speaking of the need for further dialogue to  In the course of July, Myanmar announced that it was “seriously considering” acceding to the Ottawa conven- address the ongoing conflict in Kachin State, he stressed 61 that “any loss of life and property from either side in the tion on landmines, and that it was preparing to join conflict [is] a loss for the country”. the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and was committed to implementing its provisions.62 He acknowledged the intercommunal violence in Rakhine  On 7 August, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was ap- State and gave assurances that “people inhabiting our pointed as chair of the newly-formed lower house country, regardless of race, religion or gender, have the Committee for Rule of Law and Peace and Stability.63 rights to live in peace and security”. He stated that the government would facilitate the provision of relief assis-  On the eve of the 8 August anniversary of the brutally- tance impartially to both communities and said that “we repressed 1988 nationwide uprising against military will do our utmost to solve this issue in line with interna- rule, two senior ministers, with the approval of the pres- tional norms”. However, the extent to which this reflects ident, travelled to Mandalay to meet the 88 Generation the current realities on the ground can be questioned (see student leaders and give them a donation towards the Section I above). costs of the commemoration they were planning to hold the following day.64 In previous years, it had been This was the latest in a series of key speeches by the pres- impossible to hold any public commemoration of the ident, starting with his inaugural address in March 2011, uprising, and those involved in planning underground that have set out an increasingly bold and far-reaching re- events faced arrest. This represented a significant step form agenda, and have discussed in an open way some of towards reconciliation and official recognition of the the topics that were taboo for the previous government. violent events of 1988.

Key developments in the second half of 2012 include the  On 27 August, Myanmar announced that it had removed following: around one third of the names (foreigners and Myan- mar exiles) from its 6,000-name immigration black-  Two additional amnesties of prisoners, on 3 July and list,65 and in a display of transparency it posted on the 17 September, which included approximately twenty president’s website the list of those whose names had and 90 political prisoners, respectively.58 Estimates of been removed. Over the following days, a number of the number of political prisoners vary, since all the high-profile exiles returned home, including the activist high-profile detainees have been released, and those Maung Maung and former Student Army commander remaining are either less well-known, or there is less Moe Thee Zun – both of whom had been previously certainty about their political prisoner status. Approx- sentenced to death in absentia.66 The return to the imately 200 to 300 were thought to remain imprisoned prior to these releases, some of whom were arrested 59 on criminal or terrorism charges. The government has 60 “Ministry enacts protest by-laws”, Myanmar Times, vol. 32, indicated that it is engaged in a process of ongoing no. 635, 16-22 July 2012; and “Farmers hold first official pro- evaluation of remaining cases, which led to the July test in Rangoon”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 16 July 2012. and September releases. 61 Remarks by the Myanmar foreign minister during a meeting with the Convention’s president, Prak Sokhonn of Cambodia,  Adoption of regulations for the recently-enacted Peace- during the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting on 11 July in Phnom ful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law that set Penh. out the procedures for applying for a permit to hold a 62 “Myanmar reaffirms intention to implement the EITI”, press demonstration, grounds for refusal and the procedure release, EITI International Secretariat, Oslo, 18 July 2012. for appeal. These were issued on 5 July by the home 63 See New Light of Myanmar, 8 August 2012, p. 7. 64 ministry and a few days later around 200 farmers staged “88 Gen marks anniversary in MDY”, Myanmar Times, vol. a demonstration in Yangon over land seizure, the first 32, no. 639, 13-19 August 2012. 65 See “Black-listed Myanmar citizens get green light”, New Light of Myanmar, 28 August 2012, p. 16. 66 Other well-known exiles who returned include Naing Aung (also a former leader of the Student Army) and Aung Moe Zaw (exiled head of a student political party). See Min Zin, “The 58 See New Light of Myanmar, 3 July 2012, p. 16; and 18 Sep- exiles return”, The Irrawaddy, 9 September 2012. Subsequent- tember 2012, p. 16. ly, communist party leader Kyaw Zaw and his family accepted 59 Crisis Group interviews, 88 Generation student leader, Yan- an invitation to return home from exile in China. Kyaw Zaw gon, March 2012; NLD Central Executive Committee member, was one of the legendary “30 Comrades”, who fought for the Yangon, September 2012. country’s independence under the leadership of Aung San; he Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 9

country of such prominent hardline exiles is a further The discussion of the impeachment of the president him- strong sign of how far the government is ready to go self throws Myanmar’s new power dynamics into sharp in reaching out to its former adversaries. relief. The competition between the executive and the legislature is happening despite the president and most of There has also been a further liberalisation of the media. his cabinet having been appointed from among the ranks On 20 August, the government announced the abolition 67 of the USDP. This makes it clear that the USDP cannot of media censorship. Previously, newspapers, periodicals be considered a “ruling party”.72 Given party representa- and all other printed works needed to be pre-approved by tives were willing to discuss invoking an extraordinary the censorship board and faced strict controls on the sub- constitutional provision that is intended for the gravest jects they were allowed to cover. (The blocking of politi- of situations – presidential impeachment – in the context cal content on the internet ended in 2011.) The government of what was a relatively minor dispute, it shows that the indicated that it plans to shift the state media over to a country has a long way to go to develop a mature demo- public service model, which it said can help “create a great- cratic process with stable institutions. er sense of national identity, foster democratic and other important social values, provide quality educational and The details of the case are as follows. On 2 February informational programming, and serve the needs of minor- 2012, the attorney general, acting on behalf of the presi- 68 ity and other specialized interest groups”. An editorial in dent, submitted a question to the Constitutional Tribunal the state media gave assurances that now that “draconian concerning the status of the committees and commissions censorship” had been abolished, it would aim to serve the established by the legislature. At issue was whether they public and “help our once-isolated country reunite again could be considered to have “Union-level” status as that 69 with the global family”. A prominent regional media term is used in the constitution – that is, a status equivalent representative stated that “no ASEAN member has under- to the cabinet, Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal, gone such swift change in such a short time, especially in civil service board, election commission and so on. This the media sector”, suggesting that Myanmar could soon status would both give them the right to summon minis- have a freer media environment than most countries in ters to appear before them and provide their members 70 the region. with material benefits not available to officials of lower- level institutions. The attorney general submitted arguments B. TENSIONS WITH THE LEGISLATURE that they should not be considered to have that status.

Since the start of the political transition, the legislatures The dispute had been brewing since the first legislative have emerged as a key centre of reform and a serious session in 2011. A large group of ministers then com- check on the executive. This has at times led to tensions plained to the president about the considerable amount of between President Thein Sein and Lower House Speaker time they had to devote to appearing before the legisla- Shwe Mann coming out into the open. One example, in ture to answer questions that they often considered to be early 2012, was over the issue of civil service salaries.71 routine or facile. Over subsequent sessions, the cabinet The most recent case, and one that could potentially have increasingly sent deputy ministers to answer questions in far-reaching consequences, was over a ruling by the Con- the upper and lower houses. The main reason for the dis- stitutional Tribunal. This disagreement reached a level where pute had to do with whether legislative committees and there was even talk by some legislators of impeaching the commissions would also have the status to summon min- president. isters. The executive apparently resented the power that the legislature had, and felt that having to appear before its numerous subsidiary bodies – which currently number more than 30 – would be onerous.73 passed away on 10 October 2012 at a hospital in southern Chi- na, before he had the chance to return. 67 See New Light of Myanmar, 21 August 2012, p. 7; see also “Myanmar removes controls on the media”, AFP, 21 August 2012. 72 Indeed, the fact that under the constitution the president and 68 The newly-appointed information minister, Aung Kyi, speak- his cabinet must resign their legislative seats upon taking up ing at a public service media conference in Yangon in Septem- office, and suspend party-political activities during their terms, ber 2012, which included participation from the exiled media. means that legally the majority party is not a ruling party. See “Perspective on forthcoming public service media-PSM”, 73 Two other explanations have been mooted for the dispute. New Light of Myanmar, 6 October 2012, p. 16. One is that this was a “tit-for-tat” move by the president after 69 “The New Light of Myanmar: Your newspaper”, New Light the legislature had earlier blocked a budget allocation for the of Myanmar, 18 October 2012, p. 8. Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, which the pres- 70 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Burma’s new media can shake-up ident had set up. The legislature’s grounds for doing so were ASEAN”, The Nation (Bangkok), 1 October 2012. that the commission could not be considered a “Union-level” 71 For a discussion, see Crisis Group Briefing, Reform in My- body, as it had been established without the constitutionally- anmar, op. cit., Section V.A. mandated approval of the legislature. Sources who have de- Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 10

