Public Policy Research Funding Scheme 公共政策研究資助計劃

Public Policy Research Funding Scheme

公共政策研究資助計劃

Project Number : 項目編號： 2016.A8.055.17A

Project Title : Associations between Emerging Political Ideology, Political 項目名稱： Participation and Social Media Use: Making Sense of the Connections between "Localism", "Populism", and "Post- materialism" in Hong Kong 新興政治意識、政治參與及傳媒之間的關係：釐清本土、民粹及後物質主義的關係

Principal Investigator : Dr FU King Wa 首席研究員：傅景華博士

Institution/Think Tank : The University of Hong Kong 院校／智庫：香港大學

Project Duration (Month): 推行期 (月) ： 12

Funding (HK$) : 總金額 (HK$)： 780,234.00

This research report is uploaded onto the website of the Policy Innovation and Co-ordination Office (PICO) for public reference. The views expressed in this report are those of the Research Team of this project and do not represent the views of PICO and/or the Assessment Panel. PICO and/or the Assessment Panel do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report.

Please observe the “Intellectual Property Rights & Use of Project Data” as stipulated in the Guidance Notes of the Public Policy Research Funding Scheme.

A suitable acknowledgement of the funding from PICO should be included in any publication/publicity arising from the work done on a research project funded in whole or in part by PICO.

The English version shall prevail whenever there is any discrepancy between the English and Chinese versions.

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Final Report

Associations between Emerging Political Ideology, Political Participation and Social Media Use: Making Sense of the Connections between ‘Localism’, ‘Populism’, and ‘Postmaterialism’ in Hong Kong

新興政治意識、政治參與及傳媒之間的關係：釐清本土、民粹及後物質主義的關係

(Project No.: 2016.A8.055.17A)

Principle Investigator: Dr. King-wa Fu

Research Team Dr. Siu-lun Chow Dr. Yu-leung Ng

Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong

Content

1. Executive summary ...... 4

Abstracts...... 4

Policy Implications and Recommendations ...... 5

2. Introduction ...... 7

I. The Paradigm Shift in the Hong Kong Political Spectrum ...... 7

II. Rise of Localism Groups in Hong Kong ...... 7

III. Misinterpretation of a Current Hong Kong Social Movement ...... 9

IV. Multiple Domains of Political Values ...... 11

3. Objectives of Research Project ...... 13

1. Study 1: Media Analysis ...... 15

I. Background ...... 15

II. Methods of Study 1...... 16

III. Results of Study 1 ...... 18

2. Study 2: Hong Kong Identity Scale...... 24

IV. Background ...... 24

V. Methods and Results of Study 2 ...... 28

i. Stage 1: Item Generation ...... 28 ii. Stage 2: Pre-pilot Survey ...... 30 iii. Stage 3: Pilot Survey ...... 32 iv. Stage 4: Main Study Survey ...... 35

3. Study 3: Localism, Ideologies and Media Use ...... 42

I. Background ...... 42

i. Populism...... 42 ii. Nativism ...... 43 iii. Social Justice ...... 44 iv. Rule of Law ...... 46

II. Methods of Study 3 ...... 48

III. Results of Study 3 ...... 53

i. Political Labels, Age Distribution and Political Participation 53 ii. HongKongese Characteristics ...... 56 iii. Bogardus Social Distance Scale (to Mainland Chinese) ...... 57 iv. Nativism ...... 58 v. Hong Kong Identity Recognition ...... 61 vi. Authoritarianism and Open-mindedness ...... 62 vii. Populism and Policy Implementation ...... 64 viii. Social Justice and Rule of Law...... 68 ix. Media Trust and Media Use ...... 69 x. Ideological stratifications ...... 71

4. Conclusion ...... 76

5. Policy Implications and Recommendations ...... 80

6. Limitation of the Project ...... 82

7. Public Dissemination ...... 83

8. References ...... 84

Appendices ...... 90

Appendix I: Demographic Characteristics of Interviewees in Study 1 - Stage 1 ..90

Appendix II: Items in Questionnaire of Survey in Study 2 ...... 91

1. Executive summary

Abstracts

After the large-scale protest known as the “Umbrella Movement” in 2014, Hong Kong’s political environment seems to have undergone a “reshuffle.” Fickle compositions of political groups appeared in while others faded out. “Localist” is the best known and most-often mentioned group in the media and in political circles, and it has been thought to be a new political force in Hong Kong. However, the underlying political ideologies, social values, and policy opinion of this new political label remain unclear and the question has not been empirically examined.

To address the question, two studies were conducted in this project. The first study deployed a grounded-theory approach to validate a list of measurement items reflecting the uniqueness of Hong Kong people in cultural and civic domains. In the final instrument, cultural domains are mainly represented by people’s uses of local language and the practice of avoiding use of popular Chinese smartphone apps or e-payment. Civic domains are found to comprise attitudes toward authoritarian rulings and political participation. The second study made use of a validated scale and a number of instruments to identify variations in political ideologies, attitudes toward China, and social values between political factions in Hong Kong - pan-democrat, pro-establishment, and localist. Localist and pan-democrat supporters display common themes in their ideologies but discrepancies were also found in their attitudes on nativism, discontentment with the Legislative Council,

support of bottom-up policy, media use and media trust. Using the approach of data-driven cluster analysis, newly refined political faction stratification was thus deduced and the groups “open-minded conservative”, “traditional conservative”, “mainstream liberal”, “non-cultural-oriented liberal” and “nativist” are identified.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

A strong sense of Hong Kong identity in the cultural domain is observed consistently across different political factions: pro-establishments, pan-democrats and localists, which is perhaps the most overlapped “common ground” between all groups. If the

government’s policy direction is intended to build consensus but not marginalize opposition, strategic support for building Hong Kong culture, for example subsidizing Hong Kong local movie and music production, cultivating Cantonese culture and literature, emphasizing the uniqueness of Hong Kong history, should receive acceptance by the vast majority of Hong Kong citizens. On the contrary, policies deleterious to Hong Kong culture may provoke a backlash from people of different political camps. Due to the elusive and dynamic political ideologies within political labels and age groups, the policy maker should avoid, consciously or unconsciously, highlighting or labeling certain age groups or people with certain educational background as “populist.” The self-claimed localist in this study embraces a bottom-up approach of policy development and public engagement in policy making. Government’s initiative on community-based policy and public consultation with transparency and taking advantage of social media can ease the tension between the government and the new political group.

報告撮要

在 2014 年的大型示威「雨傘運動」後，香港政治環境可謂經歷「重新洗牌」，一些零散的政治團體興起或迅速沒落。當中「本土派」算是最廣為人知，廣受媒體及政界注視，也被認為是香港一種新興的政治力量。但是我們對這個新政治標籤背後的政治理念、社會價值觀及政治意見，都不甚認識，亦沒有具體的調查研究。

為了解「本土派」，我們在是次計劃中進行了兩項研究。第一項研究是以紮根理論為基礎，驗證哪些關於「文化」和「公民」取向的測量選項，讓本地人士覺得能夠釐清「本土」和「外人」的分別，以作為自身的「身份象徵」。在最後選取一些統計學上有意義又判别能力強的選項中，「文化」取向主要是關於本地人是否用本地語言、有否使用中國智能手機應用程式及網站。「公民」取向主要是由對權威主義及政治參與兩方面組成。第二項研究運用前先已驗証的選項及其他量表，以鑑定香港不同政治派別（如泛民、建制及本土派）的政治理念、對中國的態度及社會價值觀。本土派與泛民在部份理念上有所交疊，但在排外的態度、對立法會的不滿、對由下而上之政策制定等的支持度、媒體使用及媒體信賴程度等，都有明顯的分歧。最後，我們運用以數據為本的集群分析方法，將現時政治派別的分層，歸納為五組，分別是：「開明的保守者」、「傳統的保守者」、「主流自由主義者」、「非文化為本的自由主義者」及「排外主義者」。

政策建議

不同各政治派別皆呈現強烈的香港人文化身份認同和象徵，說得上的各派別的最大的「共通點」。若政府的政策方向是以建立共識而非排除異己為目標的話，策略性支援建立本地文化，例如津貼香港本土電影和音樂，推動廣東話文化和文學，強調香港的獨特歷史等，皆有望獲得廣泛香港人認同，反之任何削弱香港人文化價值的政策，皆會廣泛被批評。政策制定者亦不應有意或無意下標籤某一特定年齡或教育水平的群體為「民粹」。稱為「本土派」的人士傾向支持由下而上的政策制定和，政府應社區政策和公眾諮詢應具透明度及利用社交媒體的便利，減低政府或新興政治組織的張力。

2. Introduction

I. The Paradigm Shift in the Hong Kong Political Spectrum

The political spectrum of Hong Kong has gradually changed, from a traditional and dichotomous classification of pan-democracy and pro-government camps, evolving into more de-stratified and fickle compositions of political groups. A newly emerging example is the rise of localism groups after the Umbrella Movement in 2014 (Chen &

Szeto, 2015). Understanding the detailed grasp of the Hong Kong’s “new” political spectrum and the momentum behind is essential for future policymaking and is the major motivation for this policy research project.

II. Rise of Localism Groups in Hong Kong

The localist groups stepped into the limelight of Hong Kong’s political arena in recent times. Lam (2017) gives a detailed historical and political context of the emergence of these groups. Public attention to the localist type escalated to new heights when the “Mong Kok unrest” broke out at the beginning of 2016 (Sun, 2016). The uprising was denounced as a “riot” by the government but the movement was widely recognized as a kind of “civic movement” or even named as “Fishball Revolution” among some groups of youths (McKirdy & Chan, 2016). Being a campaign slogan in the New Territories East by-election for the Legislative Council in February 2016, “localism” gained better-than-expected results. The vote count for the localist candidate, Edward Leung, who belonged to one localist party, “Hong Kong

Indigenous,” surprised political circles. In the following Legislative Council election in September 2016, the Electoral Affairs Commission even disqualified some candidates who advocated “separatism” and “independence of Hong Kong,” the upshot was a rebound from a part of the public, and three candidates whose political ideology proclaimed “more localistic” and greater “self-determination for Hong Kong” won the election and became Hong Kong law makers (Tan, 2016). The uprising of localist groups might have touched the nerve of both the Beijing and Hong Kong governments and became a backdrop for the future blocking of any “pro-independence” election candidates and even organization in Hong Kong.

The rise of localism in Hong Kong was often framed by the mass media as an overtone of local populism and nationalism in Hong Kong (Lam, 2016; Wong, 2014, 2016; Yeung, 2016) and even linked up to the populistic trend in Europe (Ng, 2016). Such a discursive frame was over-simplified to describe the hybrid nature of various clusters of localism supporters and their counterparts (Lam, 2017). Despite its highly contextual nature, populism is often understood as “a particular style of politics that is intricately related to particular political ideologies” (Greven, 2016, p. 3) but not a coherent set of ideologies or values. The idea is usually referred to as juxtaposing a corrupted political class and elite or expanding social rights for oppressed groups (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006). The ontology of populism may not always lead to extremism or radical movements, but different populistic rhetoric and practices are all targeted on civil re-engagement, which retrieves power from bureaucratic apparatchiks to the common mass of people (Higgins, 2013). Because of such understandings, it may be misleading to treat populism as a homogeneous ideology corresponding to a particular political notion (e.g. localism). But more likely, populism has its own continued potential across different political spectrums (Laclau,

1977) such as fundamentalism or localism and even in democratic or neo-liberalistic contexts (Mazzoleni, 2003). Therefore, stereotyping or labelling localism as populism may misinterpret the underlying characteristics of localism in Hong Kong and, worse, may underestimate its potential impact. The values and attitudes behind the localistic ideology and also its counterparts, as a new political spectrum in Hong Kong, as well as the characteristics of their supporters, sympathizers and voters (e.g. socio-economic backgrounds, attitudes toward political events, social values and expectations), warranted an in-depth investigation in a multidimensional perspective.

III. Misinterpretation of a Current Hong Kong Social Movement

Besides the arbitrary matching of localist social movements with populism, some misinterpretations of the current social movements, especially youth action, may further distort our understanding about the actual political demand of the younger generations and ascribed the political conflicts to simplified factors.

Some scholars seem to conceive the recent waves of political campaigns in Hong Kong as only a continuation of the rather modest democratic movements that originated from the 1990s and even from the 1980s (Cheng, 2014; Ortmann, 2015). We argue that such an assertion may not reflect the reality. Considering the ideological discrepancies, some localist activists strongly advocate “desinicization” and separatism against Sinocentric ideologies (Vien, 2014), which presents a stark contrast with their senior activist countparts. Many localist activists contend that the traditional Hong Kong democracy fighters were preoccupied by “patriotic” sentiment, which is an unsubstantiated “Greater China” imagination of linkage between

democratic China and democratic Hong Kong, just as the organizers of the candlelight vigil for the June 4 Tiananmen massacre positioned themselves as “Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movement.” Young social activists are also dissatisfied with the attitudes, values, and movement strategies of older generation activists and depart from traditional “aging” social movement organizations. For instance, student unions of four universities withdrew from the Hong Kong Federation of Students in 2015, which was criticized as an “old school” form of traditional student union to participate in Hong Kong democratic movements and student movements. These disagreements reflect that the present wave of social movements may, to a certain extent, not be led by a group of activists to inherit the social movement strategies of the last generations. Instead, the younger social activists may try to disaffiliate themselves from the democratic and social movement led by “old fogies”.

