The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

The Local Drivers of Political Development: Explaining Sub-national Variation in Government Capacity and Performance in Kenya

Karol Czuba1

Abstract In 2013, Kenya devolved much of the political power in the country to forty-seven newly created county governments. Although the post-devolution political system is uniform throughout Kenya, the capacity of the county governments, the standard of public services that they provide, and local populations’ attitudes towards the state vary substantially across counties. This variation raises an important question that has recently attracted considerable scholarly interest: what explains local government capacity and performance in Sub-Saharan Africa? Existing scholarship attributes such sub-national differences to historical legacies, elite capture, central state favouritism, and ethnic divisions. These theories cannot explain, however, the variation between Kenyan counties where the postulated predictors of county government capacity and performance are identical. In this article, I argue that the varied trajectories of local political development reflect the competitiveness of local political arenas. Empirical analysis for this study draws on elite interviews, government documents, news sources, and a survey conducted in Turkana and West Pokot, two neighbouring and largely monoethnic Kenyan counties that—despite their similar histories, shared experience of marginalization and neglect by the national government, and other commonalities—have experienced the construction of very different county government apparatuses following devolution. I find that the variation between the two counties reflects their governors’ ability to contain political competition and address constituents’ needs and demands. The study contributes to the scholarship on decentralization and political development by demonstrating how local political conditions and local politicians’ actions mediate the effects of institutional change.

Introduction In 2013, Josphat Koli Nanok and Simon Kachapin Kitalei became the first governors of Turkana and West Pokot (see Map on p. 2), neighbouring counties located in Kenya’s dry and sparsely populated northern periphery. The two newly created counties had much in common: inhabited by largely monoethnic and internally cohesive populations reliant on similar pastoral livelihood practices, indigenous governance systems, and other social structures, Turkana and West Pokot had both suffered a century of neglect at the hands of Kenya’s successive governments, which had never established meaningful presence in either area. The creation of the county governments led by Kachapin and Nanok—the result of the ambitious program of devolution initiated following the adoption of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010—marked a radical reversal of this pattern of marginalization. Elected by and accountable to their counties’ inhabitants, within a few years the two governors—both of them members of opposition parties—constructed, largely from scratch, new county government apparatuses responsible for provision of extensive public services never before available in Turkana

1 Sewanee: The University of the South, [email protected].

1 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba and West Pokot, which are both among the world’s poorest places. The rapidity and scope of this state-making process are no less remarkable than the surprising discrepancy in the capacity of the Turkana and West Pokot county governments, standard of public service provision, and local people’s assessment of the governors’ performance. Despite the similarities between the two counties, the quality of the well-functioning and popular state apparatus that Nanok built in Turkana greatly exceeded that of Kachapin’s corrupt, ineffectual, and poorly-regarded administration in West Pokot. Given the similarities between the two counties, the divergent trajectories of their political development since devolution present an empirical puzzle. They also raise a broader question: what explains local government capacity and performance? The considerable attention that scholars have paid to decentralization—a prominent, if not necessarily successful, solution to (central) governments’ inability to address citizens’ needs—has resulted in a large literature on the subject. Much of the existing scholarship focuses on political processes occurring within central governments and their countrywide impacts. The scale and rapidity of devolution in Kenya can be attributed to such processes. The 2010 constitution was adopted by political agents active on the national political stage with little or no input from ordinary inhabitants of the future counties or from local leaders. The actions of national governments cannot, however, explain sub-national variation in the dynamics and outcomes of decentralization exemplified by Turkana and West Pokot. Such variation is a common consequence of decentralization; its recognition has recently given rise to increased interest from scholars. Their important work attributes sub-national differences of this kind to historical legacies, elite capture, central state favouritism, partisanship, and ethnic divisions. These explanations cannot account for the variation between the two Kenyan counties: their history, ethnic composition, and relationship with the national government—including the incumbent governors’ partisan affiliations—are too similar. In this paper, I join the debate by identifying previously neglected drivers of local government capacity and performance. I articulate a theory of local political development that attributes the variation across local governments to the type of political pressure faced by local officeholders such as the Kenyan county governors and their responses to this pressure. Incumbent local leaders who wish to retain their positions react to the competition from other political agents and to demands from constituents. Depending on their vulnerability to both kinds of pressure, officeholders capture the resources of local governments for their personal benefit, channel private goods to clients, or provide public goods and services to local populations. These choices shape subsequent local political development. While elite capture requires no investment in organizational capacity, to provide private and public goods local leaders need to construct either patronage networks or apparatuses of the local

2 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba government. These ideal-type processes and the variety of their real-world manifestations contribute to the variation in the trajectories of local political development. I make this argument by investigating the sources of the divergence between Turkana and West Pokot. The empirical analysis on which the paper is based has three components. First, I conduct a survey and construct an original dataset on the presence of the county government apparatuses across the two counties’ territories and local populations’ engagement with county government officials and political leaders. Second, because survey data are inconclusive, I review government documents, including the county budgets, to identify the patterns of expenditure allocation. Analysis of these documents offers a clearer picture of the variation in the capacity and performance of the two county governments. Third, to trace the political processes that led to this variation I conduct interviews with local political leaders, county government officials, and other well-informed individuals in addition to reviewing news sources. I find that, in Turkana, Nanok had a broad, well-established, and geographically-dispersed political base that helped him to outmaneuver political competitors but required him to anticipate voters’ needs and demands. To this end, the Turkana governor sought to provide extensive public services to his constituents and built a well-functioning administrative apparatus capable of delivering those public goods. In contrast, Kachapin’s attention was absorbed by the task of constructing his own support base, which he needed to compete with the extensive patronage network of his main rival Senator John Krop Lonyangapuo, who had sponsored the governor’s rise to power. To realize this objective, Kachapin channeled a significant proportion of the West Pokot county government’s resources to his new clients, limiting his ability to develop the administrative capacity of the county government apparatus and extend public service provision. In these conditions, West Pokot’s first governor proved unable to satisfy societal demands, eventually losing the 2017 gubernatorial election to Lonyangapuo, while Nanok was easily reelected. The paper makes three contributions to the scholarship on political development and democratization. First, it draws attention to the contemporary local drivers of state-making—and political development more broadly. It builds on recent work that demonstrates that political development can be shaped as much by local factors as by those in place at the centers of political power. It thus challenges the explanations that focus on such central drivers of political development. Second, the paper identifies the causal mechanisms—that is, local leaders’ vulnerability to pressure and their responses to that pressure—that shape local government capacity and performance. It reveals the important role that local political leaders’ relationships with competitors and constituents play in political development. Valid explanation of democratization and other aspects of political development influenced by local factors requires consideration of the opportunities and constraints created by the varying configurations of incumbent officeholders’ vulnerability to local political pressure. Third, the paper points to the importance of agentic factors in political development. Their vulnerability to pressure narrows local leaders’ options, but careful empirical analysis of their responses to the political conditions in which they operate demonstrates the influence of contingent choices on the trajectories of political development.

Decentralization and devolution in Kenya Kenya gained independence in 1963 as a federal parliamentary democracy, but the country’s first president Jomo Kenyatta quickly eroded the short-lived majimbo system of autonomous ethnic regions and weakened Kenya’s parliament. Within a few years, Kenya was transformed into an authoritarian unitary state—and one of the world’s most centralized, at that—with a semi-parliamentary political system dominated by a powerful, ‘imperial’ presidency.2 Popular dissatisfaction with Kenyatta and his

2 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, “Final Report of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, October 2010” (Nairobi: Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, 2010); Yash Pal Ghai, “Devolution: Restructuring

3 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba successor Daniel arap Moi’s authoritarianism, government corruption, and pronounced interregional inequalities ensured, however, that decentralization remained an attractive option for Kenyans, especially following the country’s democratization, a gradual process that culminated in Moi’s departure from office in 2002.3 Central governments’ limited ability to establish relationships with populations across state territories and to ensure effective provision of public goods and services had by then also resulted in considerable international interest in decentralization as a potential solution to such problems. Decentralization has been promoted by developmental organizations and implemented by governments across Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.4 Several scholars have also recognized the benefits of decentralization,5 although others point to its potential to exacerbate existing inequalities and tensions.6 In practice, as the existing literature demonstrates, the success of decentralization varies across countries.7 In Kenya, devolution has involved genuine transfer of power to local elites, now directly responsible for delivery of some of the most important government functions, but also widespread corruption at the county level.8 Devolution was the product of complex bargaining among members of Kenya’s central political elite undertaken in the context of increasing societal and international pressure.9 Negotiations between the factions that made up the divided elite—the most important of the Kenyan State,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 2 (2008): 211–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531050802058336; Godwin R. Murunga, “Elite Compromises and the Content of the 2010 Constitution,” in Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order, ed. Godwin R. Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren (Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2014), 144–62; The Office of the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities (OAUPEAP), Back from the Brink: The 2008 Mediation Process and Reforms in Kenya (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2014). 3 Bruce J. Berman, Jill Cottrell, and Yash Pal Ghai, “Patrons, Clients, and Constitutions: Ethnic Politics and Political Reform in Kenya,” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 43, no. 3 (2009): 462–506, https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2010.9707567; Raymond Muhula and Stephen Ndegwa, “Instrumentalism and Constitution-Making in Kenya: Triumphs, Challenges and Opportunities beyond the 2013 Elections,” in Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order, ed. Godwin R. Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren (Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2014), 79–96. 4 Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, eds., Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, vol. 1 (The MIT Press, 2006), https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtp:titles:0262524546; Stephen N. Ndegwa, Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002); United States Agency for International Development, “Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook” (Washington, D.C., 2009); The World Bank, Kenya Economic Update, December 2011: Navigating the Storm, Delivering the Promise with a Special Focus on Kenya’s Momentous Devolution (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2011). 5 Cristina Bodea and Adrienne LeBas, “The Origins of Voluntary Compliance: Attitudes toward Taxation in Urban Nigeria,” British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 01 (2014): 215–38, https://doi.org/10.1017/s000712341400026x; James Manor, “The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization” (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999); Ndegwa, Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey. 6 Dawn Brancati, “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?,” International Organization 60, no. 03 (2006): 651–85, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830606019X; Mark Robinson, “Introduction: Decentralising Service Delivery? Evidence and Policy Implications,” IDS Bulletin 38, no. 1 (2007): 1–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2007.tb00332.x. 7 Bardhan and Mookherjee, Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective; Ndegwa, Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey. 8 Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis, “Decentralisation in Kenya: The Governance of Governors,” Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 1–35, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1500097X; Michelle D’Arcy and Agnes Cornell, “Devolution and Corruption in Kenya: Everyone’s Turn to Eat?,” African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 246– 73, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw002.. 9 Conrad M. Bosire, “The Emerging Approach of Kenyan Courts to Interpretation of National and County Powers and Functions,” in Animating Devolution in Kenya: The Role of the Judiciary, ed. Conrad M. Bosire and Wanjiru Gikonyo (Rome and Nairobi: International Development Law Organization, Judiciary Training Institute, and Katiba Institute, 2015), 101–16; Yash Pal Ghai and Jill Cottrell, “Constitutional Transitions and Territorial Cleavages : The Kenyan Case,” 2015; Nelson Kasfir, “Agency across Changing Sites: The Path to Kenya’s 2010 Constitution,” in The Politics of Governance:

