Annex A PRESS RELEASE

29 DECEMBER 2011

APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO DISRUPTION OF MRT TRAIN SERVICES ON 15 AND 17 DECEMBER 2011

The Minister for Transport has appointed a Committee of Inquiry under Section 9 of the Inquiries Act (Chapter 139A) to inquire into the cause(s) of recent MRT service disruptions on 15 and 17 December 2011.

2 Chief District Judge of the Subordinate Courts, Mr Tan Siong Thye, has been appointed as Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry. The other members of the Committee are Professor Lim Mong King, Professor, School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Nanyang Technological University and Mr Soh Wai Wah, Director of Prisons. Their CVs are attached at Annex A. The Terms of Reference for the Committee are attached at Annex B .

3 Chairman of the Committee, Mr Tan Siong Thye said, “The 2 MRT service disruption incidents of 15 and 17 December are quite unprecedented. They caused significant disruption and inconvenience to hundreds of thousands of commuters. Such incidents can also potentially pose a public safety issue if they are not well managed. As a daily user of the MRT myself to and from work for more than ten years, I share the concerns of many who want to know what went wrong and how to restore confidence in our MRT system. I will do my best to fulfil the Terms of Reference which Minister Lui Tuck Yew has given to me and my fellow COI members, Professor Lim Mong King and Mr Soh Wai Wah. We will take a comprehensive and systems approach to understand the underlying causes that could have contributed to the problem and propose improvements needed. My immediate priority in the next few weeks will be focused on fact-finding and also speaking to relevant experts.”

4 All interested parties who wish to be represented at the hearing and all persons who wish to give evidence at the Inquiry are invited to contact the Committee’s Secretary, Mr Sidney Koh, at:

Address: Ministry of Transport #33-00 PSA Building 460 Alexandra Road Singapore 119963

Email: [email protected]

5 For media queries, please contact:

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Ms Glyn Tan Media Relations Executive, Corporate Communications Division Ministry of Transport Tel: 6376 5044 Email: [email protected]

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[Annex A to press release]

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO DISRUPTION OF MRT TRAIN SERVICES ON 15 AND 17 DECEMBER 2011

Chief District Judge Tan Siong Thye (Chairman)

Chief District Judge Tan Siong Thye was appointed to the position of Chief District Judge of the Subordinate Courts of Singapore in 2008. Prior to that, CDJ Tan held several judicial appointments at the Subordinate Courts of Singapore, including District Judge and Juvenile Magistrate. He has also previously held the appointment of Director of the Commercial Affairs Department and served as Senior State Counsel of the Attorney-General’s Chambers.

CDJ Tan holds a Bachelor of Law degree from the University of Singapore as well as a Master of Law (With Merit) degree from the University of London, UK. He was awarded the Public Administration Medal (Gold) in 2003 and the Public Administration Medal (Gold) (Bar) in 2011.

Professor Lim Mong King

Professor Lim Mong King is currently with the Engineering Mechanics Division of the School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Nanyang Technological University. Professor Lim has served as Deputy President of NTU and was previously the Dean of the College of Engineering. He has published papers on a broad spectrum of applied mechanics and his focussed research topics include structural dynamics modelling and noise and vibration control problems and designs. Professor Lim has previously served as a member on two Committees of Inquiry appointed by the Ministry of Labour/Manpower in 1993 and 1998 to investigate fire incidents in shipyards.

Professor Lim obtained his Bachelor of Engineering with first class honours from the University of Singapore in 1974 and his Masters of Science and Doctorate from Universite Du Maine (France) in 1975 and 1977 respectively. He has been awarded with the Public Service Star (BBM), the Public Service Medal (PBM), as well as the Public Administration (Gold) Medal in 2004.

Mr Soh Wai Wah

Mr Soh Wai Wah is currently the Director of Prisons and was until December 2009 the Chief of Staff in the Singapore Police Force. Mr Soh joined the Singapore Police Force in 1982 and has held various operational appointments including Head of Contingency Planning, Commander of Clementi Police Division and Director of Operations. He has been deployed for various major incidents including the Hotel New World incident, the SQ 117 hijacking and the Nicoll Highway incident.

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Mr Soh holds a Bachelor of Arts (Economics) degree from the University of Cambridge, UK and a Masters of Science (Criminal Justice) degree from Michigan State University, USA. He was awarded the Public Administration (Silver) medal in 2000 and the Public Administration (Gold) medal in 2009.

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[Annex B to press release]

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO DISRUPTION OF MRT TRAIN SERVICES ON 15 AND 17 DECEMBER 2011 APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE INQUIRIES ACT (CAP 139A) a) Inquire into and determine the sequence of events that led to the disruption of MRT train services on the North-South Line on 15 December and 17 December 2011 (the “2 incidents”). b) Establish the cause(s) and any other contributory factors for the 2 incidents, including factors that may have endangered public safety.

c) Make recommendations to minimise the recurrence of such incidents.

d) Make recommendations to improve the management of similar incidents.

e) Make any observation or opinion on matters relating to the 2 incidents which the Committee should, in its opinion, bring to the attention of the Minister for Transport.

f) Conduct itself in accordance with the provisions of the Inquiries Act (Cap 139A), in particular the Schedule thereto, and consider the evidence put before the Committee as led by the Attorney-General or his designates.

g) Make and submit a report of its proceedings, findings and recommendations to the Minister for Transport.

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Annex B

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON THE DISRUPTION OF MRT TRAIN SERVICES ON 15 AND 17 DECEMBER 2011

1. Mr Speaker, Sir, Members have raised concerns and queries regarding the two service disruptions on the North-South Line (NSL) that took place on 15 and 17 December 2011. I know the incidents were disruptive and poorly managed. I know it caused a significant amount of frustration and distress to commuters, especially passengers in stalled trains who were put in a position of great duress. For the disruption to have happened on 15 December, and again on 17 December, was clearly unacceptable to Singaporeans, and I fully understand this. I will provide this House with a brief account of the facts of the case as we know them, while leaving the Committee of Inquiry (COI) to do its work in the coming months. I will also update this House on some preliminary lessons learnt and potential weaknesses identified in our current regulatory framework as we make every effort to put things right and restore confidence in the MRT system.

Incidents on 15 and 17 December

2. First, let me provide a factual account of what happened on 15 and 17 December. On the evening of 15 December, an estimated 127,000 commuters were affected by a major service disruption along the North-South Line from Marina Bay station to Braddell station. Four trains stalled, one between City Hall and Dhoby Ghaut stations, one between Somerset and Orchard stations, one at Braddell station, and one just before Braddell station. The trains stalled because of misalignment between the trains’ current collector shoes and the power rail, commonly referred to as the “third” rail. The trains draw locomotive power from the third rail through the train current collector shoes. Due to the misalignment, the trains were unable to draw power and stalled.

3. Two days later, a second service disruption took place on the North-South Line on the morning of 17 December, once more causing stress and inconvenience to

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about 94,000 commuters. This time, five trains stalled, one each at City Hall, Dhoby Ghaut, Ang Mo Kio, and Bishan stations, and one more along the stretch just before Somerset station. The cause for this second disruption was apparently similar to the earlier disruption: misalignment between the stalled trains’ current collector shoes and the third rail.

4. Following the second incident, a complete check was conducted for the entire North-South-East West Line (NSEWL) and its operating fleet of trains. LTA and SMRT wanted to do everything possible to ensure that services would not be disrupted again. LTA and SMRT mobilised their technical and engineering staffs to work through the night of 17 December, and SMRT was able to fully resume service around noon on Sunday, 18 December.

5. As a result of the checks, LTA and SMRT found 21 dislodged or missing claws. These claws secure the third rail to the support brackets, and when a few consecutive claws are dislodged, this may cause the third rail to sag and become misaligned with the collector shoes on the trains passing these sections, damaging or breaking off the collector shoes. This was likely the immediate cause of the incidents on 15 and 17 December. However, many questions remain unanswered: Why did the claws dislodge? Why did it happen on such a scale and only along certain stretches of our tunnels on those two days? And why, after apparently fixing the problem on 15 December on the affected stretches, did train services run smoothly on 16 December, only to have the problem re-surface on 17 December in a different location? These are among the questions that the COI has to look into.

6. We suspected excessive vibrations from the running of the trains could be a factor for the claws to be dislodged. Therefore as a precautionary measure, LTA directed SMRT to impose a speed restriction of 40kph, instead of the usual 80kph, on trains running along the floating slab track (FST) sections. The floating slab tracks are large concrete structures supported on bearings. They are designed to absorb vibrations from passing trains so that the surrounding buildings are not affected.

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Most of the dislodged claws were found along the FST sections. SMRT also further secured the claws with cable ties after consulting the manufacturer.

7. The staffs of SMRT and LTA have worked extremely hard to deal with the disruptions and stabilise the situation. They did so under significant time pressure and stress. I know that Singaporeans would want to join me in expressing our sincere appreciation to them for their hard work. Let me also thank commuters who also displayed tolerance and understanding, coping with the slightly degraded service levels by starting their journeys a bit earlier and taking things in their stride. As of today, all but one of the damaged trains have re-entered service, and SMRT is running more trains than before the incidents, because some of the 17 new trains that were delivered recently have entered service. The speed restriction is still in place on the FST stretches of the NSEWL and this has extended journeys by about 2 minutes. Since the two incidents, SMRT has taken steps to secure all the claws along the NSEWL, both underground and aboveground, with cable-ties, as an interim measure to prevent claws from being dislodged while they work on a permanent solution. SMRT has also stepped up inspections, including daily checks on the third rail throughout the network, particularly along the FST sections, to ensure that any signs of recurrence are picked up early and rectified. The condition of the train current collector devices (CCD) is checked daily during operational hours for any early sign of damage or abnormality, and also at the end of revenue service when the trains return to the depots to ensure the integrity of the system.

8. Since excessive vibration was identified as a possible contributing factor, as an added precaution, SMRT went further to check other vulnerable structures in the tunnel that could be affected by extensive vibrations. SMRT therefore engaged a Professional Engineer to inspect and confirm the infrastructure integrity of the tunnel fixtures and mountings, and I understand that no abnormalities were found after these inspections.

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Appointment of the Committee of Inquiry into Service Disruptions

9. The incidents of 15 and 17 December affected more than 200,000 commuters. They have suffered great frustration, inconvenience and distress. The execution of Emergency preparedness plans, especially for the first incident, ought to be significantly improved. SMRT could have better handled the evacuation of the passengers in the stalled trains to reduce the sense of distress, and provided clearer and timelier information and instructions to the public, instead of leaving commuters confused and apprehensive in already disordered circumstances. That the two incidents have the same proximate cause and happened two days apart raises concerns about possible systemic shortcomings. I assure this House that the Government takes a very serious view of the incidents and the potential safety risk that this could pose to the general public, and that is why I convened a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the incidents.

10. The Committee comprises three capable and experienced members, chosen for their legal, operational and technical expertise. Under its Terms of Reference, the COI will conduct an independent investigation into both technical and non-technical aspects of the incidents of 15 and 17 December. The Committee will investigate the sequence of events leading to the disruptions, as well as establish the technical, systematic and other causes that may have contributed to the disruptions. Based on these findings, it will make recommendations to minimise the recurrence of similar incidents, as well as improve the management of such incidents. A full report of the proceedings, findings and recommendations will be submitted upon completion of the investigation, and be made public. I hope that this addresses Mr Cedric Foo’s and Ms Sylvia Lim’s questions on the composition and terms of reference for the COI.

11. Some have also asked if the Committee should look into other service disruptions on other MRT lines. The extent and severity of the service disruptions on 15 and 17 December, and the potential safety risks that they posed are what warrant

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an independent inquiry into the causes of the disruptions. The COI should focus on investigating the core issues related to the 15 and 17 December incidents, report on its findings and make their recommendations accordingly. However, if there are any previous incidents or events which are relevant or contributed to the incidents of 15 and 17 December, the COI has the latitude and indeed the obligation to consider them. The Chairman of the COI, Mr Tan Siong Thye, has already stated that the Committee will take a comprehensive and systems approach in its inquiry to thoroughly understand all the underlying causes, both technical and non-technical, that could have contributed to the problem. Er Dr Lee Bee Wah has asked about the reasons for the recent breakdowns. I urge Members to be patient and give the COI time to conduct its investigation thoroughly as it is premature to draw definitive conclusions on the underlying reasons for these two MRT breakdowns at this stage. We should also avoid speculating about the reasons, as this will only undermine the focus of the COI in dispassionately and objectively getting to the bottom of the issues.

12. Ms Sylvia Lim has also asked how the Committee will conduct its hearings. The hearings will be held in public, and interested parties and witnesses have been invited to contact the Committee’s Secretary. The Committee will have its own independent investigation team to enable it to carry out primary fact-finding. This will enable it to do a totally independent investigation, without relying on LTA and SMRT’s ongoing investigations. The Committee will also have the power to procure and receive evidence as it thinks necessary or desirable, and examine all such persons as witnesses in order to fulfil its terms of reference.

13. Apart from the COI’s investigation, LTA and SMRT have also started their own separate internal investigations. This is to be expected. Both parties clearly have the duty and responsibility to find out what went wrong, especially for those areas that they are accountable for. SMRT as a public transport operator must ensure that it is able to operate a safe and reliable train service, while LTA as the regulator is responsible for identifying any shortcomings on the part of the operator that may

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have led to the service disruption and will also have to see if there are useful lessons from these incidents to strengthen its regulatory role. The COI on the other hand is an independent party appointed by MOT and will also look into the larger systems issues beyond that which SMRT and LTA will cover in their respective probes.

14. I would like here to update this House on the on-going investigation efforts. As vibrations within the train system appears to be a key issue contributing to the incidents in question, SMRT had engaged an overseas consultant to conduct a series of preliminary vibration testing on 22 December. This was primarily a scoping exercise, to provide data on the dynamic properties of the various track and train components. The results enabled the experts to develop a proper proposal for the conduct of a series of more detailed tests to be carried in the coming weeks. After that, the data will need to be analysed and interpreted and further tests run if necessary. As some of these activities must be carried out on the actual tracks and tunnels, the various investigating bodies will need to work through how best to do this while SMRT continues to operate the MRT services.

Ensuring Safe Operations of Our MRT System Despite Higher Usage

15. There have been questions raised about whether our MRT system has been strained by the increase in ridership over the last few years with trains becoming more crowded. Because the operators have injected an additional 2,000 weekly trips since 2008 to cater to the higher ridership, some have speculated that the higher intensity usage of our system may have resulted in the breakdowns. I would like to assure the House of the following: First the additional trips added did not exceed the safe operating parameters of the system. Second, LTA requires the Operators to keep strictly to the maintenance regime prescribed by the manufacturers. I will say a little more about this later.

16. In response to Mr Gan Thiam Poh’s question on whether 2-minute intervals are the minimum and safest margin for MRT trains to run during peak hours, the present signalling system on the NSEWL is designed to safely allow for minimum

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headways of 120 seconds or 2 minutes. It is therefore technically feasible and safe for the operator to run trains at 2-minute intervals during peak hours. The additional trips that SMRT has been putting on are only for periods where the train intervals were longer than 2 minutes previously. Where trains were already running at 2- minute intervals, no further trips were added. The signalling system is designed to disallow trains from coming too close to the next train. This is the reason why, as we come closer to running at the minimum 2-minute headways, we see more occasions where trains have to stop mid-way between stations for a while before re-starting. This is because the train ahead that has stopped at the station is sometimes delayed from moving off on time because some commuters have tried to embark when the doors are closing.

