Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace
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University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2014 Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace Jonathan C. Pinckney University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political Theory Commons Recommended Citation Pinckney, Jonathan C., "Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace" (2014). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 517. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/517 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace __________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver __________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts __________ by Jonathan C. Pinckney June 2014 Advisor: Erica Chenoweth ©Copyright by Jonathan C. Pinckney 2014 All Rights Reserved Author: Jonathan C. Pinckney Title: Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace Advisor: Erica Chenoweth Degree Date: June 2014 Abstract Several recent studies indicate that revolutions of non-violent civil resistance lead to more democratic and peaceful political transitions than either violent revolutions or elite-led political transitions. However, this general trend has not been disaggregated to explain the many prominent cases where nonviolent revolutions are followed by authoritarianism or civil war. Understanding these divergent cases is critical, particularly in light of the problematic transitions following the "Arab Spring" revolutions of 2011. In this paper I explain why nonviolent revolutions sometimes lead to these negative outcomes. I show, through quantitative analysis of a dataset of all successful non-violent revolutions from 1900-2006 and comparative case studies of the revolutions in Egypt and Yemen, that the mechanism of success whereby the non-violent revolution achieves its goals, such as an negotiation, election, or coup d’etat, has a significant impact on the likelihood of democracy and civil war. Most centrally, mechanisms which involve pre- transition capacity-building, civil resistance campaign initiative, and broad political consensus are significantly more likely to lead to democracy and peace. This research has powerful implications for understanding both the options available to non-violent activists seeking revolutionary goals and the choices likely to lead to optimal outcomes during the post-revolutionary transition. ii Table of Contents Introduction: When the Revolution Wins ........................................................................... 1 Chapter One: Civil Resistance, Democracy, and Civil Peace ............................................ 7 Civil Resistance: From Pacifism to Pragmatism .................................................... 7 After Civil Resistance: The Puzzle ....................................................................... 13 Sharp’s Mechanisms and the Need for New Mechanisms of Success .................. 16 Chapter Two: Mechanisms of Success ............................................................................. 21 Defining Terms ..................................................................................................... 21 The Six Mechanisms ............................................................................................. 24 Mechanism of Success Characteristics ................................................................. 29 Democracy ............................................................................................................ 32 Transitional Violence ............................................................................................ 40 Chapter Three: Testing the Effects of Transition Mechanisms ........................................ 46 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 46 Results: The Shape of the Data ............................................................................. 54 Democracy and Political Violence Regressions ................................................... 59 Addressing Endogeneity Concerns ....................................................................... 67 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 74 Chapter Four: Transition Mechanisms and the Arab Spring; The Cases of Egypt and Yemen ............................................................................................................................... 76 Laying the Groundwork ........................................................................................ 81 Yemen: Compromising the Revolution? ............................................................. 86 Egypt: The Army and the People – One Hand? .................................................... 96 The Effects of Mechanisms of Success .............................................................. 107 Conclusion: How Does Civil Resistance Win Well? ...................................................... 116 Works Cited .................................................................................................................... 119 Appendix A: The Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success Codebook ......................... 133 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 133 Section 1: List of Variables................................................................................. 133 Section 2: Description of Unique Variables ....................................................... 137 Section 3: Special Coding Decisions .................................................................. 140 Notes on Data Sources ............................................................................ 140 Specific Coding Special Decisions ......................................................... 141 Section 4: Transition Narratives and Sources ..................................................... 143 Appendix Works Cited ....................................................................................... 234 iii Introduction: When the Revolution Wins As, in a quavering voice, the vice-president of Egypt officially announced that Hosni Mubarak, authoritarian president of Egypt since 1981, was stepping down immediately, the crowds in Tahrir Square erupted. For 18 days, despite repression and concession, despite tear gas and thugs on camel-back, despite the regime repeatedly assuring them that their demands had been heard and there was no point in remaining in the streets, they had stayed. They were tired of assurances, tired of fear, tired of a country where the most central facts were unemployment, poverty, and a criminal government. And now, through their steadfastness, they had nonviolently ousted the regime that had ruled longer than many of the protesters could remember. Around the world commentators talked about the hope of Egypt, of a new prosperous society united across social and religious divides, led by passionate young liberal technocrats from Google. Yet over the following months the military regime which replaced Mubarak, headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), backtracked on their support for the revolution. Thousands of civilians were arrested, sometimes tortured, and sentenced in quick, secretive courts. Promises of democracy were hampered by guarantees of military immunity and the continued preferential treatment of old regime elites. And when Egypt’s first free and fair presidential election in history brought the 1 Muslim Brotherhood to power, conflict grew. Clashes between Christians and Muslims in Egypt became increasingly common. Finally in July 2013, after protests of an almost unprecedented size and scope,1 the military once again stepped in and ousted the elected government in a popularly- backed coup d’etat. This second coup has been followed by months of violent clashes between brotherhood supporters and the military, with little indication of the possibility of a long-term sustainable solution. As the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution passed, Amnesty International bleakly observed that “the revolt’s causes not only remain but in some cases have grown more acute…the motto of the uprising, ‘bread, freedom, social justice,’ rings hollow” (Amnesty International, 2014, 5). Three years of revolution have left many Egyptians wondering what went wrong and if it any of it was worth the sacrifices they endured to make it happen. Many have speculated on what happened to that hopeful moment in 2011. Perhaps it was an incompatibility of Islam with democracy, or the continuing influence of authoritarian elements, or maybe the destructive history of the totalitarian regime which preceded the revolution. But what much of this analysis misses is that Egypt, and several similar cases from the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, are part of a much larger historical trend. Since the beginning of the 20th century there have been