The issue of facilities accorded to members of “Union- legislature to amend the constitution in order to accord level” institutions may also have had some influence on the Union-level status to its bodies.79 dispute. Since the first sitting, legislators have been upset about the very poor standard of accommodation and other The president’s reply further angered many elected repre- facilities provided for them in Naypyitaw. The budget for sentatives, with some even saying that if he continued to these was under the control of the executive, and this cre- defend the tribunal, they would consider impeaching the ated a perception among elected representatives that it did president himself.80 While it is not clear that there was not respect their status. These grievances apparently in- sufficient support in the legislature to take such a step, or creased the level of anger over the Constitutional Tribu- a real willingness to do so, the fact that impeachment of nal case on the status of legislative bodies.74 The way the the president was being openly discussed showed the ex- tribunal delivered its verdict on 28 March only made mat- tent of tensions between the legislature and the executive. ters worse.75 According to an elected representative, the tribunal summoned the deputy speakers of the upper and The legislature moved ahead with impeachment proceed- lower houses, and read them its verdict, while they stood ings against the tribunal and on 6 September, when it be- in front of it. It was taken as a sign of great disrespect that came clear that there was sufficient support for the move, 81 no chair was provided, “like a judge handing down a sen- the members of the tribunal resigned pre-emptively. Lower tence on the accused”.76 In its judgment that legislative house representatives of both the Union Solidarity and bodies did not have “Union-level” status, the tribunal used Development Party (USDP) and the National League for convoluted legal reasoning that appeared to ignore some Democracy had voted in favour of impeachment, while key legal precedents. the unelected military bloc had opposed the move. A new Constitutional Tribunal will now have to be appointed by Elected representatives, irrespective of party affiliation, the president (the nine members to be appointed are se- were incensed. There was a perception that the tribunal lected in equal number by the lower house, the upper had been pressured by the president to reach this conclu- house, and the president himself). sion, and that this was part of a broader pattern of attempts by the executive to constrain the legislature. A number of For those close to this struggle, it set an important prece- representatives began to discuss the possibility of im- dent as “the legislature has flexed its muscles and won its 82 peaching the tribunal. Seeking to forestall impeachment, first victory”. But the way in which that victory was Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann urged the lawmakers achieved raises a number of questions. First, there is still to attempt to reach a solution through negotiations with uncertainty as to how the legislature will seek to achieve the president.77 When these negotiations were inconclu- its ultimate goal of obtaining “Union-level” status for its sive, impeachment proceedings against the tribunal were committees and commissions. Although the tribunal has initiated, and the speaker wrote to the president, suggest- resigned, its verdict stands, and it is not clear how it would ing that he forestall this by urging the tribunal members be reversed. The alternative suggested by the president of to resign.78 The president refused and suggested that rather amending the constitution seems unlikely to be pursued at than impeach them, it would be more appropriate for the this time as the military bloc explicitly ruled out this possibility during the impeachment debate. Any constitutional amendment would require a 75 per cent supermajority and thus support from at least some military representatives. tailed knowledge of the matter say, however, that for the legislators this was not a key factor. The other explanation is that Secondly, the position of the military bloc in the legisla- this dispute was related to the allowances and facilities accord- ture on this issue reveals an interesting divergence of in- ed to members of Union-level bodies (including official resi- terests between the military and the USDP. By throwing dence, government vehicles, personal staff and so on), but this its weight behind the president, the military has demon- does not appear to have been a key factor either. 74 strated that its overriding concern remains stability rather Crisis Group interview, NLD elected representative, Yangon, than party politics. It also reflects that the commander-in- September 2012; Crisis Group interview, senior government adviser, Yangon, September 2012. chief, Min Aung Hlaing, appears to have shifted his polit- 75 “Constitutional Tribunal of the State delivers final verdicts”, New Light of Myanmar, 29 March 2012, p. 10. 76 Crisis Group interview, elected lower house representative, Yangon, September 2012. 77 See “Speaker requests patience of parliamentarian; row over 79 Ibid. Union level organization definition to be sent to president”, 80 Crisis Group interview, lower house elected representative, New Light of Myanmar, 15 August 2012, p. 16. Yangon, September 2012. 78 See “It is up to two agencies to choose whatever political line 81 “Resignations of chairman and members of Constitutional of struggle of their own volition as both are independent ones Tribunal of the Union allowed”, Myanmar President Office Or- formed in line with the constitution”, New Light of Myanmar, der No. 29/2012, 6 September 2012. 21 August 2012, p. 1. 82 Crisis Group interview, Yangon, September 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 11

ical allegiances from his former military superior, Lower In late August and early September 2012, following the House Speaker Shwe Mann, to President Thein Sein.83 appointment of the new vice-president, President Thein Sein carried out his first major cabinet reshuffle since com- Third, the tribunal impeachment has provided a clear dem- ing to office. A number of ministers who were seen as onstration of the enormous powers of the USDP-dominated conservative or ineffective were removed or sidelined. legislature. With over half of the seats, the party has the The information minister, Kyaw Hsan, was given the much ability to impeach any public official if it is able to secure less influential cooperatives portfolio, and his successor, the support of an additional 10 per cent of representatives Aung Kyi, is regarded as dynamic and reform-minded. Dr – either from the military bloc or, as in the tribunal case, Winston Set Aung, an internationally-experienced devel- other parties – to reach the required two-thirds majority in opment economist and formerly an economic adviser to both houses. It is likely that the threat of impeachment the president, has been appointed deputy minister of na- could be used again to pressure the executive. tional planning. In total, twenty ministers were reshuffled, two resigned and twenty deputy ministers were appoint- In October 2012, the USDP held its first party congress, ed.88 The new social welfare minister, Dr Myat Myat Ohn re-electing Thein Sein as chairman. Since under the con- Khin, made history as the first ever female cabinet mem- stitution he is prohibited from taking any active role in ber. A further four female deputy ministers were selected. party politics during his term as president, the vice-chair- The number of academics and technocrats has also in- man and lower house speaker, Shwe Mann, will serve as creased. Ethnic representatives have, however, expressed 84 acting head of the party. In recognition of the enormous concern that none of the cabinet members belong to mi- challenges that the USDP will face in moving away from nority communities.89 (A list of current members of cabi- its links with the old regime, he told delegates that he would net is provided in Appendix B.) reshape it into a more democratic institution as the “people’s party”.85 An ally of Shwe Mann, Maung Maung Thein, The most significant change was the creation of a de facto was moved into the powerful general secretary position. “super-cabinet” with the appointment of four new minis- Some of the more controversial members of the party ters inside the president’s office: were moved aside, including former Yangon mayor Aung Thein Lin. The party’s regional structures were also  Soe Thane. Formerly industry minister and a key advis- overhauled.86 er to the president, and one of the architects of the reform process, along with Aung Min. He has authority over international relations, economic development, ONSOLIDATION OF C. C trade and investment (and he continues to head the THE PRESIDENT’S POWER powerful Myanmar Investment Commission).

On 1 July, the president accepted the resignation of Vice-  Aung Min. Formerly rail transportation minister, where President Tin Aung Myint Oo.87 On 15 August, the com- he was another close adviser to the president on reform, mander of the navy, Admiral Nyan Tun, was sworn in as and architect of the peace process. His responsibilities the new vice president-2 (the other vice president, Sai Mauk cover domestic affairs, national security, the peace pro- Kham, took over as vice president-1 following the resig- cess and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). nation of Tin Aung Myint Oo). Nyan Tun was selected by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Vice Senior  Tin Naing Thein. Formerly national planning and eco- General Min Aung Hlaing, who under the constitution nomic development minister, who now has responsi- chooses one of the two vice presidents. Nyan Tun relin- bility for coordinating reform strategy, donor coordi- quished his military position once his appointment as vice nation and (in consultation with Soe Thane) budget president took effect, as the constitution requires. He has and finance. a reputation as a political moderate.

