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The Center for Study and Policy 2017 Addendum to the Coast Guard High Latitude Mission Analysis A Seven Year Review and Validation of Need for Increased U.S. Government and U.S. Coast Guard Presence

Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Project Director U.S. Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, Project Sponsor

Center for Arctic Study and Policy

The Center for Arctic Study & Policy (CASP) was established at the United States Coast Guard Academy to promote academic research on Arctic policy and strategy by facilitating collaboration, partnerships, and dialogue among specialists from academia, government, tribal organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).

CASP serves as an operationally focused academic think tank to promote research, broaden partnerships, and educate future leaders about the complexities of this unique region. Through collaborative efforts, the Center promotes effective solutions to address present and future Arctic maritime challenges as the USCG increases its Arctic presence.

For further information about CASP or this Task Force, please contact Ms. Cara Condit, CASP Director, at [email protected].

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Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by the Center for Arctic Study and Policy (CASP) with Dr. Rebecca Pincus as the lead researcher and author. Contributions from CASP staff also include LCDR Jeremy McKenzie as an assistant researcher and Ms. Cara Condit as co-editor. Any omissions or mistakes are the responsibility of CASP.

CASP thanks the people and institutions with whom we met with and consulted during this project:

Department of State National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and especially Dr. Amy Merten U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) and especially, Dr. John Farrell The United States Northern Command and especially, Dan Torweihe

Coast Guard District 17, and especially, Dave Seris, and PACAREA USCGC Healy USCG R&DC

Border Guard of Finland, and the captain and crew of the Turva Finnish Transport Agency Arctia Ltd. Aker Arctic

The National and Ice Data Center and especially, Dr. Mark Serreze, Director Professor Craig Allen and the Arctic Law and Policy Center at the University of Washington

The Arctic Coast Guard Forum

The Meteorological Service of and especially, Darlene Langlois, Chief Global Affairs Canada and especially, Jutta Wark, Director, Circumpolar Affairs Polar Knowledge Canada, and especially, Jeannette Menzies, Director, Knowledge Management and Engagement Transport Canada and especially, Drummond Fraser, Operational Liaison Officer; Laura Hoy, Policy Advisor, Strategic Policy and Innovation; , Senior Advisor Environmental Response Systems; Naomi Katsumi, Senior Advisor, Environmental Protection; and Nathalie Godin, Sr. Marine Safety Inspector The Canadian Coast Guard and especially, Robert Brooks, Director Economic and Industry Intelligence; and David Toomey, Marine Navigation Strategies

WWF Arctic Program and especially, Margaret Williams, Managing Director, Arctic Program Dr. Martin Robards, WCS

The Marine Exchange of and especially, Captain Ed Page, Executive Director

Ms. Caitlyn Antrim

Thank you to members of CG-DCO, DCO-8, DCO-I, and 5-PW for their unfailing support. 2

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Thank you to CAPT Pavilonis, Dean Collela, CAPT LaBrec, CAPT Hall, and RADM Rendon for their leadership.

Thank you to our research assistants Mr. Sam Klarich and Dr. Jon Skinner.

Finally, this project benefitted from the capable and energetic assistance of Ms. Bernadette LeFaiver, to whom we are deeply indebted.

To fulfill the HLS Addendum project, CASP convened a small task force comprised of independent scholars and experts with particular knowledge of polar affairs. The HLS Task Force members contributed invaluable insight and experience to the research and trend analysis in this report. They participated in two workshops, and contributed advice, feedback, and insights that shaped this report and its findings.

Task Force Members:

CAPT (ret.) Lawson Brigham, PhD University of Alaska Fairbanks MAJ GEN (ret.) Randy “Church” Kee Arctic Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) VADM (ret.) Roger Rufe Dr. Nancy Kinner Mr. James Ellis University of New Hampshire

Dr. Walter Berbrick Dr. Donald Perovich U.S. Naval War College Dartmouth College (and CRREL, until recently)

Dr. Thomas M. Cronin Dr. Theodore Scambos U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)

CASP would like to extend sincere appreciation to the members of the Task Force for their time, expertise, and dedication to this project and for their untiring support of CASP initiatives.

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Table of contents

Executive Summary

Introduction 6

Part I. The Evolving Operational Environment 8 Environmental Changes 8 High Latitude Activities 21 Maritime Transportation Patterns 37 Part II. The Evolving Strategic Environment 44 , Strategies, and Initiatives 45 National Security 62 Geopolitical Overview 72 Conclusion 83

Acronyms Appendices Reports Consulted Task Force Biographies Works Cited

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Executive Summary

In 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) commissioned an independent series of studies to assess its ability to conduct required missions in the high latitude . The United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis (“High Latitude Study”) was completed in July 2010. The Study consisted of a three-volume body of literature with the following mission analysis reports: Volume 1 – Polar Icebreaking Needs, Volume 2 – Arctic Mission Area Needs, and Volume 3 – Mission Area Needs.

In 2017, recognizing the changing state of affairs in the high latitudes, USCG senior leadership sought an update to the Study. The U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy was selected to determine and address the dynamic factors in the Arctic and Antarctic relevant to the USCG’s continued mission execution in those areas. The CASP convened a small task force of scholars and experts to inform its execution of the project, which was intended to serve as an Addendum to the High Latitude Study. As an Addendum, this report summarizes recent developments in both polar regions and assesses the current state of knowledge about what is to come.

This Addendum to the 2010 High Latitude Study provides confidence in the original findings and encourages the sustained reliance on its initial recommendations.

SUMMARY OF ARCTIC FINDINGS

Since 2010, the state of affairs in the Arctic and Antarctic regions has evolved significantly. The Arctic region is experiencing increasing human activity, although the enormous amount of media attention has outpaced the reality of development. However, high levels of media attention reflect growing public awareness and interest in the Arctic region, largely driven by perceptions of environmental change and increasing geopolitical tension. Media attention also increases scrutiny of government actions (and non- actions) in the Arctic.

While a number of factors have contributed to slow-moving development of hydrocarbon and mining resources in the Arctic, the significant growth in cruise tourism in the region, as well as skyrocketing numbers of transpolar flights, pose an immediate risk to human life and environmental integrity. Growing numbers of Arctic cruises carry risks that, while mitigated to a certain extent by the IMO Polar Code, nevertheless comprise a real challenge to maritime authorities.

Warming in the Arctic is already leading to a longer and larger window of ice-free conditions, opening the possibility of profitable seasonal trans-Arctic commercial shipping through polar routes that offer considerable savings between northern ports in , , and . While the ice retreat will lead to a longer season of navigation, through routes farther offshore, the high variability of spring and fall conditions will pose a danger to even seasoned operators. 2

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In the longer perspective, maritime risk will remain high through the 21st century as warming in the Arctic region leads to significantly unsettled climate, weather, and ice conditions. “Normal” will no longer exist, as the Arctic’s previous central organizing characteristic—year-round sea ice—vanishes in the summer by the latter part of the century. While sea ice will still cover the Arctic each winter, the ice season will contract. However, the ice retreat will not be smooth and steady: maritime operators should expect increased variability in springtime ice retreat and autumn ice advance, along with highly dynamic environmental conditions that may see significant year-to-year differences. The Arctic transition period will be one of high variability, difficulty in prediction, rapid and nonlinear change, and consequent risk to maritime operators. Maritime authorities, including the USCG, should prepare for a multidecade period of high demand on their mission sets.

The increased presence and influence of outside states in the Arctic region is unmistakable, and argues strongly for an enhanced U.S. sovereign presence to assert and defend national interests. While non- Arctic investment opens much-needed opportunities for development in the region, careful oversight and active participation is needed to ensure American interests are safeguarded. As state-driven activity in strategic sectors (for example, in hydrocarbons or science) increases, sovereignty and security concerns in the Arctic region are becoming more strongly activated.

The security environment of the Arctic requires analysis at multiple levels: from a human security perspective, the rise in maritime activity coupled with dynamic environmental change creates more risk of incidents that may result in loss of life and/or environmental damage. Creating conditions for robust prevention and rapid response requires effective and sustained coordination across multiple levels of government (tribal, local, regional, federal) and among the Arctic states, as well as with non- governmental stakeholders.

From a national security perspective, the renewal and expansion of Russian military assets and capabilities in its Arctic territory, and the corresponding shifts by its neighbors, is the central driving trend of recent years. Russian actions have been, and continue to be, heavily scrutinized, and a full analysis and review is beyond the scope of this report; instead, those aspects of Russian activity that bear on USCG missions will get further analysis. Alongside increased Russian activity, NATO has devoted more attention to the Arctic region, primarily in the North Atlantic area; in addition, non-Arctic states have increased their presence in the region. While substantively very different, the general tempo of increased interest and activity by security actors has led to shifts in what had been, since the end of the War, a relatively stable security environment characterized by well-established deterrence dynamics.

The most fundamental level of analysis might be termed the geostrategic: as the Arctic region becomes increasingly normalized, and incorporated into the everyday business of the through robust maritime traffic, economic activity, and human development, the U.S. will need to develop an appropriately-scaled presence across many government sectors. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), many components will see increased demand, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), 3

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the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along with the USCG. Many other U.S. government departments, agencies, and administrations will also grow into larger roles in Alaska and the Arctic as development advances.

Failing to scale up U.S. leadership in the Arctic to stay abreast of the increasing pace of activity will result in other powerful nations taking the lead in a region with critical geostrategic value. The Arctic’s strategic value stems from its wealth of natural resources; from its function as a transportation connector between Asia, Europe, and North America; and from its importance to Russia, whose long Arctic coastline, once stripped of sea ice, will be both newly vulnerable to attack and newly able to support surface fleets moving readily between the Atlantic and Pacific. As the U.S. and its allies manage an unsettled global political situation, marked by the rising power of China, the Arctic will be a key locus for mediating the U.S.-Russia relationship. Furthermore, China will also seek to use the Arctic region to advance its own objectives vis-à-vis Russia: therefore, the primary geostrategic significance of the Arctic region is its keystone importance to Russia, and the trajectory of Russia will have a profound effect on the U.S.-China balance. For these reasons, U.S. decisions in the Arctic will ripple throughout the globe.

SUMMARY OF ANTARCTIC FINDINGS

While and the have received far less attention in recent years, the longer-term strategic outlook there is even more challenging. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), which froze what was rapidly approaching open conflict among states who had, during the 1940s and 50s, pursued overlapping claims to the , has come under pressure as more and more states become active in Antarctica. With important provisions of the treaty system, which pertain to the ban on resource extraction, coming up for renewal in 2048, careful attention is warranted. Any weakening in the strong treaty protections for Antarctica could trigger destabilizing and unpredictable results. Several new research stations have been established in recent years, and reports indicate that new Antarctic research and supply vessels are under construction or in design for over a dozen countries. The U.S. has a strong and compelling interest in maintaining its presence in Antarctica; in exercising its treaty rights to inspect any and all research stations and equipment; and in strengthening its symbolic and tangible support for the ATS and Antarctic protection. The role of the USCG in ensuring and facilitating U.S. maritime presence on and around Antarctica is critical and growing in significance.

While Antarctica has seen less dramatic and rapid climactic changes than the Arctic, environmental change is occurring, although there is far less clear scientific understanding of the pace and direction of change. Sea ice dynamics in the Southern Ocean demonstrate strong regional differences, with areas of ice diminishment largely offset by areas of ice growth. Well-publicized episodes of ice calving from onshore ice sheets are connected to increased temperatures in nearshore waters, which destabilize floating ice shelves and contribute to ice sheet instability. Increased wind and storm conditions are predicted.

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Persistent sea ice, increased winds and storms, and possible greater presence of icebergs will continue to pose maritime hazards well into the 21st century.

While the ATS bars resource extraction in Antarctica, some economic activity takes place in the region: primarily tourism, and fishing in the Southern Ocean. Increased winds and storms may increase mariner hazards; in addition, the complex changes taking place may add to the logistical burden of supporting Antarctic research stations onshore and aboard research vessels.

Figure 1: Photo courtesy of Dr. Donald Perovich

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Introduction

This addendum is divided into two sections. The first is aimed at informing current and near-term operations for planning purposes. The second provides a wider-angle and more strategic perspective. Within these two major strands, both the Arctic and Antarctic regions are addressed, although the ban on economic activity established by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) obviates much need for analysis of hydrocarbon and mineral extraction on the Antarctic continent.

Intended to review developments in polar affairs since 2010, this report took a broad-angle perspective across a variety of sectors: political, legal, economic, scientific, industry, security, and more. In addition, the report addressed all high-latitude developments, both Arctic and Antarctic. Given the very different circumstances and particulars of each polar region, yet some of the common threads linking them, it seemed important to keep the two polar regions connected. In order to provide a coherent approach, then, this report divided its attention between an operational planning perspective in the first section, and a strategic perspective in the second section. Within these sections, both the Arctic and Antarctica are addressed in sequence.

Reviewing and addressing the operational planning perspective keeps us focused on the men and women of the USCG who conduct polar missions bravely and often under dangerous and difficult conditions. While there is much attention paid to the future of the Arctic (and, to a lesser extent, the Antarctic), the USCG is currently operating in the polar regions, and needs to plan for this year, and next year, and the year after that. The demands of the present are urgent, and the first section of this report aims to illustrate the ways in which the operational context for USCG missions has evolved since 2010.

In the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the USCG has lead responsibilities for seven objectives: (1) enhance Arctic domain awareness; (2) sustain federal capability to conduct maritime operations in ice- covered waters; (3) improve hazardous material spill prevention, containment, and response; (4) promote Arctic oil pollution preparedness, prevention, and response internationally; (5) enhance Arctic search and rescue; (6) expedite International Maritime Organization Polar Code development and adoption; and (7) promote Arctic waterways management.1

In Alaska, the USCG executes its missions through its District 17 (D17), which marked its 150th anniversary in 2017 of “serving the last frontier.”2 Within D17, units are located in Anchorage, Juneau, Kodiak, and Sitka. The District is subdivided into two Sectors, in Juneau and Anchorage. Kodiak and Sitka are air stations. The USCG also maintains aids to navigation teams at both Kodiak and Sitka. Furthermore, the USCG has an air support facility in Cordova. Cutters serving in D17 are based out of Petersburg, Ketchikan, Homer, Juneau, Sitka, Seward, Valdez, Kodiak, and Cordova.

1 Cited in USCG. (2015). Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan. 8. 2 USCG. “Seventeenth District.” http://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-Offices/District-Seventeen/17th-district-units/. 6

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D17 conducts an annual mobile and seasonal operation in the U.S. Arctic to promote national interests and security throughout the region. Named Arctic Shield, the operation involves the deployment of cutters, aircraft, and personnel to the Arctic to perform USCG missions, enhance domain awareness, broaden partnerships, and enhance preparedness.3

USCG missions in Antarctica include support for scientific research, and support for National Science Foundation (NSF) research on and around the continent. During Operation Deep Freeze, the USCG uses a heavy polar icebreaker to break through a supply corridor to McMurdo Station. This mission is executed through a 2010 Memorandum of Agreement between the USCG and the NSF.

Reviewing and addressing the strategic perspective places USCG missions within their broader context of all-of-government efforts to achieve U.S. national interests in the polar regions and around the world. The USCG is part of a larger matrix of government actors, and a clear perspective on the ways in which USCG polar missions are vital to the achievement of broad and lasting national objectives, including freedom of the and the global rule of law, may help organize, streamline, and direct effort for maximum benefit to the U.S. public.

3 USCG D17. “Operation Arctic Shield 2017.” http://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-17/Arctic-Shield/. 7

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Part I: The Evolving Operational Environment

USCG polar missions take place within a dynamic context, in which human and environmental conditions can evolve quickly. The following section will review how environmental and human factors have evolved in the mission context in recent years, and summarize the state of knowledge about future change. USCG operations are shaped by human and environmental conditions, and since 2010 there have been significant changes in both the environmental facts on the ground—particularly sea ice extent and duration—as well as in the type and intensity of human activity. For example, between 2010 and 2017, Shell established and then withdrew a large-scale offshore oil exploration program in leased federal areas of the that would have involved an enormous expansion of vessel traffic (drill rigs, tankers, icebreakers, supply vessels, tugs, and ) in the Chukchi Sea.4 The speed and scale of the changes in maritime activity exhibited by Shell’s moves illustrate that USCG missions are evolving rapidly and underscore the timeliness of this addendum.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES

Environmental conditions shape USCG missions, in particular the afloat missions that are strongly affected by short-term weather conditions as well as longer-term climatic trends. In addition, some USCG missions are specifically environment-focused: for example, Living Marine Resources or Marine Environmental Response. Environmental change in the Arctic and Antarctic therefore affects both the content of USCG missions in those regions, as well as their execution and logistics. The following section will review how retreating sea ice in the Arctic, and other environmental changes in that region, may affect USCG missions; in addition, it will address the complex changes occurring in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.

ARCTIC

While reductions in the extent of Arctic sea ice receive widespread attention, and are linked with increased possibilities for navigation along the North American and Eurasian , as well as across the itself, the environmental change occurring in the Arctic region is much more wide- ranging. Many of the changes will impact USCG missions and planning. The following section will review major environmental changes occurring in the Arctic region that may affect USCG missions and interests.

SEA ICE

4 For an in-depth discussion of Shell’s efforts, see Funk, M. (2014). “The wreck of the Kulluk.” New York Times Magazine, 30 December 2014; and Yardley, W. (2015). “Shell’s controversial Arctic drilling effort ends for ‘foreseeable future.’” Los Angeles Times, 26 September 2015. 8

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Arctic sea ice is diminishing in spatial extent, in temporal duration, and in volume, strength, and thickness. These declines are accelerating. A seasonally nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean (less than one million square kilometers located north of the Canadian and ), is predicted by several climate models to occur in the next two decades. In the winter, the Arctic will remain ice-covered, but by thinner ice.

Ice drift speed is increasing, and ice hazards may increase with greater ice mobility. The timing of spring ice retreat and fall ice advance will be variable, bringing increasing uncertainty and possible hazard to mariners. Variability and uncertainty may increase demand for USCG response missions.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2013. IPCC is a global body comprised of members of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations (UN), and its reports serve as standards for synthesis of knowledge on climate change. IPCC reports provide degree of certainty regarding key findings. The IPCC AR5 defines "nearly ice-free conditions" as sea ice extent less than 106 square kilometers for at least five consecutive years.5

The IPCC AR5 report concludes that Arctic sea ice is decreasing in geographic extent, at a rate of 13.3% per decade for the end of summer (September) and 2.7% per decade for the end of winter in March. This decline in sea ice extent can be seen most rapidly in the summer and fall seasons, but is occurring year-round. Perennial Arctic sea ice has declined by more than 10% per decade (11.5 ± 2.1%), and multi-year ice has also declined by 13.5 ± 2.5% per decade. “The average decadal extent of Arctic sea ice has decreased in every season and in every successive decade since satellite observations commenced.”6

Along with decreasing ice extent, IPCC AR5 identified a decline in the thickness, and thereby the volume, of Arctic sea ice. Thinning of sea ice is associated with a reduction in the age of the ice.7 Arctic sea ice is thinning by roughly a tenth of a meter per year, according to sonar and satellite measurements.8

The movement or drift of sea ice is an important factor influencing sea ice thickness and distribution. Winds are largely responsible for sea ice motion over short timeframes. Drifting buoys in the Arctic

5 IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, and New York, NY, USA. Hereafter IPCC AR5 WG1 (2013). 6Vaughan, D.J. and Comiso, J.C. et al. (2014). Observations: Cryosphere. IPCC AR5. 329-330. Vaughan, D.G., Comiso, J.C., Allison,. Carrasco, J., Kaser, G. Kwok, R.Mote, P.,. Murray, T. Paul, F. Ren, J.Rignot, E. Solomina, O. Steffen, K. and Zhang, T. (2013): Observations: Cryosphere. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Sci- ence Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D. ,Plattner, G.K. Tignor, M. Allen, S.K. Boschung, J. Nauels, A. , Xia, Y. Bex, V. and Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 7 Ibid., 328. 8 Ibid., 330. 9

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have tracked an increase in sea ice drift speed, with largest increases between 2001-2009; since winds have not strengthened, scientists attribute this increase in ice drift to weaker and thinner ice enabling more movement. 9

Anecdotal accounts from Arctic operators suggest that retreating shorefast ice is leading to increased production of icebergs, creating additional hazards, particularly in the North Atlantic.

Along with declines in the extent and thickness of Arctic sea ice, the seasonality of ice has changed. Seasonality refers to the duration of ice coverage, between its advance in the fall and retreat in the spring. While ice seasonality varies regionally, “most peripheral regions in the Arctic show trends towards shorter ice season duration.”10 While most areas are seeing shorter durations of ice, this trend is largest and most significant (decline by over 10 days per decade) at coastal margins, including in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas.11

Figure 2: from IPCC AR5, Chpt 4 (Permissions pending)

The Arctic Council released its Arctic Resilience Report (ARR) in 2016, describing “regime shifts” in the Arctic environment (Chapter 3).12 These regime shifts are “hard-to-predict, persistent reorganizations of Arctic ” that impact all ecosystems and states in the region. One of the shifts identified in the ARR is a regime shift towards ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean.13

A research synthesis conducted by Stroeve et al (2011) identified acceleration towards a seasonally open Arctic Ocean14. Acceleration is driven by positive feedbacks associated with ice-albedo feedback, thinning ice, and overall warming. With declining extent and duration of ice coverage,

9 Ibid., 328. 10 Ibid., 329. 11 Ibid. 12 Arctic Resilience Report. (2016). Stockholm Environment Institute and Stockholm Resilience Centre. 13Peterson, G. and . Rocha, J.C.. (2016) Arctic regimes shifts and resilience. Chapter 3 of Arctic Resilience Report. 67. 14 Also see Serreze and Stroeve. (2015). Arctic sea ice trends, variability and implications for seasonal ice forecasting. Philosophical Transactions A, 373: 20140159. 10

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more dark ocean surface is exposed to sunlight, enabling greater heat absorption (ice is far more reflective than dark ocean water), driving further warming and declining sea ice. As ice thins, it is more vulnerable to fragmentation and melting. Warmer atmospheric and sea-surface temperatures decrease the likelihood of unusually cold winters that could rebuild ice.15

Remaining areas of scientific uncertainty include the effects of ocean forcing, from warm Atlantic waters entering the Arctic Ocean through the eastern and , and warm Pacific waters through the . Stronger inflows of warm Atlantic and Pacific waters could further accelerate sea ice declines. Some evidence exists for increases in the temperature and transport of Atlantic waters since the 1990s, and evidence also suggests increases in Pacific Surface Water temperatures due to stronger forcing of warmer Pacific waters from the Alaskan shelf slope into the Arctic Ocean.16 However, further research is needed to better understand ocean forcing.17

Estimates for when the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free (aside from remaining ice refugia in the northern Canadian archipelago and Greenland) in the summer vary. Overland and Wang (2013) identify three tracks of projections: those that rely on extrapolation from sea ice volume data, or trendsetters, those that rely on intermittent rapid loss events during years of unusually low ice, which they call stochasters, and projections based on modeling. The time horizons for these three approaches are approximately 2020, 2030, and 2040, respectively.18 Noting that all three approaches have strengths and weaknesses, Overland and Wang also point to evidence that there is a “late bias” in climate projections, and conclude that the possibility of a seasonally ice-free Arctic within the next two decades should be the basis for planning and management.19 Other assessments point to 2032-2046 as the likely window for summer [or seasonal] ice-free conditions.20 Models that can be used to predict Arctic ice trends produce widely varying results, with Jahn et al. predicting up to 21 years of variability from 2031-2052.21

15 Stroeve, J.C. et al. (2011). The Arctic’s rapidly shrinking sea ice cover: a research synthesis. Climate Change, 11:1005-1027. 16 Polyakov et al. 2017 Science Vol 356. 17 Ibid. 18 Overland, J.E. and Wang, M.. (2013). When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free? Geophysical Research Letters, 40(10):2097-2102. 4. 19 Ibid., 16-18. 20 Snape, T. J. and Forster, P. M. (2014). Decline of Arctic sea ice: evaluation and weighting of CMIP5 projections. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres. 119(2):546-554. 21 Jahn, et al. (2016). How predictable is the timing of a summer ice-free Arctic? Geophysical Research Letters, 43(17): 9113-9210. 11

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Figure 3: Average monthly sea ice extents in at the end of winter in March 2016 (left) and end of summer in September 2016 (right). The magenta line indicates the median ice extents during the period 1981-2010. Courtesy of nsidc.org/data/seaice_index (permissions pending).

Figure 4: Reduction In Sea Ice courtesy of Dr. Donald Perovich

ARCTIC OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

Increasingly corrosive conditions in the Arctic Ocean, particularly in shallow coastal waters, may drive changes in species assortments and fisheries. From a mission perspective, acidification has the potential to significantly impact subsistence and commercial fisheries.