17. Members have raised concerns about the adequacy of the current maintenance regime, and indeed a strong maintenance regime must be in place to ensure that the system is safe and reliable. Under SMRT’s current maintenance regime, the company has been performing maintenance works and inspections based on the schedules recommended by the manufacturers. Notwithstanding this, the quality and adequacy of the maintenance regime, be it for preventive or corrective maintenance, are areas that will be closely scrutinised by the COI as well as the internal investigation teams set up by SMRT and LTA.

18. Ms Foo Mee Har has asked about how SMRT is held accountable for maintenance of the RTS system. LTA as the regulator requires the Operators to comply with their Operating Performance Standards (OPS). The OPS mandates the minimum service adequacy that the Operators must fulfil. If found in breach of the OPS, operators can be penalised up to $1 million per incident, taking into account the severity of the incident. Besides OPS, operators are required to submit their 2- year maintenance plans to LTA for review, and LTA may ask the operators to adjust or improve on the plans as necessary. I should also point out that, even in the absence of the OPS, it would still be in the operators’ interest to maintain the RTS system well as this would extend the operational life of the assets.

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19. Mr Gerald Giam has asked if LTA has to date exercised its power to impose conditions relating to the appointment, re-appointment or removal of MRT operators' CEO, chairman or any of its directors, and about the criteria that LTA uses to decide when to impose such conditions. Decisions relating to the changes of these key appointments in the company are initiated by the company or (in the case of the chairman and directors) the shareholders, and cannot be unilaterally imposed by LTA. However, under LTA’s current licences, operators must seek LTA’s approval for the appointment, re-appointment or removal of any director or the Chairman of its Board of Directors. While LTA has veto powers over the appointment of the operators’ Board, these are generally intended to be used as a last resort against clearly unsuitable nominees, and to date, LTA has not found it necessary to exercise this veto power.

20. One of the questions that needs to be answered is whether the regulatory regime is sufficiently robust. Together with the COI’s more holistic findings, the Government will thoroughly review the regulatory and penalty framework and its oversight over the operators’ maintenance regimes to strengthen it where necessary.

Emergency Preparedness

21. Several Members, including Ms Foo Mee Har, Mr Gan Thiam Poh, Er Dr Lee Bee Wah, Mr Low Thia Kiang, and Ms Irene Ng have asked about the readiness of our system to respond to an emergency. Er Dr Lee Bee Wah has also asked specifically about the role of the SCDF in such incidents, and if the incidents have impacted the Government’s planning for a terror attack on the train system. Let me say at the onset that these disruptions exposed gaps in emergency preparedness and crisis response and we need to do better.

22. The current processes require that the operators work with LTA to come up with plans that will be activated based on various plausible scenarios. Operators are required to have a Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP) that is activated in the

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event of a train service disruption. Under the RIMP, the operators are responsible to provide timely information and regular updates to the public and passengers, maintain train services where possible, carry out recovery of service, and provide alternative services to stations that may be affected by the service disruption, including the timely activation of bus bridging services. Operators are also expected to have clear procedures for handling passengers in affected trains, including the “detrainment” of commuters onto the MRT tracks and the relevant safety precautions put in place in such instances, such as turning off the electrical power to relevant sections of the third rail to ensure commuter safety.

23. LTA regularly reviews the Operators’ RIMP, and works with the Operators on improvements to service recovery and incident management measures. Regular table-top exercises (TTXs) are also conducted to check the Operators’ crisis management procedures. Prior to the opening of a new line or section of line, LTA also requires the Operator to carry out a full-scale exercise involving first responders like the SCDF and SPF, to ensure that coordination between the Operator and first responders is smooth. The Operator is required to validate its SOPs during these exercises, so that adjustments can be made if necessary. Where possible, grassroot organisations and school pupils are invited to participate in such exercises, to improve the emergency readiness of residents.

24. I would also like to assure the House that a Whole-Of-Government approach is adopted with regard to commuter safety on our public transport system, and the Police and SCDF are activated during major service disruptions. During the recent incidents, Police officers were promptly deployed to assist SMRT on various fronts, and SCDF officers were also deployed to help those in distress. Apart from LTA-led safety exercises, the PTOs also participate in security exercises led by MHA at the national level. For example, in 2006, Exercise Northstar V was carried out with the public transport operators. This exercise simulated multiple terror attacks in train stations and tested out contingency plans and coordination among various stakeholders from the public, private and people sector. Shortcomings in areas such as incident management, crowd control and casualty evacuation were identified, and B-9

follow-up actions were taken to address them. More recently in 2009, as part of Exercise Northstar VII, a swarm attack by gunmen was also simulated at Raffles Place MRT station. Apart from conducting emergency preparedness exercises, the Public Transport Security Command (TransCom) was also formed in Aug 2009 under the Singapore Police Force (SPF) to provide dedicated resources to enhance the safety and security of the MRT and bus systems.

25. There are, nevertheless, limitations to such simulated exercises since these are often pre-planned and scripted, with volunteers from grassroot organisations and schools as willing and psychologically prepared participants. The most realistic exercise would be an unannounced major simulated disruption that involves actual commuters during peak hours, but such exercises would significantly inconvenience many commuters. Nevertheless, there is certainly more that LTA and the operators can do to increase the realism and effectiveness of such exercises and to extract greater value from these exercises to improve the SOPs and communications plans to the commuters and the public. Future exercises would therefore be conducted using more challenging scenarios to test the readiness of the operators and improve the multi-agency coordination needed to enhance emergency preparedness and crisis response. I believe that this is something that the COI will look into as well.

Lessons Learnt and Improvements Made

26. Members have also asked if measures have already been taken to improve existing procedures. Even as the COI looks into these two incidents, I would like to assure this House that improvement measures have been initiated so that we are better prepared for a major train service disruption. I will speak about three areas in particular, with regard to communication with commuters, bus bridging, and coordination between Government agencies and the operators in the event of a service disruption.

27. First, measures have been put in place to improve communication to in-train commuters and the general public in the event of a service breakdown. Changes

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have been implemented to enable the SMRT Operations Control Centre (OCC) to broadcast directly to passengers on a stalled train. This will provide those most affected by a disruption with more timely and accurate updates. The LTA is also working with the operators on having emergency announcements made in other languages besides English, in case of a service disruption. SMRT has also improved its detrainment procedures so the decision to detrain can be taken more quickly. After the first incident, SMRT has also set up a Twitter account to provide timely information on service delays. In addition to traditional media, LTA and the operators are also exploring the use of mass SMS broadcasts to alert commuters to service disruptions.

28. Second, on bus bridging, it has been observed that the activation of bus bridging services sometimes took too long, and encountered various execution and logistical problems. Since the incidents, LTA has further reviewed SMRT and SBST’s bus bridging plans to ensure that bus routing and passenger boarding and alighting points are updated, logical and sufficient to cater to the volume of passengers expected. On the ground, this would include the improvement of signage for evacuation routes and bus bridging points. In addition, pre-prepared instructions to drivers have been reviewed to ensure that they are clear and easily understood. And as an added assurance, SMRT will deploy an officer with every bus convoy whose drivers may be unfamiliar with the route to guide them along.

29. As the regulator, LTA is also working with both SMRT and SBST to improve contingency plans for train service disruptions, including a more integrated and holistic approach to incident management and service recovery. For example, instead of relying only bridging shuttle bus services which could take some time to activate, LTA is working with SMRT to allow for free travel on its bus services that serve SMRT stations where train services are disrupted, and to explore extending this arrangement across both operators, so that affected commuters can continue their journeys on either operators’ bus services for free, regardless of which line is disrupted.

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30. Lastly, coordination among operators and agencies has been further enhanced. We have streamlined the communications protocol so that LTA, SPF and SCDF can be alerted more quickly, if assistance is required. In addition, the SCDF, LTA and Police are already reviewing and refining response protocols and emergency procedures with the operators.

Ensuring A Safe and Reliable Public Transport System

31. Let me assure this House again that the safety of our commuters is paramount. The rail system is the backbone of our public transport system, carrying millions of commuters each day, and its safety and reliability must be ensured. We have taken a number of immediate measures after the two disruptions and we will continue to improve the MRT system to regain the confidence and trust of commuters. While we know that the claws were dislodged, we do not yet know why this happened. The COI will get to the bottom of this matter, we will get the problems fixed, we will improve the overall resilience and robustness of our public transport system and enhance our incident management capabilities. I seek Members’ and the public’s understanding and patience in the meantime.

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Annex C MEDIA RELEASE

16 February 2012

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO MRT DISRUPTIONS TO COMMENCE HEARING ON 16 APRIL 2012

The Committee of Inquiry (COI) appointed to inquire into the cause(s) of the MRT service disruptions on 15 and 17 December 2011 understands that there is a need for CID, LTA and SMRT to carry out very thorough investigations before a meaningful public inquiry can be conducted along the Terms of Reference prescribed by the Minister of Transport. After ascertaining the time needed for CID, LTA and SMRT to complete their respective investigations, the COI has decided that the Inquiry will commence its hearing on Monday, 16 April 2012, at Court 1, Subordinate Courts, 1 Havelock Square.

2 All interested parties who wish to be represented at the hearing and all persons who wish to give evidence at the Inquiry are invited to contact the Committee’s Secretary, Mr Sidney Koh, at the following address:

Mailing Address : The Committee of Inquiry (Attn : Secretary) c/o Ministry of Transport #33-00 PSA Building 460 Alexandra Road Singapore 119963

Email Address : [email protected]

3 The hearing will be open to the public.

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Annex D MEDIA RELEASE

11 April 2012

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO MRT DISRUPTIONS TO COMMENCE HEARING ON 16 APRIL 2012

The Committee of Inquiry (COI) appointed to inquire into the cause(s) of the MRT service disruptions on 15 and 17 December 2011 will commence its public hearing at 9.30am on Monday, 16 April 2012, at Court 1, Subordinate Courts, 1 Havelock Square.

2 In preparation for the Inquiry, the COI is in the process of reviewing those documents which have been submitted by SMRT, the Land Transport Authority (LTA) and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The COI and the Interested Parties have also visited the affected stretches of the third rail that supply electrical power to the trains in the tunnels, as well as SMRT’s Operations Control Centre and its Bishan Depot, where it examined various parts of the trains such as the Train Operators’ cabins, train Current Collector Devices, auxiliary batteries and backup ventilation systems. In addition, the COI has conducted Pre-Inquiry Conferences to deal with administrative matters and give directions to the Interested Parties so that the Inquiry will proceed efficiently and expeditiously.

3 On the first day of the hearing, Second Solicitor-General in the Attorney- General’s Chambers (AGC) Mr Lionel Yee will present an opening statement explaining, inter alia, the disruptions and their underlying causes. Thereafter, relevant witnesses will testify on oath or affirmation. At the same time, documents/exhibits will be tendered at the Inquiry so that the COI will be adequately apprised of the incidents in order to establish their cause(s) and any other contributory factors. The COI will also make recommendations and consider the suggestions of the Interested Parties to improve train operations, prevent the recurrence of such disruptions and enhance the management of such incidents.

4 After the Inquiry, the COI will prepare a report with its findings and recommendations. The safety and security of train commuters and the public will be the pivotal considerations of the COI. The COI’s report will be submitted to the Minister for Transport after the Inquiry; thereafter, it will be made public.

5 With regard to public feedback, the Secretariat has received email and letters from 28 persons so far, comprising accounts of the disruptions, feedback on aspects that the COI should look into and indications of interest in attending the hearing. All feedback received by the Secretariat has been forwarded to the CID, which has been appointed by the Minister for Transport to assist the COI. The CID will consider the feedback thoroughly. AGC will decide which of these persons, if any, to call as witnesses during the hearing. D-1

6 The Secretariat will continue to accept submissions from the public throughout the hearing period. All Interested Parties who wish to be represented at the hearing and all persons who wish to give evidence at the Inquiry are invited to contact the Committee’s Secretary, Mr Sidney Koh, at the following address:

Mailing Address : The Committee of Inquiry (Attn : Secretary) c/o Ministry of Transport #33-00 PSA Building 460 Alexandra Road Singapore 119963

Email Address : [email protected]

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Annex E

LIST OF WITNESSES

Name Role Statement Reference Marking W1 ASP Roy Lim Lead Investigator Vol 6 Tab 1 ES1 TOs involved in 15 December incident W2 Muhammad Yassin T133 Vol 1 Tab 4 ES2 Bin Yazid W3 Zainal Bin Rahmat T128 Vol 1 Tab 3 ES3 W4 Hady Bin Afandie T139 Vol 1 Tab 5 ES4 W5 Mohamad Alwi Bin T134 Vol 1 Tab 2 ES5 Sirat W6 Aw Thiam Huat T118 Vol 1 Tab 1 ES6 W7 Mohd Zulklifi T151 Vol 1 Tab 6 ES7 Bin Jumaat OCC personnel involved in 15 December 2011 incident W8 Moksin Bin Mahsan Chief Controller Vol 1 Tab 13 ES8 W9 Lum Kok Soon Manager Operations Vol 1 Tab 12 ES9 Control Centre W61 Yong Pui Ng Chief Controller (Area) Vol 1 Tab 20 ES61 Station Managers involved in 15 December 2011 incident W10 Tan Chit Siang Marina Bay Station Vol 2 Tab 30 ES10 W11 Soh Cherng Hoong Raffles Place Station Vol 2 Tab 31 ES11 W12 Lee Ing Kiat, David City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 20 ES12 W13 Jufri Bin Ars Had City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 21 ES13 Also Raffles Place Station (17 Dec) W14 Mustamam Bin Salleh City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 22 ES14 Also Marina Bay Station (17 Dec) W15 Mustadza Bin Nasar City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 23 ES15 Bin Ahmadtalib Also City Hall Station (17 Dec) W16 Wong Kin Kwok City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 29 ES16 Also City Hall Station (17 Dec) W17 Siak Wing Kin Dhoby Ghaut Station Vol 2 Tab 18 ES17 W18 R Kamaruzzaman Somerset Station Vol 2 Tab 16 ES18

