Neurocultures Glimpses Into an Expanding Universe

Neurocultures Glimpses into an Expanding Universe

EDITED BY Francisco Ortega and Fernando Vidal

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AN INTRODUCTION]

Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega

The belief that human beings are essentially their brains - that, as French philoso- pher Stephane Ferret (1993: 79) put it, person P and person P" are identical if they have one and the same functional brain - has become extremely powerful in contemporary culture. Especially since the mid-20m century, the anthropological figure ofthe "cerebral subject" has emerged as a major feature of industrialized and highly medicalized societies, with a great diversity of social inscriptions and embodiments both inside and outside the philosophical, neuroscientific and psychological fields (Vidal, 2005, 2009). As we discuss below, depicting oneself or others as being somehow reducible to the brain incarnates only one type of description, which coexists with others and is used only in certain contexts. Psychoanalytic clients may walk into the consulting room excited about having learned something about possible neurobiological underpinnings of their malaise, to find themselves a few minutes later engaged in exploring the psychodynamic mechanisms that contribute to make sense of their lives. These persons are not inconsistent - they simply illustrate the obvious fact that life is overdetermined. Although this certainly also applies to those engaged in neuroscientific research, some scientists have, at least by their public pronouncements, contributed to reduce to the brain the range of determinants of human existence. Thus, Semir Zeki, professor of neuroesthetics at University College London, considers his approach to be dictated "by a truth that [he] believers] to be axiomatic - that all human activity is dictated by the organization and laws of the brain" (Zeki, 2002: 54). Similarly, commenting on the thought experiment of brain transplantations and the usual view that, if feasible, they should be considered full-body rather than brain transplants, Michael Gazzaniga (2005: 31) wrote, "This simple fact makes it clear that you are your brain." It is likely that neither Zeki nor Gaz- zaniga nor Ferret (who offered his formula to epitomize a widespread position in Anglo-American discussions of personal identity), nor any of the many other neu-

Neurocultures grew out of a conference we organized in Rio de Janeiro in 2006 and a workshop (organized by Nicolas Langlitz and Fernando Vidal) tbat took place in 2009 at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. Some of the contributors to this volume participated in those events. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Brazilian agency for the promotion of academic research (CAPES), the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, and the BIOS Centre at the London School of Economics sponsored the meetings. We thank all of them for their support, and for the opportunity to bring together students and scholars from very different educational contexts. In this volume, we have tried to preserve the diversity of academic cultures, backgrounds and styles, and hope the result will be better for that.

7 Approaching the Neuroculturat Spectrum rophilosophers, neuroscientists or neurodiversity activists who make similar asser- tions actually believe they are literally reducible to their brains. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, they claim or suggest exactly that. Their language belongs in the neurocultural world we shall be exploring in this book. In its global vision and fundamental beliefs, this world rests on Zeki's axiomatic truth; by the early 21" century, its existence has been acknowledged both positively, as a promising direction for the good of humanity (e.g. Mora, 2007), and negatively, as a fashionable and counterproductive mania (e.g. Legrenzi and Umilta, 2009). The 1990s were officially launched by the US president George H. Bush as the Decade of the Brain, and the first hundred years of the new millennium have been proclaimed its Century, Such gestures support the drive to solve the puzzle of human consciousness, and unravel the secrets of an organ described as the most complex of the universe. But proclaiming a Decade or a Century of the Brain also signals the omnipresence of the brain as a major icon of contemporary culture - from literature and the plastic arts, to medicine and the human sciences, theology and spirituality, politics and marketing; from emerging research areas such as neuroeconomics, neurotheology, neurolaw, neuropsychoanalysis or neuroeducation, to an expanding universe of more or less extravagant neurobeliefs and neuropractices.

Rhetorics of the Future The public image of the brain sciences has thrived on a euphoric rhetoric about their future. The enthusiasm that inspired the Decade and Century of the brain, however, has characterized the neurosciences since the early 19i1i century. Hope and hype are constantly mixed with fear and appeals to prudence. On the one hand, knowledge of the brain should reveal the essence of human nature and eventually lead to treatments for some of its most frightful pathologies; on the other hand, it could be used in totalitarian and manipulative ways. Above all, the neurosciences boast their power to radically alter the view of the human, the notion of the person, ethical values, as well as certain basic structures and practices (e.g. in the domain of justice) of the societies in which they prosper. This is not a new phenomenon, for futuristic claims have been a staple of brain researcb since the time it attached the mind to the head (Hagner and Borck, 2001: 508). It is here as in the world of contemporary art, where a relatively few flashy and photogenic artists sustained by an avid market drown the rest. Most neuroscientists are certainly modest about what they do, and the media "translations" of their results often inflate or fictionalize their significance. Others, however, actively participate in the production of neuroscientific hype, and their effect on public consciousness (as reflected in media reporting and public policy discussions and decisions) is far from negligible. Since the optimistic self-promotion of 19i1i-centwy phrenologists promising to localize the brain"organs" of numerous more or less imaginary faculties, to today's quest, through brain imaging, of the "neural correlates" of various behaviors and