83 Both constitutionally, and de facto, the commander-in-chief has substantial power and largely independent authority over 88 See President Office Order Nos. 21/2012 and 22/2012 (27 most military matters. August), 23/2012 and 25/2012 (28 August), 27/2012 (29 Au- 84 “I’m running USDP, says U Shwe Mann”, Myanmar Times, gust), 28/2012 (31 August), 30/2012 and 32/2012 (7 Septem- 22 October 2012. ber), all reproduced in the New Light of Myanmar on the day 85 Ibid. following their issuance. 86 Crisis Group interview, Western political analyst, Yangon, 89 Crisis Group interview, head of a local NGO, Yangon, Sep- October 2012. tember 2012; and “Minorities still neglected, say ethnic MPs”, 87 For a detailed discussion, see Crisis Group Report, Myan- The Irrawaddy, 4 October 2012. See Appendix B for a list of mar: The Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit. current members of the cabinet. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 12

 Hla Tun. Formerly finance and revenue minister and establishing a precedent for so much power being concen- now covering decentralisation and coordination of trated in the president’s office may not be desirable. state/region budgets.90 The real powers in the president’s office are Soe Thane D. EVOLUTION OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI’S and Aung Min, who have been given authority over broad POLITICAL POSITION swathes of government. These “super-ministers” were de- scribed by a senior government adviser as “like vice pres- Aung San Suu Kyi has continued to refine her approach idents in all but name”.91 They have considerably more as she makes the difficult transition from leader of the power than the two vice presidents who – apart from their struggle against military rule to opposition politician and membership of the National Defence and Security Coun- legislator. It was her bold decision to meet President Thein cil and the Financial Commission – have largely ceremo- Sein in Naypyitaw in August 2011, and subsequently denial roles. clare that he wanted “to achieve real positive change”, that gave domestic and international credibility to the pres- The motivation for appointing these “super-ministers” ident’s reform plans.94 Her decision to bring the NLD into seems clear. President Thein Sein needs people who are the formal political process by registering the party, con- competent, trusted and invested in the change process – testing the April 2012 by-elections and taking up seats in both to advise him on the way forward and to ensure the the USDP-dominated legislature showed her willingness successful implementation of reform measures. This is a to make difficult political choices that were not popular major challenge given that he has inherited a cabinet and with all of her constituents. government bureaucracy from the old authoritarian regime. The reshuffle sends a strong signal that he expects Some have questioned her political positions on a number full support from ministers for his reform agenda. of controversial issues such as the Kachin conflict and intercommunal violence in Rakhine State, saying that she has The reshuffle has strengthened the president’s authority failed to take a clear stand against human rights abuses.95 and provided fresh impetus for reform. The creation of the She has been criticised for her words of caution to poten- super-cabinet also makes it clear that the president does tial investors at the World Economic Forum in Bangkok not have full confidence in cabinet members and their in May 2012, and similar comments in Europe in June, ministries to do the job. Some observers also noted that which were seen as contradicting President Thein Sein’s parts of the reshuffle were as much about loyalty to the push for job-creating foreign direct investment.96 The tim- president as they were about competence.92 ing of her overseas visits, which have sometimes coincid- ed with those of the president, had a potential to upstage The creation of a super-cabinet also reflects tensions be- him and create tensions with the old guard. tween the executive and the legislature. By bringing trusted ministers into his inner circle, and vesting them with Her U.S. trip in September 2012 has allayed some of these broad powers that are not constitutionally mandated or concerns. It demonstrated her willingness to make signif- subject to legislative approval, Thein Sein could be said icant adjustments to long-held positions in recognition of to be creating something of an “imperial presidency”.93 the changing political realities. During this trip she voiced The same can be said regarding the powerful role of some strong public support for the lifting of sanctions, the first government advisers, who are outside of civil-service struc- time that she had made an unequivocal call to this effect. tures. Even if this is regarded as necessary or at least un- This helped to ensure congressional support for a further derstandable in the present context given the reformist easing of U.S. restrictions, which was announced follow- credentials of the president and his super-ministers, it may ing a meeting between Secretary of State Clinton and not necessarily be in Myanmar’s interests in future. For a President Thein Sein in New York.97 country with a long history of authoritarian leadership,

94 For a detailed discussion, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing 90 The two pre-existing ministers in the president’s office, The- N°127, Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, 22 September 2011, in Nyunt and Soe Maung, remain in their positions, performing Section II.A. largely administrative functions. 95 See, for example, Alex Spillius, “Aung San Suu Kyi facing 91 Crisis Group interview, Yangon, September 2012. backlash for silence on abuses”, The Telegraph (London), 26 92 Crisis Group interview, well-connected religious leader, July 2012; and Andrew R.C. Marshall, “Suu Kyi’s perilous Yangon, September 2012. pivot from icon to party boss”, Reuters, 4 October 2012. 93 Crisis Group interview, Myanmar political analyst, Yangon, 96 See, for example, Vikram Nehru, “Aung San Suu Kyi must September 2012. The term “imperial presidency” is used to de- transition too”, The Wall Street Journal, 20 June 2012. scribe the strengthening of the modern presidency in the U.S., 97 See Hillary Clinton, “Remarks with Burmese President Thein particularly under presidents Nixon and Reagan. Sein before their meeting”, New York, 26 September 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 13

Relations between Aung San Suu Kyi and President The- E. IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE WEST in Sein, which have always been cordial, appear to have warmed further in recent weeks. They met twice in Nay- The West has moved quickly to begin dismantling sanc- pyitaw during the fourth session of the legislature, on 12 tions on Myanmar and end its diplomatic isolation. The and 22 August. No details of these meetings were re- European Union (EU) suspended all its sanctions on the leased. They also met on the sidelines of the UN General country in April 2012, with the exception of the arms em- Assembly in New York on 25 September. This meeting bargo.103 The EU plans to lift trade barriers for Myanmar took place on the president’s initiative, and was given goods by restoring access to the generalised system of front-page coverage in the Myanmar state media.98 preferences.104 This is expected to be a formality but as it is being done through the legislative process, it still could In her U.S. Congressional Gold Medal acceptance speech, take twelve to eighteen months, although with retroactive Aung San Suu Kyi paid tribute to the president, saying: effect.105 The EU has also moved to bolster diplomatic ties, with High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Our task of building a nation that offers peace and pros- Ashton visiting Myanmar in April 2012 “to open a new perity, and basic human rights protected by the rule of chapter in the relationship”; she also opened a new EU law to all who dwell within its realms … has been made office in the country.106 In September, European Council possible by the reform measures instituted by Presi- President Herman Van Rompuy met the president at the dent U Thein Sein. Our President, our very young but UN General Assembly in New York, together with Ashton. rapidly maturing legislature, and the vast majority of our people, are committed to democratic values that The U.S. has likewise suspended the majority of its sanc- will enable us to fulfil our potential and to take our tions, mostly by President Obama exercising his execu- 99 rightful place in the modern world. tive authority, in close consultation with Congress. This includes the authorisation of new U.S. investment, export She also paid tribute to Minister Aung Min, who had trav- of financial services, and resumed lending and technical elled to the U.S. to be present at the award ceremony. She assistance by the international financial institutions. The noted that she was “particularly encouraged by the pres- U.S. also removed Myanmar officials from its visa ban list. ence of minister U Aung Min, who has been leading peace Surprisingly, however, Congress voted in August 2012 to talks in our country, and whose presence reinforces my 100 renew a ban on the import of all Myanmar products into faith in the future of reform and reconciliation”. The the U.S. that was due to lapse this year – in seeming con- award ceremony was given prominent coverage in the 107 101 tradiction with moves to authorise new U.S investment. Myanmar state media. The following week, Thein Sein The following month, Secretary of State Clinton announced congratulated her on the award in his speech to the UN during a meeting with President Thein Sein in New York General Assembly (see Section II.1 above). that the U.S. will “begin the process of easing restrictions on imports” – a move that was facilitated by Aung San Suu Following her election to the legislature in April 2012, Kyi’s public call for sanctions to be lifted.108 There have Aung San Suu Kyi has also built good working relations so far been no indications as to when Myanmar will be with Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann. They meet regu- able to benefit from preferential tariffs under the U.S. larly to discuss legislative issues. Her closer relations with generalised system of preferences. the speaker may be part of the reason why the president and his senior ministers have been reaching out to her; in U.S. diplomatic engagement with Myanmar has also been addition to more regular meetings with the president, she stepped up. Following the landmark visit to the country by is also meeting regularly with ministers Soe Thane and 102 Secretary of State Clinton in November 2011, President Aung Min. Good relations between the president, the Thein Sein has met with her on two subsequent occasions. lower house speaker and Aung San Suu Kyi are critical for the stability and success of the reform process. 103 “Council Conclusions on Myanmar/Burma”, 3159th Euro- pean Union Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 23 April 2012. 98 See “President Thein Sein in New York”, New Light of My- 104 “European Commission proposes to reinstate trade prefer- anmar, 27 September 2012, p. 1. ences to Myanmar/Burma”, EC press release, Brussels, 17 Sep- 99 Aung San Suu Kyi, Congressional Gold Medal Acceptance tember 2012. Address, U.S. Capitol, Washington DC, 19 September 2012. 105 Crisis Group interview, member, GSP Council Working 100 Ibid. Group, Brussels, 17 October 2012. 101 See “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi delivers an address at ceremo- 106 “Catherine Ashton visits Burma/Myanmar to open a new ny to accept Congressional Gold Medal”, New Light of Myan- chapter in the relationship”, EC Press Release, 27 April 2012. mar, 21 September 2012, p. 16. 107 “US Congress reauthorizes import ban on Myanmar”, Reu- 102 Crisis Group interviews, senior government adviser, West- ters, 2 August 2012. ern ambassador, Yangon, September 2012. 108 Clinton, “Remarks with Burmese President …”, op. cit. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 14