Some may also ascribe the rise of localism to the purely materialistic dissatisfaction of the Hong Kong younger generation, and mistakenly jump to the conclusion that localism is solely an alternate form of anti-Plutocrat. However, according to result of an attitude survey, younger people in Hong Kong were generally more satisfied than other age cohorts with life in various domains including economic development, environmental conservation and political development, feeling more positive in accommodating economic restructuring, but they were also more identified with Hong Kong and giving more support for full democracy in Hong Kong (Public Policy Research Centre, 2010). This implies the youth’s support of localism or other new political discourses in recent years cannot be solely explained by materialistic reasons, the political pursuits, and demand and value systems should be focused in the investigation.

IV. Multiple Domains of Political Values

Value, in a broad sense, is “an element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation […]” (Parsons, 1951, p. 7). A value system is understood to guide one’s reaction to social phenomena, including how people react to policies and political phenomena. Resolving problems regarding social values also calls for finding ways to mediate conflicts between people with different values (Tyler, 2000).

However, understanding the localist’s value system is complicated. It is because it may interact or be reflected across different ideological domains of “value” (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Researchers endeavored to provide a more universal framework of value system to reach a consensus on the measurement of “values”. Schwartz (1992) suggested a framework for a “universal value system” which comprised a set of domains such as self-direction, universalism, benevolence, hedonism, etc., and these dimensions are adopted in the field of social psychology (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). Measurements on youth’s civic competence in Western culture may also involve domains such as citizenship, social justice, intention to engage in social movement / conventional political actions, and political self-efficacy, etc. (Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen, & Villalba, 2011; Hoskins, Saisana, & Villalba, 2015). When we seek to understand the value behind the localism supporters or their dissenters, we have to delve into specific and representative domains. In this project, we deployed a set of domains of political value: identity, populistic views, social justice, and the rule of laws. Also, these constructs of domains are mainly derived in Western culture and traditions, which must be localized to the situation of Hong

Kong. When investigating political ideologies, some domains such as “social justice” are rather confined within the Euro-American context (Leung & Stephan, 2001). Especially, when most of the measurements in the suggested domains at the least can be divided into global and local elements (Hoskins et al., 2011; Hoskins et al., 2015), the development of measurement used in Hong Kong is further complicated by the contextual factor where Hong Kong is inevitably situated within the scope of a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China. In the localism context, desinicization or even anti-China sentiment can be elements of each political domain. For instance, a localist may contend that some intrusive values in determining social justice (e.g. fairness in sharing local resources) can be shared with non-Chinese

foreigners but not ethnic Chinese. Therefore, this project makes an attempt to re-categorize the domain measurements into two particularistic strata: the China strata and the local, which means the same measurement of political domain will be “reiterated” in China and in the local context.

Another complication in measuring political values by domains is related to the respondent’s contradictory or ambivalent responses (Suedfeld, 2000). People may have contradictory values across political domains which may lead them to compromise on some political decisions, to support or reject a policy (Tetlock, Armor, & Peterson, 1994). For instance, people may struggle from the implementation of justice in a trade-off between quality and efficiency (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993). This project investigates whether there are contradictory values of people within different domains, and also in domain attitudes toward particular policies and engagement in political behavior.

3. Objectives of Research Project

This research project targets:

I. to conceptualize and operationalize the “Localism” in Hong Kong and its connection with some well-established political concepts;

II. to understand the differences in political ideologies among Hong Kong people in the following domains: i. Localism (versus Cosmopolitanism) ii. populism iii. social justice iv. legality v. altruism;

III. to understand how these ideologies and domains stated in Q1 and Q2 are established and represented in the media, especially the on-line and niche media, and also to examine how these ideologies and domains are associated with use of social media, including types of social media used and habits of accessing the relevant content

IV. capturing how these ideologies and domains are stratified in people’s: i. political attitudes: 1. Perspectives on significant political occasions from 2009; 2. Future political development of Hong Kong ii. political behavior (engagement): 1. Institutional political participation (e.g. voting) 2. Non-institutional political participation (e.g. social movement) 3. Action against political fatigue and dilutedness / political self-efficacy;

and if there are any contradictions (i) between people’s political domains, (ii) between people’s political spectrum, their attitudes and their political engagement

V. to derive latent clusters of political spectrum by ideologies and domains stated in Q1, and how these latent political clusters relate to people’s socio-economic

To achieve the above goal, three studies were conducted within the 12-month project period. The first study was a context analysis on a sample of media stories about “localism” in various newspapers. It focused on an analysis on newspapers instead of social media, as proposed in the original proposal, because Facebook has revised its developer API after the “Cambridge Analytica” incident and blocked potential tracking of users’ history and social network. The second study was about the development of a Hong Kong identity scale. The third study is a cluster analysis based on a survey sample. This report provides full description on the research procedures and results of these three studies.

1. Study 1: Media Analysis

I. Background

This study aims to explore how localism was represented in the Hong Kong mass media, specifically on newspaper media. Newspaper is still a key media channel, in forms of physical paper and online distribution, to present information about social issues to the general public. While it is understandable that the mass media in certain extent reflects public’s view, it is impossible to report a completely impartial and full account of a social issue. More often, media representation of social issues could be selective towards some social issues (agenda setting) or giving emphasize on certain aspects of an issue in presentation styles, use of language, image, or layout, i.e. framing (Entman, 1993). These representations sometimes are even excessively coloured or heavily charged according to the political or partisan preferences of the newspapers or journalists who are writing for the media companies. On the other hand, exposure and attention to news content could have impact on the reader’s political attitudes and behaviors, and the media could shape the public perception towards a social issue (Gentzkow, 2006; DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Gerber, Karlan, & Bergan, 2009).

Salience of news coverage in the media and how the stories are framed often define which social issue is viewed as important by the news media and their political preferences (Menashe, 1998). The salience of news stories could be operationalized by counting the frequency of a particular social issue or policy appearing in a newspaper. Framing of news could be represented by use of languages and lexicons

in the media texts. Use of language in the news media should be understood and situated within its specific socio-economic and communicative contexts. For instance, various forms of descriptions on “localism” and lexicons collocated with “localism” on newspapers can contextually reflect what messages are communicated with their target readership via the medium of newspaper and how “localism” could be perceived as a public discourse.

Because of this, this study is designed to track the momentum of news related to “localism” in the newspapers from 2012 to 2016, aiming to understand how the idea of localism has been evolved, and also to analyze how lexicons of concepts proposed

in the literature reviews are correlated with “localism.”

II. Methods of Study 1

All news articles containing terms related to localism, including localism [本土主義], localist parties [本土派] and localist awareness [本土意識], were sampled from eight newspapers in the Wisenews database between 1st January 2012 and 31st December 2016. The eight newspapers were selected on the basis of their coverage of a wider readerships in Hong Kong as well as their representation of a range of political spectrum in Hong Kong. The eight selected newspapers were: Apple Daily (蘋果日報), Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報財經新聞), Hong Kong Economic Times (香港經濟日報), MingPao Daily (明報), Oriental Daily (東方日報), Sing Tao Daily (星島日報), Ta Kung Pao (大公報), and Wen Wei Pao (文匯報).

Finally, 9,480 articles were obtained from the on-line databases of the sampled newspapers. Articles which were unrelated to politics or public concern, for example

entertainment or sports news, were excluded. 8,903 articles were then analyzed: Apple Daily (1,355), Hong Kong Economic Journal (1,440), Hong Kong Economic Times (305), MingPao Daily (1,603), Oriental Daily (1,155), Sing Tao Daily (787), Ta Kung Pao (1,239), and Wen Wei Pao (1,596). We computed the frequencies of articles related to localism in each of the sampled newspapers and then created diagrams to describe the longitudinal trends of the news reporting of “localism” over the study period. Visualizations of time trend lines were compared to understand when and under what circumstance(s) “localism” was substantially mentioned, and which newspaper(s) had strong reaction to the identified circumstance(s).

The second part of the analysis was text analysis based on a technique called Global Vectors for Word Representation (GloVe) (Pennington, Socher & Manning, 2014), which is widely recognized as one of the advanced tools in text mining community to represent semantic and syntactic relationship between words. GloVe model was chosen as the methodological strategy in this study because the method has been shown to be robust in tracking word similarities and word analogies in reflecting the regularities of use of language in the media text (Pennington, Socher & Manning, 2014), which is tremendously helpful to unfold the process of media framing.

Eight keywords of concepts, which are potentially associated with localism, were tested in this study: “democracy [民主]” , “extreme/extremism [極端] ”, “valiant [勇武]”, “self-determination [自決]”, “nativism [排外]”, “populism [民粹]”, “rule of laws [法治]” and “social justice [公義].” The sampled articles were entered as input parameter into the GloVe model which was then trained to reflect the semantic and syntactic relationship among a bracket of terms extracted from the sampled articles

via the tokenization process. Cosine similarities of these keywords, i.e. in a form of word vector, with “localism” were computed in each of the selected newspapers. The cosine similarities is ranged from -1 to +1, indicating how the newspapers present whether and to what extent the keywords were “comparable” to “localism,” reflecting the syntactic or semantic distance between terms. That is, the rank orders of the cosine similarities of these keywords within a newspaper can provide implication on what concepts were in high priority and of importance when the newspaper mentioning about “localism.”

III. Results of Study 1

Figure 1 shows the overall longitudinal trend of news reporting on “localism” by the sampled newspapers within the study period. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of trend lines by newspapers. We identify four apparent spikes when the term “localism” was heavily reported.

The first of these spikes was seen on June 2013. Nevertheless, there was no single occasion where a focused discussion on localism was initiated in that period. Instead, many irrelevant events and some rather abrupt and elusive discussions of “localism parties” were highlighted by different newspapers on June 2013. Apple Daily and Ming Pao were the two papers which mainly presented their supports to the pan-democrats during the conflicts between the pan-democrats and a newly established political group “Civic Passion” over a debate surrounding the “Candlelight Vigil for June 4 Massacre.” Civic Passion was directly labelled as “localist [本土派]” by Apple Daily and Ming Pao during that period of time (but lately this group was accused of being “fake-localist” [偽本土派] by some other localist

groups). For other newspapers, their mentioned “localist” was referred to another group of people who had participated into the event of “Recover Sheung Shui” in September 2012. But interestingly, these newspapers seldom labelled those activists of “Recover Sheung Shui” as “localist” when reporting the event in 2012. These observations all support an argument that the definitions of “localist” varied widely among the media and the term was seemed to be vague and diverse across a variety of media outlets in that period. While some media outlets, including Apple Daily and Mingpao, have reported that “Civic Passion” was somewhat the leading party of “localists”, other media suddenly borrowed the same terminology on the activists repelling parallel good traders.

It is worth noting that when the “Undergrad”, a student magazine of the Hong Kong University Students’ Union, published a series of articles mentioning “self-determination of Hong Kong” in February 2014 and during the period of “Umbrella Movement” in late 2014, localism or localists was not particularly highlighted or ascribed to the occurrence of these events. The number of related articles began to soar since January 2015 when former Chief Executive C. Y. Leung criticized the magazine “Undergrad” in his Policy Address 2015. Public discussion on localism was then led by Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po at that period of time. However, the peak of discussing localism by different media was indeed found in June 2015, but again most of the discussions were centered on the debate related to how “localists” ruined the traditional “Candlelight Vigil for June 4 Massacre”, which were led by Apple Daily and the Ming Pao. Another major event in that month was that the Civic Party claimed they might adopt more “localistic” ideology and policies in the future. The spikes of mentioning “localism” in February and March 2016 was owing to the so-called “Fishball Riot” and the establishment of “Hong Kong National

Party” who advocates separatism of Hong Kong from Mainland China. In September and October 2016, the localistic candidates won the Legislative Council election but were then disqualified by the Electoral Affairs Commission.

In short, “localist” was a vaguely-defined political group in the public domain at the initial stage. Both pro-liberal and pro-Beijing media acknowledged the presence of different groups of “localists” in this period. Those pro-liberal media were inclined to demonstrate certain degree of hostility toward the “localists” and accused them of conflicting with the traditional and mainstream pan-democrats.

A more consensus definition on “localism” and “localists” seemed to be only reached till the Hong Kong government proactively “re-framed” localists into an opposition force by disqualifying the candidateship of some political figures who participated into and won the Legislative Council Election in 2016. The findings seem evidently to suggest that the widespread public agenda and discussion on localism, to a substantially large degree, was set, stirred, and “constructed” by the Hong Kong government, especially when we also observed the discussions of localism was stimulated by the former Chief Executive C. Y. Leung at the beginning of 2015.

Figure 1: Overall Longitudinal Trend of Reporting “Localism” in Hong Kong

Figure 2: Longitudinal Trend of Reporting “Localism” in Hong Kong within newspapers

Table 1 shows the cosine similarities between the selected set of keywords and

“localism-related” lexicons across different newspapers. Empty cells imply that the corresponding pair of keywords did not co-occur in the articles of that newspaper so that the similarities figures were not shown. Cosine similarities only indicate a newspaper’s “localism-related” lexicons between which represents the pair’s semantic and syntactic regularities. High coefficient does not necessarily mean the pair carries same “meaning” but they are interpreted to be belonged in similar semantic and syntactic categories. By identifying the pattern of similarity (or regularities) among the pairs, we can reveal how “localism” was syntactically or semantically framed in the newspapers.

