Seeking a New Fiscal Transfer Arrangement for Nunavut
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A Critical Study of Canada Social Transfer As an Instrument of Social Policy
International Journal of Policy Studies Vol.7, No.2, 2016 A Critical Study of Canada Social Transfer as an Instrument of Social Policy Devi Roy Jawaharlal Nehru University, India Abstract The expansion of the federal role in social policy led to the development of a Canadian welfare state. The federal government funds the majority of social programmes through the mechanisms of Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and Canada Social Transfer (CST). The CST is the federal transfer payment programme in support of education, social assistance and social services, which includes early childhood development and early learning and childcare. The CST was initially combined with the CHT in a programme called the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) 1995. It was made independent from the Canada Health and Social Transfer programme on April 1, 2004, to allow for greater accountability and transparency in the social sector areas. As CHST was bifurcated into CHT and CST, the CHT is the largest major transfer and it provides funding for healthcare and supports the principles of the Canada Health Act to provinces and territories. The present paper attempts to analyse that CST is the primary federal contribution in Canada to provincial and territorial social programmes and is also an instrument of social policy. The federal transfer is an important instrument for the provinces and the territories for a social change. For the implementation of the policy, fund plays a crucial role. So from this paper tries to analyse the Canada Social Transfer as a key instrument of the social policy of 10 provinces and 3 territories. -
Report of the Council of the Federation Working Group on Fiscal Arrangements
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION WORKING GROUP ON FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS ASSESSMENT OF THE FISCAL IMPACT OF THE CURRENT FEDERAL FISCAL PROPOSALS MAIN REPORT JULY 2012 Confidential Without Prejudice Table of Contents: Summary of Major Findings 1. Introduction 2. Major Federal Transfer Programs – Context for Analysis 2.1. Recent History of Major Federal Transfer Programs 2.2. Major Federal Transfers going into Renewal 3. Current Federal Fiscal Proposals 4. Assessment of the Impact of the Current Federal Proposals 4.1. Canada Health Transfer 4.2. Canada Social Transfer 4.3. Equalization 4.4. Territorial Formula Financing 4.5. Combined Major Transfers 4.6. Federal and Provincial-Territorial Fiscal Balances 5. Additional Information Appendices Confidential Without Prejudice Summary of Major Findings The funding parameters for major transfer programs announced by the federal government on December 19th, 2011 will improve the medium and long-term fiscal prospects for the federal government. However, the amount of federal support associated with the announcement has made the provincial/territorial fiscal situation less sustainable and will result in a declining federal share of funding for provincial/territorial health care and other social programs. To estimate the fiscal impact on provinces and territories, the Working Group on Fiscal Arrangements developed projections of major transfer entitlements based on the December 19th federal announcement and a number of alternative scenarios. See full report for details. The fiscal impacts of the December 19th announcement will be as a result of: The lower CHT growth rate beginning in 2017/18 (from 6% to nominal GDP growth); Limited protection being provided for the move to equal per capita CHT cash in 2014/15; The extension of the “caps” on the Equalization Program until at least 2018/19. -
Paying for Canada
Paying for Canada by Sherri Torjman January 2014 Paying for Canada by Sherri Torjman January 2014 Copyright © 2014 by The Caledon Institute of Social Policy ISBN 1-55382-614-0 Published by: Caledon Institute of Social Policy 1354 Wellington Street West, 3rd Floor Ottawa, ON K1Y 3C3 CANADA Tel./Fax: (613) 729-3340 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.caledoninst.org Twitter: @CaledonINST Table of Contents The expenditure side of the equation 1 Transfers to Canadians and to governments 1 Table 1 2 Three major fiscal transfers 4 a. Canada Health Transfer 5 b. Canada Social Transfer 7 c. Equalization 8 Conclusion 10 References 11 The expenditure side of the equation Discussions about financing in Canada often focus on the revenue side of the equation. Federal revenues derive primarily from various sources of taxation including income tax, sales tax, payroll taxes (also known as payroll contributions) and corporate tax. The levels and mix of these taxes always seem to spark spirited conversations within and outside government. Both the volume and rhetoric heat up as elections draw near. This report does not deal with the revenue side of the ledger. It is not about how money comes into the government and how Ottawa uses the personal income tax system to deliver income benefits – the latter a crucial subject about which Caledon has written in previous reports. We have argued for a progressive income tax system, the removal or refundability of ‘boutique’ tax credits that favour the well-off and restoration of the two-percentage point cut in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) [Battle and Torjman 2011; Battle, Torjman and Mendelson 2011]. -
Women and the Canada Social Transfer