For additional information on the Arctic Fishing Moratorium, see section on Legal Instrumentalities, p. 51.

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According to NOAA, cold temperatures and unique processes associated with sea ice make the Arctic Ocean particularly sensitive to acidification, which can create conditions harmful to shellfish and associated fish species. Shallow waters near continental shelves produce localized acidification in the Arctic Ocean, but evidence indicates that acidification is becoming a more widespread problem as corrosive waters have been extending from the northern Pacific far into the waters of the Canadian .22 Corrosive waters occur on the Chukchi Sea shelf seasonally due to the interaction of biological and circulation factors, which amplify acidification.23

Concentrations of carbon dioxide that produce corrosive conditions (due to the reaction of carbon dioxide with seawater, forming carbonic acid) are highest in areas with slow currents, and in which bottom waters are isolated from surface mixing. In addition, reductions in sea ice coverage enable more absorption by seawater of carbon dioxide, and CO2 is also increasingly being transported into the Arctic Ocean via increased river discharges and permafrost degradation.24 The increased freshening of the Arctic Ocean exacerbates acidification by reducing the buffering capacity of the ocean.25

Mathis et al (2015) conclude that “it is more likely that not that harvested mollusk species in Alaska will experience negative effects” from ocean acidification, since calcifying mollusks appear to be the group of species most strongly affected by corrosive conditions.26 While much is as yet unknown about the specific response of Alaskan and Arctic marine species to ocean acidification, the data reviewed by Mathis et al suggest that some crab, oyster, and abalone species may also experience declines as a direct consequence of increasingly corrosive conditions.27 While many finfish appear capable of tolerating corrosive conditions, the “significant” impact of acidification on pteropods, tiny free-swimming snails that comprise an important part of the diet of many pelagic fish, may result in declines to commercially and ecologically important finfish in Alaska and the Arctic.28

ARCTIC ECOLOGY

Changes in sea ice and other environmental conditions are driving, and will continue to drive, changes in Arctic ecology, including the species present, their abundance, and their interactions with other species and the environment itself.

22 Mathis, J.T. and Cross, J.N.. (2016). Arctic Report Card: Ocean Acidification. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Arctic Program. 23 Mathis, J. T., S. R. Cooley, N. Lucey, S. Colt, J. Ekstrom, T. Hurst, C. Hauri, W. Evans, J. N. Cross, R. A. Feely. (2015). Ocean acificiation risk assessment for Alaska’s fishery sector. Progress in Oceanography, 136: 71-91. 24 Ibid. 25 Carmack, E.C. et al. (2016). Freshwater and its role in the Arctic Marine System: sources, disposition, storage, export, and physical and biogeochemical consequences in the Arctic and global . Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 121(3):675-717. 26 Mathis, J. T., S. R. Cooley, N. Lucey, S. Colt, J. Ekstrom, T. Hurst, C. Hauri, W. Evans, J. N. Cross, R. A. Feely. (2015). Ocean acidification risk assessment for Alaska’s fishery sector. Progress in Oceanography, 136: 71-91. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 13

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Predicting the future of Arctic ecology is complicated by the intersecting effects of different trends: for example, shrinking ice is increasing primary productivity and zooplankton, but acidification is threatening pteropods; since both of these types of organisms are important food sources at the base of the Arctic food web, impacts to predator species is unclear.

The Synthesis of Arctic Research (SOAR) project, which was launched in 2011 and funded through BOEM, is now in its second phase. Its efforts to synthesize a wide amount of Arctic scientific data have led to findings about the changes occurring in Arctic ecological conditions.

For example, Arrigo and van Dijken (2015) observed a 30% increase in primary productivity in the Arctic Ocean 1998-2012. This increase was driven by shrinking ice coverage, which increases both the extent of area open to phytoplankton as well as the length of the growing season.29

Over the past twenty to forty years, Harwood et al (2015) identified positive increases in body conditions among bowhead whales in the Beaufort, including increased abundance of calves, and in Arctic char, including both increased abundance and size. However, they identified declines in body condition and reproduction in ringed seal, beluga whale, and black guillemot, which they attribute to declines in changes to Arctic cod populations (a primary food source).30

SALINITY, TEMPERATURE, AND OCEAN CIRCULATION

Warming conditions are expected to increase precipitation and thereby freshwater runoff from coastal regions. Increased terrestrial runoff will increase nutrient flux and turbidity in nearshore waters, contributing to significant changes to coastal ecosystems. Changes to species assortments and fisheries are likely, which may impact USCG fisheries enforcement as well as subsistence fishing by Indigenous communities in the region.

The Arctic Ocean is becoming less saline as it warms and loses sea ice.31 These changes are interacting with global atmospheric and oceanic patterns, and are amplified by the special circumstances of the Arctic region. Scientists now use the term “new Arctic” to refer to the “rapid cascading” of change throughout a wide array of environmental systems in the Arctic and beyond.32 Although there are significant subregional differences in Arctic Ocean dynamics, overall the Arctic Ocean is characterized by low salinity surface waters due to sea ice and freshwater inputs, including

29 Arrigo, K. R., and van Dijken, G. L. (2015). Continued increases in Arctic Ocean primary production. Progress in Oceanography, 136: 60-70. 30 Harwood, L. A., T. G. Smith, J. C. George, S. J. Sandstrom, W. Walkusz, G. J. Divoky. (2015). Change in the : diverging trends in body condition and/or production in five marine vertebrate species. Progress in Oceanography, 136: 263-273. 31Carmack, E.C.et al. (2016). Freshwater and its role in the Arctic Marine System: sources, disposition, storage, export, and physical and biogeochemical consequences in the Arctic and global oceans. Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 121(3):675-717. 32 Ibid. 14

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the large north-draining rivers of the Eurasian continent. This lid of low-density freshwater prevents strong mixing within the water column, and sends inflowing waters downwards.33

The Arctic Freshwater Synthesis (2015) summarized recent scientific knowledge for the Arctic region. As global temperatures warm, increased amounts of moisture in the atmosphere will flow into the Arctic region, compounding the positive balance from thawing permafrost and increased terrestrial runoff34. From an ecosystem perspective, the retreat of sea ice from coastal areas in the Arctic enables stronger precipitation on coastal areas, which compounds with increasing geochemical flux from stream runoff. Increasing runoff from coastal areas will affect marine productivity in shelf areas. Large increases in marine productivity have already accompanied sea ice loss in the margins of the Arctic Ocean. While increased runoff of nutrient-enriched water may increase marine productivity, this effect may be countered by increased turbidity from suspended sediments. These uncertainties are compounded by the possibility of northward migration of coastal marine vegetation like kelp and sea grass, as well as broader ecosystem changes associated with migration of species35.

As the Arctic region becomes wetter, due to increased atmospheric moisture, increased storm tracks, and increased evaporation from open sea and lake surfaces, terrestrial areas of the Arctic are expected to becomes more “water rich”, opening possibilities for increased hydropower at both large and small scales.36

PERMAFROST AND TERRESTRIAL CHANGES

Onshore environmental conditions also bear on USCG missions, impacting the cost and availability of shore-based support and infrastructure. Permafrost is thawing and shrinking throughout the Arctic terrestrial area, adding a potentially costly complication to USCG planning and support. During the multidecadal period of permafrost retreat, the complications of thawing land, including coastal erosion, subsidence, and construction and maintenance challenges, may make sea-based assets more important to USCG mission fulfillment.

The Arctic region is characterized by permafrost, or permanently frozen subsurface layers that vary in depth from about 1.5m below surface in the southern region of the tundra to about 0.5m in the north. Permafrost obstructs movement of water through the subsurface, blocking groundwater storage and contributing to a strong spring peak flow.37

IPCC AR5 concludes that permafrost temperatures have increased by up to 3°C in parts of Northern Alaska and up to 2°C in parts of the Russian European North, where reductions in permafrost

33 Ibid. 34 Prowse, T. et al. (2015) Arctic Freshwater Synthesis: summary of key emerging issues. Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 120(10):1887-1893 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Bring, A. et al. (2016) Arctic terrestrial hydrology: a synthesis of processes, regional effects, and research challenges. Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 121(3):621-649. 15

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thickness and extent have also been observed.38 The presence and thickness of permafrost are linked closely with the terrestrial system overall, including the growing season and productivity of plants, fluxes of methane and carbon dioxide between the land and atmosphere, and the amplitude and timing of spring snowmelt.39 Scientists project that the extent of permafrost will decline in the 21st century, as well as the depth and extent of seasonally frozen ground: while estimates vary, models generally predict significant drops between about one-third to over three-quarters in the total area of permafrost by the end of the century.40 Seasonally frozen ground is expected to diminish as well, by smaller amounts (about 5-15%).41

In addition, Arctic land areas are also characterized by snow cover, which has declined significantly during the period of satellite observations42. While scientists attribute declining snow cover (and snow depth) primarily to warming temperatures, changing snow patterns have the potential to affect soil temperature and the availability of freshwater. Strong regional variability in snow coverage exists, but overall trends point to a shorter window of snow coverage.43

ANTARCTIC

The Antarctic continent generally receives less attention than the Arctic region, and has fewer dimensions of human activity. However, the importance of the Southern Ocean fisheries, and the strategic importance of the U.S. presence in Antarctica embodied in research bases and stations, in particular South Pole Station, make the USCG support to Antarctica highly important to current and future national priorities. While the Arctic region demonstrates unequivocal warming trends, the situation in Antarctica is far less clear. The difference in sea ice trends between the Arctic and Southern Oceans is a result of their very different circulation regimes. The Southern Ocean is a ring of circumpolar waters, with an enormous west-to-east (or clockwise) circulation, which is known as the Antarctic Circumpolar Current (ACC). This massive current connects the Atlantic, Pacific, and basins, and acts as an engine driving the circulation of water and heat around the globe.

The following section will review major environmental changes in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic land mass that may affect USCG missions and interests. As yet, much is still unclear about the direction, pace, and scale of environmental change in Antarctica, and therefore further research is critical. As a key

38 IPCC AR5, 9. Lawrence, D.M. et al. (2012). Simulation of present-day and future permafrost and seasonally frozen ground conditions in CCSM4. Journal of Climate, American Meteorological Society. Vol. 25: 2207-2225. 40 Ibid., Table 3. 41 Ibid., Table 4. 30 Derksen, C. et al. (2016). Arctic Report Card: Terrestrial Snow Cover. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Arctic Program. 31 Bring, A. et al. (2016). Arctic terrestrial hydrology: a synthesis of processes, regional effects, and research challenges. Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 121(3):621-649. 16

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enabler of scientific research, the USCG will have an important role to play in guaranteeing ongoing and robust access to the region and ensuring U.S. leadership in Antarctic science.

Figure 5: Antarctic Ice Melt (Permissions Pending)

ICE SHEETS AND ICE SHELVES

Much is still unclear about the future of Antarctica’s ice sheets and ice shelves. While warmer seawater is slowly melting the deeper-keeled outlet glaciers and ice shelves, leading to faster ice flow off the continent, the pace of future ice loss cannot yet be accurately determined due to the complexity and scale of the Antarctic system.

While trends of ice gain or loss are not uniform across Antarctica, on average there has been a cumulative ice mass loss, beginning around 1998, according to IPCC AR5 and recent analysis by Shepherd et al.44 The studies have concluded with high confidence that Antarctica is losing 100 to 150 Gtons of ice per year. Some evidence of increased snowfall in the Antarctic regions south of and the Indian Ocean has been reported, and this is leading to a slight increase of mass in the area of the continent. However, major ice losses continue to increase on the Pacific side, and the Antarctic has seen steady loss since around 2000. Some of the events related to warming in these areas have been quite spectacular, and caused rapid increases locally in glacier flow.45 The overall loss of ice shelf area is estimated at greater than 28,000 km2 . 46,47

44 IPCC AR5, 352. Shepherd, A., Ivins, E.R., Geruo, A., Barletta, V.R., Bentley, M.J., Bettadpur, S., Briggs, K.H., Bromwich, D.H., Forsberg, R., Galin, N. and Horwath, M., and 15 others, 2012. A reconciled estimate of ice-sheet mass balance. Science, 338(6111), pp.1183-1189. 45 See Rignot, E., Casassa, G., Gogineni, P., Krabill, W., Rivera, A.U. and Thomas, R., 2004. Accelerated ice discharge from the following the collapse of Larsen B ice shelf. Geophysical Research Letters, 31(18); Scambos, T.A., Berthier, E., Haran, T., Shuman, 17

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The terrestrial ice sheets on Antarctica are, to a certain extent, restrained by ice shelves resting in surrounding water. Therefore, changes in water temperatures that affect these ice shelves can, by extension, impact the Antarctic ice sheets. The ice shelves around the Antarctic Peninsula have been shrinking for decades, with a rate of loss around 6000 km2 per decade.48 Different areas of Antarctica display warming and cooling trends. However, satellite measurements and ocean data indicate that the Southern Ocean is slowly warming.49

In addition, wind patterns have been shifting in the , partly due to ozone depletion (the “ozone hole”). For example, the westerly jet and storm tracks have moved poleward, and wind speeds over the Southern Ocean have increased.50 These changes in wind conditions are leading to a weakening in the wind-current system that previously kept warm water farther offshore and maintained a coastal/shelf regime of cold, fresh water that protected ice shelves. Warm water is increasingly intruding to Antarctic continental shelf areas, leading to increased melting of floating ice shelves, and leading to ice mass loss from ice sheets.51

ICEBERGS AND SEA ICE

Sea ice in the Southern Ocean demonstrates strong regional differences. In addition, increased wind and storm conditions are predicted. Persistent sea ice, increased winds and storms, and possible greater presence of icebergs will continue to pose maritime hazards well into the 21st century. For the USCG, the impact to shipping traffic and future activities is likely to present a greater need for emergency preparedness.

Interestingly, while Antarctic ice sheets and shelves show losses, sea ice in the Southern Hemisphere is highly variable. Although there is a slight trend towards increasing ice (1.3% per decade), in fact extended periods of both record low levels and record high levels have occurred within the past 5 years.52 The lack of a clear trend in the Southern Ocean sea ice should be understood as the result of

C.A., Cook, A.J., Ligtenberg, S. and Bohlander, J., 2014. Detailed ice loss pattern in the northern Antarctic Peninsula: widespread decline driven by ice front retreats. The Cryosphere., 8(6), pp.2135-2145; Scambos, T., Hulbe, C. and Fahnestock, M., 2003. Climate‐induced ice shelf disintegration in the Antarctic peninsula. Antarctic Peninsula Climate Variability: Historical and Paleoenvironmental Perspectives, pp.79-92. 46 Cook, A.J. and Vaughan, D.G., 2010. Overview of areal changes of the ice shelves on the Antarctic Peninsula over the past 50 years. The Cryosphere, 4(1), pp. 77-98. 47 Turner, J., Bindschadler, R. A., Convey, P., di Prisco, G., Fahrbach, E., Gutt, J., Hodgson, D. A., Mayewski, P. A., and Summerhayes, C. P. 2009. Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment, 526. Cambridge, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) 48 IPCC AR5, 353. 49 Ibid., 354. 50 A. Purich and S. Seok-Woo. (2012) Impact of Antarctic ozone depletion and recovery on Southern Hemisphere precipitation, evaporation, and extreme changes. Journal of Climate 25(9):3145-3154. 51 Spence, P., S. M. Griffies, M. H. , A. M. C. Hogg, O. A. Saenko, and N. C. Jourdain (2014), Rapid subsurface warming and circulation changes of Antarctic coastal waters by poleward shifting winds. Geophysical Research Letters, 41: 4601–4610; also see Pritchard et al (2012) Antarctic ice-sheet loss driven by basal melting of ice shelves. Nature 484(7395):502-5. 52 Turner, J., Bindschadler, R. A., Convey, P., di Prisco, G., Fahrbach, E., Gutt, J., Hodgson, D. A., Mayewski, P. A., and Summerhayes, C. P. 2009. Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment, 526. Cambridge, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR); A. Macaldy and K. 18

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strong, but opposing, changes in different regions, and across different seasons. For example, the Bellinghausen/Amundsen Seas (on the Pacific side) show a 7.1% decrease per decade, while the adjacent sector shows an increase of 4.9% per decade.53 Further research is needed to understand the complex dynamics driving Southern Ocean sea ice. Current models are not yet sufficiently accurate to predict future conditions in detail, although in the long term (2050 and beyond) a reduction of sea ice around Antarctica is expected.54

The seasonal growth and melt of sea ice around the Antarctic continent is “one of the largest seasonal physical changes in surface conditions anywhere on the planet” due to its breadth: from about 3 million km2 in February, at the end of the austral summer, to 18 million km2 in September.55

Models predict increases in storms and waves in the Southern Ocean56, likely increasing navigational hazards.

The future trends in iceberg abundance are unclear.57 Icebergs calve off the seaward edge of ice shelves, and melt as they drift northwards, transporting fresh water to the surface offshore. Icebergs are often carried by the Antarctic Circumpolar Current for over a year before reaching the open ocean.58 The lid of freshwater created by icebergs reduces convective overturning and contributes to enhanced sea ice production in many areas of the Southern Ocean.59

SOUTHERN OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

The likelihood of increasingly corrosive conditions in the Southern Ocean poses risks to the unique species found there. Calcifying organisms, which build their shells with calcium carbonate, help transport carbon to the deep ocean, helping regulate the planetary carbon cycle. In addition, these species are at the base of the Antarctic food chain, and provide food for krill, seals, penguins, and

Thomas, rapporteurs. Antarctic Sea Ice Variability in the Southern Ocean-Climate System: Proceedings of a Workshop. (2017) National Academies Press. 53 A.L. Post, A.J.S. Maijers, A.D. Fraser, K.M. Meiners, J. Ayers, N.L. Bindoff, H.J. Griffiths, A.P. Van de Putte, P.E. O’Brien, K.M. Swadling, B. Raymond. (2014) “Chapter 4: Environmental Setting”, De Broyer C., Koubbi P., Griffiths H.J., Raymond B., Udekem d’Acoz C. d’, et al. (eds.). Biogeographic Atlas of the Southern Ocean. Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, Cambridge, pp. 46-64. 54 Macaldy et al. (2017). Also NSIDC Sea Ice News and Analysis; Stammerjohn; Kwok; Raphael; Massom; NASEM. 55 Post, et al. (2014); also see Massom, R. A. and Stammerjohn, S. E. (2010) Antarctic sea ice change and variability - physical and ecological implications. Polar Science, 4(2):149-186. 56 Post, et al. (2014) 57 J. Gutt, N. Bertler, T.J. Bracegirdle, A. Buschmann, J. Comiso, G. Hosie, E. Isla, I.R. Schloss, C.R. Smith, J. Tournadre, J.C. Xavier. (2015) The Southern Ocean ecosystem under multiple climate change stresses—an integrated circumpolar assessment. Global Change Biology, 21:1434- 1453. 58 N. Merino, J.L. Le Sommer, G. Durand, N.C. Jourdain, G. Madec, P. Mathiot, J. Tournadre. (2016) Antarctic icebergs melt over the Southern Ocean: climatology and impact on sea ice. Ocean Modelling, 104:99-110. 59 Ibid. 19

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whales.60 Some research indicates that acidification may be delayed until approximately the middle of the century.61

ECOSYSTEM CHANGES

Complex ecosystem changes are occurring and likely to continue in the Southern Ocean, which will likely lead to changes in species abundance and distribution. These changes may impact commercial fisheries, including krill and finfish, as well as the abundance of marine mammals. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Southern Ocean has been a persistent problem, and may become a more significant challenge should environmental changes lead to species declines. Should IUU fishing increase, USCG presence may offer carry-on benefits to efforts to combat illegal activity.

The highly regional and seasonal variability seen in Antarctic sea ice is reflected in the community of living organisms that are found around the continent. Southern Ocean ecosystems are “adapted and attuned” to sea ice and its dynamics.62 For example, sea ice serves as a food source (algae trapped within the ice), habitat, refuge, substrate, and regulator of the environment. Regional changes are likely to differ, and it is difficult to generalize about Antarctica given strong this variability of change.

The marine ecology of the Southern Ocean is demonstrating shifts that include smaller populations of some penguins, as well as movement in elephant seal populations from northern areas of their range towards the south. Shifting assortments of plankton species, towards smaller species, as well as declines in benthic and pelagic systems associated with shrinking ice shelves, may affect the presence and distribution of species in the Southern Ocean.63 Sea ice dynamics strongly affect the lifecycle of krill, an important base of the Antarctic food web, and retreating sea ice and a shorter sea ice season is predicted to reduce krill populations. The loss of sea ice in areas of the Antarctic is associated with a decrease in the size of phytoplankton, bolstering the species that feed on smaller phytoplankton, like salps. Trends that diminish krill availability to larger predators, and lead to larger numbers of salps, will likely negatively affect larger predators. Silverfish are the most abundant fish in coastal waters off Antarctica, and are an important food source, especially for the Adélie penguin.64 Important parts of the silverfish lifecycle are associated with sea ice, and declines in their populations have been observed near the Antarctic peninsula. A 65% decrease in the population of Adélie penguins has been observed near the Palmer research station since 1990, possibly linked to silverfish declines as well as

60 Report Card: Southern Ocean Acidification.(2010) Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre. 61 B. I. McNeil, A. Tagliabue, C. Sweeney. (2010) A multi-decadal delay in the onset of corrosive ‘acidified’ waters in the Ross Sea of Antarctica due to strong air-sea CO2 disequilibrium. Geophysical Research Letters, 37(19). 62 Massom, R. A. and Stammerjohn, S. E. (2010) Antarctic sea ice change and variability - physical and ecological implications. Polar Science, 4(2):149-186. 63 A. Macaldy and K. Thomas, rapporteurs. Antarctic Sea Ice Variability in the Southern Ocean-Climate System: Proceedings of a Workshop. (2017) National Academies Press. 64 Massom, R. A. and Stammerjohn, S. E. (2010) Antarctic sea ice change and variability - physical and ecological implications. Polar Science, 4(2):149-186. 20

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observed increases in storms and snowfall.65 New species of penguins adapted to warmer sub- Antarctic conditions, chinstrap and gentoo penguins, have replaced Adélie penguins. In contrast, other regions of Antarctica not experiencing reduced sea ice conditions, such as the Ross Sea, show increasing numbers of Adélie penguins.66 Other Antarctic species show similar responsiveness, or vulnerability, to changes in sea ice and climate variability. “Extreme” events, anomalies in seasonal climate, have significant negative and positive impacts on sea ice, ocean conditions, and marine ecology.

65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 21

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HIGH LATITUDE ACTIVITIES

The possibility of increased access to the Arctic region, and increased availability of seasonal trans-Arctic shipping routes, has contributed to growing media coverage and public interest in the region. What is the current set of human activities in the Arctic region? What factors influence the level of activity in the region, and what indications are available of future activity? The following section will discuss major sectors of activity and their trajectories.

SCIENCE

Given the limits on human activity proscribed by the Antarctic Treaty System, science is virtually the only means of maintaining U.S. presence on the continent, and is therefore an important vehicle through which the U.S. can support the ATS and through it, the global rule of law.

Science is an important function of state advancement and growth: through new scientific discoveries, states can enhance their global position, bolster their economies, build strong alliances, develop military capabilities, and contribute to the sum of human knowledge. The remote polar areas have been longstanding areas of fascination for science, and scientific research has been used strategically in the Arctic and Antarctic for many decades. In both polar regions, significant uncertainty about the changing environment demands sustained scientific research to enable human activity, facilitate , protect the environment and Indigenous lifeways, and understand global climate drivers.

ARCTIC

The Arctic region has long been a place of extraordinary scientific research, often done in collaboration among polar researchers from different nations and institutions. During the , polar scientific cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union continued to advance public understanding of the unique conditions and species found in the Arctic region. Given the many gaps in our knowledge that remain, and the significant uncertainty associated with the changing Arctic environment, scientific work in the region remains critically important to the U.S. and global community, as well as an area of ongoing cooperation.

