War on Drugs Report

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THE COST AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON DRUGS REPORT

New York, August 7, 2019 Authors: Alvaro Piaggio, Consultant Email: [email protected]

Prachi Vidwans, Research Associate Email: [email protected]

Human Rights Foundation Center for Law and Democracy 350 Fifth Avenue, #4202 New York, NY 10118 hrf.org

1 Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

01-11 PART I. AN INTRODUCTION TO PROHIBITION

02 The History of Prohibition 04 The Economics of the Illicit Market 07 Cost and Outcomes of Supply-Centric, Prohibitionist Policies 11 Overview

12-56 PART II. CASE STUDIES

13 COLOMBIA: A PRODUCTION COUNTRY

14 General Information 15 Historical Context and Government Policy 18 Costs for Human Rights and Democracy 18 Violence vs. the right to life 20 Internal displacement of people 22 Impoverishment of the rural poor 22 Increase of sickness and disease 22 Corruption and the rule of law 23 Corruption and electoral integrity 24 Chilling effect on journalists and civil society 25 Conclusion 27 M E X I C O : A TRANSIT COUNTRY

28 General Information 29 Historical Context and Government Policy 31 Costs for Human Rights and Democracy 31 Violence vs. the right to life 33 Disappearances 35 Internal displacement of people 36 Attacks on journalists 38 Attacks on civil society 39 Electoral fraud 39 Corruption and impunity 42 Conclusion

43 THE UNITED STATES: A DESTINATION COUNTRY

44 General Information 46 Historical Context and Government Policy 49 Costs for Human Rights and Democracy 49 Mass Incarceration and Criminalization 49 Discrimination against Black Americans and other marginalized groups 51 Disenfranchisement of Black Americans and other marginalized groups 52 Weakening of due process and judicial discretion 53 Inaccessibility of health care 55 Conclusion

57 CONCLUSION

61 ENDNOTES Executive Summary

The “war on drugs” was first declared by established, how the resulting black mar- U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971, with ket functions, and how its policies have ul- the goal of eradicating what he viewed as timately failed to decrease drug abuse. the growing problem of drug addiction. Since then, it has had dire consequences, Once we have established whether pro- including the exacerbation of human rights hibition policies have created the desired violations and erosion of democratic insti- outcomes, we look at the negative conse- tutions around the world. Yet human rights quences of the policy — the human rights groups largely refrain from discussing consequences — through three case stud- drug policy. ies: Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. These countries were selected because of Hundreds of civil society groups around their positions along the illegal drug supply the world are dedicated to investigating chain. Colombia is a production country the outcomes of the drug war and advo- on the cocaine supply chain because of cating drug policy reform based on their its position in the Andes mountain range, findings. However, drug reform advocates where coca, the plant used to manufacture often comment that international human cocaine, grows. Mexico is a transit country rights organizations have been largely that traffickers pass through on their way absent in these discussions. Human rights to the drugs’ final stop: the United States, a reports generally stick to noting human destination country. Drug prohibition has rights violations in affected states as a taken different forms in each country be- whole, without investigating the viola- cause of their position on the supply chain. tions’ relation to drug policy and drug traf- By examining each country, we hope to un- ficking organizations. derstand how different prohibition policies shape human rights outcomes. Knowing this, the Human Rights Founda- tion initiated its War on Drugs Research The Human Rights Foundation (HRF) is a Project to examine data and existing re- nonpartisan nonprofit organization that search on the global drug war’s costs and promotes and protects human rights glob- consequences in order to understand drug ally, with a focus on closed societies. HRF’s policy from a human rights perspective. focus shapes the scope of this report. The The resulting report is organized in two organization focuses on civil and political parts. The first offers a high-level intro- rights: the rights to free expression, belief, duction to the drug war’s history and eco- assembly, association, press; to liberty and nomics. It explains how prohibition was security of the person; to access information; to political participation and to vote; in government, and corruption; and a dete- i For more information, and, of course, to life, among others. As rioration of rule of law and electoral com- see https://hrf.org/re- search_posts/political-re- many of these rights constitute the defini- petition. The report’s findings suggest that, gime-map/ tion of liberal democracy, HRF research from a human rights perspective, there pays special attention to the political sys- must be a shift from international drug tems of countries in which human rights policies that focus on criminalization and violations take place. In this report, this supply reduction, to ones that have human means that we have taken special care to rights and health at their core. understand how the drug war interacts with and affects a country’s democratic health. Colombia, Mexico, and the United States are all categorized as democratic countries under HRF’s Political Regime Re- search Project,i which categorizes all countries in the world into regime types using a methodology adapted from the one presented in Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in Competitive Authoritarianism.1

It is well established that prohibition has failed to reduce consumption and abuse. But prohibition is not just ineffective; it’s harmful. This report shows how prohibition’s policies have directly caused severe human rights violations in affected countries, especially by undermining civil and political rights to such a degree that these policies constitute a threat to democracy. Supply-centric policies have had grave consequences for individuals, communities, and the health of democratic institutions, including high rates of violence, disappearances, kidnappings, and incarceration; impacts on local communities and minority populations; state instability, lack of trust PART I. AN INTRODUCTION TO PROHIBITION THE HISTORY OF PROHIBITION

Concerns with drug abuse have a long my, President Nixon reasoned, was so history, and prohibition — the banning pervasive that the United States would of drug production, sale, possession, be required to “wage a new, all-out of- and use — has been a popular policy fensive” across the world to defeat it.45 response from the start. This kind of language was greatly influential in establishing the war on drugs In 1810, the Qing Dynasty in China as a global struggle focused on elimi- passed the first narcotics law in the nating substance abuse. In fact, global world, banning opium mud and enforc- policy surrounding drugs has predomi- ing the death penalty for traffickers nantly been shaped by the United States’ and dealers as addiction began to rise.2 advocacy for an “absolutist prohibition Despite the restrictions, following the approach,”6 and while prohibition is a Opium Wars between Qing Dynasty matter of international law, the global and the British Empire, opium and co- drug war is widely considered a U.S.-led caine addiction and abuse continued campaign. to rise. By the start of the 20th century, influential American leaders, including The resultant international treaties U.S. Opium Commissioner Hamilton codified prohibition as the unified Wright, appointed in 1908, had begun global drug policy, limiting describing drugs as a “curse” and moral the legal use of drugs to threat that must be removed entirely scientific use and medical from society. Following U.S. leadership, treatment. After more than in 1909, world powers convened in 100 years of international Shanghai for the Opium Commission, prohibition policy, the which aimed to find a collective way drug market is alive and to eliminate “drug abuse” once and for well, though underground. all.3 This initial meeting, along with the The rhetoric calling for the Paris Convention in 1931, established elimination of drugs from the modern framework of narcotics society has not been trans- control, which was finally formalized lated into successful policy. in a series of documents and treaties Given this, many have from the 1960s onwards: the U.N. Single argued that the complete U.S. President Richard Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, removal of drugs from society is simply Nixon (Photo from the the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention unachievable. Nevertheless, this goal United States Library on Psychotropic Substances, and, fi- has shaped policy discussions: The of Congress) nally, the United Nations Convention sessions that produced the 1998 U.N. Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs Convention on drugs was convened un- and Psychotropic Substances of 1998. der the optimistic slogan, “a drug-free world, we can do it!”7 The term “war on drugs” was coined in 1971, by U.S. President Richard Nixon Similarly, though the treaties establish during an historic press conference a global mission (ending global drug where he identified “drug abuse” as consumption and abuse) with a general “public enemy number one.” This ene- policy guideline (prohibition), they did 2 not establish processes to coordinate ef- addicts, health services to drug users, ii For more information, see Francisco forts across nations. The guidelines es- or improve the socio-economic condi- Thoumi’s remarks at tablished by U.N. treaties give countries tions that lead to drug abuse. the 2018 Oslo Freedom a degree of freedom in battle drug use Forum: https://hrf. and trade within their borders, and as Many production and transit coun- org/research/war-on- a result, the strategies and harshness of tries have historically been low- to drugs. legislation vary considerably between middle-income countries, while states different jurisdictions. The only body with high rates of drug consumption created to unite member states was the tend to be wealthier. The United States International Narcotics Control Board and Western European countries are (INCB), which was charged with creat- the most common destinations for traf- ing a “global system of estimates” — i.e., fickers, as they can reach the biggest determining the quantity of narcotics markets there. To many that have suf- that should be produced in order to fered the consequences of the war on meet medical and scientific needs, so drugs, this supply-centric approach is that states could regulate above that interpreted as10 the West and the United threshold to prevent excess crops from States forcing other countries to make ending up in the black market. Unfor- enormous sacrifices fighting their war, tunately, the INCB is widely considered while they fail to take real steps to ad- a failed project that has fallen victim to dress problems at home. political manipulation.8 The failure or lack of international bodies to coordi- In recent years, activists, policymakers, nate efforts across border causes some and other experts from production and of the inefficiencies and side effects9 transit countries, particularly in Latin discussed in the following section. America, have challenged prohibition as a paradigm. For example, Francisco Furthermore, as John Collins outlines Thoumi, an expert on drug in his 2012 article, “The Economics of a policy in Latin America, New Global Strategy,” the international has been using his position community also clearly established that on the INCB to push the prohibition would be enforced by police board to revise its hardline and the military using supply-centric approach to drug policy, policies, rather than demand-centric explaining that the current ones. That is, governments would build policies were imposed with- policies aimed at reducing the supply of out any discussion or anal- d r ugs, bel iev i ng t hat t h i s wou ld i nev ita- ysis of their effectiveness. bly lead to a reduction in consumption. ii Some states are following This meant that the burden of enforcing suit by decriminalizing or prohibition fell on countries where legalizing certain drugs, but drug crops are cultivated (known as these efforts have not yet “production countries”) or countries translated to change at the An advertisement that are along trade routes (known as international level. underground. The for the 1942 movie, “transit countries”). The supply-side fo- rhetoric calling for the elimination of “Devil’s Harvest” cus deemphasized the international ob- drugs from society has not been trans- (Photo from IMDB) ligation of governments of “destination lated to change at the international countries” to provide rehabilitation for level. 3 THE ECONOMICS OF THE ILLICIT MARKET

Prohibition and other forms of sweep- The supply chain for illicit drugs like ing government intervention in the opium and cocaine moves along un- economy — such as price controls — in derstood geographic routes, from pro- general generate black markets. Even duction countries, to transit countries, though black markets have existed to destination countries. This is in part since as long as governments have, it because some drug crops, like the coca has been only since the second half of leaves that are made into cocaine, can the 20th century that economists have only grow in certain regions and con- taken up the challenge of modeling ditions. Other crops, like marijuana, do their fluctuations. International politi- not have this limitation. cal economy and international security scholars have examined illicit markets Another explanation is that certain to understand how and why policies states lend themselves better to con- translate into violence — yet this is still ducting criminal activity on a larger an underdeveloped field, as well. It has scale. In his book Narconomics, jour- been generally established that black nalist Tom Wainwright rejigs the markets operate very similarly to legal World Economic Forum’s data from markets, with the important exception the “Global Competitiveness Report” that its participants cannot rely on the to create the “Cartel Competitiveness state to enforce contracts. As a result, Report.” The index builds from the in black markets, contract enforce- hypothesis that cartels prefer to set ment through violence is common, up shop in countries with weak insti- particularly when state presence is tutions that lend themselves better weak).11 Additionally, there is the gen- to conducting large-scale criminal eral awareness that businessmen in activity. Wainwright focuses on the in- this shady industry do tend to diversify dicators for “diversion of public funds, — for example, drug cartels are likely trust in politicians, bribery, judicial to also gain money through extortion. independence, favoritism in decisions Knowing this, many experts have be- by governments, business costs of gun using the terms “drug trafficking crime and violence, presence of orga- organizations” (DTOs) or “transna- n i zed crime, reliability of the police, and tional criminal organizations” (TCOs) the ethical behavior of firms.”12 (These to refer to diversified cartels. Much qualities are “helpful” to criminals, of what we know about black market Wainwright writes: “The WEF’s ranking forces is through observation, and re- could almost have been designed with quires further empirical investigation. drug cartels in mind.”)13 The new cartel Still, economists, political scientists, index, applied to Central America, does journalists, and other experts working seem to mirror reality: Countries with on drug prohibition specifically have stronger and less corruptible states identified various trends in how illicit (Costa Rica, Panama) receive the highest markets operates that provide useful scores, while countries with corruptible insight for policy. or untrustworthy states (Guatemala, Honduras) have the lowest scores, indi- 4 cating that they are better for cartels. • Criminalization of drugs sale, pos- These rankings track well with violence session, and use, and the prosecu- levels, a proxy for cartel activity. tion of cases through the criminal justice system Wainwright’s work provides data to back the generally accepted idea that il- In response to the negative outcomes of licit drugs pass through countries with these policies (described in detail later weaker institutions or borders to enter in this report), reformers have advo- countries with the largest number of cated new approaches, including harm consumers. And it’s important to note reduction, an approach that aims to that some of these indicators — judicial reduce the negative consequences of independence, favoritism, etc. — are also drug use instead of aiming to end drug related to a country’s democratic health. use altogether. These policies are generally demand-centric and give special Along the drug supply path, there are emphasis to improving healthcare pro- five separate agents: farmers, pro- vision and outcomes for addicts. Such ducers, traffickers, consumers, and reform movements are important to governments. Common drug policies, recognize as a potential path forward, following the international model, though examining the effectiveness of focus on disrupting the supply chain their alternative policies falls out of the to prevent drugs from reaching users, scope of this report. therefore focusing the most resources and time on policies that affect farmers, Existing analyses have provided use- producers, and traffickers. The most ful insight into the failings of drug common prohibitionist policies include: prohibition policies. For example, econom ists have show n t hat t hose most • Crop eradication, where state au- effected by supply-side policies tend to thorities, very often soldiers, phys- be the most vulnerable on the supply ically destroys drug crops by hand chain: the farmers, who almost always or through other means such as receive less than 1 percent14 of the to- aerial spraying, the use of planes to tal profit. In fact, current policies may spray destructive chemicals onto actually be helping cartels. In a 2010 drug crops to render them useless paper, Rómulo Chumacero proposed a for drug production. new model, based on previous obser- vations of similar markets, that ana- • Interdiction, intercepting drug ship- lyzes how supply-centric prohibition ments as they move up the supply policies affect each agent in the supply chain, often at border crossings. chain.15 Among the most illuminating conclusions, which has since been • Militarization, where the state corroborated by empirical research, is responds to drug traffickers as a that increasing government spending national security threat, deploying on law enforcement or the military can army regiments and using military actually benefit drug cartels.16 Crop tactics to combat drug producers eradication efforts can be somewhat and traffickers. effective in reducing the supply in a specific region, but they actually seem 5 to increase the profits of cartels that book is that drug policy would be better control drug traffic, thus ensuring that understood if we apply basic economic the more violent parts of the supply principles to cartels, rather than treat- chain continue operating. Chumacero ing them like some kind of hostile and also modelled the effect of stiffer pen- unknowable enemy. In his book, Wain- alties for violating drug laws. He found wright points to several cases where that when stiffer measures are applied governments have revealed their com- across the board, the ones who end up plete obliviousness about the drug mar- suffering the most are, again, farmers ket. For example, in 2010, after Mexican and consumers, while traffickers and authorities seized 134 producers actually benefit from more metric tons of marijuana, punitive laws. Despite decades-long the biggest single drug efforts to reduce supply, the power of bust in history at the Mexican cartels has grown tremen- time, reports estimated dously in the past few decades. the worth of the drugs to be $340 million. But Another important insight has been after analyzing this case the discovery of the “balloon effect,” through a basic economic wherein policy changes in one country model, Wainwright found have been observed to affect neigh- that the real value of the boring countries, as well as other links seizure was less than 3 along the supply chain. The balloon percent of that amount.18 effect reflects the lack of coordination Mexican authorities had at the international level. When au- mistakenly applied the Coca leaves thorities in one country apply greater retail price of marijuana to estimate pressure to the drug industry, through the value of the seizure, rather than the increased crop eradication, for exam- wholesale price, which is much lower. ple, this can lead to greater competition and violence in other parts of the supply How, he asks, are government supposed chain, or can prompt cartels to shift op- to write and enforce good policies if erations to another, friendlier country. they lack an understanding of basic eco- (Cartels’ movement from one country to nomics? Cartels, he writes, are like any another in response to policy changes other business: they relocate to coun- is also sometimes called the “cockroach tries with more favorable climates; they effect.”17) Several cases of this phenom- compete and collude; they launch PR enon have been observed in the last two campaigns. By viewing cartels through decades, though economists have not this frame, we can better understand studied the effect in detail. why operate in the way do, and can write better policies to regulate them. In addition to examining the poor outcomes of existing drug policies, ana- A competing view of cartels comes from lysts have also argued that drug policies another journalist, Ioan Grillo, who are hampered by policymakers’ and argues that cartels could be considered economists’ inability to properly con- a “criminal insurgency” whose actions ceive of cartels as market or state actors. are an attack on the state itself. When The central argument of Wainwright’s cartels target police and soldiers for 6 violent attacks and kidnappings, when COST AND OUTCOMES they organize marches against the army, OF SUPPLY-CENTRIC, when they interfere in elections, they PROHIBITIONIST POLICIES are engaging in warfare against the Drug policy experts have argued that government, with the eventual aim of prohibitionist policies entail a lack of “state capture.” “When a cartel controls understanding of market dynamics a territory,” Grillo explains, “it becomes in pursuit of a goal that is unclear a shadow local government, one that of- or unachievable. Since the official ficials and businessmen have to answer declaration of the drug war in 1971, the to.”19 The insurgency has achieved some United States alone has spent upwards success: Criminal groups have infiltrat- of $640 billion on the war on drugs.22 ed and corrupted state officials, police, Other estimates of the costs of the war and even the press. are even higher — American Progress reports that it has cost the United States It could be easy to see this insurgency more than $1 trillion.23 And these perspective as justification for a mili- numbers only include federal spending. tarized response to cartels — yet recent Furthermore, according to Transform history has also shown that militariza- Drug Policy’s report, “Count the Costs,” tion does not reduce the amount of global annual spending exceeds $100 drugs trafficked, and actually increases billion.24 But has the world actually violence levels by creating more compe- made progress in reducing drug abuse? tition, as will be discussed further in the Do the results justify the cost? Mexico case study below.20 Instead, what we find insightful about Grillo’s analy- The architects of international sis is his systematic view of how cartel prohibition argued that successful, violence impacts and changes state in- supply-side policies would decrease stitutions, which lays the groundwork the amount of drugs produced, which for our argument here: that cartels and would thereby make drugs more costly the prohibitionist policies that empow- at the retail level. As a result, fewer er them present an existential threat to potential users would be willing or democratic governments.21 able to afford the drugs, decreasing consumption levels and, therefore, Currently, drug policies are driven by reducing addiction and abuse. Below, the stubborn vilification of drugs and we look at these metrics to understand drug users, and the misguided belief whether drug policy has been effective. that eliminating supply is possible and desirable. Though journalists, academ- First, drug production has not declined ics, and economists are making strides steadily since the implementation of toward a fuller understanding of how prohibition; instead, it has fluctuated illicit markets operate, these findings so dramatically in response to state-level far have not been reflected in any reca- policy changes. The U.N. World Drug librations of global policy. And the cur- Report notes that opium production rent policies are simply not working. jumped by 65 percent between 2016 and 2017. Afghanistan, the world’s number one source of opium, saw an 87

