What to Do with Sheikh Abdullah Balraj Puri This article was written before Sheikh Abdullah was interned at Ooty, but the internment does not answer the question: what are we going to do with Sheikh Abdullah and with the forces re {presented by him? The Sheikh has evidently grown less amenable and manageable since his release from jail a year ago. At the same time, let it not be forgotten that the gap between him and the rest of the country was not always so wide. Nor was his political position in the Valley always so well consolidated. This is, in fact, an occasion to look back over the years to discover which of the lost opportunities are not irretrievable. NLY in May last year Sheikh Ab­ pect now—too good to be true. The sation has damaged the prospects for O dullah had expressed the convic- difficulties in the way of a final settle­ a third course besides appeasement tion that a basis existed in India for ment were indeed formidable. But and suppression. But was this policy the kind of settlement of the Kashmir there was reason to hope that tensions really foredoomed to failure? And can problem that he was working for, would be further reduced and the area it not still be rescued? There was, he had said publicly, no of agreement would be gradually en­ The year 1964 does mark the freest basic difference between him and larged, and would remain in any case year of Kashmiri politics. But if it Prime Minister Nehru—"the differences larger than what Kashmiri leaders could be said during the Bakshi regime existed only in the imagination of could discover across the border. that people were not to be satisfied some people". The formula that he Within a month of the death of "by bread alone", it can be said now took to Pakistan had obviously the Nehru, Abdullah declared at a public that they are not to be satisfied "by blessing of Nehru. meeting in Srinagar that "India has freedom alone" either. Why did free- dug its own grave in Kashmir". dom fail to satisfy and what supple­ Though after another round of talks in mentary measures are needed to make Nehru-Abdullah Entente New Delhi he felt that the "climate it satisfying? It is not difficult to surmise the for the Indo Pak amity mission was If the people did not feel obliged to possible basis of settlement that Ab­ good" and was happy "that things are be grateful to the new regime in Kash­ dullah had discovered in New Delhi. going satisfactorily", frustration was mir, it was because it could hardly On May 11, 1964 he had declared not long in coming, "It was futile", he dispel their impression that they had that in spite of 11 years of incarce- soon said in Srinagar, "to expect any­ earned their freedom through the ration, he stood by every commitment thing from the rulers of Delhi or lo grace of the holy relic (the loss of and agreement made by him until the appeal to them on the grounds of jus­ which had occasioned a massive up­ evening before his arrest, viz, August tice, humanity or morality. Time for heaval in the valley) and as a result of 9, 1953. Taking note of this offer, such things has passed". demonstration of their strength and Nehru, in the last Press Conference of the exigencies of the international his life, reminded his listeners that Why Liberalisation Failed situation. The party in power, In fact, "before his arrest, accession of Kash- did not get an opportunity to claim mir to India had been more or less Politically and ideologically Sheikh credit for the liberalisation policy, for completed". At the ideological level Abdullah now moved away from India. the opportunities offered by greater also Nehru found common ground with On the plea that only those countries freedom of the press and speech were Sheikh Abdullah when he acknowledg- were friends of Kashmir that supported almost entirely monopolised by Ab­ ed, while addressing the AICC session its right of self-determination, he mov- dullah and other opposition elements. in Bombay, that the Sheikh "is wedd­ ed closer to Pakistan and eventually to Abdullah was released at a time when ed to the principles of secularism and China. When he started addressing his the only political force that had been does not wish anything to be done to political appeals exclusively to Kash­ allowed to exist during his absence vitiate these in any way. He does not miri Muslims, he also made a signi­ under the command of Bakshi Ghulam believe in the two-nation theory which ficant departure from his earlier secu- Mohammed had been disarmed. The was the basis for formation of Pakis- lar stand. political machinery at Sadiq's disposal tan". Is it just that Abdullah has anally was either paralysed or owed allegiance On their attitude towards Pakistan come out in his true colours? If so, to its creator, the Bakshi. the two leaders seemed to have a why had he assumed "false" colours broad measure of agreement. Abdullah in the first place? Or has he cut his Abdullah's Problems had endorsed Nehru's plea for a com- nose to spite India? ing closer of India and Pakistan "even There may still be some in India The situation, however, had its own constitutionally1', "If Sheikh who regret that Sheikh Abdullah has compulsions for the Sheikh also. He not been tackled properly. Others, far had to lead the crowds which, after Nehru had said in his AICC speech, more numerous and vocal, feel that being embittered by the masterly mis­ "can help in bringing this about, he appeasement has gone too far. Yet the handling of the relic agitation in the will have done a great: service to both two viewpoints need not be exactly preceding months, had been told to the countries. We will have to help contradictory, for appeasement is believe that India was fast retreating. him in this attempt". Apart from hardly the best way to tackle an hon­ Having fitted into their mood, he could agreement—however broad—on the ourable man. The fact remains that neither meet their demands nor keep "basis of settlement", on ideology and Abdullah is still a problem. He has them at the high pitch of excitement. approach to Pakistan, the warm emo­ neither been won over nor rendered For a while illusions of some progress tional rapport that the two leaders had politically ineffective. And the fate of were kept up. Afzai Beg confidently re-established was of crucial import­ the last one year's experiment in what predicted plebiscite within a year Soon ance. has been called the policy of liberal- disillusionment started. The same All this seemed—more so in retros- 809 May 15, 1965 T H E ECONOMIC W E E K L Y