He travelled to Cambodia in July 2012 specifically to III. SOCIAL TENSIONS meet her, at a business forum promoting greater U.S. investment in South East Asia.109 Calling the easing of sanctions “a milestone in the relationship between our The reform process continues to gather momentum, and it two countries”, she announced that she was sending a seems highly unlikely that anyone would have the ability delegation of more than 70 American business leaders to or the motivation to turn back the clock to the authoritari- Myanmar.110 The president met her again in September, an days of the past. Despite this clear direction, there are on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. After a high- huge challenges, and the process is unlikely to be smooth ranking U.S. delegation including senior military officers or straightforward. The deep wounds from decades of au- visited mid-October for a human rights dialogue with the thoritarianism are now being exposed. People’s expecta- government and leadership, it was indicated that the My- tions are rising, including for improved livelihoods and an anmar armed forces would be invited to observe the an- end to injustices and abuse by local power-holders – and nual Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand in what has they are beginning to organise and find their voice. Ad- been called a “carefully calibrated re-engagement with dressing these issues while continuing to reform or rebuild Myanmar’s military”.111 U.S. political engagement will re- the institutions needed to create a more democratic, pros- ceive a major boost when President Obama visits Myan- perous and peaceful nation will be extremely difficult. The mar in November 2012.112 challenge of ending the conflict in Kachin State and forging a sustainable peace in the country as a whole was ad- A number of EU countries are also moving to reestablish dressed in detail in an earlier Crisis Group report.114 defence attachés in their embassies in Yangon and have pursued informal military-to-military contacts. For exam- A. RISING SOCIAL TENSIONS ple, retired general Sir Mike Jackson, prominent former commander of the British army, travelled to Naypyitaw in The easing of authoritarian controls has created the space September and met with the deputy commander-in-chief 113 for the population to air grievances, the ability to organise of the Myanmar military. in a way that was not possible before, and the opportunity to have a real influence on government policies and decisions. This potent mixture has led to “an exponential growth in civil society activity”115 and a new sense of purpose in these organisations.

So far, this trend has been regarded positively by the government and most of the prominent and well-established civil society organisations. At least at the leadership level, it is official policy to be responsive to the needs of the population, and civil society is regarded as an important channel of information about community concerns. This reflects a recognition that there is a lack of capacity in many areas and civil society organisations can be a source of technical and policy advice.116 In the past, they were only able to operate by maintaining constructive relations with government and avoiding overly confrontational stances, which was in any case a prerequisite for having influence on decision-making. In the new more open environment, these organisations have seen their influence grow. They generally describe a harmonious relationship with the au-

109 thorities: they feel that government, at the highest levels, A senior adviser to the president confirmed that his intention is accessible and receptive to their ideas and shares simi- in making this trip was to meet Clinton. Crisis Group interview, Yangon, September 2012. 110 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Fo- rum”, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 13 July 2012. 114 Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, op. 111 Jason Szep and Andrew R.C. Marshall, “U.S. to invite My- cit. Another recent Crisis Group report looked at the challenges anmar to joint military exercises”, Reuters, 19 October 2012. associated with economic reform, see Myanmar: The Politics of The delegation included Lieutenant-General Francis Wiercin- Economic Reform, op. cit. ski, the commanding general of the U.S. army in the Pacific. 115 Crisis Group interview, expatriate working closely with civil 112 “Statement by press secretary on the president travelling to society, Yangon, September 2012. Asia”, U.S. mission to ASEAN, 9 November 2012. 116 Crisis Group interview, presidential adviser, Yangon, May 113 Ibid. 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 15

lar values and objectives to their own.117 They have also expressed concern about the involvement of people with been able to provide channels to senior policymakers for old-style confrontational ideologies in the campaign against smaller or more newly established organisations. the controversial Monywa copper mine (discussed in Sec- tion III.B below), and giving this as one reason for their This cooperative relationship has been seen in the devel- trip to the area.122 opment of a new NGO law. The existing 1988 Law Relat- ing to Forming of Organisations118 was adopted shortly after The emergence of the first worker and farmer unions for the 1988 coup with the aim of restricting the formation or 50 years is a key development for the empowerment of continued functioning of organisations not sanctioned by workers in Myanmar. Following the adoption of the La- the government. Following the convening of a seminar in bour Organisation Law, which came into force on 9 March January 2012 to compare different models for NGO regis- 2012, over 180 unions have legally registered,123 exposing tration in the region, the matter was raised in the legisla- how little experience of social dialogue there is among ture. In August, a prominent civil society network con- government, employers or workers. Coupled with serious vened a public hearing session in Naypyitaw for legisla- unaddressed grievances on the part of workers, this could tors, in advance of a parliamentary debate on the issue. lead to the emergence of labour organisations and move- Following this debate, the legislature decided on the draft- ments that are radicalised or co-opted by political or other ing of a new registration law “suitable for the current era”, agendas – as happened in the 1930s.124 and the urgent amendment of existing procedures. The civil society network was asked to provide the necessary The extent to which social and labour movements will be- inputs for the bill, which will be prioritised in the Octo- come radicalised is not yet clear, nor how the authorities ber-November 2012 legislative session.119 would react to this. However, the government is certainly concerned about the fact that new-found freedoms com- But even this very constructive interaction between gov- bined with deep-seated grievances are a potentially explo- ernment and civil society faces challenges. First, the issues sive mix. This is perhaps one reason why the authorities are becoming more contentious as civil society gains greater have sent clear signals that demonstrations that are out- confidence and begins to push the boundaries further. This side the scope of the new law are not acceptable – although will inevitably lead to tensions with the government or they have generally not prevented such protests from tak- with powerful interests within it or the military. Farmers ing place.125 Individuals involved with (unauthorised) are beginning to challenge land confiscations made by the demonstrations against electricity shortages in May 2012 military in the past, and victims of abuses by the military have been charged by police, as have participants in a and police are speaking out. Recently, peace activists peace rally in Yangon in September 2012 that was denied planned to hold a demonstration in front of the War Of- permission by the authorities.126 fice in Naypyitaw to protest ongoing fighting in Kachin State (but the authorities prevented them from doing so).120 B. THE MONYWA COPPER MINE Secondly, it is inevitable that some in civil society are un- comfortable about being too close to government, for fear One particularly striking current example of social ten- of being co-opted. There is a feeling in some quarters that sions involves a copper mine in Monywa, in central My- “with Aung San Suu Kyi taking a softer line, and the 88 anmar. The mine was formerly a joint venture between Generation pursuing a constructive approach, there is no Ivanhoe, a Canadian mining company, and the state-owned real opposition any more”.121 In such a context, it is likely Mining Enterprise No. 1. Ivanhoe divested its stake in that groups will begin to emerge that take a more confrontational approach. It is telling that the 88 Generation has 122 Crisis Group interview, prominent civil society leader involved in the campaign, Yangon, September 2012. This part of Myanmar was traditionally a strong support base for the Burma 117 Crisis Group interviews, leaders of several prominent civil Communist Party, and several recently-released political pris- society organisations and local NGOs, and with expatriate work- oners with communist backgrounds are from the area. ing closely with civil society, Yangon, September 2012. 123 Figures as of September 2012. Crisis Group interview with 118 State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 6/88 of the International Labour Organisation liaison officer in Myan- 30 September 1988. mar, Yangon, 19 September 2012. The law was adopted in 2011, 119 Crisis Group interview, head of a civil society network, but only came into force once implementing regulations had Yangon, September 2012; see also “NGO registration law to be been drawn up. drafted”, The Irrawaddy, 17 August 2012, and “Hluttaw agrees 124 In the 1930s, labour movements became closely linked to and to amend NGO law”, Myanmar Times, vol. 33, no. 641, 27 Au- partly organised by a resurgent Burmese nationalist movement. gust-2 September 2012. 125 That is, the Law Relating to Peaceful Gathering and Peace- 120 Ibid. ful Procession of 2 December 2011. 121 Crisis Group interview, head of a prominent local NGO, 126 “Officials press charges against ‘electricity protestors’”, Yangon, September 2012. Democratic Voice of Burma, 9 October 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 16

2007.127 The government eventually signed a cooperation ment against the mine could develop, and demonstrations agreement in 2010 with a subsidiary of Chinese defence could take on an overtly anti-Chinese character. Already, company Norinco to develop the project, in partnership demonstrators have burned coffins labelled with the name with the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited of the powerful Myanmar military conglomerate that co- military conglomerate.128 A recent report by Myanmar’s owns the mine, and placards written in Chinese have been auditor general alleged corruption in the ministry of min- waved at rallies.133 Protests have included as many as ing between 2009 and 2011.129 The mining minister was 10,000 people, and locals armed with sticks and knives appointed as the new auditor general in the recent cabinet have reportedly prevented police from arresting protest reshuffle. leaders.134