8 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega

mental functions, manyfuroscientists seem to have assumed that the essence of humanness is in the brain Even though the material and conceptual culture of brain research has evolved tre ndously, and even though practicing neuroimagers have often pointed out the limits of the technologies they employ, brain scans are frequently associated with coming ontological, epistemic and social transformations,as well as with a radically new view of the human being. In such a context, there have been good reasons for comparing phrenologists's craniological palpations and the uses to which brain scans have sometimes been put, and for noticing the rise of a neo-phrenological fad (Vital, 2003). As Joseph Durnit (2004: 24) has noticed on the basis of interviews with brain researchers, many neuroscientists think "that the..Q,hrenological movement raised the right questions, but with the wrong technology:::.J The media in particular has also conveyed fear of possible manipulative applications of cerebral imagery or neuroscieotific results, and the same concern has entered public debate. Nevertheless, being suspicious of technology or cautious about social consequences not only confirms the legitimacy of the neurosciences as a scientific enterprise, but also suggests that their predictions can be trusted, and their futuristic claims accepted. The universe we shall be exploring here is thus characterized by an ambivalent duality inherent to hype: on the one hand, it is electrified by the excitement of empirical discoveries and the hopes they seem to raise for medical applications or insights into human nature; on the other hand, it is mesmerized by the vision of dangerous consequences. These are two sides of the same coin; whether sincere or cynical, their combination is a crucial constitutive mechanism of the neurocultural universe. Neuroethics, a discipline aimed at understanding, anticipating and examining the ethical, social and legal consequences of neuroscientific knowledge and its applications, neatly illustrates such a phenomenon. As mostly practiced until now, neuroethics has contributed to fuel claims that the neurosciences are revolution- izing our views about the human subject and society, and that they will refashion in depth fimdamental values and social practices. At the same time, it has given itself the mission of orientating discussion and conduct in relation to those anticipated upheavals. In so doing, neuroethics has provided a moral backing to speculative extrapolations from neuroscientific claims, and has implicitly established itself as a moral champion of the complex of beliefs and practices about humanness we have called "cerebral subject." The neuroethicists's successful campaign to differentiate their field from bioethics by appealing to the unique and foundational nature of the link between brain and self is a conspicuous example of such a process. The stakes of "neuroethical exceptionalism" are not only professional or financial, but also, and especially, ontological. Neuroethicists justify their position first, by the existence of the "inevitable" and "omipresent" assumption that the mind is the brain I and that we are our brains, and, second, by the alleged capacity of neurotechnolo- gies to modify more profoundly than genetics our notions of personhood as well as

9 Approaching the Neuroculturai Spectrum

established beliefs about the relations between personal identity, responsibility and free will (Illes and Racine, 2005a: 10-12). This is not to question individual neuroethicists's good will and sense ofrespon- sibility, nor to deny that some are more sensitive than others to the dangers of hype. Some have even suggested that oeuroethical singularity derives less from empirical knowledge than from thought experiments (Farah, 2002; Evers, 2005). In any case, the incongruity between fact and fiction duplicates the uneasy coexistence of revolutionary claims and traditional mind-sets. The facts, concepts and technologies associated with the neurosciences have not done away, within the neurosciences themselves, with venerable questions about, and attitudes toward personhood, mind, body, and the brain's ontological function. The imbalances of fact and fiction, the well-known and the novel, are basic features of the neurocultural universe, wbich neuroethics significantly magnifies. These features are not purely academic, but dictate the structure of discussioos that may result in concrete policy-making. In 2005 and 2006, for example, under the heading "Meeting of Minds," the European Commission supported "Citizens's Deliberations on Brain Science," which brought together interested citizens, rep- resentatives of patients's associations, journalists, and specialists of the life and human sciences to discuss what "should be done with our new-found knowledge of the brain." The reasons for organizing the meetings included "a feeling within the scientific community that we are really beginning to understand the workings of the brain in a new and scientifically productive way;" the growing incidence of age-related neurodegenerative diseases, as well as the rise in reported psychiatric conditions, both determining a future "huge demand for ways to alleviate or cure brain-related diseases;" "major theoretical advances in the cognitive neurosciences," said to create a "completely unprecedented" situation, and to produce "important spin-offs for diagnosis as well as neurosurgical and pharmacological treatment - and even for cyborg-type developments" (www.meetingrnindseurope. com, "About the project," § 5). In short, the question to be addressed was, "Is science fiction becoming reality?"

Thanks to the spectacular developments of the neurosciences, scientists and physicians have today an understanding of the brain that seemed unpredictable ten yean; ago. And future developments will probably go beyond our wildest expectations. If the new technologies and medicines are capable of modifying, improving and controlling our brain, will they go as far as changing the very nature of the human being? (www.meetingmindseurope.com.Frenchpages) Neuroscientific progress is here associated to overstated claims, futuristic specula- tion, an overplayed concern about risk, and a well-intentioned trust in citizens's power. While Meeting of Minds was not specifically neuroethical, it shared with neuroethics a conviction in the revolutionary potential of the neurosciences, and in the need for a specifically neuro ethical reflection; it also exhibited the same ambition to influence regulatory processes, and to participate in the definition of

10 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega research and public policy agendas. Whatever else it does, neuroethical reflection contributes to create the reality it purports to deal with, and feeds anxieties which have become part of the problem it seeks to address (Singh and Rose, 2006: 100). If we are to judge by the introduction to a 20 I0 series of articles on "the future of the brain," the hype that drives it has not abated, and some - much evidence not- withstanding - keep proclaiming that neuroscientific progress provides us "with an image of humanity (and a new vocabulary) that transforms our understanding of what it is to be human" (Fieschi, 20 I 0: 62).