Most newspapers connected localism to “democracy” or “democrats”, in a way that some newspapers discussed the antagonistic conflicts between localists and the pan-democrats, but on the contrary some mentioned the term localism was incurred and cooperated with democrats, i.e. one key localistic group is called Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線) whose Chinese name contains the terms “localism” and “democracy.” Self-determination is also another common frame adopted by newspapers when descripting issues about “localism.” On the contrary, populism was not frequently found to have syntactic or semantic regularities when linking to localism, and Hong Kong Economic Journal is the one mostly connecting populism to localism.

Sing Tao Daily, Ta Kung Pao, and Wen Wei Pao, which were collectively considered as key pro-Beijing or pro-establishment newspapers in Hong Kong, were inclined to associate localism with nativism, though the connection between the terms was not particularly strong in their articles. These three newspapers were also chiefly keen to frame localism by connecting to extremism, especially in Ta Kung Pao

and Wen Wei Pao. In contrast, Apple Daily and Ming Pao Daily did not ever explicitly relate localism with extremism, but they had higher tendency to mention localism with the word “valiant” [勇武] when comparing with other media. Oriental Daily was more likely to raise the agenda related to localism with respect to the “rule of laws.”

Table 1: Cosine Similarities between Keywords and “Localism” 公義排外民粹極端法治勇武自決民主

Apple Daily -0.112 0.097 0.414 0.455 0.610

Ming Pao Daily 0.041 0.036 -0.043 0.420 0.503 0.748

Hong Kong Economic Journal -0.222 -0.095 0.239 -0.096 0.123 0.528 0.722

Hong Kong Economic Times 0.446

Oriental Daily 0.168 -0.215 0.296 0.611 0.600

Sing Tao Daily -0.017 0.085 0.309 0.166 0.218 0.506 0.746

Ta Kung Pao 0.128 0.536 0.100 0.265 0.457 0.729

Wen Wei Pao -0.177 -0.168 0.600 0.057 0.333 0.289 0.690

To conclude, “localism” was syntactically or semantically shaped by Hong Kong newspaper media in various manners. The two pro-liberal newspapers, Apple Daily and Ming Pao tended primarily to frame localists as “valiant” figures, but addressed them as a distractor of the pan-democrat camp at the initial stage of the development of localism movement. In contrast, Pro-Beijing media, such as Sing Tao Daily, Ta Kung Pao, and Wen Wei Pao were inclined to frame localists as extreme nativists. Other media seemed to be quite ambivalent in their understanding and framing of localism, except that Hong Kong Economic Times reported very few news stories on localism and only discussed localism in relation to their relationship with the Hong Kong democrats.

2. Study 2: Hong Kong Identity Scale

IV. Background

Study 2 aims at constructing and validating a scale of localism perceived by Hong

Kong people, which is related to Hong Kong identity. The study of Hong Kong identity is important to an understanding of the relationship between Hong Kong people under the “One country, two systems” principle imposed by the People's Republic of China and the changing political atmosphere in Hong Kong. Although the notion of “Hong Kong identity” and “localism” have already been established in Hong Kong for several years, on the basis of the term “localism” as a public discourse, its underlying meaning and definition, however, seems to be conceptually indefinite and extremely equivocal, if not inconclusive.

In the case of Hong Kong, the discourses of localism and Hong Kong identity focus on two major domains, namely the “cultural domain” and the “civic domain”. The cultural domain is more contextual to Hong Kong’s situation, which refers to a kind of “peripheral nationalism” particularly against state-level nationalism indoctrinated by the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China and some patriots in Hong Kong. Most of these discourses regarding localism in Hong Kong or Hong Kong identity were based on a cultural differentiation between China immigrants or residents and Hong Kong-born residents. The civic domain is more

attached to the rebuilding of a local democratic community, such as striving for a more democratic social system, empowerment of the weak and rejecting “property developer hegemony” (referring to government’s collusion with property developers in policy making) (Chen & Szeto, 2015). This domain of localism is more like the localism elaborated by western academia, which considers localism as a provocation of nationalism, which is against neo-liberalism in economic development and empowerment of local residents in social development (Moore, 2014).

In a broad definition, cultural value refers to some central conception of a community shared upon what is good and desirable in the culture and cultural ideals

(Schwartz, 2006). The ideology of cultural value distinctions on between residents in Mainland China and Hong Kong was prevalent in about 2011 when a Hong Kong scholar, Wan Chin, published a popular book titled “Theory of the Hong Kong City-State”. In the book, Wan Chin advocated that Hong Kong people should treat Hong Kong as an autonomous “city-state” under China to prevent “Hong Kong value” being eroded by current “Chinese values”. Chin expounded that, as residents in Mainland China had already been ruled under twisted communist ideologies for decades, and given that the Cultural Revolution ruined the merits of traditional Chinese values, the inveterate culture of residents in Mainland China is totally different from the cultural values of Hong Kong citizens, which had been influenced by colonial rule. For this reason, Chin (2011) believes residents in Mainland China and Hong Kong were not ethnically bound to the same ethnic group. Chin also condemned the pan-democrats’ ideology of striving democracy for Mainland China as the populistic but collectivistic cultural value in Mainland China would only reject greater autonomy of provinces and cities under sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China, which would become a threat to Hong Kong’s ongoing progress of

autonomy and democracy. Nevertheless, Chin admitted that Hong Kong was politically under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China, and he personally appreciated traditional Chinese cultural values, which he suggested were partly inherited by Hong Kong people (Chin, 2011).

Other local scholars such as cultural sociologist Sing Yan Tsui explained the difference in cultural values between residents of Mainland China and Hong Kong from a more historical and ancestral perspective. He suggested that the residents of Hong Kong were mostly the descendants of the southern coastal region of China, who had been marginalized under coercion and high-handedness during several

Chinese dynasties. Therefore, the ethnic bond between races of Northern China and people in Southern Coastal China was extremely weak in both the cultural and historical sense (Chan, 2017).

The elaboration of social and cultural distance from Chin’s theoretical framework and Tsui’s historical perspective was somehow still associated Hong Kong residents with classical Chinese culture and the history of dynasties in Chinese geographically dominated areas. Even some extreme localists routinely cited these theoretical and historical perspectives in promoting localism. They often rejected any connection between Hong Kong’s history and classical Chinese culture. They proclaimed that the classical Chinese culture (e.g. the reverence for Confucianism) was deleterious to the development of western democracy in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong should be culturally and politically separated from Mainland China to maintain its autonomous nature and prosperity. These kinds of rather theoretical discussions of cultural identity came to conclusions on some Sinophobia policy agendas and attitudinal orientations held by localists in Hong Kong to differentiate themselves

from Mainland China residents and new immigrants from Mainland China, and to reinforce their identity as “HongKongese”. For example, members of the Legislative Council supporting the immigrant influx from Mainland China were always regarded as “betrayers of Hong Kong” from the localist perspective. The localists protest against visitors from Mainland China in Sheung Shui, a district connecting to Shenzhen where some vendors transferred parallel trade goods brought into Hong Kong to Mainland China across the border. They further established some criteria in cultural practices to partition Hong Kong from China. For instance, they opposed the use of simplified Chinese and any Chinese idioms prevalent in China’s media, and promoted preservation of Cantonese (Chen & Szeto, 2015).

Besides the cultural factor, studies also suggested part of the identity differentiation between residents in Mainland China (or new immigrants from Mainland China) had originated from the disputes over civic values. For instance, youth with higher education in Hong Kong tended to adopt local (Hong Kong) identity instead of the Chinese identity and they might embrace post-material civic values, such as striving for better channels of expression, civic rights and political rights (Steinhardt, Li, & Jiang, 2017). This appeal to higher-order civic values could also be revealed by some specific movements led by local community groups. For instance, in the new preservation movement of historical heritages and renovation of small districts, some local community groups requested to relocate former residents in the same district in order to preserve the local community networks, stronger coalitions between residents and the government in district planning after the renovation, and more democratized committees or institutes for urban renewal (Chen & Szeto, 2015).

In this study, we attempt to develop a scale comprising both cultural and civic elements, analysis of whether the cultural and civic constructs are independent of each other or correlated, and examine whether there are any differences in ideologies and practices of people from Mainland China and residents in Hong Kong. The development of this scale can contribute to the understanding of what are initial elements of “localism” in the context of Hong Kong, and in what domains Hong Kong people differentiate themselves from Mainland China residents or immigrants.

V. Methods and Results of Study 2

Four stages of study were implemented to generate and validate items representing Hong Kong identity.

i. Stage 1: Item Generation

Methods

To reflect the complexity of Hong Kong people’s identity constructs, an initial extensive item pool was generated through a series of individual in-depth and semistructured interviews. The scopes and domains of inquiry in the interviews were concluded from the above-mentioned literature reviews. Besides the cultural domains and the civic domains suggested in the literature reviews, the stage of study also allowed interviewees to suggest some domains they thought represented Hong Kong identity. Seventeen Hong Kong-born residents with a variety of demographic, socio-economic, and political backgrounds were purposively sampled and interviewed and the sampling process stopped when theoretically saturated (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Appendix 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the

interviewees. Equal numbers of males and females, in age groups (18-20, 20-30, 30-45, and 45-60), and high and low socioeconomic status (SESs) of interviewees were deliberately selected in order to capture a wide variety of characteristics of Hong Kong residents, so as to maintain our sampling scheme unbiased toward age, gender, and SESs.

The interviewees were asked to define and characterize the features of being “HongKongese” in terms of cultural and civic domains, and also other domains suggested by the interviewees themselves. They were also requested to describe their perceived attributes which distinguish them from Mainland China immigrants. The interviews were initiated by simple questions such as: ‘What is HongKongese?’, ‘What is the definition of HongKongese?’ and ‘What characteristics does HongKongese have?’ etc. More specific questions in cultural and civic domains were tapped into how the two domains were conceptualized and actualized by the interviewees. All the interviews were conducted in Cantonese and transcribed into notes for further analysis.

Results

From the analysis of the interviews, it is observed that interviewees usually connected the cultural domains to their lifestyle and daily life practices. Besides the example about the use of traditional Chinese characters and Cantonese mentioned in the literature review, they also considered consumption of Cantonese cultural products, such as listening to Canton-pop and watching Cantonese movies, as part of the cultural practices in defining Hong Kong identity. The interviewees also proposed some practices or ideologies which were regarded as “non-localistic”, such as the use of Wechat (an instant messenger app prevalent in Mainland China), speaking

Putonghua, advocating nepotism, taking shortcuts when dealing with problems, etc. Another prominent dimension suggested by the interviewees on cultural domains was about the tough and fast-paced working style and high-pressure living style in Hong Kong. In the civic domains, interviewees framed some political views as characteristics of Hong Kong residents, such as obeying social order but also striving for better democracy, valuing the right to vote in the Legislative Council Election, valuing the legality of Hong Kong, rejecting an authoritarian style of rule, rejecting corruption and accepting diversity in political opinions, etc. A pool of 68 items related to Hong Kong identity was then finally developed from the interview analysis. ii. Stage 2: Pre-pilot Survey

Methods

This pre-pilot stage aimed at optimizing the items developed from the previous stage of study to a manageable number of items which are considered more appropriate for the follow-up study. A convenience sample of undergraduate students from two universities in Hong Kong, including both from Mainland China and Hong Kong-born, was invited through e-mails to participate in an on-line survey comprised of the 68 items drawn from the last stage. The final sample included 112 students (68.8% female; 57.1% age 18-19; 33.0% age 20-24; 8.9% age 25-29; 0.9% age 30-34). Each was also asked to identify himself/herself as a (a) Chinese (n = 28, 25.0%); (b) HongKongese (n = 60, 53.6%); (c) Hong Kong Chinese (n = 4, 3.6%); (d) Chinese Hong Kong (n = 11, 9.8%); (e) Don't know / hard to say (n = 6, 5.4%); and (f) Others (n = 3, 2.7%).

Selection of items in this stage was based on two criteria. First, items of better

differential power, which could reflect the discrepancies between undergraduates who proclaimed their Hong Kong identity and those who considered their identity more Chinese-oriented, were retained. Independent t-tests on the 68 items were conducted on pairs of undergraduates who identified themselves as “HongKongese” and those who identified themselves as having other more Chinese-oriented identities, and items having statistically significant differences (p < .05) were kept for further study in the next stage. Second, principal component analysis was performed to ascertain the underlying factor structure among the undergraduates identifying themselves as “HongKongese”. As the target of this stage was to remove redundant items, items with low factor loadings in constructs reflecting Hong Kong identity

were abandoned.

Results

There were 22 out of 68 items showed statistical significance under the independent t-test. Example items that “HongKongese” scored higher than their counterparts are: ‘I have a fast paced life’, ‘Everyone has basic human rights’, and ‘I don’t like authoritarianism’. For some items, the counterparts scored higher than “HongKongese”. A few examples are: ‘I value traditional Chinese customs and festivals’, ‘I feel apathy toward politics’, and ‘Authoritarianism has its advantages’. These items were reserved to the next stage.

An exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax (orthogonal) rotation was performed on the 68 items. Our theoretical reason for performing an orthogonal rotation was to keep a simple structure of the scale so that sub-factors should have items with high loadings, and others with zero or close to zero. Twenty-two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted, explaining 83.1%

of the variance. To reduce the number of items for further validation, factors with an eigenvalue less than 2 and explained variance less than 3% were removed. Cross-loading items and items with factor loading less than 0.4 were also removed. Finally, 45 items (comprised of the 22 items selected by the T-test) were chosen for the next stage of scale validation and item purification.

iii. Stage 3: Pilot Survey

Methods

The pilot stage aimed at dwindling the 45 self-developed Hong Kong Identity items

to a more manageable number so as to ease its implementation and adoption for the use in common survey. It also sought construct more interpretable and meaningful components or factors for explaining the Hong Kong identity and testify whether these components or factors were based on differentiation of cultural and civic values between Hong Kong residents and Mainland China immigrants/residents. The pilot stage adopted a sample of undergraduates attending common core lessons at a public university in Hong Kong and they came from various major subjects such as arts, criminology, political science, and social work. The undergraduates were requested to participate in an online survey during the class break or at the end of the classes. The final sample included 144 students (51.3% female; 46.2% age 18-19; 43.0% age 20-24; 0.6% age 25-29; 1.3% unwilling to disclose) who completed the whole questionnaire.

