The Curious Case of North Korea Courtland Robinson
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States of fragility 53 FMR 43 May 2013 The curious case of North Korea Courtland Robinson Displacement and distress migration within and outside North Korea may be an indicator of state fragility but a reduction in numbers should not necessarily be read as a sign of improving conditions there. In fact, increased movements might be considered as positive, if they are accompanied by increased protection for refugees, survivors of trafficking, stateless children and other vulnerable populations. In 2011 the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index While census data and official documents ranked the Democratic People’s Republic of from the DPRK suggest limited movement Korea (DPRK or North Korea) 22nd out of internationally and internally, the unofficial 177 countries, giving it a score of 95.5 out picture is one of a great deal more mobility, of a maximally worst score of 120. This was most of it without authorisation. A study actually an improvement over the DPRK’s in 1998-99 that included nearly 3,000 North previous rankings; indeed, it was the first Korean refugees and migrants in China time the country had dropped out of the suggested a net migration rate of 18.7%, top twenty since the index was begun in with much of the internal movement 2005. This was not due to enhanced state characterised as ‘distress migration’. The legitimacy, an indicator on which North Korea study retrospectively covered a four-year scored a 9.9 out of 10 (worst in the world), period including 1996-97, when the DPRK nor a better human rights record (9.5 out of experienced a severe famine with significant 10). The ‘improvements’ were noted in the malnutrition, a rise in infectious disease indicators of ‘refugees and IDPs’ and ‘human and a dramatic spike in mortality among flight’, where North Korea was grouped all age groups. In the study, more than 30% among states with ‘moderate’ records. of respondents said their main reason for moving out of the household was to “search Though both North Korean refugees and for food”. Large numbers of children displaced IDPs are quite challenging to count, it is by the famine and economic hardship were not numbers alone that should be used to placed in so-called ‘9/27 centres’ (named after convey improvement or decline in their the date of their establishment by government situation, as opposed to the fragility of the decree to aid those “wandering for food”). North Korean state. The unique physical and political geography of North Korea is This displacement occurred within the shaped within by a regime bent on checking territory of a state that has displayed a long- internal and external migration, as it is shaped standing disregard for human rights and externally by China to the north, that seeks the international relief agencies currently to suppress cross-border movement and deny involved had no clear mandate (or means) refugee protection to those who flee, and by to address such concerns. Natural disaster South Korea to the south, whose cautious seems to be the only form of displacement commitments stem in equal parts from a that may be discussed openly. desire to help its suffering kin to the north and a fear of a dangerous, destabilising exodus. International migration The result is a curious case where the ordinary While migration of Koreans into north- measures of increased internal or external east China dates back to at least the 1880s, exodus are no longer reliable as indicators of the more recent surge in cross-border greater fragility or propensity to fail. In North movements began in the mid-1990s but Korea, when seeking to interpret the meaning did not peak until 1998. Since then, North of displacement, the problem of absence Koreans have been crossing into China, does not mean the absence of problem. seeking to escape food shortages, economic 54 States of fragility FMR 43 May 2013 hardship and state repression in their own arrivals of North Koreans into China to a country. Most of these North Koreans trickle for several months in 2012. North have left without documentation or travel Korean entries into South Korea totalled authorisation. Given their undocumented only 1,500 in 2012, down from 2,700 in 2011. status and the repressive nature of the DPRK, Since movements to South Korea began in these North Koreans have been labelled as earnest in 2002, about 24,500 North Koreans refugees and asylum seekers by those who have settled in the South. It would be a sign seek their protection. Conversely, they are of improving North-South relations and called illegal migrants by both the Chinese – with the exception of a massive exodus and the North Korean governments. in the context of war, natural disaster or regime collapse – might be a possible sign of From 1999 to 2008, we worked with local improved conditions inside North Korea if and international partners to monitor there were an increase in the outflow of North movements of North Koreans crossing into Koreans to South Korea and other countries. China. Key trends over the years included an obvious seasonal spike in arrivals during Conclusions and recommendations the winter months when food and fuel The declining numbers of North Korean were scarce in North Korea and security refugees, migrants and asylum seekers in might have been relatively more relaxed China cannot be interpreted as a sign of on both sides of the border, and an overall improving conditions in the DPRK but, at (nearly ten-fold) decline in the number of best, as evidence of constrained migration arrivals over the period from 1998 to 2008. options and, at worst, as a cynical effort by both states to suppress the right to leave one’s It is fairly clear that there was a dramatic country and to seek and enjoy asylum in decline in the North Korean population in another. The growing proportion of women north-east China, from around 75,000 refugees among the remaining North Koreans and and migrants in 1998 to around 10,000 by the growing number of children born to 2009. Reasons for the declining refugee these women and their Chinese husbands population have little to do with improved or partners point to a need to broaden circumstances in North Korea. More than a the protection focus for displaced North decade after the famine, hardships continue Koreans to include measures to protect for the North Korean people in the form against human trafficking and promote of continued human rights abuse, chronic durable solutions for stateless children. food insecurity, a moribund economy and periodic natural disasters. The declining UNHCR has declared all North Koreans in refugee population has instead much China to be ‘persons of concern’, although more to do with tightened border security, China does not recognise North Koreans’ increased migration to South Korea and claims to asylum as valid. Indeed, in March other countries, and a growing knowledge 2012, a Chinese official reiterated that that there are clear limits to protection and “these North Koreans are not refugees but livelihood opportunities in China. China rather they have entered China illegally is signatory to the 1951 Convention but has for economic reasons… China is opposed introduced no implementing legislation to the attempt to turn the issue into a nor do its policies acknowledge North political and international subject.” Koreans as entitled to refugee protection under either national or international law. North Korea might be encouraged to initiate something like an Orderly Departure Program In the leadership transition following the (ODP), similar to the multilateral programme death of Kim Jung-il in December 2011, begun in Vietnam in 1979 to permit safe and tightened security on both sides of the orderly exodus of populations seeking to border contributed to reducing cross-border leave. It would be in North Korea’s interests States of fragility 55 FMR 43 May 2013 to permit households with motives of family shelter, asylum, family formation, family reunification, labour and economic betterment, reunification, labour/livelihood and more. or simply survival, to leave without risk of The problem is that the discussion of this penalty to themselves or their family members migration – and the policy/programme left behind. options that either are or should be available – has been dominated almost exclusively by the A practical, and perhaps even productive, question whether they are or are not refugees. approach to North Korean migration must begin by framing an understanding of Courtland Robinson [email protected] population mobility within and outside the is a core faculty member at the Center for country as something more than a simple Refugee and Disaster Response, Johns threat to stability. The migration of North Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Koreans in the last two decades has always www.jhsph.edu encompassed a mix of motives: food, health, Was establishing new institutions in Iraq to deal with displacement a good idea? Peter Van der Auweraert The humanitarian, developmental and political consequences of decades of mass forced migration are part of the legacy that the current political leaders of Iraq need to address. For this they need the right institutions if they are to be successful in guiding their country towards a more peaceful and stable future. Iraq has had a long and painful history of country, mostly to neighbouring states. forced migration. In the past decade alone, This third wave subsided alongside the it has been the scene of at least four distinct diminishing threat of an all-out civil war waves of displacement and return. The in Iraq but even today members of Iraq’s first wave occurred shortly after the Ba’ath small minorities reportedly continue to party’s fall from power with the return of an feel the urge to leave a country where they estimated 500,000 Iraqis in the period between feel less and less at home.