Following its entry, Norinco moved to develop the long- Popular perceptions in Myanmar are that China had long delayed second phase of the mining project. This required colluded with the former military regime, providing polit- the requisitioning of land and the planned eviction of ical backing while exploiting Myanmar’s natural resources. some 26 villages from the site. While compensation was The Monywa copper project is seen as having all of these paid and new housing offered at another location, the vil- elements – an allegedly corrupt deal reached between the lagers have complained that these were inadequate and former regime and a Chinese arms manufacturer to ex- many have refused to move. Environmental concerns tract natural resources without regard for the impact on have also been raised.130 the local population – and it is likely to face ongoing con- troversy. More generally, Chinese projects in Myanmar In recent months, local people have been demonstrating will continue to receive a high degree of public scrutiny, against the mine expansion, and the campaign has as- and because of the history and perceptions involved, are sumed national prominence. The combination of factors likely to attract criticism. These companies will have to involved has a particular national resonance: alleged land make strong credible efforts at public outreach and corpo- grabbing and unfair compensation, strong-arm tactics by rate social responsibility, something that they have not the authorities, environmental concerns, and the involve- been effective at doing in the past. There is increasing ment in the project of the Myanmar military and a Chinese recognition of this in various parts of the Chinese gov- company. These are similar to the factors that led to the ernment, which have been increasingly reflecting on these national campaign against the Myitsone hydropower dam issues following the cancellation of the Myitsone dam, in Kachin State.131 and increasingly vocal opposition to other Chinese projects in Myanmar.135 So far, the campaign has been focused on obtaining a better outcome for the local population affected by the project and ensuring that environmental standards are upheld, rather than trying to block the project. The 88 Generation group of former student activists has travelled to the area to advocate on behalf of detained villagers and to push for negotiations to settle the dispute.132 A more radical move-

127 “Ivanhoe Mines announces 2006 financial results”, Ivanhoe Mines press release, 30 March 2007; “Ivanhoe Mines receives proceeds of US$103 million from Monywa Trust”, Ivanhoe Mines statement, 3 August 2011. 128 “Chinese weapons maker signs Myanmar deal”, The Wall Street Journal, 23 June 2010. 129 “Myanmar ministries accused of corruption”, Financial Times, 15 March 2012; “In battling mine project in Myanmar, 2 ‘Iron Ladies’ rise”, The New York Times, 26 September 2012; “UMEHL negotiates big mining project with locals”, Eleven News, 29 September 2012. The mining ministry has rejected the allegations of corruption. 130 “In battling mine …”, The New York Times, op. cit. 131 See Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, 133 Crisis Group interview, head of a local Myanmar NGO, op. cit., Section III.C. Yangon, September 2012. 132 Crisis Group interview, Myanmar social activist involved in 134 “Burmese police search for mine demonstration leaders”, the campaign, Yangon, September 2012; see also “In Monywa, Mizzima News, 7 September 2012. protesters find they are not alone”, Myanmar Times, 15 October 135 Crisis Group interview, Chinese commerce ministry official, 2012. Beijing, April 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 17

IV. PROSPECTS FOR A STABLE The risks in such a situation are clear. If the post-2015 TRANSITION legislatures fail to represent the true political and ethnic diversity of the country, tensions are likely to increase. The main task of the government and legislature in the com- The most important consideration for Myanmar’s near-term ing years will be one of nation building. This requires an prospects is whether the macro-political environment will inclusive “big tent” approach rather than prioritising par- remain conducive to a stable transition process. Inter- ty-political interests. The marginalisation of non-NLD communal violence, continued fighting in Kachin State,136 democratic forces will only make this more difficult. This and rising social tensions are creating many challenges. If is particularly true of the 88 Generation group, who has these can be effectively addressed, the immediate future a strong national constituency. Its members have not yet for the reform process looks positive, with President Thein established a political party, but are likely to do so prior Sein consolidating his authority and committing to further to the 2015 election. Their relations with the NLD are re- reforms, and Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann continu- ported to be “difficult”, and the NLD has apparently been ing to push progressive lawmaking. The next general elec- reluctant to discuss any strategic alliance between the two tions in 2015 will be a critical moment, as they have the – with the expectation rather being that the 88 Generation potential to fundamentally reshape the political landscape. should join the party.138 In general, the NLD is dismissive With Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy of other democratic parties, particularly those that chose competing for seats across the country for the first time to contest the 2010 elections.139 since the abortive 1990 elections, it is certain that the bal- ance of power in the legislatures will change. Of even greater concern would be a marginalisation of ethnic political parties. This would revive “memories of how first-past-the-post elections marginalised minority A. THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SINGLE- parties in the parliamentary era (1948-1962) and favoured PARTY DOMINANCE large, centrally-based parties among the Burman-majority”.140 It could also threaten the ethnic peace process, There can be little doubt that with Aung San Suu Kyi’s which is predicated on convincing ethnic armed groups enormous popularity, the NLD will emerge as the domi- that they can effectively pursue their objectives in the po- nant party in any free and fair elections in 2015. As in 1990, litical arena – that is, the legislatures – rather than through when the NLD secured almost 60 per cent of the vote and armed struggle. But in many areas, ethnic parties will find over 80 per cent of the seats, the plurality (or first-past- it a challenge to win against the NLD, particularly in the the-post) voting system gives a considerable advantage to many mixed-ethnicity constituencies where the vote will a dominant party. The NLD’s April 2012 by-election land- split along ethnic lines. The NLD may be headed for a con- slide suggests that the party is again likely to win a large frontation with conservative ethnic politicians, as hap- majority of the elected seats. pened in Shan State in 1990.

However, a landslide victory by the NLD in 2015 may The marginalisation of the current political elite also pos- not be in the best interests of the party or the country. The es considerable risks. The military has the comfort of a stability of the transition and its ultimate success depend guaranteed 25 per cent of legislative seats, and the veto on ensuring the broadest possible buy-in from all seg- this provides over changes that would threaten its essen- ments of society. An NLD landslide risks marginalising tial interests. This is the main reason why it has been pre- three important constituencies in the legislatures: the old pared to allow the reforms to go ahead and has supported political elite, in the form of the USDP; the ethnic politi- many of them. The old elite, represented by the USDP, cal parties; and the non-NLD democratic parties. The by- has no such guarantees and faces the prospect of losing election results, which were for a small but not complete- most of the seats that it currently holds. This will affect ly unrepresentative set of seats, highlight this. The NLD the interests of a large group of people who retain consid- won 43 of the 45 seats contested. The USDP won only one erable political influence, and who remain deeply scepti- – and this is in all likelihood only because the NLD candidate was barred from standing. Several of the seats were in ethnic areas, only one of which was won by an ethnic 138 Crisis Group interviews, prominent individual close to the party. No other democratic party came even close to win- 88 Generation leaders, and head of a local NGO, Yangon, Sep- ning a seat.137 tember 2012. Relations are difficult in part due to what is seen as a paternalistic or patronising attitude on the part of the NLD. 139 Crisis Group interviews, NLD Central Executive Committee member, Yangon, September 2012; representatives of the NLD 136 For a detailed discussion of the Kachin conflict and the chal- and other democratic parties from 2010 to 2012. lenges of forging ethnic peace in Myanmar, see Crisis Group 140 “Burma at the Crossroads: Maintaining the Momentum for Report, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, op. cit. Reform”, Burma Policy Briefing no. 9, Transnational Institute, 137 Crisis Group Briefing, Reform in Myanmar, op. cit., Section IV. June 2012, p. 8. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 18

cal of the NLD’s willingness to accommodate their con- wishes to promote inclusiveness and reconciliation, and cerns. It is even conceivable – if very unlikely – that an ease the concerns of other constituencies about a land- overwhelming victory by the NLD in 2015 could provoke slide victory, it has several options: a 1990-type scenario where the existing power structures feel existentially threatened to such a degree that they re- Proportional representation. The electoral system could fuse to implement the result, or even seek to trigger a mil- be changed to introduce some form of proportional repre- itary coup.141 sentation. This is a topic of considerable discussion in political circles in Myanmar. It would be an obvious way to The prospect of too easy a victory could also be detrimen- ensure that minority parties (and the USDP) receive a num- tal to NLD interests in another way. The party needs to ber of seats that more accurately reflect their popularity, transform itself from a grassroots movement opposed to by removing the “winner-take-all” distortion inherent in military rule, to a political party that is ready for the re- the current plurality system. It is common for countries in sponsibilities of government. This includes building a co- transition to change their electoral systems. One example hesive, democratic party structure, which will be a huge is post-Apartheid South Africa, where Nelson Mandela’s challenge given entrenched institutional habits, weak ca- African National Congress made a conscious decision to pacity and lack of relevant experience. Recently, serious prioritise reconciliation and inclusion over maximising cracks in the party were exposed, with some 500 mem- seats, and changed the electoral system from first-past- bers in the city of Pathein resigning in protest at the per- the-post to a proportional representation system.145 ceived sidelining by the party leadership of prominent local organisers.142 The party-building process will be all Switching to a more proportional system for the lower the more difficult if there is no electoral imperative to house would probably require the amendment of the con- push through such reforms. The NLD’s main asset is Aung stitution.146 For the provision in question, this would entail San Suu Kyi, and many voters will vote for its candidates a 75 per cent vote in favour in the legislature, followed by because they will see it as a vote for her, not necessarily a simple majority in a national referendum.147 In the case for an individual candidate or the party’s policies.143 This of the upper house, some proportional system based on eases the difficult task for the NLD of candidate selection fourteen multi-member constituencies corresponding to or developing detailed policymaking capacity. But it may the states and regions appears not to be ruled out.148 The mean that the quality of its candidates and policies suffers. elections commission has asked the Constitutional Tribu- nal, prior to the resignation of its members, to advise on the compatibility of the constitution with proportional B. OPTIONS TO MINIMISE THE RISKS representation.149