4 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba them led by the then president and prime minister, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga—resulted in the adoption of the 2010 constitution. The new constitution, approved by two-thirds of Kenyan voters in a referendum held in 2010, established a comprehensive set of checks-and-balances between branches of the government, reshaped Kenya’s judicial system, and contained a range of provisions intended to protect citizens’ human rights and ensure integrity of public officials. The most fundamental changes related, however, to the creation of county governments, which following the elections held in 2013 assumed responsibility for a range of important government functions, including agricultural and pastoral production, early childhood education, health, local transport infrastructure, and other public works.10 To enable them to discharge those functions, the national government was obliged to transfer to the new county governments at least fifteen percent of the national budget. Between 2013 and 2017, the total allocations to county governments reached KES 1 trillion (approximately USD 10 billion).11 Explanations of the dynamics and consequences of decentralization—including its success— tend to focus on factors in place at the centers of state power. According to Conyers, “administrative performance at the local level is, to a large extent, a mirror of that in the country as a whole.”12 This claim is belied, however, but the substantial sub-national variation in the capacity and performance of local governments typified by the cases of Turkana and West Pokot.13 Due in part to the broader subnational turn in comparative politics, scholarly recognition of such variation has recently increased. Scholars have offered several explanations of the differences across sub-national units created through or affected by decentralization. One strand of the literature draws attention to historical legacies,14 but the history of Turkana and West Pokot and of their engagement with the state is very similar. The Pokot and Turkana inhabitants of the two future counties historically depended on comparable pastoralist livelihoods and gerontocratic non-state governance systems. The two ethnic groups’ territories were nominally integrated into the colonial Kenyan polity in the early twentieth century, but successive governments— both before and after independence—had little interest in projecting their authority in the remote and arid area that they considered to be of little value. Given the political salience of ethnicity in many contexts, and nowhere more so than in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, important work has linked public service provision to ethnic divisions.15 Both Turkana and West Pokot are, however, largely ethnically homogeneous. The Pokot and Turkana

Actors and Articulations in Africa and Beyond, ed. Lucy Koechlin and Till Förster (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2015), 52–74; Karuti Kanyinga and Sophie Walker, “Building a Political Settlement: The International Approach to Kenya’s 2008 Post-Election Crisis,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2, no. 2 (2013): 34, https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bu. 10 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, “Decentralisation in Kenya: The Governance of Governors”; Yash Pal Ghai, “Comparative Theory and Kenya’s Devolution,” in Animating Devolution in Kenya: The Role of the Judiciary, ed. Conrad M. Bosire and Wanjiru Gikonyo (Rome and Nairobi: International Development Law Organization, Judiciary Training Institute, and Katiba Institute, 2015), 13–37; Jeffrey Steeves, “The 2017 Election in Kenya: Reimagining the Past or Introducing the Future?,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 0, no. 0 (2016): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2016.1223375. 11 Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA), “Total Allocations to County Governments” (Nairobi: CRA, n.d.), http://www.crakenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TOTAL-ALLOCATIONS-TO-COUNTY-GOVERNMENTS.pdf/. 12 Diana Conyers, “Decentralisation and Service Delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa,” IDS Bulletin 38, no. 1 (2007): 18–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2007.tb00334.x; Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008). 13 Dele Olowu and James Stevenson Wunsch, Local Governance in Africa : The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Martha Wilfahrt, “Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Public Goods Delivery: Evidence from Decentralized West Africa,” World Politics 70, no. 2 (2018): 239–74, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000363. 14 Wilfahrt, “Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Public Goods Delivery: Evidence from Decentralized West Africa.” 15 Edward Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty, “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya,” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 11–12 (2005): 2325–68, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.09.004.

5 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba collective identities are cohesive and defined largely in terms of animosity towards ethnic adversaries located outside the two counties’ borders. Although they belong to the pan-ethnic Kalenjin bloc whence the Jubilee Party (until 2017 the Jubilee Alliance), which has controlled Kenya’s national government since 2013, derives some of its support, the Pokot—pastoralist rather than agriculturalist like the other Kalenjin ethnic groups, speakers of a language that differs significantly from those used by the other Kalenjin, marginalized by successive governments and, consequently, much poorer than their relatively well-off kin—occupy a peripheral position in the bloc. Relatedly, variation in public service provision has been attributed to central governments’ preference for copartisans,16 but in the elections held in both 2013 and 2017, the inhabitants of the two counties voted for parties in opposition to the Jubilee Alliance: the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) / National Super Alliance (NASA) in Turkana and Kenya African National Union (KANU) in West Pokot. Another, and perhaps most prominent, explanation of the sub-national variation emphasizes the role of the connections between central and local elites.17 KANU has at times allied itself with Kenya’s current President Uhuru Kenyatta, but its leadership is fiercely opposed to Kenyatta’s Kalenjin Deputy President William Ruto, the second most powerful Jubilee politician; furthermore, after disassociating himself from KANU, West Pokot’s governor Kachapin joined Jubilee. Given the inferior capacity and performance of his county government in relation to that in Turkana, the two Kenyan cases contradict, therefore, the explanations that focus on central state favoritism. In any case, Kenyan governors are far from clients of the central government; the power vested in them by the 2010 constitution makes them influential political agents in their own right.18 A related line of argumentation looks to the role of elite capture.19 Kachapin’s electoral loss in 2017—and along with him, that of several other incumbent governors—suggests that this claim does not apply in this context. Indeed, according to Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, Kenya’s experience of devolution more broadly “cannot be read as a case of ‘recentralization’ by national government, nor as one of the capture of sub-national units by ‘local elites.’”20 The inapplicability of the existing explanations focused on history and the relationship with the central government to devolution in Kenya points to the importance of the contemporary and local drivers of political development. In other words, political development is a local phenomenon and an ongoing process as much as it is central and historical. The limited scholarship on this local aspect of political development attributes sub-national variation in local government capacity and performance to psychological factors such as local bureaucrats’ motivation.21 I offer a more explicitly political framework and explain that this variation is the result of the actions that local officeholders such as the Kenyan governors make in response to the political pressure that they face from competitors and constituents.

16 Ryan S. Jablonski, “How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution,” World Politics 66, no. 02 (2014): 293–330, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887114000045. 17 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615597; Richard C. Crook, “Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: The Reality in Africa,” Public Administration and Development 88, no. 23 (2003): 77–88, https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.261; James Tyler Dickovick and James S Wunsch, “Decentralization in Africa : The Paradox of State Strength,” 2014, http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4352958; Olowu and Wunsch, Local Governance in Africa : The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. 18 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, “Decentralisation in Kenya: The Governance of Governors.” 19 Dickovick and Wunsch, “Decentralization in Africa : The Paradox of State Strength”; Olowu and Wunsch, Local Governance in Africa : The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. 20 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2016: 4. 21 Jordan Kyle and Danielle Resnick, “Delivering More with Less: Subnational Service Provision in Low Capacity States,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-018-9276-z.

6 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

A theory of local political development Political development involves the formation of a political system, changes in the distribution of power within that system, construction of the administrative and coercive apparatuses of the state, the strengthening and weakening of those apparatuses’ capacity, projection of the authority of the state across its territory, establishment of relations between the state and the population—and, relatedly, different levels of state accountability and responsiveness to that population—as well as state performance of functions such as provision of both private and public goods and services to different segments of the population. By extension, the term ‘local political development,’ of which I make frequent use in this paper, refers to the local manifestation of these political phenomena. I specifically focus on two aspects of local political development—the construction of the local administrative apparatus of the state22 and the development of its capacity to perform its functions—and I explain why they vary across sub-national administrative units. I argue that the trajectories of local political development depend on the type of pressure faced by local leaders such as the Kenyan county governors and their responses to this pressure. Political agents who control local governments can prioritize the distribution of public goods and services that benefit all members of local populations or the allocation of private goods to supporters and clients. Alternatively, they can appropriate local government resources for their own use. The choice that the incumbent officeholders make reflects, but is not determined by, the local political conditions and, in particular, the pressure that leaders face from competitors and constituents. Local leaders’ willingness to use local government resources to accommodate popular demands depends on their vulnerability to societal pressure. As one strand of the literature on decentralization suggests, low vulnerability can lead to elite capture;23 since I focus on Kenya, where the democratic political system ensures that political agents face a fairly strong political pressure, I do not consider such cases in this paper. In contrast, where local leaders’ ability to stay in power depends, as in post-devolution Kenya, on their responsiveness to constituent needs and demands, it is in their interest to share the resources at their disposal. Those resources can be distributed either to the entire local population in the form of public goods and services or to a specific segment of that population aligned with the incumbent leader through the provision of private goods. The identity of the beneficiaries of the distribution of local government resources and, relatedly, the mode of this distribution, is contingent on the pressure that local leaders face from political competitors. Contestation for power with political agents who control—or, alternatively, make efforts to control—substantial patronage networks and/or the votes of a specific segment of the local population creates incentives for local leaders to construct their own clientelist support bases, which requires responsiveness to particularistic demands. The structure of such voting blocs reflects the composition of the local population: where ethnic cleavages are politically salient, they can—as the rich scholarship on the subject indicates24—form the basic building block of patronage, but in their absence, which is the case in both Turkana and West Pokot, political agents have to make use of or create other political divisions. The existence of such divisions is in itself neither necessary nor sufficient for the construction of particularistic support bases. As I discuss below, in West Pokot Senator Lonyangapuo and, somewhat less successfully, his rival Kachapin established extensive networks of patronage despite the internal cohesion of the Pokot society. On the other hand, to shape

22 In Kenya, the national government is responsible for security provision. 23 Dickovick and Wunsch, “Decentralization in Africa : The Paradox of State Strength”; Olowu and Wunsch, Local Governance in Africa : The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. 24 E.g. Bruce J. Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 305–41; Simon Edjemyr, Eric Kramon, and Amanda Lea Robinson, Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Distributive Goods, Comparative Political Studies, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017730079.

