Michelle McDines – written evidence (CIC0133)

House of Lords Constitution Committee Inquiry into the Constitutional Implications of COVID-19

1. My name is Michelle McDines. am a 57 year old single woman originally from South Manchester though now living a somewhat itinerant life as a housesitter and digital nomad. While my formal education stopped after ‘O’ levels at grammar school, I have continued my own informal education and am considered by my friends and associates as a highly intelligent, well read and knowledgeable person. I spent many years in senior IT management positions in financial services, construction, industry and the not-for-profit sectors, before redundancy led me to forge a self-employed path as both a property investor and website developer.

2. My reason for submitting evidence to the Constitution Committee is I feel it is my moral duty to speak out, having seen our gold standard democratic political system transformed into an effective dictatorship in a few short months. As a nation, we have stood strong against the enemy without, holding all foes from the Spanish Armada to Hitler’s Nazis away from our shores. I cannot now stand by and watch our great nation fall to the enemy within, cunningly disguised as a response to a pandemic.

3. I am not able to provide insight on every question posed but have organised my evidence using the committee’s questions. Where I have nothing to contribute, I have omitted the question from my document.

4. The Use of Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Does the Coronavirus Act 2020 strike the right balance between powers for the Executive and parliamentary oversight and approval?

5. I believe the Coronavirus Act 2020 to be one of the most dangerous pieces of legislation ever passed in the .

6. I would refer the committee to the government’s High Consequence Infectious Diseases website page - https://www.gov.uk/guidance/high-consequence- infectious-diseases-hcid - where it clearly states that “As of 19 March 2020, COVID-19 is no longer considered to be a high consequence infectious disease (HCID) in the UK.” Part of the definition of an HCID is that it “requires an enhanced individual, population and system response to ensure it is managed effectively, efficiently and safely.”

7. I believe that the legislation was rushed through Parliament in an atmosphere of panic manufactured in conjunction with the mainstream media. Members of both Houses were understandably convinced they were looking at something akin to a modern-day Bubonic Plague that required an immediate full-scale response and perhaps the Bill was not given the depth of scrutiny it needed, and would usually receive. I believe the government misled both Houses by presenting the Bill as “the only course of action” while failing to disclose the HCID status had already been removed from the COVID-19 disease. 8. The Coronavirus Act 2020 gave emergency powers to a tiny number of people across a broad range of areas, many seeming to have little to do with the response to a pandemic (e.g. Part 1 Section 24 – Extension of time limits for retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles).

9. The Act enables the Secretary of State to issue declarations based purely on opinion. An example of this is Schedule 22 Part 2 – Powers Relating to Events, Gatherings and Premises in England - where phrases such as “of the view that” are used. The requirement to produce hard facts to support declarations is missing and with no need to go before parliament to justify the declaration prior to its implementation, the mechanism is ripe for abuse.

10. Merely stating a statutory instrument is required in order to deal with the pandemic is the single, very low bar that is set. The mechanism by which the majority of these become law combined with the rate at which they are being issued, gives little time for them to be considered by Members of either House or for MPs to consult their constituents.

11. Given the direct, and often severe, impact these declarations have on ordinary people, an appreciation of how constituents will be affected is more vital than ever. Yet the parliamentary process that would enable this has, to all intents and purposes, been scrapped.

What existing powers (other than those in the Coronavirus Act 2020) might have been used to deliver the Government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic? Was the Coronavirus Act 2020 necessary to implement the Government’s response to the pandemic?

12. I firmly believe that there was sufficient legislation already in place to enable the government to amply respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

13. The Government’s decision to hurriedly draft and extensive bill amid an apparently devastating global pandemic, is highly questionable. The role, or lack thereof, of the Lord Chancellor and Attorney General in this decision should be investigated.

14. There were ample powers granted by way of both the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 and if necessary, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 – both of which were drawn up in times of calm when their extent and wording could be contemplated, constructed and considered by both Houses without the atmosphere of fear and panic that abounded in March 2020.