The NLD’s approach is to seek the largest possible elec- The NLD is opposed to the introduction of a proportional toral mandate in 2015, aiming to win the maximum num- system, and a few ethnic parties have reservations – par- ber of seats, including by fielding candidates in all con- ticularly those that have strong majorities in their areas; stituencies. Aung San Suu Kyi has suggested that the party most other parties are favourable towards the idea. Whether has an obligation to do so, in order to give everyone the such a change could be introduced prior to 2015 is uncer- 144 opportunity to vote for an NLD candidate. In a mature tain. Changing the electoral system is a complex process democratic system, such tactics would be natural and ex- that should enjoy broad consensus from across the politi- pected. But in a transition situation, a different approach cal spectrum and may take some time. Furthermore, it is may be expedient – one that gives as many groups as pos- not clear whether there is any appetite within the military sible a stake in the politics of the country. If the NLD bloc to open up the thorny issue of changing the constitution, because it risks also opening up the question of their

guaranteed 25 per cent of legislative seats – and at least 141 A number of different people interviewed by Crisis Group in Yangon in September 2012 voiced this concern, including the head of a social organisation who has close connections to sen- 145 See Andrew Reynolds et al., Electoral System Design: The ior USDP figures, a senior government adviser, a Western am- New International IDEA Handbook, 2005, p. 62. bassador, and the head of a local NGO. 146 The constitution does not mandate a first-past-the-post sys- 142 “NLD members in Pathein to resign”, Myanmar Times, 29 tem, but it does stipulate that representatives are elected from October 2012. single-member constituencies based on townships. See 2008 143 An NLD representative told Crisis Group that in his by- constitution, section 109. election campaign, he found that many rural voters did not know 147 2008 constitution, section 436(a). who he was. He told them: “I work with Aung San Suu Kyi. If 148 2008 constitution, section 141. you like her, then vote for me”. Crisis Group interview, Yangon, 149 “Consequences of election system rest on basic causes re- September 2012. garding principles, religion, ethnic affairs, race, language and 144 Crisis Group interview, member of the NLD Central Execu- social standing of the people of the country”, New Light of My- tive Committee, Yangon, March 2012. anmar, 28 July 2012, p. 16. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 19

some military representatives would have to vote in favour V. CONCLUSION of the measure in order to obtain the constitutionally- mandated supermajority. Beyond this, it is conceivable that NLD opposition to such a move could easily motivate a The Myanmar government and legislature have demon- majority of voters to oppose the measure in a referendum. strated that they possess the vision and leadership to move the country decisively away from its authoritarian past. Coalition building. Another possibility would be for the But they will inevitably face major challenges, including NLD to form an alliance with some other parties – most containing and resolving the intercommunal conflict that importantly, ethnic parties, but also possibly some non- has engulfed Rakhine State and reaching a ceasefire in ethnic democratic parties – which would agree not to field Kachin State. The country must deal with a bitter legacy: candidates to compete against each other in certain con- in addition to forging a sustainable peace after decades of stituencies. This would reassure those parties that an NLD ethnic conflict and rebuilding a dysfunctional economy, victory, which many would not be opposed to in princi- it must come to terms with intercommunal violence and ple, would not come at their own expense. The NLD did address rising social tensions over grievances both past not pursue such an approach in the by-elections, and does and present. not favour it in general, on the grounds that it would un- fairly deprive some constituents of their right to vote for On the Rakhine State violence in particular, decisive moral the NLD.150 If it is not ready to reconsider its position, a leadership is required by both President Thein Sein and compromise might be that it opts not to field candidates Aung San Suu Kyi to prevent it spreading and contribute in upper house constituencies in ethnic areas. This would towards long-term solutions. This is a time when political be in line with the spirit of the upper house as an Amyotha leaders must rise to the challenge of shaping public opinion Hluttaw (“chamber of nationalities”) reflecting the ethnic rather than just following it. A failure to do so will be to diversity of the nation. the detriment of the country, and can also do serious dam- age to the reputations of the government and the National Bridge building. The third option would be for the NLD League for Democracy. to take steps to reassure other parties and their constituents that an NLD victory will not represent a threat to The 2015 elections will be a major test of whether the cur- their interests. Verbal assurances are unlikely to be effec- rent top-down transition – what could be called “reform- tive. Rather, the NLD would need to engage in bridge by-decree” – can survive the emergence of a new politics. building with other political forces, particularly the old There is a serious risk of instability if existing power guard. One way of doing so would be the forging of an holders feel threatened by their inevitable loss of political “elite pact” between Aung San Suu Kyi and the current power (which is different from a serious risk of a return leadership. For example, the NLD could support Presi- to authoritarianism, which is unlikely), or if important dent Thein Sein to remain president on a temporary basis constituencies are marginalised. It will be necessary for after the 2015 elections, pending constitutional changes the NLD to ensure that its expected electoral success in that would allow Aung San Suu Kyi to assume the presi- 2015 does not come at the expense of the broad represen- dency. This would give confidence to other stakeholders, tation needed to reflect the country’s diversity and ensure especially the old guard and the military, that there would an inclusive and stable transition – whether by introduc- be continuity in the transition process. Such a confidence- ing some form of proportional representation, reaching a building step would also improve the prospects of the transitional national unity agreement with the current military voting for the constitutional changes necessary government, or building coalitions with other parties. for Aung San Suu Kyi to be able to become president. It seems unlikely that those changes will be introduced prior Pursuing any of these paths will require that the NLD to 2015, and there are currently no other obvious candi- make sacrifices and put the national interest above party- dates for president within the NLD. political considerations. With a national leader of the cal- ibre of Aung San Suu Kyi at the helm, there is no reason to think that the party would be unable to make such cou- rageous decisions.

Jakarta/Brussels, 12 November 2012

150 Crisis Group interview, member of NLD Central Executive Committee, Yangon, March 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 20

APPENDIX A

MAP OF MYANMAR

Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 21

APPENDIX B

MYANMAR CABINET FOLLOWING THE RESHUFFLE

Portfolio Office holder Office holder’s previous position

Agriculture & Irrigation U Myint Hlaing Chief, Air Defence (Lt-Gen)

Border Affairs Lt-Gen Thein Htay Deputy Minister Defence

Commerce U Win Myint President, Chamber of Commerce

Communications, Posts & Telegraphs U Thein Tun Deputy Minister (same ministry)

Construction U Kyaw Lwin Deputy Minister Construction

Cooperatives U Kyaw Hsan Minister for Information

Culture U Aye Myint Kyu Deputy Minister Sports

Defence Lt-Gen Wai Lwin Quartermaster General

Education Dr Mya Aye Rector, Mandalay University

Electric Power U Khin Maung Soe Chair, Yangon Electric Supply Board

Energy U Than Htay Deputy Minister Energy

Finance & Revenue U Win Shein Deputy Minister (same ministry)

Foreign Affairs U Wunna Maung Lwin Ambassador/PR in Geneva

Forestry U Win Tun Managing Director, Myanmar Timber Enterprise

Health Dr Pe Thet Khin Rector, Yangon University of Medicine 1

Home Affairs Lt-Gen Ko Ko Chief, Bureau Special Ops 3

Hotels & Tourism U Htay Aung Deputy Minister (same ministry)

Immigration & Population U Khin Yi Police Chief

Industry U Aye Myint Science & Technology

Information U Aung Kyi Minister for Labour/Social Welfare

Labour U Maung Myint Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs

Livestock & Fisheries U Ohn Myint Minister for Commerce

Mines Dr Myint Aung Member, Union Civil Service Board

National Planning & Economic Development Dr Kan Zaw Deputy Minister (same ministry)

Rail Transportation Maj-Gen Zeyar Aung Northern Commander

Religious Affairs Thura U Myint Maung (same)

Science & Technology Dr Ko Ko Oo Deputy Minister (same ministry)

Social Welfare, Relief & Resettlement Dr Daw Myat Myat Ohn Khin Deputy Minister Health

Sports U Tint Hsan Chairman, ACE Construction Company

Transport U Nyan Tun Aung Deputy Minister (same ministry)

