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'The Supreme Principle of Morality'? in the Preface to His Best
The Supreme Principle of Morality Allen W. Wood 1. What is ‘The Supreme Principle of Morality’? In the Preface to his best known work on moral philosophy, Kant states his purpose very clearly and succinctly: “The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which already constitutes an enterprise whole in its aim and to be separated from every other moral investigation” (Groundwork 4:392). This paper will deal with the outcome of the first part of this task, namely, Kant’s attempt to formulate the supreme principle of morality, which is the intended outcome of the search. It will consider this formulation in light of Kant’s conception of the historical antecedents of his attempt. Our first task, however, must be to say a little about the meaning of the term ‘supreme principle of morality’. For it is not nearly as evident to many as it was to Kant that there is such a thing at all. And it is extremely common for people, whatever position they may take on this issue, to misunderstand what a ‘supreme principle of morality’ is, what it is for, and what role it is supposed to play in moral theorizing and moral reasoning. Kant never directly presents any argument that there must be such a principle, but he does articulate several considerations that would seem to justify supposing that there is. Kant holds that moral questions are to be decided by reason. Reason, according to Kant, always seeks unity under principles, and ultimately, systematic unity under the fewest possible number of principles (Pure Reason A298-302/B355-359, A645- 650/B673-678). -
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Arthur Schopenhauer
03/05/2017 Arthur Schopenhauer (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Arthur Schopenhauer First published Mon May 12, 2003; substantive revision Sat Nov 19, 2011 Among 19th century philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer was among the first to contend that at its core, the universe is not a rational place. Inspired by Plato and Kant, both of whom regarded the world as being more amenable to reason, Schopenhauer developed their philosophies into an instinctrecognizing and ultimately ascetic outlook, emphasizing that in the face of a world filled with endless strife, we ought to minimize our natural desires for the sake of achieving a more tranquil frame of mind and a disposition towards universal beneficence. Often considered to be a thoroughgoing pessimist, Schopenhauer in fact advocated ways — via artistic, moral and ascetic forms of awareness — to overcome a frustrationfilled and fundamentally painful human condition. Since his death in 1860, his philosophy has had a special attraction for those who wonder about life's meaning, along with those engaged in music, literature, and the visual arts. 1. Life: 1788–1860 2. The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 3. Schopenhauer's Critique of Kant 4. The World as Will 5. Transcending the Human Conditions of Conflict 5.1 Aesthetic Perception as a Mode of Transcendence 5.2 Moral Awareness as a Mode of Transcendence 5.3 Asceticism and the Denial of the WilltoLive 6. Schopenhauer's Later Works 7. Critical Reflections 8. Schopenhauer's Influence Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. Life: 1788–1860 Exactly a month younger than the English Romantic poet, Lord Byron (1788–1824), who was born on January 22, 1788, Arthur Schopenhauer came into the world on February 22, 1788 in Danzig [Gdansk, Poland] — a city that had a long history in international trade as a member of the Hanseatic League. -
Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2014 Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Bradley Taylor University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Taylor, Bradley, "Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy" (2014). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1468. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Abstract ABSTRACT HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT'S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Bradley M. Taylor Dr. Paul Guyer This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant's ethics. Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant's moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant's account of human moral agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law. -
THE ATROCITY PARADIGM This Page Intentionally Left Blank the Atrocity Paradigm
THE ATROCITY PARADIGM This page intentionally left blank The Atrocity Paradigm A Theory of Evil CLAUDIA CARD 1 2002 3 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and an associated company in Berlin Copyright © 2002 by Claudia Card Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Card, Claudia. The atrocity paradigm : a theory of evil / Claudia Card. p. cm. ISBN 0-19-514508-9 1. Good and evil. I. Title. BJ1401 .C29 2002 170—dc21 2001036610 987654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper To my teachers, whose example and encouragement have elicited my best efforts: Ruby Healy Marquardt (1891–1976) Marjorie Glass Pinkerton Marcus George Singer John Rawls Lorna Smith Benjamin This page intentionally left blank Preface Four decades of philosophical work in ethics have engaged me with varieties of evil. It began with an undergraduate honors thesis on punishment, which was followed by a Ph.D. dissertation on that topic, essays on mercy and retribu- tion, and a grant to study the U.S. -
František Kupka: Sounding Abstraction – Musicality, Colour and Spiritualism