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Also Somerset Station (17 Dec) W19 Kamalludin Bin Rabu Orchard Station Vol 2 Tab 12 ES19 W20 Wong Nian Sam Orchard Station Vol 2 Tab 13 ES20 Also Orchard Station (17 Dec) W21 Toh Kang Tiong Newton Station Vol 2 Tab 9 ES21 W22 Noor Ashah Customer Service Leader Vol 2 Tab 32 ES22 Bte A Majed Newton Station W23 Kwai Cheng Huang, Novena Station Vol 2 Tab 7 ES23 Richard W24 Jamaludin Toa Payoh Station Vol 2 Tab 2 ES24 Bin Mohamed Amin Also Bishan Station (17 Dec) W25 Koh Hui Chong Somerset Station Vol 2 Tab 15 ES25 W26 Fan Mong Sing Braddell Station Vol 2 Tab 3 ES26 W27 Omar B Jasin Braddell Station Vol 2 Tab 4 ES27 Also Braddell Station (17 Dec) W28 Siak Weng Hong Bishan Station Vol 2 Tab 33 ES28 Also Bishan Station (17 Dec) W29 Shaik Khan Bin Ang Mo Kio Station Vol 2 Tab 1 ES29 Hamid Also Ang Mo Kio Station (17 Dec) W30 Chan Chin Chuan Ang Mo Kio Station Vol 2 Tab 34 ES30 Also Ang Mo Kio Station (17 Dec) TOs involved in 17 December 2011 incident W31 Lim Han Ping James Train 136 Vol 1 Tab 11 ES31 W32 Mohamed Redzuan Train 137 Vol 1 Tab 9 ES32 Shah W34 Mazli Bin Abd Nasir Train 123 Vol 1 Tab 8 ES34 W35 Masrudin Bin Mat Train 113 Vol 1 Tab 7 ES35 Salim W36 See Boon Siong Train 132 Vol 1 Tab 10 ES36 Members of public involved in 15 December 2011 incident W33 Ang Lai Guat, Member of Public Vol 1 Tab 17 ES33 Charlene W37 Lai Ching Liang Member of Public Vol 1 Tab 19 ES37

E-2

OCC personnel involved in 17 December 2011 incident W38 Quah Siew Ghee Chief Controller Vol 1 Tab 15 ES38 W39 Lee Fook Meng Chief Controller Vol 1 Tab 16 ES39 Frankie W40 Tan Juke Boon Manager OCC Vol 1 Tab 14 ES40 Station Managers involved in 17 December 2011 incident W41 Siti Ilyana City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 25 ES41 Bte Mohamad W42 Chia Cheng Yun, Geof City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 26 ES42 W43 S. Indirakumar City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 27 ES43 W44 Abdul Shamir City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 28 ES44 Bin Abdul Sawal W45 Sudarsana Dasa Dhoby Ghaut Station Vol 2 Tab 19 ES45 Adhikari W46 Chan Keng Ping Somerset Station Vol 2 Tab 17 ES46 W47 Teo Puay Kee , Ron Orchard Station Vol 2 Tab 14 ES47 W48 Sundaraj s/o Newton Station Vol 2 Tab 10 ES48 Ramasamy W49 Nur Hafizah Binte Newton Station Vol 2 Tab 11 ES49 Amir W50 Alan Fong Keng Heng Novena Station Vol 2 Tab 8 ES50 W51 Yusof Abdullah Braddell Station Vol 2 Tab 5 ES51 W52 Lim Chiow Siong , Toa Payoh Station Vol 2 Tab 6 ES52 Philip W78 Wong Weng Tuck City Hall Station Vol 2 Tab 24 ES78 Service Operation Managers & Customer Service Team W53 Sito Wai Kwong Customer Service Vol 4 Tab 10 ES53 Leader (Raffles Place Station on 15/17 Dec) W54 Lim Sing Long Service Operations Vol 4 Tab 1 ES54 Manager (City Hall Station on 15/17 Dec) W55 Eng Wee Jin Customer Service Vol 4 Tab 5 ES55 Team Leader (City Hall Station 15/17 Dec) W56 Ramli Bin Rahmat Service Operations Vol 4 Tab 2 ES56 Manager (Orchard Station on 15 Dec, Dhoby Ghaut Station

E-3

on 17 Dec) W57 Philip Tay Kim Hoo Customer Service Vol 4 Tab 6 ES57 Team Leader (Dhoby Ghaut Station on 15 and 17 Dec) W58 Tan Peng Foong Service Operations Vol 4 Tab 7 ES58 Manager (Orchard Station on 15 Dec, Somerset Station on 17 Dec) W59 Chia Pen Chuen Service Operations Vol 4 Tab 8 ES59 Manager (Novena Station on 15 Dec, Orchard Station on 17 Dec) W60 Anbazagan s/o Service Operations Vol 4 Tab 4 ES60 Manickam Manager (Bishan Station on 15 Dec) W62 Lee Wan Seng Service Operations Vol 4 Tab 3 ES62 Manager (Bishan Station on 15 Dec, Ang Mo Kio Station on 17 Dec) W63 Lay Chin Yong Customer Service Vol 4 Tab 9 ES63 Team Leader (Ang Mo Kio Station on 15/17 Dec) SCDF personnel W106 Staff Sgt Mohamed Supervisor, SCDF Vol 1 No 22 ES106 Nizar Bin Mohamed Operations Centre Marican W112 Staff Sgt Muhammad Supervisor, SCDF Vol 1 No. 23 ES112 Ismail Bin Abdul Jalil Operations Centre Maintenance Personnel W64 Adam Bin Ismail Technical Officer Vol 3 Tab 1 ES64 W65 Ibrahim Bin Ismail Assistant Engineer Vol 3 Tab 12 ES65 W66 Lim Sime Simm Manager for Track Vol 3 Tab 10 ES66 Renewal W67 Yew Kai Png Assistant Vol 3 Tab 6 ES67 Engineer/MFV

E-4

Operator W68 Rashid Bin Abdul Leading locomotive Vol 3 Tab 5 ES68 Samat operator during MFV inspection W69 Adnan Bin Yunus Rear locomotive Vol 3 Tab 7 ES69 operator during MFV inspection W70 Noorudin Possession Master Vol 3 Tab 4 ES70 Bin Shamsudin W71 Shamsuri Mohamad Line Maintenance Vol 3 Tab 3 ES71 W72 Isman Bin Seymo Night Duty Officer on Vol 3 Tab 9 ES72 15-16 Dec 2011 W73 Loke Kwok Hoong Night Duty Officer on Vol 3 Tab 8 ES73 (Matthias) 17 Dec 2011 W74 Hashmy Bin Ridzw an Assistant Engineer Vol 3 Tab 2 ES74 W75 Mustafa Bin Kamdi Assistant Engineer Vol 3 Tab 13 ES75 W76 Mokhtar Bin Dawi Track Inspection Vol 3 Tab 11 ES76 Officer W91 Johari Bin Abdullah Assistant Engineer Vol 3 No. 14 ES91 W92 Imran Bin Ahmad Technical Officer Vol 3 No. 15 ES92 W93 Aziz Bin Ismail Technical Officer Vol 3 No. 16 ES93 W94 Noor Effendi Bin Assistant Engineer Vol 3 No. 17 ES94 Sahari Senior Management W77 Wong Then Sin SMRT Senior Vol 5 Tab 6 ES77 Manager, (Engineering Trains Branch) W79 Ng Peng Hoe SMRT Fellow (Rolling Vol 5 Tab 4 ES79 Stock System) in the Projects & Technology Department (Systems & Rolling Stock) W80 Shahrin Bin Abdol SMRT Director, Train Vol 5 Tab 8 ES80 Salam Operations W81 Teo Wee Kiat SMRT Deputy Vol 5 Tab 10 ES81 Director, Station Operations W82 Soo Weng Tuck LTA, Deputy Vol 5 Tab 12 ES82 Director, Transit

E-5

Regulation Division W83 Tay Ko San SMRT Chief Engineer, Vol 5 Tab 9 ES83 Control Operations W84 Vincent Tan Peng SMRT Senior Vice Vol 5 Tab 7 ES84 Hock President, Engineering and Projects W87 Saw Phaik Hwa Former SMRT CEO Vol 5 Tab 17 ES87 W88 Josephine Tan LTA Deputy Director, Vol 5 Tab 14 ES88 Bus & Vocational Licensing W89 Tan Ek Kia Interim SMRT CEO Vol 5 Tab 21 ES89

W90 Koh Yong Guan SMRT Chairman Vol 5 Tab 18 ES90 W104 Yeo Teck Guan LTA Deputy Group Vol 5 Tab 16 ES104 Director, Vehicle & Transit Licensing; Director, Public Transport Regulation; Director, Public Transport Security W107 Chua Hock Seng SMRT Senior Vol 5 Tab 1 ES106 Manager (Rolling Stock Depot) W108 Chew Hock Yong LTA CEO Vol 5 Tab 19 ES108 W109 Kraft Bernhard Former Consultant to Vol 5 Tab 15 ES109 August Josef Gunther MRTC W110 Ng Chong Joo SMRT Chief Engineer Vol 5 Tab 3 ES110 W111 Ng Wai Yi SMRT Deputy Vol 5 Tab 5 ES111 Director, Rolling Stock and Tracks W113 Ng Tek Poo SMRT Vice President, Vol 5 Tab 23 ES113 Maintenance W114 Lui Wai Meng SMRT Vice-President, Vol 5 Tab 2 ES114 Rail Operations W115 Khoo Hean Siang SMRT Trains, Vol 5 Tab 22 ES115 Executive Vice President (Trains) W116 Sy Hong Soon LTA Deputy Director, Vol 5 Tab 11 ES116 Design Development,

E-6

Rail Division Experts /Others W85 Andy Barr Incident Management Expert W86 Peter Gillen Incident Management Expert W95 Professor David Ewins Technical Engineering Expert W96 Dr Huang Xianya Technical Engineering Expert

W97 Jerry Evans Technical Engineering Expert W98 Richard Greer Technical Engineering Expert W99 Ben Harding Technical Engineering Expert W100 Dr Graham Brown Technical Engineering Expert W101 Professor Roderick Technical Engineering Arthur Smith Expert

W102 Dr Yu Yonghe Technical Engineering Expert W103 Mr Kevin Sawley Technical Engineering Expert W105 David Hartland Engineering Director, Vol 5 No 24 ES105 Brecknell Willis & Co

E-7

Annex F

EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Marking Description COI - 1 OCC’s initial reports on 15 th and 17 th incident Maintenance procedures and requirements reports of 3 rd rail, COI - 2 train battery/ charger/ current collector shoes and devices Print - outs for train -borne signals equipment system test and COI - 3 maintenance of trains involved in 15 th and 17 th incident Platform Automatic Train Operation Communicator (PAC) COI - 4 data for affected stations COI - 5 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 6 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 7 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 8 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 9 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 10 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 11 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Systems data server logs COI - 12 Train- borne Communication Interface (TCI) logs Radio System Radio Command and Control (RCCP) server COI - 13 logs COI - 14 OCC’s Supervisory Control System server logs Recordings of audio messages and transcripts of 15 th and 17 th COI - 15 incident SAP MMS and/ or hardcopy records of planned maintenance COI - 16 activities relating to inspection and adjustment of CCD assemblies SAP MMS and/ or hardcopy records of unscheduled COI - 17 maintenance work on CCD assemblies for the past 24 months Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 18 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 19 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months)

F-1

Marking Description Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 20 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 21 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 22 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 23 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 24 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 25 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 26 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 27 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 28 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 29 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 30 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 31 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 32 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Work instructions and records for train battery, charger COI - 33 system and CCD for affected trains (Past 12 months) Reports of corrective maintenance work done on loosened/ COI - 34 dropped claws (Past 24 months) Maintenance records - NZ 3 rd rail expansion joint service COI - 35 (Vol 1 of 2) Maintenance records - NZ 3 rd rail expansion joint service COI - 36 (Vol 2 of 2) COI - 37 Maintenance records - NZ 3 rd rail insulator cleaning COI - 38 Maintenance records - NZ 3 rd rail bolt retorque Maintenance records - NZ 3 rd rail Ramp wear check (Vol 1 of COI - 39 2)

F-2

Marking Description Maintenance records - NZ 3 rd rail Ramp wear check (Vol 2 of COI - 40 2) COI - 41 Maintenance records - NZ 3rd rail IRJ maintenance Maintenance records - NZ Turnout retorque 3 rd HSR bolt COI - 42 (Vol 1 of 2) Maintenance records - NZ Turnout retorque 3 rd HSR bolt COI - 43 (Vol 2 of 2) COI - 44 Maintenance records - NZ LTA tunnel sector 20 COI - 45 Maintenance records - NZ LTA tunnel sector 21 COI - 46 Maintenance records - WZ retorque of turnout 3 rd rail bolt COI - 47 Maintenance records - WZ 3 rd rail cover, insulator cleaning Maintenance records - WZ retorque of turnout and 3 rd rail COI - 48 HSR bolt COI - 49 Maintenance records - WZ 3 rd rail IRJ servicing COI - 50 Maintenance records - WZ 3 rd rail expansion joint servicing COI - 51 Maintenance records - WZ retorque of turnout 3 rd rail bolt COI - 52 Maintenance records - WZ 3 rd rail expansion joint servicing COI - 53 Maintenance records - WZ 3 rd rail ramp wear check COI - 54 Maintenance records - WZ retorque 3 rd rail bolt Maintenance records - WZ Retorque of turnout and 3 rd rail COI - 55 HSR bolt COI - 56 Maintenance records - WZ 3 rd rail bolt @ 1 st and 2 nd bracket COI - 57 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail cover insulator cleaning COI - 58 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail ramp wear check Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail high speed ramp wear COI - 59 check COI - 60 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail IRJ servicing COI - 61 Maintenance records - EZ turnout bolt retorque Maintenance records - EZ turnout bolts & 3 rd rail bolt COI - 62 retorque Maintenance records - EZ Retorque turnout and 3 rd rail HSR COI - 63 bolts

F-3

Marking Description

COI - 64 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail expansion joint servicing COI - 65 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail bolts retorque COI - 66 Maintenance records - EZ CM 3 rd rail COI - 67 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail CM works COI - 68 Maintenance records - EZ 3 rd rail IRJ check COI - 69 Maintenance records - EZ MFV defect 3 rd rail gauging Maintenance records - NZ patrol: 3 rd rail fishplate joint COI - 70 (2011) Maintenance records - NZ patrol: 3 rd rail fishplate JT inspect COI - 71 (All zones) COI - 72 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: 3 rd rail fishplate joint MO Maintenance records - WZ patrol: 3 rd rail inspection at COI - 73 FSPLJT COI - 74 Maintenance records - EZ CM works (3 rd rail) COI - 75 Maintenance records - NZ MFV UT Defect report COI - 76 Maintenance records - NZ Turnout greasing COI - 77 Maintenance records - NZ Turnout geometry check COI - 78 Maintenance records - NZ IRJ check COI - 79 Maintenance records - NZ Hand lever point service COI - 80 Maintenance records - NZ Bufferstop maintenance COI - 81 Maintenance records - NZ Turnout grinding and tamping COI - 82 Maintenance records - NZ UT New welds COI - 83 Maintenance records - NZ Weld monitor COI - 84 Maintenance records - NZ CM works orders COI - 85 Maintenance records - NZ Fouling point paint COI - 86 Maintenance records - NZ Tool box meeting COI - 87 Maintenance records - WZ CM works COI - 88 Maintenance records - WZ Turnout greasing COI - 89 Maintenance records - WZ CM works