Scientific activity in the maritime Arctic is typically done on research vessels, icebreakers, or vessels with icebreaker escort. Some research does occur on floating sea ice. For example, the U.S. Navy conducts a roughly biannual Ice Exercise (ICEX) in late winter that involves the construction of a temporary ice camp on a floating ice floe; ICEX includes Arctic scientific research along with operational exercises.67 In

67 To read about ICEX 2016, see U.S. Navy. (2016). “ICEX 2016 camp operations conclude successfully; submarine ops continue.” 25 March 2016. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93833. 22

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addition, a collaborative interagency partnership between the U.S. Navy and civilian scientists has utilized nuclear submarines for Arctic scientific research since 1994, through the SCICEX program.68

Since 2003, the United States has been determining the extension of its continental shelf, through research voyages aboard the USCGC Healy and the Canadian icebreaker Louis St. Laurent.69 Other cooperative relationships have since formed on this issue, as well as on numerous other ventures relating to science, from hydrography and bathymetry, to ocean circulation and sea ice thickness. These efforts are directed by the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) Task Force, an interagency body led by the Department of State, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in partnership with eleven other federal agencies.70

A critical national asset to U.S. research, the USCGC HEALY conducts annual science missions to the Arctic. With dozens of embarked scientists, HEALY not only supports traditional USCG missions in the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort seas, but also serves as a platform for mapping and sampling regions of the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska which may qualify as “extended continental shelf” under Article 76 of UNCLOS.71 Six of the cruises have been single- operations using HEALY and its installed multi- beam sonar. Four cruises have been joint operations between HEALY and the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker Louis S. St-Laurent. Supporting NOAA, the HEALY also enable continued environmental monitoring and ecosystem response tracked through the Distributed Biological Observatory (DBO).72

ANTARCTIC

The U.S. is a global leader in Antarctic science, and has maintained this position for decades. The National Science Foundation (NSF) holds responsibility for Antarctic science, which is handled through its U.S. Antarctic Program office.73 The U.S. maintains three major year-round research stations on the Antarctic continent: McMurdo Station, Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station, and Palmer Station. In addition to the major stations, the U.S. maintains five named summer research camps (Siple Dome, WAIS Divide Camp, AGAP South Field Camp, CReSIS Traverse, and Byrd Field Camp), along with field camps at Beardmore Glacier, in the McMurdo Dry Valleys, on sea ice, on Ross Island, and in remote

68 National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). SCICEX, Submarine Arctic Science Program. https://nsidc.org/scicex. 69 U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project. www.continentalshelf.gov. 70 Ibid. 71 This scientific program was conceived and led by Dr. Larry Mayer of the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping/Joint Hydrographic Center of the University New Hampshire. Dr. Mayer and his scientific party have organized and led seven cruises; research parties from the U.S. Geological Service have led three cruises. 72 NOAA scientists set sail on Coast Guard icebreaker to measure change in the Arctic (2017) http://research.noaa.gov/News/NewsArchive/LatestNews/TabId/684/ArtMID/1768/ArticleID/12282/NOAA-scientists-set-sail-on-Coast-Guard- icebreaker-to-measure-change-in-the-Arctic.aspx. Retrieved on 30 Oct 17. 73 United States Antarctic Program, www.usap.gov. 23

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locations.74 The total peak population of the U.S. Antarctic Program during the summer is approximately 1,600 on land and 300 onboard ship.

The forty-year-old USCGC POLAR STAR is the only U.S. icebreaker capable of undertaking resupply missions in support of NSF in the Antarctic. In January 2017, the USCG Antarctic science mission required the cutting a channel through more than 60 miles of ice in the Ross Sea to allow supply vessels to reach two of NSF’s three research stations on the continent.

Figure 6: Antarctic Science courtesy of Dr. Donald Perovich

INDUSTRY

The following sections will review industrial activity in the Arctic region, as well as fishing in the Southern Ocean.

Arctic industry has a long and fascinating history, from its early whaling days through the development of commercially and strategically important natural resources. Several strategic industries are found in the Arctic: there are high concentrations of hydrocarbons in the Arctic basin; in addition, there are deposits of strategic minerals, including rare elements (REEs), uranium, and other key minerals; finally, there are globally important fisheries in the Bering and Barents Seas.

While there are limits on economic activity in Antarctica, and only limited fishing in the Southern Ocean, there is potential for growth in the future. The future of the Antarctic Treaty System has already been discussed earlier in this report; should its bans on resource extraction be weakened, industrial activity in strategic sectors could be anticipated. “Strategic” industries are those that are critical for a state’s continued existence: typically, they relate to critical sectors of economic activity like food and energy, as well as industries supporting military readiness. States often pay closer attention to strategic industries, and may be more closely involved in their management.

74 U.S. Antarctic Program. (2009). “Personnel, Camps, and Stations.” 24

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Oil and Gas

While the demand for untapped oil and gas reservoirs has subsided in hand with the market, the depletion of known sources coupled with geopolitical flux indicates an inevitable rise in the future.75 The development of these industries in coming decades may involve state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises along with non-state actors, and higher levels of government scrutiny and involvement than nonstrategic industries. The Antarctic Treaty System bars energy extraction, and therefore this section only addresses the Arctic region. The Arctic basin is rich in hydrocarbon resources. Analysts indicate that approximately 13% of the world’s remaining undiscovered reserves of petroleum remain in the Arctic, and 30% of natural gas.76 It is estimated that of this total, 75% of the circumpolar Arctic hydrocarbons lies offshore, with the remaining 25% onshore.77 The majority of these resources are expected to lie within Russian EEZ areas, on its continental shelf.78

Figure 7: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise Of U.S. Arctic Oil And Gas Resources, 2015, Page (E-12).

75 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that petroleum fuels will remain the largest source of world energy consumption through 2040, when EIA projects 113 million barrels per day of petroleum and other liquid fuel use. Most of this use will be in the transportation and industrial sectors, and much of this increased demand will occur outside OECD countries. Source: EIA. (2017). International Energy Outlook 2017. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/exec_summ.php. 76 Gautier, D. (2009, May 29). Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic. Science..: American Association for the Advancement of Science. 77 National Petroleum Council (NPC). (2015). Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. Retrieved from http://npcarcticpotentialreport.org. 78 Ibid., also see Piskarev, A. and Shkatov, M.. (2012). Energy Potential of the Russian Arctic Seas: Choice of Development Strategy. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 25

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Figure 8: National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, 2015, page (1-8). Although Arctic offshore oil reserves have received significant interest and media attention, there are currently only three producing Arctic offshore hydrocarbon fields; Norway’s Snohvit Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) in the Barents Sea and Goliat northwest of Hammerfest; and Russia’s Priazlomomoye in (southeast Barents). These projects have had significant delays and cost overruns and been on the frontiers of economic viability.

Figure 9: Circumpolar Offshore Hydrocarbon development. (Skinner 2016)

26

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Alaska The most significant oil and gas potential in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is estimated to be in the lease areas in the Chukchi Sea with an estimated potential of total oil reserves of 15 billion barrels (about double the potential for the Beaufort Sea OCS to the east). By comparison, the total production from Prudhoe Bay in the last 35 years has been roughly 17 billion barrels.79 To date though, only the Northstar field, straddling both federal and state jurisdiction, has come into production (drilled in shallow water from causeway structures and not classified as offshore). Though there is some continuing exploration and production expansion in the near shore Beaufort Sea these are close to shore and will be integrated into the well-established Prudhoe Bay region. Current hydrocarbon production in the North Slope is moved via TAPS to Valdez.

Figure 9: Bureau Of Offshore Energy Management 2014.

Canada Canada’s offshore oil and gas resources are most predominant in its northwest region in the Beaufort Sea shelf, where the U.S. and Canada have an unresolved border. Canadian reserves are estimated to be predominantly gas, and to lie in water depths exceeding 100 meters, requiring less mature

79 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). (2014, October). Draft Second Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Chukchi Sea, Lease Sale 193, US Government. Retrieved from https://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/Lease_Sale _193_DraftSSEIS_vol1.pdf. 27

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technology for recovery. There are no fields in this region under development.80 Most of Canada’s oil and gas Arctic production has come from its onshore northwest regions. However, in Canada’s sub- Arctic Labrador- shelf there has been continued developments of significance with over one billion barrels having already been produced by the Hibernia platform, in challenging ice conditions.81

Greenland Greenland currently has no oil or gas production, but has an estimated potential of significance (48 BBOE). However, this potential is largely offshore in water depths over 100 meters, with no infrastructure and thus not as competitive as fields elsewhere in the Arctic. Most of the exploration has been to the west, but Greenland’s offshore northeast region is predicted to have as much as 30 BBOE, in very demanding ice conditions.82

Norway Norway’s extensive oil and gas industry is based on offshore reserves. For the last several decades this was almost entirely supported by fields which are not “Arctic” waters. Norwegian oil production (all Norwegian production is offshore) has been declining recently.83 Currently there are approximately 60 producing fields in North Sea, 16 in the and one in the Barents Sea.84 Declining market conditions also have contributed to delays in Norwegian lease areas, but production began in 2016 in Eni and Statoil’s Goliat oil field, 85 kilometers northwest of Hammerfest, which is the furthest north Arctic oil production site for Norway.85 Most of Norway’s new prospects are in water depths greater than 100 meters, which has led to pioneering developments in technology (floating and or sub-sea) though generally in open water conditions.86

Russia Russia has the largest estimated oil and gas resources in the Arctic basin. Russia has also produced more gas from the Arctic than any other state. Given its geographic significance in the Arctic, including extent of EEZ and coastline, as well as the significant estimates of potential oil and natural gas, Russia has been described as “a dominant player in Arctic oil and gas development”87 although

80 National Petroleum Council (NPC). (2015). Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources .Retrieved from http://npcarcticpotentialreport.org. 81 Skinner, J. (2016). Russian Capacity to Develop its Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources in the : Arctic and Global Implications. PhD diss., University of Alaska Fairbanks. 82 National Petroleum Council (NPC). (2015). Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. Retrieved from http://npcarcticpotentialreport.org. 83 Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic. (2014). European Union. Retrieved from http://www.arcticinfo.eu/en/sada. 84 Ebinger, C., Banks, J. and Schackmann, A..(2014). Offshore Oil and Gas Governance in the Arctic: A Leadership Role for the U.S. Energy Security Initiative. Brookings Institute. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/research/ offshore-oil-and-gas-governance-in-the-arctic-a- leadership-role-for-the-u-s/. 85 Eni. (2016). Eni Starts Production of Goliat. Retrieved from http://www.eninorge.com /en/News--Media/News-Archive/2016/Eni-starts- production-of-Goliat-/. 86 National Petroleum Council (NPC). (2015). Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. Retrieved from http://npcarcticpotentialreport.org. 87Ibid. 28

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the impact of sanctions has altered the balance of development to an extent. Russia’s offshore Arctic shelf potential of large reserve fields is assessed between 300 to 600 billion barrels of oil equivalent (Russian estimates tend to be in the higher range). Of those offshore areas, the Kara and the Laptev Seas indicate the greatest potential, while the Barents Sea is considered to be less promising. The assessment of undiscovered reserves is based on theoretical analysis and modeling of geological formations, and preliminary seismic data.88

The Yamal Peninsula has been, and is now, the largest producing onshore gas field in the Arctic, but is also geographically central to the even greater offshore reserves and well placed to be the major industrial hub for offshore hydrocarbon extraction.89 The Sabetta Port and LNG project on the western edge of the South Kara Sea, on the Yamal Peninsula, is poised to be a logistical port for the broadening of hydrocarbon extraction offshore and onshore in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region. It began initial operations in 2017. The Yamal project is central to Russian energy and geostrategic objectives; both as a new export hub for the developed gas fields ashore and for future extraction on the Arctic shelf. Once completed, the Sabetta LNG port will be the largest LNG shipping facility in the Arctic. If all three processing units are completed, output is projected to be 16.5 million tons of LNG per year.90 The Sabetta project is intended to serve the growing global LNG market by using polar class tankers that can transit west along the NSR all year towards Europe, as well as east with dedicated ice breaker support in a potentially extended summer transit season.91 In August 2017, the ice-class LNG tanker Christophe de Margerie transited the Northern Sea Route, delivering gas from Norway to South in 15 days without icebreaker escort.92 Its transit of the NSR itself set a speed record: 6 days, 12 hours, and 15 minutes.93 The Yamal project is expected to drive increased traffic through the Bering Strait to Asian markets.

As production output from the traditional onshore areas in West and stagnates, Russia looks to the Arctic offshore areas as critical to maintain its daily 2015 production level above 10.5 million barrels of oil.94

Minerals and Mining

88 Piskarev, A. and Shkatov, A.. (2012). Energy Potential of the Russian Arctic Seas: Choice of Development Strategy. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 89 Total. (2014). Yamal LNG: Harnessing the Arctic’s Gas Reserves. Retrieved from http://total.com/en/ energies-expertise/oil-gas/exploration- production/projects-achievements/lng/yamal-lng. 90 Ibid. 91 Hydrocarbons Technology. (2014). Yamal LNG Project, Sabetta. Retrieved from http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/yamal- lng-project. 92 Yamal LNG. (2017). “LNG Tanker ‘Christophe de Margerie’ Started First Voyage Through Northern Sea Route.” Press Release, 1 August 2017. http://yamallng.ru/en/press/news/34603/. 93 Grossman, D. (2017). “Russian tanker just set an Arctic speed record.” Popular Mechanics, 25 August 2017. http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/infrastructure/news/a27933/russian-tanker-sets-arctic-speed-record/. 94 US Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2016). US Field Production of Crude Oil. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WCRFPUS2&f=W. 29

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Although oil and gas are the largest industrial drivers for overall onshore Arctic development, mining is a significant industry and may be regionally the primary engine of shipping and maritime activity.

For example, in Canada the value of diamond mining had outstripped the value of oil and gas extraction in 2011 in the .95 The Arctic is expected to be home to large, undiscovered, and untapped resources with favorable access and low conditions of political risk. Mining has a long history in the region, and there are now clear areas of “mature” extraction as well as emerging growth in “frontier” areas.96 The Arctic contributes a small share of global production of minerals like titanium (0.3%) and bauxite (1.9%), but contributes as much as 40% to the global production of palladium (used by the auto and electronics industries, among others), 26% of diamond gem stones, and 23% of industrial diamonds.97 There are large and globally important mines in the Arctic region, including one of the world’s largest zinc mines in Alaska ( Dog), and the world’s second largest underground mine in Kiruna, Sweden.98 However, frontier mining in the Arctic region is high cost, and therefore sensitive to fluctuations in resource costs.99

The Antarctic Treaty System bars mining, and therefore this section only addresses the Arctic region.

Alaska Alaska’s Red Dog Mine, located in the De Long Mountains 82 miles north of Kotzebue and 46 miles east of the Chukchi seacoast100, is one of world’s biggest producers of zinc and lead. In recent years, seasonal tug- operations produce one of the largest consistent identifiable annual shipping transits through the Bering Strait.101 The Red Dog mine has been in continuous operation since 1989, and is operated by Teck Alaska Incorporated, on land owned by the NANA Corporation. According to its 2016 Reclamation and Closure Plan, the mine is expected to end active extraction and ore processing operations in 2030.102

South of the Red Dog Mine, and 37 miles north of Nome103, is the Graphite Creek project, which is slated to begin construction in the second quarter of 2019.104 The mine, which is predicted to operate for 40 years, is expected to produce approximately 55,350 tons of high-grade coated spherical

95 Haley, S. Klick, M., Szymoniak, N. and Crow, A. (2011). Observing trends and assessing data for Arctic mining. Polar . 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid.. 100 Alaska Department of Natural Resources. “Red Dog Mine.” Division of Mining, Land, and Water. http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/mining/largemine/reddog// 101 Brigham, L. (2015.) Alaska and the New Maritime Arctic. Project Report. State of Alaska-University of Alaska Fairbanks 102 SRK Consulting. (2016). “Reclamation and Closure Plan: Red Dog Mine, Alaska, USA.” Prepared for Teck Alaska Incorporated. August 2016. 103 DeMarban, A. (2017). “Mine prospect near Nome could help make batteries for laptops and cars.” Alaska Dispatch News, Business/Economy, 1 February 2017. 104 Mining Technology. “Graphite Creek Project, Alaska, USA.” http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/graphite-creek-project-alaska. 30

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graphite annually. This type of graphite is in high demand for lithium-ion batteries, and the Graphite Creek Mine has been described as the largest graphite deposit in the United States.105 Graphite One, which is developing the mine, plans to truck mine output to Nome, and from Nome ship it to a manufacturing facility in Washington for processing.106 This project can be anticipated to increase ship traffic in the Bering Strait and through the port of Nome.

Farther south, the Donlin Gold project is also in development, approximately 150 miles northeast of Bethel in the -Koskokwim region.107 If successful, Donlin Gold will involve the construction of a 315-mile natural gas pipeline from the Cook Inlet, an airstrip, and new barge terminal facilities in Bethel and a new 5-acre port on the Kuskokwim River near Angyaruaq/Jungjuk Creek from which river barges would transport ore to Bethel.

Greenland The potential for mining development in Greenland has been much discussed, although the island’s lack of infrastructure and other challenges pose significant technical hurdles to developers. The government of Greenland, Naalakkersuisut, will be issuing licenses for hydrocarbon exploration and permitting in and the in late 2017.108 According to the Greenlandic government, there are 15 new applications for exploration and prospecting for 2017/2018, and 7 ongoing surrenders of license.109

In 2016, some ongoing and nascent mining projects in Greenland included the Citronen Fjord zinc- lead project, the Greenland Minerals and Energy rare -uranium project, the Tanbreez rare-earth project, the Hudson Resources feldspar project, LNS Greenland ruby and sapphire project, and the ARC Mining lead-zinc project.110 More information on the first two projects may be found on page 78.

Russia Northeastern Russia holds a large portion of Russia’s untapped mineral wealth, although currently most activity occurs in the west. In northwest Russia, the mining industry has a significant presence on the , the Komi Republic and the Republic of , in the Murmansk region. Murmansk accounts for nearly 100% of Russia’s production of apatite and produces 12% of Russia’s iron ore and concentrates, 43% of Russia’s nickel, and as a byproduct of nickel mining produces 15%

105 Investing News Network. “Graphite.” https://investingnews.com/company-profiles/graphite-one-resources-alaska/. 106 DeMarban, A. (2017). “Mine prospect near Nome could help make batteries for laptops and cars.” Alaska Dispatch News, Business/Economy, 1 February 2017. 107 Demer, L. (2016). “Donlin gold mine brings hope of jobs – and fear of destruction.” Alaska Dispatch News, Alaska, 28 September 2016. Also see Alaska Department of Natural Resources, “Donlin Gold Project” at http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/mining/largemine/donlin/. 108 Naalakkersuisut. “Licensing Round 2017.” (No date.) https://govmin.gl/petroleum/exploration-a-exploitation/13-uncategorised/143-licensing- round-2017 109 Government of Greenland. (2017). List of Mineral and Petroleum Licenses in Greenland. Mineral License and Safety Authority. 16 October 2017. 110 MINEX Greenland, Mineral Exploration Newsletter. Edition 49, October 2016. 31

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of Russia’s copper and 40% of its cobalt.111 The mining giant Norilsk Nickel operates the Kola MMC project, which produces copper and nickel ore and is the largest industrial facility in the Murmansk region.112 Farther east, Norilsk Nickel operates a sprawling complex of industrial facilities, including copper and nickel mines and processing plants, in the Norilsk area, which lies north of the on the Taimyr Peninsula.113

However, the Russian mining industry has several obsolete plants, a comparatively slow rate of innovation and low labor productivity.114

Fisheries

Two of the world’s most important fisheries lie on the Arctic periphery: the Barents Sea and the . The Alaskan fishing industry, utilizing the Bering Sea, is an important economic driver for the state and the nation. Approximately 60,000 individuals are employed in the Alaskan seafood industry, which accounts for about $5.9 billion in total economic activity in Alaska and brought in 5.7 billion pounds of harvest in 2014.115

Enforcement of U.S. fishing laws and regulations in the Bering Sea is an important component of USCG presence in the region and is likely to become more complex as fisheries adapt to a changing ecosystem.

Fishing is one of the few economic activities permitted around Antarctica, in the Southern Ocean. There, rich waters contain a handful of species that have been fished aggressively. In the Southern Ocean, IUU fishing is a major concern that may become more active with greater foreign presence in the region. While USCG does not have a living marine resources (LMR) mission in the Southern Ocean, USCG presence has indirect carry-on benefits for IUU fishing.

ARCTIC

Fishing in U.S. EEZ waters off of Alaska is managed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), which coordinates with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, part of the Department of Commerce), the State of Alaska and the International Pacific Halibut Commission.

111 European Union. (2014) Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic. http://www.arcticinfo.eu/en/sada 112 Norilsk Nickel. “Kola Peninsula.” https://www.nornickel.com/business/assets/kola/. 113 Norilsk Nickel. “Taimyr Peninsula.” https://www.nornickel.com/business/assets/taimyr/. 114 European Union. (2014) Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic. http://www.arcticinfo.eu/en/sada 115 McDowell Group. (2015). “The Economic Value of Alaska’s Seafood Industry.” For the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute. 32

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Many important fisheries exist, including halibut, crab, scallop, salmon, and groundfish.116 Commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries are all present as well.

In 2010, 1,646 vessels fished commercially in U.S. federal fisheries off Alaska, and a further 1,090 vessels fished recreationally, for a combined total of 2,736 vessels active in federally managed fisheries.117 In addition, many other vessels participated in state managed fisheries or fished exclusively in State waters. By 2014, 3,683 commercial fishing vessels were participating in state and federal fisheries.118 Overall, the number of vessels participating in federally-managed fisheries has decreased since 1992, although the decline has tapered in recent years. Vessels are mostly using hook and line or jig gear, with smaller fleets of trawl and pot-gear activity.119 Roughly 600 hook and line/jig gear fishing vessels are active in Alaskan offshore waters, and declining numbers of trawlers (180) and pot-gear (154) were also active in 2015.120 The Bering Sea fishery is economically critical: the walleye pollock fishery in the Bering is the largest commercial fishery in the United States and the largest foodfish fishery in the world, generating over $1billion annual revenue.121

The USCG, through District 17, works with the NPFMC to enforce laws and regulations guiding fisheries in the Bering Sea. A USCG representative participates in the NPFMC Enforcement Committee, which meets approximately twice per year. According to the D17 Enforcement Report to NPFMC for 2016, fisheries boardings per year have hovered around 600 (between June-September), with a high of 762 reported in 2015. The violation rate has declined in recent years, from a high of 6% of boardings with fisheries violations in 2012 to just 3% in 2016.122 In 2016, 153 safety violations were found on 97 vessels; further, 38 SAR cases were conducted, leading to 64 lives saved, 4 lives lost, and 3 vessel sinkings.123

The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC), established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1976, develops management plans for fisheries in this area. Once the NPFMC has established its recommendations, NMFS approves, implements, and enforces them, with the USCG executing afloat enforcement.124 Through the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the NPFMC worked with domestic and foreign fishing fleets, NOAA, and the USCG to improve sustainability and management of a variety of commercially important fisheries.

116 NOAA: Alaska Regional Office. “Federal Fisheries in Alaska.” (No date.) https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/fisheries 117 North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC). “Fishing Fleet Profiles.” (2012).1. 118 NPFMC. (2016). “Fishing Communities of Alaska Engaged in Federally Managed Fisheries.” 2. 119 Alaska Fisheries Science Center. (2016). “Executive summary of recent trends in the eastern Bering Sea.” December 2016. 6. 120 Zador, S. and Siddon, E., eds. (2016). “Ecosystem considerations 2016: Status of the Eastern Bering Sea Marine Ecosystem.” NOAA, NPFMC. 7. 121 Pfeiffer, L., and Haynie, A. C. (2012). The effect of decreasing seasonal ice-cover on the winter Bering Sea pollock fishery. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 69(7): 1148-1158. 122 Sergent, LCDR C. (2016). 17th Coast Guard District Enforcement Report: June-September 2016.” October 2016. 123 Ibid. 124 North Pacific Fishery Management Council. (2009). Navigating the North Pacific Council Process, 2nd ed. 33

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In light of warming conditions in the Arctic region, which have the potential to reshape fisheries in the Arctic and North Pacific, the NPFMS advanced a Fishery Management Plan for the Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area in 2009. The Arctic FMP, which covers the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea waters of the U.S., establishes an initial prohibition on commercial fishing pending the availability of adequate information to support sustainable fisheries management.125 The NPFMC fisheries management plan (FMP) for the Arctic region “prohibits all commercial fishing until adequate scientific information is available” in recognition of the emerging possibility of a fishery north of the Bering Strait.126

At the international level, the United States participates in the Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North , which went into effect in 1993.127 The Convention is implemented through the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC), which includes Canada, Japan, Russia, and South Korea alongside the U.S. Anadromous fish spend time in both fresh and salt water during different parts of their life cycles, and in the North Pacific area these fish species include members of the Oncorhynchus —the world-famous salmon and steelhead that plan an important role in the economy and culture of the .128

As ice decreases in the Arctic region, flora and fauna may change, but ecosystem changes may also drive changes in human behavior: fish harvesters may move their efforts into new geographical and/or temporal units. However, some research indicates that, although retreating ice may open more areas to fishing effort, these areas are generally further from ports and therefore more expensive to reach and access; therefore retreating ice is predicted to have a stronger effect on more valuable fisheries.129

ANTARCTIC

Fishing in the Southern Ocean around the Antarctic continent is governed by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which came into force in 1982. At the time, high landings of Antarctic krill led to concern over management of this remote fishery, which is the largest Antarctic fishery by tonnage130. According to CCAMLR data, krill landings declined significantly by the mid-1990s131. Since 2010, krill landings have again increased, with most krill operating in the South Atlantic, near the Antarctic Peninsula, the South Orkney Islands, and South Georgia.132 China has the largest krill fleet, consisting of five vessels, and expanded to

125 Ibid. 126 North Pacific Fishery Management Council. (2016). “Celebrating 40 years of sustainable fisheries.” 127 North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission. “About NPAFC.” http://www.npafc.org/new/about_npafc.html. 128 Ibid. 129 Pfeiffer, L., and Haynie, A. C. (2012). The effect of decreasing seasonal ice-cover on the winter Bering Sea pollock fishery. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 69(7): 1148-1158. 130 Nicol, S., Foster, J., & Kawaguchi, S. (2012). The fishery for Antarctic krill–recent developments. Fish and Fisheries, 13(1), 30-40. 131 CCAMLR Statistical Bulletins, http://www.ccamlr. org/pu/e/e_pubs/sb/intro.htm). 132 Nicol and Kawaguchi (2012). 34

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areas off for the first time in 2016. In 2014, China harvested 55,000 tons of krill, and in 2015 it announced intentions to increase its catch to 1-2 million tons per year, which is above the CCAMLR take limit.133

Sustainability concerns also center on the toothfish, both the Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoide) and the Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni): in the 1990s, actual toothfish landings were estimated to be six times reported by authorized vessels.134 The IUU toothfish catch peaked at nearly 35,000 tons in 1997 but was reduced to around 5,000 tons by the 2000s due to enhanced enforcement of CCAMLR.135

IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean is a concern due to the dependence of other species on commercial fish stocks: in the mid-1990s, CCAMLR scientists concluded that illegal overfishing was leading to population collapses not only of toothfish, but also of albatross and petrel species that feed on toothfish.136 While CCAMLR believes IUU fishing has declined, the issue of IUU fishing “remains a concern and has the potential to seriously undermine” CCAMLR’s objectives.137 Toothfish are generally renamed during marketing, and may be better known to consumers as bass.