7 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba the distribution of local government resources, internal divisions need to be mobilized by political agents who can benefit from support on the basis of such cleavages. For instance, latent divisions of this kind can be identified in the (otherwise cohesive) Turkana society, but have never been successfully employed in electoral politics. If competitors are unable to build cohesive particularistic support bases, the incumbent officeholders’ incentive to take advantage of internal political divisions and prioritize the provision of private goods on the basis of those divisions weakens. The lack of current competitors who command strong patronage networks does not, however, reduce local leaders’ vulnerability to pressure from below. Rather, it reorients the incumbents towards provision of public goods and services. The lower value placed on the distribution of private goods in such conditions can be attributed to three factors. First, the demand for such goods is weakened by the lack of their provision by competitors. Second, although the officeholders could reward their own voters with private goods, they nevertheless remain vulnerable to pressure from across the local population. Local government provision of public services addresses societal demands and simultaneously reduces the probability that the incumbent will lose her position. If the local leaders fail to satisfy constituents’ demands, in the future potential competitors can take advantage of popular dissatisfaction with the incumbents’ performance in office. In such conditions, and third, equitable distribution of those government services impedes the emergence of grievances that political competitors can use to threaten the incumbent’s hold on power through the construction of patronage networks. Overall, it is, therefore, in incumbents’ interest to provide public services that are distributed equitably to all members of the local population. The choice to prioritize the distribution of either private or public goods has strong effects on the trajectory of local political development. To channel private goods to clients, political agents need patronage networks and, accordingly, focus their attention and the resources that they control on efforts to construct, maintain, and strengthen those networks. For officeholders in this position, the local state functions primarily as a source of income that can be redirected to build their relationships with clients. Not only is a well-functioning local state apparatus unnecessary for the realization of such local leaders’ objectives, but it can also be detrimental insofar as it can impose limits on or prevent misuse of government budgets. In contrast, provision of public goods and services requires its own organizational structure in the form of the administrative apparatus of the local government. Local leaders who prioritize public service provision also have the incentive to invest in the capacity of that apparatus. To ensure popular satisfaction with their performance and limit the threat posed by future challenges to their position, incumbent officeholders need to distribute government services in a manner that is effective, equitable, and—given the typically limited resources—cost efficient. A well- functioning local government apparatus is necessary to perform these functions of the state. The incumbent local leaders’ choice also shapes local state-society relations. Popular attitudes towards the state, and the local government specifically, are either mediated by the access to patronage—or lack thereof— enjoyed by members of the local population or formed in response to the experience of receipt of public services. Where those services are extensive and of high quality, not only the incumbents, but also the state with which they are associated enjoy popular support; in contrast, poor quality and limited services bring about dissatisfaction with the officeholders’ performance as well as with the government that they lead. These responses to local political conditions represent ideal types. In practice, local leaders’ choices, including those of the Turkana and West Pokot governors, are often less clear-cut. Thus, Kachapin made efforts—albeit largely ineffectual—to develop the capacity of the West Pokot county government, while in Turkana corruption has accompanied the construction of the well-functioning local administrative apparatus. Nevertheless, identification of these ideal types makes it possible to develop a parsimonious explanation of the trajectories of local political development and sheds light on the contemporary and local drivers of the sub-national variation in local government capacity and performance.

8 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

I use the term ‘choice’ to emphasize the contingent nature of local leaders’ actions. The trajectories of local political development are shaped by political conditions such as the type of pressure faced by political agents. Vulnerability to pressure from competitors and constituents creates opportunities and constraints that act as the parameters of the political arenas in which political agents operate. Those parameters produce the incentives for agents to act in specific ways. However, they rarely determine the course of agents’ actions. As I discuss below, both Kachapin and Nanok could have made different choices at specific junctures during their respective terms in office. The choices that they did make reflect not only the incentives that they faced, but also individual preferences and political skills.

The divergent trajectories of local political development in Turkana and West Pokot To demonstrate the effects of local leaders’ responses to their vulnerability to pressure from competitors and constituents, I first present empirical evidence of the substantial variation in local government capacity and performance between Turkana and West Pokot. This variation is puzzling because of the similarities between both counties. The Pokot and Turkana have well-defined collective identities, which had evolved into their current forms in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and gradually become increasingly bounded and expressed through demands for exclusive territorial control, replacing earlier practices that emphasized mobility end ethnic fluidity.25 Since the two counties are largely monethnic—and the ethnic minorities that live within their borders have little influence on local politics—these identities are defined largely in terms of animosity towards ethnic adversaries located outside the two counties’ borders. In both Turkana and West Pokot this externalization of ethnic hostility has helped to limit intra-county tensions. Although Kenya’s democratic political system makes elite capture unlikely, the two societies’ ethnic homogeneity and cohesion have placed an upper limit on the Pokot and Turkana local leaders’ vulnerability to political competition and societal pressure, creating—as I show below—a room for maneuver of which they have taken considerable advantage. The customary governance systems of both ethnic groups, which historically vested political and spiritual authority in elders,26 have weakened considerably in recent decades, allowing younger leaders who derive their prominence from their formal education and contacts with the state to strengthen their positions and assert their power over their coethnics.27 Although by virtue of their affiliation with the larger pan-ethnic Kalenjin community the Pokot played a more prominent role in pre-devolution Kenyan politics than the Turkana, government investment and presence in West Pokot were not appreciably higher than elsewhere Northern Kenya, fueling a sense of marginalization, neglect, and alienation analogous to that experienced by the Turkana. In both new

25 Michael Bollig, “Staging Social Structures: Ritual and Social Organisation in an Egalitarian Society. The Pastoral Pokot of Northern Kenya,” Ethnos 65, no. 3 (2000): 341–65; Clemens Greiner, Michael Bollig, and J. Terrence McCabe, “Notes on Land-Based Conflicts in Kenya’s Arid Areas,” Afrika Spectrum 46, no. 3 (2011): 77–81; Clemens Greiner, “Guns, Land, and Votes: Cattle Rustling and the Politics of Boundary (Re)Making in Northern Kenya,” African Affairs 112, no. 447 (2013): 216–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt003; Clemens Greiner, “Land-Use Change, Territorial Restructuring, and Economies of Anticipation in Dryland Kenya,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 10, no. 3 (2016): 530–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1266197; Alice J.C. Kurgat, “The Ethnicization of Territory: Identity and Space among the Nandi in Turbo Division,” in Spaces of Insecurity: Human Agency in Violent Conflicts in Kenya, ed. Karen Witsenburg and Fred Zaal (Leiden: African Studies Centre, University of Leiden, 2012), 30–57; Beneah Manyuru Mutsotso, “The Role of Administrative Boundaries and Territories in Pastoral Conflicts and Mitigation Efforts in North-Western Kenya,” Online Journal of African Affairs 4, no. 1 (2015): 1–12. 26 And, among the Turkana, prophet-diviners. 27 Michael Bollig, “Ethnic Conflicts in North-West Kenya: Pokot-Turkana Raiding 1969-1984,” Zeitschrift Fur Ethnologie 115 (1990)Bollig; Bollig, “Staging Social Structures: Ritual and Social Organisation in an Egalitarian Society. The Pastoral Pokot of Northern Kenya”; Michael Bollig and Matthias Österle, “Changing Communal Land Tenure in an East African Pastoral System: Institutions and Socio-Economic Transformations among the Pokot of NW Kenya,” Zeitschrift Fur Ethnologie 133, no. 2 (2008): 301–22; Nene Mburu, “Firearms and Political Power: The Military Decline of the Turkana of Kenya,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 10, no. 2 (2001): 148–62.: 73–90.

9 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba counties the promise of a break with the past offered by the transformation of Kenya’s political system after 2010 captured, therefore, popular imaginations and inspired hopes of a better future. In plots 1,2, and 3 I present the results of a survey fielded in Turkana and West Pokot in 2016, in which I asked respondents to assess their experience of interacting with the government in political leaders at the time of data collection (‘now’ in the plots) and before devolution (‘before’). I provide more information about the survey and other data sources used in the paper in the Appendix. I use the changes in the distance to the nearest government office and the frequency of local government officials’ visits to locations across the two counties as proxies for the growth of the county governments’ capacity to perform their functions. I compare the latter change to the change in the frequency of the visits of the local members of parliament (MPs). The data are somewhat ambiguous. While the distance to local government offices is overall shorter in Turkana, its reduction was similar in both counties (Plot 1). Despite devolution, frequent contact with local government officials became rarer in West Pokot; in Turkana the frequency of local governments’ visits remained essentially unchanged (Plot 2). In contrast, West Pokot MPs began to visit their constituents more frequently (Plot 3). For reasons that I discuss below, the similarities between the two counties suggested by the survey results are superficial. Because the evidence provided by the survey is limited, I complement it with analysis of government documents such as the county budgets and media sources as well as with interviews with local political leaders, county government officials, and other well- informed individuals. These data are far more suggestive of the patterns of local political development in Turkana and West Pokot.