7 percent increase in production in that impacted global trends. This is the same time period. The U.N. attributed result of poor coordination between this spike “political instability, lack states at the international level. of government control, and reduced Fluctuations like these highlight the economic opportunities for rural international nature of drug policy communities.” — the basic fact that changes in one country’s approach to prohibition can At the same time, cocaine production have a dramatic impact on others. But has reached the “highest level ever” more than that, it shows that gains — 1,410 tons, in 2016, a marked in reducing drug production can be increase from previous years that had staggeringly short-lived. Colombia had noted a decline. The U.N. finds that reduced coca production dramatically, this increase is due to a spike in coca reaching historic lows in 2013. In just production in Colombia, which was four years, by 2017, Colombia was back caused by “a number of reasons related to producing three times that amount, to market dynamics, the strategies undoing the work of a decade. of trafficking organizations, and expectations in some communities of Second, reductions in drug supply receiving compensation for replacing does not correspond with changes in coca bush cultivation, as well as a decreases in drug price at the retail reduction in alternative development level. As seen in the chart below, interventions and in eradication.” In retail prices cocaine prices have not both cases, the U.N. has found that fluctuated along with the market — changing local circumstances hugely instead, we see a steady decline.

Retail Cocaine Prices in the United States 180

160 140

120

100

80 60

Retail price (2016 USD/gram) (2016 price Retail 40 20

0 1991 2011 1997 1996 1993 1992 1995 1994 1998 1999 2012 2013 2016 2015 2014 1990 2010 2001 2007 2002 2003 2006 2009 2005 2008 2004 2000

Source: UNODC, 201933

8 In fact, economists have challenged the Finally, data show that changes in very logic underpinning the argument production and retail cost have not that declining supply would yield impacted demand. According to UNODC increases in retail price, because drug data, the prevalence of drug use disorder consumers are inherently different has changed very little since 1990. In from buyers of other, legal products. fact, between 1990 and 2016, drug use Notably, addicts are not as concerned disorder rates among U.S. adults has with price as the average buyer in a gradually increased from 2.99 percent legal market. Furthermore, the nature to 3.31 percent. In that same timeframe, of the drug supply chain works in a Western European rates have hovered way that negates scarcity issues at the around an average of 1.17 percent. supply-end. Tom Wainwright notes However, the U.N. reports that in 2016, that cartels have not had to increase just one in six people suffering from prices even when eradication has drug use disorders received treatment been particularly effective, because — a proportion that has also remained they operate as monopsonies: In any constant over time.28 given geographical area, farmers are only able to sell coca, the raw material Despite billions of dollars in spending for cocaine, to cartels that control the on prohibition, drug abuse remains a territory in which their farms are significant concern both in the United located.25 This means that farmers are States and abroad. According to the not able to dictate the price of their crop U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s 2018 and sell to the highest bidder. Rather, Drug Threat Assessment Report, drug cartels are able to dictate the price they poisoning deaths caused by both licit are willing to pay — so if the price of and illicit drugs are “currently at their producing coca goes up, according to highest ever recorded level,” and are Wainwright, farmers bear this cost. “In “the leading cause of injury death in the other words,” he writes, “it’s not that United States,” outnumbering deaths by eradication strategy is having no effect. firearms, car crashes, and homicide.29 Rather, the problem is that its impact is felt by the wrong people”26 — the In some ways, it is difficult to assess farmers, instead of the cartels. Cartels how consumption rates have changed do not pay more for coca, so they do in the United States, because of a lack not have to sell cocaine at a higher cost of data. Between 2006 and 2010, the when it reaches its destination market. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported a 50 percent decrease in the As a result, we’ve seen the direct amount of cocaine consumed in the opposite of prohibition’s intended United States, a reduction that has effect: Retail prices have decreased.27 been hailed as a triumph. Notably, this The decrease here may reflect increased corresponded with a decrease in coca competition for territorial control, as production in Colombia. However, data drug cartels proliferated throughout from that same time period showed the 1990s and 2000s. Increased that there was very little change in the competition could have driven down number of users suffering from cocaine price. But more research will need to be use disorder.30 These data create a done to confirm this correlation. muddled picture, but seems to reflect 9 that decreases in consumption do not on this theory may not be forthcoming. necessarily translate into decrease in Two important sources of data, the abuse.31 That is, without investment Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring in healthcare options for addicts (as (ADAM) program and the Drug Abuse harm reduction campaigners suggest), Warning Network (DAWN), were prohibition policies are ineffective in recently defunded or discontinued.32 reducing abuse. Unfortunately, clarity

Drug Use Disorder in the United States and Western Europe 4

3.5 3

2.5

1.5

0.5

Drug disorder rates a % of adult (as population) 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Western Europe

United States

Source: OurWorldInData.org34

10 OVERVIEW

So, has the war on drugs achieved it We find that, in addition to failing to goals? It appears that current prohi- achieve their stated aim, prohibitionist bitionist, supply-centric goals have policies have been a significant burden not succeeded in decreasing drug pro- on production and transit countries, on duction, increasing retail prices, or farmers and affected communities, on reducing drug consumption or abuse, minority populations, on economies, at least on a global level. This failure and on drug users themselves. The alone should justify a revision of glob- case studies below — Colombia, Mex- al drug policy standards. ico, and the United States — will show how these dynamics play out along the We have already evaluated the costs of supply chain. prohibition in a monetary sense. The international community has spent bil- The failure of prohibitionist drug pol- lions on what seems to be an ongoing, icy has already been well-established failed experiment. But in the end, the by economists, political scientists, and war on drugs has cost far more than drug policy reformers. However, the money. The rest of this report will ex- direct connection between prohibition plore these additional costs by answer- and human rights abuses and demo- ing a much-neglected question: What cratic decline needs greater attention. impact have war on drugs-related poli- It is imperative that, going forward, cies had on human rights in production, human rights groups partner with transit, and destination countries? And, drug reform advocates to push for par- just as significantly, are the resulting adigmatic at an international level. human rights violations severe enough to constitute a threat to democracy?

11 PART II. CASE STUDIES

COLOMBIA: A PRODUCTION COUNTRY

MEXICO: A TRANSIT COUNTRY

THE UNITED STATES: A DESTINATION COUNTRY COLOMBIA A PRODUCTION COUNTRY GENERAL INFORMATION

iii Most of the world’s cocaine originates licit market has given armed, non-state Plan Colombia remained in place in Colombia. The drug’s raw material, actors an alternate source of funding. after the agreement the coca leaf, has been cultivated in the Prohibition’s simultaneity with con- was signed and was re- flict has meant that Colombia’s drug Andes for thousands of years, and is an named Peace Colombia. important part of indigenous culture policies were not necessarily aimed at in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Boliv- reducing consumption in the United ia. The actors in Colombia’s illicit mar- States and Europe, but at fighting an ket — which includes cartels, guerilla anti-democratic threat. groups, and paramilitaries — take advantage of the country’s mountainous The resulting prohibitionist policies geography, climate, and state weak- worked to eliminate the drug market ness in rural areas to cultivate coca, at its source through crop eradication, transform it into cocaine, and export aerial spraying, interdiction, and cap- the drug through a transit country to turing drug kingpins. These policies its ultimate destinations in the United were implemented and enforced with States and Europe. guidance and cooperation from the United States through Plan Colombia Colombia’s involvement in the illicit and, more recently, Peace Colombia. iii market goes back to the 1960s, but the Between 2000 and 2008 alone, Co- country only became a major produc- lombia and the United States spent a tion country in the mid-1990s, after combined amount of over $10 billion in Peru and Bolivia cracked down on coca military and law enforcement efforts production. By this time, Colombia’s to fight against “drugs and drug-relat- 37 major drug cartels, the Medellín and ed organized crime groups.” Cali cartels, had been dismantled by state security operations that targeted Ultimately, through the analysis in this the cartel leaders. As coca production case study, we find that prohibitionist shifted from Peru and Bolivia to Co- policies like interdiction were some- lombia, former cartel members formed what successful in weakening armed new groups to fill the void that the groups but failed to advance the world’s large cartels had left in the market, larger goals of reducing consumption and entered into the drug production and abuse. At the same time, these and trafficking business. Shortly there- policies were incredibly damaging to after, the country’s insurgent groups human rights: They directly caused a followed suit.35 host of human rights violations, and indirectly caused more by creating an In Colombia, it is impossible to discuss illegal market that provides violent ac- the drug war without also analyzing tors an important source of income. the armed conflict between the Colom- bian government and the Revolution- ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Colombia shares this characteristic with other production countries like Afghanistan36 and Burma, where the il- 14 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

Colombia’s recent civil conflict can to engage in the drug trade and operate trace its roots to the civil war called “La with the same ruthlessness and disre- Violencia,” which ravaged the country gard for human life as the AUC once did. in the 1950s. The conflict officially -end ed in 1958 with an agreement between Each of these actors — the FARC and the National Front and the Liberal ELN guerillas, the AUC, and BACRIMs Party that effectively outlawed other — used drug production and traffick- parties, and it was in this context that ing to raise revenue and exert control several far-left armed groups formed to over people and territories, though in challenge the state, including the FARC different ways. The AUC was involved and the People’s Liberation Army (ELN) in coca cultivation and cocaine produc- in the mid-1960s. These groups received tion from the start, though its involve- significant support and funding from ment became much more significant Cuba and the Soviet Union during the in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a Cold War, but as the Soviet Union began period that coincided with a spike in to crumble, this financial support dried drug-related violence. The FARC, in con- up. In the 1980s and especially in the trast, was only initially involved in the 1990s, the FARC and the ELN sought out trade because it taxed local producers alternate sources of funding, and found and smugglers around 10 percent per them in the drug industry. As demand kilogram of coca base38 and, later, by rose in the United States and more offering paid protection to cartelitos.39 actors entered the field, competition But eventually, the FARC, too, became for product and territory spiked, and, directly involved in coca cultivation. therefore, so did violence. Ironically, the government played a significant role in the FARC’s entry into When the Medellín and the Cali car- drug production: In 1999, it granted the tels collapsed in the early 1990s, they FARC more than 16,000 square miles of disintegrated into hundreds of smaller territory as a part of peace talk negotia- cartels (cartelitos). The large cartels’ tions. The FARC used this territory to in- paramilitary units — which were ini- crease its drug production, establishing tially created to protect cartels from in- links with the Tijuana cartel in Mexico surgent groups — took on lives of their and smugglers in Brazil. This provided own and eventually banded together to FARC a stable source of revenue and, form the United Self-Defense Forces of more importantly, allowed it to expand Colombia (AUC). Over the years, the AUC its territory and reach rural popula- became notorious for its gruesome tac- tions that had long been isolated from tics and killings, often targeting civil- the state.40 ians indiscriminately in its fight against FARC and the ELN. Eventually, in 2006, When coca production shifted to Co- the AUC was also dismantled, but many lombia in the late 1990s, these many of its members remain active in smaller criminal, insurgent, and paramili- criminal organizations called bandas tary groups began to compete more criminales (BACRIMs), which continue fiercely for control of coca-producing 15 territories, and violence and human economic development. Plan Colombia’s rights abuses spiked. The Colombian prohibitionist policies aimed to weak- government implemented prohibition- en drug cartels and armed insurgent ist policies in this context — not out groups by neutralizing their leaders of concern for drug users in the West, and disrupting cocaine supply chains but as a part of its counter-insurgency to reduce the value of the illicit econo- strategy. The policies followed the same my. The ultimate goal of Plan Colombia supply-centric logic that guides the was to defeat the FARC and the ELN and U.N. conventions, focusing on reducing to reduce cocaine supply by 50 percent the profitability of the drug market by by 2006.41 However, it quickly became targeting the start of the supply chain: clear that crop eradication efforts were coca cultivation. both ineffective and actively damaging to local communities, so in the second These policies took form in Plan Colom- half of the 2000s, Plan Colombia refo- bia, a 1999 security cooperation agree- cused on interdiction. This strategy was ment between Colombia and the United more successful, and coca production States, through which the United States decreased significantly.42 provided Colombia funding to launch crop eradication campaigns, buy and Notably, because the primary goal of build new military equipment, and its counternarcotics policy was to end train additional security personnel. A the internal conflict, the Colombian small fraction of this amount also went government sometimes adopted poli- to institution-building and alternative cies or strategies that ran counter to its

Coca production in Colombia vs. U.S. counternarcotics aid

180,000 1600

160,000 1400

140,000 1200

120,000 1000 100,000 800 80,000

Hectares 600 60,000 400 40,000 Millions 2019 of USD 20,000 200

0 0 2011 2017 2012 2013 2015 2016 2014 2001 2010 2007 2002 2003 2005 2006 2009 2008 2004 2000

Source: UNODC52 and Security Assistance Monitor.53 Data for U.S. counternarcotics aid to Colombia includes only aid from the Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance, and Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance.