The Brain's Symbolic Efficacy Various aspects of the neurosciences, from their history to their technologies, acquire within neurocultures a form of symbolic efficacy. Their efficacy is "symbolic" not in the sense that it is somehow unreal, but that it derives less from mechanisms or features that inhere in them, than from their meanings and usages. Brain scans are prominent, but not the only examples of that. Phrenology furnishes an emblematic historical example. Its assumption that the brain is organized into "organs," precisely localized and responsible for distinct faculties and mental and behavioral dispositions, has long been discredited; yet it has not lost its appeal as a neuroscientific landmark. On the one hand, it constitutes such a negative reference that merely mentioning it adds truthvalue to one's point of view or discredits one's target. If neural networks debunk phrenology (Knight, 2007), then the observation that distinct regions of the mammalian brain synchro- nize their activity to support certain behaviors must be accurate (Friston, 2002). What, however, could be worse than the suspicion that neuroimaging research into psychological processes constitutes "a new phrenology" (Uttal, 2001)? On the other hand, phrenology sometimes looks like a legitimate ancestor of cognitive neuroscience: it asked the right questions, but did not have the tools to investigate them; it failed because, unlike functional neuroimaging, it lacked a scientific basis and adequate psychological concepts (Ward, 2006: Introduction). In both cases, the efficacy of phrenology's discursive presence has little relation to historical or scientific evidence. Something similar can be said about neuroscientific claims concerning the soul. On the one hand, Francis Crick (1994), to mention only an eminent, albeit atypi- cal figure, asserted that the neurosciences demonstrate that mental activities are entirely due to neurochemical mechanisms, and that "soul" is therefore reducible to brain physiology. The belief that "the success of the scientific method partially replaced older notions of the soul or mind-body dualism with the doctrine that mind ... is the brain's exclusive output" (Lepore, 2001) is a commonplace in many neuroscientists's writings. On the other hand, so-called non-materialist neuroscientists claim to prove not only that the mind affects the brain, but also that mind can be ac- tive when a brain is no longer functional (Beauregard and O'Leary, 2007). One can

11 Approaching the Neurocultural Spectrum examine how neuroscientific data and logical arguments are used to support each position. Nevertheless, no amount of science can conclusively settle the issues in question. Rather, what counts for each side is the belief in the power of science to do so, how that belief expresses and motivates values and actions, and how it may structure ways of experiencing and understanding oneself and the world. Discussion about the impact of the neurosciences in the theory and practice of the law may provide yet another example. The question of responsibility and free will is crucial in the domain of justice, and that is why neuroethicists write that "the legal arena offers an obvious venue for attemptingto translateneuroimaging into meaning- ful, real-world use" (Illes and Racine, 2005: 9). They quote Henry Greely, a Stanford University jurist who specializes in the consequences of biomedical technologies for legal theory and practice, and believes the neurosciences may provide responses to traditional philosophical issues. Some authors argue to the contrary, that the neurosciences will have hardly any impact and that fears about their applications are un- justified (Roskies, 2006). Yet others suggest that, although the neurosciences do not contribute anything new from the philosophical point of view, the mere increase of information about neurological causality will definitively confirm ancient ideas about determinism, and demonstrate that free will is an illusion. If that were the case, then it would be logical to give up retributive justice, and treat all the accused or proven guilty as the judicial system already treats those it considers legally irresponsible (Greene and Cohen, 2004). That would indeed restructure the entire juridical system. Nevertheless, as anthropologist Emily Martin has pointed out,

If a more reductionistic and brain-based picture of human action displaced our current everyday mental concepts, it would not be because (or solely because) the neural net theory had won in the court of scientific opinion. It would be because the environment we live in (and that scientific theories are produced in) had shifted so thai a brain-centered view of a person began to make cultural sense. (Martin, 2000: 575; see also Kaposy, 2009) In other words, even if it happened, the cerebralizing transformation of the legal system would be ultimately independent of neuroscientific discoveries: to make each criminal benefit from extenuating circumstances or a medical treatment because nobody is really free amounts to adopting a policy and legislative position that is not and could not be dictated by science. The debates that have taken place so far in the legal framework concern the acceptability of fMRI or PET brain scans as evidence supporting psychiatric diagnoses (Kulynych, 1997; Feigenson, 2006). The criteria to decide on the admissibility of those scans are the sarne as those that apply to any other sort of scientific evidence. In the USA, the courts have proven skeptical with regard to what can be inferred from neuroimaging evidence, particulary fMRI and PET and SPECT scans (Moriarty, 2008). Defense lawyers, however, appreciate its rhetorical value; and the fact that it is admitted more easily in death penalty than in insanity defense hearings is a sign of its symbolic efficacy.

12 " • . ~t~' tI' ,.. I . , ,,1,.\ f /JIV' "'~( ({I \-0 4r . Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega

The Prestige of Neuroimages In dealing with the neurosciences in history and in contemporary cultnres, this hook emphasizes the connection of brain-related beliefs to views and practices of the human. We benefit from a very rich literature in the history, sociology and anthropology of the brain sciences, as well as, increasingly, on the constitution of the brain as icon of modernity mediated by imaging technologies. This last area should be highlighted. On the one hand, brain imaging has been crucial for the "neurologization" of the human and social sciences. Tnspite of major epistemological and methodological \ shortcomings, some intrinsic to the technology, others to its use in the areas it contributes to neurologize (Hardcastle, 2002, 2005), brain imaging remains the chief method used by the neuro disciplines mentioned at the beginning of this Introduc- tion, and has therefore functioned as a major agent for the constitution of the cerebral subject, both as a concept and as a set of practices. On the other haod, precisely because of its cultnral significance, oeuroimaging has become a central object of research in social, anthropological, and historical stndies of science. It is therefore appropriate to mention some major themes and directions of this growing body of investigation. Historians, for example, have explored the continuity of the belief that brain images are mirrors of the mind, and therefore allow for a sort of "mind reading." The boom of optical ins~entation that began towards the mid-19/.'e!iiWY-g'l..ve plausibility to brainl~ihd reM~'n fictions. With the development of electroe;c:p~ alography in the ea y 1930s orne brain researcbers became con inced that th recorded waves wo ~ direct insights into mental life (Borck, 20 . ive decades later, after a period of relative "iconophobia" and the spread of brain-as- computer models, the rise of digital brain imaging technologies has given mind- reading hopes a new lease of life (Hagner, 2006). Although PET and tMRI are new technologies, they involve an older rhetoric, and resuscitate a range of possible interpretations. The desire to apprehend mental life by quantitative means bas re- mained alive across changes in both anthropological and psychological concepts, as well as in theoretical and methodological approaches. Historical investigation also underlines the constructed, contextual nature ofthe images, and the social character of their epistemic authority - a theme common to a number of studies focused on the production of brain scans in the present Several interlaced motifs define this field of stndies. Many authors have shown how PET and fMRT brain scans function as individual portraits or depictions of mental activities. The technical complexities involved in the transformation of neural activity into raw data, and of raw data into an image, should exclude such "reading" of the images (Roskies, 2008). Yet this sort of pho- tographic realism performs an important ideological work, in that it excludes the social dimension from both personhood and science. The purported isolation of