Issue No. 2/2019 František Kupka: Sounding Abstraction – Musicality, Colour and Spiritualism Anna-Maria von Bonsdorff, PhD, Chief Curator, Finnish National Gallery / Ateneum Art Museum, Helsinki Also published in Anne-Maria Pennonen, Hanne Selkokari and Lene Wahlsten (eds.), František Kupka. Ateneum Publications Vol. 114. Helsinki: Finnish National Gallery / Ateneum Art Museum 2019, 11–25. Transl. Tomi Snellman The art of František Kupka (1871–1957) has intrigued artists, art historians and exhibition visitors for many decades. Although nowadays Kupka’s name is less well known outside artistic circles, in his day he was one of the artists at the forefront in creating abstract paintings on the basis of colour theory and freeing colours from descriptive associations. Today his energetic paintings are still as enigmatic and exciting as they were in 1912, when his completely non- figurative canvases, including Amorpha, Fugue in Two Colours and Amorpha, Warm Chromatics, created a scandal when they were shown in the Salon d’Automne in Paris. It marked a turning point in many ways, not least in the decision of the Gaumont Film Company to use Kupka’s abstract works for the news in cinemas in France, Germany, the United States and England.1 And as we will see, Kupka’s far-reaching shift to abstraction was a long process which grew partly out of his childhood interest in spiritualism and partly from Symbolist and occultist ideas to crystallise into the concept of an art which could be seen, felt and understood on a more multisensory basis. Kupka’s art reflects the idea of musicality in art, colour and spiritualism. -
On the Genealogy of Morality. the Birth of Pessimism in Zapffe’S on the Tragic
On the Genealogy of Morality... 75 ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY. THE BIRTH OF PESSIMISM IN ZAPFFE’S ON THE TRAGIC SILVIYA SERAFIMOVA Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge, BAS [email protected] Abstract This article examines the genealogy of morality, as represented by the Norwegian philosopher and writer Peter Wessel Zapffe, as well as the way it affected the justification of his pessimism, which made him one of the most influential existentialists of the 20th century. Analyzing the complex relationships between so-called biological, social and (autotelic) metaphysical morality, which are explored against the background of four interest fronts (biological, social, autotelic and metaphysical fronts), I will clarify why Zapffe’s pessimism is irreducible to the one displayed by Schopenhauer since Zapffe provides a critical reception of Schopenhauer’s theory of tragic. Key words: Peter Wessel Zapffe, morality, existentialism, pessimism, On the Tragic Regardless of the fact that the conceptions of the Norwegian mountaineer, lawyer, writer and philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe are not as well-known as the theories of Arne Naess, they had a significant influence on the development of Norwegian existentialism. In this context, we should specify why one should talk about Zapffe’s pessimism rather than Zapffe’s nihilism regardless of Nietzsche’s influence on his views of cultural degrowth, as well as of the possibility to draw some parallels with Nietzsche’s ‘melancholic metaphysics’ [1], as Haave suggests (Haave, 1999, pp. 236-237). Zapffe himself describes Nietzsche’s theory of tragic arguing that his “aesthetic-tragic desire” (“aestetisk-tragiske lyst”) is imprecisely interpreted (Zapffe, 1941, p. -
Walter Kaufmann
© Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. Introduction walter kaufmann was born in Freiburg in Breisgau, Germany, on July 1, 1921, and died in Princeton, New Jersey, on September 4, 1980, far too young, at fifty‑nine, for someone of his vitality.1 His colleague, the Princeton histo‑ rian Carl Schorske, remained lucid until his death in 2015, after having cel‑ ebrated his one‑hundredth birthday.2 Arthur Szathmary, who together with Walter Kaufmann joined Princeton’s Department of Philosophy in 1947, died in 2013 at ninety‑seven; and Joseph Frank, emeritus professor of compara‑ tive literature at Princeton, with whom Walter debated an understanding of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, passed away in 2013 at ninety‑four, some months after publishing his last book.3 It is hard to imagine Kaufmann’s sudden death at that age arising from an ordinary illness, and in fact the cir‑ cumstances fit a conception of tragedy—if not his own. According to Walter’s brother, Felix Kaufmann, Walter, while on one of his Faustian journeys of exploration to West Africa, swallowed a parasite that attacked his heart. In the months following, Walter died of a burst aorta in his Princeton home. His death does not fit his own conception of tragedy, for his bookThe Faith of a Heretic contains the extraordinary sentences: When I die, I do not want them to say: Think of all he still might have done. -
Albert Camus' Dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky Sean Derek Illing Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected]
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2014 Between nihilism and transcendence : Albert Camus' dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky Sean Derek Illing Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Illing, Sean Derek, "Between nihilism and transcendence : Albert Camus' dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky" (2014). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 1393. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1393 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. BETWEEN NIHILISM AND TRANSCENDENCE: ALBERT CAMUS’ DIALOGUE WITH NIETZSCHE AND DOSTOEVSKY A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Political Science by Sean D. Illing B.A., Louisiana State University, 2007 M.A., University of West Florida, 2009 May 2014 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation is the product of many supportive individuals. I am especially grateful for Dr. Cecil Eubank’s guidance. As a teacher, one can do no better than Professor Eubanks. Although his Socratic glare can be terrifying, there is always love and wisdom in his instruction. It is no exaggeration to say that this work would not exist without his support. At every step, he helped me along as I struggled to articulate my thoughts. -
Now You See It, Now You Don't!