16 anti-drug trafficking efforts. For exam- part of the coca leaf eradication efforts ple, though the AUC had been involved were extremely inefficient: Accord- in drug trafficking from its inception, ing to a study by Daniel Mejía, Pascual it held an unofficially neutral relation- Restrepo, and Sandra V. Rozo,46 using ship with the government because they aerial spraying to reduce the “cocaine shared a common enemy: the FARC. The retail supply by 1 kg via aerial spraying AUC was often spared retribution from campaigns is at least $1.6 billion dollars Colombian security forces after com- per year.” mitting atrocities, and even received funding from local politicians and Furthermore, the successful reduction elites in exchange for protection from in cocaine production was nearly invis- cartels and other armed groups. ible at the international level in that it had a limited effect on the drug market Nevertheless, the prohibitionist policies as a whole. Retail prices decreased, as were somewhat successful in reducing did consumption, meaning the demand the value of Colombia’s drug trade and for drugs was generally unaffected. weakening armed groups. From 2001 However, data on abuse and prevalent to 2013, coca cultivation dropped from use (the number of people who con- 160,000 hectares to 48,000 hectares. sumed the drug in the past month but In the same period, AUC forces were not for the first time) tell a different demobilized and, four years later, in story. In the United States, Colombian 2017, the Colombian government final- cocaine’s main destination country, ly signed a peace agreement with the the number of first-time users and the FARC that included several provisions number of cocaine-induced overdoses aimed at ending crop production and are now above 2007 levels.47 Prevalent establishing crop substitution and ru- use dropped initially in the mid-2010s, ral development programs.43 That year, but has since bounced back.48 In the the estimated value of the drug trade European Union, another important dropped to approximately $2.7 billion, destination for Colombian cocaine, co- down from $4.5 billion in 2013.44 caine prevalence will likely rise in the coming years.49 And successes in Colom- However, these victories were costly. bia meant losses in other parts of the Plan Colombia, and now Peace Colom- world: There is evidence that the sharp bia, is one of the largest aid packages reduction in cocaine supply from Co- given by the United States to a single lombia between 2006 and 2009 caused a country in the past 40 years, only sur- balloon effect, leading to increased car- passed by the direct military and tel activity and competition later in the humanitarian aid given to war-torn supply chain. According to empirical Iraq and Afghanistan (countries with research by Juan Castillo, Daniel Mejía, their own drug-funded conflicts). The and Pascual Restrepo, this effect caused amount of resources spent on the mili- 10 to 14 percent of the homicides that tary component alone of Plan Colombia took place in Mexico during President between 2000 and 2008 amounted to 1.1 Felipe Calderón’s term. 50 percent of Colombia’s GDP.45 Further- more, the aerial spraying campaigns Additionally, successes in decreas- that were used for several years as a ing coca production and neutralizing 17 anti-government actors have been point since 2007. Indeed, the FARC is short-lived. Though Colombia’s coun- no longer around to capitalize on this ternarcotics and counterterrorism increase in production, but BACRIMs strategies saw the demise of several seem to be taking their place along sup- criminal organizations — the Medellín ply chains, opening the doors for future Cartel, the Cali cartel, the AUC, and the violence and conflict. The Colombian FARC — many members of these groups government may well find it harder to continue to be active in the drug trade fight many groups as opposed to just through smaller, fragmentary groups, one, and these actors are likely to re- like BACRIMs and cartelitos.51 Today, main in the drug trade as long there is a coca leaf production is at its highest profit to be made there.

COSTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

VIOLENCE VS. THE RIGHT TO LIFE

The murder rate in Colombia was one insurgent and paramilitary groups to of the highest in Latin America in the enrich themselves and wage a fiercer 1990s and part of the 2000s, peaking and bloodier war against the state. The at 72 murders per 100,000 people in second spike in the chart coincided with 1994, and rising nearly to the same ra- the FARC and the AUC entering into drug tio in 2001. It has been estimated that production in the late 1990s. As competi- between 1994 and 2011, over 30 percent tion for the drug market escalated, and of these homicides were directly related as insurgent and paramilitary groups to the presence of the successful, illegal became increasingly powerful, homi- cocaine market,54 a market that only cide rates rose to historic levels, finally exists because of state- and internation- peaking at nearly 72 per 100,000. al-level drug prohibition. Homicide rates have decreased in Co- Research shows that the illicit drug lombia in the years since the implemen- trade played a crucial role in the tation of Plan Colombia. It’s important high level of murder rates and the to note, though, that interdiction alone empowerment of criminal and terrorist may not have caused this decrease in organizations.55 For example, in the violence. At the same time, Colombia’s 1980s, when the Medellín and Cali democratic institutions improved sig- cartels were at the height of their power, nificantly. A lso, the FARC and the AUC ac- drug trafficking operations were a tually began working together on drug major driver of high homicide rates trafficking,57 and this collusion could in cities.56 In the chart below, the first have reduced competition and violence. increase in homicide rates coincides with the growth of the big cartels. Colombia’s experimentation with various prohibitionist strategies of- From the 1990s onward, the global fers useful information about their demand for a new source of coca led relationship to violence. Many state

18 counternarcotics strategies aimed at found that whenever drug kingpins harming insurgents and cartels actu- were captured, other groups competed ally misfired. Eradication, for example, to take control of their territories, caus- not only failed to reduce drug producing violence to spike locally.60 tion, but also exacerbated violence in poor, drug-producing regions. In the Violence levels in Colombia were also 1980s and up until the fall of the Cali impacted by policy changes in other and Medellín cartels, much of the countries. In the mid-1990s, Peru and Bo- country’s violence was located in the livia adopted hardline policies against largest cities, since these contained the coca farming. These prohibitionist ports where much of Colombia’s cocaine policies were effective in reducing was packed and shipped. However, as supply, as they were in Colombia in the Colombia became the world’s largest early 2000s. And in the same way, Peru coca leaf producer, violence shifted to and Bolivia’s mid-1990s implementa- coca producing regions, where crimi- tion of prohibition likewise impacted nal organizations and guerrillas fought the supply chain and shifted violence to control farmland.58 Lower income, elsewhere. When sourcing coca in Peru rural departments such as Guaviare in and Bolivia became too difficult, cartels the southeast and Norte de Santander went to Colombia to find a new source of on the Venezuelan border, have ranked cocaine, and they brought violence with among the most violent regions in the them. The increase in potential drug rev- country since the late 1990s. 59 enues in Colombia, and resulting heightened competition, directly contributed Colombia has had success in disman- to some of the highest levels of violence tling cartels and insurgent and para- the country has ever seen. Similarly, military groups by targeting their successful interdiction efforts in con- leaders; however, some studies have sumer countries and a small increase in

Homicide rates in Colombia

70 FARC’s direct involvement in the drug trade 60

50 War against Medellin and Cali cartels 40

Homicides per 100,000 people 100,000 per Homicides 0 1991 2011 1987 1997 2017 1996 1993 1992 1995 1989 1986 1985 1999 1998 1994 2012 2013 1988 2016 2015 2018 2014 1990 2010 2001 2007 2002 2003 2006 2009 2005 2008 2004 2000

Source: Based on chart by Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo from “Ending the War on Drugs,” with data from World Bank and InsightCrime106

19 Cocaine Production in Colombia vs. Homicide Rates in Mexico Homicides per 100,000 people 600 25

500 20 400 in Mexico 15 300 10 200

in Colombia (mt) in Colombia 100 5 0 0 Monthly cocaine production cocaine Monthly 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

consumption in the United States in the 3,000 civilians were summarily execut- Source: Based on a chart by Daniel Mejía mid-2000s contributed significantly to ed by the Colombian army between 2000 and Pascual Restrepo the rising number of homicides in Co- and 2015, and both the United Nations in “Ending the War on Drugs”107 lombia’s drug-producing regions.61 and Human Rights Watch concluded that extrajudicial killings were indeed Furthermore, when interdiction efforts systematic.62 succeeded in reducing drug production in Colombia, violence dropped in Co- In recent years, many of these cases lombia, but shifted to other countries have been brought to trial, and some of along the supply chain. This includes the officers who knew, covered up, or or- Mexico, as seen in the chart above. dered the killings have been punished; however, many obstacles to justice and It’s crucial to note, though, that not all reparations remain, especially within the violence during this period was per- the military. petrated by insurgents and criminals. Supply-focused counterinsurgency INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT strategies meant that many military OF PEOPLE campaigns against the FARC took place in remote, rural areas where coca is pro- Drug eradication policies and the em- duced — and poor, rural communities powerment of armed groups through were caught in the crossfire. In 2008, an the illicit market has also led to high investigation revealed that army units numbers of internally displaced persons were actually killing thousands of civil- (IDPs). Nearly 6 million people have been ians and presenting them as guerillas internally displaced during the broader or paramilitaries in order to prove that armed conflict, 139,000 of whom were their counterinsurgency campaigns forced to leave their homes in 2017 were turning out “positive” results. This alone.63 Even after the FARC peace deal became known as the “false positives” was ratified 2016, the number of newly scandal. It is estimated that around displaced people due to violence con- 20 tinued to increase each year, reaching cres.”67 Furthermore, there is evidence 145,000 people in 2018. Afro-Colombi- that the government’s eradication ans and indigenous populations are campaigns have also contributed to disproportionately affected, since their Colombia’s large IDPs population. In the populations are often concentrated in early 2000s, Colombia focused its coun- areas controlled by drug trafficking or- ternarcotics policies on aerial spraying ganizations and insurgent groups.64 For and on-the-ground destruction of crops example, in 2013, nearly 50 percent of by the military. These efforts, and fu- all IDPs were of Afro-Colombian descent migation in particular, wiped out not and nearly 25 percent were from indige- just illicit crops, but also the licit agri- nous communities.65 Additionally, near- cultural production of thousands of ly 80 percent of all IDPs in Colombia are farmers, forcing many of them to flee women or children.66 their homes.68 In fact, some analysts argue that if eradication policies succeed- The violence fueled by the war on drugs ed in reducing coca production, it was has contributed significantly to the because of the disruption and human number of IDPs. As conflict over co- rights abuses, not in spite of them. The ca-growing territory increased, many displacement of farmers both licit and Colombians abandoned their lands, illicit, and heightened competition over often after being subjected to “intim- undamaged territory, caused produc- idation, forced disappearances, death tion to decrease.69 threats, assassinations, and massa-

Total Number of People Internally Displaced by Violence

2 Millions of people of Millions

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Colombia Syrian Arab Republic Iraq DRC

Source: World Bank and IDMC108

21 Today, Colombia still has one of the Furthermore, recent evidence suggests largest IDP populations in the world. that the glyphosates used in aerial While the flow of additional IDPs per spraying have caused serious harm to year decreased after the AUC and the the environment,75 threatening the live- FARC were demobilized, criminal or- lihoods of not only coca farmers, but ganizations such as BACRIMS continue those who work with licit crops as well. to proliferate and fight over territory, engaging in violent activities. IDP num- INCREASE OF SICKNESS bers could continue to rise in the future, AND DISEASE as they did in 2018.70 Aerial spraying of glyphosates has also IMPOVERISHMENT OF been connected to poor health outcomes THE RURAL POOR in crop-growing regions. There is now clear scientific evidence that the in- The connection between violence and its discriminate use of these herbicides detrimental effect on economic develop- increased respiratory diseases and ment has been well established both the- even caused spontaneous abortions oretically and empirically, especially in in these regions.76 Furthermore, there Latin America.71 This has been particu- is evidence that the use of glyphosates larly true in the case of Colombia, where, in countries like Brazil has increased according to the Institute of Economics child mortality in communities sur- and Peace, violence in all its forms cost rounding the crops treated with them.77 the country over a third of its GDP, or $233 billion in 2017.72 Additionally, sup- The Colombian government faced sig- ply-focused eradication efforts in the nificant criticism for the effect aerial 2000s amounted to 1.1 percent of GDP, spraying had on local farmers, which is according to estimates by Daniel Mejia. one reason that it shifted toward interdiction policies and capturing kingpins All in all, supply-focused eradication in the mid-2000s. Targeting cocaine strategies have led to worsening condi- labs and drug shipments has had no im- tions in poor, rural areas. In effect, these pact on the environment and left fewer policies harmed poor farmers the most, innocent victims in its wake — at least since there is evidence that coca cultiva- in Colombia. tion is more likely to take place in areas with weak state presence and moderate CORRUPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW levels of poverty.73 The illicit drug trade has helped fuel Research by Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila corruption in Colombia for many years, Amin Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Kevin and this was especially true during the M. Curtin also shows that violence is 1980s and 1990s. Francisco Thoumi,78 a more closely tied to government eradi- member of the INCB, explains that the cation policies than guerilla behavior is structure of the Colombian economy to coca cultivation, and that eradication made it very difficult to launder large and human rights abuses committed by amounts of money without access to public forces appear to exacerbate con- established social and political net- flict in rural areas.74 works. If drug traffickers wished to 22 use the money they gained in the illicit CORRUPTION AND ELECTORAL economy, then they had to infiltrate INTEGRITY the political system. During the early and mid-1980s, Colombian drug cartels Corruption has also tainted the demo- accumulated an immense amount of cratic process in Colombia, as criminals wealth and power, and they sought to had the financial means to influence use those advantages to influence the legislation by bribing or extorting pol- political process. When anti-corrup- iticians. In addition to electing Escobar tion efforts increased, drug trafficking to the legislature, the Medellín cartel organizations paradoxically became also exerted its influence by influenc- more and more involved in the political ing a significant number of politicians, process, using bribes and extortion to and after its dissolution, its successor prevent their prosecution at home or ex- organizations continued to operate tradition to the United States.79 Perhaps in a similar fashion. Armed groups in the most infamous and successful case Colombia had great incentive to manip- of infiltration of politics by criminal or- ulate elections to give an advantage to ganizations was the notorious drug lord politicians whose crime and conflict Pablo Escobar’s successful bid to become resolution platforms better conformed a congressman,80 a move that granted with their interests. These tactics in- him parliamentary immunity. cluded voter intimidation, electoral violence, and even overt vote-rigging.84 A As the case of Colombia clearly illus- clear example of this came to light with trates, and as Thoumi explains, corrup- the parapolitics scandals in the early tion generated by the illicit drug trade 2000s, where demobilized can seriously cripple a country’s formal paramilitaries engaged in and informal institutions. It weakened the drug trade funded the Colombia’s judicial system, as it often campaigns of as many as 60 put judges in the position of having to of the president’s coalition accept bribes to save their own lives.81 members in the 2002 gener- 85 In the 1980s many judges, law enforce- al election. ment officials, and others who dared to go after powerful drug lords like Es- After the 1998 election saw Drug kingpin Pablo cobar ended up in their crosshairs, as the weakening of the two major politi- Escobar attends a cal parties, Colombia saw an upsurge in the cases of Medellín Judge Gustavo Congressional hearing Zuluaga82 and Justice Minister Rodrigo in smaller, third parties, which created during his term as Lara,83 both of whom paid the ultimate new opportunities for election manip- a representative 86 price. Poorly paid police officers and ulation. Daron Acemoglu, James A. (Photo from Colombia army personnel were also targeted for Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos point Reports) bribes and extortion. These impacts se- to this proliferation of third parties riously weakened the rule of law, as the as evidence that paramilitaries were temptation to accept money from insur- becoming more involved in elections, gent and paramilitary actors “weakens since many of these groups had ties to the moral restrictions necessary for armed groups. Paramilitary-controlled citizens to respect laws regarding prop- regions were more likely to elect third erty and economic activities.” parties; politicians in these regions were more likely to support laws that