15. Indeed, many of the declarations made by the Secretary of State since the enactment of the Coronavirus Act 2020, have cited powers granted by the Public Health legislation rather than the Coronavirus Act itself. As such, if any additional emergency measure were needed, they could have been implemented by statutory instruments amending or extending the Public Health or Civil Contingencies Acts.

16. So, I feel we are left with two possible scenarios to consider: a) Poor advise and/or incompetence in deciding to draft the Coronavirus Bill; or b) A deliberate strategy to capitalise on the atmosphere of panic to bring in through the back door, powers that the government would be unable to gain under normal circumstances.

How have the measures taken by the Government to address the pandemic been implemented, i.e. which aspects of the lockdown were set out in legislation, regulations and guidance? What effect has this had on the clarity of the measures?

17. I think the implementation has been poorly managed. Terminology has been used interchangeably by different people involved in the response. This has led to confusion in both the general public and bodies such as the police and hospitals about what is law and set out in a regulation and what is merely guidance and a suggestion of good practice.

18. There have been situations where police have been trying to enforce something that is merely a guideline e.g. police forcing a shopper to leave a supermarket for not wearing a mask and not having proof of an exemption. See - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yC0qNEfHWw

Has the use of emergency powers by the Government to address the pandemic been proportionate?

19. I believe the use of emergency powers has been far from proportionate. A phrase that was repeatedly used was “follow the science”. However the government have been very selective in the science they chose to follow, ignoring many respected scientists and peer reviewed studies in favour of a very narrow view that seemed to fit a political agenda and/or personal gain, rather than a response to a public health situation.

20. The very nature of science is that it is a set of “best guesses” that are continuously updated in light of new information. The government has stuck rigidly to one guess – that of Neil Ferguson, who has consistently massively over- estimated the impact of every disease he has ever modelled. They have refused to consider any alternatives, no matter how respected the source. It seems as if their actions now, for example launching , are less about handling the pandemic and more about proving themselves to have been right.

21. Dr Zoe Harcombe highlights in her recent report on conflicts of interest in the SAGE committee, that “twelve out of 20 key influencers work for/have received funding from organisations involved in the Covid-19 vaccine. There are four times more modellers/statisticians and experts in behaviour manipulation on the (SAGE) committee than there are virologists. There are no immunologists.”

22. https://worlddoctorsalliance.com/blog/sage-conflicts-of-interest/

23. This does suggest a committee that is geared up towards creating a theoretical model where the only possible solution is a vaccine, then manipulating public perception in order to achieve that agenda; rather than one that is configured to get a good understanding of a new disease and tap into a broad range of expertise to protect public health in every way possible. 24.We cannot allow a government to use emergency powers to ensure its own survival at the expense of the survival of the people they are meant to serve.

25. The mandating of face coverings in shops from 24th July 2020, when deaths and cases had all but disappeared is a prime example. All the science shows that coronaviruses and their cousins influenza viruses, are seasonal. In our climate they are active from late September through to April. Throughout the early stages of the pandemic, the government and their advisers were highly vocal about there being no need and little benefit to the public wearing face masks. Yet when the pandemic was clearly over, they suddenly mandated masks in shops. Was this a way of ensuring a constant visible reminder of the pandemic until such time as they could confirm their much predicted “second wave” (which is just the next virus season)?

26. This compilation video shows the consistent message from government early in the pandemic regarding the science around masks being weak and yet still they mandated them in July- https://www.facebook.com/martin.parsons.927/videos/10157771428526463

27. Local lockdowns were mandated in many areas of the north of the country, yet data shows that some local authorities in London had similar or worse case statistics yet were not subjected to lockdowns.

28. Small businesses have been severely affected by the emergency measures. Many were forced to close during lockdowns while seeing “big name” stores selling identical products being allowed to remain open. In order to re-open they invested in expensive additional equipment and/or significantly reduced their capacity (and therefore income earning potential) to meet the changing government guidelines, only then to be forced to close again as either local or the second national lockdown came into effect. This is doubly concerning when the data shows that these places are not the main source of infection.

