Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality
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Diane Perrons Gendering the Inequality Debate
Diane Perrons Gendering the inequality debate Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Perrons, Diane (2015) Gendering the inequality debate. Gender and Development, 23 (2). pp. 207-222. ISSN 1355-2074 DOI: 10.1080/13552074.2015.1053217 © 2015 The Author This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63415/ Available in LSE Research Online: September 2015 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. Gendering the inequality debate Diane Perrons In the past 30 years, economic inequality has increased to unprecedented levels, and is generating widespread public concern amongst orthodox, as well as leftist and feminist thinkers. This article explores the gender dimensions of growing economic inequality, summarises key arguments from feminist economics which expose the inadequacy of current mainstream economic analysis on which ‘development’ is based, and argues for a ‘gender and equality’ approach to economic and social policy in both the global North and South. -
Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth
Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Introduction Gabriel Zucman [email protected] 1 Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman Roadmap 1. What is this course about? 2. Inequality and growth in the history of economic thought 3. Course organization: grading, readings, etc. 4. Overview of the five main parts of the course - 2 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 1 What is this course about? 1.1 What you've learned in Econ 1 or 2 Market economies are efficient: • Any competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient • Limit 1: assumes no market failures • Limit 2: says nothing about how resources will be distributed at the equilibrium - 3 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 1.2 Econ 133: an introduction to economics, but putting distribution at the center stage • How unequal is the world? • What are the forces that push toward equality and inequality? • How does inequality change as countries grow? • What policies can foster equitable growth? - 4 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 1.3 Inequality is at the center of research, policy, and the public debate • Rising inequality in many countries • Barack Obama: \Inequality is the defining challenge of our time" Inequality is an important subject for: • Everybody • Economists in universities, academia, think thanks, banks... • Policy-makers in governments & international organizations - 5 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 2 Inequality & growth in the history of economic thought 2.1 Thomas Malthus • Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798 • Iron law of wages: population grows ! labor supply increases ! wages fall to subsistence levels • End outcome: misery for the masses, revolution • To prevent this: limit population growth - 6 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 2.2 David Ricardo • Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817 • Scarcity principle: if pop. -
An Overview of the European Tax Havens
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Maftei, Loredana Article An Overview of the European Tax Havens CES Working Papers Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Suggested Citation: Maftei, Loredana (2013) : An Overview of the European Tax Havens, CES Working Papers, ISSN 2067-7693, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Vol. 5, Iss. 1, pp. 41-50 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198228 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ www.econstor.eu AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN TAX HAVENS Loredana Maftei* Abstract: In the actual context of economic globalization, tax havens represent a significant obstacle for global governments seeking to increase their fiscal incomes and a source of polarization of income and wealth. -
Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre
arqus Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre www.arqus.info Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 3 Caren Sureth / Ralf Maiterth Wealth Tax as Alternative Minimum Tax ? − The Impact of a Wealth Tax on Business Structure and Strategy − April 2005 arqus Diskussionsbeiträge zur Quantitativen Steuerlehre arqus Discussion Papers on Quantitative Tax Research ISSN 1861-8944 Wealth Tax as Alternative Minimum Tax ? – The Impact of a Wealth Tax on Business Structure and Strategy – Caren Sureth∗ † and Ralf Maiterth∗∗ April 2005 ∗ Prof. Dr. Caren Sureth, University of Paderborn, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Warburger Str. 100, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany, e-mail: [email protected] † corresponding author ∗∗ Dr. Ralf Maiterth, University of Hanover, Department of Economics, K¨onigsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hanover, Germany, e-mail: [email protected] Wealth Tax as Alternative Minimum Tax ? – The Impact of a Wealth Tax on Business Structure and Strategy – Abstract An alternative minimum tax (AMT) is often regarded as desirable. We analyze a wealth tax at corporate and personal level that is designed as an AMT as proposed by the German Green Party. This wealth tax is imputable to profit taxes and is hence intended to prevent multiple (multistage) taxation. Referring to data from annual reports and the German Central Bank we model enterprises of different structure, industry, size and legal status. We show that companies in the service sector which generally maintain rather high gearing rates are more frequently subjected to the wealth tax than capital intensive industries. This result runs counter to well-known effects of a common wealth tax. Capital intensive firms, e.g. in the metal industry, are levied with definitive wealth tax only if they have large loss carry-forwards or extremely volatile profits. -
Global Wealth Inequality