10 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

In Turkana, the KES 40 billion (approximately USD 390 million) that the county government was allocated for the period from 2013 to 2017—of which it has received approximately KES 32 billion (USD 310 million)28—has been used to fund the largest and most rapid expansion of public service provision that the area has ever experienced.29 In 2013, there were approximately 650 early childhood education (ECD) centers in Turkana; by 2018, the county government had constructed 180 additional ones. It also recruited 268 ECD teachers. Although post-ECD education is the responsibility of the national government, the county government built sixty-two primary school classrooms. It also hired (and pays the salaries of) 165 primary and thirty-nine secondary school teachers and covers operation costs for the underfunded (national-government) county director of education’s office. In addition, the county government took over the only polytechnic in Turkana from the Catholic Diocese of Lodwar and built six new ones.30 Similarly, the Diocese transferred responsibility for the Kakuma Mission Hospital to the county government, which also spent KES 190 million (USD 1.8 million) on new equipment for the existing public Lodwar Hospital.31 In addition, the county government has constructed four new sub-county hospitals32 and 120 health centers.33 The number of public medicine dispensaries increased from 71 in 2012 to 131 in 2015.34 Overall, between 2013 and 2017 county government healthcare spending averaged around KES 2 billion (USD 1.9 million) per year.35 The county government has also dug boreholes—in 2015, there were 606 boreholes in Turkana, 105 more than two years earlier—and supported the pastoral economy through provision of extension services, animal vaccination campaigns (both in Turkana and across the border in Karamoja, where many Turkana take their livestock during the dry season), and construction of a multiplication and breeding center, livestock holding grounds, and sale yards.36 Furthermore, as of early 2018 the county

28 The Turkana County budget allocation was at the center of a public spat between Uhuru Kenyatta and Josphat Nanok in early 2017, which contributed to Nanok’s elevation to the office of the Chairman of the Council of Governors. Agutu, Nancy. “Uhuru Calls Nanok a Foolish Devil for Raising Queries on Oil Wealth.” Star (Nairobi), March 9, 2017. http://www.the- star.co.ke/news/2017/03/09/audio-uhuru-calls-nanok-a-foolish-devil-for-raising-queries-on-oil_c1521372.; Githinji, George. "How Much Money Has Turkana County Received Since its Inception?" Star (Nairobi), April 2, 2017. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/03/28/how-much-money-has-turkana-county-received-since-its-inception_c1533177. 29 KA10, Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 1st April 2016; KA13, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th and 7th April 2016; KO2, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016; KO8, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 7th March 2016; KO13, senior civil servant, Ministry of Public Service, Decentralized Administration, and Disaster Management, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th April 2016. 30 KO28, senior civil servant, Ministry of Education, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th April 2016; KO166, senior civil servant, Ministry of Education, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th January 2018. 31 “Turkana Reaps Devolution Fruits as 90 Clinics are Built.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), January 26, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/people-daily/194669/turkana-reaps-devolution-fruits-as-90-clinics-are-built/.; KA9, Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 1st April 2016. 32 In Elelea, Lokitaung, Lopiding, and Lorugum. 33 Letting, Joan. “Nanok to Face Munyes in Fierce Battle for Governor of Turkana.” Standard (Nairobi), April 11, 2017. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001235867/nanok-to-face-munyes-in-fierce-battle-for-governor-of-turkana.; KO169, official, Ministry of Health, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 9th January 2018. 34 Janpeter Schilling et al., “For Better or Worse: Major Developments Affecting Resource and Conflict Dynamics in Northwest Kenya,” Zeitschrift Für Wirtschaftsgeographie 60, no. 1–2 (2016): 57–71, https://doi.org/10.1515/zfw-2016- 0001. 35 The budget allocation for education was approximately KES 1 billion per year, roads and public works—also KES 1 billion per year, water services—KES 800 million per year, and pastoral economy—KES 400 million per year. Turkana County Government. 2016. “Consolidated Budget Estimates Summary for Financial Year 2015-2016.” Lodwar: Turkana County Government; “Turkana Reaps Devolution Fruits as 90 Clinics are Built.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), January 26, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/people-daily/194669/turkana-reaps-devolution-fruits-as-90-clinics-are-built/. 36 Schilling et al., “For Better or Worse: Major Developments Affecting Resource and Conflict Dynamics in Northwest Kenya.”; KO35, senior civil servant, Ministry of Pastoral Economy and Fisheries, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th April 2016.

11 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba government had graded 13,300 kilometers and graveled 3,435 kilometers of roads, in addition to tarmacking the main streets (nine kilometers) in Lodwar, where the county headquarters is located.37 In West Pokot, between 2013 and 2017 Kachapin’s county government received from the national treasury KES 17 billion (approximately USD 160 million). While this amount is much smaller in absolute terms than in Turkana, adjusted for population size it represents roughly38 equivalent per- capita expenditure in both counties. Road construction in West Pokot, where by 2016 the county government had built only 1,250 kilometers of roads, lagged behind Turkana.39 Similarly, the West Pokot county government built twenty-four new health centers, a fifth of those constructed in Turkana. In some domains, adjusted for the counties’ respective budget allocations, the performance of the Turkana and West Pokot county governments exhibited less variation. Thus, Kachapin’s administration upgraded Kapenguria County Referral Hospital—but, unlike Nanok’s, did not construct any new hospitals—and purchased six ambulances.40 The West Pokot county government constructed approximately sixty ECD centers, a third of the number of those built in Turkana by Nanok.41 It also dug boreholes—thirty-four of them in the 2015-2016 financial year alone (compared to 105 drilled in Turkana between 2013 and 2015)—and, similarly to its Turkana counterpart, provided extension services, led animal vaccination campaigns, and constructed sale yards to support the pastoral economy.42 Overall, however, in comparison with Turkana the extensiveness of public services provides by the West Pokot county government, which also did not take on any national government functions, was limited. Why is this cross-county variation not captured in the survey data? The discrepancy can be attributed to the limited amount of time that the county governments had to increase public service provision throughout the two counties’ territories. This interpretation is supported by the timing of survey data collection, which took place in Turkana six months before West Pokot. In addition, Turkana’s land area and population are much larger than West Pokot’s: as many as 1.5 million people may live across the seventy-thousand square kilometers that make up Turkana,43 while West Pokot’s population of just over half a million44 occupies nine thousand square kilometers. Delivery of public services poses, therefore, a greater challenge for the Turkana county government than for its West Pokot counterpart. This difficulty is not reflected in the survey data. Furthermore, public service

37 Letting, Joan. “Nanok to Face Munyes in Fierce Battle for Governor of Turkana.” Standard (Nairobi), April 11, 2017. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001235867/nanok-to-face-munyes-in-fierce-battle-for-governor-of-turkana.; KO167, official, Ministry of Roads, Transport, Housing, and Public Works, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th January 2018. 38 Given the lack of precise population data—an issue to which I return below—accurate measurement is difficult. 39 West Pokot County Government, “Annual Report 2015-2016” (Kapenguria: West Pokot County Government, 2016). 40 Ibid.; KO131, civil servant, Ministry of Health, West Pokot County Government, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 4th October 2016; KO135, civil servant, Ministry of Health, West Pokot County Government, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 4th October 2016. 41 KO114, senior civil servant, Department of Education and ICT, West Pokot County Government, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 29th September 2016. 42 West Pokot County Government, “Annual Report 2015-2016.”; KO140, senior civil servant, Department of Livestock, Veterinary, and Fisheries, West Pokot County Government, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 5th October 2016; KO142, senior civil servant, Department of Livestock, Veterinary, and Fisheries, West Pokot County Government, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 5th October 2016. 43 Turkana’s population has grown very fast in the last two decades. Only 450,860 people lived in Turkana District at the time of the 1999 census. By 2009, population had increased to 855,399. If the annual population growth of 6.4 percent recorded in the 2009 census remained constant in subsequent years, the county’s population might have reached 1,427,797 by 2017. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), “Kenya Population and Housing Census, August 2009 - Population Distribution by Sex, Number of Households, Area, Density, and County” (Nairobi: KNBS, n.d.), http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=67:county- statistics&id=15:county-statistics&Itemid=599/; Turkana County Government, “County Integrated Development Plan, 2013-2017” (Lodwar: Turkana County Government, 2013). 44 As of 2009. The population has certainly grown since then, but I am not aware of any recent estimates. KNBS n.d.

12 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba provision in Turkana has been both more equitable and of higher quality than in West Pokot, where provision of public services elicited widespread complaints of poor quality and inconsistent delivery, a product of the disorganization and limited capacity of the county government apparatus constructed by Kachapin.45 In contrast, in Turkana, in the words of an influential local politician:

You see now, one of the advantages of the county government in Turkana is that they distribute everything equally, to six constituencies. If they’re recruiting ECD classes, they make sure they put two in every ward. Even when they put water… two boreholes per… they put the same. So, even those who are against the county government, their people still get the same services. Because the governor is not of one constituency, he’s for the whole county. So, he cannot favour one place, but he distributes development equally.46

Since all Kenyan governors are elected by voters across their counties, the politician’s explanation of the superior standard of the public services provided by the Turkana county government does not hold. Instead, Nanok administration’s capacity for relatively equitable and efficacious distribution of public services—which has understandably proved highly popular among the ordinary Turkana and generated widespread support for the county government and its leader—reflects the choices that the county’s governor made in response to the conditions that he faced.

Local political development in Turkana Josphat Nanok was the MP for Turkana South Constituency and deputy minister in the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife when the 2010 constitution was enacted. He readily recognized the benefits of controlling the office of the governor of Turkana County that was to be created following the 2013 elections. To ensure his electoral victory, Nanok reached a power-sharing agreement with John Kiyonga Munyes, then a fellow MP (for Turkana North). Munyes contested the office of Turkana’s senator (also elected by a county-wide constituency and a member of the new upper chamber of Kenya’s parliament) and his client Peter Lokoel Ekai became Nanok’s deputy governor. Following the elections, much like most other new governors,47 Nanok quickly established control over the newly created county government. In particular, he took advantage of the powers granted to him by the constitution and sidelined his erstwhile allies as well as the MPs (members of the National Assembly, now the lower chamber of the country’s parliament) and opposition members of the new Turkana County Assembly, who found themselves cut off from the resources allocated to the county. Curbing the influence of the members of the county assembly (MCAs) proved straightforward. A Turkana MP explains how the governor used the MCAs’ inexperience—and, in many cases, lack of formal education—to limit his vulnerability to the pressure that they applied:

The MCAs, who are supposed to oversee the county government, are not doing their job. Why? One, illiteracy levels. Most of them have not gone to school properly. The governor is a degree holder. The MCA who is supposed to oversight [sic] him has not even gone to Class 1. How can this person oversee someone with a degree? How can you scrutinize the books of accounts, if they’re the right way or not?

45 KO12, Turkana assistant chief, interviewed in Lodwar on the 5th April 2016; KO13, senior civil servant, Ministry of Public Service, Decentralized Administration, and Disaster Management, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th April 2016; KO28, senior civil servant, Ministry of Education, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th April 2016; KO111, Pokot professional, interviewed in Makutano on the 28th September 2016; KO112, Pokot former local authority councillor, interviewed in Makutano on the 29th September 2016. 46 Turkana politician (code withheld to protect the respondent’s identity). 47 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, “Decentralisation in Kenya: The Governance of Governors”; Jeffrey Steeves, “Devolution in Kenya: Derailed or on Track?,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 53, no. November (2015): 457– 74, https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2015.1089006; Peter Wanyande, “Devolution, Politics and the Judiciary in Kenya,” in Animating Devolution in Kenya: The Role of the Judiciary, ed. Conrad M. Bosire and Wanjiru Gikonyo (Rome and Nairobi: International Development Law Organization, Judiciary Training Institute, and Katiba Institute, 2015), 58–100.

13 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

It’s a big, big problem.48

Given the powers vested in governors, parliamentarians too found their influence diminished, even though they hold prominent political offices and enjoy significant popular support in their constituencies. Nevertheless, they represented the only category of Turkana political agents capable of effectively challenging the governor. Over time, legislators dissatisfied with their exclusion from power coalesced around Senator Munyes. In 2016, Munyes left the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K), of which he had been the chairman, to become a member of the Jubilee Party newly formed by President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto, where he was joined by all but one incumbent Turkana parliamentarian.49 Deputy Governor Ekai also denounced his boss and joined forces with Munyes and his new coalition.50 As a member of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM, the largest party in the CORD / NASA electoral coalitions), the Turkana governor could always expect Jubilee to mount a substantial challenge in the 2017 elections. However, because such a large number of influential Turkana leaders formed an anti-Nanok alliance, the governor now faced a much more difficult than expected re-election campaign against Munyes, who chose to contest the gubernatorial office. Despite this challenge to Nanok’s political dominance, the lack of intra-ethnic divisions among the Turkana complicated his adversaries’ efforts to mobilize voters. Although the ethnic group is divided into territorial sections, these have never become politically salient.51 The internal cohesion of the Turkana society is further strengthened by the shared grievances against neighboring ethnic groups, including the Pokot, and the distant national government that had for decades neglected and mistreated the Turkana. For this reason, while the legislators’ efforts to use the strength of Turkana ethnic identity to orient their constituents against common enemies and stoke interethnic enmity have proved somewhat efficacious,52 analogous attempts to create intra-ethnic divisions have failed. For instance,

48 KO1, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 18th February 2016. 49 Joyce Akai Emanikor (Woman MP), Christopher Doye Nakuleu (Turkana North), James Lomenen Ekomwa (Turkana South), and Daniel Epuyo Nanok (Turkana West) were already members of the Jubilee Party’s predecessor outfits, Kenyatta’s National Alliance and Ruto’s United Republican Party. Munyes’s FORD-K colleague Nicholas Ngikor Nixon (Turkana East) followed the senator to Jubilee, as did the sole ODM member of parliament from Turkana, Protus Ewesit Akujah (Loima), whom Nanok excluded from access to county government resources as much as he did members of opposing parties. Only John Lodepe Nakara (Turkana Central), who had long been close to Nanok, threw his weight behind the governor, apparently in exchange for Nanok’s promised support for Nakara’s gubernatorial campaign in 2022. Lutta, Sammy. “Munyes Ditches Ford-K for Jubilee, Plans to Unseat Governor.” Daily Nation (Nairobi), September 10, 2016. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Munyes-ditches-Ford-K-for-Jubilee/1064-3375556-format-xhtml- dpde8mz/index.html/.; Ndanyi, Mathews. “Nanok, Munyes to Battle in JP, NASA Turkana Race.” Star (Kenya), May 4, 2017. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/05/04/nanok-munyes-to-battle-in-jp-nasa-turkana-race_c1553966/. 50 Cheptoo, Joy. “Governor Nanok Acuses Deputy of Rebellion.” Citizen TV (Kenya), September 5, 2016. https://citizentv.co.ke/news/governor-nanok-accuses-deputy-of-rebellion-139941/. 51 KA11, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 4th April 2016; KO8, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 7th March 2016; KA13, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th and 7th April 2016. 52 Jeremy Lind, “Devolution, Shifting Centre-Periphery Relationships and Conflict in Northern Kenya,” Political Geography, 2017, 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.004.; Agutu, Nancy. “West Pokot Senator at CID for Grilling on Nadome Killings.” Star (Nairobi), May 12, 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201505120997.html/.; Wafula, Benjamin. “Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery Has Blamed Political Leaders for Increased Attacks and Cattle Raids in Turkana, Baringo and Other Regions.” Citizen TV (Kenya), May 12, 2016. http://citizennews.co.ke/kabete-by- elections/root/news/2012/local/item/28796-politicians-responsible-for-turkana-attacks-nkaissery.html/.; “350 Families Displaced in Turkana East Clashes, 92 Dead.” Star (Nairobi), May 12, 2016. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/350-families- displaced-turkana-east-clashes-92-dead/.; KA12, Turkana professional, interviewed in Napeikar, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county on the 5th April 2016. KA13, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th and 7th April 2016; KO8, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 7th March 2016; KA21, Turkana development worker, interviewed in Lodwar on the 9th January 2018.

14 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba the governor’s successor as the Turkana South MP James Lomenen’ advocacy of the allocation of a larger share of petroleum extraction rents to the inhabitants of the constituency—the location of the oil-rich Lokichar Basin—apparently oriented to stoke tensions between his constituents and other Turkana, had little effect.53 Significant oil reserves—which are estimated to contain more than 600 million barrels of oil, enabling potential commercial production of 100,000 barrels per day (comparable to oil production in Ghana)—had been discovered in Turkana in 2012.54 The potentially very large rents from oil production simultaneously made challenging Nanok more attractive for Turkana parliamentarians and helped the governor to reduce his vulnerability to the pressure that he faced from his competitors. Given the long history of the national government’s disregard for the Turkana and their needs, the constituents of the legislators who had aligned themselves with Jubilee were deeply suspicious of the national government and of the motivations of the politicians who control it. In particular, the Turkana were wary of attempts to rob them of the county’s oil wealth. In late 2016 President Kenyatta vetoed the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill and returned it to parliament with a stipulation that the Turkana local communities’ share of oil income be reduced from 10 to 5 percent.55 Nanok immediately took advantage of President’s evident attempt to deprive the Turkana of income from extraction of oil from their land. He vowed to stop petroleum exploration in the county and called for an increase of the Turkana share of oil rents to 30 percent.56 Nanok’s proposal led to a public spat in early 2017 when, at a function in Lodwar, an agitated Kenyatta called the Turkana governor “a fool and a devil.”57 The president’s outburst only served to weaken the cohesion of the Jubilee-Turkana alliance as well as to solidify Nanok’s influence in Turkana.58 While the governor’ vulnerability to political competition remained limited, the pressure that he faced from his constituents was much stronger. To address their needs and demands, as I discuss above Nanok has effected the largest and most rapid expansion of public service provision in Turkana’s history. The relatively equitable distribution of these county government services can be attributed both to the Turkana society’s internal cohesion and the governor’s desire to prevent the emergence of future grievances that his competitors can use to build their support bases. In order to provide those

53 KA11, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 4th April 2016. 54 Brock Bersaglio and Charis Enns, “Exploring the Implications of Oil and Gas Development for Livelihood Resilience in Turkana, Kenya” (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2015), https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.2339.5681; Charis Enns, “Experiments in Governance and Citizenship in Kenya’s Resource Frontier” (Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, 2016); Charis Enns and Brock Bersaglio, “Enclave Oil Development and the Rearticulation of Citizenship in Turkana, Kenya: Exploring ‘Crude Citizenship,’” Geoforum 67 (2015): 78–88, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.10.010; Charis Enns and Brock Bersaglio, “Pastoralism in the Time of Oil: Youth Perspectives on the Oil Industry and the Future of Pastoralism in Turkana, Kenya,” The Extractive Industries and Society, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.11.003; Kennedy Mkutu Agade, “‘Ungoverned Space’ and the Oil Find in Turkana, Kenya,” The Round Table 103, no. 5 (2014): 497–515, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2014.966497; J. Schilling et al., “The Nexus of Oil, Conflict, and Climate Change Vulnerability of Pastoral Communities in Northwest Kenya,” Earth System Dynamics Discussions 6, no. 2 (2015): 1163–1200, https://doi.org/10.5194/esdd-6-1163-2015; Schilling et al., “For Better or Worse: Major Developments Affecting Resource and Conflict Dynamics in Northwest Kenya.” 55 Ngasike, Lucas, and Joan Letting. “Turkana Leaders Vow to Fight for 10 Percent Oil Share Benefits.” Standard (Nairobi), January 9, 2017. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000229184/turkana-leaders-vow-to-fight-for-10-percent-oil- share-benefits/. 56 Ibid.; Ongiri, Isaac. “Raila Upbraids Uhuru on Sharing Oil Cash.” Daily Nation (Nairobi), December 1, 2016. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Raila-opposes-Uhuru-s-oil-cash-sharing-scheme/1056-3470590-format-xhtml- 31qacy/index.html/.; Senelwa, Kennedy. “Row Brewing over How Oil Revenue from Turkana Basin Will Be Shared.” East African, January 3, 2017. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Row-brewing-over-how-Turkana-oil-revenue-will-be- shared/2560-3505470-sqvlpd/index.html/. 57 Agutu, Nancy. “Uhuru Calls Nanok a Foolish Devil for Raising Queries on Oil Wealth.” Star (Nairobi), March 9, 2017. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/03/09/audio-uhuru-calls-nanok-a-foolish-devil-for-raising-queries-on-oil_c1521372. 58 Oruko, Ibrahim. “Josephat Nanok Elected Council of Governors Chairman.” Daily Nation (Nairobi), May 22, 2017. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Josephat-Nanok-elected-Council-of-Governors-chairman/1056-3937058-ojn9gs/index.html.

15 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba services to his county’s population, Nanok needed to construct a well-functioning administrative apparatus. Mindful of the difficulty of building state capacity where none had previously existed, the governor recruited a number of competent county executive committee members (CECs) and civil servants.59 In addition to ensuring efficacious delivery of public services, employment opportunities in the county government have served Nanok as a valuable patronage tool.60 The distribution of private goods to the governor’s supporters accounts for at least some of the several recent cases of corruption in the county government.61 According to a Turkana MP:

Corruption is now high. It used to be there. But now it has gone deep down there. Even the people who did not know corruption, now they know what corruption is all about, to get rich very quickly, to use your position to get rich, or to use your position to scatter your political enemies.62

Nevertheless, Nanok has built—essentially from scratch—a remarkably well-functioning administrative apparatus that directs the operations of the county government and performs the devolved governance functions.63 This administrative system extends beyond Lodwar. The Turkana County Government has established sub-county and ward administrations, although the creation of village kraal administrations has been delayed. Projection of authority through these lower-level administrative structures helps the county government to communicate with the population, gauge public mood, address grievances, deliver services desired by their recipients, and, thereby, limit societal pressure. The relatively extensive engagement between the county government—and its sub- county and ward representatives—and individual local communities stands in contrast to the pre- devolution Kenyan government’s aloofness and has contributed to the transformation of popular attitudes towards Kenya. Whereas prior to devolution the Kenyan state was seen as an alien entity of little relevance to the lives of ordinary Turkana, frequent public consultations and service provision that the county government has extended even to relatively remote parts of Turkana County—as well as the ability to freely elect officials that represent the Turkana at various levels of the Kenyan political structure—have resulted in the gradual emergence of a sense of inclusion in and ownership of the Kenyan state as well as the increased government accountability to Turkana’s population. This shift

59 As of 2016, the county government had recruited 1,494 civil servants, in addition to the 536 whom it had inherited at the time of devolution from the national government and the former local authorities. 60 In contravention of the County Government Act, which requires that county governments recruit 30 percent of their employees from outside the county, 93.4 percent of the county government officials hired since 2013 are ethnic Turkana. While some of them have proven highly capable and helped Nanok to build an efficient administrative apparatus, many less qualified candidates have benefitted from the governor’s patronage. National Cohesion and Integration Commission, “Ethnic and Diversity Audit of the County Public Service” (Nairobi: National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 2016). 61 Thuku, Wahome. “Sh14m Graft Probe against Turkana Governor Still Under Way.” Standard (Nairobi), May 26, 2015. http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000163477/sh14m-graft-probe-against-turkana-governor-still-under-way-eacc/.; “95% of Land in Turkana County Grabbed.” Citizen TV (Kenya), February 7, 2016. https://citizentv.co.ke/news/95-of-land- in-turkana-county-grabbed-report-113846/.; Mbugua, Bernice. “Turkana County Graft Den, Says Women's Rep.” Mediamax Network (Kenya), March 18, 2016. http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/people-daily/207633/turkana-county- graft-den-says-womens-rep/.; “Turkana Officials Grab Public Land, Says MP Emanikor.” Star (Nairobi), July 25, 2016. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/07/25/turkana-officials-grab-public-land-says-mp-emanikor_c1391678/.; Otaba, Zacheaus. “Turkana County Secretary Busts MCAs over Shoddy Projects.” Star (Nairobi), December 17, 2016. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/12/17/turkana-county-secretary-busts-mcas-over-shoddy-projects_c1474945/. 62 KO8, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 7th March 2016. 63 KA9, Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 1st April 2016; KA10, Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 1st April 2016; KA11, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 4th April 2016; KO8, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 7th March 2016; KO13, senior civil servant, Ministry of Public Service, Decentralized Administration, and Disaster Management, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th April 2016; KO21, senior civil servant, Ministry of Public Service, Decentralized Administration, and Disaster Management, Turkana County Government, interviewed in Lodwar on the 7th April 2016.

16 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba can be attributed in large part to the effectiveness and extensiveness of the administrative apparatus established by Nanok.64 This apparatus has allowed the county government to successfully perform the devolved functions. Even though the expansion of public service provision has not been adequate to the needs to the county’s marginalized population, which remains exceedingly poor, as of early 2018 Turkana had spent a higher proportion of its budget on development initiatives than all but one other Kenyan county.65 The governor’s efforts to limit his vulnerability to political competition also appears to have significantly contributed to the success of the Turkana County Government and its ability to equitably distribute the services it delivers to the county’s population: beholden to competing interests of the parliamentarians, Nanok could have conceivably been forced to channel resources to their supporters. Turkana voters proved willing to reward the governor for his performance. On election day in 2017, they gave Nanok a decisive victory over Munyes in the gubernatorial contest.66

Local political development in West Pokot As the transformation of Kenya’s political system initiated by the adoption of the 2010 constitution approached, political conditions in West Pokot closely resembled those in Turkana. The ethnic homogeneity and cohesion—strengthened by the experience of marginalization and neglect at the hands of the previous Kenyan governments—of the two counties’ populations prevented the emergence of politically salient internal divisions and, simultaneously, placed upper bounds on the otherwise high vulnerability of most Kenyan politicians. At the time of the 2013 elections both counties also lacked a dominant local political figure. Nanok, after all, only established his preeminence in Turkana politics after his ascension to the gubernatorial office. In West Pokot, after an unsuccessful parliamentary bid in 2007, John Lonyangapuo, a former university administrator and lecturer turned civil servant—he is universally known as ‘Professor’ in West Pokot—had skillfully built a substantial power base, so that that by 2013 he had become the most popular Pokot politician, but he remained only one of several powerful local leaders.67 Lonyangapuo, who preferred the comfort and prestige of Nairobi to the isolation of Kapenguria, where the county headquarters was to be located, thought that senators would be able to control county governments from Nairobi. Furthermore, he presided over a fledgling, but extensive, patronage network through which he could exert influence in West Pokot. For this reason, after initially mulling a gubernatorial bid, Lonyangapuo chose to contest West Pokot’s senatorial seat and entrusted the task of running the new county government on his behalf to his client

64 KA10, Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 1st April 2016; KA11, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 4th April 2016; KA13, Turkana Catholic priest, interviewed in Lodwar on the 6th and 7th April 2016; KO4, member of parliament from Baringo County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 23rd February 2016; KO6, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 25th February 2016; KO9, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 9th March 2016. 65 “Governors Who Spent Most to Run Offices.” Standard (Nairobi), January 7, 2018. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001265183/governors-who-spent-most-to-run-offices/. 66 At the same time, Peter Emuria Lotethiro—a northerner whom Nanok had specifically selected as his running mate to weaken Munyes’s hold on Turkana North—was elected the deputy governor. Munyes’s former seat in the Senate was meanwhile captured by the governor’s ally Malachy Charles Ekal Imama. ODM candidates also won the parliamentary contests in Loima, Turkana Central, and Turkana East. Jubilee incumbents retained their seats in Turkana North, Turkana South, and Turkana West, as well as—temporarily—the position of the county’s woman representative. (Munyes’s ally Emanikor’s re-election was nullified because of election irregularities.) Jubilee also gained the plurality in the county assembly, where it holds fourteen seats, compared to ODM’s twelve. IEBC n.d.; Lutta, Sammy. “Court Nullifies Turkana Woman Rep Emanikor’s Election” Daily Nation (Nairobi), March 2, 2018. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/turkana/Turkana-Woman-Rep-election-nullified/1183330-4326134-asivoe/index.html/.; KA21, Turkana development worker, interviewed in Lodwar on the 9th January 2018; KA17, Turkana development worker, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th January 2018; KA18, Turkana professional, interviewed in Lodwar on the 8th January 2018. 67 KO98, former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September 2016; KO152, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016.

17 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

Simon Kachapin, a high school principal with no political experience. Thanks to Lonyangapuo’s charisma, personal popularity, and political skill as much as to the support from the powerful Moi family—they ran on the ticket of the KANU party associated with the family—the two candidates won the elections. It quickly became apparent that, much like his senatorial colleague Munyes, Lonyangapuo had miscalculated. Having “piggybacked on Lonyangapuo,” as a West Pokot MCA puts it, Kachapin “realized that the governor had powers, that he could employ people without consulting [Lonyangapuo]. So, they parted ways.”68 By September 2013, around six months after the elections, the governor had ceased to comply with his former patron’s directives and, much like Nanok in Turkana, begun to accumulate power in his own hands. Another MCA relates:

The governor felt that there were a lot of privileges to be had over the senator. […] The governor, after amassing power, feared that he would not enjoy the privileges if he shared with others. He wanted to be the sole decision maker. He didn’t want to share power with anyone, including with the senator.69

Unlike his Turkana counterpart, however, Kachapin had no independent support base. Instead, having distanced himself from Lonyangapuo, he faced pressure from Professor’s many clients and supporters, including the KANU MCAs. To counter the opposition from his own party—of which he was legally required to remain a member in order to retain his position—the governor set out to create his own support base that would enable him to withstand his one-time allies’ hostility. Kachapin’s pursuit of this goal was aided by the legal protections enjoyed by Kenyan governors, by the considerable funds that he now administered, and by KANU’s inability to capture the majority of MCA seats in the elections held earlier that year. As nineteen of the thirty-two seats in the county assembly were held by members of other parties, Kachapin easily bypassed the nominal ‘majority party’ and constructed a new pro-county government majority. After his split with Lonyangapuo, he also made common cause with West Pokot’s four United Republican Party (URP)70 MPs who—as Deputy President Ruto’s allies, could count on the support of the national government—and, subsequently, with KANU’s sole MP from West Pokot, Samuel Moroto. Lonyangapuo’s patronage network, formed on the basis of the KANU party organization, included, meanwhile, a large number of MCAs; in the run-up to the 2017 elections he also successfully convinced Samuel Losuron Poghisio, his ODM competitor in the 2013 senatorial race, to join him in KANU with the promise of the seat in the Senate that Professor would vacate to vie for the office of the governor.71 The two competitors also successfully integrated different sections of Pokot elders into their support bases and sought to use their coethnics’ respect for customary leaders to enhance their electoral prospects in 2017. The widely-publicized dispute about the appointment of the community spokesman sheds light on the politicization of the Pokot customary governance system during the electoral campaign. In late 2016 a group of elders presided over Lonyangapuo’s installation as the Pokot community spokesman in a ceremony held at Amaya in Baringo County.72 Kachapin’s supporters, including the local MP Asman Kamama and a number of elders, promptly declared the ritual invalid. Not to be outdone, a few months later the governor organized his own ceremony, held at his birthplace at Muino in West Pokot, where elders belonging to his patronage network appointed him as another Pokot community

68 KO152, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016. 69 KO149, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Makutano on the 5th October 2016 and in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016. 70 URP was part of the Jubilee Alliance. 71 Chai, Marryann. “Poghisio to Run for W Pokot Senator on Kanu Ticket.” September 27, 2016. http://www.the- star.co.ke/news/2016/09/27/poghisio-to-run-for-w-pokot-senator-on-kanu-ticket_c1426743/. 72 Parts of Baringo are also inhabited by the Pokot.

18 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba spokesman. Professor responded to this challenge with a rally at which at which no fewer than 4,000 Pokot elders endorsed his gubernatorial candidacy.73 This episode demonstrates Kachapin and Lonyangapuo’s success in building two distinct political blocs in the county.74 They did so despite the absence of politically salient sub-ethnic or regional divisions within the Pokot society. An MCA allied with Professor provides the following account of the role of the Pokot ethnic identity in political life in the county:

The county is one tribe, the assembly is one tribe. You cannot be against your own tribe. Even when you’re opposing the government, you don’t want to shoot down a bill that benefits the people. The MCAs are Pokot. Together we serve the same people. If you oppose a bill it will [negatively] affect the people. If we had different tribes, it would be different.75

Given the cohesion of the Pokot society, neither of the two competitors could easily target a specific segment of the county’s population. Instead, they relied on the formation of alliances with other local political agents, especially those who commanded their own popular following that could be mobilized for the 2017 elections. Such alliance-making required financial inducements. The governor funded his expenses largely with the county government funds.76 In the—in all likelihood hyperbolical—assessment of one research respondent, “three-quarters [of the county government budget] have been used to benefit individuals, not the community.”77 The rate of corruption in West Pokot is impossible to establish, but it almost certainly greatly exceeded that in Turkana. Irrespective of the precise value of misappropriated county government resources, all the respondents with whom I raised the subject agreed that corruption in West Pokot had become prevalent.78 In the words of one of them, a former mayor of Kapenguria, “the governor has treated the

73 Mabatuk, Vincent. “Pokot Elders Pick Senator to Succeed Lotodo 16 Years On.” Standard (Nairobi), October 17, 2016. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000219972/pokot-elders-pick-senator-to-succeed-lotodo-16-years-on/.; Mabatuk, Vincent. “With New Pokot Crown, West Pokot Senator John Lonyangapuo Gets Ready to Fight Jubilee.” Standard (Nairobi), October 23, 2016. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000220731/with-new-pokot-crown-west-pokot- senator-john-lonyangapuo-gets-ready-to-fight-jubilee/.; Kibor, Fred. “West Pokot Senator John Lonyangapuo is Not Fit for Spokesman, Says Tiaty MP Asman Kamama.” Standard (Nairobi), November 20, 2016. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000224074/west-pokot-senator-john-lonyangapuo-is-not-fit-for-spokesman- says-tiaty-mp-asman-kamama/.; Chai, Marryann. “Pokot Elders Split in Choice of Spokesman.” Star (Nairobi), January 10, 2017. http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/01/10/pokot-elders-split-in-choice-of-spokesman_c1484207/. 74 Since the divisions that Kachapin and Lonyangapuo have opened within the Pokot society are based on personal popularity, political skill, and patronage, rather than any identifiable social cleavages, it seems unlikely that they pose a long-term threat to the cohesiveness of the Pokot ethnic identity. 75 KO149, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Makutano on the 5th October 2016 and in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016. 76 “Clash of the Titans: Kachapin, Lonyangapuo Battle for Political Supremacy.” Rift Valley News, August 16, 2015. https://riftvalleynews.wordpress.com/2015/08/16/clash-of-the-titans-kachapin-lonyangapuo-battle-for-political- supremacy/.; KO149, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Makutano on the 5th October 2016 and in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016; KO151, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016; KO152, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016. 77 KO111, Pokot professional, interviewed in Makutano on the 28th September 2016. 78 KO98, former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September 2016; KO112, Pokot former local authority councillor, interviewed in Makutano on the 29th September 2016; KO113, Pokot human rights activist, interviewed in Makutano on the 20th September 2016; KO149, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Makutano on the 5th October 2016 and in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016; KO151, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016; KE402, Pokot elder, interviewed in Kacheliba, North Pokot Sub-county on the 1st October 2016; also Chai, Marryann. “Leaders Want Kachapin Prosecuted.” Star (Nairobi), July 20, 2017. https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/07/20/leaders-want-kachapin-prosecuted-for-misusing-west-pokot- resources_c1600635/. Keter, Gideon. “Finance Laws Disregarded Under Kachapin, Senate Watchdog Told. Star (Nairobi),

19 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba county like his own property.”79 Kachapin used the county government budget both to distribute private goods to his supporters and to enrich himself.80 Given the existence of rudimentary legal protections against graft, money was not directly looted from the county treasury. Instead, Kachapin and his allies used county government contracts.81 The distribution of private goods to supporters strained even Kachapin’s resources, despite his ability to (illegally) tap into the county government budget. For Lonyangapuo—by all accounts a rich man but lacking a comparable revenue base—independent accumulation of funds demanded by his clients would have been even more challenging. From the beginning, however, Professor benefitted from the support of the immensely wealthy Moi family. To counter the advantage that affiliation with the Mois afforded his adversary, Kachapin turned to their nemesis William Ruto. In 2016, he officially declared his intention to leave KANU and joined the deputy president and the West Pokot MPs—most of whom had already been members of Ruto’s URP—in the newly created Jubilee Party. The alliance with the national government helped Kachapin no more than it did Munyes. His vulnerability to Lonyangapuo’s challenge made it difficult for the West Pokot governor to address the pressure that he faced from his constituents. In the words of an MCA from the county:

There’s a very funny thing in Pokot. When the will of the people is no longer with you, you will lose, even if you have money. If the will of the people if high, you will win even if you have no money.82

Kachapin certainly had the money, but used it for the construction of his patronage network instead of provision of public services to West Pokot’s population. In addition, a significant proportion of the county government budget was simply unintentionally misspent.83 Both the misuse of county government resources and the limited extensiveness and standard of public service provision that I discuss above are largely the function of the capacity of the administrative apparatus that Kachapin constructed after he came to power. Devolution led to significant expansion of the rudimentary state structures that had previously been responsible for administration of West Pokot. The governor established ministries and other county government bodies, including sub-county and ward administrations, and employed officials needed to run them. This new administrative apparatus helped Kachapin to exercise the political power that he had acquired

September 28, 2018. https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/09/28/finance-laws-disregarded-under-kachapin-senate- watchdog-told_c1826257/. 79 KO98, former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September 2016. 80 KO112, Pokot former local authority councillor, interviewed in Makutano on the 29th September 2016. 81 KO149, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Makutano on the 5th October 2016 and in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016. 82 KO149, member of the West Pokot County Assembly, interviewed in Makutano on the 5th October 2016 and in Kapenguria on the 6th October 2016; also similar predictions from KO98, Pokot former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September; KO111, Pokot professional, interviewed in Makutano on the 28th September 2016; KO112, Pokot former local authority councillor, interviewed in Makutano on the 29th September 2016. 83 A former Kapenguria mayor details: “Kachapin has put up a very big building in Kapenguria for the medical training college, but the county doesn’t run medical training [which is, instead the national government’s responsibility—KC]. But Kachapin has spent county money on it. In Kacheliba he’s spent 400 million for a tourist hotel, even though there are no tourist attractions here. Here in Makutano [West Pokot’s largest town, located downhill from Kacheliba—KC], they’re also building a building for the ward administrator, even though there are already buildings here and money could be better spent on supporting people, on fertilizer, on buying tractors, on water. […] Kachapin has also appropriated land in Kapenguria for the governor’s residence.” KO98, former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September 2016. (The monumental gubernatorial mansion is located in a large walled compound that takes up much of Kapenguria’s land area. The owners of the land on which the residence was constructed are alleged to have been illegally dispossessed shortly after the 2013 elections. In the words of a former local authority councillor, Kachapin “wants prestige. That’s why he built the huge residence in Kapenguria. We still don’t have enough medicines, enough health facilities. How can you build such things, like the residence, offices? There are no medicines, how can you build the big buildings?” KO112, Pokot former local authority councillor, interviewed in Makutano on the 29th September 2016.)

20 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba upon his ascension to the gubernatorial office, perform the devolved government functions for which he was now legally responsible, administer the funds that the county government received in order to carry out these tasks, and establish a relationship with West Pokot’s population that he hoped would enhance his re-election prospects. Recruitment of civil servants also served as a valuable patronage tool. However, the pressure that he faced from his adversary led the governor to prioritize the development of his patronage network, rather than the local state apparatus. The incentives to invest in state capacity were relatively low. Furthermore, the feud with Lonyangapuo prevented Kachapin from devoting sufficient attention to organizational matters and, at times, directly interfered with the functioning of the county government. For instance, the governor illegally dismissed three of his CECs and the county secretary because he suspected them of supporting the senator. When a court ordered Kachapin to reinstate them, he ignored the ruling.84 The governor’s actions both escalated political discord in West Pokot and contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with the county government.85 In these conditions, Lonyangapuo’s long campaign against Kachapin and the governor’s own mistakes, including the poor quality of his administration and of public service provision in the county, proved sufficient to secure KANU victory in 2017. On election day, Professor handily defeated the incumbent governor.86

Conclusion The variation in the capacity and performance of the Turkana and West Pokot county governments reflects the divergent trajectories of local political development in the two counties. In Turkana, Governor Nanok outmaneuvered his competitors, who failed to build support bases large enough to threaten the incumbent local leader’s position. Nanok successfully limited his vulnerability to pressure from political adversaries. These conditions in turn weakened (but not eliminated) the incentives to channel county government resources to his clients. At the same time, Kenya’s democratic political system ensured that the governor remained vulnerable to pressure from his constituents. To increase his re-election prospects, Nanok constructed a capable administrative apparatus of the Turkana County Government and used it to greatly expand public service provision across Turkana. In West Pokot, the county government’s inferior performance stems from Governor Kachapin’s inability to successfully sideline his primary opponent, Senator Lonyangapuo. Since Kachapin remained continuously vulnerable to pressure from his adversary, the West Pokot governor redirected both his attention and the county government resources to the construction of his own patronage network and provision of private goods to his clients. The prioritization of clientelist interests made it difficult for Kachapin to construct a capable county government apparatus and deliver public services to his constituents, even though he would require their support in the 2017 elections. The trajectories of the state-making processes in Turkana and West Pokot draw attention to the contemporary local drivers of political development. The processes unfolding at the centers of political power on which much of the existing scholarship focuses certainly matter: after all, such processes led both to Kenya’s democratization, which ensured governors’ vulnerability to societal pressure, and to creation of county governments. They cannot, however, account for the variation between the two counties. Instead, the effects of institutional change have been mediated by local political conditions

84 “Sacked West Pokot County Ministers Reinstated by Court.” North Rift News, July 14, 2015. http://northriftnews.com/sacked-west-pokot-county-ministers-reinstated-by-court/.; KO98, former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September 2016. 85 KO98, former mayor of Kapenguria, interviewed in Makutano on the 27th September 2016; KO113, Pokot human rights activist, interviewed in Makutano on the 20th September 2016; KE402, Pokot elder, interviewed in Kacheliba, North Pokot Sub-county on the 1st October 2016. 86 At the same time, Poghisio won the senatorial contest. However, KANU failed to win any of the seats in the National Assembly, all of which were captured by Jubilee candidates. In the county assembly contests, Jubilee and KANU both won eight seats each. IEBC n.d.

21 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba and local leaders’ responses to those conditions. Explanation of local political development in Turkana and West Pokot requires consideration of their governors’ vulnerability to pressure from their competitors and constituents. The type of pressure that Kachapin and Nanok faced reflected not only local political conditions, but also the local leaders’ ability to take advantage of the opportunities and constraints imposed by those conditions. While the Turkana governor was an experienced political operative and an excellent strategist who successfully countered opposition to his dominance, his West Pokot counterpart, a political newcomer without his own support base, possessed limited political skills; his ill-judged early attempt to dissociate himself from Lonyangapuo, to whose patronage he owed his position, led to a power struggle between the two political agents that dominated post- devolution political life in the county. Local political development is, therefore, shaped by agentic factors as well as by political conditions.

Appendix In this project I make use of a mixed-methods research design that combines the benefits of contemporaneous media reporting, interviews with knowledgeable participants and observers of local political development in Turkana and West Pokot, and collection and analysis of observational quantitative data in both counties.

1. Media sources I reviewed close to 1,000 articles published primarily by Kenyan news outlets. 345 of these sources contained relevant data and were analyzed in Nvivo. These data helped me to identify key trends and informed me of some important events in the two counties, but—because of both the paucity of high- quality reporting and the complexity of local politics—they were unsurprisingly insufficient to develop an accurate, detailed representation of local political development.

2. Field research For this reason, I collected data in Nairobi (from January to March and in September 2016), Turkana (from March to April 2016 and in January 2018), and West Pokot (from September to October 2016). Data collection took place in sixty-eight research sites listed below. Field research was authorized by the University of Toronto Social Sciences, Humanities, and Education Research Ethics Board.

3. Research sites • Nairobi – interview only • Turkana o Interviews: § Lodwar, Central Division, Turkana Central Sub-county § Nadapal, Nadapal Sub-location, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county § Napeikar, Napeikar Sub-location, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county o Survey: § Kanamkemer Sub-location, Kanamkemer Location, Central Division, Turkana Central Sub-county § Najasikiria, Kanamkemer Sub-location, Kanamkemer Location, Central Division, Turkana Central Sub-county § Narusebo, Nadapal Sub-location, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county § Nasiger, Nasiger sub-location, Napeililim location, Loima Sub-county • West Pokot o Interviews:

22 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba

§ Kapenguria, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county § Kacheliba, Kacheliba Division, West Pokot Sub-county § Makutano, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county o Survey: § Chemarmar, Chepareria Division, Central Pokot Sub-county § Kacheliba, Kacheliba Division, West Pokot Sub-county § Kapenguria, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county § Totum, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county

4. Survey The first task of field research was to provide systematic evidence of local political development in Turkana and West Pokot. To this end, a survey was administered to the inhabitants of the research sites. The survey investigated the respondents’ experiences related to the role of the governments and local leaders. In particular, it asked them about the ways and extent to which their relationship with state administration has changed in the course of devolution. The survey was administered using Qualtrics software on Android and iOS devices in Ng’ala Pokot and Ateker Ngaturkana by teams of enumerators fluent in these languages: • in Turkana: Samuel Ekale, David Emekwi, Peter Erukudi, and Etabo Francis Loter; • in West Pokot: Paul Plimo, Ambrose Ruto, Michael Somot, and Steven Tudoreng. Due to financial limitations, data collection for the survey relied on cluster sampling; clusters were created to represent population resident in administrative centres, smaller towns or trading centres, and non-urban areas located both in the vicinity of administrative centres and in outlying areas of the administrative divisions. 371 survey responses were collected: 247 in Turkana and 124 in West Pokot. I cleaned and analysed the data in RStudio using base R and arm, boot, car, cjoint, dplyr, effects, forcats, ggplot2, magrittr, nnet, psych, stargazer, tidyr, tidyverse, and xtable packages.

5. Interviews My investigation of other aspects of local political development relied on interviews, which provided a valuable source of detailed, contextual information. In the course of field research, I conducted 67 interviews for the project local political leaders, civil servants, and other individuals knowledgeable about various aspects of local political development, including academics, journalists, and religious leaders (bishops and priests). The interviews, which were semi-structured and open-ended, took place in all research sites. The interviews were intended to yield a wide range of valuable information, including on attitudes, beliefs and preferences of the political agents, on the choices that they have made, as well as specific events and processes that have occurred in the course of the two counties’ political development. Questions to individual respondents were modified during the interviews to capture the informants’ knowledge more fully, enable them to express their views and opinions, and reveal their knowledge and understandings. When possible, member checks were applied during or at the end of each interview to ensure descriptive and interpretive validity of findings. I conducted (in English) all the interviews with non-customary political agents, and a small number of interviews with customary leaders unassisted. Research assistants—David Emekwi in Turkana and Ambrose Ruto in West Pokot— participated in and interpreted most of the interviews with customary leaders, which were conducted in Ng’ala Pokot and Ngaturkana. The interview data were coded and analysed in Nvivo. Given the politically sensitive nature of the project, I did not collect the names of the respondents. Only non-identifying codes—for example, KE1 for a customary leader or KO1 an academic or journalist—and non-identifying characteristics of the respondents such as ethnicity and the type of occupied position—for example ‘member of parliament from Turkana County’ (as there

23 The Local Drivers of Political Development Karol Czuba are eight Turkana MPs), but not ‘senator from West Pokot County’ (as each county only has a single senator)—are disclosed in this thesis. The non-identifying code is not disclosed when doing so would compromise the respondent’s anonymity.

6. Government documents Finally, I also reviewed a few dozen national and county documents such as budgets, white papers, and survey reports.

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