Southern Ocean fisheries are monitored by Australian, the United Kingdom, France, and , through ship-based, aerial, and satellite surveillance.138 CCAMLR maintains a list of vessels known to be conducting IUU fishing, along with other measures to deter IUU fishing.139

Limited whaling occurs in the Southern Ocean, and is highly controversial. In January 2017, publicly rebuked the government of Japan for violating the International Whaling Commission’s moratorium on commercial whaling. In 2014, the International Court of Justice ruled against Japan’s whaling practices, which not only violate the IWC moratorium but also have occurred in the waters of an Australian whale sanctuary off Australian Antarctic Territory, a sanctuary not recognized by Japan.140

133 Brady, A. (2017). Special report: China’s expanding Antarctic interests: implications for Australia. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 19-20. 134 CCAMLR. “Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.” Page last modified 19 DEC 2013. https://www.ccamlr.org/en/compliance/illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-iuu-fishing 135 Österblom, H., & Bodin, Ö. (2012). Global cooperation among diverse organizations to reduce illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean. Conservation Biology, 26(4), 638-648. 136 Österblom and Bodin. (2012). 137 CCAMLR. “Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.” Page last modified 19 DEC 2013. https://www.ccamlr.org/en/compliance/illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-iuu-fishing 138 Österblom and Bodin. (2012). 139 CCAMLR. “Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.” Page last modified 19 DEC 2013. https://www.ccamlr.org/en/compliance/illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-iuu-fishing 140 Smyth, Jamie. (2017). “Australia condemns Japanese whaling resumption in Southern Ocean.” Financial Times, 16 January 2017. 35

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Communications

Communications are an important and emerging area of industry activity in the Arctic, and an area that is likely to draw significant state attention given its strategic importance. The importance of securing communications cables and data centers against penetration by hostile state, state-affiliated, and non-state actors should be fully recognized.

Quintillion is in the first phase of constructing an undersea fiber optic cable, which will ultimately link Alaska as well as Asia and Europe. Fiber optic communications will aid regional connectivity, and also open new business opportunities in server farms, which require cold climates. The first phase, which Quintillion reported was completed in October 2017, consists of a 1400-mile trunk line between Nome and Prudhoe Bay, AK, with local branches to Kotzebue, Point Hope, Wainwright, and Utqiagvik/Barrow.141 This system connects with onshore cables connecting Fairbanks to Prudhoe Bay, and running from Fairbanks to Anchorage AK, Portland OR, and Seattle . In the second phase, Quintillion plans to extend its cable west to Asia, and in the third phase, run cable east through Canada to the United Kingdom.142 Quintillion’s plans, while ambitious, follow broad recognition that cold Arctic climates are ideal locations for data centers. Sweden (Facebook), Finland (Google), and have all opened large data centers, capitalizing on low local energy costs and low temperatures.143

On the eastern side of the Arctic, China has expressed interest in developing a submarine fiber optic cable project along the Russian Arctic coast, which would also include a personal mobile satellite communication system.144

Insurance

The insurance industry will play an important role in the development of Arctic maritime commerce and activity. At present, insurance requirements for Arctic shipping are not yet harmonized, and insurance tends to be on a case-by-case basis, with seasonal additional premiums that impose additional costs on Arctic shippers. The IMO Polar Code may provide a useful basis for insurance harmonization and regularization.

Novel/Emerging Industries

141 Quintillion. (2017). Quintillion Completes Installation of Historic Alaska Subsea Fiber Optic Cable System. http://qexpressnet.com/. 142 Ibid. 143 Macguire, E. (2014). “Can cool the internet’s appetite for power?” CNN. 16 November 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/14/tech/data-centers-arctic/index.html. 144 Polyakov , A., (2017, July 31) China interested in project to lay submarine cable line along Russian Arctic coast RIA Novosti. Retried from http://arctic.ru/international /20170731/650577.html. 36

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Many of the industries identified in this section are prospective and strongly dependent on future market dynamics. Although they do not guide current USCG missions, it remains important for the USCG and other elements of the U.S. government to monitor and respond to growth in strategic industries, recognizing their importance to national objectives.

Arctic Seabed Mining Reports indicate that Norwegian researchers have identified vent systems near Jan Meyen that could potentially contain seabed resources.145 As of yet, the International Seabed Authority has not established a code for seabed mining. However, it is in the process of creating the code, and has expressed an intention of releasing exploitation regulations by 2020.146 Since 2001, the ISA has been awarding exploration contracts, and so far 28 contracts have been issued, although none so far are in the Arctic Ocean. Mining companies are particularly interested in polymetallic nodules, lumps of metal with high concentrations of strategic minerals, as well as deposits of precious metals around deep sea hydrothermal vents and seamount crusts, which are generally found around seamounts in the central Pacific.147

Freshwater In addition, novel industries may emerge in the 21st century: for example, in 2017 news outlets reported on actions by the United Arab Emirates to tow icebergs from Antarctica to provide fresh drinking water.148 The presence of an iceberg offshore from the eastern emirate of Fujairah is hoped to create a micro-climate that could spur additional rainfall. While this project sounds far-fetched, global shortages of fresh drinking water are becoming more acute, and industry activity in this sector appears to be growing.

145 Carrington, D. (2017). “Is deep sea mining vital for a greener future – even if it destroys ecosystems?” The Guardian, 4 June 2017. 146 Woody, Todd. (2017). “Seabed mining: the 30 people who could decide the fate of the deep ocean.” Oceans Deeply, 6 September 2017. 147 Steiner, R. (2016). “Deep sea mining a new ocean threat.” Huffington Post, 20 October 2016. 148 For example, see Gramer, R. (2017). “This country wants to tow icebergs from Antarctica to the .” Foreign Policy, 5 May 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/05/this-country-wants-to-tow-icebergs-from-antarctica-to-the-middle-east/. 37

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ILLICIT ACTIVITY AND NON-STATE ACTORS

As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic region, concomitant challenges relating to illicit activity and non-state actors are emerging and likely to increase. The proximity of Alaska to points in the Russian Federation may facilitate transnational crime and terrorist activity. Fringe groups may also increase their activity. The following section will briefly review these activities. Given the lack of settled human population centers on Antarctica, illegal activity there will not be addressed.

Since 2009, increased access in the Arctic has resulted in a moderate increase in criminal activity. In 2016, the New York Times reported on increasing flows of illegal drugs and migrants across the U.S.- Canada border, including into Alaska. Amid increasing concern over the northern border serving as a route for terrorists to slip into the U.S., DHS has increased Border Patrol presence in the north, including agents, ground sensors, drones, and additional technology to monitor the long and largely unsecured border.149

These examples illustrate the emerging non-state security problems that are likely to expand along with increasing activity and access in the Arctic region. Further discussion of state-affiliated actors may be found in section C of Part 2 of this report, “Geopolitical Analysis.”

149 Nixon, R. (2016). “As U.S. watches , traffickers slip in from Canada.” The New York Times, U.S., 16 October 2017. 38

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MARITIME TRANSPORTATION PATTERNS

The possibility of increased access to the Arctic Ocean, and increased availability of trans-Arctic shipping routes, has contributed to growing media coverage and public interest in the Arctic maritime area. While Arctic routes may seasonally offer shorter distances between some destinations, many factors will bear on the suitability of these routes. The following section will review factors driving current maritime uses in the Arctic, as well as survey current predictions about future use. In addition, traffic pattern indicators for the Southern Ocean near/to Antarctica will briefly be addressed.

DRIVERS OF INCREASED MARITIME TRAFFIC

Tourism

Increases in Arctic cruise tourism should be expected. New Voyages to the North Pole cruise ship technologies may pose challenges to USCG, including the use of submersibles and drones. This past summer marked the 40th anniversary of the Soviet icebreaker Arktika becoming the first surface ship Ten new expedition-style cruise ships are expected to be servicing to reach the North Pole on 17 August the Arctic area by 2019, according to Lindblad Expeditions.150 These 1977. A total of 133 surface ship voyages to the North Pole have been ships will be ice-class, and range from 199-1000 passengers. These made since that historic date. Key facts: ships are intended for Crystal Cruises, Ocean Expeditions, Ponant, • 90 of the 133 voyages, all carrying Scenic Luxury Cruises, and Hapag and Lloyd, and will follow both tourists, have made by two Russian Arctic and Antarctic itineraries. In Antarctica, the destination will nuclear icebreakers. generally be the Antarctic Peninsula; in the Arctic, top destinations • From 1977 to 2009, there were 80 include the GIUK/Norway passages, the North West Passage, and voyages; from 2010 to 2017 there were the Bering Sea.151 53 voyages.

• North Pole voyages by country: Russia (111), Sweden (9), Germany (5), United According to Aaron Lawton, director of operations for One Ocean States (4), and Canada (4). Expeditions and representative for the Association of Arctic

• All of the 133 voyages, except one, Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO), the cruise industry and Arctic have been conducted in the Arctic cruising is in a prolonged growth phase, with 25.3 million summer months of June, July, August passengers expected to cruise in 2017 globally.152 While data on and September. Arctic passengers is not aggregated, approximately 45,000 • Of the 133 North Pole voyages 102 passengers visited Svalbard in 2015, which also saw about 22,000 were for tourism (all by Russian icebreakers) and 31 for research and passengers to Greenland and a few thousand passengers visiting scientific support.

Source : Ships that have Reached the North Pole, R.K. Headland, Scott Polar Research institute, Cambridge 150 University, Nilsen, 17 August Thomas. 2017 (2016) “ Be prepared, mass tourism is coming like lemmings.” The Independent Barents Observer. 8 October 2016. 151 Ibid. 152 The following information is drawn from a presentation delivered by Mr. Lawton at the 7th Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations, co-hosted by the U.S. National Ice Center and the U.S. Arctic Research Commission July 2017. Presentations may be viewed online at https://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/Ice2017/program.php. 39

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Canadian and Russian destinations. While Arctic cruises are a niche market, growth is evident. Cruise tourism in Norway grew from 300,000 passengers in 2004 to nearly 700,000 ten years later in 2014; similarly, Icelandic destinations have seen sharp recent growth in passengers, with total passengers in 2016 over 300,000.

Cruise tourism is a growth industry worldwide, with 80 additional ocean-going ships on order through 2026, reflecting an investment over $6.8 billion. AECO projects continued growth in the number of Arctic cruise passengers in the next few years.153

Of the ships on order, some are specifically intended for polar waters, with 15-20 polar class expedition cruise vessels expected by AECO.154 These ships will carry advanced new technology that may pose new challenges for Arctic coast guards, including submarines. According to reporting in The Telegraph, Scenic Cruises is building a 228-passenger expedition ship rated Ice Class 1A Super, and will carry a submarine along with two helicopters.155 The Scenic Eclipse will not be the first cruise ship to send passengers underwater in a submersible: Crystal Cruises’ Esprit also embarks a submersible.156

In addition, expedition cruise ships are charted new courses in Arctic waters, according to Mr. Lawton, who argued that cruise operators “need to push the boundaries” in the Arctic because “we are tripping over each other.” He suggested that expedition cruise itineraries are moving north to 82, at the limits of satellite coverage and ice margins, due to pressure from competitors and demand for new routes from passengers.157

Regional differences exist. In Norway, cruise visitors have increased from ~200,000 to ~700,000 since 2000.158 In addition, cruise ship port calls have increased by ~67%. In contrast, less growth has been seen in the Canadian Arctic. Observers attribute lower interest in Canadian Arctic cruise tourism to logistical challenges, lack of infrastructure, and technical navigational challenges.159 According to a 2014 GAO report, cruise industry representatives expect cruise tourism in the Northwest Passage to remain limited to adventure cruises for the next 10 to 15 years.160 However, the Crystal Serenity transits raise questions about the validity of that assumption.

153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 The Telegraph. “Scenic building a luxury cruise , with a submarine and helicopters.” 18 January 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/cruises/news/Scenic-building-a-luxury-cruise-yacht-with-a-submarine-and-helicopters/. 156 Brown, C. S. (2016) “Submarine rides: we try it on Crystal Cruises’ Crystal Esprit.” Cruise Critic, https://www.cruisecritic.com/articles.cfm?ID=2263. 157 See above at note 145. 158 Lpes-Aparicio, S., Karl, M., Leck, C., & Bäcklund, A. (2016). SHIPMATE-Ship traffic particulate matter emissions. Final project report. 159 Lasserre, F., & Têtu, P. L. (2015). The cruise tourism industry in the Canadian Arctic: analysis of activities and perceptions of cruise ship operators. Polar Record, 51(1): 24-38. 160 Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade. (2014, April 18). Retrieved June 28, 2017, from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-299 40

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Sharp differences can be seen in cruise tourism in the U.S. high Arctic (north of the Bering Strait) and in the southeast Alaska market. According to the Arctic Marine Tourism Project in PAME (Arctic Council), a handful of cruises each year sail in the U.S. Arctic, and the number is expected to remain relatively stable through the next 10 years.161

Figure 10: Current and projected Arctic shipping routes comparing the length of the NSR to the Suez canal route. Courtesy of the arctic portal (www.Arcticportal.Org). (Permissions Pending)

Air Traffic

Air traffic over the Arctic region has grown dramatically in recent years. Demand for seats on these routes is projected to increase. According to NASA, over 5000 flights/year fly over the North Pole.162

According to NAV CANADA, the company that owns and operates Canada’s civil air navigation service, there was been a 15-fold increase in air traffic operating on polar routes between 2003- 2015.163 In 2016, NAV CANADA states that over 14,000 flights used the polar routes.

Polar routes offer significant time savings, which translate into lower fuel burdens and a corresponding ability to carry additional passengers: overall, a potent combination of benefits. For example, a Chicago-Hong Kong transit over the pole in April 2006 carried 333 passengers and took

161 Arctic Marine Tourism Project (AMTP). (2014). Retrieved June 28, 2017, from http://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/arctic-marine- shipping/arctic-marine-tourism-project-amtp-workshop-report 162 Dunbar, B. (2011). Thousand-fold Rise in Polar Flights Hikes Radiation Risk. Retrieved June 26, 2017, from https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/science/polar-radiation.html 163 NAV CANADA. (2017) Polar routes – past, present and future. (2017, June 19). Retrieved July 14, 2017, from http://blog.navcanada.ca/polar- routes-past-present-future/ 41

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less than 15 hours, compared to 150 pax/over 16 hours via eastern Russia and 70 pax/16.5 hours via Pacific routes.164

In addition, demand for U.S.-China flights has dramatically increased. Chinese visitors to the U.S. have jumped from 630,000 in 2008 to over 3 million in 2016.165 OR from 1.2 million seats serving flights between the U.S. and China to almost 2.5 million in 2016.166

Specific contributing factors include the establishment of five new flight routes across Russia in 2001167, which followed the U.S.-Russian Air Transport Agreement (1994) and the Open Skies Treaty signed in 1992.168 These new polar routes offer time and fuel savings, although they pose technical challenges relating to cold temperature fuel management.169 The new routes were proposed in 1995, following the U.S.-Russia agreement, and the establishment of the Russian-American Coordinating Group for Air Traffic Control (RACGAT). Between 1998-2001, over 500 demonstration flights tested the new polar routes opened by the Russian government.170 While the RACGAT appears to be inactive, the FAA participates in the Cross Polar Working Group, which provides a forum to improve air traffic services for polar flights. Representatives from the United States, Russia, Canada, Iceland, and airspace operator groups meet regularly to advance efficiency of transpolar air traffic.171

The significant growth in transpolar flights servicing U.S.-China routes are for the outbound legs from North America to China; on flights from China to North America, the more southerly routes are still more advantageous due to strong tailwinds.172 Other advantageous routes across the polar region connect cities on the west coast of the U.S. (for example, Los Angeles or Vancouver) to destinations on the , or connect other cities in eastern and central North America to China and East Asian destinations.173

164 Skertic, M. (2006). “United takes polar express on flights to China, Japan.” Chicago Tribune, 4 April 2006. 165 Centre for Aviation (CAPA). (2017). “US-China open skies: a window in 2019 – alignment of airline partnerships & airport infrastructure.” https://centreforaviation.com/insights/analysis/us-china-open-skies-window-in-2019-with-alignment-of-airline-partnerships--airport- infrastructure-340603 166 ANNA AERO (UNCLEAR) (2016) “US-China market quardruples in size since 2006.” http://www.anna.aero/2016/10/10/us-china-market- quadruples-in-size-since-2006/ 167 Department of Defense Report to Congress on Arctic. (2011) https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf 168 U.S.-Russian Air Transport Agreement of January 14, 1994. (1994, January 14) https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/r/rs/114229.htm; Treaty on Open Skies. (1992). https://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/os/ 169 Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). “Polar Route Operations.” http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/BritishAirways38/Polar_Route_Operations.pdf. 170 Hanson, CAPT E. R., and Jensen, D. (2002). Over the top: flying the polar routes. Avionics, 1 April 2002. 171 Federal Aviation Administration. “Cross Polar Work Group.” https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/ato_intl/cross_polar/. 172 Ibid. 173 Boeing. “Polar routes offer new opportunities.” ttp://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_16/polar_route_opportunities.html#fig1 42

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Growth in trans-Arctic flights also has resulted in additional pollution, including black carbon, in the region. Emissions from aircraft in the Arctic occur at high altitudes and are long-lived, increasing their impact.174

Arctic Fishing

The prospect of commercially viable fisheries in the Arctic Ocean has drawn significant attention. While this is understandable, particularly in light of the global importance of the Arctic-adjacent fisheries in the Barents and Bering Seas, the question of future Arctic fisheries traffic remains highly prospective.

According to NOAA reporting, species richness and diversity on the eastern Bering Sea shelf have undergone significant change since 1982. Demersal, or bottom-feeding, species have shifted to the north and into shallower waters.175

The NPFMC is in the process of developing a Bering Sea Fishery Ecosystem Plan to help incorporate ecosystem goals into regional fisheries management, supporting ecosystem-based fishery management and the use of best practices.176

For additional information, see discussion of the Arctic fishing moratorium on page 52 and earlier discussion on page 29.

Lightering

Lightering, or offloading materials from larger ships to smaller ships for transfer to shore, is an important part of maritime activity in the Arctic, where long sloping continental shelves often result in shallow nearshore waters. For example, the Alaskan village of Kotzebue requires lightering of up to 15 nm for its supplies.177 Similarly, the Red Dog Mine in Alaska operates through the Delong Mountain Terminal, with ore barges lightering to Panamax and Handymax at a substantial distance offshore (three to five nm), versus directly loading at the terminal.178 According to a study by the US Army, approximately 5.8% of all vessel port calls in Nome are for lightering purposes.179 In northern

174 Jacobson, M.Z., Wilkerson, J.T., Balasubramanian, S. et al. (2012). The effects of rerouting aircraft around the Arctic Circle on Arctic and global climate. Climatic Change, 115(3-4): 709-724. 175 Alaska Fisheries Science Center. (2016). “Executive summary of recent trends in the eastern Bering Sea.” December 2016. 6. 176 NPFMC. “Bering Sea Fishery Ecosystem Plan.” https://www.npfmc.org/bsfep/. 177 http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/permits/eis/arctic_supp_deis_comments_for_web-opt.pdf 178 Ibid. 179 http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/arcticdeepdraft/AppendixBEconomics.pdf 43

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Alaska, lightering is crucial for community resupply, including fuel delivery. Given the difficulty of access, particularly during the winter, each resupply trip is important, but continues to represent a potential gap in the environmental protection capacity in remote areas. In addition, the extra steps required to resupply communities add costs to goods and fuel, placing an extra burden on villages and communities.180

RESPONSE CAPACITY FOR VESSEL INCIDENTS

In western Alaska, the non-profit Alaska Maritime Prevention and Response Network serves as the regional oil spill response network (OSRO), and is the only OSRO recognized by the USCG in that zone. The Network has the largest inventory of response equipment in western Alaska, and the largest amount of temporary storage for emergency lightering or storing recovered oil.181 Under U.S. law, the oil industry itself is legally responsible for providing capacity for oil spill response associated with its operations, overseen by state and federal actors including the USCG. In addition, the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT) was established along with twelve other regional response teams by the 1990 Oil Pollution Act; the ARRT conducts pollution preparedness planning and supports coordination during pollution incidents. The ARRT has developed a Unified Area Contingency Plan for Alaska, and ten Subarea Contingency Plans provide further detail on planning for oil and hazardous material discharges.182

The remote and expansive geography in the Arctic continues to create challenges for spill response as well as adequate search and rescue capabilities. Due to the proffered inability by certain vessels in this remote area to meet the national planning criteria required by U.S. law, the USCG created alternative planning criteria (APC). The extension of the alternative planning criteria (APC) for tank and nontank vessels is scheduled to expire this year.183

Beyond pollution response, the need for search and rescue capabilities in this expansive area will arguably increase with the maritime traffic. The IMO’s Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR) prepared guidance on contingency plans for passenger ships operating in areas considered to be remote from SAR facilities, including the need for self-sufficiency.184 However, the safety-net of an ice-capable support ship for passenger vessels as they transit may become less economically-attractive, requiring a greater effort by the Arctic states.

For additional information, see discussion of Polar Code under Global Maritime Treaties beginning on page 43.

180 Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study (2013). http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKports/1ADDAPSReportweb.pdf 181 Alaska Maritime Prevention & Response Network. Annual Report, 2016. http://www.ak- mprn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2016-Network-Annual-Report.pdf 182 Clement, J. P., Bengtson, J. L., Kelly, B. P. (2013) “Managing for the future in a rapidly changing Arctic: A report to the President.” Arctic Research Commission and National Ocean Council. David. J. Hayes, chair. 20-21. 183 Allen, C. H. (2016) “The Coast Guard Advances its Arctic Readiness in 2015, but Challenges Remain.” Pacmar 184 MSC.1/Circ.1184. See also Smith, T.W.J. (2016) “Search and Rescue in the Arctic: Is the US prepared?” Dissertation published by Rand (2016). https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD300/RGSD382/RAND_RGSD382.pdf 44

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National Research Council Report on Arctic Marine Oil Spills

In 2014, the Ocean Studies Board of the National Research Council released its report titled Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment. This report is a comprehensive review of the state of oil spill response in polar waters. One of the key recommendations is the critical need for benchmark data needs in the U.S, maritime Arctic: population counts; sea ice data; high resolution coastal topography & shelf bathymetry; monitoring of areas of biological significance; subsistence use of marine organisms; sensitivity of key species to hydrocarbons; and more. The report calls for better modelling and forecasting of sea ice and meteorological conditions, and an early warning observing network that could be community-based. The U.S. Arctic needs to develop an oil spill ‘tool box’ of a suite of approaches to oil spill response. The report keys on critical research needs including: biodegradation rates for hydrocarbons; toxicity of dispersants; methods of dispersal; under ice detection of oil; chemical herders’ performance in cold waters; and, modelling of oil in ice. Noted was the lack of basic marine infrastructure throughout the U.S, maritime Arctic, and the need for an enhanced training and organization program for local communities. The study team also called for enhanced presence and capacity of the U.S. Coast Guard in the region and further studies on marine traffic systems for Bering Strait.