The on-line survey was composed by 45 self-developed Hong Kong identity items, 1 self-perceived identity item, 5 social distance items, and 2 demographic items (i.e., gender and age). The self-perceived identity item asked each respondent

to identify himself/herself as a (a) Chinese (n = 11, 7.0%); (b) HongKongese (n = 96, 60.8%); (c) Hong Kong Chinese (n = 6, 3.8%); (d) Chinese Hong Kong (n = 31, 19.6%); (e) Don’t know / hard to say (n = 9, 5.7%); and (f) Others (n = 5, 3.2%). As Sinophobia was one of the core concepts in the localistic explanation of Hong Kong identity, the survey in this stage also included a modified Bogardus Social Distance Scale to test its validity in the situation of Hong Kong, so as to bring forward to the next stage of study, to testify the relationship between our self-developed scale and social distance. Five items in the Bogardus Social Distance Scale were revised to assess HongKongese respondents’ acceptance and willingness to engage with the Mainland Chinese in various social contacts of closeness. Participants were asked to

what extent they would be accepting of the Chinese from Mainland China to be their spouse, close friends, neighbors, coworkers, and to be HongKongese. Similar to the practices in the pre-pilot study, principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted to examine the underlying factor structure of the 45 self-developed items. Independent sample t-tests were used to identify the differential power between respondents as self-claimed HongKongese and their counterparts. A t-test was conducted on the Bogardus Social Distance Scale to compare the acceptance of Mainland China residents between respondents who identified themselves as Hong Kong residents and their counterparts.

Results

An exploratory PCA with varimax rotation was conducted on the 45 items. 13 components with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted. Items with higher factor loading (> .60) which could be concluded in interpretable components were chosen. Statistically insignificant items in the t-tests were also removed. Finally 20 items of eight major components were selected for scale validation in the main study stage.

The relevant components and questions are shown in Table 1.

The components “Life Style of Mainland Chinese people” and “Pro-authoritarian” were negatively loaded to the whole scale. The higher score in these two components indicated less “Hong Kong” characteristics. This round of study also found that, from the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, participants who identified themselves as HongKongese (M = 3.07, SD = 0.81) were less likely to engage in social contacts of closeness with the Mainland Chinese than Hong Kong Chinese / Chinese Hong Kong ((M = 3.77, SD = 0.63), t(118) = 4.66, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .93).

Table 2: 20 Hong Kong Identity Items selected in Pilot Study Domains Items Cultural Q1. I have fighting spirit. Q2. I have fast-paced life. Q3. I walk faster than others. Q4. My speech usually mixed with English or Cantonese homophones. Q5. I always use Cantonese colloquial. Q6. I keep up-to-date with the international trend. Q7. I know how to “take shortcut”. Q8. Sometimes I want to have payoff with an easier mean. Q9. It is inevitable to develop a relationship by utilizing money. Q10. I usually write in simplified Chinese. Q11. I always pay via WeChat Pay and use Alipay. Civic Q12. I think there is “developer hegemony” in Hong Kong. Q13. I do not like authoritarianism. Q14. There are some advantages to being ruled under

authoritarianism. Q15. Executive authorities, the legislature and the judiciary should be in collusion in Hong Kong. Q16. I am concerned about the livelihood issues in my community. Q17. I constantly participate in parades and protests. Q18. I vote in the election. Q19. I obey the rules of civil society. Q20. I think everyone has fundamental human rights

iv. Stage 4: Main Study Survey

Methods

The main study is aimed at re-confirming the construct validity of our scale and components extracted from the pilot study through a confirmatory factor analysis with an independent and sufficient sample. We decided to recruit 300 participants, which represented an ample sample size. The sample was obtained from telephone surveys conducted in April 2018 by the Social Sciences Research Centre at the University of Hong Kong. Respondents who were Cantonese-speaking local residents aged over 18 were invited to participate in a 10-minute phone survey. Telephone numbers were randomly selected through a scheme matching seed numbers of available telephone lines and random digits. The most recent birthday method was adopted to choose a respondent from each telephoned household if there were more than one household member. Interviews were collected from 306 respondents (62.75% female; 4.6% age 18-19; 3.6% age 20-24; 4.9% age 25-29; 2.0% age 30-34; 4.2% age 35-39; 4.9% age 40-44; 9.8% age 45-49; 14.1% age 50-54; 12.1% age 55-59; 12.7% age 60-64; 8.5% age 65-69; 18.3% age > 70; 0.3% unwilling to disclose). According to the RR5 standard of the American Association for Public Opinion

Research (AAPOR, 2016), the response rate was about 14.87%.

The phone survey included 20 self-developed Hong Kong characteristics items generated from the pilot study, 5 social distance items from Bogardus Social Distance Scale, 1 self-perceived identity item, and 2 demographic items (gender and age). The mean scores of components were compared by independent sample t-tests to verify their differential power between respondents claiming themselves “HongKongese” and others with more Chinese-oriented identity. Insignificant items are removed. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the purified self-developed Hong Kong Identity items is performed by the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R (R Core Team, 2017).

Missing data in the CFA model are imputed by the maximum likelihood solution. In the CFA, covariances were also assumed between the seven components suggested in the pilot study. Correlational analysis was conducted on the components in the scales and the social distance scale.

Results

Independent sample t-tests are conducted to determine the differential power of items (Table 2). Only ten items (Q1, Q4, Q5, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q15, Q17, Question number corresponding to Table 1) are found significantly different between those who claimed themselves “HongKongese” and the other more Chinese-related self-claimed label. Therefore these ten items are selected to be modelled in CFA.

The ten items are conceptually modelled into components. Within the civic domains, Q1 is treated as an individual component about “Fighting Spirit”; Q4 and Q5 can composite a component about “Language Use”; Q10 and Q11 is a component about “Use of China Apps and Webs”. In the civic domain, Q13 and Q14 are related to

“Anti-authoritarian” whereas Q15 and Q16 are related to “Pro-authoritarian”. Q17 is an individual component regarding “Political Participation”. The CFA on this six-component solution with 10 items showed acceptable model fits (CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.055, SRMR = 0.039). The loadings between the items and suggested components, and their residual variances are shown in Figure 1.

Table 3: T-tests by Respondents of 20 Items tested in Main Study Respondents Self-claimed Other Self-claimed labels (e.g. Items “HongKongese” Chinese, Hong Kong Chinese, etc.) t-value N Mean SD N Mean SD Q1 126 5.03 1.56 178 5.48 1.55 2.497* Q2 126 5.29 1.74 180 5.29 1.77 0.043 Q3 126 5.37 1.73 179 5.26 1.82 0.559 Q4 126 5.11 1.84 179 4.61 2.03 2.219*** Q5 124 5.31 1.77 177 4.83 2.05 2.186*** Q6 125 4.64 1.62 177 4.58 1.60 0.309 Q7 126 3.71 1.89 180 3.33 1.96 1.697 Q8 126 5.35 1.72 178 5.38 1.67 0.138 Q9 126 2.40 1.62 176 2.64 1.79 1.192 Q10 123 2.60 1.81 178 3.74 2.05 4.971*** Q11 126 1.81 1.42 178 2.42 1.86 3.221** Q12 125 6.11 1.33 176 5.34 1.71 4.434*** Q13 126 6.30 1.20 174 5.81 1.45 3.208** Q14 124 3.28 1.81 174 4.16 1.82 4.099*** Q15 120 4.03 2.20 164 4.73 2.01 2.791** Q16 126 5.48 1.42 178 5.56 1.31 0.456 Q17 125 2.90 1.87 179 2.06 1.38 4.292*** Q18 126 5.69 1.91 178 5.70 1.70 0.056 Q19 126 6.30 1.05 178 6.28 0.90 0.234 Q20 126 6.17 1.21 177 6.11 1.10 0.504 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Figure 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Hong Kong Identity Scales

The model fit and reasonable loadings suggests the overall scale holds a certain level of construct validity. Statistical significant covariances between some components were found. This suggests some potential relationships amongst the

selected civic and cultural factors, which have not been probed at the previous stage, were more manifest in the main study (see Table 3). For instance, a high association between the components “Language Use”, “Anti-authoritarian” and “Political Participation” are observed. “Use of China Webs and Apps” is positively associated with both “Fighting Spirit” and “Pro-authoritarian”. “Anti-authoritarian” has a negative association with “Pro-authoritarian” but is positively related to “Political Participation”.

Table 3: Covariances between Components in Main Study Use of China Fighting Language Anti- Pro- Webs and Spirit Use authoritarian authoritarian Apps Language Use 0.11 Use of China 0.28** -0.31** Webs and Apps Anti- 0.01 0.49*** -0.08 authoritarian Pro- 0.12 -0.02 0.34* -0.29* authoritarian Political 0.07 0.32*** 0.08 0.28** -0.31** Participation *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

The factor scores of the six components are correlated with the average score of the five items in Bogardus Social Distance Scale, and higher score means higher acceptance of immigrants or residents from Mainland China. The social distance scale is positively correlated with “Fighting Spirit” (Correlation = 0.14, p <0.05),

positively correlated with “Use of China Webs and Apps” (Correlation = 0.27, p <0.01), negatively correlated with “Anti-authoritarian” (Correlation = -0.21, p <0.01), positively correlated with “Pro-authoritarian” (Correlation = 0.35, p <0.01), and negatively correlated with “Political Participation” (Correlation = -0.25, p <0.01). Only the component “Language Use” shows no significant correlation with social distance (Correlation = -0.03, p > 0.05).

In short, the construction of Hong Kong Identity Scale informs the specific cultural and civic domains of which more localistic “HongKongese” indicates characteristics differentiating “Hong Kong people” from people of a more

Chinese-oriented identity. In the cultural domains, “HongKongese” upholds Cantonese as their native language, and rejects the use of China payment apps and online shops. Interestingly, people with a Chinese-oriented identity rate higher in the component “Fighting spirit” than those self-claimed “HongKongese”, which indicates the traditional view that “Hong Kong people work tougher than other races” may not be accepted by more localistic “HongKongese”. Strong and significant covariances are found among the components “Anti-authoritarian”, “Pro-authoritarian” and “Political Participation”. This demonstrates well-structured and inter-correlated civic domains of which “HongKongese” identify themselves as different from people positioning themselves as having a more Chinese-oriented identity.

3. Study 3: Localism, Ideologies and Media Use

I. Background

The first study was conducted to develop domains that differentiate people from more “localistic” with those with more “Chinese-oriented” identity. The second study attempts to investigate the ideological and value systems and media use between people with different political labels, especially the “localist”. The following section explains the constructs investigated in the second study but that have not been explained in Study 1. i. Populism

Populism is an elusive concept in political science and perhaps is more like a kind of political strategy and communication style in the political arena rather than a holistic ideology (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Its meanings are not identical between cultures and regions (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Several studies have been done by content analysis to operationalize the construct and consolidate the measurement of populism level of political parties (Hawkins, 2009; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 2014). From these studies and other conceptual frameworks, some predominant measurement components involved gaining power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages (Barr, 2009). Some scholars proposed another component of regarding a corrupted elite as a homogenous entity, where common people and the corrupted elites are antagonistic (Muddle, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2014).