F-4

Marking Description

COI - 90 Maintenance records - WZ Tunnel cleaning COI - 91 Maintenance records - WZ Demetronic point maintenance COI - 92 Maintenance records - WZ Turnout geometry check COI - 93 Maintenance records - WZ Tool box meeting Maintenance records - EZ Hand lever point servicing and COI - 94 maintenance Maintenance records - EZ Miscellaneous hand tamping COI - 95 grind COI - 96 Maintenance records - EZ IRJ maintenance COI - 97 Maintenance records - EZ Bufferstop maintenance check COI - 98 Maintenance records - EZ Turnout geometry check COI - 99 Maintenance records - EZ Turnout greasing COI - 100 Maintenance records - EZ Foul point paint COI - 101 Maintenance records - EZ Tool box Maintenance records - TGM records CTH-DBG/NB and COI - 102 NEW-ORC/SB and MFV 2010/11 availability and utilisation Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Dec 2010 - COI - 103 Mar 2011) Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Aug 2010- COI - 104 Nov 2010) Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Apr 2010- COI - 105 Jul 2010) Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Apr 2011 - COI - 106 Jun 2011) Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Jul 2011- Sep COI - 107 2011) Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Vol 1) (Oct COI - 108 2011- Dec 2011) Maintenance records - TGM records for NB/SB (Vol 2) (Oct COI - 109 2011- Dec 2011) COI - 110 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: ADM - KRJ (ADMP) COI - 111 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: YIS - ADM (ADMP) COI - 112 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: ORC - BDL (ADMP)

F-5

Marking Description

COI - 113 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: YCK - BDL (ADMP) COI - 114 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: YIS - YCK (ADMP) COI - 115 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: BDL - ORC (ADMP) COI - 116 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: YCK - YIS (ADMP) COI - 117 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: ADM - YIS (ADMP) COI - 118 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: KRJ - ADM (ADMP) COI - 119 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: BDL - YCK (ADMP) Maintenance records - NZ patrol: TST, MTK, RT: 1+2 and COI - 120 SID COI - 121 Maintenance records - NZ patrol: MO Dec 11 (ADMP) COI - 122 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: PSR - TNM WB (CHDP) COI - 123 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: TNM - PSR EB (CHDP) COI - 124 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: TNM - ALJ WB (CHDP) COI - 125 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: ALJ - TNM EB (CHDP) COI - 126 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: CTH - MRB NS (CHDP) COI - 127 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: CGA - XPO (CHDP) COI - 128 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: ALJ - BGS E/W (CHDP) COI - 129 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: TPG - BGS E/W (CHDP) COI - 130 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: CTH - ORC N/S (CHDP) COI - 131 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: CD Depot track (CHDP) COI - 132 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: XPO - CGA C2 (CHDP) COI - 133 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: Daily activities (CHDP) COI - 134 Maintenance records - EZ patrol: WCIXICR (CHDP) COI - 135 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: CNG - BNL WB (UPDP) COI - 136 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: BNL - CNG EB (UPDP) COI - 137 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: DVR - TIB EB (UPDP) COI - 138 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: TIB - DVR WB (UPDP) COI - 139 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: KRJ - CCK NB (UPDP)

F-6

Marking Description

COI - 140 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: CCK – KRJ SB (UPDP) COI - 141 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: CCK - JUR NB (UPDP) COI - 142 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: JUR - CCK SB (UPDP) COI - 143 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: DVR - CNG WB (UPDP) COI - 144 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: CNG - DVR EB (UPDP) COI - 145 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: TPG - TIB WB (UPDP) COI - 146 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: TIB - TPG EB (UPDP) COI - 147 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: RT1 – RT3 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: BT1 (BNL – JKN) – PT1 COI - 148 (JKN – BNL) COI - 149 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: UD – TK03 – TK42 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: Monthly new defects (Sep COI - 150 – Dec 11) COI - 151 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: Tool box meeting briefing Maintenance records - WZ patrol: Patrol UPDP MO Dec COI - 152 2011 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: Patrol UPDP MO Nov COI - 153 2011 COI - 154 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: Patrol UPDP MO Oct 2011 COI - 155 Maintenance records - WZ patrol: Patrol UPDP MO Sep 2011 COI - 156 Maintenance records – EZ CM works COI - 157 Specification of CCD shoes Maintenance regime for CCDs (Include OEM Maintenance COI - 158 manual, work instructions/ records) Details of systems along Circle Line to check droppage of COI - 159 CCD shoes Specifications of insulators (Include material stiffness of 2 COI - 160 damaged insulators) COI - 161 Specifications of 3 rd rail claws COI - 162 Details and duration of auxiliary power on of stalled trains COI - 163 Maintenance regime for claws on 3 rd rail

F-7

Marking Description Documentation on claw replacements and introduction of COI - 164 metal clips Details of models of trains (KHI, SIE, KNS and KSF) which COI - 165 stalled COI - 166 Details and explanation of DT checks COI - 167 Diagrams of cabins and switches on the trains COI - 168 Diagrams and explanation of 3 rd rail support assembly COI - 169 Pictures of the 2 damaged insulators COI - 170 List of train drivers involved in 15 th and 17 th incident License and Operating Agreements between SMRT and LTA COI - 171 and Operating Procedure Standards issued by LTA to SMRT Codes of Practice issued by LTA to SMRT i. Maintenance of structures in the Rapid Transit System (RTS) (2008) ii. Maintenance of Permanent- Way in the RTS (2006) COI - 172 iii. Advertisements in RTS stations, trains and tunnels (2007) iv. Modification of working network in the RTS (2007) v. Operation, maintenance and safety of the RTS (2007) vi. Security standards in MRT systems (2011) Agreements dated 22 May 2000, 28 Feb 2007, 20 Jul 2009 and COI - 173 12 Sep 2011 COI - 174 Particulars of duty SMs of affected stations on 15th Dec 11 COI - 175 Particulars of duty SMs of affected stations on 17th Dec 11 COI - 176 Photographs of incident sites COI - 177 Details of OCC staff involved in 15 th and 17 th incident Details of staff deployed for maintenance checks on NSEW COI - 178 line and their respective sectors between 15 th and 17 th incident Details of staff deployed for maintenance checks on NSEW COI - 179 line and their respective sectors after 17 th incident Command and control structure of the Rail Incident COI - 180 Management Plan (RIMP) as of 7 Dec 2011 Crisis communication team organisation chart as of Nov COI - 181 2011

F-8

Marking Description

COI - 182 CD containing in- train recordings Training syllabus and reading materials for TOs, SMs and COI - 183 OCC staff in NSEW line Training syllabus and reading materials for TOs, SMs and COI - 184 OCC staff in NSEW line Training syllabus and reading materials for TOs, SMs and COI - 185 OCC staff in NSEW line Training syllabus and reading materials for TOs, SMs and COI - 186 OCC staff in NSEW line Training syllabus and reading materials for TOs, SMs and COI - 187 OCC staff in NSEW line Training syllabus and reading materials for TOs, SMs and COI - 188 OCC staff in NSEW line Rolling stock conversion/ qualification training syllabus and COI - 189 reading material for TOs COI - 190 In- service training and refresher courses materials for TOs COI - 191 Training dates/ qualifications/ Tests records of TOs COI - 192 Training related documents CD containing NSEW line OCC related SOPs/ Emergency COI - 193 procedure manuals/ checklists, Orders, Guidelines and advisories COI - 194 Box containing 3 rd rail claw assembly at chainage 61245 COI - 195 Box containing 3 rd rail claw assembly at chainage 63985 COI - 196 Running rail replacement records for the 2 incident sites COI - 197 Maps of tunnel curvature at ORC - NEW COI - 198 Guide on handling delays/ disruptions to train service COI - 199 Major incident management plan COI - 200 - Ditto - COI - 201 - Ditto - COI - 202 - Ditto - Manufacturers’ manuals and service updates on current COI - 203 rolling stock on NSEW line COI - 204 - Ditto -

F-9

Marking Description

COI - 205 - Ditto - COI - 206 - Ditto - COI - 207 - Ditto - COI - 208 - Ditto - COI - 209 - Ditto - COI - 210 - Ditto - COI - 211 - Ditto - COI - 212 - Ditto - COI - 213 - Ditto - COI - 214 - Ditto - COI - 215 - Ditto - COI - 216 - Ditto - COI - 217 - Ditto - COI - 218 - Ditto - COI - 219 - Ditto - COI - 220 - Ditto - COI - 221 - Ditto - COI - 222 - Ditto - COI - 223 - Ditto - COI - 224 - Ditto - COI - 225 - Ditto - COI - 226 - Ditto - COI - 227 - Ditto - COI - 228 - Ditto - COI - 229 - Ditto - COI - 230 - Ditto - COI - 231 - Ditto -

F-10

Marking Description

COI - 232 - Ditto - COI - 233 - Ditto - COI - 234 - Ditto - COI - 235 - Ditto - COI - 236 - Ditto - COI - 237 - Ditto - COI - 238 - Ditto - COI - 239 - Ditto - COI - 240 - Ditto - COI - 241 - Ditto - COI - 242 - Ditto - COI - 243 - Ditto - COI - 244 - Ditto - COI - 245 - Ditto - COI - 246 - Ditto - COI - 247 - Ditto - COI - 248 - Ditto - COI - 249 - Ditto - COI - 250 - Ditto - COI - 251 - Ditto - COI - 252 - Ditto - COI - 253 - Ditto - COI - 254 - Ditto - COI - 255 - Ditto - COI - 256 - Ditto - COI - 257 - Ditto - COI - 258 - Ditto -

F-11

Marking Description

COI - 259 - Ditto - COI - 260 - Ditto - COI - 261 - Ditto - COI - 262 - Ditto - COI - 263 - Ditto - COI - 264 - Ditto - COI - 265 - Ditto - COI - 266 - Ditto - COI - 267 - Ditto - COI - 268 - Ditto - COI - 269 - Ditto - COI - 270 - Ditto - COI - 271 - Ditto - COI - 272 - Ditto - COI - 273 - Ditto - COI - 274 - Ditto - COI - 275 - Ditto - COI - 276 - Ditto - COI - 277 - Ditto - COI - 278 - Ditto - COI - 279 - Ditto - COI - 280 - Ditto - COI - 281 - Ditto - COI - 282 - Ditto - COI - 283 - Ditto - COI - 284 - Ditto - COI - 285 - Ditto -

F-12

Marking Description

COI - 286 - Ditto - COI - 287 - Ditto - COI - 288 - Ditto - COI - 289 - Ditto - COI - 290 - Ditto - COI - 291 - Ditto - COI - 292 - Ditto - COI - 293 - Ditto - COI - 294 - Ditto - COI - 295 - Ditto - COI - 296 - Ditto - COI - 297 - Ditto - COI - 298 - Ditto - COI - 299 - Ditto - COI - 300 - Ditto - COI - 301 - Ditto - COI - 302 - Ditto - COI - 303 - Ditto - COI - 304 - Ditto - COI - 305 - Ditto - COI - 306 - Ditto - COI - 307 - Ditto - COI - 308 - Ditto - COI - 309 - Ditto - COI - 310 - Ditto - COI - 311 - Ditto - COI - 312 - Ditto -

F-13

Marking Description

COI - 313 - Ditto - COI - 314 - Ditto - COI - 315 - Ditto - COI - 316 - Ditto - COI - 317 - Ditto - COI - 318 - Ditto - COI - 319 - Ditto - COI - 320 - Ditto - COI - 321 - Ditto - COI - 322 - Ditto - COI - 323 - Ditto - COI - 324 - Ditto - COI - 325 - Ditto - COI - 326 - Ditto - COI - 327 - Ditto - COI - 328 - Ditto - COI - 329 - Ditto - COI - 330 - Ditto - COI - 331 - Ditto - COI - 332 - Ditto - COI - 333 - Ditto - COI - 334 - Ditto - COI - 335 - Ditto - COI - 336 - Ditto - COI - 337 - Ditto - COI - 338 - Ditto - COI - 339 - Ditto -

F-14

Marking Description

COI - 340 - Ditto - COI - 341 - Ditto - COI - 342 - Ditto - COI - 343 - Ditto - COI - 344 - Ditto - COI- 345 - Ditto - COI- 346 - Ditto - COI- 347 - Ditto - COI- 348 - Ditto - COI- 349 - Ditto - COI- 350 - Ditto - Records of previous 3R claw drops in last 2 years (from 1 COI- 351 Dec 09) Records of previous 3R insulator failures in last 2 years COI- 352 (from 1 Dec 09) Records of previous 3R fastener damage in last 2 years (from COI- 353 1 Dec 09) Records on previous events of CCD shoe drop/ damage in COI- 354 last 2 years (from 1 Dec 09) COI- 355 Details of personnel resigned from SMRT since 1 Jun 11 COI- 356 Grinding records COI- 357 Details of current rolling stock on NSEW line Technical specifications and drawings of 3 rd rail, ceramic COI- 358 insulators, claws and supporting columns Manufacturers’ manuals and service updates/ advisories for COI- 359 3rd rail, ceramic insulators, claws and supporting columns Maintenance related SOPs, orders, guidelines and advisories COI- 360 for Floating slab tracks (FST) Maintenance related SOPs, orders, guidelines and advisories for 3 rd rail, ceramic insulators, claws and supporting COI- 361 columns

F-15

Marking Description Post disruption fault diagnostic results, damage, part COI- 362 replacement, servicing/ repair records for trains involved on 15 th Dec 2011 Maintenance records between 15 th and 17 th Dec 11 for tracks, COI- 363 3rd rail and rail components Maintenance records between 15 th and 17 th Dec 11 for tracks, COI- 364 3rd rail and rail components Records detailing incidents between 15 th and 17 th Dec on COI- 365 part/ component replacement for tracks and 3 rd rail. Manufacturers manuals and service updates/ advisories to COI- 366 the train classes after mid- life upgrading Pre - disruption fault diagnostic result s, damage reports, COI- 367 records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains involved on 15 th Dec 11 Pre- disruption fault diagnostic results, damage reports, COI- 368 records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains involved on 15 th Dec 11 Pre- disruption fault diagnostic results, damage reports, records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains - COI- 369 137, 132, 113, 123, 135, 115, 138/ 938, 318, 111, 701, 15, 935, 855, 127, 133, 134, 136 COI- 370 - Ditto - COI- 371 - Ditto - COI- 372 - Ditto - COI- 373 - Ditto - COI- 374 - Ditto - COI- 375 - Ditto - COI- 376 - Ditto - COI- 377 - Ditto - COI- 378 - Ditto - COI- 379 - Ditto - COI- 380 - Ditto - COI- 381 - Ditto - COI- 382 - Ditto - F-16

Marking Description

COI- 383 - Ditto - COI- 384 - Ditto - COI- 385 - Ditto - Pre- disruption fault diagnostic results, damage reports, COI- 386 records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains involved on 17 th incident Records on maintenance done on tracks, 3 rd rail and COI- 387 components after 17 th incident Records on maintenance done on tracks, 3 rd rail and COI- 388 components after 17 th incident Records on replacement of parts/ components done on tracks COI- 389 and 3 rd rail after 17 th incident Records on replacement of parts/ components done on tracks COI- 390 and 3 rd rail after 17 th incident *COI- 391 Maintenance schedules Maintenance related SOPs, orders, guidelines, advisories on COI- 392 rolling stock used on NSEW line COI- 393 - Ditto - COI- 394 - Ditto - COI- 395 - Ditto - COI- 396 - Ditto - COI- 397 - Ditto - COI- 398 - Ditto - COI- 399 - Ditto - COI- 400 - Ditto - COI- 401 - Ditto - COI- 402 - Ditto - COI- 403 - Ditto - COI- 404 - Ditto - COI- 405 - Ditto - COI- 406 - Ditto -