Source: Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment, National Research Council, 2014.

ANTARCTIC

Aker, a leading global icebreaker design and testing firm, provided information to this project indicating that at least 12 countries have vessels in planning or construction to support Antarctic research and logistics. While these vessels range in size, performance, and primary mission, this expansive list indicates strong interest from a long list of states in recapitalizing Antarctic fleets and maintaining access capabilities.

According to company representatives, the icebreaking company Arctia, which is fully owned by the Finnish government, is in talks to begin servicing Antarctic research vessels.

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Part II: The Evolving Strategic Environment

Part I of this report describes an operational environment in which USCG missions in the polar regions are facing increased human activity and increasing environmental hazard. Part I addressed characteristics of the Arctic and Antarctic theaters that affect USCG operations: environmental conditions and change, and the types, levels, and trends in human activity. These factors all shape how USCG missions in the polar regions are constructed, and affect mission intensity and requirements.

However, USCG missions take place within a broader strategic environment, in which complex global trends are shaping dynamics in the Arctic and Antarctic. While the operational environment shapes how USCG missions are quantified and resourced, the strategic environment guides all-of-government action and can be understood as the broader context in which the USCG is one of many tools with which the U.S. government can pursue national objectives. Strategies connect means, ways, and objectives to organize action. Part II places USCG missions in their strategic context, offering analyses aimed at locating the USCG (as a means), and its polar missions (as ways), of achieving U.S. national objectives in the poles and beyond.

First, subsection A reviews the relevant international legal instruments and institutions that organize and legitimize state behavior in the oceans and polar regions. Next, subsection B examines national security guidance that directs and organizes all U.S. military and security agencies, including the USCG, towards overarching U.S. security objectives. Subsection C briefly reviews key recent actions, statements, and objectives of other states relevant to the polar regions, with a particular emphasis on Russia and China.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRATEGIES, AND INITIATIVES

USCG polar missions are driven by relevant international and national legal rights and authorities. As party to international agreements concerning the polar regions and world oceans, the U.S. has undertaken to regulate and oversee certain activities, and through enabling national legislation, has given the USCG duties of implementation and enforcement. The United States is committed to the global rule of law, and to the freedom this principle affords all countries to pursue their interests within a stable and peaceful structure of established legal rights, obligations, and redresses. USCG missions contribute to the maintenance of the global rule of law, and the presence of white-hulled USCG cutters around the globe serves as tangible proof of the United States’ willingness to uphold the rule of law, including freedom of navigation, in all the world’s oceans.

As part of the global maritime system, the Arctic and Southern Oceans are covered by the major ocean treaties, like UNCLOS, MARPOL, and SOLAS; in addition, there are Arctic and Antarctic-specific agreements that impose obligations on signatory states including the U.S. In the past several years, significant developments have occurred at both the international and national level in the area of polar legal affairs. The following section will first review international treaties not limited to the Arctic or Antarctic but relevant to U.S. interests, and will then address legal instruments focused on the Arctic and Antarctic respectively.

GLOBAL MARITIME TREATIES

The following section will review globally binding international conventions and instruments that govern maritime activities.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

In 2012, General Martin Dempsey, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in support of U.S. accession to the LOS Convention, stating, “joining the Convention would give our day-to-day maritime operations a firmer, codified legal foundation” and “would affirm critical navigational freedoms and reinforce the sovereign immunity of our warships as they conduct these operations.”185

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is considered the constitution of the oceans.186 This legal framework for the world’s oceans covers issues of navigation, boundary delimitation, environmental protection, marine scientific research, living and non-living

185 Dempsey, GEN Martin E. (2012). "Statement of General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Committee on Foriegn Relations, Law of the Sea." 23 May 2012 186 Allen. 47

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marine resources, and technology transfer, and includes processes for dispute resolution.187 UNCLOS was ratified 10 December 1982, with 119 signatory nations, and it entered into force in July 1994 with formal ratification. The United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS. UNCLOS created four maritime zones in which coastal states exercise varying levels of sovereignty, which decrease with distance from a baseline established at the land edge of the coastal state. The territorial sea, which extends up to twelve nautical miles from the baseline, is considered internal waters and is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state. Adjacent to the territorial sea is the contiguous zone, which extends up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline, and in which the coastal state can exercise FISC laws: fiscal, immigration, sanitary, and customs laws. Beyond the contiguous zone lies the or EEZ, which may extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within the EEZ, a state only reserves sovereignty relating to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, and is responsible for the management and conservation of natural resources in the waters, seabed, and subsoil of this zone. Beyond the EEZ lie the high seas, on which states cannot exercise sovereignty. In international straits, like the Bering Strait, transit passage rights apply.188

Since 2010, several states have joined UNCLOS. In addition, the international tribunal for LOS (ITLOS) has issued two advisory opinions on issues of relevance to the Arctic and Southern Oceans: an opinion on seabed mining (2011)189 and an opinion on coastal and state duties in relation to IUU fishing (2015)190. These advisory opinions are not binding, but inform the work of the Conference of Ministers of the Subregional Fisheries Commission, in the IUU case, and the Council of the International Seabed Authority, in the seabed mining case.

UNCLOS also contains provisions permitting coastal states to claim areas of extended continental shelf (ECS), through special and complex provisions.191 In the ECS, states only exercise sovereignty over the exploration and exploitation of resources on or in the seafloor and subsoil, including non- living resources as well as living resources on or under the seabed.192 States shall submit information concerning the extent of the ECS, including charts and scientific data, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up through UNCLOS.193 The CLCS reviews the information and makes recommendations to coastal states regarding the establishment of their ECS.194

187 Allen. 188 Kalo et al, 67. 189 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. (2015) Advisory Opinion, “Request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC).” Case No. 21. 190 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. (2011) Advisory Opinion, “Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area.” Case No. 17. 191 UNCLOS, VI, Section 76(4-6). 192 Ibid., Section 77. 193 2017 is the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. More information can be found on the CLCS website, (http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm) 194 Ibid., Section 76(8-9). 48

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In recent years, several states have submitted claims to ECS to the CLCS, or set targets for submission, for areas in the Arctic region: Norway submitted claims to CLCS in 2006, and Iceland submitted in 2009; Denmark submitted claims to various areas in 2009, 2010, and 2012; Russia submitted a claim in 2001 that was subsequently revised in 2013 and 2015.195 Canada submitted a claim to ECS areas in the Atlantic to CLCS in December 2013, and declared its intention to submit Arctic claims at a later date.196 Canadian officials indicate that the Canadian Arctic ECS submission will be delivered to the CLCS in 2018.197 The CLCS does not resolve overlapping claims; Russia, Canada, and Denmark have reached an agreement, communicated to CLCS, requesting that the Commission treat their submissions independently and agreeing to resolve the areas of overlapping claims among themselves.198

The United States has not acceded to UNCLOS; however, the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project is working to collect data on the extent of U.S. ECS areas, in the Arctic Ocean as well as the Bering Sea, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the . The U.S. ECS Task Force is an interagency body based in NOAA.199

195 UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. “Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf…” 5 July 2017. (http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm) 196 UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. (2014) CLCS Submissions: Partial Submission by Canada. 29 December 2014. Also see IBRU. (2015) Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region. IBRU: Centre for Borders Research, Durham University. 4 August 2015. 197 Sevunts, Levon. (2016) “Canada to submit its Arctic continental shelf claim in 2018.” Radio Canada International. 3 May 2016. 198 Antrim, C. (2016). Geography and jurisdiction in the maritime Arctic. Geographical Review, 107(1): 24-47. 199 U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project. “About.” (https://www.continentalshelf.gov/about/index.htm) 49

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Figure 12: Durham University http://www.durham.ac.uk/ibru

50

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Evolution of the Polar Code

International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Polar Code The development of an IMO Polar Code dates back to 1993 and the establishment of an international The IMO took a major step in high-latitude maritime oversight through the Outside Working Group to IMO. adoption of the Polar Code. The Polar Code is a new governance regime for polar waters addressing marine safety and environmental challenges for Voluntary IMO guidelines were approved in 2002 and 2009. The ships operating in remote, sometimes extreme, conditions where marine Arctic Marine Shipping 200 infrastructure is limited or non-existent. The IMO sought to create a Assessment of the Arctic Council uniform and non-discriminatory set of amendments to existing IMO safety, called in 2009 for mandatory IMO environmental protection, and watchkeeping requirements. For the rules for ships operating in polar waters amending existing maritime industry this uniformity creates a level playing field for all maritime conventions. In 2010 the marine operators planning to voyage in polar waters. The Polar Code IMO established a Working Group establishes mandatory international standards for new and existing on mandatory polar ship commercial carriers and passenger vessels operating in Arctic and requirements. Antarctic waters; the Code applies to all of these vessels 500 tons and In November 2014, the IMO higher.201 Marine Safety Committee adopted the Polar Code SOLAS amendments; in May 2015, the The Polar Code is not a new IMO convention, but is a set of amendments IMO Marine Environmental to three existing IMO safety, environmental protection and mariner Protection Committee adopted the competency instruments – the International Convention for the Safety of Polar Code environmental Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of provisions and MARPOL Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the International Convention on amendments. Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers The IMO Polar Code enters into (STCW). In summary, the Polar Code includes a range of new and key force on the following timetable: requirements for ships operating in polar waters: •1 January 2017 general requirements, and for new ships • Ship structural standards for Polar Class ships. built after this date. •1 January 2018 for all previously • Marine safety equipment designed for operation in polar environments; built ships. • The training and experience of the ships’ officers and crew; •1 July 2018 for STCW crew • A Polar Ship Certificate issued by the flag state administration or an training requirements. authorized representative (ship classification society); Source: Key Dates in the Development • An onboard Polar Water Operational Manual that is unique to a given ship and includes operational capabilities and limitations; • Environmental rules regarding the discharge of oil, noxious liquids, sewage and garbage.

200 International Maritime Organization. 2016. International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code). Consolidated text of the Polar Code. 201 Ibid. 51

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All maritime states had the challenge of implementing elements of the Polar Code in their national legal and maritime regulatory systems by 1 January 2017. New ships (built on or after 1 January 2017) must comply with Part I of the Polar Code upon delivery. Existing ships (ships built before 1 January 2017) must comply with Part I of the Polar Code by their first intermediate or renewal survey after 1 January 2018. The manning and training requirements for both new and existing ships will come into force on 1 July 2018; select ship masters, chief mates and navigation officers will have to obtain certifications from their national maritime authorities. Thus there is a phased implementation of the Polar Code allowing additional time for existing ships to comply with a range of new safety requirements, and to allow seafarers more time to gain experience and training for polar waters operations.

Boundaries and Ship Types The Polar Code is applicable to all commercial carriers and passenger vessels (500 tons or more) in all Antarctic waters south of 60 degrees South, while the boundary in the Arctic includes adjustments due to the nature of the warmer waters in the North Atlantic and the location of the seasonal sea ice extent in the region. In the Bering Sea, the Polar Code boundary is 60 degrees North to provide measures of environmental protection to its globally important fishery. In the Atlantic the boundary moves slightly south to include all of Greenland and then runs northeast along the east Greenland coast and north of Iceland until it intersects with the Russian Arctic coast in the Barents Sea.202 The waters around Norway and the Kola Peninsula in northwest Russia are not within the Polar Code area since they are ice-free year-round.203

Https://Www.Hellenicshippingnews.Com/Polar-Code-A-New-Regulation-For-Polar-Shipping/ (Permissions Pending)

202 Ibid. 203 Arctic Climate Change Economy and Society (ACCESS). 2015. IMO Polar Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, ACCESS Policy Brief Number 4. 52

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Commercial carriers and passenger vessels to be certified are now required to obtain a Polar Ship Certificate from the flag state and will also be required to carry onboard a Polar Water Operational Manual, unique to a give polar ship, if they fall into the below categories:  Category A ~ Ships designed for operations in at least medium first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions (Polar Class 1 to 5 or equivalent, the highest ice class ships).  Category B ~ Ships for operations in at least thin first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions (Polar Class 6 to 7 or equivalent, the lowest ice class ships).  Category C ~ Ships designed for operations in open water or in ice conditions less severe than those in categories A and B.204

These categories were designed to provide a measure of flexibility in the Polar Code since not all ships are intended for operation in the same ice conditions and importantly, the same navigation season.

Key Challenges A number of key challenges await the full implementation, enforcement and overall administration of the IMO Polar Code and this new polar maritime regime.

Tight Implementation Timetable: The Polar Code entered into force for certain elements on 1 January 2017. While the Code is not a new and comprehensive convention, and the requirements of SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW are well-known, the administration of the Polar Code may add considerable workload to the flag-state maritime organizations. The issuance of Polar Ship Certificates will likely be conducted by key ship classification societies working on behalf of the flag states. How the Arctic coastal states enforce the Polar Code will be a new challenge during the early years of the Code’s implementation period.

Polar Mariner Training and Experience: Qualification of polar mariners in the global maritime workforce of 2017 remains under development. Existing ice navigation training centers are in Russia, Sweden, Canada, Norway and the United States.

Enforcement: Responsibility for enforcement falls primarily to the flag states and, in certain circumstances, to the port states. The ship classification societies also continue to have influential roles in certifying that polar class ships meet the new rules and in advising the national maritime authorities on the technical details of the Code. It is predicted that the Polar Ship Certificate will play a central role in enforcement. If a ship sails north toward polar waters and reaches a port inside or outside the Polar Code boundaries, the port state officials could make a request to see the ship’s Certificate. Without an up-to-date Certificate, the maritime authorities can feasibly become regional gateways for the control of ships entering the Arctic boundary of the Polar Code. The licensing and

204 Ibid. 53

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certification process for polar mariners by the flag states will also provide another layer of broad enforcement.

Monitoring and Tracking: The importance of ship monitoring and tracking of commercial ships voyaging in remote polar waters is increasing. For all commercial carriers and passenger vessels subject to the Polar Code, each ship is required to have Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment mandated by a 2002 IMO SOLAS agreement. The purpose is to have electronic identification of IMO classed ships with type ship, cargoes, and continuous position, course and speed information. This information could be shared among the Arctic states (the flag and port states) but this may require a new agreement among the maritime administrations. An agreement on marine traffic data exchange among the Arctic states may enhance marine safety and environmental protection and adhere to the basic tenets of the IMO Polar Code.

Arctic Marine Infrastructure Context AMSA considered the lack of basic marine infrastructure in most regions of the Arctic (the exceptions are the Icelandic coast; northern coast of Norway; and, the northwest coast of Russia, all regions that are essentially ice-free) as one of the fundamental issues for building safe and effective Arctic navigation and operations.205 The development and adoption of a mandatory Polar Code may be considered a component of ‘Arctic marine infrastructure’ since it addresses both required marine safety equipment and the requirements for mariner training and experience. The IMO Polar Code focuses solely on ship safety and marine environmental protection, and does not address any needs for search and rescue (SAR) or emergency response. The Code does not address a host of other infrastructure requirements such as charting, ports, salvage, aids to navigation, navigation and communication systems (that are not shipboard), environmental response capacity, and shore side pumping facilities for wastes. A huge infrastructure gap or deficit remains throughout much of the maritime Arctic despite the coming into force of the Polar Code.

Passenger Vessel Requirements Large passenger vessels, including cruise ships, which will be Category C ships under the Polar Code, have significant challenges to meet the higher standards of marine safety equipment and perhaps the near-term requirements for mariner training and experience. Although these ships will not normally be operating in ice-covered waters (either fully or even partially ice-covered), they will be in polar waters defined by the Polar Code. Industry has argued that only new-built ships will be able to comply fully with the Code’s marine safety, equipment and mariner requirements for Category C ships.

205 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) 2009 Report. Arctic Council, April 2009. 54

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LEGAL INSTRUMENTALITIES

Several developments in Arctic and Antarctic international legal affairs have occurred since 2010. The following section will identify and explain the most significant developments that pertain specifically to the polar regions.

ARCTIC

Arctic Council

The Arctic Council was established through the 1996 Ottawa Declaration as a high-level intergovernmental forum uniting the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) for cooperation, coordination, and interaction on common issues, including environmental protection and sustainable development but excluding security, and offers a venue for discussion among Arctic states, Indigenous communities, and other inhabitants and stakeholders in the Arctic region.206 Arctic Indigenous communities have a significant role and voice in the work of the Arctic Council, where they are represented by Permanent Participants (see chart below). The Permanent Participants include Arctic organizations of Indigenous people with a majority constituency representing either a single Indigenous people across multiple states, or multiple Indigenous peoples in one state. There is a specific Indigenous People Secretariat supporting the Permanent Participants at the Arctic Council.207

AIA Aleut International Association

AAC Arctic Athabaskan Council

GCI Gwich’in Council International

ICC Inuit Circumpolar Council

RAIPON Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North

SC Saami Council

From 2015-2017, the United States held the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, which rotates every two years: Finland assumed the chair in May 2017, and it will pass to Iceland in 2019 and Russia in

206 Arctic Council. (2017) “The Arctic Council: a backgrounder.” Orig. 20 May 2015; updated 26 May 2017. (http://www.arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us) 207 Arctic Council. (2017). “Permanent Participants.” Orig. 6 July 2015; updated 22 March 2017. http://www.arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants. 55

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2021.208 The three priorities of the U.S. chairmanship included: improved economic and living conditions in the Arctic region; maritime safety, security, and stewardship; and addressing the impact of climate change.209 The theme of the U.S. chairmanship was “One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities.”210 The Finnish theme is “Exploring Common Solutions”, and its areas of emphasis 2017-2019 will be: environmental protection, including biodiversity conservation and pollution prevention; connectivity, including broadband access, satellite, mobile, and low- bandwidth connectivity and sea cables; meteorological cooperation, in concert with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and education.211

Significant work is done through the permanent working groups and temporary task forces/expert groups of the Arctic Council, which include the following:

ACAP Arctic Contaminants Action Program

AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna

EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response

PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment

SDWG Sustainable Development Working Group

TFAMC Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation

TFICA Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic

Expert Group in support of the Framework for EGBCM Action on Black Carbon and Methane

Recent Activity Since 2010, the Arctic Council has been very active. It has facilitated the adoption of three binding international instruments: the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, and the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. In addition, the members of the Arctic Council have released the 2011 Nuuk Declaration, the 2013 Kiruna Declaration, and the 2017 Fairbanks Declaration. Reflecting this high

208 Ibid. 209 U.S. State Department. “U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.” (https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair/index.htm) 210 Ibid. 211 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Finland’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019. 56

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tempo of activity, in 2013 the Arctic Council established a formal secretariat to provide administrative and communications support as well as a repository for institutional memory.212

The 2011 SAR agreement was borne out of a temporary task force on search and rescue (TFSR) created in 2009 at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, to facilitate the adoption of a legally binding international instrument on Arctic SAR cooperation.213 The agreement identified aeronautical and maritime SAR regions for each Arctic state, within which each state Party “shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue capability” (see Map, below, of SAR regions).214 The Agreement further identifies responsible SAR agencies within each state, as well as rescue coordination centers (RCCs). While the SAR Convention, the Chicago Convention, and the IAMSAR Manual are identified as providing the basis for SAR operations, the Agreement lays out a basis for cooperation among Arctic states on SAR, including requests for assistance, border crossing, information exchange, collaborative efforts, regular meetings, and joint exercises.215In December 2015, the EPPR working group of the Arctic Council expanded its mandate to include SAR, in acknowledgement of its role in providing follow-up on the SAR Agreement, and EPPR established an Expert Group on SAR.216 Denmark is the current EPPR chair.

The 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA) has been tested through international exercises in 2014 and 2016. The first exercise was hosted by Canada during its chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Three phases were tested, including (1) notification of parties; (2) request for, development, and receipt of offers of assistance; and (3) movement of resources across borders.217 The 2016 exercise in support of MOSPA was hosted by the United States, and also occurred across three phases: (1) notification and request for assistance; (2) internal analysis of protocols for offering assistance; and (3) meeting between states, permanent participants, and observers to discuss notification and requests for assistance.218 Alongside the MOSPA agreement and implementing exercises, EPPR continues to develop a Response Viability Analysis project to identify oil spill response assets and readiness.219

212 Arctic Council. (2017) “The Arctic Council: a backgrounder.” Orig. 20 May 2015; updated 26 May 2017. (http://www.arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us) 213 Arctic Council archives. 2015. “Task Force on Search and Rescue (TFSR)” item record. 19 May 2015. 214 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. (2011)

215 Ibid. 216 Arctic Council. (2016) “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR)” Orig. 29 June 2015; updated 4 November 2016. (http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/eppr) 217 Arctic Council. (2014) Arctic Exercise: After Action Report on the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. September 2014. 218 Braynard, Katie LT. (2016) Recap of recent exercise for oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic. Coast Guard Maritime Commons. 3 August 2016. 219 Arctic Council. (2016) “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR)” Orig. 29 June 2015; updated 4 November 2016. (http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/eppr) 57

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MOSPA underscores the general acceptance of the “polluter pays” principle, and solidifies the commitment of the Arctic states to cooperation, including in the areas of research, joint training and exercises, and information exchange relating to marine oil pollution preparedness and response.220 MOSPA requires parties to maintain a national system for responding to oil pollution incidents, including: the establishment of a contingency plan; prepositioning of oil spill equipment; exercises and training for response organizations; communications and coordination for incident response; and designated authorities and 24-hour contact points. In addition, MOSPA imposes obligations relating to the identification and notification of oil pollution incidents, monitoring, requesting and providing assistance, border crossing, cost bearing, and the exchange of information, including through joint exercises and meetings.221 MOSPA included a set of operational guidelines detailing systems and procedures for the actions listed above, including notification, assistance, border crossings, areas beyond national jurisdiction, command and control, situational awareness, joint review, cost bearing, joint exercises and training, and administrative procedures.222 MOSPA was a major achievement of the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFMOPP).

The most recent major international agreement in the Arctic is the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. Signed during the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting held 11 May 2017, in Fairbanks AK, this agreement recognizes the wide-ranging, long-running, and “excellent” scientific cooperation among Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders.223 The Agreement contains provisions aimed at facilitating the pursuit of scientific research in the Arctic region, including provisions concerning border crossings, access to research facilities and infrastructure, specific areas for research identified in Annex 1, processing of marine scientific research applications, access to scientific data, and educational opportunities. In addition, the Agreement contains language encouraging the use of traditional knowledge and communication between scientific researchers and local communities. The Agreement is a product of the Science Cooperation Task Force, set up by the Arctic Council and co-chaired by representatives from the United States and Russian Federation.224

Future Activity The future direction of the Arctic Council can best be determined through an examination of its current projects and suite of task forces/expert groups.

The Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane proposed the following goal in its first biennial report: “black carbon emissions be further collectively reduced by at least 25-33 percent below 2013 levels by 2025.”225 This recommendation, and the EGBCM report, were adopted at the Fairbanks

220 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. (2013) 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. (2017) 224 Showstack, R. (2016), Arctic states nearing science cooperation pact, Eos, 97, doi:10.1029/2016EO044453. 25 January 2016. For more information, see the Arctic Council, Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers 11 May 2017, pp. 78-79. 225 Arctic Council. (2017) Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane: Summary of progress and recommendations 2017. 5. 58

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Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in 2017, although the language of the Fairbanks Declaration notes that the EGBCM goal is “aspirational” and “collective”, and underscores the importance of implementing the EGBCM recommendations “as nationally appropriate”, recognizing that “Arctic communities are entitled to develop in accordance with their needs and interests”, while encouraging innovation in technology to combat climate pollutants.226 Further specific recommendations on black carbon and methane can be found in the EGBCM report; relevant items include a recommendation to work with IMO on joint development of black carbon mitigation. The EGBCM report mentions diesel particulate filters (DPF), alternative fuels, fuel quality standards, and the use of incentives to spur adoption of voluntary measures by the shipping industry.227 The work of the EGBCM followed work done by the Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers, which delivered a technical report on black carbon in 2011228 ; and a set of recommendations in 2013.229

The Task Force on Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic (TFTIA) was created to assess telecommunications infrastructure and networks throughout the circumpolar Arctic, and to deliver recommendations for public-private partnerships to enhance telecommunications access and service.230 The TFTIA collaborated with the Arctic Economic Council.231 Following the work of the TFTIA, a new task force was created in 2017, to continue to advance the ultimate goal of improved connectivity in the Arctic. The new Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic will deliver a report to the 2019 Ministerial meeting, including recommendations on filling gaps in telecommunications via pan-Arctic, public-private, and innovation technological means.232

The Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation was established in 2015, and has been surveying mechanisms for regional cooperation on marine stewardship, as well as Arctic needs for marine stewardship. The TFAMC delivered a report to the Arctic Council Ministers in 2017, identifying needs and opportunities for strengthening marine stewardship through the Council.233 During the 2017-2019 Finnish chairmanship, the TFAMC will work towards negotiating terms of reference for a possible new subsidiary body for marine cooperation within the Arctic Council.234

Arctic Fishing Moratorium

226 Arctic Council. (2017) Fairbanks Declaration 2017: On the Occasion of the Tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council. 3. 227 Arctic Council. (2017) Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane: Summary of progress and recommendations 2017. 6. 228 Arctic Council. (2011) An Assessment of Emissions and Mitigations Options for Black Carbon for the Arctic Council. Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers. 229 Arctic Council. (2013) Recommendations to Reduce Black Carbon and Methane Emissions to Slow Arctic Climate Change. Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers. 230 Arctic Council. (2015) Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers. 79. The TFTIA report, “Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic: A Circumpolar Assessment” is available in the Arctic Council archive. 231 Arctic Council. (2017) Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers. 84. 232 Ibid., at 85. 233 Arctic Council. (2017) Report to Ministers of the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation. Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC). 234 Arctic Council. (2017) Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers. 80-82. 59

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As the maritime enforcer of U.S. fisheries laws and regulations, the USCG is responsible for enforcement of the current U.S. fishing moratorium and will likely play an important role in enforcement of future fisheries agreements in the Arctic Ocean.