Akkerman et al. (2014) and Hawkins, Riding & Mudde (2012) proposed more pragmatic scales accounting populist attitudes on respondents’ political attitudes and party preference in election. This study refines the measurement of populism based on these scales.

ii. Nativism

The concept of Sinophobia, as a kind of nativism, has already been explored in Study 1 by the scale of social distance. Study 2 aims to investigate whether “localists” embrace a consistent pattern of nativism, which holds antipathy to both Mainland

residents/immigrants and other foreigners (such as occidental immigrants). Just as with the factor of Sinophobia mentioned in Study 1, the simplest explanation of nativism can be a kind of local nationalism or patriotism against state-level nationalism or foreigners (McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Watts & Feldman, 2001). Nativism may also be aroused by local people’s anxiety about economic competition and cultural competition with immigrants and foreigners. Watts (1997) gives an account of nativism by focusing on the keen economic competition and also limited resource allocation induced by the substantial influx of immigrants and foreigners in the era of post-German reunification. His measurement of an individual’s level of nativism mainly inquires whether people felt immigrants and foreigners created burdens to the social benefit system and occupied resources (including job opportunity). Another perspective on nativism from Watts (1997) examined the cultural competition between the local and foreign cultures. The measurement on this aspect probes into whether people accept a more diversified and mixed culture, or prefer preservation of local culture. A more direct way of probing one’s nativist attitude was to ask whether he or she accepts immigrant restrictionism (Simcox,

1997). Although immigrant restrictionism is just one of the proclamations from the localists in Hong Kong, it may encounter a situation that people may refuse to disclose their attitude due to the influence of social desirability (Knoll, 2013). Therefore, the measurement of nativism in this study follows Watts’ (1997) (Watts & Feldman, 2001) approach of indirect inquiry into rejection of economic and cultural competition with immigrants and foreigners. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that nativism does not always necessarily lead to more populistic opinions, but on the contrary, nativism somehow serves as a protective mechanism to maintain an internal democracy within a place (Watts & Feldman, 2001). iii. Social Justice

Social justice is an umbrella term which consists of at least two types of justice-related judgment: distributive justice and procedural justice (Tyler, 2000). Young social activists proclaimed they were fighting for a more just society. For instance, a letter requested for open conversation, sent from the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) to the Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam-cheng in October 2004, mentioned that the protestors were striving for a future of (distributive) justice (in Chinese, “公平公義”)1. Whereas, the Secretary of Justice, Rimsky Yuen, reminded the public that the arrest procedure in the Umbrella Movement was fulfilling “procedural justice” (in Chinese, “程序公義”)2. Although people quoted the wordings in their conversation to support their decisions for the

1 see “學聯去信林鄭促在公開場地對話”, October 2, 2015

2 see “袁國強稱依法檢控政治迫害論是抽水”, January 15, 2015

benefit of the society and to rally public support, no one has investigated how Hong Kong people perceived and understood “justice” in relation to their expectations for governance. Distributive justice is regarded as fairness in distribution of socially valued goods and resources, and also the perceived fairness of the outcomes that one receives (Tyler, 2000, Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). There are at least two kinds of rule guiding people’s principles regarding distributive justice. People adopting an equity rule prefer a society with a principle of rewarding in proportion to an individual’s effort or contribution, while people adopting an equality rule tend to bolster the belief that all members of a society should receive a similar proportion of reward regardless of their contribution (Goncalo & Kim, 2010). Procedural justice is

defined as the perceived fairness of the process by which the outcome is determined (Lind & Tyler, 1988). How people interpret these concepts of justice and what rules people adopt to guide the distribution of goods and resources are always related to their orientation regarding policy, e.g. their support for minimum wages and wealth re-distribution through taxation (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Folger & Konovsky, 1989), and their trust of authorities (Tyler, 2000). Therefore, investigating people’s perceptions of distributive justice and procedural justice is particularly important for government’s future governance and policy implementation.

Well-established measurement of attitudes toward social justice sometimes serves as a component in composite indices of civic engagement in western countries, with sufficient support by comparative political theories and theories about citizenship education (Hoskins, Saisana, & Villalba, 2015; Van Deth, Montero, & Westholm, 2007). For instance, questions on enquiring about youth’s attitudes toward social justice were embedded into surveys of the International Civic and

Citizenship Education Study launched by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) (Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen, & Villalba, 2011; Hoskins et al., 2015; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). These questions were mainly centered on the concepts of equal opportunities, equal rights, democratic processes, respect for diversity and cosmopolitan value of human rights.

The above-mentioned dimensions of social justice mainly concerned a general value placed on social justice. Another common dimension of social justice is about the procedural justice when government is implementing policies (Tyler, 2000). This

dimension is divisive in media and news accounts even more relevant to the political events stated in the background, and hence will be included in our survey. Indicators measuring procedural justice can be referred to Levi, Sacks, and Tyler’s (2009) study of measuring legitimating beliefs. Their study consists of questions on people’s perception of government’s fairness, which asked whether people thought their government treats citizens and ethnic groups fairly. Moorman (1991), Naumann and Bennett (2000) and Colquitt (2001) also provided principles and examples of questions enquiring about people’s perception of procedural justice by the government.

iv. Rule of Law

According to Wisernews, there were more than 7,000 articles in Hong Kong newspapers mentioning “rule of law” (“法治”) between 1st September, 2014, and 1st December, 2015, which showed contentiousness over the concept of legality between different camps of people. While the Hong Kong government and also the China

government addressed that their dispersion of demonstrators in the Umbrella Movement followed the law (see “中央再撐 CY 港澳辦：充分肯定港府清場”, December 12, 2014), and the Chief Executive proclaimed that striving for democracy should be under the law and reiterated that “Hong Kong is a society that upholds the rule of law” in his Policy Address 2015 (Office of the Chief Executive, 2015). The former chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Paul Shieh, mentioned that “indiscriminate use of the phrase Rule of Law could confer undeserved moral respectability upon a Rule by Law or Rule by Man regime” in an opening speech (Shieh, 2015). These two examples showed discrepancies on the use of “legality” and the “rule of law”, especially on whether the “rule of law” is equal to what “nomocracy”

traditionally referred to. It also magnified the conflict over people’s perception of whether a “rule of law” system will make a better future for Hong Kong. American policymakers and commentators expected that nomocracy would support a positive economy, democracy, and political change with minimal confrontation among people (Carothers, 1998; O’Donnell, 2004), while people living in Hong Kong may take other perspectives. In this study, we also want to grasp how people think about legality and rule of law, and also how these constructs are related to their expectations regarding Hong Kong’s political development and economical changes.

The basic and relatively universal idea of the rule of law was reported by the United Nations:

‘The “rule of law” refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated,

and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’

(Report of the Secretary-General, the United Nations, 23 August 2004)

Measurements similar to that description of “rule of law” were embedded in research studies launched by international institutes, such as the Global Integrity Index designed by Global Integrity (a foundation in Washington, D.C.), the International Country Risk Guide designed by the Political Risk Services Groups, the famous Worldwide Governance Indicators adopted by the World Bank Institute and the recent Rule of Law Index in the World Justice Project. Skaaning (2010), Botero and Ponce (2011) and Voigt (2012) provide extensive reviews on the creation of “rule of law” indices. This study makes reference to the available indices, and two domains are measured: (1.) whether people think the government reflects “rule of law” and (2.) whether people support the concept of “rule of law”.

II. Methods of Study 3

A telephone survey was conducted by the Social Science Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong, between June and July, 2018. The questionnaire for this survey comprised nine sections, which are designed under considerations of the

above-mentioned literature reviews to address the project objectives:

A. HongKongese Characteristics: Items were extracted from Study 1 which indicates some cultural and civic characteristics manifesting the identity of Hong Kong people.

B. Bogardus Social Distance Scale: Items in this section measured social distance, which implies the level of rejecting Chinese immigrants or Mainland China residents.

C. Nativism: Items were designed mainly under Watts & Feldman’s (2001) framework. Besides enquiring about the “Sinophobia” set of nativism, two questions on whether people feel occidental immigrants may create burdens on social benefits and human resources are also included, so as to compare respondents’ level of nativism against Chinese immigrants and occidental immigrants.

D. Hong Kong Identity Recognition: Four items were extracted and modified from the American Identity Measure (Schwartz et al., 2012). This identity measure comprises two constructs: “identity exploration” and “identity affirmation”. The identity exploration construct represents a feeling of what being HongKongese means to a person by exploring local history, traditions, and cultures. The identity affirmation construct manifests the sense of belonging upheld by Hong Kong people.

E. Authoritarianism and Open-mindedness: Items on political ideologies and open-mindedness were extracted from the Right-Wing Authoritarianism

scale (Rattazzi, Bobbio & Canova, 2007) which is commonly adopted in the field of political science. The “political ideologies” construct gauges respondents’ potential place on a political spectrum (e.g. left-wing or right-wing), whereas the “open-mindedness” construct measures respondents openness to social phenomena (e.g. homosexuality and self-determination of life events).

F. Populism and Policy Implementation: Most of the items were generated from Mudde’s framework and measurements (Mudde, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013; Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012), which are

mostly related to the submission of people’s will and people’s antagonistic sentiments on corrupted elite. To make the questions more specific to the Hong Kong context, this section asks about populist attitudes toward government officers and members of the Legislative Council, which are both regarded as elite politicians in Hong Kong. A few questions about bottom-up policy in this section were purposely included. It is because one key feature of populism mentioned by Hong Kong politicians is about the public engagement of policy design and implementation, which is Hong Kong specific and is not well covered by foreign literatures.

G. Social Justice and Rule of Laws: Items in this section were largely about the government’s style of law enforcement, and whether efficiency of policy should overwhelm social justice and legality.

H. Media Trust and Media Use: Items were designed to investigate respondents’ trust and use of traditional media and social media.

I. Demography: This section asked respondents’ demographic information, their self-claimed political label, their self-claimed political participation, and other information.

The questionnaire was finally restricted to 59 items in order to keep reasonable interview time and maintain an acceptable response rate. All the items are listed in Appendix II. For Section A to Section H, respondents were requested to answer their agreement on the items of statements, where 1 indicates “extremely disagree”, 2 indicates “disagree”, 3 indicates “more or less disagree”, 4 indicates “neutral”, 5 indicates “more or less agree”, 6 indicates “agree” and 7 indicates “extremely agree”.

The telephone survey adopted a random digital landline scheme developed by the Social Science Research Centre, the University of Hong Kong. A respondent was chosen according to the “last birthday rule” when the household had more than one person. The problem of using telephone landline is that there was higher probability to reach senior people who often spend longer time at home. However, the cost of reaching a complete quota sampling to meet the age proportion of Hong Kong is enormous. Therefore, a quasi-quota sample was imposed in the sampling procedure. That is, when an age group (e.g. >60 year-old) reached a certain proportion of the sample, only respondents who were not in that age group were eligible to participate into the survey. The final sample consisted of 2009 completed cases. According to the RR5 standard of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR, 2016), the response rate was about 12.62%. The final sample is weighted in calculation of results when appropriate.

Means of items in relation to ideologies mentioned in the background and media

uses were calculated. ANOVAs and post-hoc tests were conducted on these items to found variations between respondents of different political labels, particularly, pan-democrats, pro-establishments, and localists. Cluster analyses were performed to answer some of the objectives proposed, especially for those relate to ideological stratification. The cluster analysis adopts a method of latent class clustering based on Gaussian Mixture Modeling (Fraley & Raftery, 2002) which can be performed by R package “mclust” (Scrucca, 2017).

III. Results of Study 3

i. Political Labels, Age Distribution and Political Participation

Difference in age distribution between survey sample and the Hong Kong population (2016 By-Census) is shown in Table 4. The survey sample, as expected, was slightly skewed to the elder groups. To adjust for the sample discrepancy, weights according to the age proportion extracted from 2016 by-census was imposed on our survey sample (N = 1994 for respondents asked the questions on self-claimed political label) when calculating proportions and means in the following result sections.

Table 5: Age proportion of survey sample and population in By-Census 2016 Final Sample Estimated % from 2016 By-Census Age groups N % N %

Below 20 (18-20) 96 4.81 241956 3.84

21 to 29 235 11.79 869006 13.79

30 to 39 249 12.49 1148525 18.23

40 to 49 341 17.10 1136842 18.04

50 to 59 457 22.92 1266114 20.09

60 to 69 315 15.80 890982 14.14

70 or above 301 15.10 747450 11.86

Total 1994 100.00 6300875 100.00

Table 5 shows the weighted proportion of self-claimed political labels (v50). About 64.6% claimed they were neither pan-democrat, nor pro-establishment nor Localist, or they proclaimed themselves having some special/complicated political labels (e.g. mild-democrats supporting localism). If only people who provided concrete responses are counted, pan-democrats dominated the sample (47.7%), whereas a similar proportion were found between pro-establishment and localist (28.2% versus 24%). The proportion of localists is about one-fourth of the respondents who provided explicit political labels.

Table 6: Weighted proportion of self-claimed political labels With “Unclassified” Without “Unclassified” Self-claimed political Label N % N %

Pan-democrat 337 16.9 337 47.7 Pro-establishment 199 10.0 199 28.2 Localist 170 8.5 170 24.0 Unclassified 1288 64.6 - -

Table 6 shows the weighted age distribution per self-claimed political labels. Compared with pan-democrat and pro-establishment groups, localists seem to be mostly composed of the younger generation, but still a certain number of them came from the senior groups. As expected, pan-democrats are more likely to be middle-age citizens, and pro-establishments are apt to be the older-age groups.

Table 7: Weighted age distribution by political labels (in %) Self-claimed Political Label Age Pro- Pan-democrat Localist Unclassified establishment 20 or Below (18-20) 2.97 1.00 7.06 4.11 21-29 18.10 4.00 28.24 12.26 31-39 13.06 14.50 26.47 19.01 41-49 15.73 16.00 12.35 19.71 51-59 27.60 19.50 10.00 19.63 61-69 14.54 22.00 10.59 13.27 70 or Above 8.01 23.00 5.29 12.02 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Table 7 presents the percentage of political participation in the last two years within each political label. Four options were given in the questions: “only participating in procession”, “only voting in elections”, “taking both actions” and “nil”. Localists had the highest percentage in “only participating in procession” whereas none of the pro-establishment respondents choose this option. On the contrary, a smaller proportion within the localists are found in “only voting in election” when compared with the pan-democrats and pan-establishments. Pan-democrats have the highest proportion of “taking both actions” while pro-establishments have the highest proportion of not participating of any of the two political action groups.

Table 8: Weighted political participation by political labels (in %) Self-claimed Political Label Political Pro- Participation Pan-democrat Localist establishment Only participating in procession 1.78 0.00 6.51 Only voting in elections 57.57 64.32 47.93 Taking both actions 27.60 5.53 22.49 Nil 13.06 30.15 23.08 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00

In the following sections, ANOVAs and post-hoc tests were conducted to tease out the differences in items between respondents of the three self-claimed political labels: pan-democrat, pan-establishment, and localist.

ii. HongKongese Characteristics

This section is comprised of the following items:

v1. I have a fast-paced life style. v2. I walk faster than others. v3. I have a fighting spirit. v4. I obey the rules of civil society. v5. I think everyone has fundamental human rights. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 8 shows the mean values of each item and the overall score of this section. Results suggest that pan-democrats and localists rated primarily similar scores in the

items of this section (except [v1]) and they exhibit like patterns of “HongKongese Characteristics”. Pan-establishments rated differently to both pan-democrats and localists in the civil domain. For instance, they generally self-evaluated higher in “obeying rules” [v4] and lower in “human rights” [v5], which would contribute to

significant differences in the ANOVAs in items [v2], [v4], [v5] and the overall scores.