F-17

Marking Description

COI- 407 Patrolman’s handbook COI- 408 Permanent- Way work instructions *COI- 409 2 investigations reports COI- 410 Details of trains involved on 15 th and 17 th incident COI- 411 Details of trains involved on 15 th and 17 th incident COI- 412 SMRT’s plan to deal with major incidents and disasters Records on length of NS and EW line (both bounds) where COI- 413 fastener- claw assembly of 1 st generation applied Records of date, location, countermeasure of 1 st event of claw COI- 414 drop/ fastener cracking/ insulator damage of 3 rd rail COI- 415 Records of claw drop events in last 20 years Drawing showing exact relative location of fish plate (crack COI- 416 of 3 rd rail) and the 3 dropped claws in 17 th incident COI- 417 Specifications of 3 rd rail (old design) material Records on standard length and weight of 3 rd rail (old COI- 418 design) COI- 419 Records on previous records of 3 rd rail cracking Records on component drawing with detailed dimensions of COI- 420 3R bracket, insulator, fastener and claw with material specifications COI- 421 Records on designated break strength of weak link of CCD COI- 422 Records on material specifications of CCD frame Previous record of CCD frame cracking event and the COI- 423 incident report of cracked frame in 18 Dec 06 COI- 424 Total input electric current or current density of 3 rd rail COI- 425 OCC train and track fault records from 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2011 COI- 426 OCC train and track fault records from 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2011 COI- 427 OCC train and track fault records from 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2011 COI- 428 OCC occurrence logbook from 1 Dec - 31 Dec 2011 COI- 429 OCC occurrence logbook from 1 Dec - 31 Dec 2011 COI- 430 OCC train delay records from 1 Dec - 31 Dec 2011

F-18

Marking Description

COI- 431 Media releases and transcripts on 15 th and 17 th incident COI- 432 List of messages sent by OCC on 15 th Dec 2011 COI- 433 Map of all stations on NSEW line COI- 434 Train service disruption information files Correspondence between SMRT and Brecknell Willis COI- 435 between 25 Dec 11 to 12 Feb 2012 List of information disseminated by UMS and Fax on 17 th COI- 436 Dec 2011 COI- 437 List of information disseminated via GDS on 17 th Dec 2011 Correspondence between SMRT and Brecknell Willis and COI- 438 Alusingen GmbH prior to 16 Dec 2011 Application to LTA for modification of 3 rd rail claws in Aug COI- 439 1996 Report by TY Lin International- Visual inspection of FST COI- 440 concrete condition between Raffles and MRB stations COI- 441 Train schedule logs COI- 442 Train schedule logs COI- 443 Train schedule logs COI- 444 Train schedule logs Train schedule logs COI- 445

3 DVDs containing footages for ORC, NEW, CTH and DBG COI- 446 station COI - 447 Train master log Physical Exhibits Third Rail COI - 448 Bracknell Willis Third Rail x 350mm (x 1) COI - 449 Alusingen Third Rail x 340mm (x 1) One segment of Bracknell Willis Third Rail between COI - 450 chainage 61219 and 61234 (x1) One segment of Bracknell Willis Third Rail between COI - 451 chainage 61219 and 61234 (x1) One segment of Bracknell Willis Third Rail between COI - 452 chainage 61234 and 61249/50 (x 1) F-19

Marking Description One segment of Bracknell Willis Third Rail from COI COI - 453 Training Track One segment of Bracknell Willis Third Rail between COI - 454 chainage 61249/50 and 61264 (x 1) Insulator Assembly (inclusive of claw) COI - 455 Phase 1 Insulator Assembly (x1) COI - 456 Phase 2 Insulator Assembly (x 1) COI - 457 Woodlands Line Insulator Assembly (x1) COI - 458 Changi Airport Line Insulator Assembly (Viaduct Type) (x1) COI - 459 Changi Airport Line Insulator Assembly (Tunnel Type) (x1) COI - 460 Generation 4 Insulator Assembly w Pin (x1) Generation 4 Insulator Assembly w/o Pin and Claw (with COI - 461 Raiser Plate) (x1) Metal clips and raiser plate COI - 462 Phase 1 Generation 2 claw clip (x1) COI - 463 Phase 2 Generation 2 claw clip (x1) COI - 464 Phase 1 Generation 3 claw clip (x1) COI - 465 Phase 2 Generation 3 claw clip (x1) COI - 466 Woodlands Line Generation 3 claw clip (x1) COI - 467 Woodlands Line and Changi Airport Line Raiser Plate (x1) COI - 468 Box of damaged small components (x1) COI - 469 CCD shoe – 3504 – B1 (x1) COI - 470 CCD frame – 3504B (Cracked) (x1) COI - 471 CCD frame – 1336 – B1 (Cracked) (x1) COI - 472 CCD shoe – 1112 – A2 (x1) COI - 473 CCD shoe – 3520 – B2 (x1) COI - 474 CCD shoe – 2106 – B2 (x1) COI - 475 CCD shoe – 40311 (x1) COI - 476 Unknown shoe (x 1)

F-20

Marking Description

COI - 477 3rd rail cover (x1) COI - 478 3rd rail cover (x1) COI - 479 Huge cable (x1) COI - 480 Huge cable (x1) COI - 481 Huge cable (x1) COI - 482 Distant block (x1) COI - 483 Distant block (x1) COI - 484 Distant block (x1) COI - 485 Connection support 6 (x1) COI - 486 3rd rail COI - 487 Fish plate COI - 488 Fish plate

F-21

Annex G

‘E’ EXHIBITS – STATE Marking Description Vol Overview documents E 1 Map of all stations on NSEW line 1 E 2 Map of Cross Over points 1 E 3 OCC’s initial reports on 15 th and 17 th incident 1 Photographs of incident sites (external bag of E 4 photos) E 5 Pictures of the 2 damaged insulators 1 E 6 Maps of tunnel curvature at ORC – NEW 1 E 7 Train Specifications 1 E 8 Diagram of 6 car trains 1 E 9 Diagrams of cabins and switches on the trains 1 Diagrams and explanation of 3 rd rail support 1 E 10 assembly Details of models of trains (KHI, SIE, KNS and KSF) 1 E 11 which stalled E 12 Details of current rolling stock on NSEW line 1 E 13 Specification of CCD shoes 1 E 14 Specifications of 3 rd rail claws 1 Specifications of insulators (Include material 1 E 15 stiffness of 2 damaged insulators) E 16 Design break strength of weak link of the CCD 1 Maintenance Documents E 17 Maintenance regime for claws on 3 rd rail 2 Documentation on claw replacements and 2 E 18 introduction of metal clips Details of systems along Circle Line to check 2 E 19 droppage of CCD shoes Reports of corrective maintenance work done on 2 E 20 loosened/ dropped claws (Past 24 months) Records detailing incidents between 15 th and 17 th 2 Dec on part/ component replacement for tracks and E 21 3rd rail.

G-1

Pre- disruption fault diagnostic results, damage 2 E 22 reports, records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains involved on 15 th Dec 11 Pre - disruption fault diagnostic results, damage 2 reports, records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains involved on 17 th Dec 11

E 23 Pre- disruption fault diagnostic results, damage reports, records for parts replacement/ servicing/ repair to trains – 137, 132, 113, 123, 135, 115, 138/ 938, 318, 111, 701, 15, 935, 855, 127, 133, 134, 136 E 24 Patrolman’s handbook 3 E 25 Permanent- Way work instructions 3 E 26 Records of claw drop events in last 20 years 3 Drawing showing exact relative location of fish plate 3 E 27 (crack of 3 rd rail) and the 3 dropped claws in 17 th incident Application to LTA for modification of 3 rd rail claws 3 E 28 in Aug 1996 E 29 Records on previous records of 3 rd rail cracking 3 Records on component drawing with detailed 3 E 30 dimensions of 3R bracket, insulator, fastener and claw with material specifications Brecknell Willis – Insulator support development 3 E 31 1985 – 2012 (Different generation of claws) Previous record of CCD frame cracking event and 3 E 32 the incident report dated 18 Dec 06 E 33 Correspondence between SMRT and Brecknell Willis 3 Presentation by David Hartland (Brecknell Willis) to 3 E 34 SMRT Correspondence between SMRT and Brecknell Willis 3 E 35 and Alusingen GMBH prior to 16 Dec 2011 Incident Management Command and control structure of the Rail Incident 4 E 36 Management Plan (RIMP) as of 7 Dec 2011 E 37 Major incident management plan 4 Job description for Manager OCC, Chief Controller, 4 E 38 Train Service Controller and Train officer E 39 Job description for Station Manager 4

G-2

Regulatory Documents License and Operating Agreement between Land 5 E 40 Transport Authority (“ LTA ”) and Singapore MRT Ltd dated 1 April 1998 Supplemental Agreement between Land Transport 5 E 41 Authority and Singapore MRT Ltd dated 22 May 2000 Direction to Modify the Conditions of a Licence 5 E 42 granted to SMRT Trains Limited (w.e.f. 12.05.2005) Letter from SMRT to LTA, accepting Notice of 5 Proposal to Modify the Conditions of a Licence E 43 granted to SMRT Trains Ltd (w.e.f. 01.06.2008) (w.e.f. 01.06.2008) dated 1 June 2008 Direction to Modify the Conditions of a Licence 5 E 44 granted to SMRT Trains Limited (w.e.f. 30.10.2008) dated 29 October 2008 Direction to Modify the Conditions of a Licence 5 E 45 granted to SMRT Trains Limited (w.e.f. 03.02.2009) dated 19 Jan 2009 Direction to Modify the Conditions of a Licence 5 E 46 granted to SMRT Trains Limited (w.e.f. 13.01.2012) dated 29 December 2011 CP 1 : Maintenance of Structures in the Rapid 5 E 47 Transit System 2008 (2 nd edition) CP 2 : Maintenance of Permanent Way in the Rapid 5 E 48 Transit System CP 3 : Advertisements in Rapid Transit System (RTS) 5 E 49 Stations, Trains and Tunnels CP 4 : Modification of the Working Network in the 5 E 50 Rapid Transit System CP 5 : Operation, Maintenance and Safety of the 5 E 51 Rapid Transit System E 52 CP 6 : Security Standards in MRT Systems 5 CP 7 : Incident Management during train 5 E 53 disruptions Expert Reports & Other Documents E 54 CCD maintenance Check on 15 Dec – 19 Dec 6 E 55 20120411 – Train Details (Excel) 6 E 56 20120411 – Third Rail details (Excel) 6 E 57 Extracts of train movement of T-151 and T118 6 G-3

Trains travelling ahead of T-113 on NSL (SB) on 17 th 6 E 58 Dec 2011 E 59 SMRT internal investigation report 6 LTA Interim Investigation Report (dated 12 April E 60 2011) Forensic Investigation of the Disruption of MRT E 61 Train Services on 15 th and 17 th December 2011, dated 9 April 2012 (TÜV SÜD PSB ) Review of the Vibration-Related Studies Undertaken in Pursuit of an Explanation of the 3 rd Rail Incidents E 62 on the SMRT in December 2011, dated 12 April 2012 (Professor David J Ewins) Report to the Committee of Inquiry into the Two Major Incidents Which Took Place on the North- South Line of the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit E 63 Corporation Ltd on Thursday 15 th December and Saturday 17 th December 2011, Expert Witness Statement, dated 13 April 2012 E 64 Opening Statement By The Second Solicitor-General E 65 CID Investigation Report – Presentation Slides Prof. Roderick Arthur Smith’s Report – Review of reports prepared by other experts assisting the Attorney General of Singapore’s Chambers and the E 66 investigating body, and reports of other experts engaged by the interested parties for the inquiry into the disruption of MRT train services on 15 th and 17 th of December 2011 E 67 Train Service Disruption File: Orchard Station E 68 Train Service Disruption File: Braddell Station Kawasaki Sifang Consortium Design Acceptance E 69 Request Contract 751B, EMU Train, Heavy Maintenance E 70 Manual E 71 SMRT Train Disruption Bus Information Leaflets Comparison between Vertical and Lateral Vibration E 72 Behaviours on “SMRT 3 rd Rail Support Post” (TÜV SÜD PSB ) Accident / Incident Investigation Report E 73

G-4

Information dissemination from OCC on during: E 74 Incident: Traction power fault on 15/12/11 E 75 SMRT Buses Bus Bridging Routes Guidebook Summary of the Report on the events of 15 & 17 E 76 December 2011 Presentation Slides E 77 Diagram – Goods service restored E 78 Problem Solving / Appreciative Inquiry Chart E 79 The basis of systems thinking Axle Box Temperature check (BSD) 16 December E 80 2011 E 81 Scots schedule E 82 Overview of the technical experts’ finding E 83 Hardcopy of Professor David Ewins’ Slides E 84 Draft ultrasonic inspection report E 85 Ultrasonic Inspection Report Hardcopy of Slides – Singapore MRT: Service E 86 Disruption 17 December 2011 Technical Responses Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Maintenance Order E 87 7723020, 08.04.2011 Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Maintenance Order E 88 7788803, 02.07.2011 E 89 CCD visual check after revenue service on 15/12/11 Fault and Status Indicator – Sketch by Mr Ng Wai Yi E 90 (W111) E 91 Per train kilometre number E 92 Consolidated date of last M12 nut torque check Preventive maintenance 3-weekly inspection E 93 checklist Investigation report on the disruptions to SMRT E 94 train services on the North-South line on 15 and 17 December 2011 – Part 2 Technical Report on the Laboratory-based Analysis of Fractured Third Rails to support the investigation E 95 of MRT train services disruption on 15 th and 17 th Dec 2011 E 96 AGC’s closing submission

G-5

Annex H

‘L’ EXHIBITS – LTA Marking Date Description Volume Incident Management L-1 Major Incident Standard Operating 1 Procedures L-2 15.12.11 Incident Report / Situational Report sent by Land Transport Authority (“ LTA ”) to 1 Ministry of Transport on 15 December 2011 L-3 15.12.11 Incident report sent by Singapore MRT Ltd 1 (“ SMRT ”) to LTA on 15 December 2011 L-4 15.12.11 Chronology of LTOC dated 15 December 1 2011 L-5 17.12.11 Incident Report sent by LTA to Ministry of 1 Transport on 17 December 2011 L-6 17.12.11 Incident report sent by SMRT to LTA on 17 1 December 2011 L-7 17.12.11 Chronology of LTOC dated 17 December 1 2011 L-8 27.02.12 Post Exercise Report for Table Top Exercise 1 conducted on 27 February 2012 L-9 27.02.12 Press statement for Table Top Exercise 1 conducted on 27 February 2012 L-10 04.04.12 Press Statement for Table Top Exercise 1 conducted on 4 April 2012 Regulatory L-11 January White Paper on “ A World Class Land Transport 1 1996 System” L-12 01.04.98 Licence and Operating Agreement between 1 LTA and SMRT L-13 22.05.00 Lease and Maintenance Agreement between 1 LTA and SMRT L-14 26.04.05 Direction to Modify the Conditions of a 1 Licence granted to SMRT (w.e.f. 12.05.2005)