In 2009, commercial fishing was preemptively banned in all U.S. federal Arctic waters, under the Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area, issued by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council and approved by the NMFS and Department of Commerce. The Plan recognized that the “emergence of unregulated, or inadequately regulated, commercial fisheries” might create “adverse effects on the sensitive ecosystem and marine resources of this area,” including to the subsistence practices of Arctic communities.235 The ban is limited to commercial fishing, but does not cover the harvest of marine mammals and birds, and does not apply to subsistence or recreational fishing or State-managed fisheries.236

Efforts are underway to achieve an international agreement on high seas fishing in the Arctic Ocean. Talks began in 2015, and continued through three meetings in 2016, with the most recent round held in Reykjavik in March 2017.237 Nations involved in the talks include: Canada, China, Denmark ( and Greenland), the EU, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, and the U.S. A possible agreement on the prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in the central Arctic, including a commitment to conservation of marine ecosystems and sustainable use of living marine resources, may pave the way for the establishment of regional or subregional fisheries management organizations. The agreement, which is currently in draft form, is very near completion.238

The agreement discussed above follows on a 2015 declaration issued by the five Arctic coastal (sometimes called the “ice”) states, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., “Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.” This declaration stated the intention of the Arctic 5 to deter unregulated fishing through interim measures while working towards a broader final agreement. The interim measures included the establishment of a joint program of scientific research into Arctic ecosystems and living marine resources, joint efforts in monitoring, control, surveillance in Arctic high seas, as well as data sharing and monitoring of non- commercial fishing, and making authorization for fishing by flag vessels of the Arctic 5 contingent upon the establishment of fisheries management organizations or arrangements in the Arctic.239

OSPAR Convention of 1992

235 North Pacific Fishery Management Council. “Arctic Fishery Management.” https://www.npfmc.org/arctic-fishery-management/. 236 Ibid. 237 U.S. State Department. (2017) “Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: Chairman’s Statement.” 27 March 2017. 238 Ibid. 239 Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. (2015). 16 July 2015. Full text available through U.S. State Department, “Arctic Fisheries.” (https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/fish/regionalorganizations/arctic/index.htm) 60

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The OSPAR Convention of 1992 is a product of updates to and a merger of the 1972 Oslo Convention against ocean dumping and the 1974 Paris Convention on pollution and offshore industrial activity. In 1998, the OSPAR Convention was expanded to include a new annex on biodiversity and ecosystems. Fifteen states participate in OSPAR, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, , Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

The OSPAR Convention is relevant to the Arctic since its Region I covers Arctic waters to the north of the North Sea. Arctic waters comprise 40% of the OSPAR maritime area.240 OSPAR cooperates closely with the Helsinki Commission/Convention, which covers the and includes the Russian Federation.241

Russia-Norway Agreement

In September 2010, Norway and Russia settled a longstanding dispute over their maritime border in the Barents Sea. The “Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation on Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Polar Ocean” draws an agreed-upon boundary, advances bilateral cooperation in fisheries management for the important fishing areas addressed, and establishes a framework for cooperation in joint exploitation of offshore oil deposits in the boundary area.242

U.S.-Russian Agreement on IUU Fishing

In September 2015, the U.S. and Russian governments signed a bilateral agreement on “Cooperation for the purposes of preventing, deterring and eliminating illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.” This agreement is described as a focused agreement that will impact the significant problem of IUU fishing, especially in the Bering Sea crab fisheries.243 The agreement facilitates information sharing on suspect vessels, fishing information, inspections, and violations.244

ANTARCTIC

240 OSPAR Commission. “Region I: Arctic Waters.” 241 For example, see language on OSPAR/Helsinki coordination in the Bergen Statement (2010). 242 Hoel, Alf Håkon. (2012). The 2010 Norway-Russia marine boundary agreement and bilateral cooperation on integrated oceans management. Nordlit, 29. 243 Summers, D. J. (2015) U.S. signs deal with Russia to curb illegal fishing. Alaska Journal of Commerce, 16 September 2015. 244 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. 11 September 2015. 61

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Visible U.S. presence, sustained through USCG icebreaking services, is an important element of supporting the limits on activity established by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Should the ATS weaken in the future, U.S. leadership will be critical to the peaceful resolution of tension.

The Antarctic continent has a unique global status established in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1961. According to the provisions of this treaty, Antarctica shall only be used for peaceful purposes, and the ATS froze the various territorial claims that had been increasing tensions on the continent during the 1950s.245 The Treaty makes clear that, as long as it is in force, no activities in Antarctica will provide a basis for territorial claims, and no new claims shall be asserted. In order to ensure transparency and maintain enforcement, “all areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment” shall be open to inspection at any time. In addition to the Antarctic Treaty, additional legal regimes govern the protection and maintenance of the Antarctic continent and surrounding areas of the Southern Ocean to 60º South, collectively referred to as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

In recent years, reports of increased geopolitical tension surrounding Antarctica have increased. The continent is anticipated to contain large deposits of valuable minerals, and more countries have become active in Antarctic science. Some experts have voiced concern over potential pressure to permit portions of the ATS governing resource exploitation to lapse in the coming decades. For example, UK’s Independent quoted Anne-Marie Brady, professor and longtime Antarctic expert, “Now that technological barriers to Antarctic exploration have eased, more and more states are seeking access to Antarctica,” and other scholars share similar concerns over the sustainability of the ATS mining prohibition.246

Antarctic Treaty

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (entered into force 1961) is one of the landmark achievements of global law. With twelve original parties (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the USSR, the UK, and the USA247), the Treaty has grown over the decades and now 53 countries participate as parties.

The Treaty states that the continent of Antarctica shall only be used for peaceful purposes; encourages freedom of scientific research and scientific cooperation; mandates the sharing of scientific findings and data; and requires that all areas and build infrastructure, including equipment, be open “at all times to inspection.”248

245 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. “The Antarctic Treaty.” www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm. 246 Coates, A. (2017). “Geopolitics threatens Antarctica’s future as a peaceful hub for science.” Independent, Science. 29 March 2017.

247 The Antarctic Treaty. Available from Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. 248 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. “The Antarctic Treaty.” http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm. 62

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Article I explicitly prohibits “any measures of a military nature,” although it does permit the use of military personnel and equipment for scientific research.249 In addition, the Treaty banned nuclear testing and the disposal of nuclear waste.250

The Treaty froze the territorial claims of the various parties, which at the time were threatening to devolve into open conflict. Furthermore, it established the “complete freedom of access” of observers from states party to the Treaty to all areas, “all stations, installations and equipment…all ships and aircraft” as well as aerial observation over all areas of Antarctica.251

In 1991, a protocol on environmental protection was added to the Antarctic Treaty. The Protocol formally designated Antarctica “as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”252 All activities planned for Antarctica are now required to minimize adverse effects, and monitoring programs are in place to ensure that impacts are controlled. The Protocol included tourism among the possible activities taking place in Antarctica, under tightly controlled conditions pursuant to the environmental protection goal, but banned mining activities outside of scientific research.253 The Protocol includes annexes on environmental impact statements; on conservation of Antarctic flora and fauna; on waste disposal and management; on prevention of marine pollution; on area protection and management; and on liability.

China hosted the Fortieth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Beijing in May-June 2017. At this meeting, remarks that addressed the “sustainable use” of Antarctica drew attention. While the intent of these remarks is still unclear, observers note that Chinese tourists are the second-largest group of visitors to Antarctica, and that tourism is considered a valid use of Antarctic.254

CCAS

In 1972, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals was adopted. This treaty, which entered into force in 1978, reflected the serious threat to Antarctic seal populations that had emerged as early as the .255 The treaty included limitations on catch, seasons, areas, methods, and other relevant measures designed to protect the populations of six seal species (Southern elephant, , Weddell, crabeater, Ross, and Southern fur seal).256

CCAMLR

249 The Antarctic Treaty. Available from Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Available from Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. 253 Ibid. 254 Brady, A. (2017). Special report: China’s expanding Antarctic interests: implications for Australia. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 255 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. “Related Agreements.” http://www.ats.aq/e/ats_related.htm. 256 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. Available from Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. 63

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In 1980, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was adopted, and entered into force in 1982.257 This convention, coming on the heels of the CCAS, addressed broader questions of exploitation around the Antarctic continent. CCAMLR establishes a structure for managing and conserving krill and other commercially desirable fish species in an area roughly (but not exactly) approximate to the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty. CCAMLR establishes an ecosystem-based management program to the exploitation of living marine resources, including birds and crustaceans, in the Southern Ocean.

For further information, see coverage of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean on pages 31-32.

257 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. “Related Agreements.” http://www.ats.aq/e/ats_related.htm. 64

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NATIONAL SECURITY

Since 2010, the security considerations relevant to the Arctic and Antarctic regions have evolved and grown in significance as the broader geopolitical balance has become more challenging to American interests. Most of the change has been in the Arctic, where very different arrangements of sovereignty, access, economic activity, and human settlement drive a rapidly evolving and nationally significant security picture. However, global trends have also shaped national security considerations in the Antarctic. While the Arctic region is currently subject to far more scrutiny, signals of increased tension in the Antarctic region are emerging and should not be ignored. The following sections will assess national security dynamics in the Polar Regions, and outline the USCG’s role in supporting U.S. security interests.

How do we define security in this section? We base it on the language in NSPD-66 and the National Strategy, which define security broadly. We begin by reviewing significant security structures in the Arctic region, chiefly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which impose specific responsibilities on the U.S. Next, Arctic-specific security strategies are explored, and then we move to more-broadly focused statements of national interest that are relevant to the Arctic. We also begin at the presidential level, with strategy and policy documents originating from the White House, and then move to the departmental level.

ARCTIC

As an emerging maritime chokepoint, the Bering Strait is a strategic waterway to which access must be assured. Additionally, the United States commitment to freedom of the seas must be demonstrated in the Arctic Ocean as it is around the globe.

As human activity increases in the Arctic region, there is potential for concomitant increase in illicit activity. The USCG has a unique and growing role in defending U.S. national security interests in the maritime Arctic, as well as in building the relationships that will provide the most effective means to achieving shared objectives for human safety, environmental protection, and responsible development. USCG is the only military branch currently capable of maintaining year-round surface presence in the Arctic Ocean; in addition, it maintains functioning working relationships with its Russian counterparts. Increased use of USCG to pursue U.S. strategic objectives, counter undesirable trends, and build useful partnerships in the Arctic region is likely given these realities.

Given the bar on military activity established by the ATS, this section will focus on the Arctic region. However, it is important to acknowledge historical military activity on the Antarctic continent258 and

258 For a fascinating history of Operation Highjump, as well as non-U.S. military activity on Antarctica, which involved the NORTHWIND icebreaker, see Summerhayes, C. and Beeching, P. (2007). Hitler’s Antarctic base: the myth and the reality. Polar Record, 43(224): 1-21. 65

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recognize the high level of tension that crested in advance of the passage of ATS. Any weakening in the ATS should be of concern.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The 1947 North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO incorporates a collective defense commitment among five of the Arctic Council member-states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway and the U.S. Russia is not a NATO member, and although Sweden and Finland are not members, they cooperate closely with NATO. Since 2014, NATO has stepped up its joint exercises and increased its focus on collective defense scenarios.259

NATO has moved modestly in the direction of increased Arctic activity. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation program funds science and technology in the area of under-ice antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and unmanned systems.260 While growing activity and interest in the Arctic region has led to calls for increased NATO focus on the Arctic, leaders are carefully choosing the language used to describe the appropriate role for NATO in the region: for example, Norwegian Foreign Minister Espon Barth Eide stated that “the Arctic should be on NATO’s watch list” in 2013.261 Public reports of NATO discussions over the revival of an Arctic and Atlantic Command to focus on increased Russian submarine activity in the region emerged in early 2017.262

The increasingly close relationship between NATO and two Arctic states, Sweden and Finland, deserves close attention. Finland declined NATO membership due to its longstanding policy on nonalignment, but has been one of NATO’s most active partners through the NATO Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Council programs. The Finnish armed forces maintain capabilities to cooperation with NATO countries through multinational operations. In 2016, President Niinist became the first Finnish president to visit NATO headquarters.263 According to NATO, “with heightened concerns about Russian military activities, NATO is stepping up cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the .”264 A Swedish government report released in 2016 argued for NATO membership265, but Swedish Foreign Minister Wallstroem reiterated the government’s position on non-alignment.266 A similar dynamic has played out in Finland, which commissioned its own study on NATO membership in 2016.267 The Russian government has made clear that any

259 NATO. (2016). “Exercises.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49285.htm. 260 “Charting the Arctic Sea’s Changing Environment.” NATO, Allied Command Transformation. http://www.act.nato.int/charting-the-arctic-sea- s-changing-environment. 261 Interview with NATO Review. “The changing Arctic: how involved should NATO be?” 2 May 2013. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/EN/Arctic.htm. 262 Barnes, J. E. (2017). “NATO mulls Arctic and Atlantic Command to counter Russia.” Wall Street Journal, World, 18 May 2017. 263 NATO. (2017). “Relations with Finland.” 30 March 2017. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm. 264 Ibid. 265 “Security in a new era: report by the inquiry on Sweden’s international defense and security cooperation.” Unofficial translation available from Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden. 9 September 2016. 266 Quoted in Sharkov, D. (2017). “Putin vows military response to ‘eliminate NATO threat’ if Sweden joins U.S.-led alliance.” Newsweek, World, 2 June 2017. 267 “The effects of Finland’s possible NATO membership: an assessment.” (2016). Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland. 66

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suggestion of Finnish or Swedish membership in NATO would be considered “an additional threat to Russia,” as President Putin stated in a 2017 interview, and would require a response.268

Although not a primary area of NATO concern, the Arctic is a space in which tension between NATO and Russia plays out, through two separate pathways: first, increased Russian submarine activity through the GIUK gap has led to increased NATO interest in the Arctic region; and second, the heightened anxiety felt by Russian neighbors Finland and Sweden has led them to work increasingly closely with NATO—fueling Russia’s military buildup. While as yet no significant change in position has occurred, the steady increase in tension and high tempo of exercises by both NATO and Russia increases the chances of an accidental incident that could rapidly escalate. Given the Baltic and Arctic locus of much of the NATO-Russia tension, U.S. could potentially require icebreaker support for defense and deterrence obligations should events trigger the activation of the NATO Article 5 obligation.

National Security Policy Directive-66 (NSPD-66)

U.S. Arctic policy is established by NSPD-66, issued in 2009. This policy directive defines U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic region, including: missile defense and early warning, strategic sealift by sea and air, strategic deterrence, maritime presence and maritime security operations, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; as well as preventing terrorist attacks, projecting sea power, and exercising sovereign rights within appropriate areas.269

NSPD-66 states unequivocally, “freedom of the seas is a top national priority.”270 It asserts that the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route include straits used for international navigation, and that transit passage rights apply to those straits, and the preservation of freedom of navigation and overflight in those areas is connected to the global interest of the U.S. in freedom of navigation. In addition, NSPD-66 notes that increasing human activity in the Arctic region “requires the United States to assert a more active and influential national presence” to protect interests and project power.271

In order to protect these defined national interests, NSPD-66 directs relevant parts of government, led by the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, to develop capabilities “as necessary” to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic, to increase maritime domain awareness, to preserve the “global mobility” “throughout the Arctic region”, to project maritime presence, and to encourage the peaceful

268 Sharkov, D. (2017). “Putin vows military response to ‘eliminate NATO threat’ if Sweden joins U.S.-led alliance.” Newsweek, World, 2 June 2017. 269 National Security Presidential Directive 66 (and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25). President George W. Bush. 9 January 2009. 270 Ibid. 271 Ibid. 67

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resolution of disputes.272 In addition, NSPD-66 includes a directive to conduct a study of the feasibility of Arctic routes for strategic sealift and humanitarian/disaster relief.

NSPD-66 contains directives relating to environmental and human security interests as well, including ensuring “safe, secure, and reliable navigation”, protection of human life and the environment, ecosystem-based management of marine areas, conservation and sustainable management of Arctic species and living marine resources, and combatting pollution.273 National Strategy for the Arctic Region

Following NSPD-66, in 2013 the U.S. released the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which expanded upon the core concepts contained in NSPD-66. President Bush issued NSPD-66, and his successor President Obama released the National Strategy, reflecting strong bipartisan consensus on U.S. interests in the Arctic region.

The National Strategy emphasizes maintaining scaled capabilities and enhancing domain awareness as human activities evolve in the Arctic region. The National Strategy emphasizes the enduring importance of freedom of the seas, including airspace. Freedom of the seas (and air) will be achieved through enforcement capabilities, including sea, undersea, air, and support assets and infrastructure.274 Many of the capabilities listed in the National Strategy as supporting United States security interests and freedom of access in the Arctic region are USCG responsibilities: national defense, law enforcement, navigation safety, marine environment response, and SAR.275 In addition, the National Strategy establishes Arctic energy resources as strategic resources for the nation’s energy security.

The National Strategy emphasizes the importance of establishing and maintaining access to the Arctic region. Another area of emphasis is the importance of establishing and maintaining strong relationships with stakeholders inside and outside the United States, ranging from Indigenous and local communities to Arctic states.

In 2014, the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy was released. This detailed document provides a more granular look at the priorities and interests laid out in the National Strategy and originating in NSPD-66. In particular, the Implementation Plan emphasizes preservation of Arctic freedom of the seas, including sustaining the ability to conduct maritime operations in ice-impacted waters for projecting presence and supporting national interests.276 The Plan also emphasizes the importance of promoting freedom of the seas in the Arctic region through the exercise of navigation and overflight rights, as well as outreach and dialogue with partners and stakeholders in the region.277

272 Ibid. 273 Ibid. 274 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. President Barack Obama. May 2013. 6. 275 Ibid. 276 Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. January 2014. 8. 277 Ibid. 9-10. 68

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NSPD-66 and the National Strategy for the Arctic Region define all-of-government objectives and interests in the Arctic region, and the Implementation Plan identifies specific tasks in support of these interests. Pursuant to these guiding statements, specific agencies with national security/defense missions have also released Arctic-specific strategies guiding their own work and progress. The following section will identify and summarize these statements.

Department of Defense Arctic Strategy

The Department of Defense (DoD) issued its initial Arctic Strategy in 2013, and an updated version in 2016. The 2013 Arctic Strategy emphasized a “balanced and collaborative approach” that DoD would take as it monitored and prepared for changes in the region and the future security environment.278 A common refrain in the 2013 Strategy was the importance of affordable tools to enhance security through partnerships and burden-sharing. The Strategy also identified cold-weather operational experience as an area for growth. From a strategic perspective, the Arctic Strategy identified the desired end-state: “A secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.” Two supporting objectives are also identified: “Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation” and “prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies.”279

In 2016, DoD released an updated version, “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.” This report, which includes a classified annex, provided a more detailed assessment of security challenges in the region. While it maintains the objectives laid out in the 2013 Strategy, the 2016 version provides more detail on timeframes and steps. DoD identified a supporting and/or partnership role for itself in relation to improving domain awareness in the Arctic; supporting civil authorities; supporting human and environmental security; and promoting regional cooperation and the rule of law. It identified a more leading role in enhancing the capabilities of U.S. forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty; strengthening deterrence; strengthening alliances; and preserving freedom of the seas.280 The 2016 Arctic Strategy identifies two key ways in which DoD can act to advance U.S. national security interests in the Arctic region: by strengthening partnerships with Arctic allies and partners. and by shaping military activity in the region “to avoid conflict while improving [DoD’s] ability to operate safely and sustain forces in a harsh, remote environment” -- this includes through preserving freedom of navigation and overflight.281

278 DoD Arctic Strategy (2013). Secretary’s Foreword. 279 Ibid. 280 DoD Arctic Strategy (2016). 2. 281 Ibid. 3.

69

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While noting that the Arctic region “generally” remains an area of cooperation, the 2016 Strategy identified some friction points.282 These include the Canadian and Russian claims to internal waters controls over the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, respectively. More broadly, the report anticipates possible increases in tension driven by economic competition and geopolitical rivalry. In addition, security planning is made more complex by thawing permafrost and coastal erosion, which threaten DoD Arctic coastal infrastructure.283 The report states that DoD needs to continue and enhance training and exercises in the Arctic, to signal its commitment to its allies, as well as to build operational expertise and identify needs.284 DoD committed itself to preserving the “global mobility” of U.S. vessels and aircraft “throughout the Arctic, as in other regions”, including through FoN operations.285 While characterizing DoD’s approach to Arctic operations as “expeditionary” and maintaining an essentially conservative approach to emerging Arctic mission demands, DoD recognized in its Strategy that the direction of change will likely lead to an increase in DoD presence in the Arctic, and that current capabilities will not be sufficient to meet future increased needs. Capability gaps include operational experience, cold-specialized equipment, communications, and domain awareness tools (hydrographic charting, weather and ice forecasting, etc.).

The Strategy underscored the importance of regional allies and partners in achieving U.S. security goals in the region, both through cementing a cooperative and aligned approach to regional issues as well as through using cooperative efforts to manage funding constraint and close capability gaps.286 The role of the USCG, which works closely with regional allies (some of whose coast guards are military, some civilian), is an important element of regional relationships.

Navy Arctic Roadmap

In 2009, the U.S. Navy released its first Navy Arctic Roadmap. An updated version of the Roadmap was issued by the CNO’s Task Force Climate Change in 2014. The Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 lays out near-term (to 2020), mid-term (2020-2030), and long-term (beyond 2030) ways and means to achieve stated strategic objectives for the Navy and United States in the Arctic region. These objectives include ensuring national security, supporting safety, and promoting defense cooperation, as well as maintaining a wide basis of preparation for future challenges. Specific Navy objectives include: (1) ensuring U.S. Arctic sovereignty and homeland defense; (2) providing “ready naval forces to respond to crisis and contingencies” (italics in original); (3) preserving freedom of the seas; and (4) promoting partnerships.287 The Roadmap emphasizes the important role of the Bering Strait in acting as a chokepoint for the Arctic Ocean, in particular its use by Russian naval forces to move its

282 Ibid. 7. 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid. 10. 285 Ibid. 10-11. 286 Ibid. 15-16. 287 U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030. CNO (2014). 3. 70

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fleets from Europe to Asia, and its role as a “Pacific gateway” to Russia’s Northern Sea Route.288 The Roadmap states that “most national defense missions that entail naval presence in the Arctic Ocean” will occur in summer months, and that the only missions with a year-round requirement are homeland defense, which require persistent domain awareness and episodic presence. The Navy’s submarine fleet is fully experienced in Arctic missions, although surface and air forces have limited experience in the region.289

The Roadmap included calculations on navigability through the Bering Strait and major Arctic waterways across the timeframes laid out above, and concluded that by 2030, major waterways will be “consistently open” with 130 days of navigability in the Northern Sea Route and Transpolar Route.290 As access increases, human activity in the region will increase, and friction may emerge alongside new pressure on fisheries and seabed extraction. The Navy anticipates a role in ensuring stability in the Arctic region as human activity increases through its missions of maritime security (in partnership with USCG), sea control (including of vital sea lanes), power projection, and ensuring freedom of navigation.291 In the event of a disaster, the Navy will also support SAR and disaster response/DSCA missions as needed. In the midterm (2020-2030) timeframe, the Navy anticipates transitioning its forces from a “periodic” capability to operate in the Arctic to “a capability to operate deliberately for sustained periods when needed.” In this midterm range, primary risks stem from SAR/disaster scenarios, although the Navy may conduct freedom of navigation missions in the Arctic.292 In the far-term, the Roadmap indicates that the Navy anticipates developing a full suite of Arctic capabilities, pending national policy guidance and Combatant Commander’s objectives. In particular, far-term areas of focus include freedom of navigation and maritime security.293 The Roadmap also includes a summary of increasing Navy tempo of operations in the Arctic region, including the annual deployment of surface vessels north of the Arctic Circle. As the Navy advances its capabilities to operate in the region, the absence of infrastructure, particularly relating to energy availability, will pose logistical and operational challenges.294

The Roadmap lays out detailed tasks across a range of sectors aimed at advancing naval capabilities in the Arctic region. By the mid-2020s, the Navy intends to have platforms and personnel capable of operating in open water and shoulder seasons, including an Arctic capable afloat forward staging base.295 As the Navy seeks to advance maritime domain awareness in the Arctic, it may leverage work that USCG is doing in this area.