13 II I Approaching the Neurocultural Spectrum

the experimental subject in the lab reproduces the isolation in which the subject is imagined relative to any social context. And yet, as Simon Cohn (2008a: 153) has shown in an ethnographic study of the neuroscientific mapping of pleasure, the social dimensions the researchers insist on excluding from their experiments and theories "are not only instrumental in the experiments, but also remain embedded in the final conceptualizations." Mental states are thereby "de-coupled" from the social realm and from the interactions that construct them inside and outside the laboratory (Cohn, 2008b). The artificiality both of the situation and of the researchers's way of seeing it is epitomized in the assumption that subjects actually respond to the stimuli as they should for the purposes of the experiment. In fact, however, as a neuroscientist put it to Cohn (2004: 64), "you just can never be sure that they're not thinking about the weekend, or something." Dumit's research on PET in Picturing Personhood, and more recent studies by Kelly Joyce on MlU (Joyce, 2005, 2008) are among the many that explore the presence of brain scans in the media and popular culture. Media presentations offMRI research have been characterized by three main features: neuro-realism, which consists of believing that scans may furnish visual confirmations or refutations of'various beliefs; neuro-essentialism, according to which fMRI has direct access to the mind and thus to what we "really" think and feel, assumes that the neurosciences can furnish ultimate explanations for human behavior, and reinforces the notion that we are our brains; and neuro-policy, a term to designate the uses of fMRI results to try to influence public policy (Racine, Bar Ilan, and Illes, 2005). In a different de- scriptive and analytical vocabulary, most other studies concerning the cultural uses and functions of brain scans corroborate the centrality of these features. Such realistic and essentialist iconophilia combines the epistemic authority and sensory appeal of images in general with the particular power of the neurological. Adding irrelevant neuroscientific information to an argument or explanation makes it more persuasive than it would be without it (Weisberg et aI., 2008); and people are more likely to agree with scientific claims and to believe that a reasoning is sound when they are supported by a brain image than when they are accompanied by another type of image (McCabe and Castel, 2008). Those responses clearly show that the neuro has gained magical qualities, and confirm the strength of the brain scan as a "fast-acting solvent of critical faculties" (Crawford, 2008: 65). Two reasons have been sometimes suggested for such a fact (Weisberg, 2008): that people are intuitive dualists, and that they lack the resources to process scientific information and its media presentation critically. The problem with these two explanations is not only that they are patronizing, but that they follow the logic of the neuro by placing causes exclusively inside individuals's beads. A third reason concerns the prestige of the neuroimage, which has been connected to various factors: the general authority of the visual in contemporary culture; the privileging of images in medical diagnosis and as tools for com-

14 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega

piling and communicating information; the belief that scientific images represent reality in the mode of mechanical objectivity, and can therefore be onquestioningly trusted. Since tbe late 19m century, visuality has been equated with epistemic transparency, and its embodiments with the represented object's onmediated presence.' A major theme of studies on the image's authority is that of a tension between the transparent, objective, unequivocal and unmediated, almost non-representative character attributed to brain scans, and the technological, epistemic and social conditions that enable them. Numerous authors have pointed out the factors that give images tbat character, from technical and esthetic choices to the need for "skillful vision" and expert knowledge (e.g. de Rijcke and Beaulieu, 2007; Dumit, 2004; Joyce, 2008; Roepstorff, 2007). The tension between the putative transparency of the image and its "constructed" nature manifests itself in a variety of ways . Several scholars have pointed out the following paradox: On the one hand, research scien- lists downplay the visual and the pictorial, and emphasize the complex transformations of quantitative data as well as the choices that determine the final look of the images. On the other hand, especially when they assume public roles or intervene in the media, they play along with the taste for colorful images and the claim that images somehow represent mental life. Their rejection of "pretty pictures" interre- lates ambiguously with the iconic role of brain scans (Beaulieu, 2002; Joyce, 2005). The experimental situation embodies a related imbalance. In the same way tbat there is an incongruity between the mechanical objectivity often attributed to the image and the "subjectivity" involved in expert judgment, there is a tension between the procedures for insuring that tbe imaging experiment is carried out in appropri- ately neutral conditions, and the persistence of subjectivity in the lab at several lev- els. A subjective alliance between the scientists and their volunteer subjects - in the form of trust and commitment - is required for establishing the "script" that makes the experiment work and allows for the co-production of scientific facts that can be considered objective (Marcel, 2003; Roepstorff and Frith, 2004). The rhetoric of direct mind-reading contrasts not only with the complexity ofthe image-production process, but also with the dependence of imaging studies on a "relational neces- sity," on "lines of intimacy" between subjects and experimenters that are crucial for experimental success (Cohn, 2008b: 100).