DUNLOP MANUFACTURE INDIA'S FIRST EXTRA LARGE QFF-THE-ROAD TYRES

In the race against time to complete various projects on schedule, giant earthmoving vehicles are being used in increasing numbers throughout the country The extra large size tyres required for these vehicles were hitherto imported, costing the country valuable foreign currency.

Dunlop have now undertaken for the first time in India the manufacture of Extra Large Off-The-Road tyres in sizes 24.00-25 and 26,5-29 for these massive earthmoving vehicles. Weighing nearly half a ton each and standing over six feet high, these tyres are made to the highest international standards.

YET ANOTHER DUNLOP FIRST

810 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY May 15, 1965

speeches with the same arguments by some steps by India unintentionally of Pakistan but also a sense of Kash­ the same persons could not hold popu­ helped to cement the front that was miri pride, Muslim fears and adminis­ lar interest at the same level. Contro­ visibly cracking. The series of mea­ trative grievances. Recently the Action versy also started about the objectives sures, avowedly meant to integrate the Committee, which owes allegiance to of the movement. Those who did not State with the Union, provoked a fresh him, observed an antiprice rise day want to completely antagonise India upsurge of popular resentment. For the also. became lukewarm, A more serious people saw in them a threat to the challenge to Abdullah's supremacy separate existence of Kashmir. Beg By simplifying all causes of dissatis- was, however, posed by Maulvi Farooq, described them as a prelude to the faction (regional, communal, adminis­ who wanted the options at a plebiscite eventual merger of the State with the trative and economic) in Kashmir into to be confined to accession to India neighbouring, exclusively Hindu, State one represented by Sheikh Abdullah, or Pakistan, ruling out independence of Himachal Pradesh (for which a de- much thinking effort is avoided but the that is supposed to be Abdullah's ob­ mand had already been made in problem is not faced. Abdullah does jective. Violent clashes between the Jammu). The "new danger" made an not create all the dissatisfaction. He two factions exhausted some of their important contribution in forcing a only symbolises or articulates most of energy and provided an opportunity to unity on the warring leaders and re- them. All discordant voices that had G M Sadiq's Government to assert it- viving the flaggnig tempo of the move- been stilled—by means far from fair self. Abdullah made a desperate bid ment. —all these years now add the most to steal the thunder of Farooq. In his vocal notes to the orchestra we call assured and confident moments he is Abdullah. The only sensible course is an excellent exponent of secularism and Dissatisfaction in Kashmir to discern the notes that are intoler­ Gandhian ideals. But when in a tight Not Abdullah's Creation able, tolerable and pleasant. But who corner, he does not hesitate to fall is to decide and on what criteria? back upon Kashmiri chauvinism, reli- It should be recognised that the re­ gion and sectarianism. actions of Kashmir—after allowing for The interests of the ruling party— the element of exaggeration by politi- or faction—has always determined the Further, through the understanding cians—are in no way dissimilar to Government's attitude towards the and friendship that he was able to those of any other State when some opposition in the State. The present revive with Nehru, during the latter's of its powers are taken over by the regime, which is otherwise fat more last days Abdullah could, for a while, Centre. Even if the so-called integra­ liberal than its predecessor, has been aspire to a wider role for himself and tion were good for Kashmir and the extremely reluctant to associate oppo- his people. He failed to set up a simi- rest of India, the citizens of every sition elements with any of the official lar rapport with the new rulers in State have the right to hold a diffe­ activities, as is often done in the rest New Delhi. The only role he got out- rent view and strive for any other of the country. The only opposition side the valley was membership of the relationship between their State and party that has any representation on 100-man Nehru. Memorial Committee, the Union. Views on the degree of official committees is the Jana Sangh which was arranged by some of his central control over Kashmir—or any which is hardly likely to satisfy the friends. But he was not given any other State—should not be the sole Muslim majority of the State. Even assignment on any of its numerous sub­ measure of the patriotism of its people. in purely religious conferences abroad, committees. He then exclusively con- the delegations do not include anybody centrated on the valley to regain his Those who who are piqued that the —political or non-political—from out- political importance. When he found people and leaders of Kashmir have side the ruling faction. challenges to his position in the Valley not appreciated the Government's also, he did not hesitate to manoeuvre gesture in restoring their liberties The Kashmir Government can cer- —politically and ideologically-—to con- should not forget that to make people tainly count upon the goodwill and quer his opponents. The nature of the free when they are angry and to make support of the whole nation in its manoeuvres was determined by the them angry when they are free is the defence of national interests. The rul­ direction from which he received the surest way to alienate them. Liberties ing party has also a right to fight most serious challenge and there was were not restored in Kashmir till the against its political and ideological as yet no political challenge 01 even relic agitation had been forced to take opponents. But the fight should not noticeable political activity by the rul­ an angry turn. Integration measures be waged by the Government -nor on ing party in the Valley, waited till repression had been com­ behalf of the rest of the nation. pletely withdrawn. When steps are Part of the Sheikh's difficulties were taken in utter disregard of the freely The challenge in Kashmir cannot due to his peculiar political position. expresed opinion of the people and in be met by administrative and econo­ Broadly speaking, he seemed to rule the teeth of opposition, the only use to mic measures alone, though they are out an exclusive relationship for Kash- which freedom can appropriately be admittedly useful—first, because there mir with either India or Pakistan. But put is to oppose the regime more is yet no fool-proof administrative and he led a much wider and precarious openly and effectively. economic system which causes no dis­ coalition of forces whose cohesion is satisfaction and, second, because re­ seriously strained whenever loyalties to Another danger of posing the inte­ gional and religious aspirations, as we India and Pakistan tend to divide the gration debate as being between pro- should know from experience in other politics of the State. Indians and anti-Indians is that it dis- parts of the country, often have a guises and inflates the actual strength more powerful appeal Regional and Two factors enabled Abdullah to of the Pakistani sentiment while iso­ religious aspirations—not to speak of weather the storm. First, Pakistan lating and shrinking the potential administrative and economic ones —are could not afford to disown a leader loyalty to India in Kashmir. What sus­ by no means more aggressive in Kash- of such stature and to disrupt the tains Abdullah apart from his personal mir than elsewhere in the country, united front against India. Second, halo is thus not merely the support But elsewhere non-secessionist avenues 811 May 15, 1965 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