Women and the Canada Social Transfer: Securing the Social Union Shelagh Day and Gwen Brodsky The research and publication of this study were funded by Status of Women Canada’s Policy Research Fund. This document expresses the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official policy of Status of Women Canada or the Government of Canada. March 2007 Status of Women Canada is committed to ensuring that all research produced through the Policy Research Fund adheres to high methodological, ethical and professional standards. Specialists in the field anonymously review each paper and provide comments on: • The accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the information presented; • The extent to which the methodology used and the data collected support the analysis and recommendations; • The original contribution the report would make to existing work on this subject, and its usefulness to equality-seeking organizations, advocacy communities, government policy makers, researchers and other target audiences. Status of Women Canada thanks those who contribute to this peer-review process. Project Manager: Pam Roper and Jo Anne de Lepper, Status of Women Canada Publishing and Translation Co-ordinator: Cathy Hallessey, Status of Women Canada Editing and Layout: PMF Editorial Services Inc. / PMF Services de rédaction inc. For more information, contact: Research Directorate Status of Women Canada 123 Slater Street, 10th floor Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1H9 Telephone: (613) 995-7835 Facsimile: (613) 957-3359 TDD: (613) 996-1322 TABLE OF CONTENTS -
Reforming Equalization: Balancing Efficiency, Entitlement and Ownership†
Volume 7 • Issue 22 • September 2014 REFORMING EQUALIZATION: BALANCING EFFICIENCY, ENTITLEMENT AND OWNERSHIP† Bev Dahlby Distinguished Fellow, The School of Public Policy and Professor, Department of Economics, University of Calgary SUMMARY In this paper, we provide an overview of the equalization grant system in Canada and the issues that have been raised concerning the reform of the fiscal transfer system. Any reforms to the equalization grant system have to balance three concerns — “efficiency” effects that arise through federal financing of transfers, and the incentive effects on provincial fiscal policies, “entitlement” to reasonably comparable public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation, and “ownership” of resources and independence of fiscal policies by provincial governments. Five proposals for reform of the equalization system are discussed. With regard to the inclusion rate for resource revenues in equalization formula, we argue that the rate should be reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent and that ceiling on total equalization payments should be eliminated. We argue against the proposal to exempt from the calculation of equalization entitlements that are deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds because this would not reduce total equalization entitlements in present value terms, it would be complex to implement if it extended to all forms of savings by provinces (such as debt reduction), and it would not alter the resource rich provinces’ incentives to save more of their resource revenues. We argue against a proposal to reduce CHT and CST to provinces with above average fiscal capacities because this would reduce their incentive to develop and tax their resources, and it would be counter to the purpose of these block grants, which is to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and the provincial governments. -
Report of Auditor General of Canada—December 2008
2008 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons DECEMBER Chapter 1 A Study of Federal Transfers to Provinces and Territories Office of the Auditor General of Canada The December 2008 Report of the Auditor General of Canada comprises Matters of Special Importance—2008, Main Points—Chapters 1 to 8, Appendices, and eight chapters. The main table of contents for the Report is found at the end of this publication. The Report is available on our website at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca. For copies of the Report or other Office of the Auditor General publications, contact Office of the Auditor General of Canada 240 Sparks Street, Stop 10-1 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G6 Telephone: 613-952-0213, ext. 5000, or 1-888-761-5953 Fax: 613-943-5485 Hearing impaired only TTY: 613-954-8042 Email: [email protected] Ce document est également publié en français. © Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2008 Cat. No. FA1-2008/2-1E ISBN 978-1-100-10968-8 Chapter A Study of Federal Transfers to Provinces and Territories Table of Contents Main Points 1 Introduction 3 Focus of the study 3 Observations 5 Four major federal transfers to provinces and territories 5 Evolution of federal support for health and social programs 6 Program-specific transfers to provinces and territories 8 Types of conditions 8 Revisions to the transfer payment policy 11 Federal use of trusts 11 Significance of conditions 16 Imposing conditions is a policy decision 16 Conclusion 17 About the Study 19 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2008 Chapter 1 iii A Study of Federal Transfers to Provinces and Territories Main Points What we examined The federal government uses a number of mechanisms to transfer funds to the provinces and territories for general areas of spending such as health or for specific purposes such as improving infrastructure. -