Subjectivation and the Cerebral Subject The transformation of quantitative data into an image and its incorporation into the public realm involve yet other dimensions of subjectivity. On the one band, events on the visual surface of the computer screen are extrapolated into the brain (making it "light up" with intelligence, and "glow" with fear or desire); the organ is thereby personified and equated witb the person. On the other band, while in the laboratory

2 There is a vast literature on this topic; we may mention Cartwright (1995), Daston and Galison (2007), Joyce (2008), Kevles (1997), Van Dijck (2005). 15 Approaching the Neurocuitural Spectrum setting, the label that will characterize the scanned subjects (normal, depressed, doing this or that) is established before the scanning begins, popular accounts tend to suggest the images provide the label, thus turning a social process into the subject's essence (Beaulieu, 2000: 46-47). In addition to providing empirical detail about the historical, epistemic and social conditions of the rise of brain scans as modem icons, these two inversions may be considered from a more aerial viewpoint, as emblematic of the mechanisms constitutive of the cerebral suhject. We are aware that with an aerial view detail is lost; but in compensation an over- all pattern may appear, and while the pattern might be partly an effect of distance, it also helps describe and interpret the detail. In short, the metaphor of the "aerial viewpoint" is meant to suggest that the notion of a "cerebral subject" may help understand the neurocultural world as a landscape composed of many locations and topographies, but still endowed with a certain unity - that which comes from em- bodying a common anthropological figure. Our "subject" obviously differs from the transcendental subject of Kantian philosophy and phenomenology, as well as from the subject that, from Descartes to Husserl and beyond, has been understood mainly as self-knowledge and self-consciousness. The cerebral subject has no reality prior to its performative embodiments; in other words, the process of subjectivation has ontological preeminence, and that is why we focus on the notions, practices and contexts associated with it. Cerebral subjects sbape themselves and are sbaped through technologies of the self which are partly sustained by expert knowledge and its transmission in popular culture. They develop in the process of "making up people" (Hacking, 2002), with its two components: a labeling "from above" whereby experts define a category which individuals make their own, or which is imposed on them; labeled individuals creating a reality such that experts might have to rethink the label. This co- construction of categorical identity and personal identity is what Hacking (1995) calls the "looping effect ofhurnan kinds." A major example of such a process is the transformation of multiple personality into Dissociative Identity Disorder (Hack- ing, 1998). Thus, one way of restating the idea that there were no multiple personalities in 1955 but many in 1985, would be to say that

(i]n 1955 this was not a way to be a person, people did not experience themselves in this way, they did not interact with their friends, their families, their employers, their counsellors, in this way; but in 1985 this was a way to be a person, to experience oneself, to live in society. (Hack- ing,2oo6) Both advocates of Dissociative Identity Disorder, and sceptics who doubt that multiple personalities ever existed can agree with such a description (Hacking, 2006). The same applies to high-functioning autism, a description that does not constitute a DSM or ICD diagnosis, and whose overlap with Asperger's syndrome is unclear. In the framework of neurocultures, high-functioning autismlAsperger's syndrome has become prominent since people from the autistic community began

-- - Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega

to advocate "neurodiversity" (Silverman, 2008: 326-330). Only then has high-functioning antism become "a way to be a person." Tbe looping effect is sustained by medical, especially diagnostic developments, self-advocate groups, and a constella- tion of materials emerging from non-academic culture, such as movies, testimonies, blogs, and novels. Some autistic persons and groups become cerebral subjects as a consequence of their claims to neurodiversity, and of practices consistent with that claim. Designating oneself as neuro is part of "objective self-fashioning" (Dumit, 2004) - tbe shaping ofa self on the basis of expert knowledge, an understanding of subjectivity that derives from a scientific third-person perspective. As the neurodiversity movement illustrates, such objectivization sustains concrete ways of being a person, experiencing oneself, and relating to others (Ortega, 2009). We have just characterized certain people diagnosed with autism as "cerebral subjects" because they claim to be "neurodiverse," and engage in practices that are consistent with or dependent on that claim. The cerebral subject, however, is not wbat humans are by virtue of their "nature." Rather, it results from the "globalization of the American psyche," a process that includes the idea that mental illness exists in the biochemistry of the brain (Watters, 2010). Neurodiversity can only take roots in a world in which "mental disorders" have been redefined as "a diverse group ofhrain disorders that primarily affect emotion, higher cognition and execu- tive function" (Hyman, 2007: 725). At the same time, as we noted at the outset, no anthropological figure is monolithic and hegemonic, and individuals are generally not one kind of subject alone. On the one hand, different terms, such as "cerebral subject" or "neurochemical self' (Rose, 2003), can be used to describe the processes of subjectivation through biomedical and neuroscientific knowledge. On the other hand, there is a cohabitation of everyday ontologies, such that individuals shift registers in their ways of actiog, experiencing, interacting, and thinking and speaking about themselves and otbers. Do people really believe they are their brains? Some perbaps do, and yet "brain"often stands for "mind". Thus, the "neurobics" industry of the late 20th century puts the brain where tbe mind was, but its exercise programs reproduce many earlier prescriptions for mental gymnastics (see Ortega's chapter in this volume). Tbe brain, as physical organ, is therefore endowed with the sort of psychologi-> cal depth formerly attributed to tbe mind. "Brain," "mind" and their referents can coexist or stand for each other as if they were interchangeable or consubstantial. This might imply the reduction of mind to brain, but may also be an expression of the cohabitation of self-concepts, from the pychoanalytic to the cerebral, from the spiritualist to the neurochemical, which people may invoke when talking about themselves and going about their lives. This very coexistence of ontologies, both in society and in the individual, throws light on the expansion of the neurocultural universe. When a phenomenon or area ofknowtedge is "cerebralized," it does not ipso faCIO cease to be what it previously or otherwise was. In the already-mentioned neurobics industry, the ideal of "brain