EC11CH05_Zucman ARjats.cls August 7, 2019 12:27 Annual Review of Economics Global Wealth Inequality Gabriel Zucman1,2 1Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA; email: [email protected] 2National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019. 11:109–38 Keywords First published as a Review in Advance on inequality, wealth, tax havens May 13, 2019 The Annual Review of Economics is online at Abstract economics.annualreviews.org This article reviews the recent literature on the dynamics of global wealth https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics- Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:109-138. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org inequality. I first reconcile available estimates of wealth inequality inthe 080218-025852 United States. Both surveys and tax data show that wealth inequality has in- Access provided by University of California - Berkeley on 08/26/19. For personal use only. Copyright © 2019 by Annual Reviews. creased dramatically since the 1980s, with a top 1% wealth share of approx- All rights reserved imately 40% in 2016 versus 25–30% in the 1980s. Second, I discuss the fast- JEL codes: D31, E21, H26 growing literature on wealth inequality across the world. Evidence points toward a rise in global wealth concentration: For China, Europe, and the United States combined, the top 1% wealth share has increased from 28% in 1980 to 33% today, while the bottom 75% share hovered around 10%. Recent studies, however, may underestimate the level and rise of inequal- ity, as financial globalization makes it increasingly hard to measure wealth at the top. -
Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010
Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010 Thomas Piketty Gabriel Zucman Paris School of Economics Paris School of Economics July 26, 2013⇤ Abstract How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970-2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200-300% in 1970 to 400-600% in 2010. In e↵ect, today’s ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600-700%). This can be explained by a long run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth, in line with the β = s/g Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. That is, for a given net saving rate s = 10%, the long run wealth-income ratio β is about 300% if g = 3% and 600% if g = 1.5%. Our results have important implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares. ⇤Thomas Piketty: [email protected]; Gabriel Zucman: [email protected]. We are grateful to seminar par- ticipants at the Paris School of Economics, Sciences Po, the International Monetary Fund, Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania, the European Commission, the University of Copenhagen, and the NBER summer institute for their comments and reactions. -
Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality
Journal of Public Economics 162 (2018) 89–100 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Public Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jpube Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence and implications for ☆ T global inequality Annette Alstadsætera, Niels Johannesenb, Gabriel Zucmanc,d,* a Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway b CEBI, University of Copenhagen, Denmark c UC Berkeley, United States d NBER, United States ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth Inequality owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens Wealth globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity—from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to Tax evasion about 15% in Continental Europe, and 60% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these Tax havens estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of JEL classification: world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01% H26 wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable H87 effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the E21 importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world. 1. Introduction statistics, we do not have a clear view of who uses tax havens. -
Unclassified ECO/WKP(2001)18
Unclassified ECO/WKP(2001)18 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 03-May-2001 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ English text only ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT Unclassified ECO/WKP(2001)18 INCREASING SIMPLICITY, NEUTRALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY: A BASIS FOR TAX REFORM IN ICELAND ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS No. 292 by Richard Herd and ThorsteinnThorgeirsson English text only JT00107006 Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d’origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format ECO/WKP(2001)18 ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ This paper analyses the possibilities for reforming the Icelandic tax system. It puts the current tax structure in its historic context, showing that there has been a steady movement towards simplification. The personal income tax has a lower than average number of bands and, taxes capital income at an unusually low rate. Such a structure favours saving, especially since consumption taxes are particularly high. Nonetheless, there are a number of additional taxes on capital income that serve to raise the overall tax on assets, notably the tax on net wealth. The paper concludes that, if the current budget surplus persists over the medium-term, priority should be given to further reducing corporate taxes and the net wealth tax. At the same time, a number of discriminatory indirect taxes should be replaced by a uniform tax, and the diesel tax reformed. Consideration should also be given to the gradual introduction of a resource tax or to auctioning fishing quotas to help fund the other tax reductions. JEL classification: H2 Keywords: Taxation, tax policy, Iceland * * * Le présent document analyse les possibilités de réformer le système fiscal islandais. -
Australia Overview 2018-19 Individual Income and Social Taxes