288 Ibid. 6. 289 Ibid. 7-8. 290 Ibid. 12. 291 Ibid. 17. 292 Ibid. 18-19. 293 Ibid. 19. 294 Ibid. 16. 295 Ibid. 32. 71

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In addition to the documents reviewed above, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is in the process of updating its C nd ’s Esti t f th A ctic, which will establish the commander’s intent and missions in the Arctic and identify near-term, midterm, and long-term goals.296

U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy

In 2013, the USCG released its Arctic Strategy. The Strategy identified three broad objectives for USCG in the Arctic region: (1) improving awareness; (2) modernizing governance; and (3) broadening partnerships. Following on the Strategy, and providing greater clarity on specific steps to achieve these objectives, USCG issued its Implementation Plan for the Arctic Strategy in 2015, with an updated version released in 2017.

The Arctic is one of many global maritime spaces, in which the United States pursues national interests and objectives. While there are many aspects of the Arctic Ocean that make it unique, and it is undergoing enormously significant changes, it is part of a broader whole when it comes to U.S. global maritime strategy. The following section will review recent developments in U.S. maritime strategy and assess how these may affect Arctic developments.

U.S. National Security Strategy

President Obama issued two National Security Strategies, in 2010 and 2015. To date, President Trump has not issued a National Security Strategy. The 2010 NSS emphasized challenges relating to terrorism and unconventional security threats, including the spread of WMD. In that spirit, the 2010 NSS emphasized a wide range of military capabilities and operations, in anti-access environments and against state and nonstate actors.297 In addition, the Strategy emphasized effective border control and domain awareness as components of homeland security, as well as partnerships with foreign allies to interdict threats originating in global flows of goods, people, and data.298 The 2010 NSS reaffirmed the traditional American commitment of freedom of the seas, identifying priorities in the maritime domain including protecting the flow of global commerce, preventing disruption by hostile actors, “keeping strategic straits and vital sea lanes open,” and early detection of emerging maritime threats.299

The 2015 National Security Strategy reflected a more diverse set of global challenges facing the United States. While the threat of global terror remained a priority, by 2015 that threat had grown far

296 For example, see GAO. (2015) Arctic planning: DoD expects to play a supporting role to other federal agencies and has efforts underway to address capability needs and update plans.” GAO-15-566. 297 National Security Strategy. (2010) President Barack Obama. 15. 298 Ibid. 18. 299 Ibid. 50. 72

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more complex with the emergence of ISIS and upheaval across the Middle East and regions. In addition, the black swan threats, exemplified by the Ebola epidemic that began in 2014 and the 2011 tsunami that struck Japan, got more attention in the 2015 NSS, reflecting the complex challenges that “natural” catastrophes pose in the modern highly interconnected world. In addition, the 2015 NSS reflected a downturn in the U.S.-Russia relationship and increasing perception of Russian threats to American interests.

The 2015 NSS emphasized the fundamental American interest in ensuring “access to shared spaces,” including the cyber realm, space, air, and the oceans, and committed the U.S. to “promote” rules for shared spaces as well as ensuring that it maintains the capabilities to “assure access” to these areas.300 The 2015 NSS hails “unprecedented” international cooperation in the Arctic, and lists key capabilities: to ensure free access, “to respond quickly to those in need,” and to deter potential threats.301

Quadrennial Defense Reviews

Along with National Security Strategies emanating from the White House, other periodic statements relating to U.S. national security come from the Department of Defense and military services themselves. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a review of DoD strategy and priorities, and offers a look at DoD interpretations of threats and challenges facing the United States.

The 2010 QDR focused on the wars in Iraq and , along with the rising pace of change in traditional and nontraditional security threats. Broadly, the 2010 QDR identified three “key elements” to the U.S. defense posture worldwide: forward-stationed forces, capabilities, and equipment, supported by a network of infrastructure and facilities, backed up by a foundation of treaties and agreements establishing access, status, and transit rights.302 The QDR notes that in North America, forward presence is less important, and priorities include: “mission assurance, support for civil authorities, strategic dispersal, and homeland defense.”303 The Arctic received some attention in the 2010 QDR, which noted that “DoD must work with the USCG and the Department of Homeland Security to address gap in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations.”304

On a specific regional basis, the 2010 QDR noted that the U.S. would seek opportunities to work with Russia on “the future of the Arctic and the need for effective missile defense architectures” to protect

300 National Security Strategy. (2015) President Barack Obama. 12. 301 Ibid. 13. 302Quadrennial Defense Review. (2010) Department of Defense. 68. 303 Ibid. 68. 304 Ibid. 86. 73

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the Arctic from external threats.305 It also noted that DoD would continue to work with Canada on regional security and “increased interaction” in the Arctic.306

The 2014 QDR acknowledged a climate of fiscal constraint, and the importance of rebalancing costs and capabilities to keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat environment, under challenging conditions of sequestration. However, it reaffirmed the global reach of the U.S. military, underlining the importance of capabilities for “operating in every region and across the full spectrum of conflict.”307

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

The first Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was released in 2007; an update was issued in 2015. The Strategy highlights attributes of maritime forces that are particularly relevant to the Arctic (and Antarctic) region: “Coming from the sea, we get there sooner, stay there longer,” and “bring everything we need with us.”308 The Strategy identified “five essential functions” of American naval forces: all domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.309

The Strategy states that U.S. sea services will “further develop our ability to operate in the Arctic,” while monitoring Arctic “access and presence needs,” improving maritime domain awareness, and building cooperative regional approaches to maritime safety and security.310 The Strategy specifically notes that Arctic access includes “ice-covered and ice-obstructed waters.”311 This point is echoed in the section on maritime security, which includes assured access to ice-covered and ice-obstructed waters in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions.312

The Strategy notes that global demand for energy resources continues to grow, citing projections of 56% growth in global energy consumption by 2040, to emphasize the importance of protecting flow through strategic maritime chokepoints.313 Free flow of global energy supplies remains a critical interest of the U.S.314, which will become increasingly relevant to the Arctic region for two reasons: the potential for energy extraction in the Arctic, and the use of Arctic shipping routes for energy transport. The Strategy notes that receding ice will lead to increased maritime activity in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions, and highlights the increasing strategic significance of the Arctic region.315

305 Quadrennial Defense Review. (2010) Department of Defense. 59. 306 Ibid. 62. 307 Quadrennial Defense Review. (2014) Department of Defense. Ix. 308 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. (2015) 309 Ibid., 19. 310 Ibid., 18. 311 Ibid., 18 and 26. 312 Ibid., 26. 313 Ibid., 6. 314 Ibid., 27. 315 Ibid., 7. 74

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In addition, the Strategy notes regional threats to the United States for which Arctic security arrangements may be relevant: these include North Korea, which is reported to be capable of striking Alaska with its most recently developed missiles316, as well as Russia.

A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority

In 2016, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority”, specifying initiatives in support of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.317 The Design observes that the “maritime system is becoming more heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before” including in the Arctic, where new trade routes are emerging.318 The Design strongly increasingly assertive maritime operations by Russia and China, as well as provocative behavior from North Korea. In order to respond to fast-evolving and complex interactive threats, the Design identifies four “lines of effort” aimed at building maritime security: (1) strengthen naval power at and from sea; (2) achieve high velocity learning; (3) strengthen the Navy team; and (4) expand and strengthen our network of partners.319

GEOPOLITICAL OVERVIEW

Actions and intentions of other nations shape the security environment of the Arctic region, in which the USCG will operate alongside other U.S. military services and agencies. Both Arctic and non-Arctic states are active in the region. While Arctic states have a long and robust history of cooperation, Russia is moving ahead with an ambitious plan for Arctic development at the same time that relations between the U.S. and Russia are in a period of decline and tension. As a result, USCG engagements with its Russian counterpart should be carefully and intentionally developed under a guiding strategy to ensure harmony of effort. The ramifications of the simultaneous and

316 For example, see Sang-Hun, Choe. “U.S. confirms North Korea fired intercontinental ballistic missile.” New York Times, Asia Pacific. 4 July 2017. 317 U.S. Navy. (2016) “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” 318 Ibid. 2. 319 Ibid. 8. 75

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intersecting dynamics between internal (Arctic) and external (non-Arctic) geopolitical events may complicate the otherwise largely peaceful and cooperative set of relationships among Arctic states. In addition, non-Arctic states have become increasingly active in the region in recent years. The increased involvement of non-Arctic states has come in many forms, ranging from scientific research, to investment in strategic infrastructure, to formal involvement in the Arctic Council. Increased interest in the Arctic by outside states offers opportunities for growth and development, but further complicates the security environment in the region.

The following sections will briefly review recent steps and current priorities of Arctic and non-Arctic states. The last section will explore indications of state interests in Antarctica.

ARCTIC STATES

Canada Canada was chair of the Arctic Council 2013-2015, and focused its chairmanship on economic and Indigenous peoples’ issues, especially through the launch of the Arctic Economic Council. The Trudeau administration has launched a new Oceans policy, which promises to emphasize involvement by Indigenous communities and stakeholders in maritime affairs. The USCGC MAPLE transit in July 2017 reflects a strong working relationship between USCG and Canadian authorities despite ongoing disagreements over the legal status of the NWP.

According to reports, Canada is in the process of developing a new “Arctic Policy Framework” to replace the Northern Strategy issued under Prime Minister Harper.320

The U.S. and Canada continue to respectfully disagree over the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and over their boundary in the Beaufort Sea. While these differences in opinion have persisted, operational cooperation between the USCG and its Canadian partners, foremost the Canadian Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Navy, Transport Canada, and Parks Canada have remained strong and steady.

Denmark Denmark continues to exercise sovereignty over Greenland, remaining responsible for security and foreign affairs for the island, although the 2009 Self-Rule Act devolved authority for resource extraction decisions to the Greenlanders.321 Persistently low global prices for many resources resulting from the 2008-9 recession have somewhat dampened the drive towards independence. Significant financial transfers from Denmark still support Greenland’s government.

320 Government of Canada. (2017). “Canada and the Circumpolar Arctic.” http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations- relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/index.aspx?lang=eng. 321 For further detail on the complexities of the Greenland-Denmark relationship, see “Act on Greenland Self-Government” Number 473, 12 June 2009. Available from Naalakkersuisut. 76

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Danish security policy is focused on Russia, with emphases on NATO, the Arctic, and cyberspace. Its stated policy intentions 2017-18 include enhanced defense spending, including for Arctic advocacy by its embassy in Moscow, as well as to combat foreign influence campaigns. Denmark gives high priority to NATO cooperation and support for its Baltic partners. In addition, the Danish government is developing a new national strategy for cyber and digital security.322

Finland In 2017, Finland assumed the chair of the Arctic Council (and also Arctic Coast Guard Forum). Its priorities for the 2017-2019 chairmanship include advancing the Paris accords on climate change and the U.S. sustainable development goals, both adopted in 2015. Specific priorities for the Finnish chairmanship include environmental protection, in particular biodiversity protection, pollution prevention, and climate change adaptation; connectivity, meaning access to broadband telecommunications, satellite connections, mobile systems, and sea cables; meteorological cooperation, in collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and education, with an emphasis on primary and lower secondary education.323

While Finland is also chairing the Secretariat of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which rotates in conjunction with the Arctic Council chair, it plans to hold a “Week of the Coast Guard” (or Border Guard) in the spring of 2019.

In June 2017, Finland hosted the third biannual Arctic Challenge Exercise, a military exercise testing large-scale air operations in the northern air spaces of Finland.324 In addition to Norway and Sweden, which are the regular participants in Arctic Challenge, Belgium, France, Canada, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the U.S. participated. The Arctic Challenge exercises are part of the broader Cross Border Training among Finland, Sweden, and Norway.

Iceland Iceland will receive the chair of the Arctic Council from Finland in 2019, and hold it until 2021.325 As a NATO member country, without a military, Iceland is in a delicate position. The large base at Keflavik hosts NATO radar and rotations of reconnaissance planes from the U.S. and other NATO members. Although U.S. troops and F-15s were unilaterally withdrawn from Keflavik in 2006, in 2016 the U.S. and Iceland signed a joint declaration that will permit U.S. and NATO forces to use and upgrade the Keflavik base, including ongoing air surveillance and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) teams. 326 Approximately $21.4 million USD in the DoD FY2017 budget for renovations aimed at

322 Regeringen. (2017) Security in Denmark and the surrounding region. Udenrigsministeriet (MFA Denmark.) 323 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “Exploring common solutions: Finland’s chairmanship program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019.” 324 Finnish Defense Forces/Puolustusvoimat. (2017). “Finland, Norway and Sweden will host Arctic Challenge Exercise 2017 in May and June.” 2 January 2017. http://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/1951206/arctic-challenge-exercise-2017-lentotoimintaharjoitus-jarjestetaan- touko-kesakuussa-suomessa-norjassa-ja-ruotsissa. 325 Arctic Council. Backgrounder. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us 326 DW. (2016) “Iceland agrees to the return of American troops.” 30 June 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/iceland-agrees-to-the-return-of- american-troops/a-19369461 77

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supporting Boeing P-8 Poseidons at Keflavik, which will include new wiring, flooring, and a rinse station for the planes.327 The renewed American interest and presence in Iceland is widely reported to be in direct response to an increase in Russian submarine patrols and overflights in the North Atlantic region.

Norway In 2014, Norway released its Arctic Policy for 2014 and beyond, which identified five priority areas: (1) international cooperation, particularly within the Arctic Council, the Arctic Economic Council, the Freedom of Movement Council (through the Nordic Council of Ministers), with Russia, and through the IMO; (2) a knowledge-based business sector, including tourism, fishing, minerals, and petroleum (especially in the Snhvit field); (3) broad-based knowledge development, in particular research cooperation between universities and the business sector, at the Fram Centre, and through the Research Initiative for Northern Norway and the Polar Research program; (4) more reliable infrastructure, including better satellite coverage of shipping activity in the Arctic; and (5) better preparedness and environmental protection.328

Sweden In 2016, Sweden issued a “New Swedish environmental policy for the Arctic” that stated in its opening, “We need to strengthen and improve security and environmental protection in the Arctic.”329 Citing evidence of significant warming in the Arctic, the policy called for “forceful measures” to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services.

Russia No Arctic state receives as much scrutiny, and raises as many questions, as the Russian Federation. Interpretations of Russian actions and intentions in the Arctic region vary. A core challenge revolves around the extent to which the Russian strategic environment is assumed to be continuous between the Arctic and , versus the extent to which these geographic spaces are seen as distinct strategic spheres. In northern Europe, Russia is engaged in a multi-year effort to challenge the unity, dominance, and security architecture of the U.S. and its allies.330 Explanations for distinctly troubling Russian actions, including its annex of the Crimean peninsula and sharp increases in long- range bomber and submarine patrols, take several forms, but generally center on power differentials and multipolarity in the post-Cold War European context. In the high Arctic, Russian moves also have been subject to widely varying interpretations; however, most experts concur that Arctic resource development will be crucial to the Russian economy and therefore Russian intentions

327 Beardsley, Steven. (2016) “Navy aircraft returning to former Cold War base in Iceland.” Stars and Stripes, 9 February 2016. 328 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway. (2014). “Norway’s Arctic Policy for 2014 and beyond – a Summary.” 11 October 2014. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/report_summary/id2076191/. 329 Ministry of the Environment and Energy Sweden/Regeringskansliet. (2016). “New Swedish environmental policy for the Arctic.” 25 January 2016. 1. 330 For a closer look, see analysis from the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies. “In-depth analysis: Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU.” January 2017. 78

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include a desire to maintain a stable environment to facilitate business interest.331 While thorough analysis is outside the parameters of this report, several major studies have explored this topic in recent years, some of which are addressed later in this section.

With 20% of its lying north of the Arctic Circle, and strong economic and strategic importance attached to the region, it is not surprising that Arctic issues are a high priority for Russia. Economic opportunities stem from traffic through the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a national waterway of the Russian Federation that stretches from Novaya Zemlya and the Kara Gate, in the west, to the northern edge of the Bering Strait in the east.332 Icebreaker escort fees on NSR traffic provide revenue, and overall growth in the shipping lane may facilitate economic activity in the Russian interior, which connects to the Arctic through three major north-flowing rivers (the , , and Yenisei) that could become transport conduits.333 In addition to the economic gains offered by the NSR and associated growth in ports, transport links, and traffic, Russia’s Arctic areas on and offshore contain large quantities of natural resources that promise growth. Russia’s Arctic shelf areas are expected to contain up to $20 trillion of oil and gas, and will likely be critical areas of production by midcentury, as older onshore wells decline.334 However, the Arctic offshore deposits are technically challenging and expensive, and therefore their exploitation is strongly dependent upon oil prices.335

In recent years, Russian government and government-aligned actors have stepped up policy declarations and policy action relating to the Arctic. Despite significant attention, traffic and cargo through the NSR have been uneven in recent years, after growth in the early part of the decade.336 In addition, the Russian government has rebuilt and expanded military bases that had fallen into disuse after the end of the Cold War. These renewed capabilities include air bases, ports, weapons systems, troop deployments, domain awareness tools, and search and rescue.337

According to World Bank data, the Russian economy shows modest growth in 2017, following a recession that began in 2014. Falling world oil prices (77% drop between June 2014-January 2016) and the impact of Western sanctions led to a financial crisis that included high inflation and was largely addressed through “massive” cuts in spending.338 However, government spending was not cut in the areas of social security, environmental protection, and national defense—indicating that these

331 See for example, Laruelle, M. (2013). Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the . Routledge; Antrim, C(2017). Natural security series: Russia in the Arctic—aggressive but not an aggressor. The Cipher Brief, 5 May 2017; also Antrim, C. (2010). Geopolitics and the Russian Arctic in the 21st century. Russia in Global Affairs, 15 October 2010. 332 For an in-depth look at the NSR, see Brigham, Lawson. (2017).The Arctic waterway to Russia’s economic future. The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2017. 333 For more information, see Antrim, Caitlyn. (2010). The next geographical pivot: the Russian Arctic in the 21st century. Naval War College Review, 63(3): 15-37. 334 Foy, H. (2017). “Russian oil groups brave cold of western sanctions to explore Arctic.” FT, 19 April 2017. 335 Ibid. 336 Soroka, G. (2016). Putin’s Arctic ambitions: Russia’s economic aspirations in the far north. Foreign Affairs, 5 May 2016. 337 For more information, see an excellent study on Arctic states by Wezeman, S. T. (2016). “Military Capabilities in the Arctic: A New Cold War in the High North?” SPIRI Background Paper; also a review by Micallef, Steve. (2017). “Russia’s Evolving Arctic Capabilities.” Center for International Maritime Security. 7 February 2017. 338 World Bank. (2017). “Russia Economic Report: From Recession to Recovery.” Iss. 37. 79

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areas are high priorities.339 While stabilizing oil prices and careful fiscal management by Russian economic authorities have improved the country’s medium-term fiscal outlook, World Bank analysts indicate that long-term growth will be constrained by ongoing low productivity.340 The Russian economy remains heavily dependent upon and influenced by oil, a reliance that is reflected in the forthcoming new fiscal rule that will be introduced in 2020, which will link federal expenditures directly to oil prices.341 According to World Bank, Russia is the world’s third-largest oil producer after the United States and Saudi Arabia, and oil revenues are the largest source of tax revenue to the Russian economy.342

While Western sanctions have contributed to Russia’s economic woes in recent years, falling oil prices have had a stronger and more severe impact on the Russian economy: “the oil price shock dwarfed the sanctions,” according to one expert.343 Sanctions have had uneven effects, leading to technology substitution by Russian firms as well as spurring them towards greater efficiency in their operations; in addition, some skirting of sanctions has been reported.344 In addition, countries that are not participating in the sanctions regime, most notably China, have taken the opportunity to build closer financial ties with Russia, including in the Arctic region.345

Many U.S. government and nongovernmental experts have commented on and analyzed Russian actions and intentions in the Arctic region. While interpretations vary, some common threads may be identified. There is growing apprehension over the possibility of an accidental or unintentional event that could trigger a considerable collapse in the as-yet peaceful and cooperative relations among the Arctic states. While observers generally acknowledge many legitimate interests motivating Russian activities in the Arctic, including an interest in improving control over an important sea lane (the NSR), modernizing military facilities that have fallen into disrepair since the end of the Cold War, and facilitating a much-needed increase in economic activity in a resource-rich area, the tone of Russian rhetoric attached to its Arctic buildup, and some of the highly militarized aspects of its activities, have contributed to discomfort. Russian activities outside of the Arctic have also shaped the interpretation of its moves in the region: in particular, increasing submarine and bomber patrols as well as other persistent attempts to test its neighbors; covert and overt interference in the territorial integrity of Ukraine; and cyber-based attacks on a variety of government targets inside and outside its region.

339 Ibid. 29. 340 Ibid. 341 Ibid. 342 Ibid. 34. 343 Foy, H. (2017). “Russian oil groups brave cold of western sanctions to explore Arctic.” FT, 19 April 2017. Quoting Apurva, Sanghi, World Bank. 344 Ibid. 345 See Maxie, J. and Slayton, D. (2016). Russia’s Arctic dreams have Chinese characteristics. The National Bureau of Asian Research, October 2016. 80

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A 2017 RAND report on Russian Arctic activities concluded that “Russia’s actions and rhetoric with regard to the Arctic have been inconsistent, alternating in recent years between inflammatory and cooperative.”346 The RAND authors noted that Russian military buildup in its Arctic areas may increase the chances of “accidental escalation” from an unintended collision; observed that Russia is very sensitive to any increase in NATO presence in the region; but underscored their basic conclusion that Russian actions are unpredictable and it may continue to swing between cooperative and assertive behavior in the Arctic.347

In 2015, CSIS issued its own analysis of Russian Arctic developments, concluding that Russian and Arctic sovereignty are becoming increasingly intertwined, similarly to the links between Canadian Arctic sovereignty and nationalism under Harper.348 The increasing symbolic value of Russia’s Arctic territory raises the stakes of both actions and rhetoric by Russian and Western actors in the region, and means that the Russian public’s awareness of Arctic affairs may be an additional pressure factor affecting Russian leadership.

A 2016 report from the International Security Advisory Board, which serves the Department of State, provides another perspective:

In many respects, these military activities by Russian forces in the Arctic are simply the sorts of things that any similarly-situated nation would undertake consistent with its military resources—to defend a major source of resources and revenues, protect the survivability of a key element of its nuclear deterrent, and assert its sovereignty. They are also elements of a return to a prior level of activity after the hiatus following the collapse of the Soviet Union…349

The ISAB report recommends that the United States and its allies push back against excessive sovereignty claims and defend freedom of navigation, through conducting FON exercises, as well as develop and maintain the ability to operate in the region through training, preparations, and intelligence gathering. However, the ISAB report notes that the U.S. has a strong interest in forestalling increased U.S.-Russia tension in the Arctic, and therefore advocates for efforts to prevent maritime and aeronautical incidents.350

In addition to U.S. commentary and analysis, non-U.S. experts have produced further analyses. For example, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs released an assessment of Russian Arctic policy, which concluded that “general uncertainty has grown and the security situation has

346 Pezard, S., Tingstad, A., Van Abel, K., and Stephenson, S. (2017). “Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for Regional Change in the Far North.” RAND Corporation. 8. 347 Ibid. 59-61. 348 Conley, H. A. and Rohloff, C. (2015). “The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic.” CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies. 349 International Security Advisory Board. (2016). “Report on Arctic Policy.” Department of State. 21 September 2016. 24. 350 Ibid. 27-28. 81

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worsened.”351 This frank and negative tone from a Finnish source is a notable sign of growing discomfort in the region. Some of the difficulty in interpreting Russian actions in the Arctic is its unmistakable escalation of destabilizing and threatening behavior in northern Europe.