17 Approaching the Neuroculturai Spectrum jogging" simply translates into training the mind; the mind is supposed to be what the brain does, but it is through the mind that neurobics seeks to improve the brain. Conflict of course also exists. For example, in a study of the online discussion group alt.support.depression.medication, anthropologist Emily Martin describes the clash between a dominant reductionist model of depression, and the participants who challenge the idea that the minds and experiences of people with mood disorders can be reduced to brain dysfunction. Thus, one member of the group, Haily, argues that depression "isn't a medical illness" but "a mental illness," and declares "[i]t's not all just science and mathematical equations." In depression, she writes, "[i]t's not just the chemical reaction, it's what 'causes' that chemical reaction, that should be addressed." Eric responds that putting "YOUR emotions into a mathematical equation" is ''very easy" since they "come from your brain." The debate degen- erates into obscenities, and in the end Haily leaves the group (Martin, 2009). In Jonathan Franzen's novel The Corrections, while Gary understands himself in neurological terms, and finds it hard "to believe that his problem wasn't neurochemical but personal," his wife Caroline wants him "to take responsibility" for his mental health by engaging in psychotherapy. The points of views clash, but do not cancel each other. The narrative highlights the sometimes difficult coexistence of the cerebral and psychological ontologies within the same social and existential space. The biomedical processes that shape our relation to ourselves as "somatic individuals" (Rose, 2007) provide favorable contexts for constituting neuroidentities through cerebral practices of the self, and for giving neurosociality an increasing visibility. A medical-physicalistic vocabulary (about risk and susceptibility, predic- tion and prevention, involving not only genomes but also cholesterol rates, muscu- lar tonus, physical performance, aerobic capacity, and other measures) popularizes and enacts quasi-moral norms, and provides classificatory and evaluation criteria. At the same time, social, religious, sport and sexual activities are reconceptualized and given new significance as health practices. Depending on the contexts, psychological notions of personhood may appear displaced by somatic "bioidentities" or individualities; as illustrated by the clash ofHaily and Eric, corporeal forms of subjectivation may take over intirnistic and intemalistic modalities of self-construction and description. Since the brain is both flesh and mind, everything pertaining in any way to ei- ther may enter into the cerebralization of personhood. The neurocultural universe is indeed expanding. Every day, websites, publications or events illustrate the anthropology of the cerebral subject and demonstrate its tentacular growth. This growth includes the critical voices of individuals who cannot be suspected of hold- ing grudges against neuroscience in general, including among others, an examina- tion of the "brain overclaim syndrome" in connection with criminal responsibility (Morse, 2006), a discussion of how functional neuroimages are systematically over-interpreted (Burock, 2009) and calls for caution in their translation to "real- world applications" (Schleim and Roiser, 2009), a study of "puzzlingly high cor-

18 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega relations in fMRI studies of emotion, personality, and social cognition" (Vul et aI., 2009), an overview of current "neuromania" (Legrenzi and Umilta, 2009), a neuropharmacologist's call to "stop the neuromadness" (Hasler, 2009), a strongly worded discussion of the "neurotrash" that makes up a large part of the neurocultural world (Tallis, 2009), and the development of the project for a "critical neuroscience" (Choudhury, Nagel, and Siahy, 2009) . • • •

The development since the 1990s of new disciplines with the prefix "neuro" (some of which we have mentioned) is a central neurocultural phenomenon. But since even to provide "glimpses" into it would require a separate volume, we have chosen not to devote individual chapters to any of those disciplines in particular. In exploring a world of unstahle borders, exhaustivity was out of the question - hence our deliber- ate choice to offer glimpses, with a diversity of fields of inquiry and empirical and interpretive approaches. Neurocultures is divided into four sections: "Practices of the Cerebral Subject," "Dynamics of Naturalization," "Cerebralizing Diagnostics," and "Art Facts, Science Fictions." Each has been tailored so as to explore different neurocultural problem-areas and significant neurocultural phenomena. l. Practices of the Cerebral Subject This section explores practices through which humans are shaped as cerebral subjects, and gives room to different contexts in which these practices take place - from popular culture to the laboratory. Of course, all forms of the cerebral subject may be characterized in terms of practices; this applies even to the most apparently theoretical or academic. The section is organized to map a range of contexts. While the two first chapters focus on cerebral practices of the self, the third one takes us into the experimental laboratory, and the fourth one examines media practices relating to neuroscientific research. In "Toward a Genealogy of Neuroascesis,' Francisco Ortega studies the development of cerebral practices of the self since the early 1800s. Neuroascesis, as he calls it, consists of discourses and practices aimed at acting upon the brain so as to maximize its performance. Although neuroascetic programs are often presented as deriving from recent neuroscientific advances, Ortega shows that, more than anything, they give an updated neuroscientific guise to forms of diet and exercise that date back to the 19· century. The discontinuity in the allegedly scientific foundations of neuroascesis masks a fundamental continuity in an ideology of the self as brain. In "Experimental Ethics and the Meditating Brain," John Tresch draws from an ethnographic study of Mind and Life, an organization that fosters dialogue between Western science and contemplative traditions, primarily Buddhist. Mind and Life