Australia Overview 2018-19 Individual Income and Social Taxes Gaining an understanding of the tax system in a new country is a critical step in addressing risks and reducing costs for companies with mobile employees. This overview summarizes key individual income and social tax compliance and tax planning considerations for companies sending employees to work in Australia. Individual income tax overview A resident of Australia is subject to Australian income tax on worldwide income at graduated tax rates that range up to 45% of taxable income. A temporary resident (defined below) is not taxed on their foreign investment income or capital gains. A non-resident of Australia is subject to Australian income tax only on Australian source income at graduated rates ranging from 32.5% to 45%. Residency A person is generally a resident of Australia if the person is domiciled in Australia or spends more than 183 days in Australia during the tax year. Domicile is the person’s permanent home (where they intend to live permanently). Individuals holding a Temporary Skills Shortage visa (i.e., subclass 482) are classified as temporary residents if they meet the following criteria: • they do not meet the definition of residency for Australian social security purposes (e.g., not a citizen, permanent resident), and • the taxpayer’s spouse is also not a resident of Australia for social security purposes. A visitor is a non-resident if they intend and actually spend less than 183 days in Australia. Available tax treaties should be considered in cases of dual-residence. Tax filings Tax Year: July 1 to June 30. -
State Individual Income Tax Federal Starting Points
STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAXES: FEDERAL STARTING POINTS (as of January 1, 2021) Federal Tax Base Used as Relation to Federal Starting Point to Calculate STATE Internal Revenue Code State Taxable Income ALABAMA --- --- ALASKA no state income tax --- ARIZONA 1/1/20 adjusted gross income ARKANSAS --- --- CALIFORNIA 1/1/15 adjusted gross income COLORADO Current taxable income CONNECTICUT Current adjusted gross income DELAWARE Current adjusted gross income FLORIDA no state income tax --- GEORGIA 3/27/20 adjusted gross income HAWAII 3/27/20 adjusted gross income IDAHO 1/1/20 taxable income ILLINOIS Current adjusted gross income INDIANA 1/1/20 adjusted gross income IOWA Current adjusted gross income KANSAS Current adjusted gross income KENTUCKY 12/31/18 adjusted gross income LOUISIANA Current adjusted gross income MAINE 12/31/19 adjusted gross income MARYLAND Current adjusted gross income MASSACHUSETTS 1/1/05 adjusted gross income MICHIGAN Current (a) adjusted gross income MINNESOTA 12/31/18 adjusted gross income MISSISSIPPI --- --- MISSOURI Current adjusted gross income MONTANA Current adjusted gross income NEBRASKA Current adjusted gross income NEVADA no state income tax --- NEW HAMPSHIRE on interest & dividends only --- NEW JERSEY --- --- NEW MEXICO Current adjusted gross income NEW YORK Current adjusted gross income NORTH CAROLINA 5/1/20 adjusted gross income NORTH DAKOTA Current taxable income OHIO 3/27/20 adjusted gross income OKLAHOMA Current adjusted gross income OREGON 12/31/18 taxable income PENNSYLVANIA --- --- RHODE ISLAND Current adjusted gross income SOUTH CAROLINA 12/31/19 taxable income SOUTH DAKOTA no state income tax --- TENNESSEE on interest & dividends only --- TEXAS no state income tax --- UTAH Current adjusted gross income VERMONT 12/31/19 adjusted gross income VIRGINIA 12/31/19 adjusted gross income WASHINGTON no state income tax --- WEST VIRGINIA 12/31/19 adjusted gross income WISCONSIN 12/31/17 adjusted gross income WYOMING no state income tax --- DIST. -
Journal of Accountancy Business Tax Quick Guide — Tax Year 2018
Journal of Accountancy Business tax quick guide — tax year 2018 Tear out this quick guide for use during tax season, and look for our quick guide for individual taxpayers in the January 2019 issue. C CORPORATION INCOME TAX ■■■ Credit: Maximum amount of 5.4% for contributions paid to ■■■ Taxable income of a C corporation: Taxed at a flat rate of state unemployment insurance funds. 21%. ESTIMATED TAX QUALIFIED PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATION TAX ■■■ Corporations owing $500 or more in income tax for the ■■■ Taxable income of a qualified personal service corporation tax year must make estimated tax payments equaling the is no longer subject to tax at a flat rate of 35%, but is taxed lesser of 100% of the prior-year or current-year tax liability. at the regular corporate tax rate of 21%. Large corporations must base the last three payments on the current-year tax liability. ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX ■■■ Due on the 15th day of the fourth, sixth, ninth, and 12th ■■■ 20% of accumulated taxable income (in addition to regular months of the corporation’s tax year (April 15, June 15, corporate income tax). Sept. 15, and Dec. 15 for calendar-year corporations). PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY TAX CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (AMT) ■■■ ■■■ 20% penalty on undistributed personal holding company Starting in 2018, the AMT no longer applies to corporations. income. ■■■ No foreign tax credit allowed against personal holding company tax. NONRESIDENT AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ■■■ Taxed on U.S.-source investment income at 30% (or lower under treaty). SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX ■■■ Net income effectively connected with a U.S. -
While Thomas Piketty's Bestseller Capital in the Twenty-First Century
Review of Counting on Marilyn Waring: New Advances in Feminist Economics, edited by Margunn Bjørnholt and Ailsa McKay, Demeter Press 2014 in Morgenbladet, Norway 4-10 July 20014 While Thomas Piketty’s bestseller Capital in the Twenty-First Century barely tests the discipline’s boundaries in its focus on the rich, Counting on Marilyn Waring challenges most limits of what economists should care about. Maria Berg Reinertsen, Economics commentator in Morgenbladet, Norway The article translated: Should breastmilk be included in gross domestic product? Maria Berg Reinertsen Morgenbladet, Norway 4.July 2014 [Translated from Norwegian] We run into one of my former university professors, and I take the opportunity to expand the three-year old’s knowledge of occupations beyond firefighter and barista. "This man is doing research on money ..." "No, no," protests the professor, "not money ..." "Sorry. This man is doing research on the real economy. " The three year old is unperturbed: "That man is very tall." But the correction is important. Economists will not settle for counting money and millions, they will say something about what is happening in the real economy. But where are the limits of it? The most underestimated economic book this spring is perhaps the anthology Counting on Marilyn Waring: New Advances in Feminist Economics, edited by Margunn Bjørnholt and Ailsa McKay. Waring is a pioneer in feminist economics, and while Thomas Piketty’s bestseller Capital in the Twenty-First Century barely tests the discipline’s boundaries in its focus on the rich, Counting on Marilyn Waring challenges most limits of what economists should care about.