23 were more lenient toward armed ac- competition. These dynamics have also tors; and senators in these areas were seriously harmed citizens’ trust in the more likely to later be arrested for cor- government.94 When criminal organi- ruption.87 Acemoglu and his cowriters zations infiltrate formal institutions, also explain that this is a “symbiotic re- the general public cannot perceive any lationship”88 — knowing that paramil- distinction between violent criminal itaries could influence vote outcomes, organizations and the state. Further- politicians were disincentivized to more, corruption and intimidation eliminate them. make it difficult for politicians to enact meaningful reforms, even if they have Many politicians maintained their ties public support. Even in recent years, af- to criminal organizations for years. ter a decade of security improvements, More recently, in 2015 over 600 gov- the perceived level of corruption in ernment officials were arrested89 for Colombia has increased,95 even as cit- suspected ties with Los Urabeños,90 a izen’s overall faith in democracy has violent drug trafficking organization declined.96 whose origins can be traced back to former members of the AUC. Though CHILLING EFFECT ON JOURNALISTS AND recent years have seen the government CIVIL SOCIETY end the civil conflict with the FARC and enact meaningful reforms to strength- Although Colombia has had a long dem- en its institutions, corruption remains ocratic tradition and opposition views a threat. As Jeremy McDermott from are common in the press, journalists InsightCrime recently explained, drug have faced harsh working conditions for trafficking organizations still see cor- decades. According to the Committee to ruption as the best way to infiltrate Protect Journalists (CPJ), more than 50 governments in Colombia and other journalists have been killed in Colombia countries in Latin America.91 since 1992.97 Nearly half of these murders were perpetrated by paramilitary While paramilitaries used coercion to or criminal groups with ties to the drug win votes for their candidates, insur- trade. In 2001, the CPJ went so far as to gent groups like the FARC worked to name Carlos Castaño, the then-leader of suppress turnout.92 Jorge Gallego the AUC, as one of the top 10 enemies of finds that guerilla violence is signifi- the press in the world.98 Even today, af- cantly higher in election years, while ter the demobilization of paramilitary paramilitary violence is lower, reflect- groups and the signing of the peace deal ing the different strategies for electoral with the FARC, Freedom House reports manipulation by these different in- that journalists continue to face “intim- terest groups. When guerilla violence idation, kidnapping, and violence” for increased by one unit (per 100,000 reporting on criminal organizations.99 population), voter turnout decreased by Impunity has also been a problem, as almost 4 percent.93 most cases of intimidation and even murder have gone unsolved. Electoral violence and intimidation increase the costs of democratic par- In recent years, there have been ef- ticipation, reducing voter turnout and forts to prosecute these crimes, but 24 journalists in Colombia continue to CONCLUSION operate in an atmosphere of self-censorship and fear. In analyzing Colombia as a case study, we aimed to understand how prohibi- Colombia’s civil society is vibrant and tion, from the eradication policies of the diverse, and while the government pro- 1990s to the implementation of Plan Co- vides guarantees for nongovernmental lombia and Peace Colombia, worsened organizations, activists face serious human rights conditions in the country. challenges while carrying out their The illicit market took pre-existing work in the country. According to Free- challenges — internal conflict, state dom House, “the threat of violent repri- weakness in the country’s peripheries, sal poses a major obstacle to freedom of corruption, etc. — and amplified their association,” as many Afro-Colombian, effects. The black market gave armed indigenous, and land rights activists groups a source of funding that en- are routinely threatened and harassed riched them enough to cause a serious by drug trafficking organizations and and lasting threat to the state, and to the guerrilla groups that splintered from right to life of civilians. Furthermore, the AUC and the FARC. Even though prohibition created incentives for state general murder rates have declined in officials to partake in corruption and recent years, violence against human abuse their power, decreasing trust in rights defenders and activists has in- the government. Ultimately, prohibi- creased substantially. The special rap- tion policies have indirectly degraded porteur on the situation of human rights the country’s democratic institutions defenders issued a warning about this and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. trend as recently as December 2018,100 and the U.N.’s high commissioner for Supply-centric strategies, meanwhile, human rights documented over 50 ac- have directly harmed individuals’ tivist deaths in that year alone.101 health, economic development, and environment. Thankfully, the Colombian Although the Colombian state is not government recognized the harm these the main threat to the freedom of the strategies were causing and shifted its press and civil society, it has struggled efforts toward interdiction and criminal tremendously over the years to provide justice. Additionally, thanks to demands its citizens with adequate protections. from civil society and the international The country’s historically weak insti- community, a fraction of the resources tutions were threatened for decades by devoted to the broader fight against drug a bloody armed conflict and the prolif- trafficking and non-state armed groups eration of the illicit drug trade. Nowa- was also spent on the professionalization days, criminal organizations continue of the armed forces and the police, as wel l to threaten the small but important in- as the strengthening of the judiciary. stitutional gains the country has made This led to a significant improvement of over the years. Colombia’s institutions and contributed to the country’s development, improved the security situation, and ensured the continuation of its democracy.

25 However, future reforms seem both democratic gains and bring back vio- difficult and unlikely. International lence and impunity. prohibition is now codified in Article 49 of Colombia’s constitution,102 and was But perhaps the most significant finding included as a condition of the state’s of this case study is the extent to which peace deal with the FARC. Legalizing conditions in one country can affect or even decriminalizing drugs, for ex- another. Colombia’s crop production ample, will require a protracted legis- economy exists largely because of hard- lative process. Nearly three years after line prohibitionist laws that caused a the signing of the peace agreement, decrease in production in Peru and Bo- Colombia sits at a crossroads. Despite livia. Likewise, successes in Colombia Colombia’s history of progressive laws pushed traffickers to other markets. A on drug possession and consumption, lack of coordination among states means there are now calls for a return to that, at the international level, any of harsher penalties for drug users.103 The prohibition’s local successes zero out. rise in coca leaf cultivation and cocaine Furthermore, its victories even at the production out of Colombia has caused local level have been very short-lived, serious concern in both Washington as Colombia’s past and present make and Bogotá, and Colombia’s new leader- evident. Though Colombia’s interaction ship is now considering re-implement- with the drug trade is highly complex ing the same eradication policies that and intertwined with local politics, the caused so much damage in the past.104 lessons are clear: prohibition harms The FARC peace agreement offered hope human rights at the micro and macro that drug-fueled violence would be a level, threatens state stability, and fails thing of the past, but changing political to meet its goals internationally. winds105 threaten to undo Colombia’s

26 MEXICO A T R A N S I T COUNTRY

27 GENERAL INFORMATION

A majority of drugs entering the United Mexican cartels include El Chapo’s States enter through Mexico, an import- Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the ant transit country, particularly for Zetas; smaller cartels include the Bel- cocaine. Cocaine and heroin generally trán Leyva Organization, La Familia enter across the U.S.-Mexico border via Michoacana, and the Knights Templar. land routes, and, contrary to popular belief, most shipments pass through le- Mexico’s continued susceptibility to gal ports of entry or U.S. Border Patrol drug trafficking can be attributed to checkpoints. The trade is executed by the weak nature of its democratic in- cartels, which earn between $19 billion stitutions. Although the country tran- and $29 billion annually from drug sitioned into a democracy in 1997, the sales in the United States109 The impor- changes were not foundational. Chron- tance of Mexico as a transit country has ic problems, in particular widespread prompted the United States to spend corruption and impunity, are exploited billions of dollars on counternarcotics by cartels to further their business in- in Mexico and at the border through terests. This has allowed a culture in various initiatives since the 1970s, in- which human rights violations, such as cluding most recently through the Me- violence and disappearances, threats to rida Initiative, a security cooperation journalists and civil society activists, agreement launched by U.S. President and electoral fraud, are able to thrive. George W. Bush and Mexican President Reversing such deep-set issues requires Felipe Calderón in 2008. not only revoking prohibition policies, but implementing much deeper reform. Although Mexico has a long history of drug production, its potential as a transit country was initially tested by Juan Ramón Matta-Ballesteros, who began using the country’s land route as a “‘trampoline’ to bounce drugs into the United States” in the early 1970s.110 Throughout the 1960s, drug use in the United States was increasing rapidly, and traffickers were meeting the demand using routes that passed through the Caribbean and into Florida. In response, the United States increased interdiction efforts at Florida’s ports, pushing traffickers to find new paths into the country. At first, drug trafficking organizations merely moved goods through Mexico, but it soon became apparent that Mexico could serve as a good home base for drug trafficking operations. Today, the most powerful 28 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

The Mexican government’s counter- (2) because, crucially, it gave PRI a new narcotics policies have been highly way to go after political dissidents. militaristic, a strategy that has, in re- As Grillo explains, at this time, “often cent decades, been closely tied with an- leftists would be arrested under the ti-democratic trends. pretense of drug charges. Hundreds of activists were never seen again. Mex- Since the beginning, the Mexican gov- icans use the words the disappeared to ernment’s approach to drug policy refer to these lost souls. As anti-drug was influenced by the United States. operations spread to other states, so did The country’s prohibitionist regime the dirty war on leftists.” The United was technically established in 1927, States also used drug eradication cam- when the government passed a cohe- paigns in Mexico as a cover to investi- sive prohibitionist law, in response to gate “guerilla activities.”114 The period pressure from the United States.111 But was also marked by horrific conditions in the following decades, the country and torture in prisons, and a corre- had actually shifted toward harm re- sponding lack of accountability. duction — that is, until the United States launched Operation Intercept in 1969. Nevertheless, violence levels were com- The Mexican government was, at that paratively low under PRI rule. Drug-re- time under the one-party, dictatorial lated violence kicked in, rising to crisis rule of the Institutional Revolutionary levels, between 2000 and 2004. Some Party (PRI). Operation Intercept took a analysts argue that the explosion of supply-centric approach, aiming to stop violence in Mexico was directly linked the rise in drug consumption among to the country’s democratic transition, Americans by stemming trafficking which began after PRI lost the presiden- across the U.S.-Mexico border, imple- tial election in 1999.115 This transition menting (ultimately ineffective) man- severed the clientelist links between datory searches of every vehicle trying drug traffickers and PRI politicians, and to make the crossing.112 The initiative cartels sought new connections with effectively “strong-armed” Mexico into the country’s new democratic leaders. obeying a “new modus operandi” that Such changes upset previous territorial “convinc[ed] countries to destroy nar- claims, increasing competition, and, in cotics at the source.”113 the process, violence levels.

The initiative provided a pretext under Drug trafficking reached crisis levels which both the Mexican government by the time President Felipe Calderón and the United States could undertake began campaigning for president. At anti-democratic activity. The Mexican the start of his presidency, on December government cooperated with this new 10, 2006, President Calderón declared prohibition policy for two reasons: (1) “an all-out global war on the drug to take advantage of the United States’ menace,” assembling a “gendarmerie” financial and military support (which (a national militarized police force of included military equipment); and around 5,000 troops116) to “take back” 29 parts of the country that had been did nothing to harm the drug industry’s “seized” by criminal insurgents.117 outputs). Some fear that Mexico’s new President Calderón’s strategy focused leader, Andrés Manuel López Obrador on taking down the crime bosses at the (AMLO), is following a similar path. De- head of each cartel. During his 2012 spite claiming that his administration state of the nation address, he boasted would prioritize public that his government had captured 125 safety over capturing It’s clear the cartel cell leaders or lieutenants and kingpins,121 AMLO has National Guard is 5,108 hit men since he took office, and instead pursued his own, the Army with a three kingpins in that year alone.118 larger version of President different uniform. President Calderón cooperated with the Calderón’s “gendarmerie”: Soldiers being United States on this, too, significantly a 60,000-member National trained to do increasing extraditions of wanted crim- Guard. Although the Na- what soldiers do. inals to the United States.119 To be sure, tional Guard will be under Indefinitely. arresting and trying violent criminals civilian leadership, not - The Washington Post is worthwhile in itself, and necessary to military, according to The returning justice to Mexico. Washington Post, “It’s clear the National Guard is the Army with a different uni- But these policies did nothing to deter form. Soldiers being trained to do what drug trafficking or stem the violence. soldiers do. Indefinitely.”122 On the contrary, territorial competition and restructuring led to a proliferation Mexico’s recent emphasis on militariza- of cartels starting in 2007, and violence tion and catching kingpins has been skyrocketed. By 2010, the war on drugs supported and shaped by the United was beginning to significantly weaken States, which has provided substan- Mexico’s democracy. Freedom House tial funding, mainly for militarized officially downgraded the country from intervention. Shortly after President “free” to “partly free” in 2011, a direct Calderón declared his war on drugs, consequence of the war on drugs. That he sought financial support from U.S. year, activists went as far as filing a com- President George W. Bush, and together plaint against President Calderón with they established the Merida Initiative. the International Criminal Court.120 The Merida Initiative also sets priorities for the country’s counternarcotics Successive leaders have failed to move efforts and those priorities have always away from the militarized, supply-cen- mirrored prohibitionist international tric approach. President Calderón’s priorities. President Bush’s initial bud- successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, elected get for the program proposed spending in 2012, implemented very similar pol- 63 percent on counternarcotics, coun- icies, despite promising to refocus on terterrorism, and border security assis- the criminal violence impacting civil- tance and just 15 percent on institution ians’ daily lives. President Peña Nieto’s building, human rights, and rule of law administration also worked to arrest promotion.123 Under President Barack kingpins, including most famously Joa- Obama, the Merida Initiative adopted a quin “El Chapo” Guzman of the Sinaloa “four-pillar” model, placing greater em- cartel in 2014 (a capture that increased phasis on the institutionalization of the President Peña Nieto’s popularity but rule of law and, to a lesser extent, human 30 rights. Though this gradual shift toward administration emphasized fighting supporting human rights and demo- transnational criminal organizations cratic institutions in Mexico is a positive as a priority, and attributed rising drug one, these changes do not appear to be abuse levels in the United States to in- improving human rights conditions on creases in its availability due to traffick- the ground. Violence has been rising ing. The executive steadily since 2014, and journalists and order represented civil society members are under great- a recommitment127 er threat than ever before. This may be to prohibition’s sup- because of other Obama-era trends, such ply-centric policies, as increased collaborations on captur- arguing that drug ing drug kingpins, and a new emphasis abuse is the result of on the extradition of drug criminals to availability (supply), the United States. and not consumption (demand).128 Tellingly, this change also U.S. President George In the eight years preceding the im- saw a reversal of the Obama-era focus W. Bush welcomes plementation of the Merida Initiative on community building and violence Mexican President in 2008, the U.S. security aid to Mexico reduction within Mexico. Felipe Calderón to the White House (Photo averaged $43 million per year; in the from White House same time frame afterward, disburse- The United States and Mexico have spent photographer Eric ments increased six-fold to more than billions of dollars on the Mexican drug Draper) $303 million per year.124 Since the Me- war. Yet drugs continue to flow across rida Initiative was implemented, the the country’s borders, and cocaine and United States has invested $2.7 billion marijuana supply is actually increasing in Mexico. And yet, as has been seen, year by year. Meanwhile, consumption this money has had little to no success in the United States is climbing, and Mex- in lowering drug abuse rates in the ico, which for a long time did not have United States — the stated goal of the much of a domestic market, is seeing war on drugs — and drug flow through marijuana and cocaine abuse rise each Mexico is better explained by fluctu- year.129 Even as Mexico’s drug policies ations in the illicit market and along fail to meet the most basic benchmarks, the drug supply chain. For instance, the side-effects are resulting in serious in 2004, when eradication and inter- costs for the human rights and democra- diction efforts in Colombia resulted in cy. Repairing the damage that the drug scarcity in the drug market, northern war has caused will be an enormous, Mexico experienced a 46 percent in- seemingly insurmountable task — but crease in drug-related homicides as continuing the policies that have caused traffickers moved to Mexico and Cen- this damage is indefensible. tral American countries.125 COSTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Despite strong evidence that prohibi- AND DEMOCRACY tion policies focusing solely on supply reduction fail to yield desired results, VIOLENCE VS. THE RIGHT TO LIFE the current U.S. administration has continued to invest in this approach.126 Violence is the defining feature of Mex- In a 2017 Executive Order, the new ico’s war on drugs. According to data 31 collected by the Mexican government, part as a means to control violence.132 It ’s since 2007, there have been 227,428 not that cartels prefer to be violent. It’s homicides.130 The last two years have that, in times of instability, they resort achieved record-breaking levels of vi- to violence. Spikes in violence, then, re- olence: 28,868 people were murdered flect uncertainty in market ownership in Mexico in 2017, and 33,518 in 2018. — in other words, competition. In Mex- Early projections indicate that 2019 ico, violence increased when elections may break the record once again. There threaten a cartel’s established access were 8,493 victims of homicide in the to power; when anti-narcotics policies first three months of this year, a 9.59 succeed in one region, shifting trade percent increase compared to the same routes; when changing policies tighten period last year. In comparison, in 2006, the U.S. border, increasing competition when the drug war began, the Mexican for control of entry points; when a king- government recorded 11,806 homicides; pin is captured and his cartel splinters, last year’s tally shows that violence has and factions fight with one another for nearly tripled after more than a decade territorial control; and other such sce- of militarized anti-trafficking efforts. narios when ownership over valuable According to the Mexican government, territory or product is up in the air. 13 percent of these homicide victims are innocent bystanders.131 Indeed, research shows that crackdowns on drug cartels are accompanied What accounts for this violence? Illicit by violence.133 As Melissa Dell explains markets tend to devolve into violence. in a 2014 paper, spikes in violence are Criminals cannot use courts to en- directly related to party politics. Be- force contracts, so they resort to force. tween 2007 and 2010, in close elections, However, as political scientist Thomas municipalities that elected mayors Schelling notes, large-scale cartels are from President Calderón’s political actually incentivized to organize in party, the National Action Party (PAN),