President’s Office 1. U Thein Nyunt Minister for Border Areas 2. U Soe Maung Judge Advocate General (Maj-Gen) 3. U Soe Thein Minister for Industry 4. U Aung Min Minister for Rail Transportation 5. U Tin Naing Thein Minister for National Planning & Economic Development 6. U Hla Tun Minister for Finance & Revenue

Attorney-General Dr Tun Shin Deputy Attorney-General Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 22

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyp- pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some rus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia 130 staff members on five continents, working through and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, resolve deadly conflict. Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guate- Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams mala, Haiti and Venezuela. of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent con- Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of flict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it governments, institutional foundations, and private sources. produces analytical reports containing practical recommen- The following governmental departments and agencies have dations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for In- Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly ternational Development, Austrian Development Agency, bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International play in all the most significant situations of conflict or po- Development Agency, Canadian International Development tential conflict around the world. Research Centre, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union Instru- Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed ment for Stability, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ger- widely by email and made available simultaneously on the man Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liech- website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely tenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New with governments and those who influence them, including Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Nor- the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate wegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International support for its policy prescriptions. Development Cooperation Agency, Swedish Ministry of For- eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom De- from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media partment for International Development, U.S. Agency for – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and International Development. recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. The following institutional and private foundations have pro- Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. vided funding in recent years: Adessium Foundation, Car- Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been negie Corporation of New York, Elders Foundation, William Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Henry Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foun- Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. dation, Oak Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Plough- shares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and Stanley Foundation, The Charitable Foundation, Tinker Foun- the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: dation Incorporated. Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujum- bura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala November 2012 City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbab- we; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kash- mir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 23

APPENDIX D

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009

Central Asia North Korea: The Risks of War in the Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Yellow Sea, Asia Report N°198, 23 Track, Asia Report N°182, 11 December Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, Asia December 2010. 2009. Report N°162, 12 February 2009. China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, Asia Briefing Women and Radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan, Yellow Sea, Asia Report N°200, 27 N°99, 11 January 2010. Asia Report N°176, 3 September 2009. January 2011 (also available in Chinese). Nepal: Peace and Justice, Asia Report Central Asia: Islamists in Prison, Asia Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the N°184, 14 January 2010. Briefing N°97, 15 December 2009. South, Asia Report N°208, 14 July 2011 Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service, Asia Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic (also available in Korean). Report N°185, 16 February 2010. Crisis, Asia Report N°183, 5 January South Korea: The Shifting Sands of 2010. The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the Security Policy, Asia Briefing N°130, 1 LTTE, Asia Report N°186, 23 February Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses, December 2011. 2010. Asia Briefing N°102, 27 April 2010. Stirring up the South China Sea (I), Asia The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Report Report N°223, 23 April 2012 (also Bangladesh, Asia Report N°187, 1 N°193, 23 August 2010. available in Chinese). March 2010. Central Asia: Decay and Decline, Asia Stirring up the South China Sea (II): A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Report N°201, 3 February 2011. Regional Responses, Asia Report N°229, Afghan National Army, Asia Report Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent 24 July 2012. N°190, 12 May 2010. Threats, Asia Report N°205, 24 May North Korean Succession and the Risks of War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report 2011. Instability, Asia Report N°230, 25 July N°191, 17 May 2010. Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in 2012 (also available in Korean). Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris the South, Asia Report N°222, 29 March First, Asia Briefing N°106, 3 June 2010. 2012. South Asia Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111, 16 September 2010. North East Asia Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process, Asia Report N°163, 19 February 2009 (also Nepal’s Political Rites of Passage, Asia North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks available in Nepali). Report N°194, 29 September 2010 (also of Overreaction, Asia Briefing N°91, Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, available in Nepali). 31 March 2009. New Directions, Asia Briefing N°89, Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, China’s Growing Role in UN Peace- 13 March 2009. Asia Report N°195, 17 November 2010. keeping, Asia Report N°166, 17 April Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement, Asia 2009 (also available in Chinese). Asia Report N°164, 13 March 2009. Briefing N°115, 28 November 2010. North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice Weapons Programs, Asia Report N°167, Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Prov- System, Asia Report N°196, 6 December 18 June 2009. ince, Asia Report N°165, 16 April 2009. 2010. North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Pro- Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism, grams, Asia Report N°168, 18 June Opportunities, Asia Briefing N°93, 3 Asia Report N°199, 13 January 2011 2009. June 2009. (also available in Nepali). North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, Asia Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, Asia Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate, Asia Report N°169, 18 June 2009. Report N°171, 24 June 2009. Briefing N°117, 23 February 2011. China’s Myanmar Dilemma, Asia Report Sri Lanka’s Judiciary: Politicised Courts, Reforming Pakistan’s Electoral System, N°177, 14 September 2009 (also avail- Compromised Rights, Asia Report Asia Report N°203, 30 March 2011. able in Chinese). N°172, 30 June 2009. Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process, Asia Briefing Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?, Asia N°120, 7 April 2011 (also available in Korea, Asia Report N°179, 2 November Report N°173, 13 August 2009 (also Nepali). 2009 (also available in Chinese). available in Nepali). India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, Asia The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Afghanistan: What Now for Refugees?, Report N°206, 23 June 2011. Beijing, Asia Briefing N°100, 17 Feb- Asia Report N°175, 31 August 2009. The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heart- ruary 2010 (also available in Chinese). Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, land, Asia Report N°207, 27 June 2011. North Korea under Tightening Sanctions, Asia Report N°178, 21 October 2009. Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder Than Asia Briefing N°101, 15 March 2010. Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Ever, Asia Report N°209, 18 July 2011. China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections, Governance, Asia Briefing N°96, 25 Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan, Asia Ethnic Politics and Economics, Asia November 2009. Report N°210, 4 August 2011. Briefing N°112, 21 September 2010 (also available in Chinese). Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 24

Nepal: From Two Armies to One, Asia Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand, The Communist Insurgency in the Report N°211, 18 August 2011 (also Asia Report N°170, 22 June 2009 (also Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Asia available in Nepali). available in Thai). Report N°202, 14 February 2011. Reforming Pakistan’s Prison System, Asia Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings, Asia Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, Asia Report N°212, 12 October 2011. Briefing N°94, 24 July 2009 (also avail- Briefing N°118, 7 March 2011 (also Islamic Parties in Pakistan, Asia Report able in Indonesian). available in Chinese and Burmese). N°216, 12 December 2011. Myanmar: Towards the Elections, Asia The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame Report N°174, 20 August 2009. in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°119, 24 Nears, Asia Briefing N°131, 13 Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base, March 2011. December 2011 (also available in Asia Briefing N°95, 27 August 2009. Thailand: The Calm Before Another Nepali). Handing Back Responsibility to Timor- Storm?, Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in the North Leste’s Police, Asia Report N°180, 3 2011 (also available in Chinese and and East, Asia Report N°217, 20 December 2009. Thai). December 2011. Southern Thailand: Moving towards Polit- Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of ical Solutions?, Asia Report N°181, 8 from Indonesia, Asia Briefing N°122, 18 Minority Rights, Asia Report N°219, 16 December 2009 (also available in Thai). April 2011 (also available in March 2012. The Philippines: After the Maguindanao Indonesian). Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Massacre, Asia Briefing N°98, 21 Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Military, Asia Report N°220, 16 March December 2009. Plans, Asia Report N°204, 19 April 2012. Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua, 2011 (also available in Chinese). Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Asia Report N°188, 11 March 2010 (also Indonesia: Gam vs Gam in the Aceh Settlement in Afghanistan, Asia Report available in Indonesian). Elections, Asia Briefing N°123, 15 June N°221, 26 March 2012. Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia 2011. Pakistan’s Relations with India: Beyond Report N°189, 20 April 2010. Indonesia: Debate over a New Intelligence Kashmir?, Asia Report N°224, 3 May Philippines: Pre-election Tensions in Bill, Asia Briefing N°124, 12 July 2011. 2012. Central Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°103, The Philippines: A New Strategy for Peace Bangladesh: Back to the Future, Asia 4 May 2010. in Mindanao?, Asia Briefing N°125, 3 Report N°226, 13 June 2012. Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian August 2011. Aid and Conflict in Pakistan, Asia Report Border, Asia Briefing N°104, 20 May Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in N°227, 27 June 2012. 2010. Papua, Asia Briefing N°126, 22 August Election Reform in Pakistan, Asia Briefing The Myanmar Elections, Asia Briefing 2011. N°137, 16 August 2012. N°105, 27 May 2010 (also available in Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, Asia Nepal’s Constitution (I): Evolution Not Chinese). Briefing N°127, 22 September 2011 Revolution, Asia Report N°233, 27 Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide, Asia (also available in Burmese and Chinese). August 2012. Report N°192, 5 July 2010 (also Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon, Asia Nepal’s Constitution (II): The Expanding available in Thai). Briefing N°128, 4 October 2011. Political Matrix, Asia Report N°234, 27 Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Timor-Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished August 2012. Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Asia Briefing Struggle?, Asia Briefing N°129, 18 Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the N°107, 6 July 2010. November 2011. 2014 Transition, Asia Report N°236, 8 Indonesia: The Deepening Impasse in The Philippines: Indigenous Rights and the October 2012. Papua, Asia Briefing N°108, 3 August MILF Peace Process, Asia Report Pakistan: No End To Humanitarian Crises, 2010. N°213, 22 November 2011. Asia Report N°237, 9 October 2012. Illicit Arms in Indonesia, Asia Briefing Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, Asia N°109, 6 September 2010. Report N°214, 30 November 2011 (also South East Asia Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste, available in Burmese and Chinese). Asia Briefing N°110, 9 September 2010. Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai- Local Election Disputes in Indonesia: The Stalemate in Southern Thailand, Asia Cambodian Border Conflict, Asia Report Case of North Maluku, Asia Briefing N°215, 6 December 2011 (also available N°86, 22 January 2009. Briefing N°113, 3 November 2010 (also available in Thai). in Chinese). Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency, Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism Asia Briefing N°87, 9 February 2009. Indonesia: “Christianisation” and Intolerance, Asia Briefing N°114, 24 in Cirebon, Asia Briefing N°132, 26 The Philippines: Running in Place in November 2010. January 2012. Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°88, 16 Indonesia: Cautious Calm in Ambon, Asia February 2009. Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Elections, Asia Report N°197, 8 Briefing N°133, 13 February 2012. Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as December 2010 (also available in Indonesia: The Deadly Cost of Poor Elections Approach, Asia Briefing N°90, Indonesian). Policing, Asia Report N°218, 16 23 March 2009. Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, February 2012 (also available in Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palem- Asia Briefing N°116, 15 December Indonesian). bang Group”, Asia Briefing N°92, 20 2010. Timor-Leste’s Elections: Leaving Behind a May 2009. Violent Past?, Asia Briefing N°134, 21 February 2012. Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 25

Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in Aceh, Asia Briefing N°135, 29 February 2012. Reform in Myanmar: One Year On, Asia Briefing N°136, 11 April 2012 (also available in Burmese and Chinese). The Philippines: Local Politics in the Sulu Archipelago and the Peace Process, Asia Report N°225, 15 May 2012. How Indonesian Extremists Regroup, Asia Report N°228, 16 July 2012 (also available in Indonesian). Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, Asia Report N°231, 27 July 2012 (also available in Burmese and Chinese). Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua, Asia Report N°232, 9 August 2012. Indonesia: Defying the State, Asia Briefing N°138, 30 August 2012. Malaysia’s Coming Election: Beyond Communalism?, Asia Report N°235, 1 October 2012.

Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 26

APPENDIX E

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

CHAIR Samuel Berger Wim Kok Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Thomas R Pickering Former U.S. National Security Adviser Former U.S. Undersecretary of State; Ricardo Lagos Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Emma Bonino Former President of Chile Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria Vice President of the Italian Senate; Former Minister of International Trade and European Joanne Leedom-Ackerman PRESIDENT & CEO Affairs of Italy and European Commissioner Former International Secretary of PEN for Humanitarian Aid International; Novelist and journalist, U.S. Louise Arbour Lalit Mansingh Former UN High Commissioner for Human Micheline Calmy-Rey Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Former President of the Swiss Confederation to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Foreign Affairs Minister and Rwanda Wesley Clark Benjamin Mkapa Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Former President of Tanzania VICE-CHAIRS Sheila Coronel Laurence Parisot Ayo Obe Toni Stabile Professor of Practice in Investigative President, French Business Confederation Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for Inves- (MEDEF) tigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S. Ghassan Salamé Karim Raslan Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Mark Eyskens Founder, Managing Director and Chief Executive Sciences Po Former Prime Minister of Belgium Officer of KRA Group Nabil Fahmy Paul Reynolds EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Former Ambassador of Egypt to the U.S. and President & Chief Executive Officer, Canaccord Financial Inc. Morton Abramowitz Japan; Founding Dean, School of Public Affairs, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State American University in Cairo Javier Solana and Ambassador to Turkey Joshua Fink Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary- Cheryl Carolus CEO & Chief Investment Officer, Enso Capital General and Foreign Minister of Spain Former South African High Commissioner to Management LLC the UK and Secretary General of the ANC Joschka Fischer Liv Monica Stubholt Senior Vice President for Strategy and Commu- Maria Livanos Cattaui Former Foreign Minister of Germany nication, Kvaerner ASA; Former State Secretary Former Secretary-General of the International Lykke Friis for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chamber of Commerce Former Climate & Energy Minister and Minister Lawrence Summers Yoichi Funabashi of Gender Equality of Denmark; Former Prorec- Former Director of the US National Economic Chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative; Former tor at the University of Copenhagen Council and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; Editor-in-Chief, The Asahi Shimbun Jean-Marie Guéhenno President Emeritus of Harvard University Frank Giustra Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Wang Jisi President & CEO, Fiore Financial Corporation Studies, Columbia University; Former UN Under- Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Dean, School of International Studies, Peking Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown University; Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Carla Hills Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Administrator of the United Nations Development Wu Jianmin Programme (UNDP) Trade Representative Executive Vice Chairman, China Institute for Moisés Naím Lena Hjelm-Wallén Innovation and Development Strategy; Member, Senior Associate, International Economics Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Minister of Sweden Chinese Foreign Ministry; Former Ambassador of China to the UN (Geneva) and France Peace; Former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy Mo Ibrahim George Soros Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Lionel Zinsou Chairman, Open Society Institute Founder, Celtel International CEO, PAI Partners Pär Stenbäck Igor Ivanov Former Foreign Minister of Finland Former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation OTHER BOARD MEMBERS Asma Jahangir President of the Supreme Court Bar Association Kofi Annan of Pakistan, Former UN Special Rapporteur on Former Secretary-General of the United Nations; the Freedom of Religion or Belief Nobel Peace Prize (2001) Wadah Khanfar Nahum Barnea Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; Former Director Chief Columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel General, Al Jazeera Network Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon Crisis Group Asia Report N°238, 12 November 2012 Page 27

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL

A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.

Dow Chemical George Landegger Shearman & Sterling LLP Mala Gaonkar McKinsey & Company Ian Telfer Frank Holmes Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton White & Case LLP Steve Killelea Harry Pokrandt Neil Woodyer

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Group’s efforts to prevent deadly conflict.

Anglo American PLC Neemat Frem Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Nina Solarz APCO Worldwide Inc. FTI Consulting Näringslivets Horst Sporer Ryan Beedie Seth & Jane Ginns Inter¬nationella Råd (NIR) Statoil – International Council of Stanley Bergman & Edward Alan Griffiths Swedish Industry Talisman Energy Bergman Rita E. Hauser Griff Norquist Tilleke & Gibbins BP George Kellner Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey Kevin Torudag Chevron Faisel Khan R. Hoguet Yapı Merkezi Construction Neil & Sandra DeFeo Family Zelmira Koch Polk Kerry Propper and Industry Inc. Foundation Elliott Kulick Michael L. Riordan Stelios S. Zavvos Equinox Partners Shell

SENIOR ADVISERS

Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).

Martti Ahtisaari Victor Chu Miklós Németh Grigory Yavlinski Chairman Emeritus Mong Joon Chung Christine Ockrent Uta Zapf George Mitchell Pat Cox Timothy Ong Ernesto Zedillo Chairman Emeritus Gianfranco Dell’Alba Olara Otunnu Gareth Evans President Emeritus Jacques Delors Lord (Christopher) Patten Kenneth Adelman Alain Destexhe Shimon Peres Adnan Abu Odeh Mou-Shih Ding Victor Pinchuk HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Surin Pitsuwan Hushang Ansary Gernot Erler Cyril Ramaphosa Óscar Arias Marika Fahlén Fidel V. Ramos Ersin Arıoğlu Stanley Fischer George Robertson Richard Armitage Malcolm Fraser Michel Rocard Diego Arria I.K. Gujral Volker Rühe Zainab Bangura Swanee Hunt Güler Sabancı Shlomo Ben-Ami Max Jakobson Mohamed Sahnoun Christoph Bertram James V. Kimsey Salim A. Salim Alan Blinken Aleksander Kwasniewski Douglas Schoen Lakhdar Brahimi Todung Mulya Lubis Christian Schwarz-Schilling Zbigniew Brzezinski Allan J. MacEachen Michael Sohlman Kim Campbell Graça Machel Thorvald Stoltenberg Jorge Castañeda Jessica T. Mathews Leo Tindemans Naresh Chandra Nobuo Matsunaga Ed van Thijn Eugene Chien Barbara McDougall Simone Veil Joaquim Alberto Chissano Matthew McHugh Shirley Williams