In 2021, Iceland will pass the chair of the Arctic Council to Russia.352 In addition, Russia will also assume the chair of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2021. During the 2021-2023 timeframe, Russia will host meetings of the Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard Forum on its territory. The Russian Coast Guard is administratively located within the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is headquartered in Moscow. Several aspects of Russian activities in the Arctic region are relevant to USCG missions, and USCG interacts with Russian counterparts across a range of offices. The USCG may benefit from a coordinated approach to engagement with its Russian counterparts.

NON-ARCTIC STATES WITH INTERESTS IN THE REGION

A request for observer status at the Arctic Council by a non-Arctic state is a clear demonstration of interest in the region. The following tables list observer states, observer intergovernmental and inter- parliamentary organizations, and nongovernmental organizations by year of acceptance.353

NON-ARCTIC OBSERVER STATES:

1998 Germany 1998 Netherlands 1998 Poland 1998 United Kingdom 2000 France 2006 Spain 2013 2013 Japan 2013 China 2013 2013 Korea 2013 Singapore 2017 Switzerland

351 Käpylä, J., Mikkola, H., and Martikainen, T. (2016). “Moscow’s Arctic Dreams Turned Sour?: Analyzing Russia’s Policies in the Arctic.” FIIA Briefing Paper 192. 352 Arctic Council. Backgrounder. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us 353 Information from Arctic Council, “Observers.” Available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. 82

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTER-PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATIONS WITH OBSERVER STATUS:

1998 Nordic Council of Ministers 1998 Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1998 United Nations Environment Program 2000 International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies 2000 International Union for the Conservation of Nature 2000 North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 2002 United Nations Development Program 2004 Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 2017 International Council for the Exploration of the Seas 2017 OSPAR Commission 2017 World Meteorological Organization 2017 West Nordic Council

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH OBSERVER STATUS:

1998 International Arctic Science Committee 1998 International Union for Circumpolar Health 1998 Northern Forum 1998 World Wide Fund for Nature – Global Arctic Program 2000 Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas 2000 Association of World Reindeer Herders 2000 Circumpolar Conservation Union 2000 International Arctic Social Sciences Association 2002 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2002 University of the Arctic (UArctic) 2004 Arctic Institute of North America 2017 National Geographic Society 2017 Oceana

Of the observer states, none has received as much attention as China, which has famously constructed large icebreakers, opened Arctic research stations, and popularized the term “near-Arctic state.” The following section will briefly review some of China’s recent actions in the Arctic region.

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China China has been an active player in Arctic developments in recent years, including in key strategic areas, like basing, ports, uranium, and rare earths. In addition, it has demonstrated its willingness to link economic and political issues. Its spreading economic influence across the Arctic region should therefore be subject to close attention. In addition, the freedom of navigation concerns of the U.S. in the Arctic region link to similar concerns in the , where China has demonstrated a strong resistance to U.S. and international principles. China’s rapid expansion of polar capabilities includes the Antarctic as well, where is has established five research stations. China recently announced a major program of research aimed at both polar regions.

China has invested in Arctic countries, and built economic and political ties that may provide it with leverage in the region. In June 2017, China formally incorporated the maritime Arctic into its One Belt, One Road (or Belt and Road Initiative), creating a ‘blue economic passage’ through Russia’s NSR along with its other ‘blue economic passages’ through the Indian Ocean and South Pacific.354 The Chinese government created an investment vehicle to finance Belt and Road Initiative projects, the Road Fund, which owns nearly 10% of Russia’s Yamal LNG project. This signal of interest and investment follows other significant milestones, including another $12 billion Chinese investment in Russia’s Yamal, and regular NSR transits by COSCO, a state-owned shipping company. Seasoned commentators see increasing Chinese assertiveness in the Arctic region as China becomes more “forthcoming about its interests” in the Arctic rather than wrapping its efforts within science and climate change-focused projects.355

In recent years, China has developed economic ties with Arctic countries, alongside its successful pursuit of Arctic Council observer status and an emerging rhetoric centered on the interests of “near-Arctic” states. In 2013, Iceland signed a free trade agreement with China356. In 2010, Finland released a “roadmap for deepening of the Sino-Finnish relations”.357 Currently, Canada is in free-trade talks with China.358 Denmark was the first northern European country to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, and the two states have a China-Denmark Joint Work Program (2017-2020) that is intended to expand cooperation.359

In addition, China has invested in Greenland. In an episode that drew significant attention by Danish media, a Chinese state-affiliated iron trading company attempted to purchase a defunct U.S.-built Navy base in Greenland (Grønnedal/Kangilinnguit) in 2016, until the sale was blocked by a “remarkable”

354 Bennett, M. (2017). “China plans Arctic Belt and Road Initiatives.” Maritime Executive, 3 July 2017. 355 Ibid. 356 Ministry for Foreign Affairs Iceland. “Free Trade Agreement between Iceland and China.” https://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/trade/free-trade- agreement-between-iceland-and-china/. 357 Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland. (2010). Finland’s China Action Plan. June 2010. 358 Global Affairs Canada. “Free Trade Agreements (FTA) Consultations.” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords- commerciaux/consultations/fta-ale.aspx?lang=eng. Last updated 11 August 2017. 359 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2017). “China to expand ties with Denmark.” News. http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/05/03/content_281475644566257.htm. 84

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turnaround from Danish authorities, which decided to re-establish the base.360 Experienced commentators see a strong interest on the part of Greenlandic authorities in building closer ties with China, since Chinese investment would theoretically provide revenue to support the eventual independence of Greenland from Denmark. Observers even suggest that an independent Greenland would be willing to accept Chinese establishment of a military base on the island.361

Aside from the base episode, Chinese investment in Greenland has thus far centered on mining: a Chinese-Australian mining company began construction on a zinc and lead mine at Citronen Fjord in 2017, where one of the world’s largest zinc deposits lies at the far northeastern edge of Greenland.362 In 2016, the Chinese-owned and state-affiliated Shenghe Resources Holding company, a leading rare earth mining and processing firm, purchased a 12.5% stake in the Australian-owned Greenland Minerals and Energy firm. According to a press release from Greenland Minerals and Energy, “the fundamental objective of both parties is to develop the Kvanefjeld Project” in Greenland363, which will be the world’s fifth-largest uranium mine and second-largest rare earths operation.364 Reports suggest that the language of the Shenghe-Greenland Minerals and Energy deal includes an option for Shenghe to acquire a controlling 60% stake in the Kvanefjeld project once it has received permits from the Greenlandic government, and the revelations of this clause have generated some controversy.365

China has pursued strategic real estate deals in the Arctic beyond Greenland. The efforts by Huang Nubo, a former Chinese Communist Party official, to purchase 100 square miles of coastal land in northeastern Iceland around Grimsstadir, on which he supposedly planned to operate a golf course and luxury resort, generated widespread media attention and political controversy in Iceland.366 While the purchase was reported to be supported by Iceland’s president and ministers of economics and foreign affairs, the deal was eventually blocked by the minister of the interior in 2011.367 Mr. Nubo went on to purchase roughly 250 acres of land in northern Norway, and attempted to purchase one of only two privately held plots of land on the Svalbard archipelago in 2014. The Svalbard purchase was blocked by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries, which took over the property.368

360 See Lulu, J. (2017). China, Greenland and competition for the Arctic. China Policy Institute: Analysis. 2 January 2017. https://cpianalysis.org/2017/01/02/china-greenland-and-competition-for-the-arctic/. Also see Matzen, E. (2017). “Denmark spurned Chinese offer for Greenland base over security-sources.” Reuters, 6 April 2017. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-denmark-china-greenland-base/denmark- spurned-chinese-offer-for-greenland-base-over-security-sources-idUKKBN1782E2. 361 Lulu, J. (2017). China, Greenland and competition for the Arctic. China Policy Institute: Analysis. 2 January 2017. 362 Lulu, J. (2017). Also, see Naalakkersuisut/Government of Greenland. (2016). “Exploitation license and EIA approved Citronen Fjord Project.” http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2016/12/161216_ironbark. For more information on Greenlandic mining in general, see Boersma, T., and Foley, K. (2014). The Greenland gold rush: promise and pitfalls of Greenland’s energy and mineral resources. Brookings. 363 Greenland Minerals and Energy, Ltd. (2016). “Company Announcement: Leading Rare Earth Company Shenghe Resources Holding to Acquire 12.5% Interest in Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd., and Commence Strategic Working Relationship.” 23 September 2016. 364 Jamasmie, C. (2017). “Greenland closer to building world’s fifth-largest uranium mine.” Mining.Com, 13 March 2017. http://www.mining.com/greenland-closer-building-worlds-fifth-largest-uranium-mine/. 365 The story was broken by Jichang Lulu, an independent researcher and China-Arctic watcher. For more, see his 2017 report for the China Policy Institute, and his blog https://jichanglulu.wordpress.com/2016/10/04/more-on-shenghes-greenland-deal/. 366 For example, see Higgins, A. (2013). “Teeing off at edge of the Arctic? A Chinese plan baffles Iceland.” The New York Times, Europe. 22 March 2013. 367 Jackson, R. and Hook, L. (2011). “Iceland rejects Chinese investor’s land bid.” The Financial Times, 25 November 2011. 368 Pettersen, T. (2014). “Norway stops Chinese tycoon’s bid on Svalbard.” Barents Observer, 23 May 2014. 85

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Alongside economic leverage, Chinese investment in the Arctic region is often linked to political issues important to China. Statements on trade agreements and partnerships generally include acknowledgement of Chinese core interests, including the one-China policy. While developing trade with China brings important benefits to Arctic states, the Chinese government has also demonstrated its willingness to link economic policy with political issues, complicating relationships with the generally politically liberal states of Northern Europe.

In 2010, the Nobel committee awarded its Peace Prize to the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, setting off what has been called a “diplomatic ice age”369 between Norway and China as the Chinese government retaliated by blocking Norwegian fish imports and freezing trade talks. Following a six-year freeze in relations, the Norwegian government appeared to bow to Chinese pressure in the eventual resolution, releasing a statement that Norway “fully respects China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, attaches high importance to China’s core interest and major concerns, will not support actions that undermine them, and will do its best to avoid any future damage” to the relationship.370 The statement also noted that polar issues are an area for China-Norway “win-win cooperation.”371 In 2017, Reuters reported that China and Norway have resumed bilateral free trade talks, which were frozen by China immediately following the Nobel award in 2010.372

China also has been active in Antarctica, where it operates four research stations (the fifth is under construction) and recently expanded its logistical capabilities through the addition of a fixed wing aircraft.373 According to a 2017 report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, China is conducting undeclared military activities and mineral exploration in violation of the ATS, and is rapidly expanding its presence there.374 China is now a major actor in Antarctica, with fully self-sufficient land, air, and sea capabilities, including all-access capability through its two ice-capable vessels (with a third under construction.)375 The ASPI report notes that Chinese PLA personnel have helped with the construction of global positioning system and high-frequency radar in Antarctica, and that Chinese scientific vessels have closely coordinated with Chinese Navy—including personnel rotation between the two agencies.376 China has the largest budget for Antarctic science of any state, the second-highest number of citizens in Antarctic (after the U.S.), and the third-highest level of engagement (after the U.S. and Russia).377

Taken together, Chinese activities in the Arctic and Antarctic indicate a cumulative and increasing amount of influence that may have both positive and negative impacts to U.S. interests. While Chinese

369 From Geir Hnneland, quoted in Stephen, K. (2017). “Arctic expert explains the complexities of Norway’s High North politics.” High North News, August 16 2017. 370 Quoted in Chan, S. (2016). “Norway and China restore ties, 6 years after Nobel Prize dispute.” New York Times, 19 December 2016. 371 Quoted in Milne, R. (2016). “Norway and China resume diplomatic ties after Nobel .” FT, 19 December 2016. 372 Reuters. “Norway and China launch free-trade talks.” Business News, Reuters. 24 August 2017. 373 Liu, N. (2017). “Demystifying China in Antarctica.” The Diplomat, 9 June 2017. 374 Brady, A. (2017). Special report: China’s expanding Antarctic interests: implications for Australia. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Dr. Brady’s report largely draws on Chinese-language sources and interviews with Chinese scientists and officials, offering a novel perspective on the topic. 375 Ibid., 8. 376 Ibid., 13-14. 377 Ibid. 20. 86

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investments bring needed growth and development to the Arctic region, the willingness of China to link political and economic activities, as well as the often opaque motives and connections between Chinese industry and state actors, demand careful attention and consideration by U.S. leaders.

The Marine Exchange of Alaska: Key to Domain Awareness in the U.S. Maritime Arctic

The Marine Exchange of Alaska (MXAK), established in 2000, is a non-profit maritime organization that provides services that aid safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible marine operations. MXAK is a successful public-private partnership with funding provided by the maritime industry, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the State of Alaska. Headquartered in Juneau, Alaska MXAK focuses on four services: vessel tracking; regulatory compliance; maritime databases and information; and, charts and publications. The vessel tracking and monitoring system uses land-based Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers (128 receivers are located around Alaska’s coasts) as well as satellite AIS information to provide a comprehensive marine traffic picture throughout Alaska’s waters. This vessel tracking system is particularly critical to the U.S. maritime Arctic which stretches from the through Bering Strait and eastward to the U.S.-Canada border in the Beaufort Sea (and beyond). MXAK also operates 40 weather receiver stations that transmit real-time environmental data to mariners over AIS. MXAK services a broad maritime community including: fishing vessels; towing industry; ports; marine pilots; passenger vessels and ferries; cruise ships; bulk and break bulk ships; container ships; tankers; recreational boats; oil spill response organizations; the U.S. Coast Guard: and, the State of Alaska. MXAK operates a world class ship tracking and monitoring system, one of only two in the Arctic (another is monitoring the Norwegian coast) providing real-time information on vessels operating throughout the U.S. maritime Arctic.

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Conclusion

In 2010, the High Latitude Study completed a mission analysis and requirements study. The 2010 report made four specific findings, which, seven years later, remain critical for the United States in securing interest in the Arctic and Antarctic:

 The USCG is a significant component of a whole-of-government solution in implementing national policy in the Polar Regions.  The existing icebreaker capacity is not viable. Most importantly, ice breaker augmentation is essential in the next three-five years to limit the impact of capability gaps when USCGC HEALY approaches the end of her service life in 2030  The Arctic mission analysis continues to dictate a USCG deployment posture in northern Alaska with forward operating locations and supporting communications systems.  The Antarctic mission analysis likewise (Volume 3) concludes that deficiencies are most pronounced in the Defense Readiness and Ice Operations mission areas. The primary finding is that additional heavy icebreaking capacity is required.

This 2017 Addendum provides a timely update on the changes in the operational and strategic environment of the Arctic and Antarctic regions since the release of the High Latitude Study in 2010. Without conducting requirements analysis, this addendum simply indicates that need for U.S. presence in both polar regions is critical and likely to increase in coming decades. Particularly in the areas of maritime safety and security, the USCG is likely to see mission growth as human activity accelerates in the Arctic region.

The 2010 High Latitude Study was undertaken in recognition of the fact that expanding human access to the Arctic region is reshaping USCG missions in Alaska and the Pacific Area Command, and straining operational resources, manpower, and budgets. The 2010 report highlighted the need for additional resources to help USCG meet mission requirements. Foremost among these are all-access cutters capable of breaking or working in ice, embarking helicopters, sustaining communications, and serving as mobile command and control platforms for a variety of missions including national defense. The 2017 Addendum, while not addressing mission requirements specifically, does contain findings that provide further justification. In particular, the Addendum highlights increasing human activity in the polar regions; increasing maritime hazards; increasing challenges associated with shore-based infrastructure; and increasing state and non-state activities that may pose security and/or sovereignty threats.

As an Addendum to the High Latitude Study, this report re-affirms the work completed in 2010 and provides support for the ongoing necessity of USCG operations in the Arctic and Antarctic. The Addendum identifies the broad and diverse developments that have occurred in or affected the polar regions since 2010, including changes in human activity and environmental conditions. Of necessity, it cannot provide a detailed evaluation of each development; however, by laying the groundwork for further

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research in key areas of relevance for the USCG, the Addendum underscores the importance of ongoing efforts by USCG to monitor, interpret, and adapt to ongoing changes in polar theaters of operations. A number of issues raised in this report deserve closer attention: in particular, the rising influence of China in both polar regions; Russia’s increasing activity in the Arctic, and the impact of strategic industries to the future of polar development.

The polar regions—the Arctic in particular—are undergoing profound transformation, much of which is uncertain, difficult to predict, and contested. Visible U.S. leadership and presence are needed to communicate to both Alaskan communities and outside actors that the U.S. government is aware and engaged. The agency best positioned to ensure and maintain national leadership as the Arctic Ocean opens is the USCG. As a military, law enforcement, and life-saving service, the USCG is seeing mission growth in every domain.

While national security concerns are growing in the Arctic region, an influx of U.S. Navy surface presence would likely serve to exacerbate tension, particularly in the U.S.-Russia dynamic. In addition, the multi-mission nature of the USCG enables it to advance important human and environmental security interests in the Arctic while simultaneously ensuring that national security objectives are defended. Equipping USCG with all-access capabilities will further support U.S. national interests in the Antarctic region, in which a ban on military activity means that USCG missions are the best way to achieve integrated governmental presence. Although U.S. Navy submarines have all-access capabilities, their narrowly focused missions make them ill-suited for establishing visible, tangible, and presence-based U.S. leadership that will maintain peace in both polar regions.

This report has underscored the way in which extra-Arctic forces and political decisions impact the region and its communities. It has emphasized the variety of profound changes cascading through the Arctic region, which are resulting in alterations to the physical landscape (built and natural) as well as the opportunities and constraints confronting those who live there. Arctic communities will experience significant change throughout the 21st century, much of it beyond their control. It is important that government authorities, including the USCG, be mindful of the broader paradigm of change when engaging with Arctic communities.

“The U.S. is an Arctic nation” is a common refrain among leaders who seek to highlight the importance of the Arctic to the United States. It may also be worth repeating that the U.S. is a polar nation, and that American leadership at both poles will be critical to global peace and security in the 21st century. Steady U.S. leadership, and strong partnerships with allies and stakeholders, will help maintain stability and cooperation in the Arctic region as it transitions into a new phase, characterized by connectivity, new opportunities and dangers, and unprecedented change. Steady U.S. leadership is also needed to sustain the long-term future of the Antarctic Treaty System, and to protect this unique and peaceful continent for future generations. The United States maintains its global leadership through its commitment to freedom, support for the global rule of law, and outstanding scientific and knowledge institutions. These values are inextricably linked with the remarkable polar regions, which are facing new and profound challenges— and U.S. presence is needed now more than ever. 89

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Acronyms

AC: Arctic Council AECO: Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators AIS: Automatic Identification System (AIS ARR: Arctic Resilience Report ARRT: Alaska Regional Response Team ATS: Antarctic Treaty System BBOE: Billion barrel of oil equivalent CCAMLR: Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CLCS: Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf CNO: Chief of Naval Operations CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency ECS: Extended Continental Shelf EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone EGBCM: Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane EPPR: Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response FMP: Fishery Management Plan GAO: Government Accountability Office GIUK: Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom IMO: International Maritime Organization IUU: Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (AR5 is the Fifth Assessment Report) ISAB: International Security Advisory Board ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and ITLOS: International Tribune for the Law of the Sea IWC: International Whaling Commission LNG: Liquid Natural Gas MARPOL: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

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MOSPA: Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO: North American Treaty Organization NPFMC: North Pacific Fishery Management Council NSPD: National Security Presidential Directions NSR: Northern Sea Route NSS: National Security Strategy NWP: Northwest Passage OCS: Outer Continental Shelf OSPAR: Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic OSRO: Oil Spill Response Organization PAME: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review RCC: Rescue Coordination Center SAR: Search and Rescue SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea STCW: International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers TAPS: Trans-Alaska Pipeline TFAMC: Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation TFMOPP: Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention TFTIA: Task Force on Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic UN: United Nations UNCLOS: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea WMO: World Meteorological Organization WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Appendix A. Reports Consulted

Arctic Matters: The Global Connection to Changes National Research Council. 2015. Arctic Matters: The Global in the Arctic Connection to Changes in the Arctic. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/21717. Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation Research Board and National Research Environment Council. 2014. Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/18625. Seasonal to Decadal Predictions of Arctic Sea Ice: National Research Council. 2012. Seasonal to Decadal Challenges and Strategies Predictions of Arctic Sea Ice: Challenges and Strategies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/13515. National Security Implications of Climate Change for National Research Council. 2011. National Security U.S. Naval Forces Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12914. Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy Council on Foreign Relations Press (March 2017) on America’s Fourth Coast

U.S.-Sino Relations in the Arctic: A Roadmap for CSIS, January 2017 Future Cooperation Recommendations for the U.S. Arctic Council CSIS, April 2015 Chairmanship Enhancing Policy Focus on Arctic Health and Well- Being Arctic potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic National Petroluem Council, 2015 Oil and Gas Resources Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Ronald O'Rourke, Naval Affairs September 14, 2017 Background and Issues for Congress MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE GAO Report March 2014 Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade Antarctic Sea Ice Variability in the Southern Ocean- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Climate System: 2017. Antarctic Sea Ice Variability in the Southern Ocean- Proceedings of a Workshop (2017) Climate System: Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

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https://doi.org/10.17226/24696. Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs 2017. Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation’s Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24834 Approaches to Understanding the Cumulative Effects National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. of Stressors on Marine Mammals 2017. Approaches to Understanding the Cumulative Effects of Stressors on Marine Mammals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/23479. Safe Navigation in the U.S. Arctic: Summary of a Transportation Research Board of the National Academies. Workshop (2013). Safe Navigation in the U.S. Arctic: Summary of a Workshop. Conference Proceedings on the Web 11.

Appendix B: Biographies

CASP Fellows:

CAPT (ret.) Lawson Brigham, PhD

Dr. Brigham is a CASP Fellow and distinguished academic currently affiliated with the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. His leading role in the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment and Polar Code, and his research into Arctic geography and maritime activity make him a global leader in Arctic maritime affairs. During his USCG career, he commanded icebreakers in Arctic, Antarctic, and Great Lakes waters.

VADM (ret.) Roger Rufe

VADM Rufe is a CASP Fellow and a former president of the Ocean Conservancy. He also is a member of the Pew Ocean Commission and has served a number of prominent ocean conservation NGOs. His distinguished career with the USCG, as well as his years in ocean advocacy, make him an important source of experience and voice for environmental stewardship in the Arctic.

Mr. James Ellis

Over the course of two decades in the USCG, Mr. Ellis served in D17 during the development of the TAPS, the 200-mile fisheries zone, and the ANCSA. He later served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Transportation for maritime policy and represented the DoT on the U.S. delegation to the UNCLOS. His long career in maritime law makes him an expert in Arctic maritime affairs.

Study Group:

Dr. Walter Berbrick

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Dr. Berbrick is a professor at the Naval War College, currently serving a one-year Council on Foreign Relations fellowship in the office of the Special Representative for the Arctic in the U.S. State Department. He is a widely recognized expert in Arctic security affairs.

Dr. Thomas M. Cronin

Dr. Cronin is a senior geologist at the USGS, and a lecturer at Georgetown University and the Urbino Summer School for Paleoclimatology in Italy. His area of expertise is reconstructing climate records from the earth’s past, and his fieldwork has included expeditions to the North Pole, on the Healy in the Beaufort and , and in Russian Arctic waters.

MAJ GEN (ret.) Randy “Church” Kee

Major General Kee, USAF (ret) is Executive Director of the Arctic Domain Awareness Center of Excellence. During his 30-year career in the USAF, he commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels, and served operationally in the Western Pacific, Southwest Asia, the and Afghanistan. He held a variety of staff assignments, including U.S.TRANSCOM, HQ USAF, and the U.S. Joint Staff in both Operations and Strategic Plans and Policy Directorates. He has contributed to U.S. Arctic Strategy and Policy development, supported domain awareness technology development, and contributed to Defense Support to U.S. Federal agencies on several Arctic planning initiatives.

Dr. Nancy Kinner

Dr. Kinner is the UNH Director of the Coastal Response Research Center (a partnership between NOAA and UNH), and the Director of the Center for Spills and Environmental Hazards. She is a global expert in oil spill preparedness, response and restoration, remediation, and oil spill microbiology. She recently organized a workshop in Russia on lessons from the Deepwater spill.

Dr. Donald Perovich

Dr. Donald Perovich was until August 2017 a research geophysicist at the US Army Corps Cold Regional Research and Engineering Lab. He is now a professor at Dartmouth College. His research focuses on sea ice geophysics and climate change in the Arctic system. He is a prominent sea ice researcher.

Dr. Theodore Scambos

Dr. Scambos is a senior scientist and leader of the NSIDC science team, specializing in glaciology; remote sensing of the poles; climate change effects on the cryosphere; Antarctic history; geochemistry; and planetary science. He is a leading expert on Antarctic science.

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