Homicide Rates in Mexico

5 Homicides per 100,000 people 100,000 per Homicides 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: World Bank180 32 saw violence increase by a factor of es go uninvestigated by authorities, 5.5 compared to municipalities where leading families to take it upon them- PAN lost.134 Over 90 percent of the vio- selves to search. The loved ones of the lence in these municipalities consist of disappeared face stigma from their “drug traffickers killing each other.”135 communities, who often believe the Evidently, PAN victories brought harsh disappeared must have been connect- crackdowns on criminality in the mu- ed to cartels in some way and therefore nicipality, and this crackdown led to deser ved t heir fates, a narrative spread violence. Dell explains that PAN crack- by the Calderón administration.140 downs had the unintentional effect of increasing competition in key drug Two particularly horrible incidents trafficking zones: The new policies have drawn attention to disappearanc- threatened cartels’ control over key es in Mexico in recent years. In 2014, 43 districts, which prompted rival cartels male students disappeared in the west- to move in to try to take over. Dell notes ern coastal state of Guerrero, one of that these results contribute to a larger the most violent states in the country. body of research that demonstrates a In the first ten years of Calderón’s war “positive relationship between drug on drugs, there were 16,980 murder enforcement and violence.”136 cases in Guerrero, making it the second most murderous states (second only to The Mexican government’s policies Chihuahua, a state on the U.S.-Mexico failed to put an end to the violence border).141 The government’s official — in fact, they are only making vio- account claims that the students, who lence worse. Natan Sharansky’s “town were traveling by bus on their way to square test” holds that a country is not Mexico City, were allegedly taken into free unless any person can walk into custody by the police, who turned them the town square and express their over to a local cartel, Guerreros Unidos, opinion without fear of violence. Due which burned their bodies, leaving no to cartel violence, many parts of Mexi- remains. This story has been widely co fail this test. In addition to violating disputed. The Mexican government the right to life, the war on drugs, then, has not released information or evi- should be considered a threat to Mexi- dence from the investigation to back up can democracy. the narrative, and has been criticized by the Inter-American Commission on DISAPPEARANCES Human Rights and the United Nations for the routine “arbitrary detention More than 37,000 people have dis- and torture” of subjects during the appeared137 during Mexico’s war on investigation, and for the subsequent drugs, 7,000 of whom were under the cover-up of those abuses.142 Five years age of 18.138 As if that number were later, the families of the students still not horrifying enough, the Mexican have no information on what happened government also announced that there to their loved ones, and no one has been are 26,000 unidentified bodies in the convicted in the case. country, and more than a thousand uninvestigated mass graves.139 The In response to international and nation- vast majority of disappearance cas- al pressure, the Mexican government 33 has taken several steps to address this thorities’ involvement, and failure to chronic problem. In 2017, then-Pres- stop additional disappearances are re- ident Peña Nieto passed a law on dis- ducing citizens’ faith in the government appearances, drafted in collaboration and creating a culture of impunity. with families of victims, that devoted significant funds to the matter, and Additionally, a growing percentage of created a federal agency to investigate disappeared are believed to be victims disappearances. Recently, AMLO has of human trafficking. Tom Wainwright announced the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission to address the disappearances, and has also announced that his administration will allocate a further $20 million to investigations and create a forensics department to aid in the process.

Yet these government efforts do not seem to have made an impact so far. In 2018, the U.N. released another report on the significant uptick in disappearances in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, along the U.S.-Mexico border. At least twenty-one men and two women disappeared between February 1 and May 16, three of whom were less than 14 years old, and the report found “strong indications” that Mexican authorities were responsible for these disappearances.143 Between 2017 and 2019, 7,000 additional people went missing in Mexico, according to government numbers, and many human rights groups believe that Mexican authorities are involved in these disappearances and subsequent cover-ups. Fifty-one disappearances in Nuevo Laredo between January and May 2018 were reported- notes that since the U.S.-Mexico border A group of women ly linked to the Mexican Marines, yet has become more difficult to cross, a embrace after a mass authorities have apparently refused growing number of hopeful migrants held to launch a search group for their missing to investigate them.144 Disappearanc- are willing to pay people smugglers relatives in the state es appear to be linked to deep-seated (known as “coyotes”) to help their pas- of Guerrero in Mexico. 145 corruption and collusion problems sage. This has created an incentive for (Photo from Daniela that will require complex reforms and cartels to enter the business, diversify- Rea and Mónica much greater transparency to resolve. ing their business model to use their ex- González) For now, the absence of conclusive in- isting assets — tunnels, official contacts, vestigations, growing evidence of au- etc. — to transport people instead of 34 drugs. Unfortunately, many of these vic- victims of the war on drugs or acknowl- tims are funneled into human traffick- edge displacement as a problem.149 ing for sex and forced labor. According However, the uptick in displacement to Alejandro Encinas, Mexico’s sub-sec- in 2010 spurred research into the topic, retary of human rights, migration, and and it has now been established that population, between 8 to 10 percent of migrants are leaving to escape violence, the disappeared are migrants.146 not to pursue economic gain elsewhere. In fact, migrants moving from high-vi- The war on drugs has incentivized the olence to low-violence states see their creation of hidden networks and pas- wages decrease by 3.65 percent on av- sages; a terrible consequence of this is erage.150 More violent states see higher that these networks can also be used to displacement rates: In one IDMC study, traffic other things. Lifting prohibition the 104 municipalities with the most vi- will not eliminate these routes, and olence had a displacement rate 15 times could push drug traffickers to grow oth- greater than municipalities without er parts of their businesses — creating high levels of violence.151 a new kind of balloon effect for human rights violations. Any anti-drug policies The number of new displacements gen- will have to consider ways to deter this erally follows the trends in homicide alternative trafficking. rates; years with high levels of violence bring more IDPs, and dips in violence INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT result in fewer. In Ciudad Juarez, Chi- OF PEOPLE huahua, for example, its most violent year (2010, which saw 3,903 homicide Even as thousands of people disappear, cases in the state) was followed by a many more have been uprooted by en- surge of displacements — 24,000 people demic violence. According to the Inter- were displaced in 2011, moving to other nal Displacement Monitoring Centre parts of the state or to nearby states.152 (which contributes data to the World Ban k), i n 2017, Mex ico had 345,000 IDPs The IDP crisis has significant implica- due to conflict and violence, 20,000 of tions for Mexican culture and economic whom had been displaced that year.147 development. Since the war on drugs Between 2009 and 2010, the IDP popu- began, many towns, now called “ghost lation skyrocketed from 8,000 persons towns,” have been outright abandoned to 123,0000. Since then, the number as citizens flee violence, leaving their of newly displaced persons each year possessions behind. It is unlikely that had tapered, but rarely has the total these migrants will return home, be- number displaced dipped. Notably, cause their safety cannot be guaranteed, these are conservative estimates; other as new criminal groups have “taken to firms report that the IDP population conducting illegal activities on the aban- surpasses 1.5 million.148 doned land, mainly the production of illegal crops and illegal mining.”153Such Internal displacement as a result of displacement is linked to broader so- the war on drugs was long understud- cio-economic stagnation and represents ied. Until very recently, the Mexican a loss in development terms.154 government did not recognize IDPs as 35 Total Number of People Internally Displaced by Violence in Mexico 400

350

300

250

200

150

Thousands of People of Thousands 100

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Source: IDMC181

The large number of IDPs is a direct were targeted for murder as a result of result of the war on drugs, but, as econ- their reporting.156 As of April 2019, 14 omist Laura H. Atuesta Becerra points journalists are missing, making Mexico out, ending prohibition alone cannot the country with the highest number guarantee IDPs’ safety enough to en- of missing journalists in the world. courage their return home. She writes, Mexico now ranks 7th on CPJ’s Impu- “The drug policy based on prohibition nity Index because of the number of and the ‘war on drugs’ left [Mexico] murder cases that remain unsolved.157 with serious problems… However, it Similarly, Reporters Without Borders is naive to expect that if prohibition (RSF) ranks Mexico 144 out of 180 coun- is ended and the earnings of the illicit tries in its World Press Freedom Index drug market are reduced, these organi- due to the “constant violence and fear” zations are going to become legal, condi- that prevents journalists from working tions are going to be safer, and IDPs are freely and deprives the general public going to return to their homelands.”155 of its right to access information.158 Though lifting prohibition is an important first step, building peace and For years the “official narrative” of the undoing the complex problems that the Mexican government has attributed the war on drugs has caused will require murder of journalists to the higher levels deeper reforms. of overall violence in cartel homelands, however it has now been established ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS that journalists are often specifically targeted and are “at much higher risk of Mexico has won the unfortunate reputa- being murdered than the general popu- tion of being one of the most dangerous lation” in many of these states.159 places on earth to be a journalist. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Cartels threaten journalists to control reports that 109 journalists have been how their image is presented to the gen- killed since 2007, at least 32 of whom eral public.160 Coverage of cartels’ vio- 36 lent behavior threatens levels of trust As with disappearances, reports link within the community. Additionally, re- threats to journalists to the government ports on cartel violence can warrant in itself. One study out of the University of strong, militant responses from the gov- Amsterdam linked violations of press ernment, which make it more difficult freedom to department-level author- for cartels to operate. If cartels deem itarian characteristics that persisted that violence is necessary for business, despite the nation’s broader transition they will take extra effort to ensure that to democracy.162 Local officials not only news of their crimes do not make it into ignored attacks on journalists, but the press.161 Journalists are under so “collud[ed] with violent actors to re- much pressure, that some newspapers press critical voices.” In 2012, of 207 have ceased to cover the crime beat. “aggressions” against media, 43 percent In other cases, reporters from one city were attributable to state agents.163 Gov- will cover the cartel news of another, ernment inaction in the face of these and vice versa, to avoid the danger of dangerous conditions led RSF to refer reporting in their own neighborhoods. Mexico to the International Criminal Others move to the relative safety of Court in March 2019, arguing that the the city’s capital. One journalist inter- disappearances constitute “crimes viewed for this report commented that against humanity.”164 she knows many journalists now living in Mexico City, saying “none of us want This state harassment of the media to be here… but because of the violence, leaves journalists with no protection we have no choice.” against violence, can prevent them for

Total number of journalists or media workers killed in democracies in the Americas 2006-2019

Guatemala Brazil Honduras

13 98 38 24 26 33

Mexico Colombia Rest

Source: Committee to Protect Journalists182

37 carrying out their work, or lead them The incentives to silence civil society to self-censor. Drug trafficking under activists are similar to the motivations prohibition, then, is a direct threat to to censor journalists. Human rights Mexican democracy because it under- defenders working to draw attention mines the freedom of press, the general to the work of cartels threaten their public’s right to access information, PR, and activists working to advance and the journalists’ rights of free policies that threaten criminal enter- expression and opinion. In this way, prise — including the legalization of reporters’ vulnerability is heighted drugs — jeopardize their future prof- because criminal groups are able to its. Further, human rights defenders exploit the authoritarian distaste for that openly criticize the government critics and proclivity for corruption put politicians in the uncomfortable held over from PRI’s time. position of having to speak out against cartels, an act that can prove danger- ATTACKS ON CIVIL SOCIETY ous. More cynically, corrupted officials within the government with ties to One of the hallmarks of Mexican de- cartels may use their power to silence mocracy is its vibrant civil society. civil society leaders as a part of their Indeed, Mexico has hundreds of dedi- agreements with drug traffickers. cated NGOs and activists that are able to operate freely and engage directly There may even be some interactivity with the Mexican government to advo- between the pressure put on journal- cate for their policy agendas. However, ists, the involvement of authorities in activists and civil society members disappearances, and the treatment of working on drug policy reform are not human rights defenders. A ProPublica afforded this liberty. In 2018, a stagger- report pointed to evidence of a “smear ing 49 human rights defenders were campaign” against human rights de- killed in Mexico.165 An additional 12 fenders right before the release of a defenders were killed from January to damning report on the Guerrero dis- March 2019, according to Washington appearances case in 2014.167 More re- Office on Latin America and Peace Bri- cently, a condemnatory report released gades International.166 by Citizen Lab revealed evidence that a group linked to the Mexican gov- Lisa Sánchez, director general of the ernment infected the phones of 25 in- nonprofit Mexico United Against Crime dividuals who had been critical of the (MUCD), told HRF that she has been ha- government with Pegasus spyware.168 rassed for her work: During one advo- This included the widow-turned-ac- cacy campaign, she said, “we suffered tivist of Javier Valdez, an intrepid drug for three months receiving threats crimes reporter who was killed in June directly to our homes, threatening to 2017. kill our families and our friends, cars [id l i ng] outside of our homes obser v i ng Threats against civil society, especially you twenty-four seven, spy software when they come from the government, that was on our phone illegally by the violate citizens’ freedom of expression Mexican government. [...] This is a very and opinion, as well as their freedom dangerous job to have.” of association. It is a common feature 38 of authoritarian rule, and significantly election cycle.170 Others report an even undermines Mexican democracy. higher death toll among candidates; according to the U.S. Congressional ELECTORAL FRAUD Research Service, 114 candidates were killed “allegedly by crime bosses and Free and fair elections are widely con- others in an effort to intimidate public sidered a necessary condition for any office holders.”171 democracy. However, “free and fair” is a challenging goal in an environment Although Etellekt has made data avail- characterized by conflict and violence. able for this most recent election cycle, Many of the negatives consequences of this subject requires further research prohibitionist drug policies discussed to understand why these particular above have serious implications for the candidates were targeted, and by which quality of elections: If citizens cannot cartels. What is clear for now is that express their opinions without fear of violence against officials is having a violence, cannot access news stories on chilling effect on public discourse. pressing political issues, cannot orga- Politicians, even at the highest level of nize to support candidates or political government, are incentivized not to agendas, is an election truly free? speak out against cartels for fear of re- taliation. Others are intimidated into As in Colombia, cartels are involved in leaving politics altogether — in 2011, politics in Mexico because their bottom 51 candidates running for local office lines are affected by changes in public in Michoacán dropped out the day be- policy. As Andreas Schedler explains, fore the election172 — and others may be cartels in Mexico act like “single-issue intimidated or bribed into serving car- movements whose concerns are limited tels’ interests if elected. to one policy domain” that have “a positive interest in seeing that cooperative Furthermore, voters are aware of the candidates win elections.”169 A candi- impact cartels have on politics, and the date with a strong anti-crime agenda, intimidation could affect their choices who advocates for transparency and an- in the voting booth and deepen their ti-corruption initiatives would directly mistrust of officials that are elected. In threaten a cartel’s economic agenda. As some cases, criminal groups have even a result, Mexican criminal groups have campaigned on behalf of candidates increasingly threatened and even killed and instructed voters on which candi- candidates running for public office. date to support. As Schedler notes, “[E] ven if it does not change outcomes, the According to the Mexican think tank very phenomenon of brazen criminal Etellekt, the most recent election cycle intrusion into the electoral arena jeop- in Mexico, between September 8, 2017, ardizes the democratic spirit of free and and July 1, 2018, was the most violent peaceful political competition.”173 election period since the country’s transition to democracy in 1997. In this CORRUPTION AND IMPUNITY period, 152 politicians were killed, 48 of whom were either prospective can- Cartels not only threaten democracy, didates or candidates in the current they thrive on its weaknesses. Time 39 and again, analysts and activists point Years of academic research have pointed to two key failures of Mexican govern- to possible ways to disincentivize cor- ment that have allowed conditions to ruption, or at least to make the Mexican deteriorate to the current point: cor- government harder to exploit. In Narco- ruption and impunity. Cartels are so nomics, Tom Wainwright explains how powerful because they are able to wield the country’s multi-layered policing sys- political influence, while almost never tem facilitates cartel competition. Car- being held accountable. tels take advantage of rivalries between the local, state, and federal police forces Corruption has influenced Mexico’s to gain influence and go after other car- relationship with drugs since the be- tels during territorial competitions.175 ginning of the prohibition regime and Rather than reforming the policing sys- is such a pervasive feature of Mexican tem to be more vertically integrated, suc- government that many politicians are cessive Mexican presidents have simply unwilling to fight it. One activist told us created additional, militarized police that the extent of corruption in Mexico forces to add into the mix. has never surprised her, because many of the same people who were involved in Government involvement in the human PRI’s one-party state remained in office, rights abuses described above has fur- especially at the municipality level. The ther deteriorated trust in public officials culture of corruption remained. Indeed, and politicians. Since 2006, complaints public perception of corruption has relating to military and police abuses wavered little since the 1997 election, made to national human rights com- scoring consistently around 33/100 on missions have increased by 900 percent, Transparency International’s Corrup- according to MUCD and Transform Drug tion Perceptions Index.174 In 2018, Mexi- Policy’s “Alternative Drug Report.”176 co ranked 138 among 180 countries. According to Pew’s 2017 Global Attitudes

Mexico’s Ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index

100

120

140

160 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Source: Transparency International183 40 Survey, just 17 percent of Mexicans trust the national government to do what is right for the country.177 High-profile cases in which government officials were exposed for having collaborated with cartels have led Mexican citizens to hes- itate to report crimes to police. Because of this, an estimated 85 percent of extortion cases go unreported.