29. From an economic perspective the north of England, the self-employed and small businesses in general and the hospitality sector in particular have been disproportionately affected by the emergency measures

Criminalisation and enforcement

What new criminal offences have been introduced as part of the Government’s response to the pandemic? Is criminalisation a proportionate, justified and appropriate response?

30. With adequate powers already available in existing legislation, the main purpose of the Coronavirus Act 2020 appears to be to introduce a raft of new criminal offences which largely encroach on the ability of free and healthy people to go about their daily lives unimpeded.

31. Schedule 21 – Powers Relating to Potentially Infectious Persons gives police the power to detain anyone “suspected” of being infectious. It states that not complying is a criminal offence. I am deeply troubled by such legislation where healthy people can end up being criminals merely for challenging an assertion that they could be infected. Where are such powers and offences leading us as a society? Again, there is a very low bar where “suspicion” is sufficient. That is open to abuse – enabling the police and others to detain people on suspicion of being infected. These are the sorts of powers used in communist China and other totalitarian regimes to supress and silence anyone challenging the regime. Is that what we want for our great nation?

32. Schedule 22 – Powers Relating to Events, Gatherings and Premises has effectively criminalised having a social life. Currently, as a single woman, I would be committing a criminal offence if I were to commence a romantic relationship with someone. I cannot even seek social contact with friends or more than one member of my family without becoming a criminal. 33. The same schedule and subsequent secondary legislation also criminalise one of our most sacred traditions in the UK – the right to peaceful protest. With Parliament having less input into, and oversight of, the government’s activities, peaceful protest is one of the few ways that the public can have a voice to express the true impact of the pandemic response. Yet that voice is being systematically silenced by swingeing fines of £10,000 for organising a protest – though the fines are inconsistently applied, with certain protests allowed to go ahead and others broken up. There is clearly a politicisation of this legislation, which is deeply worrying.

34. These are just a few examples of the criminal offences that now exist. To consider whether they are proportionate, one only has to compare the data for COVID-19 with other similar diseases. We are clearly dealing with something in the order of magnitude of influenza, not the bubonic plague. So, we must look to past responses to recent influenza seasons as a benchmark against which the response to COVID-19 can be measured for proportion, justification and appropriateness. Has the government mandated masks, ordered lockdowns and criminalised family gatherings during recent flu seasons? No, they have not.

35. One could argue that COVID-19 was an unknown entity, justifying the response implemented. However, the government has failed to adapt that response once data became available to show the true impact of the disease.

Have the new criminal offences introduced in response to the pandemic been sufficiently clear to: (a) members of the public and (b) the public authorities responsible for their interpretation and enforcement (including the police and the Crown Prosecution Service)?

36. No, they have not as my previous evidence shows.

What factors led to wrongful arrests and convictions under the emergency powers and how might these have been avoided?

37. Apart from the constant changing of legislation and guidelines by the government and the poor communication thereof, the main factor seems to have been overzealousness on the part of the police. Sadly, our police forces have undergone radical change in recent years and our quaint perception of a “British Bobby” is rapidly becoming a distant memory. While there are still a “few good men” who understand their role is to uphold the law and protect the public from harm, far too many see themselves as “enforcers” who are actually relishing these additional powers that allow them to assert their perceived authority over the public. The police are tasked as individuals, divisions and forces to achieve targets and charging someone for visiting an elderly friend’s house during lockdown is a quick and easy way to get a result compared to investigating a burglary, for instance.

Promulgation

To what extent have the legal requirements imposed on people during lockdown been clear and accessible to members of the public? How should the new measures introduced in response to the pandemic be communicated and explained to authorities (e.g. local government, police, border force, regulators), businesses and members of the public?

38. While information has generally been widely available, it has often been interpreted differently by different people and organisations. An example is the way in which different supermarkets have responded to the mask mandate, with some taking the stance that anyone without a mask must have an exemption and therefore not challenging them whereas others have become so draconian in their approach that they have committed offences under the Equalities Act 2010 (though sadly the police seem reluctant to deal with these situations and are even complicit in them at times).

39. While I could speak to how things could be done better, my stance is that the whole response is a complete over-reaction to the situation and therefore recommending a better way to do it is rather a waste of time.