H-1

Marking Date Description Volume L-15 03.08.06 Letter from LTA to SMRT Trains Ltd 1 (“ SMRT ”) L-16 28.02.07 Supplemental Agreement between LTA and 1 SMRT for Lease and Maintenance Agreement L-17 20.07.09 Supplemental Agreement between LTA and 1 SMRT for Lease and Maintenance Agreement L-18 29.12.11 Direction to Modify the Conditions of a Licence granted to SMRT Trains Limited 1 (w.e.f. 13.01.2012) L-19 02.02.12 Letter from LTA to SMRT 1 L-20 09.03.12 Letter from LTA to SMRT 1 Technical General Documents L-21 Drew and Napier’s CD containing 2 Photographs of the Evidence Room L-22 October MRTC Manual 2 1998 L-23 15.12.11 On-site Reports for the 15 December 2011 2 incident L-24 17.12.11 On-site Reports for the 17 December 2011 2 incident L-25 Sent by CD of photographs taken of the damaged SMRT CCDs and 3 rd rail sections (labelled showing to LTA their locations and Electrical Multiple Unit 2 on (EMU) numbers) for the 15 and 17 December 1.2.12 2011 Incidents and those found after the incidents. Permanent Way General L-26 2008 – SMRT 2-yearly Maintenance Plan 2 2009 L-27 2010 – SMRT 2-yearly Maintenance Plan 3 2011 L-28 2011 5-yearly PSI Report 3

H-2

Marking Date Description Volume Claws L-29 SMRT Permanent Way Work Instructions: 3 01.06.10 - Third rail expansion joint maintenance 3 / inspection 01.06.10 - Third rail wear monitoring 3 01.06.10 - Third rail insulator cleaning (manual) 3 01.06.10 - Third rail IRJ maintenance 3 01.06.10 - Third rail (at fishplated joints) 3 inspection 29.06.11 - 3rd rail replacement 3 02.01.12 - Retorque of 3 rd rail bolts 3 L-30 SMRT Report of Dropped Claws for 2009, 3 2010 and 2011 L-31 10.11.98 LTA’s as-built records from when the North- 3 South Line was first constructed L-32 18.12.11 Photographs taken by LTA on 18 December 2011 for inspection carried out on Third Rail 3 Claw between Orchard and Braddell (North- bound) L-33 01.02.12 Report of dislodgement of claws, modification record for clips / cable ties for 3 the past 36 months L-34 01.02.12 SMRT classification of claw drops into missing claws; claws dislodged from 3 rd rail and fallen onto tracks; and claws dislodged 3 from 3 rd rail supports but had not fallen off (from 2009 to 2011) L-35 06.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 3 in letter 3 dated 31 January 2011 L-36 06.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 13 in letter 3 dated 31 January 2011 L-37 06.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 6 in letter dated 31 January 2012 3

H-3

Marking Date Description Volume L-38 09.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 1 in dated 3 31 January 2011 L-39 14.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 1 in letter 3 dated 8 March 2012 L-40 22.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 8 in letter 3 dated 14 February 2012 L-41 22.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 11 in letter 3 dated 14 February 2012 L-42 22.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 9 in letter 3 dated 14 February 2012 L-43 22.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 12 in letter 3 dated 14 February 2012 L-44 09.03.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 3 in letter 3 dated 24 February 2012 L-45 09.03.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 4 in letter 3 dated 24 February 2012 L-46 09.03.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 5 in letter 3 dated 24 February 2012 L-47 19.03.12 SETSCO Services Pte Ltd Radiographic Inspection/ Interpretation Report on Jaw and 3 Claw Assemblies L-48 22.03.12 SETSCO Services Pte Ltd Eddy Current Test 3 Report on Jaws and Claws L-49 27.03.12 SETSCO Services Pte Ltd Report on the 3 Metallurgical Examination of Jaw 10 3rd Rail L-50 MRTC / Henry Boot-Gammon-Singa JV As- 3 built Records for the 3 rd Rail System L-51 Correspondence between MRTC and Henry Boot-Gammon-Singa JV in relation to the 3rd 3 rail and claw assembly L-52 17.12.11 Photographs and records taken by LTA to personnel on 17, 18 and 20 December 2011 3 19.12.11 during the joint site inspection by LTA and

H-4

Marking Date Description Volume SMRT. L-53 06.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 9 in letter 3 dated 31 January 2011 L-54 06.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 12 in letter 3 dated 31 January 2011 L-55 22.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 7 in letter 4 dated 14 February 2012 L-56 27.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 1 in letter 4 dated 14 February 2012 MFV L-57 MFV readings for 3 locations (NEW-ORC (SB) CH 63925 – CH63970; MRB-RFP (SB) CH9750 – CH 59840; and SOM-ORC (NB) CH63060 – 4 CH63180) and corresponding Maintenance Records from SMRT L-58 17.11.01 SMRT Work Instructions (MFV) 4 L-59 17.12.11 MFV Readings 4 L-60 01.02.12 SMRT’s Report of the section of tracks checked by the MFV and/or patrol from 16 to 4 20 December 2011, and their findings L-61 01.02.12 Incident and investigation reports for the mirror found cracked on MFV on 17 4 December 2011 L-62 06.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 2 in letter 4 dated 31 January 2011 Rolling Stock General L-63 Kawasaki Si Fang (KSF) Maintenance Manual (C151A trains) (Draft Version) (Extract) 4 - Batteries L-64 Kawasaki Si Fang (KSF) Design Submissions (C151A trains) (Extract) 4 - Weight - Specifications of train

H-5

Marking Date Description Volume - CCD (16.05.2011) - Wheels (16.05.2011) L-65 Kawasaki Nippon Sharyo (KNS) Design Submissions (C751B trains) (Extract) - Weight - Specifications of train 5 - CCD (01.04.1999) - Wheels (01.09.2000) - Battery (30.03.1999) L-66 Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) Maintenance Manual (C151 trains) (Extract) 5 - CCD L-67 Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) Maintenance Manual (C151 trains) (Extract) 5 - Batteries L-68 Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) Maintenance Manual (C151 trains) (Extract) 5 - Wheels L-69 Siemens (SIE) Design Submissions (C651 trains) (Extract) 5 - Weight - Specifications of train L-70 01.08.96 Siemens (SIE) Technical Manual of CCDs 5 (including Design Specifications) L-71 10.05.11 Kawasaki Si Fang (KSF) Maintenance Manual (C151A trains) (Draft Version) (Extract) 5 - Current Collector Devices (“CCD”) L-72 10.10.00 Kawasaki Nippon Sharyo (KNS) Maintenance Manual (C751B trains) (Extract) 5 - Wheels L-73 12.10.05 Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) Maintenance Manual (C151 trains) (Extract) 5 - Weight - Specifications of train

H-6

Marking Date Description Volume L-74 28.02.96 Siemens (SIE) Maintenance Manual (C651 trains) (Extract) - CCD 5

L-75 28.02.96 Siemens (SIE) Maintenance Manual (C651 trains) (Extract) 5 - Batteries L-76 29.04.96 Siemens (SIE) Maintenance Manual (C651 trains) (Extract) 5 - Wheels L-77 29.12.99 Kawasaki Nippon Sharyo (KNS) Maintenance Manual (C751B trains) (Extract) 5 - Batteries L-78 31.03.00 Kawasaki Nippon Sharyo (KNS) Maintenance Manual (C751B trains) (Extract) 5 - CCD L-79 07.11.11 Kawasaki Si Fang (KSF) Maintenance Manual (C151A trains) (Draft Version) (Extract) 5 - Wheels Work Instructions L-80 SMRT Work Instructions for KNS (C751B) 5 trains: 12.01.01 - 6-monthly inspection of bogie 5 09.05.06 - 6-monthly inspection on low voltage 5 electrical systems & DT-car earth brush 26.08.11 - 3-weekly inspection checklist 5 L-81 SMRT Work Instructions for KSF (C151A) 6 trains: 18.08.11 - 3-weekly inspection checklist 6 30.09.11 - 6-monthly inspection of bogie 6 30.09.11 - 6-monthly inspection on APS & auxillary switch box 6

H-7

Marking Date Description Volume 30.09.11 - 6-monthly inspection on low voltage 6 electrical systems & DT-car earth brush 30.09.11 - 6-monthly inspection on gangway/battery 6

L-82 SMRT Work Instructions for SIE (C651) 6 trains: 09.05.06 - Battery / power converter / door event 6 recorder inspection 22.07.09 - Reduction gear unit, drive unit 6 container and battery inspection 22.10.09 - Pneumatic system inspection 6 18.08.11 - 3-weekly inspection checklist at A01 6

L-83 SMRT Work Instructions for KHI (C151) 6 trains: 22.09.09 - Reduction gear unit, chopper control 6 system and battery inspection 22.10.09 - Pneumatic system inspection 6 22.10.09 - Auxiliary power supply inspection 6 18.08.11 - 3-weekly inspection checklist 6 L-84 SMRT Work Instructions for overhaul of KNS 6 (C751B) trains: 16.05.05 - Servicing KNS Ni-Cadmium Battery 6 (Honda) 20.07.09 - Car Height Adjustment 6 L-85 SMRT Work Instructions for overhaul of KHI 6 (C151) trains: 21.05.09 - Service / Overhaul of Current Collector 6 28.03.11 - Car Height Adjustment 6

H-8

Marking Date Description Volume Current Collector Devices (“CCD”) L-86 SAP MMS records of purchase of shoes and CCD assembly components for past 24 6 months L-87 CCD components list for SIE (C651) trains from the Illustrated Parts Catalogue, 6 extracted from the manufacturer’s Maintenance Manual L-88 CCD components list for KHI (C151) trains from the Illustrated Parts Catalogue, 6 extracted from the manufacturer’s Maintenance Manual L-89 KSF (151A) trains: Dimension and Mechanical 6 Check (Record Sheet) L-90 30.03.01 CCD components list for KNS (C751B) trains from the Illustrated Parts Catalogue, extracted from the manufacturer’s 7 Maintenance Manual

L-91 20.01.11 KSF (C151A) Trains Type Test Report: 7 25.11.11 - Design acceptance request L-92 10.08.11 Type Test Procedure 7 L-93 01.02.12 List of trains (with EMU numbers) checked on 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 December 2011 for 7 damaged shoes/CCD and the damage found for each day L-94 20.02.12 CCD components list for KSF (C151A) trains from the Illustrated Parts Catalogue, 7 extracted from the manufacturer’s Maintenance Manual L-95 21.02.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 2 in letter 7 dated 14 February 2012

H-9

Marking Date Description Volume Train Batteries L-96 SMRT Work Instructions for Servicing of 7 Batteries for the following type of trains: 16.05.05 - KNS (C751B) Trains only 7 16.01.09 - SIE (C651) or KHI (C151) Trains only 7 L-97 Preventive Maintenance Records in relation to the 3-weekly inspection of trains with the 7 same EMU L-98 09.11.09 SMRT Work Instructions for Removal and Installation of Batteries for SIE (C651), KHI (C151) or KNS (C751B) Trains only 7

Train Vibration Reports L-99 16.01.12 Kawasaki Bogie Vibration Measurement 7 Results L-100 09.03.12 Kawasaki Bogie Vibration Measurements on North-South Line Results 7

Noise Measurements L-101 19.03.12 SMRT’s answer to LTA’s query no. 5 in letter 8 dated 8 March 2012 Trains involved in the Incidents L-102 01.02.12 SMRT’s summary of trains affected by the 15 8 and 17 December 2011 incidents L-103 01.02.12 Train timetables (with train and EMU numbers) for 15, 16 & 17 December 2011 on 8 North-South Line and East-West Line L-104 29.02.12 LTA’s photographs and observations from 8 and LTA’s inspection of the 8 affected trains 4.03.12

H-10

Marking Date Description Volume Changes made Post-Incidents L-105 01.02.12 SMRT’s account of the changes SMRT has made to the infrastructure, trains and other 8 operating assets since 15 and 17 December 2011 incidents Correspondence between LTA & SMRT L-106 29.12.11 Letter from LTA to SMRT 8 L-107 4.01.12 Letter from SMRT to LTA 8 L-108 20.01.12 Letter from LTA to SMRT 8 L-109 31.01.12 Letter from LTA to SMRT 8 L-110 14.02.12 Letter from LTA to SMRT 8 L-111 20.03.12 Letter from SMRT to LTA 8 L-112 30.03.12 Letter from LTA to SMRT 8 L-113 11.04.12 Letter from SMRT to LTA 8 Miscellaneous L-114 18.01.11 Sample of Maintenance Order Records to 8 31.12.11 Other documents L-115 27.03.12 Expert Report of Richard Greer L-116 16.04.12 LTA’s Written Opening Statement L-117 02.05.12 Drawings for the third rail system insulator

support assembly L-118 07.05.12 Joint news release – Public transport operators to provide free bus service at

designated points in event of MRT service disruption L-119 17.05.12 Recovery of Train Services with SMRT & SBST – Notes of Meeting held at LTA

Hampshire Office, Block 5, Level 1, Meeting Room 2 on Friday, 2 December 2011, at 2pm L-120 08.06.20 Closing Statement of the Land Transport

12 Authority of Singapore

H-11

Annex I

‘S’ EXHIBITS -SMRT Marking Description Volume S 1 Permanent Way Work Instructions 1 Report by TY Lin International- Visual inspection of FST 1 S 2 concrete condition between Raffles and MRB stations S 3 Rail Incident Management Plan as of 15 December 2011 2 RIMP Standard Operating Procedures as of 15 December 2 S 4 2011 Report from the Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation 2 entitled “Relevant Comments on the Rail Incident S 5 Management Plan and Operations Relating to the SMRT Incidents on 15 and 17 December 2011” S 6 SMRT’s Bundle of Vibration Reports S 7 WS Atkins Report on engineering S 8 WS Atkins Report on Rail Incident Management Plan S 9 SMRT’s Opening Statement dated 16 April 2012 Bundle of Sample of SMRT Training Documents (Station S 10 Ops Schemes) Bundle of Sample of SMRT Training Documents (Train S 11 Operators) Bundle of Sample of SMRT Training Documents S 12 (Customer Services & Other Courses) Volume 1 Bundle of Sample of SMRT Training Documents S 13 (Customer Services & Other Courses) Volume 2 Bundle of Sample of SMRT Training Records (Station S 14 Managers) Bundle of Sample of SMRT Training Records (Train S 15 Operators) Applying Basic Rules and Procedures for Train Officers, S 16 EMU Train Defect Handling Procedure S 17 No cut in maintenance expenditure S 18 Diagram drawn by Mr Johari (W91) Letter from LTA to SMRT of 11 April 2012 - 15 and 17 S 19 December 2011 Service Disruptions to the North-South Line: Actions to be undertaken for train and tracks Letter from SMRT to LTA dd. 20 March 2012 - S 20 Clarification on LTA’s Queries on 19 March 2012 S 21 SMRT’s Closing Submissions

I-1

S 22 SMRT’s Supplementary Closing Submissions

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Annex J

Chronology of events for 15 December 2011 incident by CID

Time Train Occurrences 6:40 pm 133 About 50 meters from the tail-wall (TW) of Dhoby Ghaut Station, the TO of T-133 noticed sparks emanating from the undercarriage but did not report it to OCC as he assumed that this was normal.