Simultaneously, weak rule of law in Mexico fosters the widespread understanding that no one will be held accountable for their crimes, including government officials, and that most crimes will go unsolved. Despite years of U.S. funding for rule of law improvements, drug courts still struggle to process and conclude cases. As a result, a staggering 90 percent of violent crimes go unpunished in Mexico.178 Moreover, since the government has largely focused on chasing down capos, there is little to prevent lower-ranked cartel members and government officials from acting violently and corruptly in pursuit of their personal goals.

41 CONCLUSION

The war on drugs has failed as a policy Drug policy reform is not a silver bullet.179 in Mexico. It has not succeeded in de- The problems that have allowed this increasing drug availability, consump- dustry to flourish will continue to plague tion, or abuse, and, at the same time, Mexican society, and will require deep has had disastrous consequences for reforms to amend. Changes will need to human rights and democracy in the include an overhaul of Mexico’s policing country. Mexican citizens are not able system and justice system, a turn to radi- to fully exercise their rights to free cal transparency, and heightened govern- expression, opinion, press, access to in- ment accountability. The first step is for formation, movement, and association, the Mexican government to take responsi- amongst others. They are under con- bility for the ills its policies have brought stant threat of violence and kidnapping, to the people. Violence, disappearances, and the government has largely failed and censorship are a direct result of the to respond to these dangers, or even Mexican government’s highly militarized take them seriously. The “war on drugs” approach to prohibition. Reconsidering has yielded serious consequences and these policies, and ending prohibition, must be reconsidered as a policy. will go a long way to reducing cartels’ political and economic power. Our analysis has shown that the relationship between drug prohibition and In Mexico, prohibition was an undemocrat- human rights violations is not always ic strategy from the start, used to persecute one of cause and effect. In Mexico, drug political dissidents; going forward, the prohibition exacerbated the existing country should work to pass drug laws that systemic problems of corruption and im- place human rights and reform at the cen- punity, in turn spreading violence and ter. Weaknesses in democracy and policy fear. This is not to say that cartels should have caused human rights abuses. Demo- not be blamed for their violent actions; cratic strength will resolve them. rather, it means that the state cannot ignore its own role in creating the black market, and in failing to adequately address its own weaknesses.

42 THE UNITED STATES A DESTINATION COUNTRY GENERAL INFORMATION

The United States is the largest economy the criminalization of everything from in the world by nominal GDP, and this wholesale drug distribution to simple naturally makes it a major destination possession. Drug policy is framed as for goods both licit and illicit. a public safety and national security issue, and attempts to limit the supply For years, the United States has been the and use of drugs are primarily enforced number one buyer of Colombian cocaine through the criminal justice system. by a large margin. The flow of Colombi- an cocaine into the United States became The cost of the war on drugs has been significant in the early 1980s. Most astronomical for U.S. taxpayers. The shipments initially entered the United federal government alone spends ap- States through Florida via the Caribbean proximately $33 billion a year on drug until the United States ramped up border control; the total amount spent since security at that state’s ports; then, traf- the 1960s is estimated to be over $1 fickers adapted, using Pacific routes and trillion.186 State and local governments, land routes through Mexico instead. meanwhile, spend approximately $30 billion each year on criminal justice Marijuana, the most popular recre- expenditures related to drug crimes,187 ational drug in the U.S. market, is also nearly matching the federal govern- an important piece of the puzzle. 90 ment’s entire yearly drug prohibition percent of the foreign produced mar- budget. Additionally, according to the ijuana in the United States enters the National Drug Intelligence Service, the country through Mexico. However, drug war costs the United States nearly the Drug Enforcement Administration $200 billion a year in indirect costs tends to focus its efforts on eradicating when accounting for lost productivity domestic marijuana sources, efforts and the strain put on the criminal jus- that have recently been at odds with the tice system. legalization of marijuana or marijuana products at the state level.184 As of July However, prohibitionist policies have 2019, most U.S. states have passed some largely failed to reduce consumption kind of decriminalization or legaliza- and abuse at home. According to the lat- tion law for medicinal or recreational est United Nations estimates, the Unites marijuana possession or use; in only 14 States accounts for around 30 percent of states is marijuana still fully illegal.185 the world’s illicit drug consumption.188 In the last 20 years, the United States Drug overdose deaths in the country has also become a major consumer of have reached record levels,189 and the synthetic drugs originating in Asia and illicit drug market continues to thrive, other parts of the world. further empowering violent criminal organizations abroad and undermining To combat rising drug abuse in the ear- the rule of law, democracy, and human ly 20th century, the United States began rights everywhere. pushing supply-centric, prohibitionist drug policies internationally. Domesti- cally, this manifested chiefly through 44 In addition to being largely ineffective dentured servitude and Jim Crow laws, in reducing drug consumption and and, today, through the over-policing abuse, we find that the enforcement of and mass incarceration of Black Amer- drug prohibition in the United States icans and their communities. The Unit- constitutes a serious threat to Ameri- ed States’ hardline drug policies have can human rights and democracy. The established an overly punitive system criminalization of the drug trade has of justice that discriminates against given new expression what has long and disenfranchises huge swathes of been the most serious flaw in American the population, and undermines the democracy: the institutionalization of legitimacy of the state in the eyes of racism, first through slavery, then in- many of its citizens.

45 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

Drug use in the United States goes back and cocaine were classified as Schedule centuries, but the market was largely I substances, which firmly prohibited unregulated throughout the 1800s and their production, trade, and use for any early 1900s. Doctors freely prescribed purpose. This list has been the subject opium and cocaine to treat pain, and of serious criticism throughout the opium was also popular a recreational years, because of inconsistencies and drug throughout the country. It was arbitrariness in its categorization.191 not until the passing of the Harrison Act of 1914 that the federal government Federal prohibition is enforced by the started to take a serious role in regu- Drug Enforcement Administration lating and taxing the use of opium and (DEA), which was officially established cocaine. This legislation had a huge in 1975, and whose mission is to de- impact nationally and internationally, liver criminals involved in the drug and in the following decades, the United trade to the criminal justice system. States consistently responded to rises in Criminalization has also led security drug consumption by passing legisla- authorities to ramp up the policing of tion criminalizing the production, sale, neighborhoods to catch drug offenders, and use of drugs, and instating harsh especially in poor and minority-majori- punishments for violating these laws. ty neighborhoods, leading to very high This trend came to a head in 1970 when numbers of arrests. former U.S. President Richard Nixon gave a now-infamous speech in which Once suspected violators of drug laws he deemed drug abuse “America’s Pub- reach court, they face a set of criminal lic Enemy No. 1” and officially kicked justice practices put in place during the off the “war on drugs” as we know it country’s “tough on crime” era in the today.190 He put a special emphasis on 1980s and 1990s. These policies include law enforcement as a means to control mandatory minimums (a mix of federal abuse, and greatly ramped up foreign and state guidelines and requirements policy efforts aimed at reducing drug that establish specific prison terms for supply. This approach continues to de- certain crimes) and three strikes laws, fine American drug policy to this day. which subject individuals to harsh penalties, including potentially life U.S. federal legislation criminalizes the in prison, if they break any law three production, sale, and use of marijuana, times. In 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act opium, cocaine, and other drugs, with established criminal penalties for sim- the notable exceptions of alcohol and ple possession and use of any scheduled tobacco. Under the Controlled Substanc- drugs and amended the CSA to establish es Act (CSA) of 1970, which merged all stronger punishments for drug offenses previous federal drug laws into one, involving substance analogues that drugs are sorted into five categories, or were deemed to be more harmful. For “schedules,” according to how danger- example, though crack cocaine and ous they are, their addictiveness, and pure cocaine are basically the same their potential medical uses. Marijuana substance, under the 1986 amendment, 46 crack possession and trade are pun- General’s office issued a comprehensive ished much more severely. report in 2016 where it highlighted some of these issues.195 Citing data from the Three strikes laws and harsher penalties National Survey on Drug Use and Health have been shown to be utterly ineffective from 2015,196 it indicated that only 10.4 in reducing violent crime across the percent of people with substance abuse country and curbing abuse. A compre- disorder received treatment, and only hensive study in 2006 of 18 cities in three a third of them went through one that strikes states concluded that these laws met “minimal standards of health.”197 were not associated with any “significant reduction in crime rates.”192 Likewise, a study on the effects of these laws on crack addiction concluded that the decline in crack use was no larger than the decline in cocaine use, even though the punishment for crack is far more stringent.193As written and as enforced, most of these policies are aimed at reducing the supply of drugs by targeting drug dealers, gang members, and others involved in the drug trade. Proponents of this approach also argue that harsher enforcement drives prices of drugs, and thus reduces consumption. This might sound plausi- ble at first; however, academic studies, historical drug price data, and the fluctu- Ronald Reagan signs ations in drug abuse provide no evidence Additionally, less than 10 percent of the Anti-Drug Abuse of this effect.194 school administrators in the country Act of 1988 reported using proven drug prevention The United States does also spend money programs.198 on medical treatment and rehabilitation services. Historically, this has been a The United States has also established very small fraction of the overall drug a path to treatment for drug offenders budget, but, through the efforts of civil through its “drug courts.” Defendants society advocates, it is a fraction that has can elect to have a drug court judge slowly grown over the years. Two years hear their case instead of going to a ago, under President Barack Obama’s ad- criminal court, where they would ministration, funding for treatment and likely receive prison time. Drug court prevention finally caught up to funding defendants must plead guilty, and in for supply-reduction policies (interdic- exchange are offered lighter sentences tion, law enforcement, and international and are given access to treatment for aid). Nevertheless, these programs addiction. Although this system may remain inadequate particularly given seem preferable to incarceration, its the size of the current crisis or have practices have raised concerns in the otherwise proven to be ineffective in human rights community, which will preventing abuse. The U.S. Surgeon be described in detail below. In terms 47 of effectiveness, while recidivism does did the same thing in the 1920s. Back decline significantly for people who go then, it actually arrested physicians for through drug courts instead of the tra- prescribing opioids for chronic condi- ditional criminal system,199 the results tions. Then, as now, these interventions in terms of preventing drug abuse are simply drove more people toward the modest.200 black market. Doctors have stopped prescribing painkillers fearing legal Another aim of these punitive policies is action, but rather than simply aban- to reduce demand by using harsh pen- doning opioids abruptly, patients have alties to disincentivize the use of drugs. turned to the illicit market and started But on the whole, domestic U.S. prohibi- taking heroin and fentanyl, drugs that tion has utterly failed to meet its goal of come w it h a h i g her r i s k of overdose a nd ending drug consumption and abuse, that are often sold interchangeably in and successes have been short-lived, the black market. Today, an increasing as has been seen in other case studies. number of new addicts start with illicit Tragically, in 2017 alone, more than substances rather than prescription 70,000 people lost their lives to drug drugs,203 and more than two thirds of overdoses in the United States. This is opioid related deaths are linked to illic- the highest recorded death count in the itly acquired drugs.204 United States and represents a 10 percent increase from 2016. This number is high- Not only have these policies utterly er than all American casualties during failed to decrease drug consumption the Vietnam War. and abuse, but they have had a dire impact on human rights. In the analysis After dropping by 50 percent after 2013, that follows, we elaborate on these neg- cocaine consumption is back up to pre- ative consequences and illustrate the 2013 levels, and the number of first-time need for a revision of prohibition. How- cocaine users has reached an all-time ever, it’s worth noting that some states high.201 Additionally, recent data from have started to undo federally imposed the National Health Center for Health prohibitionist laws. In 1996, California Statistics and the Center for Disease Con- became the first state to decriminalize trol point to a sharp increase in overdose marijuana consumption for medical deaths from cocaine in recent years. To use. In the intervening decades, many make matters worse, opioid addiction, other states have followed California’s dependency, and related deaths have lead. Today, there are only three states been rising dramatically in the past in the union (Idaho, Kansas, and South three decades, causing is what is now Dakota)205 that still criminalize the widely regarded as a serious crisis. possession of marijuana or related products under all circumstances. This The United States’ initial response to this trend is significant and warrants deep new crisis followed old patterns. Federal analysis. Nevertheless, marijuana is and state governments blamed doctors still a Schedule I drug at the federal for overprescribing opioids as pain level, and there have been no serious medication for patients with enduring legislative efforts to decriminalize it, or chronic pain, and even sought crim- much less other banned substances. inal charges for it.202 The government 48 COSTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

MASS INCARCERATION AND CRIMINALIZATION

The war on drugs is a major driver of addiction,209 any detained addicts sim- mass incarceration in the United States. ply find themselves without access to The United States has only 5 percent of treatment or community support, fur- the world’s population, but nearly 25 ther inhibiting their ability to improve percent of its prisoners. 20 percent of their lives.210 prisoners are incarcerated for drug crimes, and often for nonviolent crimes, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST like possession. Furthermore, the crim- BLACK AMERICANS AND OTHER inalization of drugs has made criminals MARGINALIZED GROUPS of an alarming number of people. Over 1 million people are arrested every year The effects of mass incarceration have for drug-related offenses. In 2016, more a disproportionate impact on racial people were arrested for marijuana and ethnic minorities, and especially possession than for all violent crimes on Black Americans. Black Americans combined.206 Additionally, more than are far more likely to be arrested and 250,000 people have been deported for convicted for drug crimes than white drug violations since 2007.207 Americans, despite the fact that these populations use drugs at similar rates. Prohibition as implemented in the This is sometimes due to structural in- United States has established a harshly equalities built into the criminal justice punitive set of practices that have de- system; other times, it is due to uncon- 211 prived millions of individuals of their scious biases in policing practices. liberty simply for using drugs, even in cases where this use poses no threat to One factor that leads to harsher penalties themselves or to others. With laws like for Black Americans is the irrational dis- the three strikes rule, a defendant that parity in the criminalization of certain has been arrested for possession three drugs as determined by CSA categories, times could spend their life in prison. as explained above. Crack cocaine and Mandatory minimums levy prison pure cocaine are essentially the same sentences automatically in many states. substance, but crack possession and In some, drug possession and other trade are punished much more severe- nonviolent drug crimes are considered ly, a problem that is compounded with felonies, meaning that individuals minimum sentencing and three strikes could be deprived of their right to vote, laws. The crack epidemic of the 1990s led child care rights, and housing, educa- to tremendous injustices against Black tion, and employment opportunities, communities. Lower prices of crack in often leading them into a cycle of pov- inner cities meant that poorer, Black erty.208 In many cases, the punishment communities were particularly vulner- simply does not fit the crime. Further- able to becoming users, more so than more, since incarceration does little richer, white Americans. This meant to nothing to reduce the prevalence of that Black individuals ended up serving 49 North Carolina police practice no-knock raids in a joint operation training exercise at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. (Photo from Senior Airman Whitney Lambert/U.S. Air Force)

more time than white cocaine users for Black people 11 times more likely to be essentially the same crime.212 Although arrested for drugs than white people. the penalties for crack possession were lowered significantly in recent years, T he ove r p ol ic i n g of Bl ac k ne i g h b orho o d s the disparity remains. has also worsened the relationship between the police and the communities The early association of drugs with mi- they are meant to serve. According to norities that led to the establishment of Gallup, trust in police by Black Amer- harsh crack punishments has also been icans is at an historic low, with only 30 translated into policing practices. Law percent of this group saying it has “a enforcement devotes more resources great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence and time to policing poverty-stricken in police.214 Several high-profi le shooting areas in inner cities where the majori- cases that involved police inspired the ty of the population is either Black or creation of the Black Lives Matter pro- Hispanic. Drug laws, such as New York test movement, which worked to bring City’s former “Stop and Frisk” law, give attention to incidents of police brutality, police offers an incentive to conduct including the killings of Michael Brown drug searches on pedestrians and in Ferguson, Missouri, and Eric Garner drivers in these overpoliced neighbor- in New York City. Although there is hoods. As a result, Black Americans are difficulty in getting reliable data on arrested at far higher rates than white police shootings on the national level, an Americans. According to an extensive ongoing project by The Washington Post Human Rights Watch report, 213 Black in- shows that in the past four years alone dividuals in Manhattan were arrested there have more than 4,000 police shoot- at a rate of 3,309 per 100,000 people be- ings in the United States and, although tween 2010 and 2015, compared to only African Americans make up less than 12 306 per 100,000 white people, making percent of the national population, they

