Scrutiny and Legitimation

M12_NORT6663_05_SE_C12.QXD 1/8/10 9:19 PM Page 313 PART IV SCRUTINY AND LEGITIMATION CHAPTER 12 Parliament: Commons and Lords CHAPTER 13 The Monarchy: Above the Fray? M12_NORT6663_05_SE_C12.QXD 1/8/10 9:19 PM Page 314 CHAPTER 12 Parliament Commons and Lords he United States has a bicameral legislature. In legislative matters, each house is the equal of the other.1 Both houses are chosen by popu- Tlar vote, albeit by differently defined constituencies. They are elected separately from the executive, and members of the two houses are precluded by the Constitution from holding any civil office under the authority of the United States. Congress displays the characteristics of what Michael Mezey has aptly termed an “active” legislature: Its policy-making power is strong and it enjoys popular support as a legitimate political institution.2 Each house is master of its own timetable and proceedings. In their behavior, not least in their voting behavior, senators and members of the House of Representatives are influenced by party, more so in recent years than previously.3 Nonetheless, though party is an important influence, it is not an exclusive one. Members of Congress are responsive to other influences. There is a high re-election rate not necessarily because of the party label but because of the benefits that the members are able to channel to their states or districts. Although the initiative in policy making has passed largely to the executive, Congress remains an important part of the process. As Michael Foley and John Owens have noted, there was a seesawing of power between president and Congress in the nineteenth century. “Although the power of the president was augmented exponentially in the twentieth century—notably during and after Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency (1933–45)—the period has witnessed a similar see-sawing in the pre-eminence and power of the two branches.”4 The past century has witnessed various periods when Congress has overshadowed the president or fought for control of the political agenda. The United Kingdom also has a bicameral legislature, but there the similarity ends. Of the two houses, only one—the House of Commons—is popularly elected. Members of the upper house, the House of Lords, are not 314 M12_NORT6663_05_SE_C12.QXD 1/8/10 9:19 PM Page 315 Parliament 315 elected: Until 1999, most members served by virtue of having inherited their seats. The two houses are no longer equal: The House of Commons as the elected chamber enjoys preeminence and can enforce its legislative will over the upper house under the provisions of the 1911 and 1949 Parliament Acts (see Chapter 3). The executive, or rather the political apex of the executive (i.e., ministers), is drawn from Parliament—there is no separate election—and its members remain within Parliament. The executive dominates both the business program (deciding what will be debated and when) and the voting of Parliament, party serving as the means of that domination. Party cohesion is a feature of voting in the House of Commons. (The same is largely true of the House of Lords, though fewer votes take place there.) Party is the determining influence in the election of an MP and it is normally the determining influence in the member’s parliamentary behavior. Parliament exhibits the features of what Mezey has termed a “reactive” legislature: It enjoys popular support as a legitimate political institution but enjoys only modest power, if that, in policy making. Discussion of “the decline of Parliament” has been a characteristic feature of political discourse in Britain for many years.5 MPs have on occasion been known to look with envy across the Atlantic at the power and influence of their U.S. counterparts. The reasons for executive dominance of the legislature in Britain have been sketched already (Chapter 3). For part of the nineteenth century, Parlia- ment exhibited the characteristics of an “active” legislature. The period was historically atypical. The 1832 Reform Act helped lessen the grip of the aris- tocracy and of the ministry on the House of Commons (seats were less easy to buy, given the size of the new electorate), allowing MPs greater freedom in their parliamentary behavior. Debates in the House could influence opin- ion and the outcome of votes was not a foregone conclusion. This period was short-lived. The 1867 Reform Act and later acts created a much larger and more demanding electorate. With the passage of the 1884 Representation of the People Act, most working men were enfranchised. Electors were now too numerous to be bribed, at least by individual candidates. The result was that “organized corruption was gradually replaced by party organization,”6 as one observer puts it, and both main existing parties were developed from small cadre parties to form mass-membership and complex organizations. Party organization made possible contact with the electors. To stimulate voting, candidates had to promise something to electors, and electoral promises could be met only if parties displayed sufficient cohesion in parliamentary organization to ensure their enactment. Institutional and environmental factors combined to ensure that the pressures generated by the changed electoral conditions resulted in a House of Commons with low policy influence. Competition for the all-or-nothing spoils of a general election victory, the single-member constituency with a plurality method of election, and a largely homogeneous population (relative to many other countries) would appear to have encouraged, if not always produced, a basic two-party as opposed to a multiparty system. One party was normally returned with an overall parliamentary majority. Given that the M12_NORT6663_05_SE_C12.QXD 1/8/10 9:19 PM Page 316 316 CHAPTER 12 Parliament government was drawn from and remained within Parliament, the electoral fortunes of MPs depended primarily on the success or failure of that government. Government was dependent on the voting support of its parliamentary majority both for the passage of its promised measures and for its own con- tinuance in office. Failure of government supporters to vote against a motion expressing “no confidence” in the government or, conversely, not to vote for an important measure that the government declared a “matter of confidence” would result in a dissolution. Within the House of Commons, party cohesion quickly became the norm. Internal party pressures also encouraged MPs’ willingness to defer to government. A member was chosen as a party candidate by the local party and was dependent on it for re-nomination as well as for campaign support. Assuming local party loyalty to the party leadership (an assumption that usu- ally but not always could be made), local parties were unlikely to take kindly to any consistent dissent from “their” members. The norms of the constitution and of party structures also encouraged acquiescence. There were no career channels in Parliament alternative to those of government office, and a place in government was dependent on the prime minister, the party leader. Achiev- ing a leadership position in the House meant, in effect, becoming a minister. The nature of government decision making as well as the increasing responsibilities assumed by government also had the effect of moving policy making farther from the floor of the House. The conventions of collective and individual ministerial responsibility helped provide a protective cloak for decision making within the cabinet and within departments. Only the conclu- sions of discussions could be revealed. Furthermore, as government responsibilities expanded and became more dependent on the cooperation of outside groups (see Chapter 7), government measures came increasingly to be the product of negotiation between departments and interest groups, who then presented those measures to Parliament as packages already agreed on. As the demands on government grew, these “packages” increased in extent and com- plexity. The House of Commons was called on primarily to approve measures drawn up elsewhere and for which it lacked adequate time, resources, and knowledge to submit to sustained and informed debate. Parliament thus came to occupy what was recognized as a back seat in policy making. This is not to say that it ceased to be an important political body. As we shall see, institutions are not neutral in their effect. The government remained dependent on Parliament for its support, and both houses continued to provide significant forums of debate and scrutiny. Nelson Polsby has distinguished between transformative legislatures (enjoying an independent capacity, frequently exercised, to mold and transform proposals into law) and arena legislatures (providing a formal arena in which significant political forces could be expressed).7 The British Parliament can most appropriately be described as having moved from being temporarily a transformative legislature in the second third of the nineteenth century to an arena legislature in the twentieth. The U.S. Congress, by contrast, has remained a transformative legislature. M12_NORT6663_05_SE_C12.QXD 1/8/10 9:19 PM Page 317 The House of Commons 317 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS The events of the nineteenth century that served to consolidate power in the executive served also to ensure the dominance of the House of Commons within the triumvirate of monarch, Lords, and Commons. The Commons constitutes the only body of the three that is popularly elected. Indeed, its dominance has become such that there is a tendency for many to treat “House of Commons” and “Parliament” as almost synonymous terms. The attention accorded it by the media and outside observers is far more extensive than that accorded the House of Lords. Members The House of Commons has a much larger membership than its U.S. equiva- lent. It has 646 members, each elected to serve a particular constituency (see Chapter 5).

Load more