Table 9: Weighted means on items in section “Hong Kong Characteristics” Means (Hong Kong Style) Self-claimed Label v1* v2* v3 v4* v5* Overall* Pan-democrat 4.76 5.02 4.79 6.20 6.55 5.46 Pro-establishment 4.46 4.48 4.63 6.34 5.94 5.17 Localist 5.32 5.19 4.72 6.06 6.53 5.56 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

iii. Bogardus Social Distance Scale (to Mainland Chinese)

This section is comprised of the following items:

v6. Would you be willing to accept a Mainland Chinese to marry your kid(s) if you have one? v7. Would you be willing to accept a Mainland Chinese as a close friend? v8. Would you be O.K. with having a Mainland Chinese as a neighbor? v9. Would you be O.K. with having a Mainland Chinese as a coworker? v10. Would you be O.K. with having a Mainland Chinese as a Hong Kong citizen? (7-point, 1 = completely unacceptable, 7 = completely acceptable)

Table 9 shows the mean values of each item and the overall score of this section. Statistically significant differences were found in all items and the overall score in

terms of ANOVAs and post-hoc tests between pan-democrat, pro-establishment, and localist. As a higher score indicates a higher acceptance level, localist demonstrates the lowest acceptance to Mainland Chinese, especially in item “having a Mainland Chinese as a Hong Kong citizen?” [v10], whereas pan-democrats’ attitude is relatively mild, and pro-establishments show the strongest acceptance to Mainland Chinese.

Table 10: Weighted means on items in section “Bogardus Social Distance Scale (to immigrant from Mainland China)” Means (Bogardus Social Distance Scale) Self-claimed Label v6* v7* v8* v9* v10* Overall* Pan-democrat 4.78 5.67 5.01 5.38 4.23 5.01 Pro-establishment 5.76 6.16 5.83 6.05 5.56 5.87 Localist 4.39 5.40 4.85 5.23 3.64 4.70 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

iv. Nativism

This section comprises the following items particularly probing into the nativism toward Mainland China immigrants: v11. Immigrants from Mainland China bring talents to Hong Kong and reinforce the labor force. v12. Investments from Mainland China in general bring benefits outweighing their detriment to Hong Kong. v13. Immigrants from Mainland China burden the society of Hong Kong (e.g. job opportunity, housing, and health care resources)? v14. Immigrants from Mainland China worsen the quality of service provided by local government to Hong Kong people as citizens? v15. Immigrants from Mainland China make Hong Kong’s culture more diversified?? v16. Hong Kong people should protect their own language to avoid replacing it with

Putonghua. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 10 shows the mean values from [v11] to [v16] and the overall score. Localists rated in a similar pattern with pan-democrats in item [v12], [v13], [v14] and [v16], yielding very close in both overall score. That means both localists and pan-democrats think that the influx of immigrants from China burdened Hong Kong’s resources to almost the same extent, and Hong Kong people should protect Hong Kong’s culture and language. An apparent discrepancy between localist and pan-democrat is on whether Mainland China immigrants complemented Hong Kong’s labor force ([v11]). Localists gave a much lower score than pan-democrats on

this item. On the contrary, pro-establishments rated quite low in all the items that it results in a very low overall score, i.e. less xenophobia sentiment.

Table 11: Weighted means on items in section “Nativism (to Mainland China immigrants)” Means (Nativism [Mainland China Immigrants]) Self-claimed Label v11* v12* v13* v14* v15* v16* OA* Pan-democrat 3.09 2.81 4.07 3.70 2.61 4.54 3.62 Pro-establishment 3.83 3.83 3.61 2.94 3.44 3.34 2.81 Localist 2.72 2.72 4.10 3.86 2.45 4.51 3.73 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA (Overall score is calculated by reversing the score of v11, v12 and v15, so that higher score indicates greater xenophobia sentiment.)

Two more items in this section were analyzed to examine the level of nativism

towards occidental immigrants:

v17. Occidental immigrants bring talents to Hong Kong and reinforce the labor forces.

v18. Occidental immigrants burden the society of Hong Kong (e.g. job opportunity, housing, and health care resources). (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 11 shows the mean values of these two items and a comparison between the counterpart items about nativism toward Mainland China immigrants. All the three political labels rated lower than the correspondent counterparts in the last section ([v11] and [v13]). This implies, generally speaking, respondents in all political factions have higher acceptance to non-Chinese occidental immigrants than have the Mainland Chinese immigrants. According to the result of post-hoc tests, the score of

localists in this section are inclined to the pro-establishments rather than to the pan-democrats. Localists have relatively consistent stances of nativism (non-Chinese occidental immigrants and Mainland Chinese immigrants) when compared with the pan-democrats, and they may have greater rejection of both Mainland China immigrants and occidental immigrants. On the contrary, pan-democrats had the lowest overall score in nativist feelings toward occidental immigrants, but they rated quite high in nativism toward Mainland China immigrants.

Table 12: Weighted means on items in section “Nativism (to occidental immigrants)” Means (Nativism [Occidental Immigrants]) Self-claimed Label v17* v18* Overall* v11+v13* Pan-democrat 3.72 2.84 2.56 3.49 Pro-establishment 3.46 3.10 2.80 2.91 Localist 3.51 2.93 2.70 3.58 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA (Overall score is calculated by reversing the score of v17, so that higher score indicates greater xenophobia sentiment.)

v. Hong Kong Identity Recognition

This section is comprised of the following items:

v19. I have spent time trying to find out more about Hong Kong, such as its history, traditions, and customs. v20. I have a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong. v21. I participate in Hong Kong cultural activities, for example listening Cantonpop, reading local literatures, and watching Hong Kong movies. v22. I feel good about being HongKongese. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 12 shows the mean values of each item and the overall score of this section. Significant differences were found in some items but the overall score between the three groups of respondents was not statistically significant in ANOVA (p>0.05). This is because the measurements in this section relate to different aspects of Hong Kong culture and recognition to Hong Kong, and the three groups had very diverse performance in each of the items. In [v19], when talking about the time-spending on digging into Hong Kong history and customs, localists rated the highest, pan-democrats follow with a slightly lower score than localists, and the pro-establishment respondents rated the lowest. In [v20] regarding the sense of belonging, localists still rated the highest, but the pan-democrats rated similar to the pro-establishment group. In contrast, pro-establishments scored much higher than the other two groups in both [Q21] (participation in cultural activities) and [v22] (feeling good to be HongKongese).

The variations in the scores between the three groups in each item can be understood as suggesting that people of different political labels may have different

interpretations on “Hong Kong recognition” and the age group effect. For some of the localists, the recognition of Hong Kong may be focused more on the recognition of Hong Kong history, tradition, and customs. However, pro-establishments were generally older than the localist, may participate frequently in Cantonese cultural activities throughout their lives such as listening to Canton pop, reading local literatures and watching local movies, when some Cantonese cultural icons made a

substantial impact in Asia culture during the 1970s to 1990s.

Table 13: Weighted means on items in section “Hong Kong Identity Recognition” Means (HK Identity and Culture) Self-claimed Label v19* v20* v21* v22* Overall Pan-democrat 5.48 5.58 6.09 5.49 5.66 Pro-establishment 5.25 5.57 6.20 5.94 5.74 Localist 5.58 5.65 5.89 5.47 5.70 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

vi. Authoritarianism and Open-mindedness

Three items in this section gauge respondents’ level of supporting authoritarianism:

v23. Most critics of the government only create frivolous doubts within people. v24. Hong Kong is at a stark moment. It is appropriate to adopt the firmest measures to eliminate troublemakers in order to put the society on the right track. v25. What Hong Kong actually needs is not more “liberty” but stronger legislative measures and orders. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 13 shows the mean values from [v23] to [v25] and the overall score. Post-hoc tests found significant differences between the three groups in each item and the overall score. Three layers of rating can be observed. The pro-establishment respondents had a high inclination to support an authoritarian style of ruling, regarding which consider that government’s order and wills can override legislative measures and the liberty of people. Pan-democrats, on the other extreme, scored low in these questions. Localists rated somewhere in between pro-establishment and pan-democrat, indicating that some of the localists may have a higher tendency to support a more authoritarian style of ruling or leadership.

Table 14: Weighted means on items about supportiveness of authoritarianism Means (Supportiveness of Authoritarianism) Self-claimed Label v23* v24* v25* Overall* Pan-democrat 2.87 2.35 2.28 2.51 Pro-establishment 5.20 5.42 5.37 5.33 Localist 3.03 2.89 3.24 2.88 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

Another three items in this section measure respondents’ openness in social liberty:

v26. Each people should have their own living style and religious belief. v27. Homosexual people, like heterosexual people, should be treated with the same respect. v28. It is good that nowadays young people decide ‘‘to create their own destiny’’ and to protest against things they don’t like. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 14 shows the mean values from [v26] to [v28] and the overall score.

Concerning the openness, based on the results of ANOVAs and post-hoc tests, pan-democrats and localists rated very similar in these items, except that localists scored slightly lower in [v27] (about supportiveness of homosexuality), whereas pro-establishments graded much lower than the other two groups in all the items, especially in [v27] and [v28] (about supportiveness of self-determination of young people).

In sum, pro-establishment respondents were apt to support a powerful leader’s rulings, and some of them tended to specifically oppose homosexuality and youngsters’ opportunity for independent decision making, but to a certain extent accepted a universal concept of liberty, i.e. living style and religion.

Table 15: Weighted means on items about openness in social liberty Means (Open-mindedness) Self-claimed Label v26* v27* v28* Overall* Pan-democrat 6.61 5.39 5.71 5.90 Pro-establishment 6.44 4.29 3.62 4.78 Localist 6.52 5.22 5.75 5.81 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

vii. Populism and Policy Implementation

This section consisted of three parts. In the first part, respondents were asked about their discontent with government officers. The second part’s questions concerned respondents’ discontent with members of the Legislative Council. The questions in the third part enquired into the participants’ supportive for public participation in bottom-up policy making. The first and second parts comprise the following items:

(About government): v29. Hong Kong government officers should follow the will of people. v30. Hong Kong government officers just talk too much but act too little. v31. Hong Kong government officers often use power to satisfy their own interests, which would be detrimental to the welfare of the people. v32. Policies suggested by government officers are always disconnected with the reality. (The government officials always put their head into the clouds.)

(About Legislative Council) v33. The elected LC members should follow the will of people. v34. The elected LC members talk too much but act too little. v35. The elected LC members often use power to satisfy their own interests, which would be detrimental to the welfare of the people. v36. Policies suggested by the elected LC members are always disconnected with reality. (LC members always put their head into the clouds.) (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 15 shows the mean values for these items. In terms of the political ideology and discontent toward government officers, pan-democrats and localists demonstrated a similar pattern of views. Both of them gave similarly high grades to all related items, suggesting that both groups seemed to agree that government officers should follow the will of people, but they also were dissatisfied with the performance of the government. Pro-establishments, on the contrary, rated relatively low in item [v29] (government officers following the will of people) and also rate low in other items about the discontent with government officers. This pattern shows the relationship between different political factions’ expectations of government officers and discontent. While people do not expect governance in a liberal style and are inclined to support an authoritarian way of ruling, i.e. pro-establishment, they may have a higher tolerance for the malfunctions of government.

About the respondent’s ideology and discontent with the Legislative Council, all three political factions graded high on [v33] than on the corresponding item [v29] referring to the government. This suggests that in general people have higher expectations of the representativeness of the people’s will by the Legislative Council than by the government. However, the three political groups have quite distinct patterns of rating among [v33] (following will of people), [v34] (talking too much, acting too little) and [v36] (policies disconnected from reality). In [v33], pan-democrats took the most liberal view, pro-establishments rated relatively low, and localists’ rating was somewhere in between the pan-democrats and pro-establishments. In [v34], localist and pro-establishment respondents exhibited almost the same high level of discontentment to the lawmakers, but pan-democrats graded lower than the other two parties. In [v36], an apparent pattern of discrepancy was observed among all three groups’ grading. Interestingly, respondents in the three political factions demonstrated an agreement in [v35] that they did quite agree with the overall image of “corrupted politicians,” and that members of the Legislative Council “often use power to satisfy their own interests, which would be detrimental to the welfare of the people”.

In short, concerning the performance of the government, localists and pan-democrats have similar patterns of ideologies and discontent with the government, but both groups demonstrated variation in their attitudes toward Hong Kong lawmakers in general.

Table 16: Weighted means on items about discontent with government officers and members of the Legislative Council: Means (Perception to the government) Self-claimed Label v29* v30* v31* v32* Pan-democrat 6.07 5.62 5.74 5.46 Pro-establishment 4.57 3.67 4.13 3.40 Localist 5.91 5.68 5.76 5.50 Means (Perception to the Legislative Council) Self-claimed Label v33* v34* v35 v36* Pan-democrat 6.25 4.62 5.39 3.91 Pro-establishment 5.13 5.33 5.31 4.77 Localist 6.08 5.32 5.38 4.44 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

Another two items in this section gauge respondents’ view on public engagement of policies:

v37. Policies suggested by citizens are usually better than those suggested by the government. v38. Government’s intervention often make trouble in some policies that used to be adopted by local communities. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 16 shows the mean values of these two items. Localists rated the highest in both items, suggesting that while they were strongly dissatisfied with the government and lawmakers’ performance, they might be predisposed to despise the policies proposed and implemented by the government and lawmakers, and think policy should be designed in a community-based and bottom-up manner. In these two items, discrepancy between localists and pan-democrats was still apparently shown.

