The British at Wei-Hai-Wei : a Case Study of an Ill-Fated Colony
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Lingnan University Digital Commons @ Lingnan University Theses & Dissertations Department of History 2-9-2017 The British at Wei-Hai-Wei : a case study of an ill-fated colony Rong KONG Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/his_etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Kong, R. (2017). The British at Wei-Hai-Wei: A case study of an ill-fated colon (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://commons.ln.edu.hk/his_etd/10/ This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. Terms of Use The copyright of this thesis is owned by its author. Any reproduction, adaptation, distribution or dissemination of this thesis without express authorization is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved. THE BRITISH AT WEI-HAI-WEI: A CASE STUDY OF AN ILL-FATED COLONY 1898-1906 KONG RONG MPHIL LINGNAN UNIVERSITY 2016 THE BRITISH AT WEI-HAI-WEI: A CASE STUDY OF AN ILL-FATED COLONY 1898-1906 by KONG Rong 孔榮 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in History Lingnan University 2016 ABSTRACT The British at Wei-Hai-Wei: A Case Study of an Ill-fated Colon 1898-1906 by KONG Rong Master of Philosophy In 1898, Russia, Germany and France forced the Qing government to cede them one territory each, which challenged the traditional predominance of the British in China. The British lost no time to acquire leased territories in the era of scrambling for concessions. Wei-Hai-Wei, an isolated leasehold in Northern China, was therefore occupied by the British. Two years after the takeover, Wei-Hai-Wei was transferred from the Admiralty and the War Office to the Colonial Office. However, the British invested little to construct this territory during its 32-year leasehold. Faced with limited funds, the Commissioner, James Stewart Lockhart, took several measures to develop the leasehold- all of which failed. The uncertain tenure of Wei Hai Wei, as many then policy-makers stated, played a very important part in discouraging Parliament’s financial support. Besides its intrinsic limits, the British policy and international factors also influenced the status of the colony. My research focuses on why and how the British changed their policy at Wei Hai Wei in its early days and what the Commissioner did to develop this colony. I will analyze the reason why Wei Hai Wei turned into an ill-fated and ignored colony of the British Empire. I argue that although the British kept the territory for 32 years in total (1898-1930), its development and future was mostly determined in its first ten years of leasehold. Researching the first decade of Wei Hai Wei can provide insight into British imperial policy in northern China in the late 19th and early the 20th century. CONTENTS LIST OF MAP, TABLES ………………………………………………………..…..ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …………………………………………………….…...iv INTRODUCTION ………………………………………..……………………….…1 CHAPTER 1. SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE CHANG OF THE BRITISH POLICY IN CHINA…………………………………………….…………….……...6 2. THE LEASE OF WEI-HAI-WEI, 1898..………………………………....13 3. ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGN AND TRANSFER IN WEI-HAI-WEI IN 1898-1902…………………….…………………………………………..37 4. JAMES LOCKHART’S STRUGGLE IN EARLY DAYS FOR WEI-HAI-WEI, 1902- 1906…………………………….………………...55 5. UNACHIEVABLE DREAM OF "A SECOND HONG KONG" ………………...………………………………….……………..87 CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………….………..107 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………….……110 i Maps, Tables Map Map of leased territory of Wei-Hai-Wei 1904 Tables Table 1: Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1901-1911 Table 2: Major Exports and Imports at Wei-Hai-Wei, 1902-1905 Table 3: Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1911-1931 ii Map of leased territory of Wei-Hai-Wei 1904 Source: Weihai Archive, No. 229-1-1546(1),China’s Holy Province: Shandong, 1904. iii Acknowledge I hereby thank all parties who have provided help to me during the research. The first group of people I would like thank is my two supervisors Prof. Lau Chi-pang and Prof. Han Xiaorong. They not only assisted me in structuring my thesis, but also suggested to me lots of useful historical theories and secondary literatures related to my research. Prof. Liu Shuyong provided me with an important information on how to do archive research before I went to the British National Archive. I want to express my appreciations to all professors of history department, scholars I met in the conference. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Zhang Junyong who sent me some invaluable documents when I was stuck in materials searching. Also those who provided me support when I visited Weihai Archive deserve my compliments here. I particularly thank Mr. James Fellows and Mr. Simon Case, who were my classmates at Lingnan University, for having devoted their valuable time in revising my thesis. I sincerely give a credit to them. I am solely responsible for all mistakes and misinterpretations in this thesis. iv Introduction This thesis tells the story of Wei-Hai-Wei, an ignored British leased territory, in its first decade leasehold. By examining Britain’s administration and policies in this leased territory, I attempt to examine British foreign policy in northern China in the late Qing dynasty. Great Britain occupied Wei-Hai-Wei as a leased territory from 1898 to 1930. Considerable documents have been made during its 32 years’ leasehold, which include reports on newspapers, remarks of politicians, and a series of investigation reports. However, these documents should be regarded as historical records, rather than academic research.1 Apart from the limited research results, studies on British rule in Wei-Hai-Wei remained unexploited until the period from 1998 to 2002, when the Weihai Archive copied the records of Wei-Hai-Wei’s leasehold from overseas sources and brought them back to China. By then, the history of the leasehold of Wei-Hai-Wei attracted the attention of the Chinese people, especially those in Shandong Province. Currently, from most of the research results presented as dissertations, very few monographs have come out. The major publications on Wei-Hai-Wei are the follow: Pamela Atwell’s British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers: the British Administration of Wei-Hai-Wei (1898-1930) and the Territory's Return to Chinese Rule firstly used substantial archive materials at the British National Archives, delineating the general situation during the 32 years of the British occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei.2 Atwell made the comparison between the way the British governed Wei-Hai-Wei and the Chinese governed after it retrieval. Unlike Britain’s mild administrative methods, Atwell points out that the Chinese reformers were more radical and earned little success in developing Wei-Hai-Wei. E-Tu Zen Sun's article, "The Lease of Wei-hai Wei," explores the responses of the Chinese officials to the British request of leasing Wei-Hai-Wei.3 She argues that 1 During the leasing period, the colonial government had annual reports every year, most of which were published in the next year. The contents of the reports were related to finance, public utilities, police, judiciary, education, economy, sanitation and special events, etc. of Wei-Hai-Wei for the whole year. They are very important historical materials. 2 Pamela Atwell, British mandarins and Chinese reformers: The British administration of Weihaiwei (1898-1930) and the territory's return to Chinese rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 3 E-tu Zen Sun, ''The Lease of Wei-hai Wei '', Pacific Historical Review, Vol.19, 1950, 277-283. 1 Wei-Hai-Wei was an attempt to win British support and bring Britain closer to the Qing government by those pro-British ministers in the Beijing court. In their "The British at Wei-Hai-Wei: a case study in the irrationality of Empire, " Clarence B. Davis and Robert J. Gowen claim that the British decision-makers occupied Wei-Hai-Wei irrationally, and their refusal to return it 30 years later was also an unreasonable decision.4 These are examples to demonstrate that the Empire’s irrationality was very prevalent within the British government in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Thomas Otte refutes such opinion in his "WEE-AH-WEE? : Britain at WeiHaiwei, 1898-1930" by analyzing the lengthy debates concerning the leasing and military significance of Wei-Hai-Wei in the Whitehall.5 Otte argues that the lack of proper policy-coordinating mechanism led to the ignorance of the leased territory at the end, thus indicating the strategic and systemic limitations of the British power in the Far East. Ian Nish also discusses this topic in "The Royal Navy and the Taking of Weihaiwei, 1898-1905, " and provides further discussion on the role of Royal Navy had played in the course of leasing Wei-Hai-Wei.6 He concludes that the acquisition of the leased territory was not for naval value, as little consultation had taken place before the Foreign Office made the request to China. In the article "Zhongying shoujiao weihaiwei zujiedi de jiaoshe (1921-1930)" [Interactions between China and Britain about the restoration of the leased territory Wei-Hai-Wei (1921-1930)], Li Enhan generally describes the rendition process between China and Britain, and argues that it was a political decision between China and Britain and the rendition concerned closely the relationship between the two countries.7 4 Davis, Clarence B., and Robert J. Gowen. "The British at Weihaiwei: A Case Study in the Irrationality of Empire." Historian 63.1 (2000): 87-104. 5 Thomas Otte, WEE-AH-WEE?: Britain at WeiHaiwei, 1898-1930. in British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: Influences and Actions.