of protest are available (even the Mus­ (which is not visible on either side at him off is likely to harden in India, lim League and the DMK have opted the moment) to revive the dialogue it is not yet too late to prevent the for them). In Kashmir where all ave­ between Abdullah and the Indian authorities from writing olf all the nues were suppressed as a matter of leaders and while the decision to write forces he represents. "national policy", now Abdullah is un­ willing to be merely such an avenue nor does his charismatic umbrella leave much room for other avenues. So long as it is not possible (either due to official policy or other reasons or due to Abdullah's spell) to provide in Kashmir avenues of expression of protest that the rest of the country can tolerate and appreciate, a discri­ minating attitude to the powerful opposition movement and its leader is called for. This requires much more firmness and clarity in New Delhi than shown so far.

It is not sufficiently realised either in New Delhi or Srinagar that the current tension is far in excess of what objective conditions should per­ mit. It should certainly be possible for India, consistent with her self-interest, to go a longer way to meet the dem­ ands of Kashmir and its leaders. Like­ wise, Abdullah can hardly afford to completely antagonise India if he has any ambition left of making Kashmir a bridge between India and Pakistan.

The current moods on either side do not permit bridging the entire gap between the demands of Kashmir and the rest of India. But it should be possible to shift the debate from the level of abstract and provocative slogans to concrete proposals. Thus delimited, the differences could then be set in the perspective of two facts. First. Kashmir shares the common and precious heritage of political values evolved under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru, which it can throw away only at its own peril. Second, the gap between the interests of Pakistan and Kashmir, clouded by negative common demands against India, has always been and will remain very large. It was this perspective in which the Nehru- Abdullah talks were held last year.

There are obvious difficulties in picking up the threads at this stage. But the difficulties are not ail due to political differences which, too, can be kept within limits. The limits of national interest may not as such bind Sheikh Abdullah, but the Kashmir leader may be compelled to take up positions far more extreme than those necessary to safeguard the interests of MANUFACTURED IN INDIA HY his people by the incompetence, con­ THE ALKALI & CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. fusion and panick of those who claim to be his opponents. While it will need statesmanship of a very high order 812