50 Incarceration rates in the United States in 2010, by race

250

200

150

100

50 `Per 100,000 people 100,000 `Per 0 Asian Two or White National Some Hispanic Native American Black or more alone, not rate other or Latino Hawaiian Indian and African races Hispanic race and other Alaska Na- American or Latino Pacific tive alone Source: Prison Policy Initative253 Islander

make up nearly 25 percent of those shot American democracy. Under federal by the police.215 Additionally, the total law, drug crimes are considered felo- number of police shootings per year in nies, meaning that anyone imprisoned the United States is significantly higher for any crime ranging from possession than in other developed countries, such to drug-related homicide would be con- as Canada, Japan or Australia.216 These sidered a felon, and therefore denied trends have been well-established, but their right to vote in several states. Some do not seem to be compelling the U.S. states have passed different criminal federal government to make any real disenfranchisement laws — ranging reforms. Some argue that this discrim- from permanent disenfranchisement inatory treatment of Black Americans in Kentucky to no disenfranchisement is unintentional; others argue that the in Vermont217 — but on the whole, the criminal justice system was specifically existence of these laws have enormous built to marginalize the poor and racial consequences for voting rights and and ethnic minorities. Regardless of electoral integrity in the United States. intention, the vast, systemic discrimina- Florida, for example, was until recently tion against minority populations is a se- one of the states with the harshest crim- rious human rights issue that should not inal disenfranchisement laws. Prior to be tolerated anywhere, much less in a January 2019, it is estimated that 1 in 5 free, democratic, and pluralistic nation. Black American adults could not vote due to prior felony convictions.218 Flor- DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF ida is a key swing state in U.S. elections, BLACK AMERICANS AND OTHER meaning that the disenfranchisement MARGINALIZED GROUPS of Black Americans that results in part from prohibition could have affected An important effect of the mass incar- general election outcomes by depriving ceration of Black individuals is the a historically marginalized group of its enormous consequence it poses for right to vote. This policy was amend- 51 ed earlier this year, when Florida’s more power in “charging and plea-bar- iv According to Frank legislature followed up on a popular gaining decisions,”223 which effectively O. Bowman III, by the late 1990s, “the November 2018 ballot initiative by vot- takes power away from judges and average sentence for ing to re-enfranchise felons who have gives the government substantial lever- methamphetamine 219 completed their sentences. Florida’s age in these negotiations. Additionally, cases [was] higher than new law signals positive change, but by taking away the judge’s discretion, the average sentence debate on re-enfranchisement policies mandatory minimum and three strikes for sexual abuse, continues,220 and many states continue laws create a situation where defen- more than double the to disenfranchise individuals with fel- dants are not evaluated as individuals average sentence for assault, one-and-a- ony drug convictions.221 on the basis of their specific case, but half times the average grouped in with others facing similar sentence for arson, and In her influential book, The New Jim charges. Finally, even among scholars nearly four times the Crow, legal scholar Michelle Alexander who do not favor the decriminaliza- average sentence for explains how criminal justice laws have tion or legalization of drugs, there is a burglary.” worked to re-establish the structural in- clear understanding that mandatory equalities that were supposedly undone minimums yield disproportionally by the repealing of Jim Crow laws during punitive sentencesiv for nonviolent drug the civil rights movement.222 Domestic offenders.224 Punishing drug crimes drug prohibition policies like criminal- so severely sets a dangerous precedent ization and police militarization present for future sentencing guidelines and a threat to the civil rights gains made in endangers the core legal principle of the past five decades for Black A mericans. proportionality. All of these issues have had a questionable effect on due process Although criminal disenfranchising and weaken the credibility of the judi- laws are not necessarily a product of the cial system in general. drug war, nor an American invention, the drug war’s overcriminalization of Experts have also expressed concern drug offenses and its crucial contribu- about policing practices in collecting tion to the United States’ bloated prison evidence for drug crime cases. For ex- population make it a significant threat ample, police have increasingly sought to the health of American democracy. to detain suspects in “no-knock raids,” in which law enforcement enters a WEAKENING OF DUE PROCESS AND building without notifying its resi- JUDICIAL DISCRETION dents, often in partnership with Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. The war on drugs has also created Judges can issue no-knock warrants to questionable incentives for judges provide police forces with the element and prosecutors that could potentially of surprise – an important advantage to deteriorate the quality of the judicial have when attempting to capture heav- process in the United States. Mandato- ily armed and bunkered criminals. ry minimums and three strikes laws, But critics argue that these warrants for example, change legal procedures have frequently been issued without an for drug-related offenses in troubling appropriate level of scrutiny. A recent ways. In these cases, mandatory mini- study by The New York Times found mums, especially those applied to drug that the “no-knock process often begins offenses, provide federal prosecutors with unreliable informants and curso- 52 ry investigations that produce affida- health problems to go through treatment vits signed by unquestioning low-level and to be submitted to the stringent re- judges.”225 Many of these searches have quirements of most drug courts, which uncovered only small stashes of drugs include routine urine tests and social or no evidence at all, and it has been worker visits for parents.229 estimated that nearly 100 people have died in these raids between 2010 and INACCESSIBILITY OF HEALTH CARE 2016 alone.226 According to the ACLU, 54 percent of the people impacted by The war on drugs has also had a serious, searches employing a SWAT unit were negative impact on public health. The Black or Hispanic.227 denigration of drug users has been a feature of the war on drugs since the Drug courts have also presented a chal- start, and has created a cultural stigma lenge to the justice system. Although around addiction that prevents individ- these courts are generally seen as an uals from getting the help they need. improvement to dealing with drug During the campaign to establish pro- issues through the criminal justice sys- hibition in the early 20th century, Harry tem, they have also prompted serious Anslinger, the first commissioner of concerns. Though defendants techni- the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, made cally elect to enter drug courts instead inflammatory statements to Congress of a criminal court when they are facing arguing that drug addicts were the serious addiction issues, they are often “most frequent [criminal] offenders” required to plead guilty to a crime, and and that marijuana led to “violent and may do so to avoid incarceration. insane behavior.”230 These comments did not stop at branding drug users as a This is not much of a choice, and, ac- public menace, but went further to link- cording to a Social Science Research ing non-white Americans, in particular Council report from 2018, it should Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics, to drug lead us to question whether their entry use and crimes such as murder, child into the drug court system can really abuse, and property damage.231 be considered consensual.228 Some of the challenges faced by drug Finally, drug courts do not seem to take abuse patients are a shortage of trained into consideration the realities of drug professionals, reluctant care providers, use, possession, and abuse. An individ- and underfunded government and ual charged with assault while under private institutions, all of which can the influence of drugs and an individual be partly attributed to the generalized charged with simple possession may stigma of drug use and the misinforma- both be eligible to enter a drug court tion it has engendered. A recent article depending on the jurisdiction. In cases from Health Affairs uses data from the where the defendant is suffering from Substance Abuse and Mental Health addiction, drug courts can be a good op- Services Administration to highlight tion, because they allow the state to mon- some serious geographical gaps in itor and provide addiction treatment to coverage for people seeking addiction the offender. But it makes little sense for treatment, in particular those affected a defendant with no addiction or mental by the opioid crisis.232 Even when addic- 53 tion centers are available, only a small programs run into additional hurdles at fraction of them provide a complete set the state level, making it difficult for the of options for medication-assisted care, patient to have access to medication.236 as the drugs required for these treat- ments are heavily regulated. To this day, government officials continue to use derogatory and racialized Additionally, overdose victims do not language to describe the drug trade, par- generally have access to proper emer- ticularly when addressing immigration gency care. Immediate care has been over the southwestern border. President discouraged by prohibition, as people Donald Trump has routinely called for are incentivized not to help someone a tougher approach on immigration and who is in possession of drugs for fear law enforcement by claiming that the of criminal reprisals. Furthermore, need to defend Americans from Mexican controlled emergency medication like “drug dealers” constitutes a national Naxolone — which has the power to emergency. A small exception can be “reverse” an opioid overdose — is still seen in the U.S. government’s response to inaccessible or in short supply in many the opioid crisis, which has been marked parts of the country. There have been by a shift toward health-first language some improvements. In recent years, and emphasis on providing addiction Naxolone has been made more widely treatment. available in the United States, and so- called Good Samaritan laws233 have Still, government officials continue to been passed in nearly every state to blame physicians for the opioid crisis. shield those who help drug abusers from As explained above, the government prosecution. Still, there is much work to has occasionally pressured physicians be done in terms of implementation, as to change their prescription practices police officers in particular still lack suf- when opioid addiction has spiked. For ficient training to deal with emergency patients with chronic pain or other con- drug-related health crises.234 ditions that would benefit from treatment via illicit drugs, this constitutes a When health care services are avail- serious hurdle to access much-needed, able for addicted users, individuals and potentially life-saving treatment. are often hesitant to take advantage of them, fearing that there could be Finally, some drug policies could con- serious social, educational, and career stitute a violation to a patient’s right to consequences if they are seen entering privacy. In drug courts, defendants are clinics or rehabilitation centers.235 The often forced to give the judge personal high financial costs of rehabilitation medical information, since the judge and medicine-assisted treatment are is supposed to be intimately involved another serious issue for many Ameri- in setting their treatment plan.237 As cans, especially those who lack health explained above, this revelation of pri- insurance, approximately 10 percent of vate medical records may not really be the population. Even when individuals considered consensual because many have insurance, it is sometimes difficult choose to enter the drug court system to access treatment, as plans that do cov- because it is often their only chance at er more comprehensive rehabilitation receiving treatment for addiction. 54 CONCLUSION

This case study analysis of the United abuse patients to receive care, improve States as a destination country has the effectiveness of federal treatment revealed that prohibitionist policies programs, and clear the way for the have largely failed to meet their goal implementation of harm reduction of eliminating the “threat” of drug policies (needle exchange programs, consumption and abuse. These policies replacement therapy, etc.) that have have had 100 years to prove their effec- proven to be more effective.238 tiveness and have failed, and, worse, have created serious threats to individ- In the meantime, marijuana decrim- uals’ rights to equal treatment under inalization and legalization experi- the law, participation in the electoral ments throughout the United States are process, health care, and more. starting to present new paths forward. A recent study in the Journal of Urban Furthermore, criminalization has Economics found that in states that set up serious obstacles to policy al- have legalized marijuana, prescrip- ternatives that would better address tions of more dangerous or addictive addiction and drug abuse. This may opioids have dropped by an average of explain why the United States’ de- nearly 7 percent. 239 Contrary to popular mand-reduction efforts have failed to belief, legalization has not been found see impressive results. Ending prohi- to increase consumption; in Colorado, bition could make it far easier for drug youth use of marijuana remained sta-

U.S. Attitudes toward Cannabis Legalization

80 70

60 50

20 % of respondents of % 10

0 2011 1977 1972 1973 1979 1969 2017 1995 1985 2012 2013 2016 2015 2018 2014 1980 2010 2001 2003 2009 2005 2000 Yes, it should be legal No, it should be illegal

Source: Gallup254 55 ble in the five years after legalization, and played a major role in establishing but arrests dropped dramatically.240 prohibitionist policies at the inter- Legalization is not necessarily more national level. This analysis shows effective in eliminating recreational that the drug war has not only had drug consumption compared to prohi- enormous consequences in production bition — but it has negated some of its and transit countries, but has also human rights consequences. threatened human rights and democratic institutions at home. The United So far, these changes have not translat- States has been spared the level of ed to a federal level, despite the fact that violence seen in other countries along 61 percent of Americans now support the supply chain, and the strength of marijuana legalization.241 Some signs, its democratic institutions has ensured including the rhetoric of U.S. President that there is space for civil society, in- Donald Trump, suggest that the execu- dependent press, and voters to push for tive branch may actually double down reform. However, this does not mean on the law enforcement approach. In an that prohibition has been a politically official memo, former Attorney General neutral policy at home. Jeff Sessions even suggested that the death penalty be used against drug On the contrary, its implementation traffickers.242 President Trump echoed has caused enormous damage, particu- this rhetoric in February 2019, when he larly to minority communities, and has praised China’s use of the death penalty degraded the perceived legitimacy of for drug offenses,243 and suggested it as its institutions in the eyes of the public. a possible solution to the opioid crisis.244 A century of prohibition has fed into- the current climate of political polar- The United States has been the world’s ization, and, ultimately, endangered fiercest advocate of the war on drugs the United States’ democratic health.

56 Conclusion

In this report, we have examined In Mexico, drug war-related violence prohibition as a policy globally and spiked when the state was at its most at the national level through three vulnerable, transitioning from author- case studies: Colombia, Mexico, and itarianism to democracy in the 1990s the United States. The analysis joined and early 2000s. Increased political existing research across many fields — competition led to increased competi- including economics, political science, tion in the illicit market. Corruption international relations, international and weak rule of law — two problems law, and journalism — to provide a that existed under the PRI government cohesive understanding of the negative and were never quite reformed — were consequences of prohibition. What given new, violent expression through we have found is that prohibition has cartel violence, displacement, and largely failed to meet its stated goal and threats to civil society that today rep- has caused destruction and death along resent a serious threat to the country’s the way. Additionally, in the course of democratic future. our research, we became increasingly aware of the interaction between pro- In the United States, prohibition has hibition and a state’s political system. played a significant role in re-estab- In each of these cases, prohibition gave lishing institutional racism through ammunition to existing institutional a criminal justice system that is more flaws, exacerbating them and creating likely to imprison a Black person than violent outcomes that directly threat- a member of any other minority group, ened human rights. even when they commit the same crime. Other minority groups are also dispro- In Colombia, apart from damaging the portionately affected: in 2012, 37% of health, safety, and economic wellbeing drug offenders in federal prison were of civilians directly, prohibitionist Hispanic or Latino, though this group policies created an illicit market that made up just 16% of the U.S. population empowered armed groups, allowing at the time.245 them to mount a serious challenge to the state in the rural, peripheral areas The drug war has played a significant where it was already weak. It set up role in creating these threats to human perverse incentives that led to corrup- rights and democracy. Lifting prohibition within the state’s judicial system tion would weaken armed groups and and electoral process. criminals, reduce the amount of profit to be gained through the illicit market, and allow states to regulate the markets

57 to ensure the safety of consumers. It security campaigns that Lifting prohibition could also open the way for drug use could amount to crimes would weaken armed to be destigmatized, and for health against humanity.248 groups and criminals, care workers to be able to provide reduce the amount much-needed treatment to victims of Is there hope in these of profit to be gained drug abuse and addiction. However, countries of reversing through the illicit lifting prohibition won’t alone solve the effects of prohibi- market, and allow these endemic problems with the state tion’s proxy wars? This states to regulate in each of these cases, and criminals report has asked how the markets to may well find other ways to make prohibition interacts ensure the safety of money — as they have done in Mexico with democratic politi- consumers by entering into people smuggling and cal systems. One future human trafficking. Lifting prohibition avenue for research would be to explore would need to be coupled with deep in- its interaction with authoritarian ones. stitutional rehabilitation and reform to Our hypothesis would be that the war improve the overall health of the justice on drugs gives authoritarians another systems, police departments, electoral means to exert their will on the people. bodies, and more, in order to truly end human rights violations. In the context of Mexican democracy, intrepid advocates have risked their In fact, these cases also show how in- lives to advocate for drug reform and stitutional strength can lead to better are making serious gains. In October human rights outcomes. The countries 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the examined in this report, and those ban on recreational marijuana was un- mentioned above, are all democracies. constitutional, leaving it up to Congress The existence of a civil society there to regulate its use.249 The result of this — however embattled — created some advocacy can be seen also in AMLO’s room for drug reform advocacy, and the intent to invest government money in importance of elections gave politicians forensic investigations of disappeared incentive to heed voters’ concerns. But people and other newly-announced in authoritarian countries, where civil initiatives. In Colombia and the United society is repressed or nonexistent, States, civil society advocacy led gov- how would reform happen? In China ernments to reverse harmful policies and Iran, the justice system uses the like aerial spraying and “Stop and death penalty to punish perpetrators Frisk.” In Colombia, some of these gains of drug crimes.246 In Venezuela, the could be attributed to Plan Colombia’s authoritarian regime of Nicolás Mad- human rights and rule of law funding. uro has used the illicit drug trade247 to keep funding the corrupt state it has Evaluating the effectiveness of alter- captured, even after the precipitous native drug policies, and whether or collapse of the Venezuelan economy. not they are weakened by the simulta- In the Philippines, strongman Rodrigo neity of prohibition, falls outside the Duterte is killing thousands of alleged scope of the report, but also warrants addicts in the name of prohibition in further investigation.