19 I 11

Approaching the Neurocultural Spectrum stands at the point of convergence of two important developments in the understanding and experience of the self in the U.S.: on the one hand, the rise of the ; neurosciences; on the other, a fascination with Buddhist cosmology and practices. : "Neurobuddhism" thus combines a commitment to centuries-old spiritual practices . with the belief that "the mind is wbat the brain does." i With Gesa Lindemann's "Neuronal Expressivity: On the Road to a New Natural- ness," we move into a different realm of practice: that of the neuroscientific experi- . mental laboratory. "Neuronal expressivity" designates recorded brain activitiesthat are treated as neuronal correlates of the inner states of an organism. Thus, ifneuro- nal expressivity could be integrated into everyday life, it would open up theroadto simple and pure, unmediated human interaction, and a perfectly transparent display of individuality. Belief in the purported readibility of the technologically exhibited self sustains much neuroscientific research, and contributes to shape imagesofthe self that acquire a life of their own beyond the laboratory. In "Neuroscience's Impact on Our Self-Identity: Perspectives from Ethicsand Public Understanding," Eric Racine and Zoe Costa-von Aesch chronicle themedia portrayal of neuroscientific research and its implications for self-identity. While the enthusiasm for neurotechnology points to future policy applications, twoother features of this literature - neuro-essenrialism and neuro-realism - highlightthe cultural presence of reductionistic views of what it means to be human, as wellas their potential ethical consequences.

1I. Dynamics of Naturalization This section discusses major areas related to how the neurosciences serveas the occasion and ground for naturalistic views of the human being. It approaches the long history of naturalistic arguments about the self without limiting it to the philosophy of science or the philosophy of mind. Although each chapter refersto philosophy, none offers a strictly philosophical argument; rather, they all engage "from the outside" with the foundations of such arguments. A fairly broad overview of the naturalism debates regarding brain and self is followed by a sociologi- cal perspective on the "social brain," and a more focused history ofthe revivalof hallucinogenic research since the Decade of the Brain. A fourth chapter thencon- fronts psychoanalysis and neuroreductionism as two major modem naturalistic perspectives, and a last chapter explores how neuroimaging studies tum a complex emotion (disgust) into a innate biological reaction independent of culture. Maurizio Meloni, in "The Cerebral Subject at the Junction of Naturalism and Anti-Naturalism," proposes a long-duree interpretation of the clash between these two perspectives. The movement "from mind to molecules" betrays the desire to substitute the neurosciences for philosophy as the dominant discipline to orient culture and society. Reductionistic naturalism has extended the symbolic dimensions of the brain, making it circulate not only as a scientific object, but also as a

,'---- b Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega philosophical, political, and moral entity. The brain thereby emerges as crucial for the construction of modern technologies of the self. Alain Ehrenberg's "The 'Social' Brain: Epistemological Chimera and Socio- logical Truth" argues that in order to understand the relationships between neuroscience and society it is necessary to consider naturalism not only as a philosophical idea, but also as a social concept. Neuroscience and its related neurocultures prosper in the social and moral context of autonomy as a value, where emphasis is placed on individual choice, initiative, achievement and self-ownership, and where everyone has to decide and act as a free entrepreneur of himself or herself. The chapter develops these points using the example of the neuroscience of em- pathy, and draws epistemological conclusions from the fact that the naturalization of subjectivity has taken the form of a social neuroscience or a neuroscience of the self. The public image of drug culture has been informed by comparisons with Al- dous Huxley's dystopian Brave New World (193 I). In "Political Neurotheology: Emergence and Revival of a Psychedelic Alternative to Cosmetic Psychopharma- cology," Nicolas Langlitz unveils a different Huxleyan connection. In the writer's later utopia Island (1962), "neurotheology" uses consciousness-expanding drugs to study the relationship between physiology and spirituality. This fictive science was actualized by researchers whose clash with the American Establishment led to the prohibition of hallucinogens and the breakdown of hallucinogen research. Since the I 990s, a new generation of scientists have revived the field and its Hux- leyan underpinning, while striving to overcome the antagonism between culture and counterculture. In ''Psychoanalysis and the Cerebral Subject," Jurandir Freire Cnsta, questions three basic weaknesses of the project of reducing subjective life to a pre- or extra- subjective status. The first concerns the goal of abolishing the subject's autonomy by identifying in brain mechanisms the factors that supposedly constitute the prime cause of individual behaviors. The second consists in the objectivist ideal which highlights the epistemological naivete of wanting to reduce to neural correlates the manifold character of human dispositions and behaviors. Finally, the third and most important weakness is the postulate of the self-sufficiency of neuroscientific explanations of mental phenomena. In "Visualizing Disgust: Subtractions and assimilations in the production of Neuroscientific Knowledge" Simon Cohn examines the neuroscientific study of disgust as an innate, universal emotion devoid of social and cultural context. The complex process of subtraction that is a crucial procedure of image production in fMRl serves to manipulate large amount of data to depict the isolated brain area associated with the emotion. The procedure presupposes that most mental states can be disaggregated into specific elements, and creates a kind of fiction necessary to establish a scientific claim and something the neuro-community will accept as

21 Approaching the Neurocultural Spectrum

a fact. In the end, disgust appears as an un-contentious and unproblematic object isolated from social and cultural influences and localized in the brain.

I III. Cerebralizing Diagnostics This section examines several instances of the transformation of diagnostic cat- I egories in cerebral terms. Such a transformation is a major feature of neurocultures. Nevertheless, Alzheimer's Disease, epilepsy and compulsive gambling are II three very different nosological configurations, and they are here treated in mark- I edly different ways. While the chapter on Alzheimer's Disease explores the human consequences of the extreme somatization of the condition, the one on compulsive gambling highlights the biologization of a complex of behaviors traditionally endowed with a highly social component. In turn, the study on the history of epilepsy examines how the disease functioned as a natural experiment that furnished the conditions of possibility for thinking of the human as brain. The final chapter of this section deals again with psychoanalysis as a major interpretation of mind and culture; the focus is not on particular diagnoses, but on what is at stake in the debates between proponents of neurological causality and proponents of psychoanalytic etiologies. In "Seduced by Plaques and Tangles: Alzheimer's Disease and the Cerebral Subject," Margaret Lock examines how, since its first description in 1906, the understanding of the nosology and diagnostic classification of the disease has changed considerably. Yet, in the postgenomic era of the early 21"-century, Al- zheimer's Disease continues to be understood primarily as a condition best tracked through the use of biomarkers, genotyping, phenotyping on the basis of cognitive testing, brain scans, and autopsies. After setting out this genealogy, Lock discusses why mind, emotions, and persons are chronically absent from this somatized professional discourse, and considers what this means for social science and humanist approaches to subjectivity and biosociality. In "On the political Economy of the 'Gambling Brain," Scott Vrecko turns to the case of pathological gambling as a means of investigating the interactions between society and the neurosciences. Compulsive gambling has been redescribed as an addiction-like brain disease, sharing an etiology with conditions such as drug or alcohol addiction, which were previously treated as distinct disorders. Although biology may be socially malleable, and politics may be biologized, the distinction between society and biology remains highly significant. Biological facts are powerful by virtue of their distinction from the social: pathological gambling as a fac- tual matter of neurobiology can be mobilized by the gambling industry precisely because those facts are understood to be a world apart from the social. Cathy Gere's '''Nature's Experiment:' Epilepsy, Localization of Brain Functi and the Emergence of the Cerebral Subject" traces the emergence of the cere subject in the laboratories, hospital wards and operating theaters where epil

22 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega was studied and treated. Focusing on the brain thought-experiments of analytical philosophy, popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Gere suggests that they derive from a long history of real human experimentation. The antiseptic space of rationalism turns out to be haunted by the specter of real human suffering. The philosophers's speculations were only thinkable by virtue of experiments ofa very different kind - a century of research into the localization of brain function princi- pally conducted on epileptic subjects. In his chapter "Looking for Experience in the Brain: Psychoanalysis and the Project of Naturalizing Mind," Benilton Bezerra explores the debates, within psychoanalysis, between partisans and opponents of an integration of neuroscientific knowledge into psychoanalytic theorization and clinical practice as a launching platform for a renewed discipline. These debates go beyond the epistemological level to involve philosophical assumptions, as well as discussions concerning psychoanalytic institutes, mental health institutions and public health policies. The chapter argues for a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to the relations between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences.

N. Art Facts, Science Fictions This section deals with artistic and fictional embodiments of the cerebral subject. The first two chapters are complementary: they deal with artists's engagement with images of the brain and the relationships of brain and self, one from the point of view of an artist telling about her own work and experience, the other from an art-historical and aesthetic viewpoint. The third and fourth chapters explore the brain in literary and cinematographic fiction since the 1930s, especially how fictional brains rehearse the dilemmas of the cerebral subject. In "The Physical Brain and the Sense of Self: An Artists's Exploration," Susan Aldworth describes a series of collaborative partnerships with doctors and neuroscientists, based on her experience of drawing and painting in operating theaters and angiography suites while observing procedures in the brain scanning unit in a busy London Hospital. Through a highly personal narrative, Aldworth explores questions about the relationship of brain and identity, and suggests how contemporary ideas about the nature of consciousness take shape not only in the works of philosophers and neuroscientists, but also in artistic productions that open up spaces for interdisciplinary dialogue. Pursuing Aldworth's path in an art-historical vein, and dealing partly with AI- dworth's work itself, Robert Zwijnenberg's "Brains, Art, and the Humanities" shows how artists's work with neuroimages and related materials provides, rather than straight answers about the relationship of brain and self, new ambiguities, paradoxes, and uncertainties. Unlike a scientific or philosophical argument, an art- work is allowed to be a locus of contradictions where opposites may coincide. Within tbe field of possibilities opened up by the visual register, an artist can try

23 Approaching the Neurocultural Spec/rom out different and sometimes opposing avenues for understanding the visualmean- ing of a brain scan as a new cultural visual experience. In "Larger Than Our Biologies: Identity and Consciousness in Contemponuy Fiction," Valeria Gennero focuses on the novelistic refashioning of current debates about brain and self, examining works by writers as diverse as Jonathan Franzen, Richard Powers and David Lodge. Their novels, despite obvious differences in both form and content, reveal a shared confidence in the ethical power of literature,and articulate modes of resistance to the reductionist view which tries to fit issuesof identity and behavior within a neurobiological mould. Fernando Vidal's "Fiction Film and the Cerebral Subject" focuses on threemov- ies where the brain appears as a central protagonist, and whose plots involvebrain transplantations and their consequences: The Man Who Changed His Mind(1936). Change of Mind (1969), and L 'homme au cerveau greffe (The Man With theTrans- planted Brain, 1971). The chapter examines ways in which these and otherfilms embody the tensions and ambiguities inherent in the notion that where the brainis, there is the person. It also shows how movies may question the dichotomybrain- body and other central tropes of the contexts, both philosophical and scientific, learned and popular, where the brain is given an essential ontological fimction.

24 Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega

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