Nuclear Weapons and International Security Since 1945 Series Editor
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Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945 Series Editor: Professor John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, UK During the second half of the last century, the practical aspects of national nuclear weapon policies remained shrouded in state secrecy laws. This was an area where polit- ical and technical issues were intertwined, and understanding required knowledge and expertise of both. Archival material was sparse and most writings on the subject were based on information provided to well-placed journalists and confidential inter- views with some of those involved. The result was that for the academic analyst, sepa- rating truth from fiction was a very difficult task, especially in the case in the United Kingdom. With the end of the Cold War, archival material became available from all of the five declared nuclear-weapon states on their activities and scholars were able to discuss the previous century’s nuclear reality. A small community of scholars and former practitioners in the UK therefore started to rethink this history by producing a new series of volumes on the evolution of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapon poli- cies from 1952 onwards, the date of the explosion of its first nuclear device. Thanks to a grant from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Board to the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton, Professor John Simpson and his colleagues were able to start a systematic study of the post-1952 period, and to engage with those directly involved in its many aspects. What soon became clear was that in the period 1958 and 1964 the course was set for UK nuclear policy in the next half-century. It is thus appropriate that Richard Moore’s volume Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–1964 should be the first of the planned chronological volumes arising from this systematic process. This is reinforced by the current salience of debates over the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent force, and the role of the volume as the lead publication in Palgrave’s wider series of studies on nuclear history. Titles include: Kristan Stoddart LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70 Kristan Stoddart THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD Britain, America, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976 Richard Moore NUCLEAR ILLUSTION, NUCLEAR REALITY Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64 Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945 Series Standing Order ISBN: 978–0–230–21775–1 hardback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England Also by Kristan Stoddart LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE Britain, America, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70 THE BRITISH NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE The Role of Beliefs, Culture and Status ( with John Baylis ) The Sword and the Shield Britain, America, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976 Kristan Stoddart Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UK © Kristan Stoddart 2014 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-0-230-30093-4 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-1-349-33658-6 ISBN 978-1-137-31350-8 (eBook) DOI 10.105 7/9781137313508 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. To the memory of Lee Williams, 1971–2012, and to his surviving family Sian, Harri and Ben. More a brother than a best friend. This page intentionally left blank Contents List of Figures viii Acknowledgements ix Series Editor’s Introduction xii List of Abbreviations xvii Introduction 1 1 The Heath Government, France, and the Not So Special Relationship, 1970–1974 11 2 The ‘Special Nuclear Relationship’ under Heath, 1970–1974 43 3 Britain, NATO’s Evolving Military Doctrine, and Its Nuclear Planning Group: The Balance between the Sword and the Shield, 1970–1974 83 4 National Strategy and Multilateral Priorities: British ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Operations, 1970–1974 115 5 The Last Wilson Governments and Strategic Nuclear Deterrence, 1974–1976 138 6 Nuclear Testing and the Practicalities of Moving Chevaline to Completion, 1974–1976 156 7 Britain, America, and NATO Modernisation, 1974–1976 172 8 Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Operational Employment, and Conventional Defence, 1974–1976 203 Conclusion 217 Appendices 233 Notes 235 Bibliography 295 Index 313 vii List of Figures 4.1 A Sea Cat missile being fired from HMS Eagle (circa 1970) 137 4.2 The Island of HMS Eagle with nuclear-capable Buccaneers clearly visible (circa 1970) 137 6.1 A complete Polaris missile with all three stages separated 165 6.2 Close-up of a decommissioned Chevaline front-end minus the warhead 166 viii Acknowledgements National security considerations make researching and writing about nuclear weapons a difficult subject area to work in, with non-proliferation aspects and the potential harm declassification might do to foreign rela- tions to be taken into account. This is the case in the UK and, indeed, in all nuclear weapons states. However, given their centrality to defence and foreign policy and the influence they can have on international security, they deserve noteworthy attention. The British government takes these issues into consideration when declassifying the kinds of material this book is based on, and, since the end of the Cold War, have been releasing material under the ‘Thirty Year Rule’, and now a ‘Twenty Year Rule’ with the ability to request further declassifications under the Freedom of Information Act, passed in 2000 and which came into force in 2005. The US, from which material has also been gathered, has no equivalent of a 20 or 30-year rule, but similarly operates a Freedom of Information Act, according to which government agencies have to justify continued classification to halt the mandatory release of government documents. In the acknowledgements section of my first book on these issues I recorded the views of Lawrence Freedman, who wrote in the introduction to Britain and Nuclear Weapons : ‘The agnosticism of this study is partly a reflection of a determination to provide a book of description and anal- ysis rather than advocacy.’ This remains the case. I will only add that, as a result of the more than a decade I have spent studying the issues found in the following pages, I am increasingly of the view, a view long held in British government circles, that if a state does possess nuclear weapons they are for deterrence purposes only and should not be seen as having a military utility should deterrence fail, because, as this book will show, crossing the nuclear threshold carries monumental considerations and dangers which, for large-scale use, evoke biblical metaphors of the apocalypse. Like its predecessor volume, this book seeks to provide a holistic investiga- tion of British nuclear weapons policy in all its aspects that time, space, and the historical record will allow, touching directly on US and NATO policies as well as those of France. It examines areas of policy including the acquisi- tion and manufacture of nuclear warhead designs, weapons deployment, and means of nuclear delivery as well as operational strategy and tactics at national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Such wide areas of policy depict the size and scale of the effort involved even as Britain’s commitment to non-European theatres continued to diminish. ix x Acknowledgements No endeavour of this nature could have been attempted alone, and there- fore I must extend my thanks to all those who have contributed directly and indirectly to this research project. I must first extend my thanks to Emeritus Professor John Simpson, whose intellect and generosity with time in reviewing and suggesting corrections for this book, in difficult personal circumstances, has been greatly valued. I have got to know John well during the past decade, and he and his wife Sue have been extremely supportive and kind to me. I hope, in my small way, I have been (and continue to be) supportive and appreciative of them.