58 Other countries, too, offer perspectives around treating drug abuse not as a on alternatives to prohibition, includ- criminal or security threat, but as a ing the legalization of “hard” drugs in health problem. Consensus at the inter- addition to marijuana. Portugal, for national level must translate into coor- example, has seen a sharp decrease in dinated action that eliminates negative drug overdose deaths and even violent incentives up and down the supply crime since it decriminalized most chain. The current consensus, prohibi- drugs in 2001.250 The Netherlands has tion, has simply failed to produce the also experimented with decriminaliza- desired results, and it is long past time tion of small amounts of drugs, and also for alternatives to be considered. with smarter harm reduction policies such as needle exchanges and easily We hope that this report has made prog- accessible treatment for addiction. A ress in connecting the dots between 2013 report by the Open Society Foun- prohibition and poor human rights out- dations found that the Dutch experi- comes. Competition in the illicit market ence has also been a success, 251 reducing sparks violence. Corruption weakens harm and the population’s exposure to the rule of law. Criminalization creates dangerous drugs, as well as improving stigma and harms minority groups. health outcomes for the general popula- Though some of the most violent actors tion.252 Mexico is starting to follow this in the drug war are criminals, a govern- pattern right now, as the legislature ment policy is what creates the incen- looks into ways to decriminalize mari- tives that make their crimes possible. juana and potentially other drugs. So far, it seems that most drug policy groups fight for change on their own, However, shifts in one market, as we’ve without support from international hu- learned, can impact others. The cre- man rights organizations. Our research ation of a legal market in destination has made clear that if we hope to de- countries like Portugal may well be crease human rights violations in these responsible for increases in violence countries, prohibition needs to go. HRF in production and transit countries, is committed to supporting drug policy shifting criminal competition from groups, and we urge our partners in the one market to another. Ultimately, what human rights space to do the same. is needed is a new global consensus

Endnotes

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87 Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, “The Monopoly of Violence,” 7-9. 65 97 “Data and Research: 51 Jour- 105 “Colombia’s President Cracks nalists Killed in Colombia,” Commit- Down on Drug Use”; Jorge Eduardo Espi- tee to Protect Journalists, accessed nosa, “La Dosis Mínima de Iván Duque,” July 8, 2019, https://cpj.org/data/ New York Times, September 6, 2018, killed/americas/colombia/murder/?sta- https://www.nytimes.com/es/2018/09/06/ tus=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=- opinon-dosis-minima-colombia-duque/; Confirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&cc_ Jeremy McDermott, “Op-Ed: Duque ‘Has fips%5B%5D=CO&start_year=1992&end_ Done Nothing For Us,’ Says Trump,” year=2019&group_by=year. InSight Crime, April 6, 2019, https://www. insightcrime.org/news/analysis/duque-done-nothing-trump-us-colombia/. 98 “Enemies of the Press 2001,” Committee to Protect Journalists, May 2001, accessed June 15, 2019, https://cpj. 106 Mejía and Restrepo, “Why is org/reports/2001/05/enemies-01.php. Strict Prohibition Collapsing?” 31; “Inten- tional Homicides (per 100,000 People): Colombia,” World Bank, accessed May 20, 99 “2019 Freedom in the World 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ Report: Colombia,” Freedom House, VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=CO; Chris accessed May 20, 2019, https://freedom- Dalby and Camilo Carranza, “Balance de house.org/report/freedom-world/2019/co- InSight Crime sobre los Homicidios en lombia. 2018,” InsightCrime, accessed May 20, 2019, https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/ 100 “Colombia Must Act to Stop analisis/balance-de-insight-crime-sobre- Killings and Attacks against Human Rights los-homicidios-en-2018/. Defenders - UN Expert,” Office of the Unit- ed Nations High Commissioner for Human 107 Mejía and Restrepo, “Why is Strict Rights, accessed July 8, 2019, https:// Prohibition Collapsing?” 29. www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23968&Lan- gID=E. 108 “Internally displaced persons, total displaced by conflict and violence (number of people): Colombia,” World Bank, 101 “Informe Mundial 2019: Colom- accessed May 20, 2019, https://data. bia,” Human Rights Watch, January 17, worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IDP.TOCV?lo- 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, https://www. cations=CO; “Colombia,” Internal Displace- hrw.org/es/world-report/2019/country-chap- ment Monitoring Centre. ters/326041#0ee309. 109 “Mexico Drug War Fast Facts,” 102 Martin Jelsma, “Tendencias en CNN, February 15, 2019, accessed May las Reformas a las Leyes de Droga en 25, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/ América Latina,” Transnational Institute, world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/ accessed July 3, 2019, https://www.tni. index.html. org/files/Panorama%20Regional%20 Leyes%20Drogas%20Final%2003.10.pdf. 110 Grillo, El Narco, 63. 103 “Listo el Borrador del Decreto que Faculta a la Policía para Decomisar la 111 F. De Jonge, “Mexico and the Dosis Mínima,” El Espectador, September Drug Cartels: A History of Fascination,” 4, 2018, accessed May 25, 2019, https:// Peace Palace Library, accessed July 22, www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/ 2019, https://www.peacepalacelibrary. listo-el-borrador-del-decreto-que-facul- nl/2016/01/mexico-and-the-drug-car- ta-la-policia-para-decomisar-la-dosis-mini- tels-a-history-of-fascination/. ma-articulo-810312. 112 Richard B. Craig, “Operation 104 Ibid; “Colombia’s President Intercept: The International Politics of Cracks Down on Drug Use,” Voice of Pressure,” The Review of Politics 42, no. America, October 21, 2018, https://www. 4 (1980): 556-80, http://www.jstor.org/sta- voanews.com/a/colombia-s-president- ble/1406640. cracks-down-on-drug-use/4595197.html. 113 Grillo, El Narco, 45.

114 Ibid, 51.

115 Andreas Schedler, “The Crimi- nal Subversion of Mexican Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1 (2014): 5-18, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/ articles/the-criminal-subversion-of-mexican-democracy/. 66 116 June S. Beittel, Mexico: Orga- 127 James Bargent, “Trump’s Plan to nized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organi- Tackle Organized Crime Provides Bluster, zations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional No Substance,” InSight Crime, September Research Service, July 3, 2018), https:// 20, 2017, accessed June 9, 2019, https:// fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf, 3. www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/trump- plan-tackle-organized-crime-all-bluster-no- substance/; “Executive Order. No. 13773 of 117 Luis Gómez Romero, ”A decade February 14, 2017, Enforcing Federal Law of murder and grief: Mexico’s drug war With Respect to Transnational Criminal turns ten,” The Conversation, December Organizations and Preventing International 11, 2016, accessed July 11, 2019, https:// Trafficking,” Code of Federal Regulations, theconversation.com/a-decade-of-mur- 82 FR Ref. 10691 (2017), 10691-10693, der-and-grief-mexicos-drug-war-turns- https://www.federalregister.gov/docu- ten-70036. ments/2017/02/14/2017-03113/enforcing-federal-law-with-respect-to-transnation- 118 “Calderon Touts Successes in al-criminal-organizations-and-preventing. Mexico’s War on Drug Cartels,” CNN, Sep- tember 6, 2010, accessed July 8, 2019, 128 Ibid. http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/09/02/mexico.calderon.speech/index. html. 129 Joshua Partlow, “Mexico’s Drug Trade Hits Home,” Washington Post, December 21, 2017, accessed June 9, 119 Clare Ribando Seelke, Mexico: 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007- graphics/2017/world/mexico-s-drug-traffic- 2019 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional is-now-hitting-home/. Research Service, March 11, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10578.pdf, 2. 130 “Víctimas, incidencia delictiva del fuero común, metodología anterior,” Gobi- 120 “Mexico Activists Seek ICC erno de México Secretariado Ejecutivo del Investigation of Drugs War,” BBC News, Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, November 25, 2011, accessed May 20, April 20, 2019, https://www.gob.mx/sesnsp/ 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-lat- acciones-y-programas/incidencia-delicti- in-america-15899687. va-81638?idiom=es; “Víctimas y unidades robadas, nueva metodología,” Gobierno de 121 Casey Quackenbush, “‘There Is México Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Officially No More War’: Mexico’s Pres- Nacional de Seguridad Pública, June 20, ident Declares an End to the Drug War 2019, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www. Amid Skepticism,” TIME, January 31, gob.mx/sesnsp/acciones-y-programas/vic- 2019, https://time.com/5517391/mexi- timas-nueva-metodologia?state=published; co-president-ends-drug-war/. The numbers in this paragraph use data from the first listed source (the Mexican government’s old methodology) for 2007- 122 Esteban Illades, “Mexico’s AMLO 2014, and data from the second source Doubles Down on a Failed Security Policy: (the new methodology, which was first Militarization,” Washington Post, January used in 2015) for 2015-2018. 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/2019/01/20/mexicos-amlo-doubles-down-failed-security-policy-mili- 131 Count the Costs, “The War on tarization/?utm_term=.6730db111f2f. Drugs: Creating Crime, Enriching Crimi- nals,” 9. 123 Olson, “The Mérida Initiative and Shared Responsibility in U.S.- Mexico 132 Schelling, Economics and Crimi- Security Relations.” nal Enterprise, 65.

124 “Mexico,” Security Assistance 133 Melissa Dell, “Trafficking Networks Monitor, accessed May 20, 2019, https:// and the Mexican Drug War,” American www.securityassistance.org/Mexico. Economic Review 105, no. 6 (2015): 1738- 1779, www.jstor.org/stable/43495438; Gabriela Calderón, Gustavo Robles, Al- 125 Mejía and Restrepo, “Why is Strict berto Díaz-Cayeros, and Beatriz Magaloni, Prohibition Collapsing?” 29. “The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico,” 126 “Mexico,” U.S. Department of Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 8 State, accessed April 28, 2019, https:// (December 2015): 1455–85, https://doi. web.archive.org/web/20190414161055/ org/10.1177/0022002715587053. https://www.state.gov/j/inl/regions/western- hemisphere/219174.htm.

67 134 Dell, “Trafficking Networks and the 147 “Mexico,” Internal Displacement Mexican Drug War,” 1739. Monitoring Centre, accessed June 15, 2019, http://www.internal-displacement. org/countries/mexico. 135 Dell, “Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War,” 1740. 148 Laura H. Atuesta Becerra, “Ad- dressing the Costs of Prohibition: Internally 136 Ibid. Displaced Populations in Colombia and Mexico,” in Ending the War on Drugs, ed. 137 Daniel Wilkinson, “México: Los John Collins, (London: LSE Expert Group Otros Desaparecidos,” Human Rights on the Economics of Drug Policy, May Watch, January 14, 2019, accessed 2014), http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/ June 9, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/es/ Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Ending- news/2019/01/14/mexico-los-otros-desa- the-Drug-Wars.pdf, 27-28, 49- 54. parecidos. 149 Becerra, “Addressing the Costs of 138 “Mexicans Protest ‘Epidemic’ of Prohibition,” 53. Forced Disappearances,” Al Jazeera, April 27, 2018, accessed June 9, 2019, https:// 150 Ibid, 52. www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/mexicans-protest-epidemic-forced-disappearances-180427064652890.html. 151 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Forced Displacement Linked to Transnational Organised Crime in Mexico 139 Lizbeth Diaz, “Mexico to Try New (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitor- Tactics in Search of Those Missing in Drug ing Centre, May 2012), accessed June War,” Reuters, February 4, 2019, accessed 15, 2019, http://www.internal-displace- July 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ar- ment.org/sites/default/files/publications/ ticle/us-mexico-politics/mexico-to-try-new- documents/2012005-am-mexico-Mexi- tactics-in-search-for-those-missing-in-drug- co-forced-displacement-en.pdf, 3. war-idUSKCN1PT2DY. 152 Ibid. 140 Wilkinson, “México: Los Otros Desaparecidos.” 153 Becerra, “Addressing the Costs of Prohibition,” 51. 141 “Víctimas, incidencia delictiva del fuero común, metodología anterior.” 154 Marco Tucci and Christelle Caza- bat, The Ripple Effect” Economic Impacts 142 “Mexico: Ayotzinapa Investigation of Internal Displacement (Geneva: Internal Marred by Torture and Rape Cover-Ups Displacement Monitoring Centre, October – UN Report,” United Nations Office 2018), accessed June 15, 2019, http:// of the High Commissioner of Human www.internal-displacement.org/sites/de- Rights, March 15, 2018, accessed June fault/files/inline-files/201810-idmc-econom- 9, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/New- ic-impacts-correlation_0.pdf. sEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News- ID=22830&LangID=E. 155 Becerra, “Addressing the Costs of Prohibition,” 53. 143 Nicole Acevedo and Reuters, “U.N. says Mexican Security Forc- es are Likely Behind Disappearances 156 “Data and Research: 63 Jour- in Border City,” NBC News, May 31, nalists Missing in 2019,” Committee to 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/ Protect Journalists, accessed June 15, latino/u-n-says-mexican-security-forc- 2019, https://cpj.org/data/missing/?sta- es-are-likely-behind-disappearanc- tus=Missing&start_year=2019&end_ es-n878941. year=2019&group_by=location.

144 Dawn Paley, “Will Mexico’s New 157 Elisabeth Witchel, “Getting Away President Seek Justice for the Disap- with Murder,” Committee to Protect Jour- peared?” The Nation, January 10, 2019, nalists, October 2018, accessed June accessed June 9, 2019, https://www. 15, 2019, https://cpj.org/reports/2018/10/ thenation.com/article/mexico-drug-war-kill- impunity-index-getting-away-with-mur- ings-lopez-obrador/. der-killed-justice.php.

145 Wainwright, Narconomics, 193- 158 “Mexico: Constant Violence and 205. Fear,” Reporters without Borders, accessed June 15, 2019, https://rsf.org/en/ mexico. 146 Diaz, “Mexico to Try New Tactics in Search for Those Missing in Drug War.” 68 159 Jos Midas Bartman, “Murder in 172 Schedler, “The Criminal Subver- Mexico: Are Journalists Victims of General sion of Mexican Democracy,” 14. Violence or Targeted Political Violence?” Democratization 25 (7): 1101, https://doi. org/ 10.1080/13510347.2018.1445998. 173 Ibid, 15.

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170 “Séptimo Informe de Violencia 183 Ibid. Política en México 2018,” Etellekt, July 9, 2018, http://www.etellekt.com/reporte/sep- timo-informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexi- 184 United States Drug Enforcement co.html. Administration, 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment, 77-80. 171 Beittel, “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations,” 2. 185 “State Policy,” Marijuana Policy Project, accessed July 21, 2019, https:// www.mpp.org/states/.

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