Pro-establishments consistently rated low in these two items, indicating their support for government’s initiative to take the lead in policy making.

Table 17: Weighted means on items about public engagement of policies Means (Bottom-up policy) Self-claimed Label Q37* Q38* Pan-democrat 4.69 5.00 Pro-establishment 3.90 3.51 Localist 4.91 5.15 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

viii. Social Justice and Rule of Law

There are four items to measure respondents’ perception to social justices and the rule of law. v39. For the sake of administration effectiveness and efficiency, equal treatment of every citizen may not be necessary when government implements a policy. v40. Government officials have the right to interpret laws as per their own needs. v41. Judicial independence is of paramount importance to resolve disputes between the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong citizens. v42. The society will benefit if the government can get tough in policy implementation and ignore the process required by the judicial courts and legislative council. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 17 provides the mean values of the above four items. Gaps in scores in all the items between the three political factions were observed. Pro-establishments demonstrated a very distinguishable rating pattern when compared with

pro-democrats and localists. They graded remarkably higher in [v39] and [v40], but lower in [v41] and [v42] than the other two groups, showing their strong preference for strong governance at the expense of social justice and the rule of law. Nevertheless, localists also showed less support to social justice and the rule of law than did the democrats, which implies that some localists may be willing to sacrifice libertarian values: social justice and the rule of law to trade off efficiency and effectiveness of social administration, echoing the results of previous authoritarian

items where some localist respondents can accept strong leadership.

Table 18: Weighted means on items about social justice and rule of law Means (Social Justice) Self-claimed Label v39* v40* v41* v42* Overall* Pan-democrat 3.73 3.38 6.38 1.93 2.64 Pro-establishment 4.88 5.26 5.90 4.52 4.19 Localist 3.72 4.09 6.22 2.72 2.98 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA Remark: v41 is reverse-coded in calculation of overall score, so that higher overall score indicates greater antisocial justice and an anti-rule of law attitude

ix. Media Trust and Media Use

This section is comprised of the following items:

v43. Information obtained from traditional media (such as TV news and newspapers) is reliable. v44. Information obtained from social media (such as Facebook and Instagram) is reliable. v45. It is important to my daily life that I have to use social media to obtain information about news or social issues from social media (such as Facebook and Instagram)

v46. It is important to my daily life that I have to use social media to express my political opinions or perspectives on news or social issues. (7-point, 1 = extremely disagree, 7 = extremely agree)

Table 18 shows the mean values of items in this section. Pro-establishment and pan-democrat respondents have similar trust levels regarding traditional media, but the latter exhibited highest trust of social media whereas pro-establishments were the group with the lowest trust of social media among the three. Localists demonstrated a marked mistrust on traditional media as well as the creditably of social media contents.

Pro-establishments rated the lowest in both expressing and obtaining information from social media. Pro-democrats rated higher in “obtaining information of news and social issue from social media” than did the localist respondents. On the contrary, localists gave higher marks to “expressing political opinions or perspectives on news or social issues through social media” than did the pan-democrat respondents.

This result suggests that pro-establishment is a rather inactive group regarding social media consumption and production. Pan-democrat is the one consuming and trusting social media news more than the others, but the most active social media producer is the localist who, however, often evaluates mainstream media as mistrusted information sources.

Table 19: Weighted means on items about media use and media trust Means

Media Trust Media Use Self-claimed Label Q43* Q44* Q45* Q46*

Pan-democrat 3.79 3.54 4.51 3.81 Pro-establishment 3.78 3.16 3.51 3.18 Localist 3.45 3.30 4.42 4.32 *Significant difference, p<0.05 in ANOVA

x. Ideological stratifications

All eight scales presented previously were entered into a cluster analysis to examine the ideological stratifications of the respondents with different political factions. These scales included “Hong Kong characteristics”, “Bogardus social distance scale”, “nativism towards Mainland China immigrants”, “nativism toward occidental immigrants”, “Hong Kong identity recognition”, “authoritarian”, “openness on social liberty” and “social justice and the rule of law”. Mean values were calculated for each construct by averaging the composite score of corresponding items (with reversed coding when necessary) and standardized into z-scores. The z-score of each construct was entered into a Gaussian mixture model. The complete 2,009 cases in the sample were utilized because the cluster model required a larger sample to achieve a better solution and the stratification was population-based, regardless of people’s self-claimed political labels. The models generated a set of solutions from 1-cluster model to 10-cluster model. Among the generated solutions, the 5-cluster model was found to be the most optimal solution among all based on the least Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).

Table 19 shows the proportions of respondents by their political labels and also the mean values of each scale according to the clustering membership. The table omitted those respondents giving no indication of political faction for the ease of comparison between those who have self-claimed their political labels.

Table 20: Proportions and Characteristics of Clusters

Clusters in Tag name

Non-cultural- Open-minded Traditional Mainstream oriented Nativist conservative conservative liberal liberal Proportion (N = 1994) (in %) 25.52 34.40 25.06 4.48 10.53

Proportion by Political Labels (in %)

Pro-democrat 21.5 26.1 73.0 62.5 67.6

Pro-establishment 64.6 56.0 1.8 3.1 0.0

Localist 13.9 17.9 25.2 34.4 32.4

Scales Mean Scores3

Hong Kong Characteristics 5.14 5.13 5.62 5.64 5.50

Social Distance Scale1 5.70 5.41 5.62 4.45 3.36

Nativism (Mainland China) 2.96 3.17 3.37 3.89 3.97

Nativism (Occidental) 2.82 2.75 2.67 2.25 2.44

Hong Kong Identity Recognition 5.73 5.72 5.86 3.84 5.89

Authoritarianism2 5.03 4.83 2.03 1.90 2.31

Open-mindedness in social liberty 5.28 4.60 6.14 5.97 6.05

Social justice and rule of laws3 4.11 3.86 2.49 2.52 2.40 1 Higher score indicates higher acceptance of Mainland China Immigrants 2 Higher score indicates greater support of authoritarianism 2 Higher score indicates greater anti-social justice and anti-rule of law attitude 3 Numbers in same color (red, orange, blue, green) belong to same homogenous subset (post-hoc test).

Based on the characteristics of the clusters, a tag was connoted for each cluster to summarize its specific features:

1. Open-minded Conservative (25.5%)

2. Traditional Conservative (34.4%)

3. Mainstream Liberal (25.1%)

4. Non-cultural-oriented Liberal (4.5%)

5. Nativist (10.53%)

Cluster 1 (Open-minded conservatives, 25.5%) and Cluster 2 (Traditional conservatives, 34.4%) are both dominated by pro-establishments. However, the pro-establishments-alike respondents in Open-minded Conservatives have the highest acceptance of Mainland China immigrants (the higher score in the social distance scale), higher than the Traditional Conservatives. They also show greater support to authoritarian regime but greater illiberal attitudes - anti-social justice and anti-rule of law - than those “Traditional” counterparts. The only exception is that the “Open-minded Conservatives” accepted homosexuality and youngster’s self-determination than did the “Traditional Conservatives”.

Cluster 3 (Mainstream Liberals, 25.1%), Cluster 4 (Non-cultural-oriented liberal, 4.5%) and Cluster 5 (Nativist, 10.53%) are all mostly constituted by a high proportion of pro-democrats and localists. These distributions imply there is an apparent pattern of ideological overlapping between pro-democrats and localists, but within-group discrepancies in ideologies amongst pro-democrats and localists also exist. For instance, when comparing Mainstream Liberals with Non-cultural-oriented Liberal, Nativist demonstrates the strongest rejection to Mainland Chinese residents and immigrants. Non-cultural-oriented Liberal can be considered as a group of more “western-oriented” liberalistic views but without strong local attachments. Among all the clusters, Non-cultural-oriented Liberal

shows least resistance to occidental immigrant and the highest anti-authoritarian sentiment, but they are not concerned much with Hong Kong culture as shown by the extremely low score in “Hong Kong identity recognition”. Overall speaking, Mainstream Liberal is a group of “left-wing” and “typical democrats” in Hong Kong. Democrats and localists in this group display considerably higher acceptance of Mainland Chinese residents/immigrants than those in Cluster 4 and Cluster 5, and they are relatively more open-minded in social liberty. These three clusters dominated by pro-democrats and localists consistently have higher levels of support for social justice and the rules of law. In short, it is evident that pan-democrats and localists are not two substantially distinct and independent political factions, in a

way that some localists may share more “pan-democratic” values, whereas a certain portion of pan-democrats are ideologically closer to “localists”.

Table 20 shows the proportions of clusters by respondents’ age and education attainment. Open-minded Conservatives are those older and less educated whereas their “Traditional” counterparts are relatively younger and well-educated pro-establishments. The demographic of Mainstream Liberals cuts across all ranges of age groups and majority of them receive tertiary education. Non-cultural-oriented Liberals are relatively older and seemed to be less educated when comparing with other democrat- or localist-dominated clusters. Nativists have education profiles similar to Mainstream Liberals, but Nativist’s age range is more evenly distributed across age groups.

Table 21: Age and education of Clusters Clusters

Non-cultural- Open-minded Traditional Mainstream oriented Nativist conservative conservative liberal liberal

Proportion by Age (in %)

Below 20 (18-20) 2.6 7.0 4.6 1.3 5.2

21 to 29 8.6 21.7 16.1 7.1 23.2

30 to 39 12.3 24.0 32.2 15.0 20.9

40 to 49 21.5 19.6 13.8 15.2 15.2

50 to 59 21.7 17.5 20.7 21.9 18.0

60 to 69 18.3 8.4 10.3 18.4 8.5

70 or above 15.0 1.9 2.3 21.1 9.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Proportion by Highest Education Attained (in %)

Uneducated 1.9 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.0

Primary School 12.0 3.1 3.5 16.2 6.2

Secondary School (S1. – S.5) 43.1 20.3 29.4 37.6 31.1

Matriculation (S7 or DSE) 9.4 12.1 11.8 7.9 10.0

Hong Kong Identity Recognition 11.4 16.1 11.8 12.0 16.3

Tertiary (Non-honorable degree, 17.6 35.8 34.1 16.9 29.2 associate degree & diplomat)

Tertiary (Honorable Degree) 4.7 12.6 9.4 6.2 6.2

Master’s degree or above 1.9 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

4. Conclusion

In response to the project objectives, the first study of this project identifies a variety of cultural and civic domains which characterize the “Hong Kong identity” as those who express localistic sentiments. We also derive, psychometrically speaking, that the cultural domain can be mainly represented by two components, “language use” and “use of Chinese popular webs and apps”, to distinguish people with or without Hong Kong origin. People with more localistic identity are more likely to reject spoken Putonghua and distance themselves from “Mainland Chinese” on-line activities, such as using Wechat and purchasing goods through Taobao on-line stores. The civic domains can be primarily represented by three inter-correlated domains, “pro-authoritarian”, “anti-authoritarian”, and “political participation”. People who proclaimed having a “Hong Kong identity” have a higher likelihood to exhibit anti-authoritarian inclinations and be involved in political activities. It is noteworthy that, although the scores in these domains generally manifest significant differences between those who embrace a stronger sense of Hong Kong identity and those are “Mainland China-oriented” identity, substantial within-group variation is observed in some of the domains.

The project also grasps a better understanding of the ideological landscape of different political factions in Hong Kong. For instance, if a subset of localist is defined by the level of concerns on Hong Kong history and consumption of local cultural products, i.e. Canton-pop, Hong Kong literatures, and Cantonese movies, a discrepancy is shown within the self-claimed localist group, while some

pro-establishments and pan-democrats may be even more “localistic” in this respect. This implies that some localists are “politically-oriented”, which can be called “politically localistic” but not “culturally localistic”, even though this set of localists are a minority in the research sample. In the future, a booster sampling approach can be deployed to over-sample this small group and to better characterize their defining features.

Concerning “populism”, while taking “expelling corrupted elites” into account, respondents in different political factions generally felt a higher discontent with the members of the Legislative Council than with the government officers, even though the discontent level with government officers was also considered to be high. Localists demonstrate a similar level of discontent with the pan-democrats toward the government, but they display an even higher level of discontent than the pan-democrats toward the members of the Legislative Council, which can be understood by the fact that pan-democrats are more “institutionalized” in electoral politics than the localists. Furthermore, localists seem to be more supportive of a community-based bottom-up approach to public engagement and policy making than the pan-democrats, even though the pan-democrat councilors in the Legislative Council and District Councils have been engaging in district level community engagement for many years. Strong nativism sentiment regarding the Mainland China immigrant is found within some of the localists, while pan-democrats generally hold a relatively milder attitude and, unsurprisingly, pro-establishments (mainly conservative group, not the “liberal” group) have the highest acceptance of the Mainland China immigrant. About the importance of social justice and the rules of law in Hong Kong, pan-democrats demonstrate the strongest rejection of differential treatment in policy-making and the violation of the rule of law. Localists

show relatively less rejection in these aspects. Pro-establishments give lower weight to the importance of social justice and the rules of law.