Insight in Comparative Perspective September 2016 | No
IRPP Canada’s Equalization Policy Insight in Comparative Perspective September 2016 | No. 9 Daniel Béland and André Lecours Summary ■■ Equalization, a core program of Canadian federalism, uses federal government revenues to mitigate the consequences of fiscal disparities among provinces. ■■ Funding pressures change in response to circumstances, often creating significant political tensions between government over equalization entitlements. ■■ Drawing on experience with Australia’s Commonwealth Grants Commission, the creation of an arm’s-length agency to recommend the level of equalization payments would potentially depoliticize the process. Sommaire ■■ La péréquation, un programme essentiel du fédéralisme canadien, utilise des revenus du gouvernement fédéral afin d’atténuer les conséquences des inégalités fiscales entre les provinces. ■■ Les pressions fiscales changent en fonction des circonstances, une situation qui crée souvent des tensions politiques importantes entre les gouvernements pour ce qui est des droits de péréquation. ■■ En s’inspirant de la Commonwealth Grants Commission australienne, la création d’une agence autonome recommandant le niveau des paiements de péréquation pourrait favoriser une dépolitisation de ce processus. IN MID-MARCH 2016, just before the unveiling of the federal budget, Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall requested that the Trudeau government send back the money his province had contributed to equalization in order to help Saskatchewan through an enduring downturn in the oil industry. As he stated, “I understand the equalization formula is not likely to change anytime soon…But the federal gov- ernment could recognize that the formula is flawed by providing Saskatchewan with new economic stimulus funding at least equal to the amount they are taking in equalization.”1 Made during the 2016 Saskatchewan electoral campaign, Pre- mier Wall’s remarks point to long-standing frustrations about the functioning of the federal equalization program in wealthier provinces such as Alberta that do not receive equalization payments. -
Equalization: Financing Canadians’ Commitment to Sharing and Social Solidarity
Equalization: Financing Canadians’ Commitment to Sharing and Social Solidarity by Errol Black and Jim Silver ISBN: 0-88627-382-X March 2004 CAW 567 OTTAWA Equalization: Financing Canadians’ Commitment to Sharing and Social Solidarity by Errol Black and Jim Silver March 2004 ISBN: 0-88627-382-X Acknowledgements We are grateful to Elizabeth Beale, Larry Haiven, John Loxley, Todd Scarth and Alisdair Sinclair for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; to Ron Neumann and Rob Balacka of Federal- Provincial Relations and Research, Manitoba Finance, for making data available to us and for helping us to clarify certain technical aspects of the equalization program; to Anne Webb for copy editing and Doug Smith for layout and design of the paper; and to John Jacobs, Director of the Nova Scotia office of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and Wayne Antony, Acting Director of the Manitoba office of the CanadianCentre for Policy Alternatives. About the Authors Errol Black is a retired Brandon University Professor of Economics, and a City Councillor in Brandon, Manitoba. Jim Silver is a Professor of Politics at the University of Winnipeg, and Chair of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives-Manitoba. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES-MB 309-323 Portage Ave. Winnipeg, MB • Canada R3B 2C1 ph: (204) 927-3200 fax: (204) 927-3201 [email protected] www.policyalternatives.ca/mb Table of contents 1. Executive Summary..............................................................................................................1 -
Accountability with Respect to the Federal Social Transfer Was A
Accountability Regimes for the Federal Social Transfer Barbara Cameron York University Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 Annual Meetings Of the Canadian Political Science Association Vancouver, British Columbia June 6, 2008. Comments are welcome. Author contact information: Email: [email protected] Phone: 416 736-2100, x66623. Address: School of Social Sciences, Atkinson Faculty of Liberal and Professional Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3 Cameron – Accountability Regimes 1 Accountability with respect to the federal social transfer1 was a challenge for governments long before accountability became a buzzword of the new public management. The Auditor General has identified and forcefully criticized a lack of accountability with respect to the social transfer on several occasions.2 Importantly for this paper, nongovernmental organizations promoting the protection and expansion of social rights have also called attention to the weak accountability governing the social transfer. As an indication of the importance attached to accountability, several unions and other nongovernmental organizations went to court to challenge the failure of the Minister of Health to report adequately to the House of Commons on provincial compliance with the criteria of the Canada Health Act.3 The Canadian Association of University Teachers calls for accountability mechanisms for the federal social transfer for post-secondary education to ensure that provinces respect national principles and spend the transfer for the purposes intended.4 While calling for an increase in federal funding for child care services, the Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada (CCAAC) has insisted that federal transfers be accompanied by effective mechanisms to ensure provincial compliance with national standards. -
Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Canada
Institut C.D. HOWE Institute commentary NO. 431 Adaptability, Accountability and Sustainability: Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Canada Ever-rising federal transfers to provinces weaken accountability and fiscal discipline. Greater provincial reliance on their own revenue sources would strengthen the federation over the long term. William B.P. Robson and Alexandre Laurin The Institute’s Commitment to Quality About The C.D. Howe Institute publications undergo rigorous external review Authors by academics and independent experts drawn from the public and private sectors. William B.P. Robson is President and CEO The Institute’s peer review process ensures the quality, integrity and of the C.D. Howe Institute. objectivity of its policy research. The Institute will not publish any study that, in its view, fails to meet the standards of the review process. Alexandre Laurin The Institute requires that its authors publicly disclose any actual or is Director of Research at potential conflicts of interest of which they are aware. the C.D. Howe Institute. In its mission to educate and foster debate on essential public policy issues, the C.D. Howe Institute provides nonpartisan policy advice to interested parties on a non-exclusive basis. The Institute will not endorse any political party, elected official, candidate for elected office, or interest group. As a registered Canadian charity, the C.D. Howe Institute as a matter of course accepts donations from individuals, private and public organizations, charitable foundations and others, by way of general and project support. The Institute will not accept any donation that stipulates a predetermined result or policy stance or otherwise inhibits its independence, or that of its staff and authors, in pursuing scholarly activities or disseminating research results. -
The Constitution and the Sharing of Wealth in Canada
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SHARING OF WEALTH IN CANADA PAUL DAVENPORT* I INTRODUCTION The sharing of wealth among the provinces in Canada is one of the central parts of the country's federal system. Canada's provinces differ enormously in size, population, resource wealth, and income per capita, and some form of inter- provincial redistribution of revenues or income is essential to national unity. Moreover, the sharing of wealth has always been in part a constitutional issue in Canada. Sections 118 and 119 of the British North America (BNA) Act of 18671 included a specific statement of subsidies to be paid by the federal government to the provinces, with higher per capita subsidies to the Maritime provinces than to Central Canada.2 In the forty years that followed, the subsidies were continually changed until a 1907 amendment to the BNA Act set down a new scale. 3 The BNA Act also gave the provinces jurisdiction over spending on health, education, and welfare.4 As the importance of these areas of government spending expanded in the twentieth century, so too did the importance of revenue sharing, since the poorer provinces could fairly claim that their own revenue bases were insufficient to permit them to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in social programs. Thus it is largely for constitutional reasons that the current system of wealth sharing through equalization payments is often called "the glue that holds Confed- '5 eration together." There are two sections of the Constitution Act, 1982, which are of direct impor- tance to the sharing of wealth: Part III, on equalization, and Part VI, on natural resources revenues. -
Fiscal Transfers in Canada
Final, Unalterable (and Up for Negotiation): Federal-Provincial Transfers in Canada Trevor Tombe∗ University of Calgary August 2018 Abstract Federal transfers are a central but ever-changing feature of Canada’s federation. Despite early hopes that transfer arrangements were “a final and unalterable settlement” of provincial demands, complex economic and political pressures forced successive governments to negoti- ate. To explore this history and Canada’s various transfer programs, I compile uniquely detailed data from Confederation to today. Explicit transfers to provincial governments are large, but more equally distributed today than throughout most of Canada’s history. I also propose a uni- form methodology to quantify and analyze both explicit and implicit fiscal transfers. Overall, federal tax and spending activities redistribute just under 2 per cent of Canada’s GDP across provinces; but this too is less than any point in the past six decades. This data, analysis and brief historical review reveal why today’s transfer programs are designed as they are, what pressures they must withstand, and what future reforms might consider. 1 Introduction Federal transfers are essential to Canada’s fiscal landscape, and have been since Confederation. But achieving stable, equitable, and efficient arrangements is difficult. Canada’s original provincial subsidies were “in full settlement of all future demands on Canada,” according to Section 118 of the British North America Act. But as new provinces joined and special arrangements proliferated, the Constitution was amended in 1907 to enlarge the subsidies and to achieve (they thought) “a final and unalterable settlement of the amounts to be paid yearly to the several provinces”.