6:41 pm 133 200 meters after leaving Dhoby Ghaut Station, the TO again saw sparks emanating from the undercarriage, but this time accompanied by some ‘arking’ sound and burn smell. The observations were communicated to OCC. When OCC queried further on the burning smell, the TO was not able to elaborate further.

6:43 pm 139 Just about 200 -300 meters after leaving City Hall Station, the TO experienced a master fault light illuminating at the front desk console of his train. He turned to check the rear panel to identify the faults. The TO noted that the fault lights for the power and converter were illuminated. Following that, when the train was about 150 meters to the tail-wall (TW) of Dhoby Ghaut Station, the compressor and air-con fault lights also illuminated. The TO informed OCC of the fault lights and was instructed to rectify the faults at the next Station.

- 134 As T-134 was the train directly behind T-139 when faults were reported by T-139, OCC requested T-134 to perform a line check as it was moving towards City Hall Station (NB).

6:44 pm 139 T-139 arrived at Dhoby Ghaut Station. The TO then re -set the train’s system by depressing the ‘reset’ and ‘Auxiliary-on’ buttons. The fault indicators cleared and OCC was informed. OCC then instructed the TO to continue with his scheduled journey.

- 128 T-128 reported to OCC that prior to the train reaching Somerset Station, he experienced fault lights for air-con, converter, compressor (local and Train) illuminating, but cleared when he arrived at Somerset Station. T-128 was just ahead of T-139. Since the fault lights were cleared, OCC instructed T-128 to proceed as scheduled and to monitor the situation.

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Time Train Occurrences

6:45 pm 134 Shortly after leaving City Hall Station and passing the ‘limit - marker’, which is 133 meters from the head-wall (HW) of City Hall Station, the TO heard a loud sound from outside, towards the rear of the train. The TO described the sound as resembling the dragging and crushing sound of plastic, not metal, and that the sound was continuous.

6:46 pm 134 A few seconds later, T -134 came to a gradual stop. The TO noticed that the master fault light had illuminated. The TO checked the rear panel and discovered that the air-con and converter fault lights were also illuminated. In addition, the TO noticed that the ‘line-voltage’ indicator was not lit, and thus there was no electrical supply to the train. Almost immediately, the emergency lights of the train activated and there was no air-conditioning. The TO reported to OCC that the stalled train’s location was about 150 meters from the TW of Dhoby Ghaut Station as he could see the ‘+1.5’ markers in the tunnel. OCC instructed the TO to make delay announcements through the train’s PA system.

- 139 About 200 meters after departing Dhoby Ghaut Station, the TO experienced fault lights for power, converter, compressor and air- con. The TO reported the fault lights to OCC and was instructed to do a ‘reset’ at the next Station i.e. Somerset Station.

6:47 pm 134 The TO tried all modes to propel the train forward but was not successful. The train remained stalled in the tunnel. The TO also reported to OCC that he had seen smoke just prior to his train stalling.

- 139 Meanwhile, T-139 arrived at Somerset Station and managed to clear all the fault lights after re-setting the system. This was communicated to OCC and the TO was advised to proceed as scheduled, but to monitor the faults. Within the same minute, T- 139 left Somerset Station for Orchard Station.

6:48 pm - OCC turned on the tunnel fans along the stretch of tunnel where T-134 had stalled.

- 134 Commuters of T -134 began to communicate with the TO through

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Time Train Occurrences the Emergency Communication Button (ECB). However, the TO was not able to make out what the commuters were trying to tell him due to the loud background noises. The TO tried replying to other ECB activators, but did not receive any responses. The TO then made PA announcements in the train to calm the commuters while he waited for further instructions.

- 139 About 400 meters after leaving Somerset Station, the TO experienced fault lights illuminating again for power, converter, compressor and air-con. The TO tried reaching OCC through the train’s communication set but did not receive any response. Gradually, the train came to a halt and stalled 50 meters from the TW of Orchard Station. When the TO tried to propel the train forward in manual mode, the train rolled back. OCC instructed the TO to make delay announcements.

- 128 The TO reported to OCC that the train was experiencing intermittent fault lights illuminating in between Stations. As the train was still propelling, the TO was advised by OCC to monitor the fault lights and continue with service.

6:52 pm 118 Having two trains stalled in the tunnel (T -134 and T -139), OCC directed T-118, which was behind T-134, to detrain its commuters at the north-bound track of City Hall Station and then head towards Dhoby Ghaut Station to ‘push-out’ T-134.

6:55 pm 128 While departing Novena Station, the TO reported a fault for the battery charge. OCC was informed and the TO was instructed to monitor the situation.

- 133 T-133 arrived at Braddell Station and the TO reported to OCC that the train had stalled and he was experiencing problems with the line voltage. Just before arriving at Braddell Station, T-133 was experiencing an assortment of problems, including loss of battery charge, loss of line voltage, fault lights for air-con and compressors. The doors of the train were also slightly misaligned with the platform doors. When the TO tried to depart from Braddell Station, the train could not be propelled forward. OCC instructed the TO to make delay announcements and to detrain the commuters.

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Time Train Occurrences

6:56 pm 139 The TO reported to OCC that the commuters were using the ECB to complain that there was no air-conditioning.

6:58 pm 128 While almost reaching Toa Payoh Station, T-134 could only operate at speeds up to 40 kph. The moment the train stopped at the platform, it lost electrical power and the emergency lights of the train activated. According to the TO, all the communication sets in the train, including the PA system, malfunctioned. At the HW of Toa Payoh Station, he made use of the EPAX system of the Station to communicate with OCC. OCC instructed the TO to detrain the commuters. The detrainment process was assisted by the Station staff since the train’s PA system was not functioning. As T-128 was still able to propel forward, OCC directed the TO to ‘rescue’ T-133 which was ahead of his train at Braddell Station.

7:04 pm 112 T-112, which was plying the south -bound track of NSL, was at Newton Station when the TO received instructions from OCC to detrain its commuters at Newton Station. Thereafter, it was directed to perform a ‘cross-over’ to the north-bound track between Orchard Station and Newton Station, and head south- bound towards Orchard Station, on the north-bound track (wrong direction movement) to ‘rescue’ T-139. In gist, T-112 was to travel against the flow towards T-139 and haul T-139 to Orchard Station for detrainment of its commuters at the platform.

7:07 pm 118 Meanwhile, as T -118 was making its way towards T -134 for a ‘push-out’, it came across a segment of the track, about 50 meters after leaving City Hall Station, where the third rail had sagged and was almost touching the sleepers of the track. The TO also noticed that about 3 meters of the third rail cover was missing, but did not see any debris on the track. The TO estimated that the length of the sag was about 6 meters. OCC then instructed the TO to open the rear door of the train to allow technicians and station masters to board since the trailing end of the train was still at the buffer area of the HW of City Hall Station.

7:07 pm - Recovery Teams were activated to proceed to the incident sites.

7:08 pm - Seeing that 3 trains were now stalled along the NB track of NSL

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Time Train Occurrences and that there was no way to ‘push-out’ T-134, the Chief Controller, Mr Moksin, decided to perform a ‘train-to-track’ detrainment for the commuters of T-134.

7:10 pm - Electrical supply to the third rail was switched off from City Hall Station to Somerset Station to facilitate the detrainment of T-134.

- 133 OCC instructed the TO to detrain its commuters at the platform of Braddell Station and to wait for the ‘rescue’ train.

7:18 pm 128 T-128 departed from Toa Payoh Station and headed towards Braddell Station to ‘rescue’ T-133 which was still stalled there. Shortly after departing from Toa Payoh Station for Braddell Station, T-128 also stalled. The TO observed that the lights to the 3 leading cars had ‘blacked-out’. The lights to the 3 trailing cars were still functioning. The TO contacted OCC to report the train stalling and was instructed to wait for ‘rescue’.

7:23 pm - OCC activated SMRT’s Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP).

7:26 pm 134 The 1 st commuter from T-134 arrived on foot at the TW of Dhoby Ghaut Station.

7:30 pm - Recovery Teams arrived at the incident sites.

7:31 pm 139 T-112 coupled with T-139 and hauled it to Orchard Station for detrainment at the Station’s platform.

7:33 pm 139 T-139 arrived at Orchard Station and detrained all its passengers. The TO checked the train after its detrainment to ensure that all the commuters had left the train. He then discovered that a glass on the door of one of its cars had been smashed. A fire- extinguisher was found next to the door, which was believed to be the equipment used to smash the glass. To date, the person who smashed the glass has not been established.

7:39 pm 134 A call was made by a passenger onboard T -134 to the Singapore Civil Defence Force (“SCDF”). The text of message was “Someone fainting”.

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Time Train Occurrences 7:43 pm SCDF SCDF’s Ambulance No. 112, led by Paramedic Hesper, arrived at Dhoby Ghaut Station and headed onto the track to attend to the casualty onboard T-134.

7:46 pm - With the exception of Dhoby Ghaut, City Hall and Raffles Place Stations, which are interchanges, OCC instructed the Station Managers of all Stations between Marina Bay and Bishan Stations, both bounds, to have their Stations closed.

7:56 pm - The 1 st bus for bus-bridging services left Bishan Depot.

8:00 pm - Recovery Teams began to restore the sagged third rail.

8:03 pm - The 1 st bus-bridging service departed from City Hall Station.

8:05 pm 134 The last commuter from T -134 arrived at Dhoby Ghaut Station (est. 1200 pax and total time for detrainment from the time of stalling was about 1 hr and 18 mins).

8:20 pm SCDF SCDF left Dhoby Ghaut Station to convey the casualty to SGH for treatment. 8:30 pm SB Alternate trains were turned -around at Bishan to resume north - trains bound services on the NSL. The other trains continued towards Raffles Station and crossed-over to the west-bound line.

9:00 pm - A visual line clear was conducted between Dhoby Ghaut and Braddell Stations.

9:52 pm - Restoration of the third rail at the affected segment was completed (2 hrs 45 mins from the time the TO of T-118 sighted the damage). The sagged third rail stretched for about 40 meters, affecting 6 bracket assemblies. A total of 4 claws had dropped, of which 1 was due to a broken fastener. Another 2 fasteners were totally dislodged from the insulators. ‘Rescue’ trains then proceeded to either push or haul the 4 stalled trains out of the track.

11:26 - Speed restriction was imposed on the tracks at the incident sites. pm

11:40 - Full train services resumed. J-7

Time Train Occurrences pm (Total time of service outage – 4 hrs and 54 mins) Estimated pax affected : 123,101

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Annex K

Chronology of events for 15 December 2011 incident by SMRT IIT

Time Event Description 18:47 T134 stalled before Dhoby Ghaut Northbound and was unable to proceed in all modes. The intake and exhaust tunnel ventilation fans were turned on for this stretch at 18.48

18:49 T139 stalled before Orchard Northbound as train had no traction power. The intake and exhaust tunnel ventilation fans were turned on for the Somerset-Orchard section at 19.01 -19.04; approximately 12-15 minutes after train stalled in the tunnel.

18:52 T118 was detrained at City Hall Station Northbound and intended to assist T134 for the push out operation.

18:54 T133 reported train had low battery charge.

18:55 T133 stalled at Braddell Northbound.

18:56 Southbound T137 turnaround at Newton Southbound and arrived Newton Northbound.

18:59 Southbound T116 turnaround at Newton Southbound and arrived Newton Northbound.

19:02 Southbound T127 arrived at Orchard Southbound from Newton Southbound.

19:06 T133 instructed to detrain at Braddell

19:04 T112 instructed to assist in push out at Newton Southbound. It crossed over to Newton Northbound and operated in “wrong-direction movement” towards Orchard to haul T139 to the platform for detrainment. T112 arrived Newton Northbound at 1911 hrs, departed Newton Northbound at 1914 hrs in “wrong-direction movement”to Orchard. This is now 25 minutes after T139 stalled in the tunnels.

19:07 Train Officer (T118) reported sighting of sagged third rail. Chief Controller instructed T134 to detrain passengers to track and evacuate from Dhoby K-1

Time Event Description Ghaut station since a push out of T134 is no longer possible.

19:10 Traction power is switched off from City Hall to Somerset to prepare for passengers detrainment.

19:15 Train Officer (T139) reported feedback from passenger that there was no ventilation and a lady passenger had fainted. He was instructed by OCC to be prepared for haul-out by T112.

19:17 Operations Control Centre (OCC) checked with T133 whether it had detrained the passengers at Braddell. Train Officer reported that there was no line voltage.

19:19 T112 arrived at Newton Northbound tail wall to rescue T139.

19:22 Assisting T128 approaches T133 for coupling but stalled before Braddell tail wall.

19:26 T134 detrained passengers to track towards Dhoby Ghaut. There was no train service between Marina Bay and Bishan in both directions. This is now almost 40 minutes since the train stalled.

19:33 Coupled T112 and T139 arrived at Orchard Northbound. Train Officer (T139) reported train aligned and ready to detrain passengers through isolation of doors.

19:33 Trains from Toa Payoh to Braddell Northbound reported loss of traction power. Bus Bridging service activated between Bishan and Marina Bay.

19:46 OCC informed station managers of stations between Braddell and Marina Bay to close stations except for Dhoby Ghaut, City Hall and Raffles Place interchange stations.

19:56 First bus bridging service departed from Bishan station. (Average service headway was 5 min)

19:59 Train Officer of T139 reported his rear train cars had no line voltage and the lights were not on.

20:03 1st bus bridging service departed from City Hall towards Bishan. 43 buses K-2

Time Event Description were activated for the bus bridging services.

20:05 T134 detrainment to track towards Dhoby Ghaut station was completed. The detrainment of commuters from the stalled train took 78 minutes.

20:23 Bus bridging service was extended to operate between Ang Mo Kio and Marina Bay.

20:30 Train service between Toa Payoh and Raffles Place Southbound resumed.

20:32 1st Southbound T927 departed City Hall Southbound to Raffles Place Westbound.

20:35 Rail Service Manager (Jurong) conducted a visual inspection of T133 at Braddell Northbound. 4 collector shoes were reported to have dislodged.

21:20 All traction power was switched off from Raffles Place to Braddell to allow inspection of damage to track and collector shoes.

21:26 Line cleared for the T134 stalled between City Hall and Dhoby Ghaut Northbound.

21:52 Sagging third rail at Dhoby Ghaut rectified. This is 2hour 45 minutes after the sagged rail was noted. 21:58 T131 start service from Bishan Northbound towards Jurong East.

22:01 Bus bridging from Ang Mo Kio to Raffles Place stations ceased while the service from Marina Bay to Ang Mo Kio and from Raffles Place to Marina Bay continues.

22:06 Bus bridging services update: 55 buses were deployed. 22:14 T130 starts service from Bishan Northbound to Jurong East station to relieve overcrowding at bus bridging point.

22:15 Line clear completed from Dhoby Ghaut to Newton. 22:25 Bus bridging service update: 82 buses were deployed. Headway at 9 -15 min

22:40 Line clear completed at Newton.

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Time Event Description 23:05 T918 and T134 were coupled at Dhoby Ghaut Northbound.

23:07 First two bus bridging service for Novena-Ang Mo Kio arrived.

23:09 Bus bridging service update: 87 buses were deployed.

