The Battle for Bavaria Online Information Campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election
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The Battle for Bavaria Online information campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2 The Battle for Bavaria Online information campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election 3 About this paper This report presents the findings of a project investigating malign social media campaigns launched during the 2018 Bavarian state election. The research was conducted in a context where the norms guiding what is legitimate and illegitimate in political campaigning have been thrown into question. A host of new online technologies and tools have changed the nature of democratic electoral contests. ISD’s research interrogates these new grey zones of influence in the Bavarian context, unearthing a suite of tactics deployed by international extremist networks to sway electoral audiences or to harass, threaten or undermine their opponents. A combination of social media analysis, network mapping and investigative reporting demonstrate the international far-right community mobilising in this local election, primarily in favour of the AfD. The election also revealed new transnational far-right communities emerging in Europe and active in the Bavarian election, spreading conspiracy theories and disinformation in tandem with transatlantic allies. The report provides recommendations for steps that German and international policymakers, technology companies, media and civil society can take to build a proportional and effective response to malign influence efforts. The project was supported by the Foundation Open Society Institute, in cooperation with the OSIFE of the Open Society Foundations. © ISD, 2019 London Washington DC Beirut Toronto This material is offered free of charge for personal and non-commercial use, provided the source is acknowledged. For commercial or any other use, prior written permission must be obtained from ISD. In no case may this material be altered, sold or rented. ISD does not generally take positions on policy issues. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisation. Designed by forster.co.uk. Typeset by Danny Arter 2 The Battle for Bavaria Online information campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election 3 Contents 1. Executive Summary 4 2. Glossary 11 3. Introduction 13 4. Key Findings 16 5. Conclusion and Recommendations 35 Endnotes 44 4 The Battle for Bavaria 1. Executive Summary The norms that have guided what is legitimate remain fluid and contested. Questions over intention and illegitimate in the context of democratic and outcome matter deeply in delineating malign uses political campaigning have been thrown into of technology from legitimate ones, yet these are often question by the emergence of a host of new the hardest and most politically charged differences to technologies and tools that make it possible adjudicate. The term malign influence is used here to to target voters and amplify messages with an describe campaigns that use online products, media altogether new scale and sophistication. An entire systems or platforms with the outcome of deceiving ecosystem of technology products has provided audiences, distorting the available flow of information state and non-state actors alike with new levers or conducting illegal activities. We see these malign of influence online and new forms of anonymity campaigns waged frequently in the promotion of hate with which to cover their tracks. Elections, speech, hate crime, extremist recruitment or foreign referendums, terrorist attacks, political scandals influence efforts in elections, though similar tactics are – all have emerged as rallying points for actors at used across an even broader range of potential harms home or abroad to deploy tactics that sow division, online. Deceptive tactics include activities such as the muddy the availability of accurate, transparent creation or promotion of disinformation or the use of information, subvert democratic processes sockpuppet accounts. Distortive tactics include the use and spread exclusionary and extreme political of bots or bot networks to disproportionately amplify agendas. Governments, electoral commissions content in online networks. Illegal activities differ across and technology companies are all grappling with national legal contexts, but can include hate speech, the implications of these new developments, while harassment, defamation, or the provision of foreign in- regulation has not yet caught up with the rapid kind support to domestic political parties in elections. advance of advertising, amplification and audience segmentation technologies. Following the emergence of foreign state influence operations across a series of recent elections, some A set of new practices in communication and political progress is being made in mapping the tactics at play mobilisation is emerging far quicker than the framework in this new context. From India to Brazil, researchers, for understanding or regulating it. Beyond the tactical governments and technology companies have begun changes enabled by particular technology products – to compile evidence detailing the concerted and bots or targeted advertising, for example – the social often sophisticated attempts made by state or state- media ecosystem has revolutionised politicians’ abilities sponsored actors to dupe audiences, often promoting to communicate with their constituents, rendering the intolerance and outrage online through fake or political information space unrecognisable from the anonymous accounts. Yet we remain largely in the pre-internet age. However, the vast and swift potential dark about the scale and impact of these efforts on reach afforded by social media has also meant that our democratic processes and information networks. technology platforms have become a central part of Moreover, while attention has focused largely on the the modern information warfare playbook, used for activities of state actors, notably the Kremlin and the deceit, harm and the distortion of democracy. Some of emergent digital dealings of the Iranian state, it is these activities cross existing legal thresholds, such as increasingly difficult to distinguish foreign and domestic online hate speech or harassment and trolling in many activity in the online world. Though elections are now European countries. Some are newly regulated, such watched with a nervous eye, less attention is being as disinformation identified during election periods in paid to the broad array of ongoing influence activities France. But most sit in a grey zone of acceptability – of non-state groups that are directed at promoting deceptive or distortive, they range from the production extremist agendas, undermining inter-community of disinformation to the micro-targeting of anonymous security and encouraging nationalist, exclusionary and political advertising. closed societies. In this report, we examine what we have described It is against this ever more complex backdrop that the as malign influence campaigns. In an area still sorely Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) conducted research lacking clear legal boundaries or norms, definitions on social media influence activities in the 2018 Bavarian Online information campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election 5 state election. The Bavarian election, held every five CDU [Christian Democratic Union], CSU and SPD [Social years, has rarely drawn a great deal of attention on the Democratic Party] is working together.”5 international stage. Yet in October 2018 this regional election became a hotspot for activities directed by The complexity of these local, national and international online networks connected to the US and pan-European dynamics surrounding the state election provide far-right. The kind of international efforts intended to critical context for understanding the regional election’s scare, sway or seduce voters seen in the US, Mexican, importance to the international far-right community French and German elections were in full swing in this that mobilised essentially in favour of the AfD in crucial corner of Germany in October 2018. October 2018. Foreign interest in the Bavarian election must be What did we find? understood in the context of the relevant political • The research identified online tactics used by tensions at the local, national and international levels. interconnected networks of international and Bavaria has long been a bastion of conservative politics domestic far-right activists to influence the Bavarian in Germany under the continuous leadership of the state election, largely directed towards the promotion Christian Social Union (CSU) for 60 years. But the of the AfD and the denigration of their opponents. CSU’s involvement in a federal governing coalition Co-ordinated campaigns smeared opposition parties that is increasingly under pressure set the stage for a or candidates and mobilised a host of international redrawing of the political map in Bavaria. Criticism of networks to amplify pro-AfD messaging and Merkel’s governing coalition has been accompanied in undermine trust in the election process. Germany by steadily increasing support for the right- wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD)1, • We saw evidence that international actors were which was seeking representation for the first time in co-ordinating these efforts, using English language Bavaria2. Beyond German borders, far-right activists instruction manuals, meme banks and targeted have been proactively mobilising support for parties and