Looking into the pattern of media use and media trust, localists rely more on social media platforms than the other two groups in obtaining information on politics and social issues and in expressing their views, while pan-democrats tend to use social media mainly as a channel to receive information. Localists have least trust on the traditional media, whereas both pan-democrat and pro-establishment have relatively higher trust on the traditional media. Pro-establishment do not likely trust social media and relatively seldom use social media as the channel of getting

information and expressing political opinions.

By inspecting the proportion of political participation, localists are more likely to participate in a procession but are less likely to cast votes in elections. Perhaps some of the localists have a certain nagging sense of hopelessness and low external political efficacy when it comes to election and therefore choose extra-institutional activities as main vehicle for political expression rather than voting. An extremely high proportion of pro-establishments have not even participated in either procession or voting, showing a certain degree of political apathy or political fatigue with the society.

Individual’s self-claimed political faction is inextricably relevant to their embracing ideologies. However, within-group discrepancies in values and ideologies are commonly observed in all political factions. As mentioned before, some self-proclaimed localists are not entirely devoted to local cultural activities or local cultural consumption. Although anti-authoritarianism is one of the strongest

“signals” to distinguish “local” and “non-local”, a group of localists present a higher level of support for an authoritarian style of ruling or leadership and accept a certain degree of violation to compromise social justice and the rule of law. Furthermore, usually, submissiveness to authority is negatively correlated with openness in social liberty, i.e. against self-determination and freedom of religion. However, it is observed that, in the stratification analysis, a subset of pro-establishments are strong supporters of authoritarianism and openness in social liberty, whereas another group of pro-establishments grade relatively low in supporting authoritarianism but are low in openness to social liberty.

In relation to ideological stratification, it is observed that self-claimed pan-democrats and localists have some elusive relationships in their values and ideologies. A significant portion of localists possess typical thoughts of Hong Kong democrats, who generally have higher acceptance and tolerance to both Mainland China immigrants and non-Chinese immigrants, uphold social justice and the rule of law, oppose authoritarian rule, and tend to be more open-minded in social liberty. On the contrary, a mixed group of pan-democrats and localists is found to subscribe to nativistic thoughts and less advocacy of social justice and the rule of law, with a relatively higher degree of acceptance of the rulings of an authoritarian regime. Another small group of pan-democrats and localists is non-cultural dependent, and are not much interested in Hong Kong culture, but show repulsion toward Mainland China immigrants or residents

5. Policy Implications and Recommendations

One key policy implication of this project is that, despite its conceptual incoherence, “localism” is often culturally characterized as “defending local culture and values” (Lam, 2017). Not only do the so-called “localists” possess strong identification with Hong Kong’s values and cultures and regard these characteristics as not defining (since non-discriminative) for “localism” in Hong Kong. On the contrary, most

pro-establishments and pan-democrats, though they are politically in stark contrast, also uphold a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong and devotedly engage in local cultural activities and exhibit a Hong Kong identity.

The cultural domain of Hong Kong identity is seen to be more universally embraced by people living in Hong Kong regardless their political views. This is what we call the political “common ground” of all political factions. As scholars, we would not be so naïve as to believe that policy making is primarily driven by rational decision making but rather mainly political-economy driven and highly sensitive to the power game of China-Hong Kong relations. However, if the government would really strive to build trust among increasingly polarized political factions, finding “common ground” is the approach that we strongly recommend to the government as an overarching guiding principle for future policy direction and policy objective-setting. Most Hong Kong people treasure the values and living style of Hong Kong. Government’s policy support to local cultural activities, such as Hong Kong Cantonese movies and music production (non-co-production with Mainland China) and local arts and literature (emphasizing Hong Kong’s bottom-up local

history and culture but not the Chinese Communist party’s top-down and heavily politically framed version of Hong Kong history) should be welcomed by people of different political factions. On the contrary, this also implies that policies which are deleterious to Hong Kong culture, i.e. marginalization of Cantonese or drastic changes in Hong Kong’s social norms, may not only provoke a strong backlash from the localists, but also discontent from the pro-establishment and pan-democrat camps may be aroused.

Moreover, there is no sign that the localists, in general, are far more “populistic” than the pan-democrats. We found some democrats are also nativism-leaning and in contrast some localists (mainly cultural localists, sharing alike views with Mainstream pan-democrats) show a higher degree of acceptance of Mainland immigrants. Pan-democrats, pro-establishments and localists all present discontent with the political elites of Hong Kong, either government officers or the members of the Legislative Councils, despite their diverse targeted elites, in some respects. We also found that localistic and populistic ideologies are not narrowly confined to certain educational attainment or age groups. Therefore, it is inappropriate to specifically highlight or stereotype certain demographic groups as “populist”.

The self-claimed localists in this study deserve a more open public engagement to foster community-based and bottom-up policy development and a higher level of involvement in policy making. The government must stop the “pork barrel” approach of political appointments, but instead must invite capable people with different political views to assist policy making in all levels of governance, i.e. consultation committees, semi-government organizations, and even the cabinet. Government’s initiatives to enhance an open and transparent community-based policy making can

ease the tension between the Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong people.

6. Limitation of the Project

There are several study limitations that worth mentioning in this report. Due to resources and time constraints, Study 1 only analyzed newspapers drawn from mainstream media, i.e. newspaper. However, news media nowadays is widely reported and distributed through other means of media such as digital forums and on-line media which published news solely in digital forms (e.g. NowTV news channel). Further analysis on these media channels and responses of their audiences may grasp more detailed information on how general public perceived localism in Hong Kong. As most of our resource was allocated to Study 3, Study 2 was designed to conduct scale development of Hong Kong identity by a relatively small and non-representative sample, i.e. university student samples. Even though it is not an uncommon practice in social science to validate scale using college students, a larger sample may deduct more dimensions and perspectives on Hong Kong-China issues and identities to generate more comprehensive study findings. Study 3 can be more representative if quota sampling was adopted. In Study 3, we found some clusters are contradictory or ambivalent in ideologies. For instance, there was a group of people who were quite open-minded in social affairs (e.g. homosexuality) but very conservative in their political views. Nevertheless, we did not have further investigation on how such kinds of contradictions were cultivated in our society. This makes Study 3 rather descriptive but not very explanatory on the changing society of Hong Kong.

7. Public Dissemination

A preliminary version of the research findings of this project were presented in a public symposium titled “Digital Research into Media and Politics” on 24th August 2018, at the University of Hong Kong. The presentation title was “Identity, ideology, and social media” presented by King-wa Fu, Siu-lun Chow, and Yu-leung Ng. An audience of about 100, including scholars, students, teachers, NGO workers, political party workers, and government officers etc., attended the symposium.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Demographic Characteristics of Interviewees in Study 1 - Stage 1

Interviewee Number Age Gender SES 1 18-20 Male Low 2 18-20 Male High 3 18-20 Female High 4 20-30 Male Low 5 20-30 Male Low 6 20-30 Male High 7 20-30 Female Low 8 20-30 Female Low 9 20-30 Female High 10 30-45 Male Low 11 30-45 Male High 12 30-45 Male High 13 30-45 Female High 14 45-60 Male Low 15 45-60 Male High 16 45-60 Female Low 17 45-60 Female High

Appendix II: Items in Questionnaire of Survey in Study 2

A 部分：香港文化特色

[v1] 我嘅生活節奏急促。

[v2] 我行路比其他人快。

[v3] 我有拼搏精神。

[v4] 我會遵守文明社會嘅規矩。

[v5] 我覺得每個人都有基本人權。

B 部分：鮑氏社會距離量表（受訪員請讀出選項）

[v6] 如果你有仔女, 你接唔接受佢哋同內地人結婚？

[v7] 你接唔接受你自己同內地人成為好朋友？

[v8] 你接唔接受內地人成為你嘅鄰居？

[v9] 你接唔接受內地人成為你嘅同事？

[v10] 你接唔接受內地人成為香港永久居民？

C 部分：排外意識

[v11] 你同唔同意內地嚟嘅新移民能夠為香港帶來人才同勞動力？

[v12] 你同唔同意內地嚟嘅投資對香港整體而言係好處多過壞處？

[v13] 你同唔同意內地嚟嘅新移民為香港帶黎社會負擔（例如房屋、醫

療、工作機會等等）？

[v14] 內地嚟嘅新移民，會令香港政府提供畀一般市民嘅服務差咗？

[v15] 內地嚟嘅新移民能令香港文化更多元化？

[v16] 香港人應保護自己嘅言語，以免被普通話取代？

[v17] 你同唔同意歐美地區嚟嘅新移民能夠為香港帶來人才同勞動力？

[v18] 你同唔同意歐美地區嚟嘅新移民為香港帶黎社會負擔（例如房屋、醫療、工作機會等等）？

D 部分：港人身份認同

[v19] 我會花時間了解香港嘅歷史、傳統同習俗。

[v20] 我會參與香港嘅文化活動，例如聽本地音樂、閱讀本土文學、睇港產片之類。

[v21] 我對香港有強烈嘅歸屬感。

[v22] 作為香港人我感覺良好。

E 部分：政治及人生理念

[v23] 大多數批評政府嘅人，只會令市民對政府產生無謂嘅猜疑。

[v24] 香港嘅情況愈來愈嚴峻，如果能趕走啲滋事分子，令社會重回正軌，用最強硬嘅手段都係合理。

[v25] 香港而家需要嘅，唔係更多嘅「公民權利」，而係更嚴厲嘅法制去維持秩序。

[v26] 每個人都應該有自己的生活方式同宗教信仰。

[v27] 同性戀其實同異性戀一樣，應該受到同樣尊重。

[v28] 年輕人爭取決定自己嘅命運同反抗不滿嘅事情，係一件好事嚟。

F 部分：民粹理念

[v29] 香港嘅官員應該要遵循香港市民嘅意願。

[v30] 香港政府平日「講多過做」。(如果受訪者不明白，可說「講嘅嘢太多、實際做嘅好少」)

[v31] 官員往往以權力去滿足自身利益，會對市民造成負面影響。

[v32] 香港政府提出嘅政策好多時都係非常「離地」。

[v33] 香港嘅民選議員應該要遵循香港市民嘅意願。

[v34] 整體嚟講，香港嘅民選議員平日「講多過做」。(如果受訪者不明白，可說「講嘅嘢太多、實際做嘅好少」)

[v35] 議員往往以權力去滿足自身利益，會對市民造成負面影響。

[v36] 整體嚟講，香港嘅民選議員提出嘅政策好多時都係非常「離地」。

[v37] 市民建議嘅政策，往往好過政府提出嗰啲。

[v38] 民間一向做開政策，如果政府插手，往往都係越攪越衰。

G 部分：社會公義及法治

[v39] 為咗令政策實施得更有效同快捷，政府施政時未必需要對每個市民都一視同仁。

[v40] 政府官員可以因應政策嘅需要，去解釋法律條文嘅意思。

[v41] 司法獨立對於解決政府同市民間嘅衝突係非常重要。

[v42] 政府如果可以強硬一啲，唔駛理會立法會及法庭，其實對整個社會嚟講都係好事。

H 部分：媒體使用

[v43] 傳統媒體如電視新聞、報紙的消息準確可信。

[v44] 網上社交媒體如 Facebook、 Instagram 的消息準確可信。

[v45] 透過 Facebook 或 Instagram 等社交網站接收有關新聞或者時事嘅資訊，對我日常生活嚟講相當重要。

[v46] 透過 Facebook 或 Instagram 等社交網站去表達對時事嘅睇法或政見，對我日常生活嚟講相當重要。

I 部分：個人背景資料

[v47] 你會覺得自己係屬於社會上邊一個階層呢？ 1. 下層 2. 中下層 3. 中層 4. 中上層 5. 上層 6. 唔知道／唔清楚／話唔定

[v48] 你通常會稱自己為： 1. 香港人 2. 中國人 3. 住响香港嘅中國人 4. 住响中國嘅香港人 5. 其他，請註明：______6. 唔清楚／難講

[v49] 現時香港傳媒都會用「民主」同「建制」去劃分政治取向，你覺得自己嘅政治取向係屬於邊一面？ 1. 非常支持民主 2. 稍為傾向民主 3. 中間／中立 4. 稍為傾向建制

5. 非常支持建制 6. 其他，請註明：______7. 唔清楚／難講

[v50] 現時香港傳媒會將市民分為「泛民」、「建制」、「本土」等等組群，你覺得自己比較似係邊一個？ 1. 泛民 2. 建制 3. 本土 4. 三個都唔係 5. 其他，請註明：______6. 唔清楚／難講

[v51] 在過去兩年，有沒有參與同政治有關集會遊行或投票活動？ 1. 只參與集會遊行 2. 只參與投票 3. 兩樣都有 4. 兩樣都冇

[v52] 請問你嘅年齡係幾多？

[v53] 請問你嘅最高教育程度係？ 1. 未受過教育 2. 小學 3. 中學（中一至中五） 4. 預科（中七） 5. 大專（非榮譽學士，如副學士、文憑） 6. 大專（榮譽學士）或以上程度 7. 碩士或以上

[v54] 請問你係唔係响香港出世？ 1. 係（跳答[v57]） 2. 唔係 3. 拒絕回答（跳答[v57]）

[v55] （如果唔係香港出世）咁請問你嘅出身地係邊到呢？

[v56] （如果唔係香港出世）咁請問你係香港住咗幾耐？

[v57] 請問你依家嘅職位係乜嘢呢？

[v58] 請問你現時個人每月平均收入大約係幾多？

[v59] 受訪者性別: