Kenya 2017: the Interim Elections? Justin Willis - Durham University Nic Cheeseman - University of Birmingham Gabrielle Lynch - University of Warwick
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NOTE ACTUALITE 2 KENYA 2017: THE INTERIM ELECTIONS? Justin Willis - Durham University Nic Cheeseman - University of Birmingham Gabrielle Lynch - University of Warwick Juillet 2017 L’Observatoire de l’Afrique de l’Est (2017-2010) est un programme de recherche coordonné par le Centre d’Etude et de Documentation Econo- mique, Juridique et Sociale de Khartoum (MAEDI-CNRS USR 3123) et le Centre de Recherches Internationales de Sciences Po Paris. Il se situe dans la continuité de l’Observatoire de la Corne de l’Afrique qu’il remplace et dont il élargit le champ d’étude. L’Observatoire de l’Afrique de l’Est a vocation à réaliser et à diffuser largement des Notes d’analyse relatives aux questions politiques et sécuritaires contemporaines dans la région en leur offrant d’une part une perspective historique et d’autre part des fon- dements empiriques parfois négligées ou souvent difficilement accessibles. L’Observatoire est soutenu par la Direction Générale des Relations Inter- nationales et de la Stratégie (ministère des Armées français). Néanmoins, les propos énoncés dans les études et Observatoires commandés et pilo- tés par la DGRIS ne sauraient engager sa responsabilité, pas plus qu’ils ne reflètent une prise de position officielle du ministère de la Défense. Il s’appuie par ailleurs sur un large réseau de partenaires : l’Institut fran- çais des relations internationales, le CFEE d’Addis-Abeba, l’IFRA Nai- robi, le CSBA, LAM-Sciences Po Bordeaux, et le CEDEJ du Caire. Les notes de l’Observatoire de l’Afrique de l’Est sont disponibles en ligne sur le site de Sciences Po Paris. Coordination Jean-Nicolas BACH Roland MARCHAL 2 Table des matières Summary / Résumé 4 1. Background: ‘big men’ politics and bottom-up demands 5 2. Parties: a failed project? 10 3. Election management and mismanagement 13 Conclusion 16 3 Summary / Résumé The fear of violence hangs over elections in Kenya. The murders and popu- lation displacements that followed the disputed elections of 2007 still loom large in the minds of Kenyans, as well as internationally. In advance of the 2017 elections there have been multiple warnings from government agen- cies of the possibility of violence1. But the 2017 elections are unlikely to see conflict on the scale of 2007/8, though there has already been some lethal violence at a local level, and more is likely – particularly if there are signifi- cant problems with election processes. At the time of writing (early July), and with a month of campaigning still to go, the race is becoming increasingly close. Nevertheless, it currently seems likely that, unless one side conducts a very good or bad campaign, that incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta will be returned to power in the first round with a marginal lead, defeating Rai- la Odinga, who is the candidate for the coalition National Super Alliance (NASA). Although this could still change in the last month of the campaigns as NASA continue to pick up ground and the elections become increasingly close. It also seems likely that Kenyatta’s new political vehicle – the Jubilee Party – will have a majority in parliament. Kenyatta is again running with William Ruto as his deputy, with the very explicit understanding that he will have Kenyatta’s support in running for the presidency in the next elections scheduled for 2022. The focus of attention has already partly shifted to those polls, and the August elections have often felt like an interim process – with much of the political calculations and manoeuvring revolving around a key question: will the voters and the political/business establishment of central Kenya really give their full support to William Ruto in five years’ time? This focus on presidential outcomes, immediate and future, distracts attention from the significance of other contests, especially those for the powerful po- sitions of county governor created by Kenya’s 2010 constitution. These are the second national elections under that constitution – the first having been held in 2013. Kenyan voters will cast six ballots on 8 August: for president, member of parliament (MP), county governor, senator, member of county assembly (MCA) and women’s representative. Kenya’s new constitution, and subsequent legislation, have been explicitly intended to transform politics. That transformation has not realised the ambitions of some of its advocates; but the dynamics of Kenyan politics have changed significantly. Key Words / Mots-clefs : Kenya,Elections, Violence, Parties, coalitions, election management 1 ‘NCIC now warns of poll violence’, Daily Nation, 4 July 2017 http://www.nation.co.ke/news/ NCIC-now-warns-of-poll-violence/1056-3999748-4xfbpm/index.html, viewed 6 July 2017. 4 1. Background: ‘big men’ politics and bottom-up demands Kenya’s 2013 elections brought Uhuru Kenyatta – son of Kenya’s first pre- sident, Jomo Kenyatta – to State House2. Kenya’s new constitution requires an absolute majority of votes for a first-round presidential win. Kenyatta achieved this by a very narrow margin, after the tallying of presidential votes descended into near-chaos with the failure of an electronic results transmis- sion system3. The defeated candidate, Raila Odinga, challenged the result in court; his petition was refused, amid multiple claims and counter-claims about the changing of results4. The speed with which the petition had to be submitted and a verdict given (the timetable is set in the constitution) made the presentation and sifting of evidence extremely challenging5. Both Kenyatta and Odinga were the candidates of coalitions in 2013. Kenyat- ta and William Ruto led what was then the Jubilee Alliance, composed of two parties (The National Alliance and the United Republican Party) that drew much of their support from Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters in central Kenya and the Rift Valley, respectively. Their alliance, which seemed unlikely at first, was cemented by a shared status: both had been accused of organizing the violence of 2007/8, when they had been on opposing political sides; both faced the prospect of trial by the International Criminal Court. In the event, Kenyatta’s case never went to court, and Ruto’s was stopped; but the al- liance between the two men has held. The wider accommodation between Kalenjin and Kikuyu has also survived, though it is under constant strain. This is significant. The ownership of land in the Rift Valley was a key issue in the violence of 2007/8; the argument that Kikuyu are occupying what ‘should’ be Kalenjin land was and is a powerful driver of grievance6. The alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto has not resolved that issue, but it has tempora- rily suspended the open politics of incitement that fed the 2007/8 violence7. This alone makes widespread violence less likely in 2017 – though there are 2 The authors acknowledge the support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council, who funded much of the research under project ES/L002345/1, ‘The impact of elections in sub-Saharan Afri- ca’’. 3 Nic Cheeseman, G. Lynch & J. Willis. “Democracy and its Discontents: Understanding Kenya’s 2013 elections”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8. 1 (2014): 2-24. 4 Africa Centre for Governance (AFRICOG). The Election Petition: Petition Number 4 by AFRI- COG Consolidated by the Supreme Court, (Nairobi: AFRICOG, 2013). http://www.africog.org/category/ election-petition/; Yuhniwo Ngenge, ‘Kenya 2013 Elections: Reflections on the Supreme Court Ruling and the Role of the Judiciary in Democratisation.’ Open Democracy, 18 April 2013. http://www.opende- mocracy.net/yuhniwo-ngenge/kenya-2013-elections-reflections-on-supreme-courtruling-and-role-of-judicia- ry-in-dem viewed September 6, 2013. 5 John Harrington and Ambreena Manji. ‘Restoring Leviathan? The Kenyan Supreme Court, constitutional transformation, and the presidential election of 2013’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 9.2 (2015): 175-192. 6 Nic Cheeseman, “The Kenyan elections of 2007: an introduction”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2 (2008): 166–184; , Jérôme Lafargue and Musambayi Katumanga. ‘Élections et violences au Kenya.’, Politique africaine, 109 (2008): 107-121; Gabrielle Lynch, I say to You:Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2011. 7 Mathieu Mérino, ‘Les élections générales du 4 mars 2013 au Kenya’, Afrique contemporaine 2013/3 (No 247), 73-86; Gabrielle Lynch, ’Electing the “alliance of the accused”: the success of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8.1 (2014): 93-114. 5 also other factors which reduce that likelihood. By contrast, the main leaders in Odinga’s 2013 coalition (the Coalition for Reform and Democracy, or CORD) came not from central Kenya or from the central Rift Valley, but from other parts of the country; the strongest party in that coalition was the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by Odin- ga. The Luo leader and his supporters felt – and feel – that they have been cheated of power repeatedly. They look back to the 1960s, when Odinga’s father, Oginga Odinga, gave his support to Jomo Kenyatta, only to find him- self driven out from the ruling party; to 2002, when Odinga endorsed Mwai Kibaki’s bid for the presidency in return for a promise of power-sharing as prime minister, which was not fulfilled; and, of course, to 2007, when Kiba- ki was declared winner against Odinga in deeply flawed elections. In 2013, Odinga did not call for mass protests, but neither did he accept the verdict of the court, which has become part of the narrative of exclusion. Some believe that Odinga is unlikely to accept defeat as this may be his last bid for the president8. He has promised to respect the outcome, but in practice this may depend on whether problems in process create any room for doubt over the result9.