Devolved and local government

40. I have no comments on this section

Parliamentary scrutiny

To what extent has Parliament been able effectively to scrutinise the statutory instruments related to the pandemic measures? What additional steps ought to be taken to ensure effective scrutiny of emergency statutory instruments in future?

41. I believe the government has misused its emergency powers on several occasions. It has used the statutory instruments mechanism to implement measures with implementation dates in the future, thereby circumventing parliamentary debate when there had been sufficient time for at least some debate to take place. Either a situation is critical and requires an immediate response i.e. draw up and implement a statutory instrument with immediate effect, or it is not critical and there is time for even a shortened version of the democratic process.

42. Of the 295 coronavirus related Statutory Instruments laid since March, 206 of them have been on the “made negative” procedure. So, unless a motion to annul is passed, the SI remains in force. I believe that once again the fear and panic surrounding the pandemic have an impact on the thinking and perception. Are members of both Houses perhaps taking the view that “we’re in a pandemic, so this must be necessary” and not giving each SI the right amount of due diligence?

To what extent are safeguards on emergency powers (such as provisions for 21-day reviews) undermined when Parliament is not sitting, or when sittings are restricted? How might the law and/or parliamentary procedure need to adapt to such circumstances?

43. It is vital that when government has the use of emergency powers that parliament does not enable a “while the cat’s away, the mice will play” situation to arise.

44. Sixty statutory instruments were laid during the summer recess – a time at which deaths and cases were very low and there were few lockdown or other measures in place. What emergency legislation was needed in such times?

45. Given the nature of some of the regulations brought in by statutory instruments, and their impact on people’s lives and livelihoods, I think having a complete recess of parliament during a situation that requires the government to have emergency powers is unacceptable. I think that, at the very least, there should be a skeleton parliament sitting in both houses to ensure that there is no abuse of the emergency powers.

What processes are there for securing renewed Parliamentary oversight and control of the legislative agenda once the urgency of a given emergency has diminished? Are the sunset provisions and other safeguards provided for in the Coronavirus Act 2020 and associated regulations sufficient for this purpose?

46. I believe the sunset provisions and review mechanisms in the Coronavirus Act 2020 are wholly inadequate and may well have been written in such a way to enable to hold on to its emergency powers for far longer than needed.

47. As already mentioned, the virus causing COVID-19 is clearly following the behaviour of other viruses in its seasonality. I believe that at the time the Coronavirus Act 2020 was enacted, there was sufficient data available to show this. In fact, the naming of the virus as SARS-COV-2 shows that it was recognised as being highly similar to SARS, and the data for that virus shows a clear Gompertz curve pattern to infections and deaths.

48. The correct time for the initial review of the need for the Coronavirus Act 2020 to continue should really have been at some point in the summer. However, with a second wave being forecast by the government before the first wave had barely started to decline, and a review date set for October 2020, they were guaranteed that by the time the review took place, “cases” would be on the rise again and the Houses would willingly renew their emergency powers.

49. Sections 88, 89 and 90 of the Coronavirus Act give the government the power to extend any or all of the Act indefinitely by means of a regulation i.e. another statutory instrument that requires no parliamentary scrutiny save for its annulment by prayer. But given the policy of the head of HM’s Opposition to whip his MPs to abstain from almost every vote of late, the ability of the nation to escape the increasingly draconian regime that the government are attempting to exact upon us, falls to the House of Lords it seems. What lessons can be learned from the (1) Government’s preparation, and (2) Parliament’s constrained scrutiny of the fast-tracked Coronavirus Bill? What should be done differently the next time there's a need for substantial emergency legislation?

50. I would suggest the first step is to gather sufficient data from a wide range of reliable sources to first consider whether there is a need for emergency legislation. As previously stated, there is already sufficient law in place that could have handled the pandemic response and I cannot help but feel that Parliament was hoodwinked into approving the Coronavirus Bill and giving up so much of its ability to scrutinise and challenge both its implementation and subsequent secondary legislation.

51.The result has been that far more of the nation have been severely affected by the impact of the response to the pandemic than the pandemic itself.

18/11/2020