CALIFORNIA STATE SCIENCE FAIR 2009 PROJECT SUMMARY Name(s) Project Number Stephanie S. Manson-Hing J1315 Project Title Now You See It, Now You Don't! Abstract Objectives/Goals The objective of my science project is to explore how the perception of objects, using peripheral vision, is affected by the objects' color. Methods/Materials I tested ten people from two different age groups: 30-60 year old adults and 13-15 year old adolescents. Using a vision protractor I designed and created myself for the project (made out of foam core), I tested which out of the colors blue, red, yellow, and green was percepted easiest and at the earliest degree on the protractor. Each person must focus on a pin in their direct line of central vision (90 degree mark on the vision protractor) thus forcing them to use their peripheral vision to detect the different, nickel sized, colored objects. I tested both eyes/sides of peripheral vision in my experiment. Results After gathering together my data, I concluded that the object colored yellow, for both age groups, was detected earliest and was easiest to see. For the 13-15 year old age group, the average perception was 9.5 degrees and the average for the 30-60 year olds was 11 degrees. I also figured out that green was the most difficult color of object to recognize. The younger age group recognized the objects earlier in general (with all four colors) by about 2-4 degrees on both sides. Conclusions/Discussion My hypothesis: If I test peripheral vision using the colors blue, red, yellow, and green, then the brightest color, yellow will be detected earliest and easiest out of the four colors, was proven correct by my experiment#s data. -
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Qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqw ertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwert yuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyui opasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopa An Investigation of the Parallels between Sartre’s Bad Faith and Nietzsche’s Slave Morality sdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfMasters Dissertation 1/1/2011 ghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjStudent: James Speirs Student Number 210553574 Supervisor: Dr. Deepak Mistrey School of Philosophy and Ethics klzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzFaculty of Human Development and Social Sciences Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for degree of Master of Arts in the programme of xcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvPhilosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban I hereby declare that this work is my own. I have not willingly plagiarised and where I have used another’s work I have stated so. bnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbn mqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmq____________________________________ wertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwe rtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwerty uiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyui Abstract The following dissertation examines Sartre’s notion of bad faith before identifying parallels found in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. Bad faith is often construed as lying to oneself; however, this entails an individual being both the deceiver and deceived which presents a number of paradoxes. By reconceptualising bad faith as self-deception rather than lying to oneself these paradoxes are avoided. Nietzsche’s Genealogy examines the development of modern morality and explains its genesis through identifying a specific psychological tendency, namely, ressentiment. Ressentiment -
Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford Ox2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With oces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York Translation, Note on the Text and Translation, Select Bibliography, Chronology, Explanatory Notes © David E. Cartwright and Edward E. Erdmann 2010 Introduction © Christopher Janaway 2010 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published as an Oxford World’s Classics paperback 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above -
Schopenhauer's Ethics
Schopenhauer’s Ethics: A Metaphysics in Action Department of Education Ivan Brian L. Inductivo, M.A. Abstract: Disputations whether Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) assent to a certain normative system of Ethics in his philosophy has been an interminable topic. Despite his dispiriting claim that philosophy can never ‘guide conduct’ as well as the determinability of character raises the question of how there exists a moral dimension in his works. Indeed, he states explicitly that his views on morality are entirely in the spirit of Christianity, as well as being consistent with the doctrines and ethical precepts of the sacred books of India (The World as Will and Representation, Section 68). Through this, by way of synoptic assessment, many works on Schopenhauer focused on compassion as the basis of his ethics. This paper will then seek to underscore a different vantage point on the grounding Inductivo... of his ethics, i.e., one which is emerging from metaphysics and achieves its embodiment in action. Hence, the principal intent of this paper is to ascertain a possible normative exposition of Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy. This entails an elucidation on whether there is a framework of Ethics embedded in his metaphysics and a critical analysis on the plausibility of this moral philosophy. Keywords: Arthur Schopenhauer, Metaphysics, Ethics, Will-to-Live, Compassion, Virtue “It is just as little necessary for the saint to be a philosopher as for the philosopher to be a saint; just as it is not necessary for a perfectly beautiful, person to be a great sculptor, or for a great sculptor to be himself a beautiful person.