23:13 T894 (1st 12-Car Train) at Braddell Northbound proceeding towards Ang Mo Kio Northbound. T918 and T134 (4th 12-Car Train) proceeded to Newton and turnaround towards Marina Bay.

23:18 T156 at Raffles Place Northbound proceeded towards City Hall

23:21 T122 Raffles Place Southbound departed towards Marina Bay Northbound

23:22 Rescue train T196 departed from Toa Payoh Northbound to Braddell Northbound to couple up with T128 stalled before Braddell tail wall.

23:28 T149 from Raffles Place Northbound proceeded towards City Hall Northbound

23:28 1st defective train (T133) coupled with T894 arrived at Ang Mo Kio Northbound.

23:31 T916 coupled with T128 (2nd 12-Car Train) proceeded towards Toa Payoh Southbound.

23:37 T112 (3rd 12-Car Train) departed from Newton Northbound.

23:39 T192 cross over to Westbound and detrained passengers at Raffles Place.

23:40 Train service resumed at 2340hrs.

23:42 T156 started passenger service at Orchard Northbound.

23:45 T149 started passenger service at Somerset.

23:48 T918 and T134 (4th 12-Car Train) at Newton Northbound proceeded towards Marina Bay Southbound.

00:36 Commenced additional train service from Bishan Northbound to Jurong K-4

Time Event Description +1 East.

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Annex L

Chronology of events for 17 December 2011 incident by CID

Time Train Occurrences 6:28 am 136 About 300 meters from the TW of Orchard Station south-bound, the TO felt a jerk on the train and the air-con fault light illuminated. The TO did not report this to OCC as he thought that this was not an uncommon issue.

6:29 am 136 When T-136 arrived at Orchard Station, the fault light for the air- con cleared.

6:30 am 136 When T -136 left Orchard Station, the TO experienced intermittent air-con fault lights but did not report the faults to OCC as the fault lights did not seem to be permanent and the train was functioning normally. T-136 proceeded according to its schedule and headed towards Marina Bay Station.

6:35 am 137 T-137 was the train directly behind T-136. When T-137 arrived at Newton Station, OCC instructed the TO to perform a line check all the way to Marina Bay Station and to look out for any abnormalities or foreign objects on the track.

6:35 am 137 When T-137 left and cleared Newton Station, the TO noticed that the fault lights for the compressor (local and train), converter and air-con illuminated. These faults were immediately reported to OCC and the TO was advised to proceed ahead with caution.

6:37 am 137 When T -137 arrived at Orchard Station, all the fault lights cleared.

6:38 am 137 The moment T-137 left Orchard Station, the same fault lights illuminated again.

6:39 am 137 Each time T -137 arrives at a Station, the fault lights cleared again.

6:40 am 137 Similarly, when T-137 left Somerset Station, the same fault lights reappeared.

6:41 am 137 When T -137 arrived at Dhoby Ghaut Station, the fault lights cleared again. The TO felt uneasy and contacted OCC via the

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‘EPAX’ system at the HW of Dhoby Ghaut Station. OCC directed the TO to continue with its schedule. According to the TO, although he felt uneasy with the directions provided by OCC, he did not question OCC. The TO then proceeded with its journey.

6:42 am 137 T-137 left Dhoby Ghaut Station. The moment the train left the Station, the TO noticed that the same fault lights illuminated again. Being so after picking up speed, the TO set the train into ‘coast’ mode.

6:44 am 137 As the TO neared City Hall Station, he realised that the train which was already set to ‘coast’ mode would not have ample momentum to dock in the Station with the train’s doors properly aligned with the platform doors. When the TO tried to power-up the train to propel it forward, the train did not respond and continued to gradually glide to a halt. The TO then checked the fault indicator panel and realised that apart from the initial 4 fault lights that were illuminated, the ‘line voltage’ indicator was off. This meant that there was no power supply to the train. The TO then allowed the train to slowly glide as far as possible until it came to a complete halt at the platform of the Station. When the train came to a complete halt, the train was ‘under-run’ and only the driver’s cab door was aligned with the Station’s platform door. The rest of the doors were out of alignment to the platform’s doors. The TO informed OCC about the ‘under-run’ and was instructed to detrain the passengers at the platform. As he opened his cab door to go into the rear cars, he realised that the lights in the passenger cabins were on emergency mode. Soon after, the City Hall’s SM arrived at the platform and assisted to open the platform door that was aligned with the driver’s cab. This was the door that the commuters subsequently detrained from.

6:45 am 132 Meanwhile, T-132 was leaving Orchard Station when OCC instructed the TO to detrain all his commuters at the next Station, which was Somerset Station. The TO was not informed of the reasons for the detrainment. T-132 was the train directly behind T-137 that was stalled at City Hall Station.

6:46 am 132 T-132 arrived at Somerset Station and requested all its passengers to detrain without stating any reasons. The TO saw Station staff assisting to detrain the passengers from the train at the platform.

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6:47 am 136 By this time, T-136 had already ‘changed-ends’ at Marina Bay Station and was servicing the north-bound of the NSL. T-136 had just arrived at City Hall Station (NB) and was experiencing fault lights for the air-conditioning system.

6:48 am 136 T-136 left City Hall Station (NB) and felt that the move-off from the Station was sluggish. Around that time, the TO heard chatter over the train’s communication set between OCC and other south- bound trains, informing the TOs to make delay announcements. As T-136 was north-bound, he did not make any announcements.

6:49 am 113 T-113 arrived at Newton Station (SB). The train was ‘held’ at Newton Station by OCC and the TO was instructed by OCC to make delay announcements to the passengers.

6:51 am 137 T-137 began to detrain its passengers at City Hall Station’s platform (6 mins since stalled).

6:51 am 113 T-113 which was earlier held at Newton Station was ‘released’, and headed towards Orchard Station.

6:52 am 113 T-113 arrived at Orchard Station and was again ‘held’ at the Station by OCC.

7:01 am 113 T-113 was ‘released’ from Orchard Station and continued its journey towards Somerset Station.

7:02 am 113 About 100 meters from the TW of Somerset Station, T-113 slowed down automatically as there was another train (T-132) still at Somerset Station’s platform (ATPS - Automatic Train Protection System kicked-in). The TO could see the tail-lights of T-132. T- 113 was almost coming to a halt.

7:03 am 132 T-132 moved out of Somerset Station after detraining its passengers. The TO was instructed by OCC to perform a line-clear ahead.

7:03 am 113 Just when the TO saw T-132 (ahead of him) moving out of the Station, the train came to complete halt and began rolling L-3

backwards. The TO immediately applied the brakes. The train had rolled back about ½ a meter. Just then, the TO from his Cab Console, received codes to proceed ahead. When the TO powered up to move ahead, the train rolled back again. The TO immediately applied the brakes. From the TO’s console, the TO confirmed that he had received the codes to proceed forward. The TO then reset his Safety Interlocking Relay (SIR) and the console indicated that he was clear to proceed ahead.

Sensing something amiss, the TO turned around to check his rear panels and realised that the ‘line-voltage’ indicator was off. On seeing this, he knew that he had lost traction power. Immediately, he contacted OCC about the two roll-backs and loss of traction power. OCC informed him to ‘wait-out’ for further instructions and to make delay announcements to its passengers.

7:03 am 132 Meanwhile, as T-132 left Somerset Station to perform a line-clear as instructed by OCC, it also lost traction power. However, due to the momentum of the train, the TO was able to coast the train towards Dhoby Ghaut Station.

7:04 am 132 T-132 coasted to a halt at Dhoby Ghaut Station and the TO reported to OCC that he had lost traction power. OCC instructed him to power-off the train at Dhoby Ghaut Station and wait for further instructions.

7:05 am 137 The detrainment process of T -137 was completed (took 14 minutes to detrain). The SM of City Hall Station did a head-count and estimated that there were about 400 passengers.

7:06 am 136 T-136, who had encountered intermittent fault indicators as it travelled along north-bound, arrived at Ang Mo Kio Station (NB). Some colleagues who were at the platform informed the TO that the train was running on ‘off-mode’. The TO came out of the cab and checked. At this point, he realised that the first 3 leading car’s emergency lights were activated, while the trailing 3 cars were normal. The TO also checked the panel and discovered that the ‘line-voltage’ indicator was off. The TO then informed OCC and was instructed to detrain the passengers and shut down the train.

- - By this time, a total of 4 trains had stalled. Of these, 3 trains (T -

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137, T -132 and T -113) south -bound were stalled at City Hall Station, Dhoby Ghaut Station and near to Somerset Station respectively. Another train (T-136) was stalled at Ang Mo Kio Station.

7:11 am - OCC instructed the TO of T-113 and SM of Somerset Station to prepare for ‘train-to-track’ detrainment.

7:12 am - The RIMP was activated. All south -bound trains on the NSL were turned-around at Newton Station. Stations from Marina Bay to Orchard were closed, with the exception of Raffles Place and City Hall to maintain the EW Line. Recovery Teams were activated to the incident site.

7:17 am 113 T-113 began the process of detrainment of its passengers to track. The SM of Somerset arrived to facilitate the process and guided the passengers to the TW of Somerset Station.

7:30 am - The 1 st bus arrived at Newton Station for bus-bridging services.

7:30 am - Recovery Teams arrived at the incident site.

7:33 am 113 The detrainment process was completed. The SM of Somerset Station estimated that there were about 500 passengers.

8:29 am - Alternate EW Line trains were diverted to cross -line to maintain the north-bound services. Trains running north-bound utilised the middle track of Ang Mo Kio Station as T-136 was still stalled on the north-bound platform.

8:34 am 123 T-123 arrived at Toa Payoh Station. OCC instructed the TO to detrain its passengers at the south-bound platform and change ends. After changing ends, the TO was instructed to pick up passengers heading north-bound from the south-bound track.

8:35 am 123 T-123 left Toa Payoh Station, and performed a cross-over to the north-bound between Toa Payoh Station and Braddell Station.

8:36 am 123 T-123 arrived at Braddell Station to maintain north -bound services.

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8:38 am 123 About 100 meters to the TW of Bishan Station, the TO noticed that he was receiving intermittent traction power as the ‘line-voltage’ indicator was flickering. The moment T-123 arrived at Bishan Station, the TO lost all propulsion and the fault indicator lights for air-con, compressor and converter illuminated. The TO informed OCC of the faults and was asked to detrain the passengers at Bishan Station.

8:40 am - Recovery Team spotted 20 meters of sagged third rail before TW of Orchard Station south-bound.

8:50 am - Commenced the restoration of the sagged third rail.

9:00 am 123 T-123 was pushed out of the way further towards Ang Mo Kio Station to allow other revenue trains to bypass and utilise the siding at Bishan Station, via Bishan Depot, for service continuity.

9:18 am - 2-way bus-bridging services from Ang Mo Kio Station to Raffles Place Station, and between Raffles Place Station and Marina Bay Station.

9:25 am - Sagged third rail restored and gauged.

11:06 - 2-way bus-bridging services extended between Marina Bay am Station and City Hall Station.

11:24 - A train was sent to ‘rescue’ T-113 but experienced some am propulsion fault and thus withdrawn.

11:26 136 Hauled to Bishan Depot. am

11:38 137 Hauled to Ulu Pandan Depot via East-West Line. am

12:13 132 Hauled to Marina Bay Station over -run track. pm

12:25 123 Hauled to Bishan Depot. L-6

pm

1:15 pm 113 Hauled to north-bound platform of Ang Mo Kio Station.

1:19 pm - South-bound services resumed.

1:53 pm - Normal train services resumed. (Total time of service outage : 7 hrs and 9 mins) Estimated pax affected : 94,375

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Annex M

Chronology of events for 17 December 2011 incident by SMRT IIT

Time Event Description 0627 Train Officer (T127) reported to Operations Control Centre (OCC) a line voltage indication after departing Orchard Southbound. The indications were intermittent.

0634 Train Officer (T127) reported to OCC that no line voltage indication had illuminated again after departing Raffles Place Southbound.

Train Officer also informed the Train Service Controller (TSC) that he heard a loud noise from undercarriage at Orchard Southbound. When departing Orchard, Somerset, Dhoby Ghaut and City Hall, train was operating normally.

0639 Train Officer (T127) was instructed by OCC to detrain passengers at Marina Bay.

0640 Train Officer for T137 reported to OCC a train converter fault between Orchard and Dhoby Ghaut Southbound.

OCC instructed Train Officer of T132 to conduct line clear (checking the tracks for any abnormality) from Newton to Marina Bay.

0644 Train Officer (T137) reported to OCC train’s indication of no line voltage. Train Service Controller asked Train Officer to detrain passengers at City Hall.

0648 T132 stalled at Dhoby Ghaut Southbound.

0649 T113 stalled before Somerset Southbound Tail Wall.

0658 Detrainment of passengers in T137 at City Hall was completed.

0700 Passengers of T132 were detrained at Dhoby Ghaut.

0708 Passengers of T115 were detrained at Newton Southbound; after which, it reversed for Northbound service.

M-1

Time Event Description 0708 Train Officer (T136) reported to OCC there was no line voltage indication at Ang Mo Kio Northbound.

0710 OCC instructed Train Officer (T136) to detrain passengers at Ang Mo Kio Northbound.

0711 Somerset’s Station Manager was instructed to assist T113 with train to track detrainment of passengers.

0717 Train to track detrainment of passengers in T113 was carried out. This was 28 minutes after train stalled in the tunnel. At about this time, the intake and exhaust tunnel ventilation fans for the section SOM-ORC Southbound were turned on.

0730 1st bus bridging service arrived at Newton

0733 Train to track detrainment was completed for T113.

0735 1st bus bridging service arrived at Raffles Place

0808 Train Officer (T318) conducted a line clear movement from Marina Bay to Newton North Bound

0822 1st bus bridging arrived at Marina Bay

0829 Northbound service resumed from Raffles Place to Jurong East

0838 T123 stalled at Bishan Northbound

0840 20m of third rail was found sagging near Orchard Southbound tail wall

0841 Passengers of T123 detrained at Bishan Northbound.

0844 Passengers of T111 detrained at Braddell, so train could be used for push out of T123.

0850 Commenced the restoration of sagged third rail between Newton to Orchard Southbound

0854 T136 stalled at Ang Mo Kio Northbound M-2

Time Event Description

0900 T111 and T123 were pushed out towards Ang Mo Kio to allow for trains to continue Northbound service via Bishan Depot

0918 Bus bridging from Ang Mo Kio to Raffles Place started.

0925 Sagged third rail between Newton and Orchard Southbound was restored. This was 45 minutes after the sagged rail was reported.

0930 T701 from Bishan Depot pushed out T136 at Ang Mo Kio towards Yio Chu Kang.

1108 T15 detrained at Raffles Place and was routed to push out T137 at City Hall Southbound

1133 T111 coupled with T123 moved towards Yio Chu Kang Northbound.

1138 T15 coupled with T137 were brought back to Ulu Pandan Depot.

1202 T935 was changed from Raffles Place Westbound to Dhoby Ghaut Southbound to rescue T132 and subsequently brought back to Ulu Pandan Depot

1310 T113 coupled with T855 were brought back to Bishan Depot.

1350 North-South Line resumed service. All trains conducted a line clear.

M-3